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Název:
Johannis Wyclif Miscellanea philosophica. vol. II. De universalibus. Fragmenta. Notae et quaestiones variae. De materia. Now first ed. from the mss. Univ. Prag. IV. H. 9., and III. G. 10
Autor:
Dziewicki, Michael Henry
Rok vydání:
1905
Místo vydání:
London
Počet stran celkem:
236
Počet stran předmluvy plus obsahu:
XLII+194
Obsah:
- I: Titul
- IV: Obsah
- V: Předmluva
- 1: Edice
- 189: Index
upravit
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JOHANNIS WYCLIF MISCELLANEA PHILOSOPHICA. VOL. II. CONTAINING DE UNIVERSALIBUS FRAGMENTA NOTAE ET QUAESTIONES VARIAE DE MATERIA. NOW FIRST EDITED FROM THE MSS. UNIV. PRAG. IV. H. 9., AND III. G. 10. BY MICHAEL HENRY DZIEWICKI. LONDON. PUBLISHED FOR THE WYCLIF SOCIETY BY TRÜBNER & Co. PATERNOSTER HOUSE, CHARING CROSS ROAD. 1905.
JOHANNIS WYCLIF MISCELLANEA PHILOSOPHICA. VOL. II. CONTAINING DE UNIVERSALIBUS FRAGMENTA NOTAE ET QUAESTIONES VARIAE DE MATERIA. NOW FIRST EDITED FROM THE MSS. UNIV. PRAG. IV. H. 9., AND III. G. 10. BY MICHAEL HENRY DZIEWICKI. LONDON. PUBLISHED FOR THE WYCLIF SOCIETY BY TRÜBNER & Co. PATERNOSTER HOUSE, CHARING CROSS ROAD. 1905.
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Printed in Austria.
Printed in Austria.
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Contents. V. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p. VI. I. Manuscripts, Authenticity, Date . . . . . . . p. VIII. II. Analysis of the De Universalibus. . . . . . p. III. Analysis of the Fragmenta . . . . . . . . p. XXXVII. IV. Analysis of the Notae et Questiones Variae . . p. XXXIX. V. Analysis of the De Materia . . . . . . . . p. XL. De Universalibus . . . 1. . . . . . . . . . p. Fragmenta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p. 152. Notae et Quaestiones Variae . . . . . . . . . . p. 157. De Materia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170. p. 189. Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . P. Vindobonac, Carolus Fromme, typogr. C. et R. Aulae.
Contents. V. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p. VI. I. Manuscripts, Authenticity, Date . . . . . . . p. VIII. II. Analysis of the De Universalibus. . . . . . p. III. Analysis of the Fragmenta . . . . . . . . p. XXXVII. IV. Analysis of the Notae et Questiones Variae . . p. XXXIX. V. Analysis of the De Materia . . . . . . . . p. XL. De Universalibus . . . 1. . . . . . . . . . p. Fragmenta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p. 152. Notae et Quaestiones Variae . . . . . . . . . . p. 157. De Materia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170. p. 189. Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . P. Vindobonac, Carolus Fromme, typogr. C. et R. Aulae.
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INTRODUCTION. The present volume of Wyclif's Miscellanea Philosophica, which with the works already published contains all his philosophical writings, whether spurious, doubtful, or authentic, with the exception of his great work De Ente, is not less interesting than the first, but presents fewer new points of interest. All that I wrote concerning Wyclif's philosophy in my Introductory Essay to the first volume applies of course to the second, as it may also be truly said to apply to every one of his works. It will therefore be unnecessary to write a very elaborate Introduction; a few remarks concerning the manuscripts, their authenticity and date, and the analysis of the text of each work, seems to be sufficient. I would however point out, in regard to possible shortcomings and mistakes, that I have been still worse off for the editing of this volume than for the former one. In the first, it is true, De Actibus Animæ was copied from the only manuscript extant; but for the Repli- catio de Universalibus I had two, and for the De Materia et Forma as many as five manuscripts to consult. But in the editing of the present volume I have had in every case to do with unique manuscripts ; which of course immensely increased my labours and difficulties. Add to this the fact that the writing is in both MSS. very careless and illegible, as much so as (I will not say, more than) the worst specimens I have met with in Logica or elsewhere; and occasional slips will, I hope, be readily accounted for and forgiven. Mr. Matthew has, as ever, been ready with his unfailing help and suggestions, some of much worth, of which I have been glad and thankful to avail myself. My hearty thanks are also due to Dr. Furnivall, who though anxious to see the volume terminated as soon as possible, and doing his best to hasten its slow progress through the press, has nevertheless understood my position, and the conflicting claims of speed and thoroughness, which I have indeed attempted to conciliate as well as I could.
INTRODUCTION. The present volume of Wyclif's Miscellanea Philosophica, which with the works already published contains all his philosophical writings, whether spurious, doubtful, or authentic, with the exception of his great work De Ente, is not less interesting than the first, but presents fewer new points of interest. All that I wrote concerning Wyclif's philosophy in my Introductory Essay to the first volume applies of course to the second, as it may also be truly said to apply to every one of his works. It will therefore be unnecessary to write a very elaborate Introduction; a few remarks concerning the manuscripts, their authenticity and date, and the analysis of the text of each work, seems to be sufficient. I would however point out, in regard to possible shortcomings and mistakes, that I have been still worse off for the editing of this volume than for the former one. In the first, it is true, De Actibus Animæ was copied from the only manuscript extant; but for the Repli- catio de Universalibus I had two, and for the De Materia et Forma as many as five manuscripts to consult. But in the editing of the present volume I have had in every case to do with unique manuscripts ; which of course immensely increased my labours and difficulties. Add to this the fact that the writing is in both MSS. very careless and illegible, as much so as (I will not say, more than) the worst specimens I have met with in Logica or elsewhere; and occasional slips will, I hope, be readily accounted for and forgiven. Mr. Matthew has, as ever, been ready with his unfailing help and suggestions, some of much worth, of which I have been glad and thankful to avail myself. My hearty thanks are also due to Dr. Furnivall, who though anxious to see the volume terminated as soon as possible, and doing his best to hasten its slow progress through the press, has nevertheless understood my position, and the conflicting claims of speed and thoroughness, which I have indeed attempted to conciliate as well as I could.
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VI INTRODUCTION. I. The Manuscripts, authenticity and dates of the works. De Universalibus and Fragmenta take up from f. 193' to f. 259 of MS. IV. H. G. of Prague University. Notae extends from f. 1“ to the end of f. 4 (Univ. Prag. III. G. 10), with the exception of I and the greater part of 2°, which has already been published (see Note, p. 158). De Materia begins with f. 135“ of the same MS. and ends on f. 139b. A full description of both the MSS. will be found in the Miscellanea Philosophica, Introduction, pp. LXIX, LXX. As to their authenticity, we must first state that only De Uni- ver salibus and De Materia are noticed in Shirley's catalogue ; I copied the others in Vienna, on the chance that they might be portions of the lost works of Wyclif, and acting under Dr. Furnivall's advice. There are a few peculiarities, about De Universalibus which differentiate it from the other works of Wyclif. One is the great number of mistakes in grammar, some of which seem certainly ascribable to the writer and not to the copyist; another is the frequent recurrence of certain expressions (such, for instance, as cum tunc) which are rare in the other works. The writer's attitude towards the Roman Church (see p. 11, l. 30—35) and his assertion that God can, if He chooses, preserve accidents in being without their subjects (p. 78, 1. 29—33) — an assertion which Wyclif, even in so early a treatise as De Actibus Animae, assailed with great vigour — may also incline us to doubt whether this tractate was really by him, although by far the greater part of his philosophical system is to be found therein. But we recognize here, not only the doctrine, but the power and subtlety of Wyclif; and the old argument: If not by Wyclif, then by whom? naturally presents itself since we know of no Realist contemporary worthy of mention by his side. As to the above stated points, they are easily answered if we note (p. 137) that the writer excuses himself for his inexperience which has made him diffuse, and write, he says, “satis pueriliter". And a few lines lower he again alludes, not without a touch of pride, to his ce pueriles deductiones". If we assume that we have here Wyclif's very earliest work extant, mistakes of grammar, awkwardness of repeated expressions, orthodoxy as concerns Rome, and even his belief in “ab- solute accidents" are all explained. For my own part, I have no doubt that the work is authentic.
VI INTRODUCTION. I. The Manuscripts, authenticity and dates of the works. De Universalibus and Fragmenta take up from f. 193' to f. 259 of MS. IV. H. G. of Prague University. Notae extends from f. 1“ to the end of f. 4 (Univ. Prag. III. G. 10), with the exception of I and the greater part of 2°, which has already been published (see Note, p. 158). De Materia begins with f. 135“ of the same MS. and ends on f. 139b. A full description of both the MSS. will be found in the Miscellanea Philosophica, Introduction, pp. LXIX, LXX. As to their authenticity, we must first state that only De Uni- ver salibus and De Materia are noticed in Shirley's catalogue ; I copied the others in Vienna, on the chance that they might be portions of the lost works of Wyclif, and acting under Dr. Furnivall's advice. There are a few peculiarities, about De Universalibus which differentiate it from the other works of Wyclif. One is the great number of mistakes in grammar, some of which seem certainly ascribable to the writer and not to the copyist; another is the frequent recurrence of certain expressions (such, for instance, as cum tunc) which are rare in the other works. The writer's attitude towards the Roman Church (see p. 11, l. 30—35) and his assertion that God can, if He chooses, preserve accidents in being without their subjects (p. 78, 1. 29—33) — an assertion which Wyclif, even in so early a treatise as De Actibus Animae, assailed with great vigour — may also incline us to doubt whether this tractate was really by him, although by far the greater part of his philosophical system is to be found therein. But we recognize here, not only the doctrine, but the power and subtlety of Wyclif; and the old argument: If not by Wyclif, then by whom? naturally presents itself since we know of no Realist contemporary worthy of mention by his side. As to the above stated points, they are easily answered if we note (p. 137) that the writer excuses himself for his inexperience which has made him diffuse, and write, he says, “satis pueriliter". And a few lines lower he again alludes, not without a touch of pride, to his ce pueriles deductiones". If we assume that we have here Wyclif's very earliest work extant, mistakes of grammar, awkwardness of repeated expressions, orthodoxy as concerns Rome, and even his belief in “ab- solute accidents" are all explained. For my own part, I have no doubt that the work is authentic.
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INTRODUCTION. VII De Materia is so mutilated that it is difficult to form any judgment at all concerning it. Its authenticity, so far as I can see, amounts to this: We have no reason to believe that it is not by Wyclif, since it is his doctrine, and written in a style indistinguishable from his. It is true (see Note, p. 170) that a work ascribed to Johannes Huss de Hussynetz has the “incipit" and the first page, but the first page only, identical with this work. But Huss, as has been amply shown by Dr. Loserth more than once, was what we moderns would call a plagiary of Wyclif; and the circumstance that only the first page is identical seems rather to show that Huss borrowed it from the present tractate, and that this tractate is by his master's hand. Fragmenta, as I found when copying the last lines (p. 156, 1. 16—17) are by another author. Nevertheless, these fragments are quite in their place here. They were evidently written by some disciple, who in all probability copied them with insignificant additions from some of the lost works of Wyclif. Notae et Questiones Variae have about as much authenticity as De Materia, save that De Materia alone is mentioned in Shirley's Ca- talogue. A point in their favour is also the fact that one of these "Notae" is identical with one of the Questiones Tredecim, already pu- blished with De Compositione Hominis. We may set aside the question of the dates of these last short tractates as impossible to answer, but that of De Universalibus may be approximately fixed. Granting that it is by Wyclif, it is certainly earlier than De Actibus Animae, itself earlier than Logica. The admission of “ Absolute Accidents", already mentioned, which Wyclif combated during the whole of his subsequent career, seems to be a sufficient proof of this ; besides, there are indications here and there in the work that the cosmo- logical system of "punctal atoms", so carefully elaborated in Logica, which (as we have elsewhere shown) clashes with the idea of accidents separated from a substance and finally comes into collision with the doctrine of Transubstantiation itself, was not yet fully developed. As I showed in Miscellanea, vol. I, p. XXXIII, De Actibus Animae was not much, if at all, anterior to Wyclif's Mastership at Balliol College. It is very probable that the present work was written by him when an under- graduate; though of course the precise date cannot be ascertained.
INTRODUCTION. VII De Materia is so mutilated that it is difficult to form any judgment at all concerning it. Its authenticity, so far as I can see, amounts to this: We have no reason to believe that it is not by Wyclif, since it is his doctrine, and written in a style indistinguishable from his. It is true (see Note, p. 170) that a work ascribed to Johannes Huss de Hussynetz has the “incipit" and the first page, but the first page only, identical with this work. But Huss, as has been amply shown by Dr. Loserth more than once, was what we moderns would call a plagiary of Wyclif; and the circumstance that only the first page is identical seems rather to show that Huss borrowed it from the present tractate, and that this tractate is by his master's hand. Fragmenta, as I found when copying the last lines (p. 156, 1. 16—17) are by another author. Nevertheless, these fragments are quite in their place here. They were evidently written by some disciple, who in all probability copied them with insignificant additions from some of the lost works of Wyclif. Notae et Questiones Variae have about as much authenticity as De Materia, save that De Materia alone is mentioned in Shirley's Ca- talogue. A point in their favour is also the fact that one of these "Notae" is identical with one of the Questiones Tredecim, already pu- blished with De Compositione Hominis. We may set aside the question of the dates of these last short tractates as impossible to answer, but that of De Universalibus may be approximately fixed. Granting that it is by Wyclif, it is certainly earlier than De Actibus Animae, itself earlier than Logica. The admission of “ Absolute Accidents", already mentioned, which Wyclif combated during the whole of his subsequent career, seems to be a sufficient proof of this ; besides, there are indications here and there in the work that the cosmo- logical system of "punctal atoms", so carefully elaborated in Logica, which (as we have elsewhere shown) clashes with the idea of accidents separated from a substance and finally comes into collision with the doctrine of Transubstantiation itself, was not yet fully developed. As I showed in Miscellanea, vol. I, p. XXXIII, De Actibus Animae was not much, if at all, anterior to Wyclif's Mastership at Balliol College. It is very probable that the present work was written by him when an under- graduate; though of course the precise date cannot be ascertained.
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VIII INTRODUCTION. II. Analysis of the De Universalibus. Chapter I. (pp. 1—6.) Wyclif begins by proving the existence of Real Universals from the doctrine of Divine Ideas, or ideal archetypes of all created things, eternally existent in God. It is probable that this proof, placed first here, was also first in order of time amongst the reasons which led to his conversion to Realism from the prevailing Nominalism of the Oxford Schools. The discrepancy, not to say the contradiction, between the doctrine of the World of Archetypes (so general amongst the early Fathers that it was almost a dogma of the Church, so univer- sally admitted that St. Augustine did not hesitate to say : "He who denies them is an infidel") and the tenets of Nominalism, must have struck Wyclif from the first. For these patterns of things, or Archetypes, where and what are they? They are in God's mind, and therein endowed with eternal existence and reality ; they correspond to the many indivi- duals in the created world — the Ideal man to the multitude of created man, and so forth: therefore they are Universals. To deny them were to stand convicted of infidelity by the authority of Augustine; but as soon as Wyclif's youthful mind accepted them, he accepted them with all the consequences that he thought they contained. God certainly knows man not only as this or that particular man, but in his essence as a human being ; and all other beings likewise (p. 2, 1. 20 to p. 3, 1. 25). This cannot be identical with the essence of any individual as known by God, since it applies equally to all individuals, and they therefore cannot be its proper and distinct object. What then is that distinct object? It can be nothing else but Created Humanity, eternally known by God as Creatable Humanity. And if the Idea is of something, surely it is of something real ; and if the Idea of the Particular and of the Universal Man are distinct, no doubt the Particular and the Universal Man must be distinct also, unless we deny truth to these Divine Ideas (p. 3, l. 25 to p. 4, 1. 5). These, having for objects things which are distinct, must be distinct one from another, though not from God (p. 4, 1. 4—14); must be distinct from their objects, since the copy cannot be the same as the pattern (ib., 1. 14—22), and cannot be denied, if we admit that God knows all things from all eternity (ib., 1. 22—38). Chapter II. The Divine Essence is as it were a mirror in which all possible created things are reflected, and this reflection is the Ideal
VIII INTRODUCTION. II. Analysis of the De Universalibus. Chapter I. (pp. 1—6.) Wyclif begins by proving the existence of Real Universals from the doctrine of Divine Ideas, or ideal archetypes of all created things, eternally existent in God. It is probable that this proof, placed first here, was also first in order of time amongst the reasons which led to his conversion to Realism from the prevailing Nominalism of the Oxford Schools. The discrepancy, not to say the contradiction, between the doctrine of the World of Archetypes (so general amongst the early Fathers that it was almost a dogma of the Church, so univer- sally admitted that St. Augustine did not hesitate to say : "He who denies them is an infidel") and the tenets of Nominalism, must have struck Wyclif from the first. For these patterns of things, or Archetypes, where and what are they? They are in God's mind, and therein endowed with eternal existence and reality ; they correspond to the many indivi- duals in the created world — the Ideal man to the multitude of created man, and so forth: therefore they are Universals. To deny them were to stand convicted of infidelity by the authority of Augustine; but as soon as Wyclif's youthful mind accepted them, he accepted them with all the consequences that he thought they contained. God certainly knows man not only as this or that particular man, but in his essence as a human being ; and all other beings likewise (p. 2, 1. 20 to p. 3, 1. 25). This cannot be identical with the essence of any individual as known by God, since it applies equally to all individuals, and they therefore cannot be its proper and distinct object. What then is that distinct object? It can be nothing else but Created Humanity, eternally known by God as Creatable Humanity. And if the Idea is of something, surely it is of something real ; and if the Idea of the Particular and of the Universal Man are distinct, no doubt the Particular and the Universal Man must be distinct also, unless we deny truth to these Divine Ideas (p. 3, l. 25 to p. 4, 1. 5). These, having for objects things which are distinct, must be distinct one from another, though not from God (p. 4, 1. 4—14); must be distinct from their objects, since the copy cannot be the same as the pattern (ib., 1. 14—22), and cannot be denied, if we admit that God knows all things from all eternity (ib., 1. 22—38). Chapter II. The Divine Essence is as it were a mirror in which all possible created things are reflected, and this reflection is the Ideal
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INTRODUCTION. IX World. This must be admitted unless we refuse to believe in God's omniscience (p. 6, 1. 1—28). God's knowledge must be of something necessarily existing, since His knowledge exists necessarily ; if then this object be not the Ideal World, it must be the world as we know it, our world: but this does not exist necessarily. Each created being is distinct from others, and so has a distinct intelligibility; the Divine Essence cannot by itself be identical with all these different objects. As one seal stamps only one species of impression, so God must have other patterns besides His Essence to stamp the multitude of creatures with (ib., 1. 28, 29; p. 7, 1. 1—35). It is absurd to say that an Infinite Artist requires no model for His creations. On the contrary, the greater the artist, the more perfect his mental pattern is (p. 8, l. 7—15). Only in the case of a finite artist the mental pattern is not eternal; with the Infinite Artist, it is eternal or is not at all (ib., 1. 15—38). The distinctness of God's knowledge of all things in Himself implies a mul- titude of ideas ; if there were only a few, or one, the knowledge would be confused. And what of God's knowledge of things that never were, nor will be, but only might be? The object of that knowledge must be in Himself, or not exist at all. We must therefore admit an Ideal World, if we admit that anything can exist (p. 9, 1. 1—60). Note by the way that Wyclif here openly admits the possibility of things that never are nor will be. As we have shown elsewhere, this is in conflict with this more matured system. Even in the present work (Ch. XXI, p. 131) we find Wyclif asserting that every Universal must at some time or other exist in its own proper form ; and yet more clearly (p. 137) that every species must at some time or other really exist. He had not yet extended his conclusion to every possible particular being ; but the drift of his argument was already leading him that way. Chapter III. Wyclif here adds several remarks, designed to forestall objections which might be made to his doctrine of an Ideal World. It contains in itself a vast multitude of forms that differ really amongst themselves, and may therefore be called different realities in God; although the Catholic faith allows us only to call the Three Divine Persons Things (res). Their difference is not, like that of the Three Persons, a numerical difference (so at least I understand the term sup- positaliter, p. 10, l. 34, though it may be understood as a difference of subject, supposition), nor of essence, like that of God and His
INTRODUCTION. IX World. This must be admitted unless we refuse to believe in God's omniscience (p. 6, 1. 1—28). God's knowledge must be of something necessarily existing, since His knowledge exists necessarily ; if then this object be not the Ideal World, it must be the world as we know it, our world: but this does not exist necessarily. Each created being is distinct from others, and so has a distinct intelligibility; the Divine Essence cannot by itself be identical with all these different objects. As one seal stamps only one species of impression, so God must have other patterns besides His Essence to stamp the multitude of creatures with (ib., 1. 28, 29; p. 7, 1. 1—35). It is absurd to say that an Infinite Artist requires no model for His creations. On the contrary, the greater the artist, the more perfect his mental pattern is (p. 8, l. 7—15). Only in the case of a finite artist the mental pattern is not eternal; with the Infinite Artist, it is eternal or is not at all (ib., 1. 15—38). The distinctness of God's knowledge of all things in Himself implies a mul- titude of ideas ; if there were only a few, or one, the knowledge would be confused. And what of God's knowledge of things that never were, nor will be, but only might be? The object of that knowledge must be in Himself, or not exist at all. We must therefore admit an Ideal World, if we admit that anything can exist (p. 9, 1. 1—60). Note by the way that Wyclif here openly admits the possibility of things that never are nor will be. As we have shown elsewhere, this is in conflict with this more matured system. Even in the present work (Ch. XXI, p. 131) we find Wyclif asserting that every Universal must at some time or other exist in its own proper form ; and yet more clearly (p. 137) that every species must at some time or other really exist. He had not yet extended his conclusion to every possible particular being ; but the drift of his argument was already leading him that way. Chapter III. Wyclif here adds several remarks, designed to forestall objections which might be made to his doctrine of an Ideal World. It contains in itself a vast multitude of forms that differ really amongst themselves, and may therefore be called different realities in God; although the Catholic faith allows us only to call the Three Divine Persons Things (res). Their difference is not, like that of the Three Persons, a numerical difference (so at least I understand the term sup- positaliter, p. 10, l. 34, though it may be understood as a difference of subject, supposition), nor of essence, like that of God and His
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INTRODUCTION. X creatures. One is not the other, and they are therefore really different though in the same subject. They are identical with the Divine Essence by eternal communication (emanation?), and therefore cannot properly be called God, like one of the Three Divine Persons ; but this eternal communication of the Deity makes them to be God in a restricted sense. As Augustine says, they are Life in God; that is, they live in Him everlastingly (p. 10; p. 11, 1, 1—23). It is true that St. John Chrysostom punctuates this text differently; instead of 'Quod factum est in ipso vita erat", he joins "Quod factum est" to the preceding sentence, and begins another with “In ipso". This would destroy the effect of the preceding argument. But the Roman Church follows Augustine's punctuation. This would be decisive as fixing the meaning of the text, if meant as a dogmatic assertion, or even as an approbation of St. Augustine's view; if meant only to declare the probability of his opinion, we are free to assert it as true (ib., 1. 23 to end ; p. 12, 1. 1—5). I have already pointed out Wyclif's attitude of appeal to Rome on this point; though it must be added that Rome seemed to be in his favour, and orthodoxy was easy. Wyclif's comparison of the Divine Essence to a mirror found, it seems, more than one opponent; also his doctrine that the Ideas could in any way be identified with God. The image in a mirror is not its essence, but a mere accident. If these Ideas are God, they must be God formally, like the Word or the Holy Spirit; which would be a heresy. To this it may be replied that, distinct one from another, they all share in the Personality of the Word ; or that they all share in God's essence which is their subject, as corporality is the subject of igneity ; as fire is really a body, so the Ideal World is really God. Yet we must not conceive them as forms determining God's essence, since they are but the exemplars of creatures which He may create. If they are the forms of anything, it is of those creatures alone. They have no essence at all of their own, apart from that of God, and it is only as exemplars that they are conceivable (p. 12, 1. 5 to end; p. 13, 1. 1—29). Wyclif goes further. Every such Idea in God is the supreme measure (ratio) of existence of the creature whose exemplar it is, and every creature is identical with its own created measure of existence; a fortiori it must be identical with its uncreated measure (ratio). Therefore every creature, in so far as it is thus identical, is the Divine Life itself.
INTRODUCTION. X creatures. One is not the other, and they are therefore really different though in the same subject. They are identical with the Divine Essence by eternal communication (emanation?), and therefore cannot properly be called God, like one of the Three Divine Persons ; but this eternal communication of the Deity makes them to be God in a restricted sense. As Augustine says, they are Life in God; that is, they live in Him everlastingly (p. 10; p. 11, 1, 1—23). It is true that St. John Chrysostom punctuates this text differently; instead of 'Quod factum est in ipso vita erat", he joins "Quod factum est" to the preceding sentence, and begins another with “In ipso". This would destroy the effect of the preceding argument. But the Roman Church follows Augustine's punctuation. This would be decisive as fixing the meaning of the text, if meant as a dogmatic assertion, or even as an approbation of St. Augustine's view; if meant only to declare the probability of his opinion, we are free to assert it as true (ib., 1. 23 to end ; p. 12, 1. 1—5). I have already pointed out Wyclif's attitude of appeal to Rome on this point; though it must be added that Rome seemed to be in his favour, and orthodoxy was easy. Wyclif's comparison of the Divine Essence to a mirror found, it seems, more than one opponent; also his doctrine that the Ideas could in any way be identified with God. The image in a mirror is not its essence, but a mere accident. If these Ideas are God, they must be God formally, like the Word or the Holy Spirit; which would be a heresy. To this it may be replied that, distinct one from another, they all share in the Personality of the Word ; or that they all share in God's essence which is their subject, as corporality is the subject of igneity ; as fire is really a body, so the Ideal World is really God. Yet we must not conceive them as forms determining God's essence, since they are but the exemplars of creatures which He may create. If they are the forms of anything, it is of those creatures alone. They have no essence at all of their own, apart from that of God, and it is only as exemplars that they are conceivable (p. 12, 1. 5 to end; p. 13, 1. 1—29). Wyclif goes further. Every such Idea in God is the supreme measure (ratio) of existence of the creature whose exemplar it is, and every creature is identical with its own created measure of existence; a fortiori it must be identical with its uncreated measure (ratio). Therefore every creature, in so far as it is thus identical, is the Divine Life itself.
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INTRODUCTION. XI This argument may perhaps be put a little more clearly. There is something in common between a seal and the impression actually stamped upon it, and the seal is therefore identical with the impression to some extent. But if so far identical, it must also be in so far identical with the signet which gives the impression ; for that which is common to both copy and pattern must be the same in both (p. 13, 1. 29 to end; p. 14, 1. 1—4). The argument is subtle, but perhaps a little too subtle, and I suspect that the author's opponents would join issue with him on this point. If then we can say: Any creature in its ideal nature is God" can we conclude: 'Therefore any creature is God?" No ; for the usual sense of the words would mean that any creature is God without restrictions. When a restrictive term is used to qualify a term, we cannot conclude anything by eliminating this restriction. A man is a good burglar : we cannot thence conclude simply that he is good. And therefore if, by saying that a creature is God in a certain sense, i. e. in its intelligible being, we scandalize the weak, it is better to avoid saying so (p. 14, l. 4—30). The question, however, cannot be thus eluded, and no doubt Wyclif's adversaries urged the point more than once to the admission that, in a sense, any creature was God. The argument certainly seems to mean identity a parte rei. A being is identical with its own finite measure of existence; therefore it is also identical with its Ideal, or supreme measure of existence, in so far as there is something really common between the two. If Wyclif means this, he exposes himself to the objection: “Then, in some sense, we are really identical with God!" If he means only an analogy, or a figure of discourse, he escapes the difficulty, but his argument seems to fail. And indeed I do not remember to have met with the same line of reasoning anywhere else; it was probably abandoned later for the notion of Transcendental Entity, common both to God and the Creature, but in two different and only analogical senses. To the objection just noted, our author replies: It is strange that modern logicians and theologians should be so squeamish about this identity of merely ideal existence, when, according to them, the Word might assume, not only the nature of man, but that of a brute ; and an ass might be God. And since (again according to them) all things are necessary in God, and what is necessary must be true, then an ass
INTRODUCTION. XI This argument may perhaps be put a little more clearly. There is something in common between a seal and the impression actually stamped upon it, and the seal is therefore identical with the impression to some extent. But if so far identical, it must also be in so far identical with the signet which gives the impression ; for that which is common to both copy and pattern must be the same in both (p. 13, 1. 29 to end; p. 14, 1. 1—4). The argument is subtle, but perhaps a little too subtle, and I suspect that the author's opponents would join issue with him on this point. If then we can say: Any creature in its ideal nature is God" can we conclude: 'Therefore any creature is God?" No ; for the usual sense of the words would mean that any creature is God without restrictions. When a restrictive term is used to qualify a term, we cannot conclude anything by eliminating this restriction. A man is a good burglar : we cannot thence conclude simply that he is good. And therefore if, by saying that a creature is God in a certain sense, i. e. in its intelligible being, we scandalize the weak, it is better to avoid saying so (p. 14, l. 4—30). The question, however, cannot be thus eluded, and no doubt Wyclif's adversaries urged the point more than once to the admission that, in a sense, any creature was God. The argument certainly seems to mean identity a parte rei. A being is identical with its own finite measure of existence; therefore it is also identical with its Ideal, or supreme measure of existence, in so far as there is something really common between the two. If Wyclif means this, he exposes himself to the objection: “Then, in some sense, we are really identical with God!" If he means only an analogy, or a figure of discourse, he escapes the difficulty, but his argument seems to fail. And indeed I do not remember to have met with the same line of reasoning anywhere else; it was probably abandoned later for the notion of Transcendental Entity, common both to God and the Creature, but in two different and only analogical senses. To the objection just noted, our author replies: It is strange that modern logicians and theologians should be so squeamish about this identity of merely ideal existence, when, according to them, the Word might assume, not only the nature of man, but that of a brute ; and an ass might be God. And since (again according to them) all things are necessary in God, and what is necessary must be true, then an ass
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XII INTRODUCTION. is necessarily God! (p. 14, l. 30 to end; p. 15, l. 1—20). It is impossible to know who were the 'modern logicians and theologians' against whom this sharp retort was directed. If we consult St. Thomas (Sum. Theol. p. III., qu. 4, art. 1. Ad secundum) we find that he denies that brutes are 'assumptible' by any Divine Person. What is not capable of a lesser perfection, is not capable of a greater. A body incapable of sensitive life must also be incapable of reason. Brutes are incapable of being united to God by knowing and loving Him ; therefore they must be incapable of the infinitely greater hypostatic union. The argument would seem to imply absolute impossibility. But St. Thomas only concludes: “Creatura rationalis ... non habet congruitatem ..." thus leaving in doubt the question whether the 'assumption' is or is not impossible to God's absolute power. I must add, however, that I have only been able to consult the Summa Theologica. It is well known that theologians do not like to ascribe any bounds to God's omnipotence short of the clearest contradiction in terms, and they distinguish carefully between potentia absoluta' and the potentia ordinata' or controlled by Infinite Wisdom. For myself, I do not see that anything implying the negation of Infinite Wisdom fails to be a contradiction in terms ; for it would amount to the denial of God's existence. Chapter IV. The beauty of the Ideal World is God's own beauty ; therefore infinite. An existing creature is not infinitely beautiful, and in this sense is not identical with its Ideal and Eternal exemplar. But it is notwithstanding eternally intelligible; and this eternal intelligibility, existing before its temporal entity, really belongs to it, though not quà temporally existing. It is therefore true to say that the ass is its Idea, is eternal, infinitely beautiful, etc. if we keep cautiously to the sense in which this is true, and avoid scandalizing those who cannot or will not understand this doctrine. On one hand, the being of the ass, as existing hic et nunc, differs from its Ideal Form; on the other, as eternally intelligible, it is the same (p. 16—19, 1. 10). There are dialectical difficulties in the way, but they are not insurmountable (p. 19, 1. 10—29). Are these Ideals absolute or relative forms ? Absolute, since their existing copies are absolute. If relative, they would be relative to their copies alone ; and this cannot be, since the accident of the existence of their copies makes no difference in their own entity. Besides, we cannot class them with relations, which are the most imperfect of all
XII INTRODUCTION. is necessarily God! (p. 14, l. 30 to end; p. 15, l. 1—20). It is impossible to know who were the 'modern logicians and theologians' against whom this sharp retort was directed. If we consult St. Thomas (Sum. Theol. p. III., qu. 4, art. 1. Ad secundum) we find that he denies that brutes are 'assumptible' by any Divine Person. What is not capable of a lesser perfection, is not capable of a greater. A body incapable of sensitive life must also be incapable of reason. Brutes are incapable of being united to God by knowing and loving Him ; therefore they must be incapable of the infinitely greater hypostatic union. The argument would seem to imply absolute impossibility. But St. Thomas only concludes: “Creatura rationalis ... non habet congruitatem ..." thus leaving in doubt the question whether the 'assumption' is or is not impossible to God's absolute power. I must add, however, that I have only been able to consult the Summa Theologica. It is well known that theologians do not like to ascribe any bounds to God's omnipotence short of the clearest contradiction in terms, and they distinguish carefully between potentia absoluta' and the potentia ordinata' or controlled by Infinite Wisdom. For myself, I do not see that anything implying the negation of Infinite Wisdom fails to be a contradiction in terms ; for it would amount to the denial of God's existence. Chapter IV. The beauty of the Ideal World is God's own beauty ; therefore infinite. An existing creature is not infinitely beautiful, and in this sense is not identical with its Ideal and Eternal exemplar. But it is notwithstanding eternally intelligible; and this eternal intelligibility, existing before its temporal entity, really belongs to it, though not quà temporally existing. It is therefore true to say that the ass is its Idea, is eternal, infinitely beautiful, etc. if we keep cautiously to the sense in which this is true, and avoid scandalizing those who cannot or will not understand this doctrine. On one hand, the being of the ass, as existing hic et nunc, differs from its Ideal Form; on the other, as eternally intelligible, it is the same (p. 16—19, 1. 10). There are dialectical difficulties in the way, but they are not insurmountable (p. 19, 1. 10—29). Are these Ideals absolute or relative forms ? Absolute, since their existing copies are absolute. If relative, they would be relative to their copies alone ; and this cannot be, since the accident of the existence of their copies makes no difference in their own entity. Besides, we cannot class them with relations, which are the most imperfect of all
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INTRODUCTION. XIII entities, since they are infinitely real and beautiful and perfect (p. 19, l. 29 to end; p. 20, l. 29). Has everything that we can conceive a separate Idea? If so, to each of the infinite degrees of heat, cold, etc. which are possible, we can conceive a separate corresponding Divine Idea. But these degrees are not infinite ; we must admit in each genus one which is the highest possible, and comprises all the others; and it is to this one that the Idea corresponds. For wherever we think of more and less, we also think of most (p. 20, l. 29 to end of chapter). Here it may be allowed to extend the old Scholastic argument given briefly in the text, in order to make out Wyclif's meaning more thoroughly. Take, for instance, the term strong ; A und B are both strong, but A is stronger than B. What does this mean but that of all the possible members of the class A and B, A is the strongest? Say now that strong is not restricted to A and B, but includes a third, C; either C is not so strong as B (in which case A is still the strongest of the class A, B and C) or as strong (in which case A and C are together the strongest members of that class) or lastly C is stronger than A, and C is the strongest member of the class. We may increase the class of beings that are strong', to any extent, and we shall always find that, if we admit the notion of more and less, one stronger than another, the notion of most necessarily follows, in the sense of that than which none is stronger'. Obviously this line of argument is employable whenever the idea of more or less occurs, con- nected with other terms, and no matter how many individuals the class contains. Thus, if we take it that some men are more intelligent than others from a given fixed point of view, and we take the class of all men at present existing', there will be one man (or several men) most intelligent of all in the sense I have given. Similarly, if we take the class of 'all men that have lived, live, or will live'. And lastly it will also be true if we take the class of 'all men that have lived, live, or will or might live under any conceivable circumstances'. In every case, more implies a most. This is extremely important for any student of Scholastic Theology, for it gives the key to several demonstrations, espe- cially to one concerning the existence and the attributes of God. (See St. Thomas, Sum. Theol. 1° P. qu. II, art. 3 in corp. art. "Quarta via, etc.") Chapter V. Hitherto Wyclif, discussing only the Ideal World, of which the reality is not distinct from that of God, was not dealing with
INTRODUCTION. XIII entities, since they are infinitely real and beautiful and perfect (p. 19, l. 29 to end; p. 20, l. 29). Has everything that we can conceive a separate Idea? If so, to each of the infinite degrees of heat, cold, etc. which are possible, we can conceive a separate corresponding Divine Idea. But these degrees are not infinite ; we must admit in each genus one which is the highest possible, and comprises all the others; and it is to this one that the Idea corresponds. For wherever we think of more and less, we also think of most (p. 20, l. 29 to end of chapter). Here it may be allowed to extend the old Scholastic argument given briefly in the text, in order to make out Wyclif's meaning more thoroughly. Take, for instance, the term strong ; A und B are both strong, but A is stronger than B. What does this mean but that of all the possible members of the class A and B, A is the strongest? Say now that strong is not restricted to A and B, but includes a third, C; either C is not so strong as B (in which case A is still the strongest of the class A, B and C) or as strong (in which case A and C are together the strongest members of that class) or lastly C is stronger than A, and C is the strongest member of the class. We may increase the class of beings that are strong', to any extent, and we shall always find that, if we admit the notion of more and less, one stronger than another, the notion of most necessarily follows, in the sense of that than which none is stronger'. Obviously this line of argument is employable whenever the idea of more or less occurs, con- nected with other terms, and no matter how many individuals the class contains. Thus, if we take it that some men are more intelligent than others from a given fixed point of view, and we take the class of all men at present existing', there will be one man (or several men) most intelligent of all in the sense I have given. Similarly, if we take the class of 'all men that have lived, live, or will live'. And lastly it will also be true if we take the class of 'all men that have lived, live, or will or might live under any conceivable circumstances'. In every case, more implies a most. This is extremely important for any student of Scholastic Theology, for it gives the key to several demonstrations, espe- cially to one concerning the existence and the attributes of God. (See St. Thomas, Sum. Theol. 1° P. qu. II, art. 3 in corp. art. "Quarta via, etc.") Chapter V. Hitherto Wyclif, discussing only the Ideal World, of which the reality is not distinct from that of God, was not dealing with
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XIV INTRODUCTION. Real Universals properly so called; for God's Ideas are not only real beings in a very peculiar sense, but they are also Universals in a very peculiar sense, i. e. because they influence the existence of many par- ticulars as their archetypes. He now proceeds to prove the Universals proper, viz., those which exist in created things. Everything good is good and pleasing to God. He sees it and wills it. But what is it then that He sees and wills ? No answer can be given to this question, other than : That common goodness which is in all creatures. If we do not admit any common goodness, then God sees nothing that is common to all ; the proposition that "Everything good is good" becomes unmeaning; and yet it is necessarily true. If, on the contrary, we admit a common goodness which is in every created nature as such, we shall by a like reasoning be forced to admit a common humanity in all men, and so forth. And a denial would subvert the whole of our Catholic faith and practice, and even obedience to the King (p. 23—25, 1. 9). Again, if the Scholastic axiom, that Every Being is good, be true, it follows that universal goodness belongs to Being. This, known by God, and including His own goodness, is something neither created nor increate, but abstracted from the idea of God and of His creatures; if abstract, then universal (p. 25, 1. 9—28). Besides, it is absurd to say that our knowledge of Nature extends only to the propositions made concerning it; we must know what the propositions signifiy. Now this is in every case something universal. And even in practical matters, we know that a groat is worth more than a farthing. This is not only a knowledge of the proposition, but of the Universals, Every groat, and Every farthing. A man is universally and really an animal: can this be, without animal being something universal and real? No more than there can be mighty labour without might. 'A man being an animal' depends on 'All men being animals' (cf. Repli- catio de Universalibus, W's Miscell. Phil. vol. I, p. 133); and this is the dependency of the Particular upon the Universal. We know this by the dependency of one proposition upon another ; God knows it without their aid, and directly. If one man had nothing really in common with another, all men would be as different from each other as men are from stones. Resemblance cannot proceed from mere particularity, which only makes one thing not to be another (p. 25, 1. 28 to p. 27, 1. 34).
XIV INTRODUCTION. Real Universals properly so called; for God's Ideas are not only real beings in a very peculiar sense, but they are also Universals in a very peculiar sense, i. e. because they influence the existence of many par- ticulars as their archetypes. He now proceeds to prove the Universals proper, viz., those which exist in created things. Everything good is good and pleasing to God. He sees it and wills it. But what is it then that He sees and wills ? No answer can be given to this question, other than : That common goodness which is in all creatures. If we do not admit any common goodness, then God sees nothing that is common to all ; the proposition that "Everything good is good" becomes unmeaning; and yet it is necessarily true. If, on the contrary, we admit a common goodness which is in every created nature as such, we shall by a like reasoning be forced to admit a common humanity in all men, and so forth. And a denial would subvert the whole of our Catholic faith and practice, and even obedience to the King (p. 23—25, 1. 9). Again, if the Scholastic axiom, that Every Being is good, be true, it follows that universal goodness belongs to Being. This, known by God, and including His own goodness, is something neither created nor increate, but abstracted from the idea of God and of His creatures; if abstract, then universal (p. 25, 1. 9—28). Besides, it is absurd to say that our knowledge of Nature extends only to the propositions made concerning it; we must know what the propositions signifiy. Now this is in every case something universal. And even in practical matters, we know that a groat is worth more than a farthing. This is not only a knowledge of the proposition, but of the Universals, Every groat, and Every farthing. A man is universally and really an animal: can this be, without animal being something universal and real? No more than there can be mighty labour without might. 'A man being an animal' depends on 'All men being animals' (cf. Repli- catio de Universalibus, W's Miscell. Phil. vol. I, p. 133); and this is the dependency of the Particular upon the Universal. We know this by the dependency of one proposition upon another ; God knows it without their aid, and directly. If one man had nothing really in common with another, all men would be as different from each other as men are from stones. Resemblance cannot proceed from mere particularity, which only makes one thing not to be another (p. 25, 1. 28 to p. 27, 1. 34).
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INTRODUCTION. XV Moreover, to deny Universals is to deny Scripture. In Genesis it is said that God created animals in their genera and species. This cannot mean 'according to their Archetypes', since 'in' is not synonymous with according to'. Nor does it mean our ideas or the words we use to signify them; nor the multitude of particular animals that have existed or will exist, since God did not create them all at that time. The words must stand for the essential resemblances of things, which are in the things, and afford a foundation for classification ; if not, they are utterly unmeaning (p. 27, l. 34 to end of chapter). Chapter VI. Universals are thus the intrinsic formal causes of par- ticular beings. If it seems hard to think that one formal cause can exist identically in many particulars, remember that many such particulars may have one and the same efficient, final and material cause: why make an exception for formal causes alone? The adversaries will here quote Aristotle : Form is that which separates and distinguishes. This is true ; but form separates those things which have it from those which have it not; it joins together all those of the same species. As we know, the loss of a form entails separation and dissolution in the beings which lose it. Those who say that a form cannot exist in more than one being would curtail God's Omnipotence. Not only one particular fire but all fire is fire ; every peasant knows that, and thus tacitly admits a universal Form of igneity. He does not indeed explicitly assert it, nor does he know anything about the proposition affirming it ; all the same he knows perfectly well that the thing is true. And even learned men who verb- ally deny the existence of Universals are often forced to admit them as a matter of fact (p. 29—p. 31, 1. 28). Indeed, a universal fact (All fire is fire) is more certainly known than its particular (This fire is fire) ; and if it were not so, no principle of science would be more self-evident than the particulars deduced there- from. In fact, those principles would be no more than mere aggregates of particular propositions, and there would be no inference at all. But they exist, and whether known and uttered by us or not, they are inde- pendent of the facts which they determine. Really, there is no need to prove this, nor is it possible to reason with an adversary who denies the objective existence of light, colour, sound, etc. Being in general, and sensible Being in particular, once admitted, open the door to the ad- mission of the Universal. To deny it is like denying the Principle of
INTRODUCTION. XV Moreover, to deny Universals is to deny Scripture. In Genesis it is said that God created animals in their genera and species. This cannot mean 'according to their Archetypes', since 'in' is not synonymous with according to'. Nor does it mean our ideas or the words we use to signify them; nor the multitude of particular animals that have existed or will exist, since God did not create them all at that time. The words must stand for the essential resemblances of things, which are in the things, and afford a foundation for classification ; if not, they are utterly unmeaning (p. 27, l. 34 to end of chapter). Chapter VI. Universals are thus the intrinsic formal causes of par- ticular beings. If it seems hard to think that one formal cause can exist identically in many particulars, remember that many such particulars may have one and the same efficient, final and material cause: why make an exception for formal causes alone? The adversaries will here quote Aristotle : Form is that which separates and distinguishes. This is true ; but form separates those things which have it from those which have it not; it joins together all those of the same species. As we know, the loss of a form entails separation and dissolution in the beings which lose it. Those who say that a form cannot exist in more than one being would curtail God's Omnipotence. Not only one particular fire but all fire is fire ; every peasant knows that, and thus tacitly admits a universal Form of igneity. He does not indeed explicitly assert it, nor does he know anything about the proposition affirming it ; all the same he knows perfectly well that the thing is true. And even learned men who verb- ally deny the existence of Universals are often forced to admit them as a matter of fact (p. 29—p. 31, 1. 28). Indeed, a universal fact (All fire is fire) is more certainly known than its particular (This fire is fire) ; and if it were not so, no principle of science would be more self-evident than the particulars deduced there- from. In fact, those principles would be no more than mere aggregates of particular propositions, and there would be no inference at all. But they exist, and whether known and uttered by us or not, they are inde- pendent of the facts which they determine. Really, there is no need to prove this, nor is it possible to reason with an adversary who denies the objective existence of light, colour, sound, etc. Being in general, and sensible Being in particular, once admitted, open the door to the ad- mission of the Universal. To deny it is like denying the Principle of
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XVI INTRODUCTION. Contradiction; the denial is merely verbal, not real. Our own nature irresistibly impels us to admit the Universals; and since we cannot destroy nature, why not yield to it? (p. 31, l. 28 to end of chapter). Chapter VII. We have then Universal Entity, first object of the mind, predicated in many and of many subjects, yet not belonging to any of the five Predicables (Genus, Species, Difference, Property, and Accident) though more truly existing in its subjects than any of these; and also, by that same existence in a subject, distinct from the Ideal Exemplars, which have no such formal existence. As God is a common Form in the Three Divine Persons, so Entity is a common form in every without exception (p. 33). — In the marginal notes I put inadver- being tently, “Somewhat like the Deity", etc. I now think that the restriction ought to be erased ; and indeed there is nothing in the text to imply any restriction. If we go through Wyclif's philosophical works, we shall always find him consistently defending his position by reference to the Divine Essence and the Holy Trinity. The genesis of his system may perhaps be stated thus. He had arrived at the conviction that there are Real Universals, and Entity, the most universal of all ; the subordinate Universals are distinct one from another somehow, and somehow from the supreme Universal, Entity. What was the distinction, and how was it to be understood so as neither to fall into Pantheism on one hand, non to the denial of reality to the Universals on the other? Here Wyclif bethought him of the mystery of the Holy Trinity, in which the Divine Essence is each of the Three Persons, distinct therefrom only by a logical distinction (distinctio rationis), whilst the Three are really distinct from each other, though One in the Unity of God. If (we may suppose he thought) Entity is assumed as the common form of all beings, God and His creatures alike, which are notwithstanding really different from each other, as the Father is different from the Son, we have a stand- point that is impregnable, since any argument to prove that such a distinction is absurd would be tantamount to a denial of the doctrine of the Church. As there are Three Persons in One God, so there are many particulars and One Being. He thus avoided saying that 'Man is God', since (in his view) there is the same relation between Man and God, as between the Father and the Son; now the Father is not the Son. Yet they are both the same Being, just as both the Father and the Son are God. This of course was open to the objection that he
XVI INTRODUCTION. Contradiction; the denial is merely verbal, not real. Our own nature irresistibly impels us to admit the Universals; and since we cannot destroy nature, why not yield to it? (p. 31, l. 28 to end of chapter). Chapter VII. We have then Universal Entity, first object of the mind, predicated in many and of many subjects, yet not belonging to any of the five Predicables (Genus, Species, Difference, Property, and Accident) though more truly existing in its subjects than any of these; and also, by that same existence in a subject, distinct from the Ideal Exemplars, which have no such formal existence. As God is a common Form in the Three Divine Persons, so Entity is a common form in every without exception (p. 33). — In the marginal notes I put inadver- being tently, “Somewhat like the Deity", etc. I now think that the restriction ought to be erased ; and indeed there is nothing in the text to imply any restriction. If we go through Wyclif's philosophical works, we shall always find him consistently defending his position by reference to the Divine Essence and the Holy Trinity. The genesis of his system may perhaps be stated thus. He had arrived at the conviction that there are Real Universals, and Entity, the most universal of all ; the subordinate Universals are distinct one from another somehow, and somehow from the supreme Universal, Entity. What was the distinction, and how was it to be understood so as neither to fall into Pantheism on one hand, non to the denial of reality to the Universals on the other? Here Wyclif bethought him of the mystery of the Holy Trinity, in which the Divine Essence is each of the Three Persons, distinct therefrom only by a logical distinction (distinctio rationis), whilst the Three are really distinct from each other, though One in the Unity of God. If (we may suppose he thought) Entity is assumed as the common form of all beings, God and His creatures alike, which are notwithstanding really different from each other, as the Father is different from the Son, we have a stand- point that is impregnable, since any argument to prove that such a distinction is absurd would be tantamount to a denial of the doctrine of the Church. As there are Three Persons in One God, so there are many particulars and One Being. He thus avoided saying that 'Man is God', since (in his view) there is the same relation between Man and God, as between the Father and the Son; now the Father is not the Son. Yet they are both the same Being, just as both the Father and the Son are God. This of course was open to the objection that he
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INTRODUCTION. XVII solved the whole question of Universals by constant reference to the most obscure mystery in the whole Christian faith ; not to speak of many other secondary difficulties which he spent his life-time in trying to surmount, and his explanation of which finally put him in opposition with many doctrines of the Church. Nevertheless, it may be frankly said that amongst all the many shades of more or less extreme Realism, that which Wyclif expounded seems perhaps the most reasonable; or, if you prefer, the least unreasonable. Of the theory of Moderate Realism, which touches Conceptualism on one side, and exaggerated Realism on the other, avoiding the difficulties of each system, and expounded and upheld by the greatest masters of Scholastic thought, I have already written much, both in Logica, vol. II, pp. XI—XIII, and in Misc. Phil. vol. I, Preliminary Essay, pp. XXVI—XXVII. Wyclif subsequently plunges into a disquisition upon the three kinds of Universals. As there is Metaphysical, Logical, and Grammatical truth, so there are three kinds of universality, strictly corresponding to these (p. 36, 1. 1—17). A Metaphysical Universal is that which is common to many ; a Logical Universal is that which is only thought as common to many ; it results from our power of abstraction from particulars, and has no existence save in the thinking mind. But it is that by which we know the Real Universal; for it must stand for something, and that something can neither be our own mind nor the abstractive act which it produces, neither being universal (ib. 1. 17 to end p. 37, l. 1—12). The argument is excellent, and in my opinion admits of no reply ; but it does not prove that the Universal is, in existing and con- crete things, anything more than 'a fundamental possibility of being ab- stracted by the mind', which is the theory of Moderate Realists. Of this last theory Wyclif, absorbed in his struggles with the Nominalists, either does not speak at all (at least in the works that I have seen) or he deals with it in the following paragraphs. If so, he shows that he never understood it, or was only imperfectly acquainted with that doctrine. He considers it as the theory of those who make all universality to consist in mere Logical abstraction ("negant in rebus universalitatem metaphysicam" ... p. 39, l. 4), thus treating it as pure Conceptualism. And I am the more justified in thinking that he meant by these words the Moderate Realism of Aristotle, of Alexander Hales, of Aquinas and Duns Scotus and a host of others, since we find him ad- De Universalibus, B
INTRODUCTION. XVII solved the whole question of Universals by constant reference to the most obscure mystery in the whole Christian faith ; not to speak of many other secondary difficulties which he spent his life-time in trying to surmount, and his explanation of which finally put him in opposition with many doctrines of the Church. Nevertheless, it may be frankly said that amongst all the many shades of more or less extreme Realism, that which Wyclif expounded seems perhaps the most reasonable; or, if you prefer, the least unreasonable. Of the theory of Moderate Realism, which touches Conceptualism on one side, and exaggerated Realism on the other, avoiding the difficulties of each system, and expounded and upheld by the greatest masters of Scholastic thought, I have already written much, both in Logica, vol. II, pp. XI—XIII, and in Misc. Phil. vol. I, Preliminary Essay, pp. XXVI—XXVII. Wyclif subsequently plunges into a disquisition upon the three kinds of Universals. As there is Metaphysical, Logical, and Grammatical truth, so there are three kinds of universality, strictly corresponding to these (p. 36, 1. 1—17). A Metaphysical Universal is that which is common to many ; a Logical Universal is that which is only thought as common to many ; it results from our power of abstraction from particulars, and has no existence save in the thinking mind. But it is that by which we know the Real Universal; for it must stand for something, and that something can neither be our own mind nor the abstractive act which it produces, neither being universal (ib. 1. 17 to end p. 37, l. 1—12). The argument is excellent, and in my opinion admits of no reply ; but it does not prove that the Universal is, in existing and con- crete things, anything more than 'a fundamental possibility of being ab- stracted by the mind', which is the theory of Moderate Realists. Of this last theory Wyclif, absorbed in his struggles with the Nominalists, either does not speak at all (at least in the works that I have seen) or he deals with it in the following paragraphs. If so, he shows that he never understood it, or was only imperfectly acquainted with that doctrine. He considers it as the theory of those who make all universality to consist in mere Logical abstraction ("negant in rebus universalitatem metaphysicam" ... p. 39, l. 4), thus treating it as pure Conceptualism. And I am the more justified in thinking that he meant by these words the Moderate Realism of Aristotle, of Alexander Hales, of Aquinas and Duns Scotus and a host of others, since we find him ad- De Universalibus, B
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XVIII INTRODUCTION. mitting that many great philosophers (multos famosos, p. 37, 1. 12) held the opinion which he thinks is inadmissible, and even quoting one of the greatest, Aristotle (p. 39, 1. 8, 9). It seems therefore advisable to analyse the paragraphs from p. 37, l. 12 to p. 40, l. 12, with special care, not omitting to give (where necessary) the replies which might be made by upholders of this doctrine, so as both to show the difference between Wyclif's system and theirs, and to point out the misconception under which I think he laboured. Many great writers compare the Universal with Primordial Matter, in so far as the latter is never bereft of all forms, and is only conceived as thus bereft by the act of our mind which can think it without thinking of them. In like manner the nature of a thing does not exist apart from its concrete conditions of existence, but may be thought apart from them by the mind ; its universality is therefore a mere abstraction, and a fiction produced by our intellect (p. 37, 1. 12—30). Moderate Realists, admitting the greater part of this exposition of their theory, would dissent from its conclusion, or at least point out a distinction here. Universality, for- mally considered, is indeed a mere abstraction; but that from which we abstract is truly and really such that we are enabled to think it as uni- versal. The resemblances between beings exist before they are thought of as resemblances ; before they are actually joined together by one general idea, they are in themselves and truly capable of being thus joined together. They are indeed not universal in the way that our notion of them is ; but they supply the basis in fact of that very univer- sality, which we therefore cannot call a mere fiction. Wyclif admits that there is in the mind an act of abstraction by which the Subjective Universal, or the general idea, is formed. But he rejects the comparison with Primordial Matter as quite worthless. As a fact, Matter exists, not in time indeed, but in its nature, previously to any of its determinations, and this separate existence does not by any means depend upon our thought of it. Now the same may be said of Universals. The nature of man (or Humanity) for instance, exists (not indeed in time but in its essence) previously to any individual man ; when we abstract from individuals we do not make Humanity, we only find it. The truth of things cannot depend on the truth of our thoughts con- cerning them (p. 37, 1. 30 to p. 39, 1. 3). — To this the reply would probably be that all Wyclif says here is quite true, but beside the mark.
XVIII INTRODUCTION. mitting that many great philosophers (multos famosos, p. 37, 1. 12) held the opinion which he thinks is inadmissible, and even quoting one of the greatest, Aristotle (p. 39, 1. 8, 9). It seems therefore advisable to analyse the paragraphs from p. 37, l. 12 to p. 40, l. 12, with special care, not omitting to give (where necessary) the replies which might be made by upholders of this doctrine, so as both to show the difference between Wyclif's system and theirs, and to point out the misconception under which I think he laboured. Many great writers compare the Universal with Primordial Matter, in so far as the latter is never bereft of all forms, and is only conceived as thus bereft by the act of our mind which can think it without thinking of them. In like manner the nature of a thing does not exist apart from its concrete conditions of existence, but may be thought apart from them by the mind ; its universality is therefore a mere abstraction, and a fiction produced by our intellect (p. 37, 1. 12—30). Moderate Realists, admitting the greater part of this exposition of their theory, would dissent from its conclusion, or at least point out a distinction here. Universality, for- mally considered, is indeed a mere abstraction; but that from which we abstract is truly and really such that we are enabled to think it as uni- versal. The resemblances between beings exist before they are thought of as resemblances ; before they are actually joined together by one general idea, they are in themselves and truly capable of being thus joined together. They are indeed not universal in the way that our notion of them is ; but they supply the basis in fact of that very univer- sality, which we therefore cannot call a mere fiction. Wyclif admits that there is in the mind an act of abstraction by which the Subjective Universal, or the general idea, is formed. But he rejects the comparison with Primordial Matter as quite worthless. As a fact, Matter exists, not in time indeed, but in its nature, previously to any of its determinations, and this separate existence does not by any means depend upon our thought of it. Now the same may be said of Universals. The nature of man (or Humanity) for instance, exists (not indeed in time but in its essence) previously to any individual man ; when we abstract from individuals we do not make Humanity, we only find it. The truth of things cannot depend on the truth of our thoughts con- cerning them (p. 37, 1. 30 to p. 39, 1. 3). — To this the reply would probably be that all Wyclif says here is quite true, but beside the mark.
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INTRODUCTION. XIX The Universal nature of Man certainly must be somehow before we can abstract it. But the question is, How is it there? Just as it is in our minds and after we have abstracted it, or otherwise? It is sufficient to suppose that it is there indeed, but in potentia, not in actu, as something merely capable of being abstracted, of being thought as the One in Many. This capability of being thus thought is real ; the being actually thought as One in Many is notional. What Wyclif has to prove is that this real aptitude, existing in many individuals, of being embraced in one idea, is one and the same quality in itself, and not as many qualities as there are concrete beings. The redness of one poppy and the redness of another are two concrete determinations of each flower, but such that we, seeing them, may form thence the general idea of redness. To say that this redness is one and the same identical reality, universal in the flower as it is in our thoughts, is to go too far. It is quite possible (if we remember how universally dominant the system of Nominalism was in England at that time) to suppose that Wyclif may never have had the opportunity to speak with a philosopher holding these moderate views, and his misconception of the theory is therefore easily accounted for. He goes on to say that philosophers who deny metaphysical universality to things, and only admit logical universality, should not be listened to; and he boldly counts (with a restrictive forte indeed) Aristotle himself amongst these (p. 39, 1. 3—22). But the Greek philosopher's dictum (Universale animal aut nihil est, aut posterius est singulari) whilst it certainly militates against Wyclif's system, may be explained with the greatest ease in the sense of St. Thomas and his followers, if we take into account Aristotle's other sayings and the general drift of his theory of cognition. Our author proceeds to show other shortcomings in this view, as he understands or misunderstands it. It would confound metaphysical with logical truth; yet God made the one first, and allowed men after- wards to know it by means of the other. It would imply the denial of an essence which is common to many species, as happens in the case of a genus (for instance, the essence of Animal is common both to Man and to Brute). And it would entail the refusal to admit that primordial matter exists, save when considered as such by abstracting it from its forms (p. 39, 1. 22 to end; p. 40, l. 1—12). — All these difficulties are set aside by the preceding distinctions. B*
INTRODUCTION. XIX The Universal nature of Man certainly must be somehow before we can abstract it. But the question is, How is it there? Just as it is in our minds and after we have abstracted it, or otherwise? It is sufficient to suppose that it is there indeed, but in potentia, not in actu, as something merely capable of being abstracted, of being thought as the One in Many. This capability of being thus thought is real ; the being actually thought as One in Many is notional. What Wyclif has to prove is that this real aptitude, existing in many individuals, of being embraced in one idea, is one and the same quality in itself, and not as many qualities as there are concrete beings. The redness of one poppy and the redness of another are two concrete determinations of each flower, but such that we, seeing them, may form thence the general idea of redness. To say that this redness is one and the same identical reality, universal in the flower as it is in our thoughts, is to go too far. It is quite possible (if we remember how universally dominant the system of Nominalism was in England at that time) to suppose that Wyclif may never have had the opportunity to speak with a philosopher holding these moderate views, and his misconception of the theory is therefore easily accounted for. He goes on to say that philosophers who deny metaphysical universality to things, and only admit logical universality, should not be listened to; and he boldly counts (with a restrictive forte indeed) Aristotle himself amongst these (p. 39, 1. 3—22). But the Greek philosopher's dictum (Universale animal aut nihil est, aut posterius est singulari) whilst it certainly militates against Wyclif's system, may be explained with the greatest ease in the sense of St. Thomas and his followers, if we take into account Aristotle's other sayings and the general drift of his theory of cognition. Our author proceeds to show other shortcomings in this view, as he understands or misunderstands it. It would confound metaphysical with logical truth; yet God made the one first, and allowed men after- wards to know it by means of the other. It would imply the denial of an essence which is common to many species, as happens in the case of a genus (for instance, the essence of Animal is common both to Man and to Brute). And it would entail the refusal to admit that primordial matter exists, save when considered as such by abstracting it from its forms (p. 39, 1. 22 to end; p. 40, l. 1—12). — All these difficulties are set aside by the preceding distinctions. B*
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XX INTRODUCTION. Wyclif points out that his theory easily explains the existence of a more universal form (v. g. Life) in one less universal (Humanity for example); the former extends to the latter as the divine Essence extends to the Father. — I believe, however, that the doctrine which made of God a Universal of which the Three Persons are the particulars had already been condemned by the Catholic Church; and therefore this could only have been meant by Wyclif as an analogy. But if only an analogy, it does not seem at all easy to point out the difference, since he takes the Trinity and the relations of the Three Persons with each other and with the Godhead as the central point of his system. If these relations are identical with those of the Universals and their par- ticulars, is it not natural to conclude that the Divine Essence must be a Universal? — A Universal which does not exist in each of its indi- viduals — such, for instance as Plato's Ideal Man, which led Aristotle to deny all reality to Universals — is impossible; that is, impossible naturally; whether, like the accidents in the Sacrament of the Altar, it can be miraculously sustained in existence without existing in any par- ticular, is doubtful; at any rate, it has an existence of its own, far nobler than that of its subjects (p. 40, l. 12 to p. 41, l. 25). Note here again how explicitly Wyclif states his belief in the doctrine of Absolute Acci- dents, of which he was soon to see the incompatibility with his perfected system. The chapter ends with a few remarks concerning 'Grammatical' Universals, which are merely the words used to mean a Universal idea or thing ; and also concerning another division, given by Grosseteste (p. 41, 1. 25 to p. 42, 1. 13). Chapter VIII. Here the author begins by enumerating a series of objections (p. 43 to p. 44, 1. 11), to which, both here and in the following chapters, he replies at great length. As he however answers them in a very diffuse manner, and without any further reference to them, it is unnecessary to state them here. A great many ideas, such for instance as God, Being, etc. though universals in Wyclif's theory, are not comprised under genera and species, as Universals should be. — To answer this would be difficult if we accept the usual definition. We ought rather to say that “A Universal is a thing, capable of being predicated as one form existing in many separately, and of those many which are as it were its matter and its subjects". If we take this definition, and start from any particular sub-
XX INTRODUCTION. Wyclif points out that his theory easily explains the existence of a more universal form (v. g. Life) in one less universal (Humanity for example); the former extends to the latter as the divine Essence extends to the Father. — I believe, however, that the doctrine which made of God a Universal of which the Three Persons are the particulars had already been condemned by the Catholic Church; and therefore this could only have been meant by Wyclif as an analogy. But if only an analogy, it does not seem at all easy to point out the difference, since he takes the Trinity and the relations of the Three Persons with each other and with the Godhead as the central point of his system. If these relations are identical with those of the Universals and their par- ticulars, is it not natural to conclude that the Divine Essence must be a Universal? — A Universal which does not exist in each of its indi- viduals — such, for instance as Plato's Ideal Man, which led Aristotle to deny all reality to Universals — is impossible; that is, impossible naturally; whether, like the accidents in the Sacrament of the Altar, it can be miraculously sustained in existence without existing in any par- ticular, is doubtful; at any rate, it has an existence of its own, far nobler than that of its subjects (p. 40, l. 12 to p. 41, l. 25). Note here again how explicitly Wyclif states his belief in the doctrine of Absolute Acci- dents, of which he was soon to see the incompatibility with his perfected system. The chapter ends with a few remarks concerning 'Grammatical' Universals, which are merely the words used to mean a Universal idea or thing ; and also concerning another division, given by Grosseteste (p. 41, 1. 25 to p. 42, 1. 13). Chapter VIII. Here the author begins by enumerating a series of objections (p. 43 to p. 44, 1. 11), to which, both here and in the following chapters, he replies at great length. As he however answers them in a very diffuse manner, and without any further reference to them, it is unnecessary to state them here. A great many ideas, such for instance as God, Being, etc. though universals in Wyclif's theory, are not comprised under genera and species, as Universals should be. — To answer this would be difficult if we accept the usual definition. We ought rather to say that “A Universal is a thing, capable of being predicated as one form existing in many separately, and of those many which are as it were its matter and its subjects". If we take this definition, and start from any particular sub-
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INTRODUCTION. XXI stance, we shall find that any Universal predicated thereof is either predicated of it as a substance or not. If as a substance, either of the whole substance, and then it is a species, or it is the predicate of another universal which determines it, and is called genus, or it determines the genus in the formation of a species, and is a difference. (Example: Man = species; animated being = genus; rational = difference,) If the Universal does not belong to its singular as a substance, it either belongs to the whole species taken in its abstract essence, and is a property; or to the individual as such, and is an accident (p. 44, l. 11 to end; p. 45, l. 1 to 16). God, therefore, though He might be called a Universal if we follow the old definition (Unum in multis et de multis predicatum) since He is predicated of the Three Persons, is not to be called so according to the one given above. He is not predicated of the Divine Persons as a form existing in several subjects essentially different, since they have the same identical essence. Being again, and the other Transcendentals (the Something, the Good, and the True) do not exist in their subjects as forms in matter, and correspond to none of the five Praedicabilia above mentioned; so they, though real, are not properly Universals (p. 45, l. 16 to p. 46, l. 11). Then our definition of the Universal as a Form implies that it limits its subjects; whereas both God and Entity are unlimited. God, as an absolute actuality, and primordial matter, as a potentiality equally absolute, are both beyond the scope of the Pre- dicaments, which deal only with substances in which actuality and potentiality are combined. Units, points, and numbers are like forms in respect to the singulars which they determine, but in themselves they rather share the pure potentiality of matter, and so cannot be classed amonst the Universals (p. 46, l. 11 to p. 47, l. 29). The difficulty as to whether universal rationality is or is not the form of singular rationality is met by the assertion that there is no such thing as singular rationality distinct from the singular man, since a singular man and his humanity are one and the same (p. 47, 1. 29, to p. 49, 1. 25). "But if there is One God in Three Divine Persons, does it not follow that there is one Man only in many human persons, if we follow up the theory? This is clearly absurd" (p. 49 to end of chapter). Chapter IX. The answer to the preceding question which so ab- ruptly closes Ch. VIII — so abruptly, indeed, that the division is pro-
INTRODUCTION. XXI stance, we shall find that any Universal predicated thereof is either predicated of it as a substance or not. If as a substance, either of the whole substance, and then it is a species, or it is the predicate of another universal which determines it, and is called genus, or it determines the genus in the formation of a species, and is a difference. (Example: Man = species; animated being = genus; rational = difference,) If the Universal does not belong to its singular as a substance, it either belongs to the whole species taken in its abstract essence, and is a property; or to the individual as such, and is an accident (p. 44, l. 11 to end; p. 45, l. 1 to 16). God, therefore, though He might be called a Universal if we follow the old definition (Unum in multis et de multis predicatum) since He is predicated of the Three Persons, is not to be called so according to the one given above. He is not predicated of the Divine Persons as a form existing in several subjects essentially different, since they have the same identical essence. Being again, and the other Transcendentals (the Something, the Good, and the True) do not exist in their subjects as forms in matter, and correspond to none of the five Praedicabilia above mentioned; so they, though real, are not properly Universals (p. 45, l. 16 to p. 46, l. 11). Then our definition of the Universal as a Form implies that it limits its subjects; whereas both God and Entity are unlimited. God, as an absolute actuality, and primordial matter, as a potentiality equally absolute, are both beyond the scope of the Pre- dicaments, which deal only with substances in which actuality and potentiality are combined. Units, points, and numbers are like forms in respect to the singulars which they determine, but in themselves they rather share the pure potentiality of matter, and so cannot be classed amonst the Universals (p. 46, l. 11 to p. 47, l. 29). The difficulty as to whether universal rationality is or is not the form of singular rationality is met by the assertion that there is no such thing as singular rationality distinct from the singular man, since a singular man and his humanity are one and the same (p. 47, 1. 29, to p. 49, 1. 25). "But if there is One God in Three Divine Persons, does it not follow that there is one Man only in many human persons, if we follow up the theory? This is clearly absurd" (p. 49 to end of chapter). Chapter IX. The answer to the preceding question which so ab- ruptly closes Ch. VIII — so abruptly, indeed, that the division is pro-
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XXII INTRODUCTION. bably a mistake of the copyist, if not of the writer, who, we must remember, was very young and inexperienced — is that Humanity, one in itself, is not one but many in its singulars; so that there is not one man but many. There is only a formal (not a real) distinction between the individual humanity and the singular man, between the white individual and his individual whiteness. Persons differ in respect of their singular humanities; otherwise we might say that there was only one singular man; which is false and heretical. But singular attributes, unlike those which are universal, add nothing to the perfection of the being which possesses them (p. 50—52, 1. 7). Thus a given man is identical with his humanity, his animality, and his rationality; but these are not identical with one another ; just as every compound nature is at the same time matter, form, and compound, and yet these three are not the same, though having the same essence. Matter means a being in its lowest, form the same being in its highest degree of perfection; and the compound itself is that being considered both ways. Each of these is therefore the same individual thing viewed from different standpoints (p. 52, 1. 7 to p. 53, 1. 9). Thus, whilst in intelligent beings three things of the same nature (memory, intelligence and will, as is more than once expounded in Wyclif's works) form an image of the Trinity, there is in all beings a vestige of the Trinity, caused by things that are not of the same nature — genus, species, and difference, which in man correspond to animality, humanity and rationality, one underlying the other which determines it, and the two together forming the species (p. 53, 1. 9 to end of page). From p. 54 to p. 57, a discussion concerning the relations between higher and lower Universals results at the end of the chapter in the assertion that they differ as one formalitas' (taken in the sense of Duns Scotu's theory) differs from another. The arguments are in great part unintelligible to my mind ; but perhaps the reader may find a clue to understand them if I set forth here very briefly what I know about that once famous and now forgotten theory. It amounts, however, to very little. Scholastics before Scotus used to admit the distinctio rationis and the distinctio realis. The former was a mere distinction between a thing considered in one way and the same thing considered in another way. It was divided into distinctio rationis ratiocinantis, in which the difference in consideration is based, not upon anything in the nature of the thing
XXII INTRODUCTION. bably a mistake of the copyist, if not of the writer, who, we must remember, was very young and inexperienced — is that Humanity, one in itself, is not one but many in its singulars; so that there is not one man but many. There is only a formal (not a real) distinction between the individual humanity and the singular man, between the white individual and his individual whiteness. Persons differ in respect of their singular humanities; otherwise we might say that there was only one singular man; which is false and heretical. But singular attributes, unlike those which are universal, add nothing to the perfection of the being which possesses them (p. 50—52, 1. 7). Thus a given man is identical with his humanity, his animality, and his rationality; but these are not identical with one another ; just as every compound nature is at the same time matter, form, and compound, and yet these three are not the same, though having the same essence. Matter means a being in its lowest, form the same being in its highest degree of perfection; and the compound itself is that being considered both ways. Each of these is therefore the same individual thing viewed from different standpoints (p. 52, 1. 7 to p. 53, 1. 9). Thus, whilst in intelligent beings three things of the same nature (memory, intelligence and will, as is more than once expounded in Wyclif's works) form an image of the Trinity, there is in all beings a vestige of the Trinity, caused by things that are not of the same nature — genus, species, and difference, which in man correspond to animality, humanity and rationality, one underlying the other which determines it, and the two together forming the species (p. 53, 1. 9 to end of page). From p. 54 to p. 57, a discussion concerning the relations between higher and lower Universals results at the end of the chapter in the assertion that they differ as one formalitas' (taken in the sense of Duns Scotu's theory) differs from another. The arguments are in great part unintelligible to my mind ; but perhaps the reader may find a clue to understand them if I set forth here very briefly what I know about that once famous and now forgotten theory. It amounts, however, to very little. Scholastics before Scotus used to admit the distinctio rationis and the distinctio realis. The former was a mere distinction between a thing considered in one way and the same thing considered in another way. It was divided into distinctio rationis ratiocinantis, in which the difference in consideration is based, not upon anything in the nature of the thing
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INTRODUCTION. XXIII considered which lends itself to this distinction, but merely upon the action of the thinking mind ; and distinctio rationis ratiocinatae, in which the nature of the thing considered lends itself to the distinction. For example, we are forced to think God as merciful and just, separating the two ideas in our mind ; but in reality His justice and His mercy are the same, and are both identical with God's Essence. But when we think of Plato as a philosopher and a poet, the same man is both, and there is no real distinction at all between the two. Yet Socrates, not being both by his nature, happens to be such that be can be considered from either point of view; and to consider him only as a poet, or only as a philosopher, would not give us a false, but only an inadequate idea of the man. Real distinction, on the other hand, was affirmed when the things thought of differed in themselves and anteriorly to being thought, and this realis distinctio was either major or minor, either sicut res differt a re, or sicut res differt a modo ipsius rei. There were other, but less important divisions. — Now Duns Scotus tried to introduce a distinction that was less than any realis distinctio, and yet greater than any distinctio rationis. It was the distinctio formalis a natura rei. The same man is animal and rational; and therefore the distinction between animality and rationality, taken as factors of the idea Man, is a notional distinction merely. But animality, taken in itself, is a parte rei independent of rationality taken in itself, since animality can really exist without being accompanied by rationality; and on the other hand, as rationality cannot exist without animality, the former depends upon the other. But if of two things one is independent of the other and the second dependent on the first whether we think of them or not, there must be a real distinction, but on one side only. A formal distinction was therefore a distinction which in one respect was merely notional, and was real in another. It is pretty generally agreed among Scholastics at the present day that this so-called distinctio formalis ought to be classed amongst the distinctiones rationis ratiocinatae: though very few, I fear, understand what Scotus really meant, and for what purpose he introduced these formalitates. Chapter X. That which answers to the question, What is this ? is the essence of a thing ; and this answer being generally true of all things bearing the same name, the essence of anything must be universal; and the more universal the more perfect it is. There must be a most and a
INTRODUCTION. XXIII considered which lends itself to this distinction, but merely upon the action of the thinking mind ; and distinctio rationis ratiocinatae, in which the nature of the thing considered lends itself to the distinction. For example, we are forced to think God as merciful and just, separating the two ideas in our mind ; but in reality His justice and His mercy are the same, and are both identical with God's Essence. But when we think of Plato as a philosopher and a poet, the same man is both, and there is no real distinction at all between the two. Yet Socrates, not being both by his nature, happens to be such that be can be considered from either point of view; and to consider him only as a poet, or only as a philosopher, would not give us a false, but only an inadequate idea of the man. Real distinction, on the other hand, was affirmed when the things thought of differed in themselves and anteriorly to being thought, and this realis distinctio was either major or minor, either sicut res differt a re, or sicut res differt a modo ipsius rei. There were other, but less important divisions. — Now Duns Scotus tried to introduce a distinction that was less than any realis distinctio, and yet greater than any distinctio rationis. It was the distinctio formalis a natura rei. The same man is animal and rational; and therefore the distinction between animality and rationality, taken as factors of the idea Man, is a notional distinction merely. But animality, taken in itself, is a parte rei independent of rationality taken in itself, since animality can really exist without being accompanied by rationality; and on the other hand, as rationality cannot exist without animality, the former depends upon the other. But if of two things one is independent of the other and the second dependent on the first whether we think of them or not, there must be a real distinction, but on one side only. A formal distinction was therefore a distinction which in one respect was merely notional, and was real in another. It is pretty generally agreed among Scholastics at the present day that this so-called distinctio formalis ought to be classed amongst the distinctiones rationis ratiocinatae: though very few, I fear, understand what Scotus really meant, and for what purpose he introduced these formalitates. Chapter X. That which answers to the question, What is this ? is the essence of a thing ; and this answer being generally true of all things bearing the same name, the essence of anything must be universal; and the more universal the more perfect it is. There must be a most and a
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XXIV INTRODUCTION. least universal; and one may, by God's power, be united to another of a higher or lower rank. This hierarchy is necessary, for the essence cannot be made up of two or more parts independent of one another, and consequently accidental (p. 57; p. 58, 1—30). — To conceive Wyclif's meaning more clearly, let us take 'Something animated and rational' on one hand, and Something large and red' on the other. Rational' depends on 'animated' and is inconceivable without it. A being may be animated and rational, or animated and not rational, or neither, but not rational and not animated ; whereas we can perfectly conceive something large and red, or large and not red or red and not large, or neither. These, as separately conceivable, are accidental to each other's essence, whilst 'animated' is essential to rational'. As there are three sorts of differences, real and essential, real but not essential, and merely formal difference, so there are correspondingly three sorts of composition: quantitative, uniting parts really and essen- tially different, and easily conceivable; qualitative, of matter and form, which are really distinct, but forming only one essence as the deter- mining and determinable parts of the same being (that v. g. out of which a watch is made, and that which makes it to be a watch); and formal composition, the most abstruse of all, between things which differ neither really nor essentially. Rationality, for instance, added to animation, makes Man ; these are two, but only formally. This composition is very similar to that of matter, form, and compound, as may readily be seen: and these formal parts may be called different modes of the same being (p. 58, 1. 30 to end; p. 59—p. 60, l. 38). We can only improperly predicate one of these parts of the other ; and the genus, according to Aristotle, cannot in any sense be predicated of its difference, for the idea of the latter is outside of the intension of the former. Animality and ralionality are, taken together, parts of the species humanily; and one part is not another. Thence it follows that entity is not a genus ; if it were, it would form a lower species by the addition of something else, extraneous to entity; but it is clear that there can be no such thing (p. 60, l. 30 to p. 61, l. 30). A genus, which belongs to the essence of anything previously to its species, must at some time or other have all its possible species, for otherwise it would be mutilated and incomplete (p. 61, l. 30 to p. 62, l. 32). Wyclif returns to this idea on p. 137, almost in the same terms
XXIV INTRODUCTION. least universal; and one may, by God's power, be united to another of a higher or lower rank. This hierarchy is necessary, for the essence cannot be made up of two or more parts independent of one another, and consequently accidental (p. 57; p. 58, 1—30). — To conceive Wyclif's meaning more clearly, let us take 'Something animated and rational' on one hand, and Something large and red' on the other. Rational' depends on 'animated' and is inconceivable without it. A being may be animated and rational, or animated and not rational, or neither, but not rational and not animated ; whereas we can perfectly conceive something large and red, or large and not red or red and not large, or neither. These, as separately conceivable, are accidental to each other's essence, whilst 'animated' is essential to rational'. As there are three sorts of differences, real and essential, real but not essential, and merely formal difference, so there are correspondingly three sorts of composition: quantitative, uniting parts really and essen- tially different, and easily conceivable; qualitative, of matter and form, which are really distinct, but forming only one essence as the deter- mining and determinable parts of the same being (that v. g. out of which a watch is made, and that which makes it to be a watch); and formal composition, the most abstruse of all, between things which differ neither really nor essentially. Rationality, for instance, added to animation, makes Man ; these are two, but only formally. This composition is very similar to that of matter, form, and compound, as may readily be seen: and these formal parts may be called different modes of the same being (p. 58, 1. 30 to end; p. 59—p. 60, l. 38). We can only improperly predicate one of these parts of the other ; and the genus, according to Aristotle, cannot in any sense be predicated of its difference, for the idea of the latter is outside of the intension of the former. Animality and ralionality are, taken together, parts of the species humanily; and one part is not another. Thence it follows that entity is not a genus ; if it were, it would form a lower species by the addition of something else, extraneous to entity; but it is clear that there can be no such thing (p. 60, l. 30 to p. 61, l. 30). A genus, which belongs to the essence of anything previously to its species, must at some time or other have all its possible species, for otherwise it would be mutilated and incomplete (p. 61, l. 30 to p. 62, l. 32). Wyclif returns to this idea on p. 137, almost in the same terms
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INTRODUCTION. XXV and with the very same argument; an oversight that we may consider as a further proof of the youthful inexperience which he confesses. A few remarks on genera more or less general, and species more or less special, serve to conclude the chapter (p. 62, 1. 32 to end; p. 63). Chapter XI. The writer now comes to Specific Difference, by which the genus is divided into species; and he thereupon treats of divisions. No genus can be adequately divided by means of one division alone ; and the same may be said of definitions, which contain the dividing term, affirmed or denied (p. 64). Wyclif here alludes to what are called cross-divisions, as the example he gives shows plainly. The number three is odd, prime, and incomposite ; that is, not produced by the addition of other numbers (unity not being considered as a number). The example is from Aristotle; but it seems that prime' is an unneces- sary division; only two numbers, 2 and 3, are 'incomposite' in the sense stated. And 'odd', if we add it to incomposite', leaves the number 3, whether we add prime' or not (p. 65, 1. 1—21). This theory, however, is exposed to considerable difficulties. The principal is that by introducing more than one principle of division, the genus is divided into species which overlap, instead of excluding each other. Wyclif's manner of putting it (p. 65, l. 21 to end; p. 66, 1. 1—13) is somewhat obscure. It may be thus explained: Cross-divisions introduce differences which are not essentially contained within the genus. If we divide animal, v. g. by two differences which are independent of each other, such as large and beautiful, and these by others of the same sort, we can never get to the ultimate species. This does not explicitly state that the divisions overlap within the genus, but that they may contain what is beyond it. As a fact, if not comprised within the genus, they will overlap ; some animals will be large and not beautiful, others beautiful and not large In this connection we may quote the words of Jevons (Elementary Lessons in Logic, XII, p. 105—107), who takes the side opposed to Wyclif: 'The division must be founded upon one prin- ciple or basis. It would be obviously absurd to divide books into folio, quarto, French, German, and dictionaries, because these species overlap each other, and there may be French or German dictionaries which happen to be quarto or folio and belong to three species at once. A division of this kind is said to be a Cross-Division, because there is more than one principle of division, and the several species in con-
INTRODUCTION. XXV and with the very same argument; an oversight that we may consider as a further proof of the youthful inexperience which he confesses. A few remarks on genera more or less general, and species more or less special, serve to conclude the chapter (p. 62, 1. 32 to end; p. 63). Chapter XI. The writer now comes to Specific Difference, by which the genus is divided into species; and he thereupon treats of divisions. No genus can be adequately divided by means of one division alone ; and the same may be said of definitions, which contain the dividing term, affirmed or denied (p. 64). Wyclif here alludes to what are called cross-divisions, as the example he gives shows plainly. The number three is odd, prime, and incomposite ; that is, not produced by the addition of other numbers (unity not being considered as a number). The example is from Aristotle; but it seems that prime' is an unneces- sary division; only two numbers, 2 and 3, are 'incomposite' in the sense stated. And 'odd', if we add it to incomposite', leaves the number 3, whether we add prime' or not (p. 65, 1. 1—21). This theory, however, is exposed to considerable difficulties. The principal is that by introducing more than one principle of division, the genus is divided into species which overlap, instead of excluding each other. Wyclif's manner of putting it (p. 65, l. 21 to end; p. 66, 1. 1—13) is somewhat obscure. It may be thus explained: Cross-divisions introduce differences which are not essentially contained within the genus. If we divide animal, v. g. by two differences which are independent of each other, such as large and beautiful, and these by others of the same sort, we can never get to the ultimate species. This does not explicitly state that the divisions overlap within the genus, but that they may contain what is beyond it. As a fact, if not comprised within the genus, they will overlap ; some animals will be large and not beautiful, others beautiful and not large In this connection we may quote the words of Jevons (Elementary Lessons in Logic, XII, p. 105—107), who takes the side opposed to Wyclif: 'The division must be founded upon one prin- ciple or basis. It would be obviously absurd to divide books into folio, quarto, French, German, and dictionaries, because these species overlap each other, and there may be French or German dictionaries which happen to be quarto or folio and belong to three species at once. A division of this kind is said to be a Cross-Division, because there is more than one principle of division, and the several species in con-
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XXVI INTRODUCTION. sequence cross each other and produce confusion..... But when sub- division is employed, and each of the species is considered as a genus which may be subjected to a further separation, a new principle of division may and in fact must be employed each time..... The most perfect divisions in a logical point of view are produced by continually dividing each genus into two species by a difference, of which an example has been given in the Tree of Porphyry. This process is called Dicho- tomy ..... ; it is also called Exhaustive Division..... To answer this, Wyclif takes the case of quantity, which is either continuous or not, either having position in space or not. If continuous and having position in space, it includes all mathematical bodies ; if con- tinuous without position, it is Time, or Duration. Non-continuous quantity, having position in space, is inconceivable (universaliter negatur, p. 67, 1. 25, 26); we have, therefore, only a third species, number, which is non-continuous and without position in space. Now continuous' and having position in space' are not by themselves species in regard to quantity, and genera in regard to the three subaltern species enumerated; for if they were, they would exclude each other as species, and not have the same species (i. e. mathematical bodies) included under them both as genera. The three species, therefore, though produced by these cross-divisions, are directly subalterns to quantity. We can take them as they are ; each has a proper difference that belongs to no other. One is continuous and having position in space'; the second is continuous without position'; the third is neither continuous nor having position'. And this is all we want to distinguish them essentially from one another ; the divisions do not by themselves constitute an essential difference, but only when taken together (p. 66, l. 12 to p. 69, l. 3). A difference may be said to belong only to one species or to many, according as we consider all the cross-divisions which make it up, or only one of them ; or as we consider it in itself or together with its opposite; or lastly if we think it as the difference from one species to another, or between them. These two last views, however, as Wyclif admits, do not agree with Porphyry's standpoint, when he states that a difference expresses the howness of many different species (p. 69, l. 3 to p. 70, l. 23). Chapter XI. Here the author begins to treat of accidents. These can only improperly be said to belong to genera and species. For though whiteness' may be said to determine the genus 'colour', it determines
XXVI INTRODUCTION. sequence cross each other and produce confusion..... But when sub- division is employed, and each of the species is considered as a genus which may be subjected to a further separation, a new principle of division may and in fact must be employed each time..... The most perfect divisions in a logical point of view are produced by continually dividing each genus into two species by a difference, of which an example has been given in the Tree of Porphyry. This process is called Dicho- tomy ..... ; it is also called Exhaustive Division..... To answer this, Wyclif takes the case of quantity, which is either continuous or not, either having position in space or not. If continuous and having position in space, it includes all mathematical bodies ; if con- tinuous without position, it is Time, or Duration. Non-continuous quantity, having position in space, is inconceivable (universaliter negatur, p. 67, 1. 25, 26); we have, therefore, only a third species, number, which is non-continuous and without position in space. Now continuous' and having position in space' are not by themselves species in regard to quantity, and genera in regard to the three subaltern species enumerated; for if they were, they would exclude each other as species, and not have the same species (i. e. mathematical bodies) included under them both as genera. The three species, therefore, though produced by these cross-divisions, are directly subalterns to quantity. We can take them as they are ; each has a proper difference that belongs to no other. One is continuous and having position in space'; the second is continuous without position'; the third is neither continuous nor having position'. And this is all we want to distinguish them essentially from one another ; the divisions do not by themselves constitute an essential difference, but only when taken together (p. 66, l. 12 to p. 69, l. 3). A difference may be said to belong only to one species or to many, according as we consider all the cross-divisions which make it up, or only one of them ; or as we consider it in itself or together with its opposite; or lastly if we think it as the difference from one species to another, or between them. These two last views, however, as Wyclif admits, do not agree with Porphyry's standpoint, when he states that a difference expresses the howness of many different species (p. 69, l. 3 to p. 70, l. 23). Chapter XI. Here the author begins to treat of accidents. These can only improperly be said to belong to genera and species. For though whiteness' may be said to determine the genus 'colour', it determines
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INTRODUCTION. XXVII as much (if not more) the substance to which it belongs. And whiteness appearing in A is simply A turning white; it is the production, not of a thing, but of the mode of a thing. Yet this mode is real, and so in a sense accidents are realities and have real genera and species (p. 71; p. 72, 1. 1—21). Here comes the difference between the proprium and the accidens. The proprium (v. g. risibility in man) is so closely connected with the abstract essence of the substance that it can have neither genera nor species in any sense. It is, however, a Universal, constant in all individuals of the same species or genus, whether the species be ultimate or not. Sex, for instance, is a property of all animals, and 'animal' is a genus. However, the proprium does not differ really from that of which it is predicated, just as genus, difference and species are not really different; whereas the accident differs really from the essence of the thing (p. 72, 1. 21—p. 75, 1. 18). The Proprium is, according to Porphyry, 'quod inest omni, soli, et semper", always present in all individuals of a given class, and in no others. The accident is what may be present or absent without the destruction of its subject. It is divided into separable and inseparable: inseparable in reality, when it is always found in a given individual, though it may be thought as not present ; whilst the other Universals are not even separable in thought. Even inseparable accidents can be really separated by God's power; He can make a substance to exist without accidents. And though whiteness is the being white of a sub- stance' it can also exist without its substance, since it has an essence different therefrom (p. 75, 1. 18 to p. 79, l. 8). Chapter XIII. Proprium and Accident are said to inhere; the others to be predicated. How many sorts of Predication are there? Predication being the union of subject and predicate, there are three sorts, greater, less, and least, according to the perfection of this union. The first is an essential union between subject and predicate: 'Man is an animated being'. The second implies something real in, but not essential to, the subject: This man is white'. The third implies something that is true of the subject, but not a real quality existing in it: God is loved by me'. In Holy Scripture we find that John the Baptist is Elias; this again is true, but Elias is not really predicated of John the Baptist (p. 80 to p. 82, l. 20). But if Elias is truly yet not really John the Baptist, why should it not be as true to say: Peter is Paul?' Because Christ uttered this
INTRODUCTION. XXVII as much (if not more) the substance to which it belongs. And whiteness appearing in A is simply A turning white; it is the production, not of a thing, but of the mode of a thing. Yet this mode is real, and so in a sense accidents are realities and have real genera and species (p. 71; p. 72, 1. 1—21). Here comes the difference between the proprium and the accidens. The proprium (v. g. risibility in man) is so closely connected with the abstract essence of the substance that it can have neither genera nor species in any sense. It is, however, a Universal, constant in all individuals of the same species or genus, whether the species be ultimate or not. Sex, for instance, is a property of all animals, and 'animal' is a genus. However, the proprium does not differ really from that of which it is predicated, just as genus, difference and species are not really different; whereas the accident differs really from the essence of the thing (p. 72, 1. 21—p. 75, 1. 18). The Proprium is, according to Porphyry, 'quod inest omni, soli, et semper", always present in all individuals of a given class, and in no others. The accident is what may be present or absent without the destruction of its subject. It is divided into separable and inseparable: inseparable in reality, when it is always found in a given individual, though it may be thought as not present ; whilst the other Universals are not even separable in thought. Even inseparable accidents can be really separated by God's power; He can make a substance to exist without accidents. And though whiteness is the being white of a sub- stance' it can also exist without its substance, since it has an essence different therefrom (p. 75, 1. 18 to p. 79, l. 8). Chapter XIII. Proprium and Accident are said to inhere; the others to be predicated. How many sorts of Predication are there? Predication being the union of subject and predicate, there are three sorts, greater, less, and least, according to the perfection of this union. The first is an essential union between subject and predicate: 'Man is an animated being'. The second implies something real in, but not essential to, the subject: This man is white'. The third implies something that is true of the subject, but not a real quality existing in it: God is loved by me'. In Holy Scripture we find that John the Baptist is Elias; this again is true, but Elias is not really predicated of John the Baptist (p. 80 to p. 82, l. 20). But if Elias is truly yet not really John the Baptist, why should it not be as true to say: Peter is Paul?' Because Christ uttered this
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XXVIII INTRODUCTION. proposition, making it true figuratively. Was the goat which Abraham sacrificed figuratively Christ, since it was a figure of Christ? No, for not every figure is figuratively identical with the thing it represents. Some are, some are not; God alone knows why. Such a form of predication is only true within its own limits ; if taken to mean another kind of predication, it becomes false (p. 82, 1. 20 to p. 84, 1. 10). — This theory, from some points of view, is identical with that which in Wyclif's later works served him to explain the Eucharistic Presence of Christ. But in the latter he maintains that the 'figurative identity', really true, can be called real; and in De Apostasia he even maintains that the Paschal Lamb, being the figure of Christ, was Christ, though less per- fectly so than the Host. These developments naturally sprang from the idea here already expressed, that Christ's words have the power of bestowing on a subject and a predicate some sort of identity that could not exist without them. Here he openly combats the assumption that 'truly' means really'. If it did, since the Father is truly different from the Divine Essence, He would be really so. Probably Wyclif came later to find this distinction untenable, since the Father is not truly different from the Godhead, but only according to our imperfect mode of thinking, which distinguishes what is identical in itself, just as we think separately of Edward VII and of the King of England. And this is the more likely when we find him admitting that his sketch of the matter is inadequate, and requires com- pletion and possibly correction (p. 84, 1. 10 to p. 85, 1. 29). We prove these three degrees of predication by the principle that all difference of perfection, such as may be found in predication, implies not only a positive, but a comparative and a superlative as well. And as, taking a greater, a less and a least within each of these degrees of entitative perfection, we have the nine choirs of Angels, so we get nine degrees of predicative union, of which examples are given. There are also other divisions in this matter (p. 85, 1. 29 to end of chapter). Chapter XIV. The so-called Expositorial Syllogism being closely connected with predication, Wyclif here proceeds to examine it. Its general form requires the middle term to be a singular, and it is much used in different ways to a combat the theory of Universals. Leaving the detailed examination of this syllogism to another tractate, various fallacies proceeding more or less from the abuse of this argument will here be
XXVIII INTRODUCTION. proposition, making it true figuratively. Was the goat which Abraham sacrificed figuratively Christ, since it was a figure of Christ? No, for not every figure is figuratively identical with the thing it represents. Some are, some are not; God alone knows why. Such a form of predication is only true within its own limits ; if taken to mean another kind of predication, it becomes false (p. 82, 1. 20 to p. 84, 1. 10). — This theory, from some points of view, is identical with that which in Wyclif's later works served him to explain the Eucharistic Presence of Christ. But in the latter he maintains that the 'figurative identity', really true, can be called real; and in De Apostasia he even maintains that the Paschal Lamb, being the figure of Christ, was Christ, though less per- fectly so than the Host. These developments naturally sprang from the idea here already expressed, that Christ's words have the power of bestowing on a subject and a predicate some sort of identity that could not exist without them. Here he openly combats the assumption that 'truly' means really'. If it did, since the Father is truly different from the Divine Essence, He would be really so. Probably Wyclif came later to find this distinction untenable, since the Father is not truly different from the Godhead, but only according to our imperfect mode of thinking, which distinguishes what is identical in itself, just as we think separately of Edward VII and of the King of England. And this is the more likely when we find him admitting that his sketch of the matter is inadequate, and requires com- pletion and possibly correction (p. 84, 1. 10 to p. 85, 1. 29). We prove these three degrees of predication by the principle that all difference of perfection, such as may be found in predication, implies not only a positive, but a comparative and a superlative as well. And as, taking a greater, a less and a least within each of these degrees of entitative perfection, we have the nine choirs of Angels, so we get nine degrees of predicative union, of which examples are given. There are also other divisions in this matter (p. 85, 1. 29 to end of chapter). Chapter XIV. The so-called Expositorial Syllogism being closely connected with predication, Wyclif here proceeds to examine it. Its general form requires the middle term to be a singular, and it is much used in different ways to a combat the theory of Universals. Leaving the detailed examination of this syllogism to another tractate, various fallacies proceeding more or less from the abuse of this argument will here be
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INTRODUCTION. XXIX refuted. "Every thing is singular, and Realists affirm that Universals are things". Yes, but they deny that every thing is singular ; for Universal things cannot be singular. 'Substance is identical with ass, and man with substance". But this gives no conclusion, since Substance ought to be, and is not, taken distributively. One might by a like argument prove the Father to be the Son. The syllogism is worthless unless we say (which we do not) that Substance is identical with each particular man (p. 87 to p. 89, 1. 3). Aristotle expresses himself differently; a statue, according to him, is not a stone, but is of stone. But this is only a difference of language: to be of stone is to be a stone modified in a certain way; and in like manner the Father is God from a certain point of view. Any other manner of arguing lands us in heresy or in absurdity ; or would land us in heresy were it not for the formal declarations of the Church. They are therefore, dangerous and sophistical subtleties (p. 89, l. 3 to end of chapter). Chapter XV. Wyclif here formulates (p. 91 to p. 94, l. 6) thirteen objections, most of them bearing on the doctrine of Transcendent Being, common to God and His creature, and proceeds to answer them. We give the objections together with the answers. (1) 'If there is Transcendent Entity, there will be also transcendent beauty, common both to God and the creature ; for entity and beauty imply one another. Every creature would be beautiful with the infinite beauty of God". — We must admit, however, the existence of Trans- cendent Entity, since we conceive it distinctly, apart from the entity of particulars, and in thinking of it, we certainly think of something. But the argument is worthless. The Finite possesses the infinite beauty of God, but not infinitely (p. 94, 1. 6 to p. 95, l. 12). This same distinction serves also to answer the fifth objection, viz., that God would be no better than the lowest of His creatures. For though God and the creature have the same entity, God has it in an infinitely more perfect manner than the creature. Besides, He possesses special attributes which He alone can possess (p. 95, l. 12—30). In the text, the preceding objection is numbered as the seventh. This is a copyist's mistake no doubt. (2) Transcendent entity would be more divine, being universal, than God Himself". — No, for He is the cause of that entity ; and His own incommunicable Being is anterior to the other, as the cause is to
INTRODUCTION. XXIX refuted. "Every thing is singular, and Realists affirm that Universals are things". Yes, but they deny that every thing is singular ; for Universal things cannot be singular. 'Substance is identical with ass, and man with substance". But this gives no conclusion, since Substance ought to be, and is not, taken distributively. One might by a like argument prove the Father to be the Son. The syllogism is worthless unless we say (which we do not) that Substance is identical with each particular man (p. 87 to p. 89, 1. 3). Aristotle expresses himself differently; a statue, according to him, is not a stone, but is of stone. But this is only a difference of language: to be of stone is to be a stone modified in a certain way; and in like manner the Father is God from a certain point of view. Any other manner of arguing lands us in heresy or in absurdity ; or would land us in heresy were it not for the formal declarations of the Church. They are therefore, dangerous and sophistical subtleties (p. 89, l. 3 to end of chapter). Chapter XV. Wyclif here formulates (p. 91 to p. 94, l. 6) thirteen objections, most of them bearing on the doctrine of Transcendent Being, common to God and His creature, and proceeds to answer them. We give the objections together with the answers. (1) 'If there is Transcendent Entity, there will be also transcendent beauty, common both to God and the creature ; for entity and beauty imply one another. Every creature would be beautiful with the infinite beauty of God". — We must admit, however, the existence of Trans- cendent Entity, since we conceive it distinctly, apart from the entity of particulars, and in thinking of it, we certainly think of something. But the argument is worthless. The Finite possesses the infinite beauty of God, but not infinitely (p. 94, 1. 6 to p. 95, l. 12). This same distinction serves also to answer the fifth objection, viz., that God would be no better than the lowest of His creatures. For though God and the creature have the same entity, God has it in an infinitely more perfect manner than the creature. Besides, He possesses special attributes which He alone can possess (p. 95, l. 12—30). In the text, the preceding objection is numbered as the seventh. This is a copyist's mistake no doubt. (2) Transcendent entity would be more divine, being universal, than God Himself". — No, for He is the cause of that entity ; and His own incommunicable Being is anterior to the other, as the cause is to
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XXX INTRODUCTION. the effect. He is, therefore, more universal as its cause; it is more universal in predication only. The mere universality of a predicate does not argue its perfection. Perfection, however, generally follows; and always in the case of creatures, if the predication be formal (i. e. essen- tial to the subject) (p. 95, 1. 12 to end of chapter). Chapter XVI. (3) “Transcendent Entity, being caused, cannot be God, the uncaused; yet it is God, according to this theory". — a) In so far as it is caused, it is something that is not-God; but we cannot conclude thence that it is simply not God, i. e. that its idea excludes that of God. b) It comprises non-Deity, but it comprises Deity also. c) The argument would only have weight if we were so absurd as to maintain that the Universal is formally singular ; for the Singular alone is unable to be predicated at the same time of contradictory subjects. The answers b) and c) are the best, but a) is simplest, and suffices: and these answers show us where we can argue from the affirmative, A is a not-B, to the negative, A is not B, and where we cannot (p. 99—p. 102, l. 30). (4) The goodness of any being would be infinite, since it has Trancendental Entity". — Not if the possession be only partial and finite. But the adversary retorts that this either means: A thing is at the same time finitely and infinitely good (since 'to have infinite goodness' is 'to be infinitely good'), or means nothing. We deny this ; to have goodness is not the same as to be good. And if he insists, then we say that no creature can have infinite essential goodness (p. 102—103, 1. 36). (6) God and a stone would be one, since they would have absolutely the same entity". — If 'absolutely' is meant to determine the thing which is Transcendental Entity, we have merely the statement that one and the same thing is a stone, and is God. If it is taken to deter- mine the affirmation of identity, then a stone would be God; a heresy which we deny (p. 103, l. 36 to p. 104, 1. 11). (7) There would be only one Being, since Entity is numerically one, and all things would be identical therewith". — But numerically one' means in the usual sense a being that is one and cannot exist in many numerically distinct individuals; in that sense we must deny that Entity is numerically one. Entity is one in itself, yet may be shared by many ; and if that is meant by numerically one', the argument fails (p. 104, 1. 11—31).
XXX INTRODUCTION. the effect. He is, therefore, more universal as its cause; it is more universal in predication only. The mere universality of a predicate does not argue its perfection. Perfection, however, generally follows; and always in the case of creatures, if the predication be formal (i. e. essen- tial to the subject) (p. 95, 1. 12 to end of chapter). Chapter XVI. (3) “Transcendent Entity, being caused, cannot be God, the uncaused; yet it is God, according to this theory". — a) In so far as it is caused, it is something that is not-God; but we cannot conclude thence that it is simply not God, i. e. that its idea excludes that of God. b) It comprises non-Deity, but it comprises Deity also. c) The argument would only have weight if we were so absurd as to maintain that the Universal is formally singular ; for the Singular alone is unable to be predicated at the same time of contradictory subjects. The answers b) and c) are the best, but a) is simplest, and suffices: and these answers show us where we can argue from the affirmative, A is a not-B, to the negative, A is not B, and where we cannot (p. 99—p. 102, l. 30). (4) The goodness of any being would be infinite, since it has Trancendental Entity". — Not if the possession be only partial and finite. But the adversary retorts that this either means: A thing is at the same time finitely and infinitely good (since 'to have infinite goodness' is 'to be infinitely good'), or means nothing. We deny this ; to have goodness is not the same as to be good. And if he insists, then we say that no creature can have infinite essential goodness (p. 102—103, 1. 36). (6) God and a stone would be one, since they would have absolutely the same entity". — If 'absolutely' is meant to determine the thing which is Transcendental Entity, we have merely the statement that one and the same thing is a stone, and is God. If it is taken to deter- mine the affirmation of identity, then a stone would be God; a heresy which we deny (p. 103, l. 36 to p. 104, 1. 11). (7) There would be only one Being, since Entity is numerically one, and all things would be identical therewith". — But numerically one' means in the usual sense a being that is one and cannot exist in many numerically distinct individuals; in that sense we must deny that Entity is numerically one. Entity is one in itself, yet may be shared by many ; and if that is meant by numerically one', the argument fails (p. 104, 1. 11—31).
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INTRODUCTION. XXXI (8) "Every being is separately numerable; therefore none can have being in common with another." — The same distinction should be made here as in (7) (p. 104, l. 31—39). (9) 'Every being is an individual; therefore there is no universal Being." — A like distinction should again be made. That by which Universal Being is Universal Being — its formal essence — cannot be shared with many ; and if you call that alone individuality, nothing follows. But if you say that Being is individual, meaning that it can in no sense belong to many individuals, we deny this (p. 104, 1. 39 to p. 105, 1. 11). (10) 'Every creature would be as identical with God as the Father or the Son is identical with the Divine Essence." — It is almost im- possible to explain the distinction given here without recurring to the Latin terms used in the text. The Father, according to theologians, is unum (ens) with the Son; but He is not unus (Pater) with the Son. In like manner, a horse, for instance is unum (ens) with God, but not unus (equus) with God. The argument makes the difference between God and the creature to correspond between that of a Divine Person and the Godhead : which difference is not real but fictive. Wyclif, on the contrary, says that it corresponds to the difference between the Persons, which all Catholic theologians admit to be real (p. 105, 1. 11 to p. 196, 1. 16). (11) 'If, because every man is a being, there is a Universal Being, so, because every man is singular, there would be Universal Singularity ! This is absurd." — Not if properly understood. Truth may be uttered respecting falsehood, and universality may be predicated of singularity. But there is no Universal Person; when we say 'A Person', this is a mere abstraction of the mind ; and as soon as personality is abstracted, it ceases to be incommunicable. There is, in different senses, a singular Universal and a Universal Singular (p. 106, l. 16 to end of chapter). Chapter XVII. The adversaries urge that, "if the Universal Man is singular, then it (or he) is identical with the singular man, and there remains only singular humanity". — But this is an equivocation ; for we do not say that the Universal is identical with its singular taken as an indi- vidual. We mean no more than: Every man is this, that, or the other singular, but is not one of them alone' (p. 108 to 109, 1. 30). — 'But’, it is said, what does this, that, or the other stand for ? It must be for one or more singular men, or for nothing at all ; if for the first, your Universal is only so many individuals; if for the second, it does not
INTRODUCTION. XXXI (8) "Every being is separately numerable; therefore none can have being in common with another." — The same distinction should be made here as in (7) (p. 104, l. 31—39). (9) 'Every being is an individual; therefore there is no universal Being." — A like distinction should again be made. That by which Universal Being is Universal Being — its formal essence — cannot be shared with many ; and if you call that alone individuality, nothing follows. But if you say that Being is individual, meaning that it can in no sense belong to many individuals, we deny this (p. 104, 1. 39 to p. 105, 1. 11). (10) 'Every creature would be as identical with God as the Father or the Son is identical with the Divine Essence." — It is almost im- possible to explain the distinction given here without recurring to the Latin terms used in the text. The Father, according to theologians, is unum (ens) with the Son; but He is not unus (Pater) with the Son. In like manner, a horse, for instance is unum (ens) with God, but not unus (equus) with God. The argument makes the difference between God and the creature to correspond between that of a Divine Person and the Godhead : which difference is not real but fictive. Wyclif, on the contrary, says that it corresponds to the difference between the Persons, which all Catholic theologians admit to be real (p. 105, 1. 11 to p. 196, 1. 16). (11) 'If, because every man is a being, there is a Universal Being, so, because every man is singular, there would be Universal Singularity ! This is absurd." — Not if properly understood. Truth may be uttered respecting falsehood, and universality may be predicated of singularity. But there is no Universal Person; when we say 'A Person', this is a mere abstraction of the mind ; and as soon as personality is abstracted, it ceases to be incommunicable. There is, in different senses, a singular Universal and a Universal Singular (p. 106, l. 16 to end of chapter). Chapter XVII. The adversaries urge that, "if the Universal Man is singular, then it (or he) is identical with the singular man, and there remains only singular humanity". — But this is an equivocation ; for we do not say that the Universal is identical with its singular taken as an indi- vidual. We mean no more than: Every man is this, that, or the other singular, but is not one of them alone' (p. 108 to 109, 1. 30). — 'But’, it is said, what does this, that, or the other stand for ? It must be for one or more singular men, or for nothing at all ; if for the first, your Universal is only so many individuals; if for the second, it does not
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XXXII INTRODUCTION. exist". — We answer that there is no need for it to stand for anything in particular. The subject of a proposition may be unreal, and yet the proposition may be true; for instance, A Chimaera cannot run. One of two alternatives is true; this is necessary in sensu composito, and false in sensu diviso. We cannot say that the first alternative is true, nor that the second is so (in sensu diviso); but we are obliged to admit that one of the two — we know not which, but take both together (in sensu composito) — is necessarily true, with a disjunctive existence' (p. 109, 1. 30 to end of p. 110). — To show this distinction more clearly still, I may be allowed to quote once more from Jevons' Ele- mentary Logic, which sets it forth far better than I could do. 'The Fallacy of Composition is a special case of equivocation, arising from the confusion of an universal and a collective term..... We must not argue that ..... because each of the witnesses in a law case is liable to give false or mistaken evidence, no confidence can be placed in the concurrent testimony of a number of witnesses..... The Fallacy of Division is the converse of the preceding, and consists in using the middle term collectively in the major premise but distributively in the minor, so that the whole is divided into its parts. Thus it might be argued : All the angles of a triangle are (together) equal to two right angles ; A B C is an angle of a triangle, therefore A B C is equal to two right angles'. It is evident that the argument used by Wyclif's opponents was a fallacy of Composition. They said : The Universal Man is identical with the singulars A, B, C ... therefore the Universal Man is identical with all singular men, and is nothing more than they. Wyclif replied by positing a ’disjunctive existence' of the Universal in each, which is not the same as singular existence. What then is the nature of this 'disjunctive existence?’. It consists in being indifferent to and independent of the subjects in which it is found. When we say. 'One of these two, A or B, must be true', we predicate the existence of truth as certain; but this existence is not more bound to A than to B. The Universal then, being to the Particular as Form is to Matter, may be either contingent or necessary ; the Particular here meaning the general term with Some prefixed to it: Every man is some man. As matter is vague and indeterminate until determined by its form, so Some man is in comparison with Every man a vague and indeterminate object of thought (p. 111—p. 113, 1. 11), Wyclif says that
XXXII INTRODUCTION. exist". — We answer that there is no need for it to stand for anything in particular. The subject of a proposition may be unreal, and yet the proposition may be true; for instance, A Chimaera cannot run. One of two alternatives is true; this is necessary in sensu composito, and false in sensu diviso. We cannot say that the first alternative is true, nor that the second is so (in sensu diviso); but we are obliged to admit that one of the two — we know not which, but take both together (in sensu composito) — is necessarily true, with a disjunctive existence' (p. 109, 1. 30 to end of p. 110). — To show this distinction more clearly still, I may be allowed to quote once more from Jevons' Ele- mentary Logic, which sets it forth far better than I could do. 'The Fallacy of Composition is a special case of equivocation, arising from the confusion of an universal and a collective term..... We must not argue that ..... because each of the witnesses in a law case is liable to give false or mistaken evidence, no confidence can be placed in the concurrent testimony of a number of witnesses..... The Fallacy of Division is the converse of the preceding, and consists in using the middle term collectively in the major premise but distributively in the minor, so that the whole is divided into its parts. Thus it might be argued : All the angles of a triangle are (together) equal to two right angles ; A B C is an angle of a triangle, therefore A B C is equal to two right angles'. It is evident that the argument used by Wyclif's opponents was a fallacy of Composition. They said : The Universal Man is identical with the singulars A, B, C ... therefore the Universal Man is identical with all singular men, and is nothing more than they. Wyclif replied by positing a ’disjunctive existence' of the Universal in each, which is not the same as singular existence. What then is the nature of this 'disjunctive existence?’. It consists in being indifferent to and independent of the subjects in which it is found. When we say. 'One of these two, A or B, must be true', we predicate the existence of truth as certain; but this existence is not more bound to A than to B. The Universal then, being to the Particular as Form is to Matter, may be either contingent or necessary ; the Particular here meaning the general term with Some prefixed to it: Every man is some man. As matter is vague and indeterminate until determined by its form, so Some man is in comparison with Every man a vague and indeterminate object of thought (p. 111—p. 113, 1. 11), Wyclif says that
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INTRODUCTION. XXXIII this is hard to understand, even by philosophers (difficillime a philosophis et sicut impossibiliter a grossis est secundum hunc modum apprehensibile, p. 112, l. 34, 35) ; and I willingly admit that the general drift of this passage seems very obscure. Continuing his comparison with matter, he remarks that as matter may be manifold, so there may be many such vague, particular, yet not singular, objects. This passage too, at such a distance of time and without the means of knowing any more about the question than our author chooses to say, — seems to me 'difficillime apprehensibile'; and as I frankly confess in a foot-note (p. 113) con- cerning the two following paragraphs, I must rank myself amongst the grossi, to whom the apprehension of these things is as it were impossible (p. 113, l. 11 to p. 114, 1. 40). The chapter closes with some further remarks about Particularity, as distinct both from Singularity and from Universality, properly so called (p. 114, 1. 40 to p. 115, l. 30). Chapter XVIII. The first three pages (p. 115 to p. 118, 1. 20 are relatively without interest, being merely a continuation of the former remarks, and winding up with the assertion that the difficulty consists in pointing out what thing corresponds to the truth of disjunctive propo- sitions, and consequently (I may say) of particular propositions in general. For a particular proposition, v. g. Some man runs' is equivalent to an indefinite number of disjunctives, containing all the singulars under Every Man: 'The man A, or the man B, or ..... the man Z runs. But I must here explain a point which, if left unexplained would seem not far removed from absolute absurdity. On p. 115, and again on p. 118, Wyclif declares that a disjunctive may be true when neither of its parts are true ; and he gives us an example: I speak or I do not speak. Now it looks as if there could be no time when I neither speak nor do not speak. Such, however, is not his meaning. The disjunctive proposition is true, — when? Eternally. Now neither I speak nor I do not speak is eternally true. If we understand thus the "pro aliqua mensura vel aliquo tempore" on p. 116, l. 10, and p. 118, l. 5, 6, the whole meaning of the two passages is quite clear. At this point, our author examines the question of the inherence of the Universal in its particulars. As there are three kinds of difference and of predication, so there are also three degrees of inherence. When I say : "My right eye or my left is necessary to see", "Necessary to see" belongs in fact either to one eye or the other, but vaguely and De Universalibus. C
INTRODUCTION. XXXIII this is hard to understand, even by philosophers (difficillime a philosophis et sicut impossibiliter a grossis est secundum hunc modum apprehensibile, p. 112, l. 34, 35) ; and I willingly admit that the general drift of this passage seems very obscure. Continuing his comparison with matter, he remarks that as matter may be manifold, so there may be many such vague, particular, yet not singular, objects. This passage too, at such a distance of time and without the means of knowing any more about the question than our author chooses to say, — seems to me 'difficillime apprehensibile'; and as I frankly confess in a foot-note (p. 113) con- cerning the two following paragraphs, I must rank myself amongst the grossi, to whom the apprehension of these things is as it were impossible (p. 113, l. 11 to p. 114, 1. 40). The chapter closes with some further remarks about Particularity, as distinct both from Singularity and from Universality, properly so called (p. 114, 1. 40 to p. 115, l. 30). Chapter XVIII. The first three pages (p. 115 to p. 118, 1. 20 are relatively without interest, being merely a continuation of the former remarks, and winding up with the assertion that the difficulty consists in pointing out what thing corresponds to the truth of disjunctive propo- sitions, and consequently (I may say) of particular propositions in general. For a particular proposition, v. g. Some man runs' is equivalent to an indefinite number of disjunctives, containing all the singulars under Every Man: 'The man A, or the man B, or ..... the man Z runs. But I must here explain a point which, if left unexplained would seem not far removed from absolute absurdity. On p. 115, and again on p. 118, Wyclif declares that a disjunctive may be true when neither of its parts are true ; and he gives us an example: I speak or I do not speak. Now it looks as if there could be no time when I neither speak nor do not speak. Such, however, is not his meaning. The disjunctive proposition is true, — when? Eternally. Now neither I speak nor I do not speak is eternally true. If we understand thus the "pro aliqua mensura vel aliquo tempore" on p. 116, l. 10, and p. 118, l. 5, 6, the whole meaning of the two passages is quite clear. At this point, our author examines the question of the inherence of the Universal in its particulars. As there are three kinds of difference and of predication, so there are also three degrees of inherence. When I say : "My right eye or my left is necessary to see", "Necessary to see" belongs in fact either to one eye or the other, but vaguely and De Universalibus. C
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XXXIV INTRODUCTION. without exclusion of inherence in either (the examples given here are mine, not Wyclif's). When I say : "A or B is the first boy in the class', ce First boy in the class" belongs to A or to B; we know not to which of the two, yet we know that it belongs distinctly to one, excluding the other. This is a higher form of inherence, since the vagueness is only in our thought, not in the fact. The lowest of these forms, being the least perceptible, has been denied by some, who are too deeply plunged in the senses to perceive it. The highest is when a Universal is affirmed of many together : as, “All men are mortal'. 'Mortal" belongs to each man separately and to the whole multitude of singular men together. The cavils of our opponents proceed from their not distinguishing between these various sorts of inherence, and are answered victoriously by means of this distinction (p. 118, l. 20 to end of chapter). Chapter XIX. Wyclif replies to the objection numbered (13), inter- verting the order of the objections stated in Ch. XV. 'The Proprium, or property, is not part of the essence of the species, yet it is common to all. In what subject then does the Universal Proprium inhere ? When we say, “Man is capable of laughter", Capable of laughter does not belong merely to individual man, being common to all ; nor to the species, since the Universal Man is not capable of laughter". There are several answers. One is that “capable of laughter" is nothing but a peculiar standpoint from which the species Man is considered, and therefore is objectively identical with Man. But the faculty of laughing varies in the individuals in which it is found (p. 122). Again, we may say that the proposition means only that every man, quà man, is capable of laughter; here man is taken, neither as an individual nor a species, but as something between ; and we have theological instances which authorize us to do so (p. 123, 1. 1—37). For we may consider the Universal man either without reference to the subjects in which it inheres, or with such reference ; in the first case, the species man cannot laugh, in the second it can (p. 123, l. 37 to p. 124, l. 24). There are also other answers which amount nearly to the same ; and by means of these or similar answers, difficulties concerning accidental Universals are also solved. We must, however, remark that though we speak of species and genera in accidents, these are mere abstractions — not realities like the essential differences of substances one from another (p. 124, 1. 24 to end of chapter).
XXXIV INTRODUCTION. without exclusion of inherence in either (the examples given here are mine, not Wyclif's). When I say : "A or B is the first boy in the class', ce First boy in the class" belongs to A or to B; we know not to which of the two, yet we know that it belongs distinctly to one, excluding the other. This is a higher form of inherence, since the vagueness is only in our thought, not in the fact. The lowest of these forms, being the least perceptible, has been denied by some, who are too deeply plunged in the senses to perceive it. The highest is when a Universal is affirmed of many together : as, “All men are mortal'. 'Mortal" belongs to each man separately and to the whole multitude of singular men together. The cavils of our opponents proceed from their not distinguishing between these various sorts of inherence, and are answered victoriously by means of this distinction (p. 118, l. 20 to end of chapter). Chapter XIX. Wyclif replies to the objection numbered (13), inter- verting the order of the objections stated in Ch. XV. 'The Proprium, or property, is not part of the essence of the species, yet it is common to all. In what subject then does the Universal Proprium inhere ? When we say, “Man is capable of laughter", Capable of laughter does not belong merely to individual man, being common to all ; nor to the species, since the Universal Man is not capable of laughter". There are several answers. One is that “capable of laughter" is nothing but a peculiar standpoint from which the species Man is considered, and therefore is objectively identical with Man. But the faculty of laughing varies in the individuals in which it is found (p. 122). Again, we may say that the proposition means only that every man, quà man, is capable of laughter; here man is taken, neither as an individual nor a species, but as something between ; and we have theological instances which authorize us to do so (p. 123, 1. 1—37). For we may consider the Universal man either without reference to the subjects in which it inheres, or with such reference ; in the first case, the species man cannot laugh, in the second it can (p. 123, l. 37 to p. 124, l. 24). There are also other answers which amount nearly to the same ; and by means of these or similar answers, difficulties concerning accidental Universals are also solved. We must, however, remark that though we speak of species and genera in accidents, these are mere abstractions — not realities like the essential differences of substances one from another (p. 124, 1. 24 to end of chapter).
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INTRODUCTION. XXXV Chapter XX. Possibly following up the idea of abstract Universals', Wyclif now proceeds to state that some are simply real, some potentially real, and some merely conceptual, or pure abstractions. There is only one sun, but by a miracle there might be many. The sun is therefore a potential Universal, which in the ordinary course of nature exists only in one singular. If we admit St. Thomas' doctrine that each angel is of a different species which cannot possibly exist in more than one individual, we shall still be able to conceive the Universal of each species of angel, though this is only Universal in our minds (p. 127, 1. 1—27). Thus there are three degrees of Universality, from greatest to least: actual, potential, and merely conceptual; though these degrees have nothing to do with the entitative perfection of the singulars. Of the last (conceptual) we may say that we ought to follow the doctrine of St. Thomas con- cerning Angels, and consequently admit in their case only conceptual universality. These three degrees are in close connection with the degrees of essential difference above mentioned (p. 127, l. 27 to end of chapter). Chapter XXI. Wyclif returns to the question already dealt with before, viz., whether there can be any Universal which is never existent in any of its singulars, and he proceeds hereupon to classify the ten categories — substance and the nine sorts of accidents, which are the substance as perfected in three ways (quidditatively, qualitatively, and quantitatively) and in three degrees (little, more, and most). These, com- bined, give nine determinations of Substance; but it is very difficult — if we admit (though this is doubtful) that the Nine Categories of Aristotle rightly correspond to these divisions of Substance — to show how and in what sense they correspond; we may let the question drop (p. 131 to p. 135, l. 30). Notwithstanding we can show that there must be ten categories and not more, but omit for want of space many arguments by which this division can be proved (p. 135, 1. 30 to p. 137, 1. 13). Now these ten categories have under them species of which they consist; and if any species were wanting, they would therefore be mutilated ; which is contrary to God's wisdom and power. But certain species will not exist after the Day of Judgment (p. 137, l. 13 to end of chapter). Chapter XXII examines whether Universals have more perfect entity than their respective singulars. It must be so, for no number of singulars can equal the perfection of the species. Yet the individual Man, not the Universal, is the image of God and of the Trinity. If then intellectual C*
INTRODUCTION. XXXV Chapter XX. Possibly following up the idea of abstract Universals', Wyclif now proceeds to state that some are simply real, some potentially real, and some merely conceptual, or pure abstractions. There is only one sun, but by a miracle there might be many. The sun is therefore a potential Universal, which in the ordinary course of nature exists only in one singular. If we admit St. Thomas' doctrine that each angel is of a different species which cannot possibly exist in more than one individual, we shall still be able to conceive the Universal of each species of angel, though this is only Universal in our minds (p. 127, 1. 1—27). Thus there are three degrees of Universality, from greatest to least: actual, potential, and merely conceptual; though these degrees have nothing to do with the entitative perfection of the singulars. Of the last (conceptual) we may say that we ought to follow the doctrine of St. Thomas con- cerning Angels, and consequently admit in their case only conceptual universality. These three degrees are in close connection with the degrees of essential difference above mentioned (p. 127, l. 27 to end of chapter). Chapter XXI. Wyclif returns to the question already dealt with before, viz., whether there can be any Universal which is never existent in any of its singulars, and he proceeds hereupon to classify the ten categories — substance and the nine sorts of accidents, which are the substance as perfected in three ways (quidditatively, qualitatively, and quantitatively) and in three degrees (little, more, and most). These, com- bined, give nine determinations of Substance; but it is very difficult — if we admit (though this is doubtful) that the Nine Categories of Aristotle rightly correspond to these divisions of Substance — to show how and in what sense they correspond; we may let the question drop (p. 131 to p. 135, l. 30). Notwithstanding we can show that there must be ten categories and not more, but omit for want of space many arguments by which this division can be proved (p. 135, 1. 30 to p. 137, 1. 13). Now these ten categories have under them species of which they consist; and if any species were wanting, they would therefore be mutilated ; which is contrary to God's wisdom and power. But certain species will not exist after the Day of Judgment (p. 137, l. 13 to end of chapter). Chapter XXII examines whether Universals have more perfect entity than their respective singulars. It must be so, for no number of singulars can equal the perfection of the species. Yet the individual Man, not the Universal, is the image of God and of the Trinity. If then intellectual C*
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XXXVI INTRODUCTION. natures have Universals, these cannot be more perfect; which contra- dicts what has just been said. Most writers deny that this image exists in the human soul, for then it would be, like the Trinity, Three Persons ; and the Word of God united to the human soul in Christ would be also three persons. But the fact is that the Church, having for very good reasons chosen to call the Uncreated Three by the name of persons, and not the Created Trinity, we may either call the latter so or not; there is nothing derogatory to God in doing so (p. 139 to p. 142, 1. 25). As to Christ, if we call the parts of a soul persons, we must assume that when united to the Word, they lose their hypostases; if not, we may simply call them constituents: it does not follow that what is a Person in God must necessarily be a person in man (p. 142, l. 25 to p. 143, l. 14). At any rate, the argument first stated fails. If each man is the image of God, the Universal Man, being each singular man, is the image of God many times repeated, and therefore far more perfect. This as regards natural perfection; as to supernatural entity, a singular may be more perfect than the Universal (p. 143, l. 14 to end of chapter). Chapter XXIII. Wyclif now at last answers the twelfth difficulty, which tends to show that Universals, doing nothing and being of no use, are mere superfluous monsters. This he denies. For firstly they are the formal causes of things. It would be impossible for any singular being to exist without them, since the singular is implied in the Universal. They are also final causes. The non-existence of Man would mean the non-existence of any singular man, and not vice versâ; therefore the former does not exist for the latter, but the latter for the former ; and as the non�existence of Man would be a far greater evil than the non- existence of any particular man, the existence of the former is a far greater good than that of the latter (p. 145 to 147, l. 26). Also, they are, in a sense, efficient causes. Man' does what his singulars do, i. e. in his singulars, though not in himself. They are not properly agents, however, nor need they be. In themselves they do not act, but in their state of union with individuals, the acts of these may be said to be theirs, since they are the principles of the individuals. Therefore they are exceedingly useful, and far more so than their individuals (p. 147, 1. 26 to p. 150, 1. 4). Universal man is a bond of common humanity between man and man, and we should rejoice that this bond exists (p. 450, 1. 4—17). Wyclif ends the chapter and the work by declaring
XXXVI INTRODUCTION. natures have Universals, these cannot be more perfect; which contra- dicts what has just been said. Most writers deny that this image exists in the human soul, for then it would be, like the Trinity, Three Persons ; and the Word of God united to the human soul in Christ would be also three persons. But the fact is that the Church, having for very good reasons chosen to call the Uncreated Three by the name of persons, and not the Created Trinity, we may either call the latter so or not; there is nothing derogatory to God in doing so (p. 139 to p. 142, 1. 25). As to Christ, if we call the parts of a soul persons, we must assume that when united to the Word, they lose their hypostases; if not, we may simply call them constituents: it does not follow that what is a Person in God must necessarily be a person in man (p. 142, l. 25 to p. 143, l. 14). At any rate, the argument first stated fails. If each man is the image of God, the Universal Man, being each singular man, is the image of God many times repeated, and therefore far more perfect. This as regards natural perfection; as to supernatural entity, a singular may be more perfect than the Universal (p. 143, l. 14 to end of chapter). Chapter XXIII. Wyclif now at last answers the twelfth difficulty, which tends to show that Universals, doing nothing and being of no use, are mere superfluous monsters. This he denies. For firstly they are the formal causes of things. It would be impossible for any singular being to exist without them, since the singular is implied in the Universal. They are also final causes. The non-existence of Man would mean the non-existence of any singular man, and not vice versâ; therefore the former does not exist for the latter, but the latter for the former ; and as the non�existence of Man would be a far greater evil than the non- existence of any particular man, the existence of the former is a far greater good than that of the latter (p. 145 to 147, l. 26). Also, they are, in a sense, efficient causes. Man' does what his singulars do, i. e. in his singulars, though not in himself. They are not properly agents, however, nor need they be. In themselves they do not act, but in their state of union with individuals, the acts of these may be said to be theirs, since they are the principles of the individuals. Therefore they are exceedingly useful, and far more so than their individuals (p. 147, 1. 26 to p. 150, 1. 4). Universal man is a bond of common humanity between man and man, and we should rejoice that this bond exists (p. 450, 1. 4—17). Wyclif ends the chapter and the work by declaring
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INTRODUCTION. XXXVII that in view of the great advantage which accrues to us thereby, no one should deny the Universals, if not certain that they do not exist, and it is impossible to attain such certitude. Men who have a common board (this looks like a hit at some monastic opponents) ought not to be so set against a common humanity. "For myself," he says, "I rejoice to share therein, and I feel that it deserves far more praise and love than my own individuality.' III. Analysis of the Fragmenta. As the writer declares on p. 256, l. 16, 17, "Suppono quedam tradita in 3cio tractatu loyco Magistri Johannis Wyclif," we are, as I said before, entitled to regard these pages as at least inspired by the Master, though written by a disciple. But nowhere else in his printed works does Wyclif give such desperate and uncompromising directions for the defender in an exercise of 'Obligations'; and most likely they were only for use in cases of extreme danger, and when the defender was very hard pressed. I have already stated at some length (Logica, vol. I. Introduction, pp. XXVII—XXX) what I suppose this exercise to have been, and need not repeat it here. There are three modes of answering in the Exercise of Obligations. The first consists in admitting the premises of the syllogism separately, and denying them, if taken together so as to form a copulative. And if they be not thus taken together, it is still possible to deny the con- clusion of any syllogism ; for it is impossible to prove that the conclusion is right without a copulative proposition, which can always be denied (p. 152 to 153, l. 26). This looks a good deal like an abuse of dialectical subtlety ; for then any argument, however powerful, might be rendered worthless. For instance : “All men are mortal and Englishmen are men", might be denied, whilst we admit each of the parts separately ; and it becomes very hard indeed to prove the copulative syllogistically when there is no direct denial of its parts. And the writer remarks (p. 154, l. 30—35) that this and the following mode of defence are available not only in Obligations, but in other arguments (indifferenter in casu vel extra casum). But no doubt it was a convenient way of getting out of a tight place.
INTRODUCTION. XXXVII that in view of the great advantage which accrues to us thereby, no one should deny the Universals, if not certain that they do not exist, and it is impossible to attain such certitude. Men who have a common board (this looks like a hit at some monastic opponents) ought not to be so set against a common humanity. "For myself," he says, "I rejoice to share therein, and I feel that it deserves far more praise and love than my own individuality.' III. Analysis of the Fragmenta. As the writer declares on p. 256, l. 16, 17, "Suppono quedam tradita in 3cio tractatu loyco Magistri Johannis Wyclif," we are, as I said before, entitled to regard these pages as at least inspired by the Master, though written by a disciple. But nowhere else in his printed works does Wyclif give such desperate and uncompromising directions for the defender in an exercise of 'Obligations'; and most likely they were only for use in cases of extreme danger, and when the defender was very hard pressed. I have already stated at some length (Logica, vol. I. Introduction, pp. XXVII—XXX) what I suppose this exercise to have been, and need not repeat it here. There are three modes of answering in the Exercise of Obligations. The first consists in admitting the premises of the syllogism separately, and denying them, if taken together so as to form a copulative. And if they be not thus taken together, it is still possible to deny the con- clusion of any syllogism ; for it is impossible to prove that the conclusion is right without a copulative proposition, which can always be denied (p. 152 to 153, l. 26). This looks a good deal like an abuse of dialectical subtlety ; for then any argument, however powerful, might be rendered worthless. For instance : “All men are mortal and Englishmen are men", might be denied, whilst we admit each of the parts separately ; and it becomes very hard indeed to prove the copulative syllogistically when there is no direct denial of its parts. And the writer remarks (p. 154, l. 30—35) that this and the following mode of defence are available not only in Obligations, but in other arguments (indifferenter in casu vel extra casum). But no doubt it was a convenient way of getting out of a tight place.
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XXXVIII INTRODUCTION. The second mode of answering consisted in admitting or denying the premises as may be more convenient, but always denying the con- clusion. And if it be argued: You ought to admit this conclusion, for you know it is logically drawn; answer : To be logically drawn is not enough, the conclusion must not make me contradict myself; and therefore I deny it." If v. g. you admit that Every man runs, deny its contra- dictory (that some man does not run); then, should the opponent say : cev You do not run and you are a man;" you can also admit this, but deny the conclusion, as landing you in self-contradiction (p. 153, 1. 26 to p. 154, l. 35). This mode too seems to savour somewhat of quibbling. It may be doubted, indeed, whether in casu vel extra casum' has the sense which I give to it, viz., that these answers are applicable to all arguments; but I do not know what other sense they can bear, specially together with the context (obligatus, l. 34). Moreover, casus is very often used by Wyclif in this precise sense. Compare Logica, vol. I, p. 70, 1. 25, 26; p. 71, l. 3, 6, 10, 11 ; and further in many places, in which casus stands for the proposition put for admission and denial in the Exercise of Obligations. The third mode is much simpler, but must, if followed, have led — possibly with no bad results — to the total abandonment of this Exer- cise. It is as if a chess-player had found an easy means to get a drawn game in every case. You answer as you like, and deny the conclusion: if urged, deny that there is any power of conclusion in the premises, because in these Exercises words have no longer the meaning which they usually bear. A man swears that he is committing perjury ; is he doing so or not? Answer Yes or No, as you please. If Yes, the adver- sary then points out that you contradict yourself, since you admit that he speaks the truth. You deny that; and when he presses you, say ; The argument is unmeaning, and has therefore no consequence at all : the propositions have been admitted, merely because in these exercises one is obliged to admit or deny them. The writer ends by pointing out (no doubt to a very raw beginner) that such an answer cannot be used except in these special cases (p. 154, 1. 35 to p. 156, 1. 8). The few lines entitled Insolubilia Pulchra call for no comment, and are only important because of the allusion to Wyclif which they contain.
XXXVIII INTRODUCTION. The second mode of answering consisted in admitting or denying the premises as may be more convenient, but always denying the con- clusion. And if it be argued: You ought to admit this conclusion, for you know it is logically drawn; answer : To be logically drawn is not enough, the conclusion must not make me contradict myself; and therefore I deny it." If v. g. you admit that Every man runs, deny its contra- dictory (that some man does not run); then, should the opponent say : cev You do not run and you are a man;" you can also admit this, but deny the conclusion, as landing you in self-contradiction (p. 153, 1. 26 to p. 154, l. 35). This mode too seems to savour somewhat of quibbling. It may be doubted, indeed, whether in casu vel extra casum' has the sense which I give to it, viz., that these answers are applicable to all arguments; but I do not know what other sense they can bear, specially together with the context (obligatus, l. 34). Moreover, casus is very often used by Wyclif in this precise sense. Compare Logica, vol. I, p. 70, 1. 25, 26; p. 71, l. 3, 6, 10, 11 ; and further in many places, in which casus stands for the proposition put for admission and denial in the Exercise of Obligations. The third mode is much simpler, but must, if followed, have led — possibly with no bad results — to the total abandonment of this Exer- cise. It is as if a chess-player had found an easy means to get a drawn game in every case. You answer as you like, and deny the conclusion: if urged, deny that there is any power of conclusion in the premises, because in these Exercises words have no longer the meaning which they usually bear. A man swears that he is committing perjury ; is he doing so or not? Answer Yes or No, as you please. If Yes, the adver- sary then points out that you contradict yourself, since you admit that he speaks the truth. You deny that; and when he presses you, say ; The argument is unmeaning, and has therefore no consequence at all : the propositions have been admitted, merely because in these exercises one is obliged to admit or deny them. The writer ends by pointing out (no doubt to a very raw beginner) that such an answer cannot be used except in these special cases (p. 154, 1. 35 to p. 156, 1. 8). The few lines entitled Insolubilia Pulchra call for no comment, and are only important because of the allusion to Wyclif which they contain.
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INTRODUCTION. XXXIX IV. Analysis of the Notae et Questiones Variae. It is almost impossible to analyze a text so corrupt as this. It is better then to take the two most salient passages. From p. 158 to p. 161. Wyclif examines the question whether every truth has a corre- sponding falsehood. By falsehood we cannot mean non-entity, for then we would mean nothing (p. 159, l. 5—10); it is an entity, the belief that something which is, is not. Now the First Truth (There exists a God) can have no corresponding falsehood, since that would be an entity, and absolutely bad, even as God is absolutely good ; but nothing is absolutely bad. Nor can the Second Truth (Creatures exist) have a corresponding falsehood. That, if it existed, would be the worst of all things; and there is no such worst'. — And consequently since these truths, which are entities, make up the sum of being, no truth can have an opposite falsehood : for no entity has a contradictory non-entity. — Waiving for a moment the peculiar theories of Wyclif's system, we cannot but admit that this last argument sheds light upon many a modern controversy. Hegel has affirmed, as all know, that Being and Non-Being are one and the same, since to be thought of is to be, and Non-Being is thought of. As Wyclif points out, Non-Being is not, and cannot be, the contradictory of Being. When we say Some Non-Being is a Being, we say true in a certain sense; when we say, Some Not man is a man, we say what cannot possibly be true. Yet the first proposition, as it stands, looks as self-contradictory as the second. As a matter of fact, Being is not taken in the same sense in the subject as Being in the predicate; we have two different terms, though there is a certain analogy between them. The Principle of Contradiction (pace Hegel!) thus remains unassailable, since it only affirms that you cannot assert and deny at the same time the same thing in the same sense. Non-Being is something thought of, but it is not thought of in the same way as Being thought of without the negation. In the same way, if it should be said : What is not thought of is thought of : "It is," we answer, “but it is thought of negatively, whilst the predicate Thought of embraces every manner of thinking." These subtleties are worth while noticing, since the name of their inventor is Hegel. Another point, which touches the very essence of Wyclif's theory, is that All positive entities exist in one first mode of being, and conse-
INTRODUCTION. XXXIX IV. Analysis of the Notae et Questiones Variae. It is almost impossible to analyze a text so corrupt as this. It is better then to take the two most salient passages. From p. 158 to p. 161. Wyclif examines the question whether every truth has a corre- sponding falsehood. By falsehood we cannot mean non-entity, for then we would mean nothing (p. 159, l. 5—10); it is an entity, the belief that something which is, is not. Now the First Truth (There exists a God) can have no corresponding falsehood, since that would be an entity, and absolutely bad, even as God is absolutely good ; but nothing is absolutely bad. Nor can the Second Truth (Creatures exist) have a corresponding falsehood. That, if it existed, would be the worst of all things; and there is no such worst'. — And consequently since these truths, which are entities, make up the sum of being, no truth can have an opposite falsehood : for no entity has a contradictory non-entity. — Waiving for a moment the peculiar theories of Wyclif's system, we cannot but admit that this last argument sheds light upon many a modern controversy. Hegel has affirmed, as all know, that Being and Non-Being are one and the same, since to be thought of is to be, and Non-Being is thought of. As Wyclif points out, Non-Being is not, and cannot be, the contradictory of Being. When we say Some Non-Being is a Being, we say true in a certain sense; when we say, Some Not man is a man, we say what cannot possibly be true. Yet the first proposition, as it stands, looks as self-contradictory as the second. As a matter of fact, Being is not taken in the same sense in the subject as Being in the predicate; we have two different terms, though there is a certain analogy between them. The Principle of Contradiction (pace Hegel!) thus remains unassailable, since it only affirms that you cannot assert and deny at the same time the same thing in the same sense. Non-Being is something thought of, but it is not thought of in the same way as Being thought of without the negation. In the same way, if it should be said : What is not thought of is thought of : "It is," we answer, “but it is thought of negatively, whilst the predicate Thought of embraces every manner of thinking." These subtleties are worth while noticing, since the name of their inventor is Hegel. Another point, which touches the very essence of Wyclif's theory, is that All positive entities exist in one first mode of being, and conse-
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XL INTRODUCTION. quently, that All positive entities (omne genitum) have eternal existence (esse) p. 167—168. We cannot, of anything that has existed or will exist (positive entities) say absolutely, “This does not exist". Since it is eternally true that it will exist or has existed, the will exist' or has existed' is eternal ; and this truth being identical with entity, some entity must therefore be everlastingly predicable of this being, and no absolute negation of its existence can be true. Therefore everything exists (in a sense) eternally ; but we must distinguish between its intelligible existence, its becoming, and its specific being. Only the first is everlasting. Thus far Wyclif; but it is easily conceivable that his followers may have pro- ceeded farther. For the becoming' of any being is eternally true, and so is its specific being ; and if we distinguish between its 'intelligible becoming' and its 'becoming as a fact', then it may be urged that be- coming as a fact' is also eternally true. The argument might be continued indefinitely, with an indefinite number of distinctions, neither assailant nor defender being worsted. V. Analysis of De Materia. Though the text of this tractate is less corrupt than that of the former three, if we consider each sentence in particular, it is not less difficult to analyze than they are. There is a great gap, — I think between pages 172 and 173 ; indeed it would seem as though what precedes p. 173 has no connection whatever with the rest of the treatise. The title, De Materia, is merely conjectural (see Shirley's Cata- logue) and nothing more is said about matter after p. 172. This indeed is not a sufficient reason to conclude that these two parts are fragments of different treatises, for Wyclif is often given to wandering far from his subject; but it authorizes us in analyzing the two parts separately. First Part (p. 170—173). Primal matter never can be a predicate. This means, not that we cannot say of any given body, This is matter ; but that it is the first underlying subject of all forms ; all forms or determinations are therefore predicable of it, and not vice versâ. We say truly, This is matter, but then we mean determined matter, not the first underlying subject. The question is, whether this primordial matter is absolutely formless in its essence. Wyclif proceeds to solve the problem, noting the different terms used to denote matter, form, and compound,
XL INTRODUCTION. quently, that All positive entities (omne genitum) have eternal existence (esse) p. 167—168. We cannot, of anything that has existed or will exist (positive entities) say absolutely, “This does not exist". Since it is eternally true that it will exist or has existed, the will exist' or has existed' is eternal ; and this truth being identical with entity, some entity must therefore be everlastingly predicable of this being, and no absolute negation of its existence can be true. Therefore everything exists (in a sense) eternally ; but we must distinguish between its intelligible existence, its becoming, and its specific being. Only the first is everlasting. Thus far Wyclif; but it is easily conceivable that his followers may have pro- ceeded farther. For the becoming' of any being is eternally true, and so is its specific being ; and if we distinguish between its 'intelligible becoming' and its 'becoming as a fact', then it may be urged that be- coming as a fact' is also eternally true. The argument might be continued indefinitely, with an indefinite number of distinctions, neither assailant nor defender being worsted. V. Analysis of De Materia. Though the text of this tractate is less corrupt than that of the former three, if we consider each sentence in particular, it is not less difficult to analyze than they are. There is a great gap, — I think between pages 172 and 173 ; indeed it would seem as though what precedes p. 173 has no connection whatever with the rest of the treatise. The title, De Materia, is merely conjectural (see Shirley's Cata- logue) and nothing more is said about matter after p. 172. This indeed is not a sufficient reason to conclude that these two parts are fragments of different treatises, for Wyclif is often given to wandering far from his subject; but it authorizes us in analyzing the two parts separately. First Part (p. 170—173). Primal matter never can be a predicate. This means, not that we cannot say of any given body, This is matter ; but that it is the first underlying subject of all forms ; all forms or determinations are therefore predicable of it, and not vice versâ. We say truly, This is matter, but then we mean determined matter, not the first underlying subject. The question is, whether this primordial matter is absolutely formless in its essence. Wyclif proceeds to solve the problem, noting the different terms used to denote matter, form, and compound,
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INTRODUCTION. XLI he defines substantial and accidental form, and draws certain corollaries from these premises, which no doubt were to serve for the full solution: but the first part comes to an end here, and we find nothing more on the subject. Second Part (p. 173 to the end of the work). Here we have two questions answered. The first, is (p. 173, 1. 2, 3) Whether the Universals have only ideal being in the Divine Mind ; the second seems to be, so far as I can judge, Whether the Universals are really distinct from their singulars. To the first he answers (p. 173, 1. 3, 4; p. 175, 1. 14, 15) that we must admit the Divine Ideas of all things; and (p. 173, l. 38, 39) that every creature, in its intelligible being, is God. He nowhere states explicitly that the Universals have only ideal Being in God; but this is easy to gather from the whole sense of p. 174. — As to the second question, he on p. 179, 1. 4, 5, after having described the various sorts of Universals, and enumerated the various opinions concerning them, declares distinctly that there is no Universal that is really and essentially different from its singulars. Such an opinion is, perhaps wrongly, ascribed to Plato by Aristotle. Yet the Universal has an entity of its own, and differs from its singulars by a formal difference only ; but each Universal differs really from every other. Such are the five tractates, or fragments of tractates, which are now published. Either by reason of their original imperfections, or by those which the copyists have introduced, they are far less easy to analyze than the works contained in the first volume. Yet even the short and inadequate analysis which I have given shows here and there many flashes of profound thought, not unworthy of the great thinker who wrote these tractates.
INTRODUCTION. XLI he defines substantial and accidental form, and draws certain corollaries from these premises, which no doubt were to serve for the full solution: but the first part comes to an end here, and we find nothing more on the subject. Second Part (p. 173 to the end of the work). Here we have two questions answered. The first, is (p. 173, 1. 2, 3) Whether the Universals have only ideal being in the Divine Mind ; the second seems to be, so far as I can judge, Whether the Universals are really distinct from their singulars. To the first he answers (p. 173, 1. 3, 4; p. 175, 1. 14, 15) that we must admit the Divine Ideas of all things; and (p. 173, l. 38, 39) that every creature, in its intelligible being, is God. He nowhere states explicitly that the Universals have only ideal Being in God; but this is easy to gather from the whole sense of p. 174. — As to the second question, he on p. 179, 1. 4, 5, after having described the various sorts of Universals, and enumerated the various opinions concerning them, declares distinctly that there is no Universal that is really and essentially different from its singulars. Such an opinion is, perhaps wrongly, ascribed to Plato by Aristotle. Yet the Universal has an entity of its own, and differs from its singulars by a formal difference only ; but each Universal differs really from every other. Such are the five tractates, or fragments of tractates, which are now published. Either by reason of their original imperfections, or by those which the copyists have introduced, they are far less easy to analyze than the works contained in the first volume. Yet even the short and inadequate analysis which I have given shows here and there many flashes of profound thought, not unworthy of the great thinker who wrote these tractates.
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CAPITULUM PRIMUM. Are there Cum multis in philosophia prima famosis visum Universal sit oportere non esse formas quasdam rerum communes forms of things, or are there quas quidam universalia seu rerum universalitates none? Even those who seem 5 appellant, aliis vero apparet huiusmodi formas sic ne- to deny them, admit them in cesse esse; et eciam illi qui res singulares existentes reality; and has formas habere, vocibus negant, corde illas habere though the question has profiteri coguntur; et quamvis eas a singularibus voce- long been disputed, tenus removent, semper mente ipsas in illis participant; it is good to ro et nedum intellectus, sed et sensus corporei tales for- go into the arguments on mas in singularibus percipere videntur, prius naturaliter both sides even in our days, percipientes istam substanciam esse coloratam quam regarding them ipsam hoc vel alia specie coloris colorari, et prius esse with impartiality. rubram quam vel hoc vel illo gradu rubedinis profor- We must not presume on the 15 mari: propter quod, licet retractis temporibus multa strength of our et plurima, hinc, inde, alta et profunda contra et iuxta reason, but trust that God posita sint, ut veritas huius materie claresceret; videtur will give us light in this tamen non esse inutile eciam in nostro tempore ad- matter. Let us huc utcumque motiva apparencia que occurrere pote- then in humble confidence 20 runt contra et iuxta se ponere et oculo indifferenti enquire whether the perspicere easdem, si forte dominus veritatis falsitatem ideal forms of circa hanc materiam detegere et verum, ita amplius things exist or do not exist patefacere dignaretur. Et sicut nemo presumere debet in the Divine quod de veritatibus suis materiam hanc hominibus mind. 25 delucidare posset, sic nemini pie et humiliter in veri- tate philosophari conanti desperandum est; quando deus infinite potens, sciens, et benivolus est eum in hac re ad satis illuminare. Accedamus ergo cum fiducia ad tronum gracie, motivis hinc inde petentes, querentes, et puls- 193% 2. Gap for initial letter MS. 1. Capitulum primum deest MS. 2. (2) fomosis' MS. 12. percipiens (!) MS. 22. ta MS. 23. me un pro neminini MS. 27. cu pro eum MS. 1. MSS. Univ. Prag. IV. H. 9. 2. Philosophia prima, i. e. Ontology or General Metaphysic. 12. Percipientes. In this copy there are a great many grammatical errors. I shall only correct those which render the sense ambiguous. De Universalibus.
CAPITULUM PRIMUM. Are there Cum multis in philosophia prima famosis visum Universal sit oportere non esse formas quasdam rerum communes forms of things, or are there quas quidam universalia seu rerum universalitates none? Even those who seem 5 appellant, aliis vero apparet huiusmodi formas sic ne- to deny them, admit them in cesse esse; et eciam illi qui res singulares existentes reality; and has formas habere, vocibus negant, corde illas habere though the question has profiteri coguntur; et quamvis eas a singularibus voce- long been disputed, tenus removent, semper mente ipsas in illis participant; it is good to ro et nedum intellectus, sed et sensus corporei tales for- go into the arguments on mas in singularibus percipere videntur, prius naturaliter both sides even in our days, percipientes istam substanciam esse coloratam quam regarding them ipsam hoc vel alia specie coloris colorari, et prius esse with impartiality. rubram quam vel hoc vel illo gradu rubedinis profor- We must not presume on the 15 mari: propter quod, licet retractis temporibus multa strength of our et plurima, hinc, inde, alta et profunda contra et iuxta reason, but trust that God posita sint, ut veritas huius materie claresceret; videtur will give us light in this tamen non esse inutile eciam in nostro tempore ad- matter. Let us huc utcumque motiva apparencia que occurrere pote- then in humble confidence 20 runt contra et iuxta se ponere et oculo indifferenti enquire whether the perspicere easdem, si forte dominus veritatis falsitatem ideal forms of circa hanc materiam detegere et verum, ita amplius things exist or do not exist patefacere dignaretur. Et sicut nemo presumere debet in the Divine quod de veritatibus suis materiam hanc hominibus mind. 25 delucidare posset, sic nemini pie et humiliter in veri- tate philosophari conanti desperandum est; quando deus infinite potens, sciens, et benivolus est eum in hac re ad satis illuminare. Accedamus ergo cum fiducia ad tronum gracie, motivis hinc inde petentes, querentes, et puls- 193% 2. Gap for initial letter MS. 1. Capitulum primum deest MS. 2. (2) fomosis' MS. 12. percipiens (!) MS. 22. ta MS. 23. me un pro neminini MS. 27. cu pro eum MS. 1. MSS. Univ. Prag. IV. H. 9. 2. Philosophia prima, i. e. Ontology or General Metaphysic. 12. Percipientes. In this copy there are a great many grammatical errors. I shall only correct those which render the sense ambiguous. De Universalibus.
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2 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. I. antes, si in mente divina sint vel non sint forme rerum ydeales communes. Videtur enim quibusdam literatis ad salutem Some even consider that necessarium non discredere esse huiusmodi formas to deny their existence would ydeales; valde eciam infidelis esset deo qui sibi hunc be a sin against faith mundum sensibilem abnegaret. Et quia multitudo ydea- unless there were some rum (a katholicis doctoribus in nullis vel paucis famosis evident reason negare presumentibus) creditur esse mundus architypus for such denial. longe preciosior mundo I isto sensibili, infidelis deo We, taking it 194" that the videretur qui sine patenti racione hunc mundum archi-л0 arguments pro are typum abnegare presumeret. Et quia credimus argu- conclusive, menta pro parte affirmativa de necessitate concludere, those contra being sophisms, et pro parte negativa esse puras apparencias zophisticas, will first expound the ideo in primis, si quod motivum pro affirmacione formier; and in the first occurreret inducemus, posterius zophismata huius ma- place examine terie, si deus dederit, dissolvenda. Et quia ydee in mente whether the full and proper divina videntur potissime esse intelligibilitates prime et intelligibility propriissime rerum ad extra, ideo pro primo argu- of things really exists in God. mento videndum est si in hoc eis veritas consenciat. God has full knowledge of Argumentatur igitur sic: deus maxime proprie 20 any man as he is a man, of intelligit hominem ut homo est, Sor ut Sor est, et ani- any individual mal ut animal est etc. Igitur in mente divina est pro- man as that individual, of priissime intelligibilis homo ut homo est, etc. Et per any animated consequens in mente divina est proprie propria intelli- being as that animated being. gibilitas hominis, ut homo est; et per consequens deus 25 The animated being may be secundum illam solum intelligit hominem ut homo est, a man, and the et non ut Sor est, vel ut animal est: igitur est proprie man this individual, but propria intelligibilitas in mente divina animalis ut animal God knows him in these est, alia ab animalitate Platonis; et sic de Sorte ut three different ways with full Sor est. cognition; — of Igitur in mente divina sunt tres intelligibilitates the individual, the less general, maxime proprie. Prima singularis, scilicet Sortis, ut and the more general: this is Sor est. Secunda communis, et 3° universalior. Igitur indubitable. est dare universalem ydeam hominis, ut homo est, in But every intelligibility in mente divina, et aliam animalis, ut animal est, et aliam 35 God's mind is an archetype; corporis, ut corpus est, etc. Nec est ponendum in du- so the cognítion bium, si deus intelligat propriissime Sortem ut Sor est, of man qua man is the et hominem ut homo est, et animal ut animal est, etc., principle of creating Man cum homo intus proprie intelligat Sortem ut Sor est, qua man, not et hominem ut homo est, etc. Cum igitur in mente 40 qua individual. 15 30 MS. 3. lia 9 MS. 16. dissolvende MS. 21. Sor ut ut MS. 39. ho
2 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. I. antes, si in mente divina sint vel non sint forme rerum ydeales communes. Videtur enim quibusdam literatis ad salutem Some even consider that necessarium non discredere esse huiusmodi formas to deny their existence would ydeales; valde eciam infidelis esset deo qui sibi hunc be a sin against faith mundum sensibilem abnegaret. Et quia multitudo ydea- unless there were some rum (a katholicis doctoribus in nullis vel paucis famosis evident reason negare presumentibus) creditur esse mundus architypus for such denial. longe preciosior mundo I isto sensibili, infidelis deo We, taking it 194" that the videretur qui sine patenti racione hunc mundum archi-л0 arguments pro are typum abnegare presumeret. Et quia credimus argu- conclusive, menta pro parte affirmativa de necessitate concludere, those contra being sophisms, et pro parte negativa esse puras apparencias zophisticas, will first expound the ideo in primis, si quod motivum pro affirmacione formier; and in the first occurreret inducemus, posterius zophismata huius ma- place examine terie, si deus dederit, dissolvenda. Et quia ydee in mente whether the full and proper divina videntur potissime esse intelligibilitates prime et intelligibility propriissime rerum ad extra, ideo pro primo argu- of things really exists in God. mento videndum est si in hoc eis veritas consenciat. God has full knowledge of Argumentatur igitur sic: deus maxime proprie 20 any man as he is a man, of intelligit hominem ut homo est, Sor ut Sor est, et ani- any individual mal ut animal est etc. Igitur in mente divina est pro- man as that individual, of priissime intelligibilis homo ut homo est, etc. Et per any animated consequens in mente divina est proprie propria intelli- being as that animated being. gibilitas hominis, ut homo est; et per consequens deus 25 The animated being may be secundum illam solum intelligit hominem ut homo est, a man, and the et non ut Sor est, vel ut animal est: igitur est proprie man this individual, but propria intelligibilitas in mente divina animalis ut animal God knows him in these est, alia ab animalitate Platonis; et sic de Sorte ut three different ways with full Sor est. cognition; — of Igitur in mente divina sunt tres intelligibilitates the individual, the less general, maxime proprie. Prima singularis, scilicet Sortis, ut and the more general: this is Sor est. Secunda communis, et 3° universalior. Igitur indubitable. est dare universalem ydeam hominis, ut homo est, in But every intelligibility in mente divina, et aliam animalis, ut animal est, et aliam 35 God's mind is an archetype; corporis, ut corpus est, etc. Nec est ponendum in du- so the cognítion bium, si deus intelligat propriissime Sortem ut Sor est, of man qua man is the et hominem ut homo est, et animal ut animal est, etc., principle of creating Man cum homo intus proprie intelligat Sortem ut Sor est, qua man, not et hominem ut homo est, etc. Cum igitur in mente 40 qua individual. 15 30 MS. 3. lia 9 MS. 16. dissolvende MS. 21. Sor ut ut MS. 39. ho
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CAP I. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. divina proprie propria intelligibilitas hominis, ut homo est, sit apud deum proprie propria racio formandi hominem, ut homo est, igitur deus secundum illam non potest formare ad extra hominem, ut Sor est, vel ut 5animal est, vel ut calidus est, vel aliquo alio modo, nisi ut homo est, et per consequens secundum illam racionem non potest ad extra formare nisi humanitatem simpliciter, et per consequens communem humanitatem; ut est impossibile quod in mente divina esset intelli- 10 gibilis propriissime homo ut homo, nisi ibi esset proprie propria intelligibilitas hominis, ut homo, cum esse pro- 104^ priissime intelligibilem hominem | ut homo sit proprie propria intelligibilitas hominis ut homo etc, Sic quod in mente divina est propria proprie intelligibilitas Sortis, 15ut Sor est, et proprie propria hominis, ut homo, et proprie propria animalis, ut animal. Nec prima potest esse aliqua.reliquarum, cum tunc intelligibilitas proprie propria animalis, ut animal est, esset intelligibilitas proprie propria Sortis, ut Sor est, et per idem esset 2ointelligibilitas proprie propria Platonis ut Plato est, et Brunelli ut Brunellus est, et istius equi, ut iste equus est; quod contradiccionem implicat, cum tünc solius Sortis intelligibilitas esset non solius Sortis intelli- gibilitas. Igitur, cum sunt per ordinem ille 3*5 diverse in- telligibilitates in mente divina, scilicet proprie propria animalis, ut animal est, hominis ut homo est, Sortis ut Sor est, et quelibet illarum secundum hoc est racio proprie propria et exemplar deo ad formandum ad extra: 3o patet [quod | secundum primam deus format propriissime ad extra animalitatem simpliciter, et per consequens communem et non singularem; et per secundam format humanitatem simpliciter communem et non aliquam singularem; quia, qua racione unam singularem, eadem 35et quamlibet... Et illa racio esset proprie propria humanitati cuidam, et non esset proprie propria eidem, Secundum autem terciam propriissime. format Sortei- 25 9. p9 le MS. — 3o. quod deest MS. 21. Brusellus occurs elsewhere in Wyclifs works as the name of an ass. 35. El illa. Some words seem to be omitted here. I * 3 This proyes that Universal Humanity is created separately from its individual. Man, qua man, could not be intelligible to God's mind, unless that intelligibility were present there. The three intelligiblities of animality, humanity, individuality, exist as separate forms in God's mind, and therefore separately realizable in the world of existences. The Ideo, archetype by hen ) Humanity is formed, cannot be at the same time the archetype of an indivi ual, forit would ap to all individuals equally well, and not be their distinctive images in God's mind. If these exemplars are thus distinct, that which is realized by them must be distinct also. Otherwise, God would not properly know,
CAP I. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. divina proprie propria intelligibilitas hominis, ut homo est, sit apud deum proprie propria racio formandi hominem, ut homo est, igitur deus secundum illam non potest formare ad extra hominem, ut Sor est, vel ut 5animal est, vel ut calidus est, vel aliquo alio modo, nisi ut homo est, et per consequens secundum illam racionem non potest ad extra formare nisi humanitatem simpliciter, et per consequens communem humanitatem; ut est impossibile quod in mente divina esset intelli- 10 gibilis propriissime homo ut homo, nisi ibi esset proprie propria intelligibilitas hominis, ut homo, cum esse pro- 104^ priissime intelligibilem hominem | ut homo sit proprie propria intelligibilitas hominis ut homo etc, Sic quod in mente divina est propria proprie intelligibilitas Sortis, 15ut Sor est, et proprie propria hominis, ut homo, et proprie propria animalis, ut animal. Nec prima potest esse aliqua.reliquarum, cum tunc intelligibilitas proprie propria animalis, ut animal est, esset intelligibilitas proprie propria Sortis, ut Sor est, et per idem esset 2ointelligibilitas proprie propria Platonis ut Plato est, et Brunelli ut Brunellus est, et istius equi, ut iste equus est; quod contradiccionem implicat, cum tünc solius Sortis intelligibilitas esset non solius Sortis intelli- gibilitas. Igitur, cum sunt per ordinem ille 3*5 diverse in- telligibilitates in mente divina, scilicet proprie propria animalis, ut animal est, hominis ut homo est, Sortis ut Sor est, et quelibet illarum secundum hoc est racio proprie propria et exemplar deo ad formandum ad extra: 3o patet [quod | secundum primam deus format propriissime ad extra animalitatem simpliciter, et per consequens communem et non singularem; et per secundam format humanitatem simpliciter communem et non aliquam singularem; quia, qua racione unam singularem, eadem 35et quamlibet... Et illa racio esset proprie propria humanitati cuidam, et non esset proprie propria eidem, Secundum autem terciam propriissime. format Sortei- 25 9. p9 le MS. — 3o. quod deest MS. 21. Brusellus occurs elsewhere in Wyclifs works as the name of an ass. 35. El illa. Some words seem to be omitted here. I * 3 This proyes that Universal Humanity is created separately from its individual. Man, qua man, could not be intelligible to God's mind, unless that intelligibility were present there. The three intelligiblities of animality, humanity, individuality, exist as separate forms in God's mind, and therefore separately realizable in the world of existences. The Ideo, archetype by hen ) Humanity is formed, cannot be at the same time the archetype of an indivi ual, forit would ap to all individuals equally well, and not be their distinctive images in God's mind. If these exemplars are thus distinct, that which is realized by them must be distinct also. Otherwise, God would not properly know,
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4 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. I. tatem. Et sicut ille forme exemplares propriisime ad invicem distingwuntur, ita opportet et propriissima eorum formata ad extra, quando existunt, distingwi. Igitur opportet distinccio inter humanitatem simpliciter, ani- malitatem simpliciter, et Sorteitatem, et istam animali-? tatem singularem, et humanitatem simpliciter, et istam humanitatem singularem: alioquin proprie propria in- telligibilitas animalis, ut animal est, esset proprie propria huius animalis, ut hoc animal est, et sic esset proprie propria alterius ut huius, et tercii, et sic de 10 aliis omnibus: quod est inconveniens, ut prius. Et videtur quod non [sophistice sed] sincere et in simplicitate bene perpendens vim huius racionis, non obstante quod vis hec non sit hic expressa per- fecte, habebit efficax et sufficiens motivum ad assen- 15 ciendum primo formis ydealibus, eciam communibus, et hoc in deo; deinde formis universalibus in rebus creatis singularibus subiectatis. Videtur eciam quod Plato, et alii sapientes ante It led Plato and others to admit et posterius eum vi huius racionis (que vis varie in both the ideal world and the argumentis potest explicari); vi, inquam, quod moti World of Universals; as fuerint ad ponendum vere universalia ydealia in mente Augustint says, dei; et exhinc formas communes rebus singularibus who adds that no one can secundum illas ydeas inpressas. Unde beatus Augustinus, attain to true wisdom, unless 83 questionum, questione 46ta, sic scribit: “Non est ve- 25 he understands risimile sapientes ante Platonem istas raciones quas this doctrine. Plato ydeas vocat, non intellexisse; siquidem ex eis tanta vis constituitur ut nisi hiis intellectis sapiens esse nemo possit." Et sequitur: “Sunt namque ydee princi- pales quedam forme vel raciones rerum stabiles atque 30 incommutabiles que ipse formate non sunt; ac per hoc eterne et semper eodem modo se habentes; secundum eas tamen dicitur formari omne quod oritur vel interit." Et postmodum arguit ydeas esse; ut, vi argumenti superioris ista racione expressa, necesse est deum om-35 nia condita raccionabiliter facere et gubernare. Sed impossibile est quitquam fieri racionabiliter sine racione, ergo est dare raciones quibus deus causat universalitatem ad extra, et ille sunt ydee, de quibus est sermo. Notwith- standing all defects in the putting of this argument, it must convince any candid man. Augustine's definition of the Ideal Forms, according to which God made and governs all things. 195* v. g. what animality is in itself, but only this or that animal. 40 12. sophistice sed deest; a gap MS. 20. pt 9 MS. 28. et ut MS.
4 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. I. tatem. Et sicut ille forme exemplares propriisime ad invicem distingwuntur, ita opportet et propriissima eorum formata ad extra, quando existunt, distingwi. Igitur opportet distinccio inter humanitatem simpliciter, ani- malitatem simpliciter, et Sorteitatem, et istam animali-? tatem singularem, et humanitatem simpliciter, et istam humanitatem singularem: alioquin proprie propria in- telligibilitas animalis, ut animal est, esset proprie propria huius animalis, ut hoc animal est, et sic esset proprie propria alterius ut huius, et tercii, et sic de 10 aliis omnibus: quod est inconveniens, ut prius. Et videtur quod non [sophistice sed] sincere et in simplicitate bene perpendens vim huius racionis, non obstante quod vis hec non sit hic expressa per- fecte, habebit efficax et sufficiens motivum ad assen- 15 ciendum primo formis ydealibus, eciam communibus, et hoc in deo; deinde formis universalibus in rebus creatis singularibus subiectatis. Videtur eciam quod Plato, et alii sapientes ante It led Plato and others to admit et posterius eum vi huius racionis (que vis varie in both the ideal world and the argumentis potest explicari); vi, inquam, quod moti World of Universals; as fuerint ad ponendum vere universalia ydealia in mente Augustint says, dei; et exhinc formas communes rebus singularibus who adds that no one can secundum illas ydeas inpressas. Unde beatus Augustinus, attain to true wisdom, unless 83 questionum, questione 46ta, sic scribit: “Non est ve- 25 he understands risimile sapientes ante Platonem istas raciones quas this doctrine. Plato ydeas vocat, non intellexisse; siquidem ex eis tanta vis constituitur ut nisi hiis intellectis sapiens esse nemo possit." Et sequitur: “Sunt namque ydee princi- pales quedam forme vel raciones rerum stabiles atque 30 incommutabiles que ipse formate non sunt; ac per hoc eterne et semper eodem modo se habentes; secundum eas tamen dicitur formari omne quod oritur vel interit." Et postmodum arguit ydeas esse; ut, vi argumenti superioris ista racione expressa, necesse est deum om-35 nia condita raccionabiliter facere et gubernare. Sed impossibile est quitquam fieri racionabiliter sine racione, ergo est dare raciones quibus deus causat universalitatem ad extra, et ille sunt ydee, de quibus est sermo. Notwith- standing all defects in the putting of this argument, it must convince any candid man. Augustine's definition of the Ideal Forms, according to which God made and governs all things. 195* v. g. what animality is in itself, but only this or that animal. 40 12. sophistice sed deest; a gap MS. 20. pt 9 MS. 28. et ut MS.
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CAP. I. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 5 Nec restat aput quem sint iste raciones eterne, nisi aput deum. [SJacrilegum enim esset dicere deum intueri extra se exemplar sui ad extra producti. Nec potest dici quod non sint multe raciones, quia, 5 ut dicit Augustinus: "Restat ut omnia racione sint condita, nec eadem racione homo quam equus." Hoc enim absurdum est existimare pro tanto, quia tunc proprie propria racio producendi equum esset proprie propria racio producendi hominem, et e contra: quod 10 contradiccionem implicat, vel non esset in mente divina proprie propria racio equi secundum quam deus pro- priissime formaret equum ad extra, cum tamen racio- nabiliter propriissime servet equum ad extra. Nec potest dici quod proprie propria racio intrinseca They must be different from 15 equi ad extra sit illa racio proprie propria, 2m quam the created deus format sic proprie equum ad extra. Licet enim essences, which depend upon equus secundum illam racionem formetur a deo, non these increate and eternal tamen deus secundum illam creatam racionem format ones. ad extra equum, sed secundum racionem proprie propria 20 increata et eterna; quia secundum intelligibilitatem proprie propriam equi, que necessario est eterna. Hec ergo propriissime rerum ad extra formabilium 195b intelligibilitates] in speculo deitatis sicut ydola pulcher- rima, eterna, incommunicabiliter relucentes, sunt ipsa- 25 rum rerum primo potissime et maxime proprie racio- nes, forme exemplares exemplario, et producibilitates. Nemo ergo audeat negare ydeas in mente dei, nisi sciat vere salvare deum posse proprie, et distincte valde intelligere atque racionabiliter formare, exemplare, et 30 producere res extra producibiles ut sunt sic distincte et proprie valde intelligibiles, formabiles, exemplabiles et producibiles racionabiliter, negando proprie proprias et simpliciter necessarias rerum extra producibilium raciones, exemplaria, intelligibilitates, et producibilitates. 35 Cum autem hoc quod sic salvandum esset a negante ydeas in deo contradiccionem implicare videtur, omnino consenciendum nobilibus illis ydeas clare immediate divina dicentibus se esse ibidem ..... . They must be in God, for God cannot look for patterns of things to be created elsewhere than in Himself. They must be many, for the archetype of a horse cannot be that of a man. They appear in the mirror of Deity, as beautiful images of things which may be produced. And to deny them it would be necessary to reconcile this denial with the admission that God knows eternally all that He can produce ; but no reconciliation is possible. 2. acrilegum (quite plain) MS. 22. for MS. 29. ut twice MS. 37. Some words are no doubt wanting here; the text seems, besides, to be corrupt as it stands, though that of course must remain uncertain.
CAP. I. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 5 Nec restat aput quem sint iste raciones eterne, nisi aput deum. [SJacrilegum enim esset dicere deum intueri extra se exemplar sui ad extra producti. Nec potest dici quod non sint multe raciones, quia, 5 ut dicit Augustinus: "Restat ut omnia racione sint condita, nec eadem racione homo quam equus." Hoc enim absurdum est existimare pro tanto, quia tunc proprie propria racio producendi equum esset proprie propria racio producendi hominem, et e contra: quod 10 contradiccionem implicat, vel non esset in mente divina proprie propria racio equi secundum quam deus pro- priissime formaret equum ad extra, cum tamen racio- nabiliter propriissime servet equum ad extra. Nec potest dici quod proprie propria racio intrinseca They must be different from 15 equi ad extra sit illa racio proprie propria, 2m quam the created deus format sic proprie equum ad extra. Licet enim essences, which depend upon equus secundum illam racionem formetur a deo, non these increate and eternal tamen deus secundum illam creatam racionem format ones. ad extra equum, sed secundum racionem proprie propria 20 increata et eterna; quia secundum intelligibilitatem proprie propriam equi, que necessario est eterna. Hec ergo propriissime rerum ad extra formabilium 195b intelligibilitates] in speculo deitatis sicut ydola pulcher- rima, eterna, incommunicabiliter relucentes, sunt ipsa- 25 rum rerum primo potissime et maxime proprie racio- nes, forme exemplares exemplario, et producibilitates. Nemo ergo audeat negare ydeas in mente dei, nisi sciat vere salvare deum posse proprie, et distincte valde intelligere atque racionabiliter formare, exemplare, et 30 producere res extra producibiles ut sunt sic distincte et proprie valde intelligibiles, formabiles, exemplabiles et producibiles racionabiliter, negando proprie proprias et simpliciter necessarias rerum extra producibilium raciones, exemplaria, intelligibilitates, et producibilitates. 35 Cum autem hoc quod sic salvandum esset a negante ydeas in deo contradiccionem implicare videtur, omnino consenciendum nobilibus illis ydeas clare immediate divina dicentibus se esse ibidem ..... . They must be in God, for God cannot look for patterns of things to be created elsewhere than in Himself. They must be many, for the archetype of a horse cannot be that of a man. They appear in the mirror of Deity, as beautiful images of things which may be produced. And to deny them it would be necessary to reconcile this denial with the admission that God knows eternally all that He can produce ; but no reconciliation is possible. 2. acrilegum (quite plain) MS. 22. for MS. 29. ut twice MS. 37. Some words are no doubt wanting here; the text seems, besides, to be corrupt as it stands, though that of course must remain uncertain.
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CAPITULUM SECUNDUM. Secundo principaliter argumentatur: cum essencia This mirror of Deity, being absolutely divina sit speculum intellectuale, verum, mundum, clarum, perfect, must et amplum simpliciter infiniter, igitur sicut speculo contain all the images of corporali et sue contradiccioni speculari multam dero- possible created things; garet si in eo non possent relucere vera et propria ſor even a ydola corporaliter visibilia, sic magis derogaret illi spe- common mirror is worthless, culo si non possent in eo relucere vera ydola et valde if it does not propria intellectualiter visibilia rerum intellectualium represent its object. a speculo illo distancium et diversarum. Et quia spe- 10 culum illud propter infinitatem sue perfeccionis non potest recipere in se de novo ab alieno talia ydola — ymmo, magis derogaret illi speculo actualissimo, si non necessario eternaliter in eo omnium ydola talia relu- cerent, cum tamen ibi relucere possunt — igitur de 15 actu necessario tot relucent quotquot poterint. Item, signato quocunque possibili, deus necessario intelligit illud, et noscit noticia simplicis apprehensionis, sicut necessario noscit illud posse esse; ergo, si aliquod intelligibile quod posset intelligere non de actu intelli-20 geret, deus sciret quod intelligibile ipse posset intelli- gere et non de actu intelligeret: quod est inconveniens. Cum autem deus apud se distincte| et proprie valde 196 signaret et diceret intellectualiter illud quod posset intelligere, et tamen illud non intelligeret, videtur 25 contradiccionem implicare, distincte scilicet et proprie signare et dicere intellectualiter hoc, et non intelligere hoc. Argumentatur igitur sic: Deus simpliciter necessario intelligit distincte et proprie valde hoc (demonstrato Again, taking any possible creature, God knows it ; unless we admit His actually knowing that He does not know it! Then, God's knowledge being perfect, 2 Capitulum Secundum deest; gap of one line and blank space for initial S. MS. 19. 9° pro ergo MS. 25. quia videtur MS. 5. Speculari. I cannot make anything of this, nor of the four preceding words. The general sense, however, is quite clear. Mr. Matthew makes the very ingenious suggestion that 'contra- diccio' may stand for the reflection in the looking-glass. This would explain the whole sentence at once; and if the word 'contradiccio' is never used in this sense, we may readily assume it to be a mistake of the copyist.
CAPITULUM SECUNDUM. Secundo principaliter argumentatur: cum essencia This mirror of Deity, being absolutely divina sit speculum intellectuale, verum, mundum, clarum, perfect, must et amplum simpliciter infiniter, igitur sicut speculo contain all the images of corporali et sue contradiccioni speculari multam dero- possible created things; garet si in eo non possent relucere vera et propria ſor even a ydola corporaliter visibilia, sic magis derogaret illi spe- common mirror is worthless, culo si non possent in eo relucere vera ydola et valde if it does not propria intellectualiter visibilia rerum intellectualium represent its object. a speculo illo distancium et diversarum. Et quia spe- 10 culum illud propter infinitatem sue perfeccionis non potest recipere in se de novo ab alieno talia ydola — ymmo, magis derogaret illi speculo actualissimo, si non necessario eternaliter in eo omnium ydola talia relu- cerent, cum tamen ibi relucere possunt — igitur de 15 actu necessario tot relucent quotquot poterint. Item, signato quocunque possibili, deus necessario intelligit illud, et noscit noticia simplicis apprehensionis, sicut necessario noscit illud posse esse; ergo, si aliquod intelligibile quod posset intelligere non de actu intelli-20 geret, deus sciret quod intelligibile ipse posset intelli- gere et non de actu intelligeret: quod est inconveniens. Cum autem deus apud se distincte| et proprie valde 196 signaret et diceret intellectualiter illud quod posset intelligere, et tamen illud non intelligeret, videtur 25 contradiccionem implicare, distincte scilicet et proprie signare et dicere intellectualiter hoc, et non intelligere hoc. Argumentatur igitur sic: Deus simpliciter necessario intelligit distincte et proprie valde hoc (demonstrato Again, taking any possible creature, God knows it ; unless we admit His actually knowing that He does not know it! Then, God's knowledge being perfect, 2 Capitulum Secundum deest; gap of one line and blank space for initial S. MS. 19. 9° pro ergo MS. 25. quia videtur MS. 5. Speculari. I cannot make anything of this, nor of the four preceding words. The general sense, however, is quite clear. Mr. Matthew makes the very ingenious suggestion that 'contra- diccio' may stand for the reflection in the looking-glass. This would explain the whole sentence at once; and if the word 'contradiccio' is never used in this sense, we may readily assume it to be a mistake of the copyist.
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CAP. II. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. effectu possibili non necessario). Igitur deus simpliciter necessario intelligit Aoc secundum suam racionem pro- prie propriam. Si telligere nisi secundum aliquam eius racionem, non 5poterit quidquam intelligere aliud ad summum di- stincte et proprie, nisi secundum eius valde distinctam et proprie propriam racionem. Cum ergo deus simpli- citer necessario intelligat hoc (quocunque effectu possi- bili signato); intelligat, dico, ad summum distincte et 10 proprie: igitur secundum eius proprie propriam racionem et non secundum eius proprie propriam racionem ad extra. Cum autem deus simpliciter necessario illud intelligeret secundum eius propriam existenciam .. .... et sic necessario esset in propria existencia; quod est 15inconveniens. Igitur intelligit illud secundum proprie propriam eius racionem in deo simpliciter necessariam. Nec potest dici quod essencia divina esset proprie propria racio intelligendi cuicunque possibili intelligibili, quia tunc esset unius solius racio talis intelligendi et 20non esset unius solius: igitur etc. Item, deus primus artifex format et distingwit res ad extra in suis per se primis et propriis existenciis per illapsum regule et forme artis sue in materiam sue artis, que materia est res ipsa extra formata; sicut ar- 25 tifex humanus, per quemdam illapsum forme artis sue (ut sigilli in cera vel forme in plumbum etc.), et distingwit artificiatum. Si enim non esset multi- formitas, sed per totum uniformitas in forma artis dei, non possent res ad extra nisi uniformiter et non gra- 3odualiter dispariter existere; nec est dubitandum deum apud se habere necessario regulam et formam artis sue; nec est katholico discredendum quin deus illabatur in intima cuiuscunque creature et per consequens, cum forma artis illabitur, pulchre formando et disting- 35 wendo suam fabricam. 196° Item, varia opera operata operari | artificialiter secun- dum exemplaria propriissima est simpliciter perfeccionis; igitur hoc convenit deo. Et per conseguens deus habet apud se propriissima exemplaria suorum operatorum. 4o Et antecedens patet; quia quanto artifex in terris arti- ficialia sua operatur secundum exemplaria magis propria, 14. Et sic. There is no gap before these words, but I incline to think something has been omitted here. 7 its intelligible object must be so likewise; and if there enim non potest quidquam in- were no Ideas, the object would be the created thin itself that would thus (being known as existing) exist necessarilly; which is absurd. The answer, that the Divine Essence is the intelligibility of all things possible, is absurd; for their intelligibilities are not one, but distinct. Besides, God creates things thom with His format supreme art, as a scal stamps wax; if there were only one seal, there would be only one species of things. As a painter or a sculptor has the man he paints or scu Ipts more vividly before his mind's eye, and expresses this interior image in colours or
CAP. II. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. effectu possibili non necessario). Igitur deus simpliciter necessario intelligit Aoc secundum suam racionem pro- prie propriam. Si telligere nisi secundum aliquam eius racionem, non 5poterit quidquam intelligere aliud ad summum di- stincte et proprie, nisi secundum eius valde distinctam et proprie propriam racionem. Cum ergo deus simpli- citer necessario intelligat hoc (quocunque effectu possi- bili signato); intelligat, dico, ad summum distincte et 10 proprie: igitur secundum eius proprie propriam racionem et non secundum eius proprie propriam racionem ad extra. Cum autem deus simpliciter necessario illud intelligeret secundum eius propriam existenciam .. .... et sic necessario esset in propria existencia; quod est 15inconveniens. Igitur intelligit illud secundum proprie propriam eius racionem in deo simpliciter necessariam. Nec potest dici quod essencia divina esset proprie propria racio intelligendi cuicunque possibili intelligibili, quia tunc esset unius solius racio talis intelligendi et 20non esset unius solius: igitur etc. Item, deus primus artifex format et distingwit res ad extra in suis per se primis et propriis existenciis per illapsum regule et forme artis sue in materiam sue artis, que materia est res ipsa extra formata; sicut ar- 25 tifex humanus, per quemdam illapsum forme artis sue (ut sigilli in cera vel forme in plumbum etc.), et distingwit artificiatum. Si enim non esset multi- formitas, sed per totum uniformitas in forma artis dei, non possent res ad extra nisi uniformiter et non gra- 3odualiter dispariter existere; nec est dubitandum deum apud se habere necessario regulam et formam artis sue; nec est katholico discredendum quin deus illabatur in intima cuiuscunque creature et per consequens, cum forma artis illabitur, pulchre formando et disting- 35 wendo suam fabricam. 196° Item, varia opera operata operari | artificialiter secun- dum exemplaria propriissima est simpliciter perfeccionis; igitur hoc convenit deo. Et per conseguens deus habet apud se propriissima exemplaria suorum operatorum. 4o Et antecedens patet; quia quanto artifex in terris arti- ficialia sua operatur secundum exemplaria magis propria, 14. Et sic. There is no gap before these words, but I incline to think something has been omitted here. 7 its intelligible object must be so likewise; and if there enim non potest quidquam in- were no Ideas, the object would be the created thin itself that would thus (being known as existing) exist necessarilly; which is absurd. The answer, that the Divine Essence is the intelligibility of all things possible, is absurd; for their intelligibilities are not one, but distinct. Besides, God creates things thom with His format supreme art, as a scal stamps wax; if there were only one seal, there would be only one species of things. As a painter or a sculptor has the man he paints or scu Ipts more vividly before his mind's eye, and expresses this interior image in colours or
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8 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. II. stone, so the tanto amplius secundum hoc laudatur: ut quanto work will deserve more pictor vel lapidicida magis proprie aliquem hominem praise: and a in exterioribus concipit et secundum hoc facit artificia- like idea exists liter eius ymaginem, secundum hoc magis laudatur. in God's mind. Let it not be Igitur varia operata secundum exemplaria eorum pro- said that God, being infinite, priissima artificialiter operari est simpliciter perfeccionis. requires no pattern to work Nec potest dici quod deus propter immensitatem sue by. The greater potencie et sapiencie ac perfeccionis non requirit ad the artist, the more perfect operandum ulla propria exemplaria pro operatis suis. is his mental Quanto enim artifex in arte sua est potencior, sapien- 10 pattern. cior, perfeccior, tanto concipit modum magis proprium secundum quem magis proprie rem efficiat. Deus igitur concipit propriissimum modum sui operati secundum quod ipsum extra efficiat. Nec valet dici quod deus vel alius artifex, in conci- 15 To say that God produced piendo proprium modum rei operate secundum quem within Himself this mode or ipsam operatur, fit in se proprius modus rei existendi model according to extra deum; quia tunc deus illum proprium modum which He faceret et operaretur in se secundum se ipsum; et per brings things into existence, consequens deus operaretur illum modum quodammodo 20 were to suppose in post se ipsum, sed quia nichil potest gignere se ipsum Him an act nec gigni a se ipso, sic nichil potest aliqua prioritate which is not eternal; such vel posterioritate esse ante se ipsum vel posterius se- an act we must either deny. ipso, cum tunc esset in aliquo gradu prioritatis vel absolutely or posterioritatis in quo ipsum non esset; non potest esse 25 say that it exists in the quod aliquod sit sibi ipsi modus secundum quem ipsum cternal concept operaretur et fieret. Aut ergo deus non concipit apud of God. se proprium modum rei secundum quem operaretur rem in suam propriam existenciam, aut est proprius modus aut racio propria rei apud deum eternaliter 30 secundum quem operatur operatum suum. Primum autem videtur tollere industriam et ingenium summi artificis in operando artificiose: igitur secundum videtur asserendum: quod prius artifex, concepto summe proprio modo rei, secundum quem ipsam rem fabricaret, postea tempore suo 2m illum modum conceptum eternaliter in mente dei operatur rem cum suo proprio et per se primo modo existendi. 197" 4. 13 pro secundum MS. 17. msi MS. 19. msi MS. 23. pt9 MS. 24. seipsum MS. 35. pt9 ea MS. 17. Fit, etc. With the exception of fit (which I have changed from sit in the copy) and of the expression that may be either in se or nisi, the whole of this sentence is marked as certainly identical with the MS.
8 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. II. stone, so the tanto amplius secundum hoc laudatur: ut quanto work will deserve more pictor vel lapidicida magis proprie aliquem hominem praise: and a in exterioribus concipit et secundum hoc facit artificia- like idea exists liter eius ymaginem, secundum hoc magis laudatur. in God's mind. Let it not be Igitur varia operata secundum exemplaria eorum pro- said that God, being infinite, priissima artificialiter operari est simpliciter perfeccionis. requires no pattern to work Nec potest dici quod deus propter immensitatem sue by. The greater potencie et sapiencie ac perfeccionis non requirit ad the artist, the more perfect operandum ulla propria exemplaria pro operatis suis. is his mental Quanto enim artifex in arte sua est potencior, sapien- 10 pattern. cior, perfeccior, tanto concipit modum magis proprium secundum quem magis proprie rem efficiat. Deus igitur concipit propriissimum modum sui operati secundum quod ipsum extra efficiat. Nec valet dici quod deus vel alius artifex, in conci- 15 To say that God produced piendo proprium modum rei operate secundum quem within Himself this mode or ipsam operatur, fit in se proprius modus rei existendi model according to extra deum; quia tunc deus illum proprium modum which He faceret et operaretur in se secundum se ipsum; et per brings things into existence, consequens deus operaretur illum modum quodammodo 20 were to suppose in post se ipsum, sed quia nichil potest gignere se ipsum Him an act nec gigni a se ipso, sic nichil potest aliqua prioritate which is not eternal; such vel posterioritate esse ante se ipsum vel posterius se- an act we must either deny. ipso, cum tunc esset in aliquo gradu prioritatis vel absolutely or posterioritatis in quo ipsum non esset; non potest esse 25 say that it exists in the quod aliquod sit sibi ipsi modus secundum quem ipsum cternal concept operaretur et fieret. Aut ergo deus non concipit apud of God. se proprium modum rei secundum quem operaretur rem in suam propriam existenciam, aut est proprius modus aut racio propria rei apud deum eternaliter 30 secundum quem operatur operatum suum. Primum autem videtur tollere industriam et ingenium summi artificis in operando artificiose: igitur secundum videtur asserendum: quod prius artifex, concepto summe proprio modo rei, secundum quem ipsam rem fabricaret, postea tempore suo 2m illum modum conceptum eternaliter in mente dei operatur rem cum suo proprio et per se primo modo existendi. 197" 4. 13 pro secundum MS. 17. msi MS. 19. msi MS. 23. pt9 MS. 24. seipsum MS. 35. pt9 ea MS. 17. Fit, etc. With the exception of fit (which I have changed from sit in the copy) and of the expression that may be either in se or nisi, the whole of this sentence is marked as certainly identical with the MS.
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CAP. II. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 9 Item, deus intra se totaliter distincte et proprie valde noscit singula que possunt extra eum in suis propriis modis et formis existere; et uniuscuiusque talium distincta et propria talis noticia dei intra seipsum to- 5 taliter terminatur ad distinctam et propriam racionem intra deum totaliter sistentem. Sed non est possibile esse unicam valde distinctam et valde propriam racionem aput deum et intra singulorum illorum possibilium; quia tunc talis cuiuslibet et nullius eorum esset valde 10 propria. Singulum ergo talium possibilium habet valde sibi propriam racionem intra deum totaliter terminatam obiective per modum formalis obiecti distincta et pro- pria nimis noticia dei totaliter ad intra de tali pos- sibili. Et cum multa possibilia in nulla mensura existunt 15 in propria forma extra deum, [si] non terminatur distincta noticia dei totaliter ad intra de quocunque possibili, [sed] terminatur ad racionem ad extra rei, tunc talis noticia non esset totaliter ad intra, sed extra transiens in racionem extra sistentem. Primum autem antecedens 20 cum prima consequencia huius racionis patet; quia deus ad intra perfectissime et totaliter noscit distincte et proprie valde singularia illa possibilia; et non est possibile quod distincta et propria noticia dei totaliter ad intra non terminetur ad racionem valde propriam 25 rei cognite, sicud ad objectum formale apud deum to- taliter ad intra sistens. Alias enim aliqua distincta noticia dei non terminaretur ad per se proprium suum obiectum, vel non haberet ibi per se proprium obiec- tum, ubi totaliter sisteret, et non ultra procederet: que 3o sunt inconveniencia. Patet ergo quod singulorum possibilium existere This possibility of existence" is the extra deum sunt in mente divina proprie, eterne, et ne- primordial cessarie raciones que sunt summe proprie et prime intelligibility of things in God's ipsarum intelligibilitates, secundum quas oportet eas mind. 35 via perfeccionis primo intelligi. Et non est possibile aliquem esse sapientem circa effectus quanto ex prima causa prodeunt, nisi prima via perfeccionis tales ydeas cognoscat. Hec ergo pauca ad presens pro quali- cunque probacione, sed firma assercione multitudinis ydearum in mente divina, sunt adducta. God knows all things possible distinctly; therefore the term of His cognitive act corresponding to each must be not one, but many, and all within Himself. Otherwise His knowledge of them would be confused. Many possible things never exist except in God's mind ; if then God's knowledge of them was not complete without their actual existence at some time, the object of His cognitive act would be dependent upon that existence outside of Himself, would either not be the proper object of His act, or be no object at all. 197 11. terminantem MS. 15. si deest MS. 6. et pro esse MS. 17. sed deest MS. 23. quia pro quod MS. 36. effom MS. 37. pdeut MS.
CAP. II. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 9 Item, deus intra se totaliter distincte et proprie valde noscit singula que possunt extra eum in suis propriis modis et formis existere; et uniuscuiusque talium distincta et propria talis noticia dei intra seipsum to- 5 taliter terminatur ad distinctam et propriam racionem intra deum totaliter sistentem. Sed non est possibile esse unicam valde distinctam et valde propriam racionem aput deum et intra singulorum illorum possibilium; quia tunc talis cuiuslibet et nullius eorum esset valde 10 propria. Singulum ergo talium possibilium habet valde sibi propriam racionem intra deum totaliter terminatam obiective per modum formalis obiecti distincta et pro- pria nimis noticia dei totaliter ad intra de tali pos- sibili. Et cum multa possibilia in nulla mensura existunt 15 in propria forma extra deum, [si] non terminatur distincta noticia dei totaliter ad intra de quocunque possibili, [sed] terminatur ad racionem ad extra rei, tunc talis noticia non esset totaliter ad intra, sed extra transiens in racionem extra sistentem. Primum autem antecedens 20 cum prima consequencia huius racionis patet; quia deus ad intra perfectissime et totaliter noscit distincte et proprie valde singularia illa possibilia; et non est possibile quod distincta et propria noticia dei totaliter ad intra non terminetur ad racionem valde propriam 25 rei cognite, sicud ad objectum formale apud deum to- taliter ad intra sistens. Alias enim aliqua distincta noticia dei non terminaretur ad per se proprium suum obiectum, vel non haberet ibi per se proprium obiec- tum, ubi totaliter sisteret, et non ultra procederet: que 3o sunt inconveniencia. Patet ergo quod singulorum possibilium existere This possibility of existence" is the extra deum sunt in mente divina proprie, eterne, et ne- primordial cessarie raciones que sunt summe proprie et prime intelligibility of things in God's ipsarum intelligibilitates, secundum quas oportet eas mind. 35 via perfeccionis primo intelligi. Et non est possibile aliquem esse sapientem circa effectus quanto ex prima causa prodeunt, nisi prima via perfeccionis tales ydeas cognoscat. Hec ergo pauca ad presens pro quali- cunque probacione, sed firma assercione multitudinis ydearum in mente divina, sunt adducta. God knows all things possible distinctly; therefore the term of His cognitive act corresponding to each must be not one, but many, and all within Himself. Otherwise His knowledge of them would be confused. Many possible things never exist except in God's mind ; if then God's knowledge of them was not complete without their actual existence at some time, the object of His cognitive act would be dependent upon that existence outside of Himself, would either not be the proper object of His act, or be no object at all. 197 11. terminantem MS. 15. si deest MS. 6. et pro esse MS. 17. sed deest MS. 23. quia pro quod MS. 36. effom MS. 37. pdeut MS.
Strana 10
CAPITULUM TERCIUM. We must here Ceterum vero pro defensione huius mundi pulcherrimi add a few nobis sensualibus absconditi, ne per apparencias sophi- words against the sophistical sticas destrui videatur, aliqua sunt adicienda. Et ut fiat attacks made upon this brevius, videtur sufficere quod hic inseratur sentencia world of Ideas. ex qua videtur posse satis responderi ad questiones et inpugnaciones sophisticas que in hac materia poterunt ventilari. There are as Est ergo sciendum quod, quotquot possunt res in many ideal forms as there suis per se primis propriis formis vel modis extra 10 are things deum sistere, tot sunt talium rerum proprie ydee. Et which may exist out of tota multitudo omnium illarum simul est mundus God; the totality of these architypus in mente divina. Et licet ille mundus archi- ſorms is the typus secundum partem illius multitudinis principiet Architypal Universe in exemplariter ad extra res existentes, non tamen est 15 God's mind, possibile quod ille mundus secundum se totum et but not the architype of all quodlibet illius multitudinis principiet res ad extra things, those v. g. which exemplariter; quia contingencia ad utrumlibet in tota depend on our sua latitudine adhuc angusta est, quod non potest in se free-will. Though the capere distanciam veritatum contingencium ad invicem 20 Catholie faith teaches that contradictoriarum. Et licet secundum veritatem katho- there are only licam in deitate solum sint tres res eterne realiter inter three eternal things, yet in se differentes, quarum quelibet personaliter subsistens this sense there are many more, formaliter et naturaliter est deus omnis bonitatis et not merely figments, but pulchritudinis simpliciter infinite, tamen in mente divina 25 substantial. ille ydee 2m beatum Augustinum (ut superius fuit alle- They differ from each other gatum) sunt res, et sic sunt valde multe res; et videntur really, but not pocius esse res et raciones reales quam res racionis, essentially nor numerically. cum sunt multo pociores raciones substanciarum intel- Comparison of this World of lectualium creatarum quam ille nature intellectuales, 30 Divine Ideas que utique sunt reales res et raciones; et ens reale with the Trinity and prestancius est ente racionis. Et secundum hoc videntur with Christ incarnate. ille ydee inter se et ad invicem differre realiter, non tamen essencialiter neque suppositaliter. Persona autem 2. Blank space for initial C. MS. 34. u3 MS.
CAPITULUM TERCIUM. We must here Ceterum vero pro defensione huius mundi pulcherrimi add a few nobis sensualibus absconditi, ne per apparencias sophi- words against the sophistical sticas destrui videatur, aliqua sunt adicienda. Et ut fiat attacks made upon this brevius, videtur sufficere quod hic inseratur sentencia world of Ideas. ex qua videtur posse satis responderi ad questiones et inpugnaciones sophisticas que in hac materia poterunt ventilari. There are as Est ergo sciendum quod, quotquot possunt res in many ideal forms as there suis per se primis propriis formis vel modis extra 10 are things deum sistere, tot sunt talium rerum proprie ydee. Et which may exist out of tota multitudo omnium illarum simul est mundus God; the totality of these architypus in mente divina. Et licet ille mundus archi- ſorms is the typus secundum partem illius multitudinis principiet Architypal Universe in exemplariter ad extra res existentes, non tamen est 15 God's mind, possibile quod ille mundus secundum se totum et but not the architype of all quodlibet illius multitudinis principiet res ad extra things, those v. g. which exemplariter; quia contingencia ad utrumlibet in tota depend on our sua latitudine adhuc angusta est, quod non potest in se free-will. Though the capere distanciam veritatum contingencium ad invicem 20 Catholie faith teaches that contradictoriarum. Et licet secundum veritatem katho- there are only licam in deitate solum sint tres res eterne realiter inter three eternal things, yet in se differentes, quarum quelibet personaliter subsistens this sense there are many more, formaliter et naturaliter est deus omnis bonitatis et not merely figments, but pulchritudinis simpliciter infinite, tamen in mente divina 25 substantial. ille ydee 2m beatum Augustinum (ut superius fuit alle- They differ from each other gatum) sunt res, et sic sunt valde multe res; et videntur really, but not pocius esse res et raciones reales quam res racionis, essentially nor numerically. cum sunt multo pociores raciones substanciarum intel- Comparison of this World of lectualium creatarum quam ille nature intellectuales, 30 Divine Ideas que utique sunt reales res et raciones; et ens reale with the Trinity and prestancius est ente racionis. Et secundum hoc videntur with Christ incarnate. ille ydee inter se et ad invicem differre realiter, non tamen essencialiter neque suppositaliter. Persona autem 2. Blank space for initial C. MS. 34. u3 MS.
Strana 11
CAP. III. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 11 198* divina a creatura differt realiter, suppositaliter [et] es- None of them can, like the sencialiter, et ab alia persona divina differt realiter et Divine Persons and Christ, suppositaliter. Et videtur quod sicud deus temporaliter be called formally God. gratiose, contingenter, cummunicat homini in Christo But though unitatem et ydemptitatem personalem verbi dei, ut homo these ideas are not God they in Christo sit una et eadem persona cum verbo dei, are in God, and quod sit tota trinitas principians multitudinem ydea- intrinsically united with rum in mente divina necessario et eternaliter, miro Him, and thus Divine ; for, modo communicans omnibus illis unitatem et ydempti- according to 10 tatem divine essencie; ut unaqueque earum sit una et Augustine they are Life in eadem divina essencia et unus solus verus deus; nulla Him, and share in His eternal tamen illarum potest esse formaliter deus, sicud deitas, Life. et trinitas, et quelibet personarum divinarum formaliter est deus. Nulla enim illarum habet deitatem ab intrin- 15 seco per modum forme sue intrinsece, sed quod forte cuilibet earum modo nobis inestimabili communicatur nobilitas, unitas et ydemtitas deitatis et divine essencie; et quelibet earum eternaliter et necessario redditur deus et divina essencia. Cum enim, secundum beatum 20 Augustinum, “quod factum est in ipso", (scilicet verbo dei), “vita erat", et non utique nisi prima vita, oportet ydeam quamlibet esse vitam primam, que deus est. Verumtamen beatus Chrysostomus illum textum Johannis Chrysostom, however, primo sic distingwit: "Omnia per ipsum facta sunt, et punctuates this verse of 25 sine [ipso] factum est nichil quod factum est. In ipso St. John's Gospel vita erat." Et si textus sic deberet distingwi (sic tamen otherwise, ecclesia Romana non distingwit, sed sicud beatus Augu- thus: Without Him was stinus) tunc illud argumentum iam superius adductum nothing made that was made. videtur ex parte materie inefficax ad probandum pro- In Him was 3o positum. Verumtamen, quia ecclesia Romana Catholica life. The Roman sic distingwit et legit: "Quod factum est in ipso vita Church follows Augustine's erat", et si assertive, vel determinative, vel eciam appro- punctuation; bative hoc facit, tunc sicut "quod factum est erat vita which, if meant to assert that in deo" ita et a maiori raciones ille vitales et vivaces it is the right one, is a 35 erant vita in deo: vita scilicet prima divina. Si autem decisive ecclesia faceret hoc solum sequens beatum Augustinum, argument in favour of ideas ; probabiliter sic distingwentem textum ewangelii, sicut at any rate it is a probable eciam cantat de beata Maria Magdalena quod ipsa argument in fuerit “in civitate peccatrix"etc. sequens in hoc opinio- their favour. 40 nem beati Gregorii, ut a quibusdam dicitur, et beati 1. et deest MS. 4. groſe MS. 9. communicat MS. MS. 18. rddr MS. 25. ipso deest MS. 40. a deest MS. 17. nobis
CAP. III. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 11 198* divina a creatura differt realiter, suppositaliter [et] es- None of them can, like the sencialiter, et ab alia persona divina differt realiter et Divine Persons and Christ, suppositaliter. Et videtur quod sicud deus temporaliter be called formally God. gratiose, contingenter, cummunicat homini in Christo But though unitatem et ydemptitatem personalem verbi dei, ut homo these ideas are not God they in Christo sit una et eadem persona cum verbo dei, are in God, and quod sit tota trinitas principians multitudinem ydea- intrinsically united with rum in mente divina necessario et eternaliter, miro Him, and thus Divine ; for, modo communicans omnibus illis unitatem et ydempti- according to 10 tatem divine essencie; ut unaqueque earum sit una et Augustine they are Life in eadem divina essencia et unus solus verus deus; nulla Him, and share in His eternal tamen illarum potest esse formaliter deus, sicud deitas, Life. et trinitas, et quelibet personarum divinarum formaliter est deus. Nulla enim illarum habet deitatem ab intrin- 15 seco per modum forme sue intrinsece, sed quod forte cuilibet earum modo nobis inestimabili communicatur nobilitas, unitas et ydemtitas deitatis et divine essencie; et quelibet earum eternaliter et necessario redditur deus et divina essencia. Cum enim, secundum beatum 20 Augustinum, “quod factum est in ipso", (scilicet verbo dei), “vita erat", et non utique nisi prima vita, oportet ydeam quamlibet esse vitam primam, que deus est. Verumtamen beatus Chrysostomus illum textum Johannis Chrysostom, however, primo sic distingwit: "Omnia per ipsum facta sunt, et punctuates this verse of 25 sine [ipso] factum est nichil quod factum est. In ipso St. John's Gospel vita erat." Et si textus sic deberet distingwi (sic tamen otherwise, ecclesia Romana non distingwit, sed sicud beatus Augu- thus: Without Him was stinus) tunc illud argumentum iam superius adductum nothing made that was made. videtur ex parte materie inefficax ad probandum pro- In Him was 3o positum. Verumtamen, quia ecclesia Romana Catholica life. The Roman sic distingwit et legit: "Quod factum est in ipso vita Church follows Augustine's erat", et si assertive, vel determinative, vel eciam appro- punctuation; bative hoc facit, tunc sicut "quod factum est erat vita which, if meant to assert that in deo" ita et a maiori raciones ille vitales et vivaces it is the right one, is a 35 erant vita in deo: vita scilicet prima divina. Si autem decisive ecclesia faceret hoc solum sequens beatum Augustinum, argument in favour of ideas ; probabiliter sic distingwentem textum ewangelii, sicut at any rate it is a probable eciam cantat de beata Maria Magdalena quod ipsa argument in fuerit “in civitate peccatrix"etc. sequens in hoc opinio- their favour. 40 nem beati Gregorii, ut a quibusdam dicitur, et beati 1. et deest MS. 4. groſe MS. 9. communicat MS. MS. 18. rddr MS. 25. ipso deest MS. 40. a deest MS. 17. nobis
Strana 12
12 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. III. Augustini; quamvis beatus Hieronymus et Chrysostomus Johannes aliud sentenciant; tunc ut quid non similiter assertive ex facto ecclesie possit dici quia “quod factum est in ipso vita erat". It may be Et forte dicerent aliqui quod, licet ydee sint vere 5 denied that these Ideas are in] mente divina, non tamen essent divina essencia, 1983 one with the sicud ydolum sensibile in corporali speculo non est Divine Essence; for the image ipsum speculum. Et sic forte dicerent ulterius quod in a mirror is omne illud, et solum tale, quod est forma in deo, sive not the mirror's essence, and in deitate, est deus vel est deitas, sive in quo deitas 10 that only which est per modum forme intrinsece, et sic nulla ydearum is formally God can be called talium est in deitate; quia tunc persona divina per Divine in any way. modum naturalis producentis voluntarii principiaret If they were, they would talem ydeam formaliter esse deum. Et sic talis ydea each of them formaliter esset filius dei naturalis, vel spiritus sanctus: 15 be the Word, or the Holy quod nephas est dicere; quia tunc essent multi filii Ghost, and this were a heresy. vel spiritus sancti in divinis. Igitur vel nulla talis ydea Either none of est deus neque divina essencia, vel quelibet talis est them is God, or they are all deus et est divina natura; forte secundum hoc quod God, being necessarily one deus eternaliter necessario communicat sibi unitatem 20 with Him. Possibly they et ydemptitatem divine essencie, seu assumit eam eter- share in the naliter necessario ad illam unitatem et ydemptitatem. Et Personality of the Word, sic eciam quia ydee ille relucent appropriate in verbo though distinct dei quod appropriate est res summi patris, forte dice- one from another. retur quod communicatur eis personalitas verbi dei et 25 Or, as these 2m hoc essent verbum dei, non tamen ex hoc una est Ideas are the uncreated reliqua. Vel dicendum quod ydea in mente dei est di- essences of things, vina essencia et deus, quia racio create essencie cor- infinitely more poree habet essenciam et est essencia corporea, et racio perfect than they, God’s spiritualis creata rei intellectualis est essencia spiritualis 30 essence is to them what intellectualis. Et quia ydee sunt infinite nobiliores ra- created corporeity is to ciones quam ille create, igitur quelibet habet essenciam created eternam et est essencia eterna, cum sola divina essencia, igneity, aqueity etc. quamlibet talem ydeam in se eternaliter relucentem principiat quemadmodum (vel quasi per modum quo) 35 essencia corporea principiat in se creatam racionem: scilicet quidditatem totam ignis, aque, terre, vel alterius rei corpore. Igitur sicut creata racio (puta, tota quidditas ignis, gracia exempli, est essencia corporea ignis, est et ipse 40 ignis) sic videtur quelibet ydea in mente divina esse Thus, as the essence of fire is really a corporeal essence, so 18. uz MS. 2. � pro quid MS. 33. cum autem or tamen ante MS. 28. est pro essencie MS.
12 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. III. Augustini; quamvis beatus Hieronymus et Chrysostomus Johannes aliud sentenciant; tunc ut quid non similiter assertive ex facto ecclesie possit dici quia “quod factum est in ipso vita erat". It may be Et forte dicerent aliqui quod, licet ydee sint vere 5 denied that these Ideas are in] mente divina, non tamen essent divina essencia, 1983 one with the sicud ydolum sensibile in corporali speculo non est Divine Essence; for the image ipsum speculum. Et sic forte dicerent ulterius quod in a mirror is omne illud, et solum tale, quod est forma in deo, sive not the mirror's essence, and in deitate, est deus vel est deitas, sive in quo deitas 10 that only which est per modum forme intrinsece, et sic nulla ydearum is formally God can be called talium est in deitate; quia tunc persona divina per Divine in any way. modum naturalis producentis voluntarii principiaret If they were, they would talem ydeam formaliter esse deum. Et sic talis ydea each of them formaliter esset filius dei naturalis, vel spiritus sanctus: 15 be the Word, or the Holy quod nephas est dicere; quia tunc essent multi filii Ghost, and this were a heresy. vel spiritus sancti in divinis. Igitur vel nulla talis ydea Either none of est deus neque divina essencia, vel quelibet talis est them is God, or they are all deus et est divina natura; forte secundum hoc quod God, being necessarily one deus eternaliter necessario communicat sibi unitatem 20 with Him. Possibly they et ydemptitatem divine essencie, seu assumit eam eter- share in the naliter necessario ad illam unitatem et ydemptitatem. Et Personality of the Word, sic eciam quia ydee ille relucent appropriate in verbo though distinct dei quod appropriate est res summi patris, forte dice- one from another. retur quod communicatur eis personalitas verbi dei et 25 Or, as these 2m hoc essent verbum dei, non tamen ex hoc una est Ideas are the uncreated reliqua. Vel dicendum quod ydea in mente dei est di- essences of things, vina essencia et deus, quia racio create essencie cor- infinitely more poree habet essenciam et est essencia corporea, et racio perfect than they, God’s spiritualis creata rei intellectualis est essencia spiritualis 30 essence is to them what intellectualis. Et quia ydee sunt infinite nobiliores ra- created corporeity is to ciones quam ille create, igitur quelibet habet essenciam created eternam et est essencia eterna, cum sola divina essencia, igneity, aqueity etc. quamlibet talem ydeam in se eternaliter relucentem principiat quemadmodum (vel quasi per modum quo) 35 essencia corporea principiat in se creatam racionem: scilicet quidditatem totam ignis, aque, terre, vel alterius rei corpore. Igitur sicut creata racio (puta, tota quidditas ignis, gracia exempli, est essencia corporea ignis, est et ipse 40 ignis) sic videtur quelibet ydea in mente divina esse Thus, as the essence of fire is really a corporeal essence, so 18. uz MS. 2. � pro quid MS. 33. cum autem or tamen ante MS. 28. est pro essencie MS.
Strana 13
CAP. III. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 13 divina essencia et est deus. Non tamen ydea formaliter each Idea is the Divine est essencia divina vel deus, sicud nec tota ignis quid- essence; but as fire itself is not ditas est formaliter ipse ignis vel eius essencia cor- that which porea, que transit de uno esse substanciali in aliud. underlies the change from 5 Nec est putandam quod, si ille ydee in mente divina one substantial form to sunt eternaliter forme, quod igitur [sunt] forme infor- another, so mantes divinam essenciam vel aliquod suppositum vel in-these Ideas are not identical dividuum alicuius nature. Cum enim solum sint forme with the Divine Essence as exemplares, contra racionem earum est quod sint ali- principiating them. They are ro cuius essencie vel alicuius suppositi vel individui cuius- forms indeed, cunque nature forme informantes; nec sunt forme exem- but as mere exemplars of plares divine essencie vel suppositi divini, sed solum things to be created, not as rerum ad extra producibilium, et illis solum concretive intrinsically nominant vel denominant exemplariter, et non insistenter determinants in the Divine 15 vel inexistenter. Et sic secundum ydeam equi non deus Essence itself. vel divina essencia dicitur formabilis, sed solus equus; The Divine Idea of a horse, et ita de aliis. Et quelibet earum nominat formaliter v. g. is merely the pattern se esse illam racionem ydealem, et quelibet earum according to which God can ydearum secundum suum per se primum proprium et create a horse. 20 adequatum modum est pulchra, nobilis, formosa, ama- All these Ideas are infinitely bilis, deliciosa, delectabilis, et preciosa nimis infinite; beautiful, quamvis nullum earum habeat essenciam vel naturam though none have any creatam vel increatam in se per modum forme in- essence at all of their own, existentis, sed ex hoc quod ipsa ydea secundum suum except as patterns, and 25 proprium modum est et habet essenciam divinam, et in so far, each est ipsa essencia divina, ut dictum est: ipsa secundum is the essence of the Divine suum per se primum et adequatum est sic nobilis et Mind. pulchra etc. Et videtur quod si per impossibile homo perpetuo To see a single one of them 30 clare et secure videret unicam earum, peccato ab eo for ever would remoto, ipse inenarrabiliter delectaretur in illam. Videtur secure ineffable bliss. ulterius primo aspectu simpliciter dicendum — cum Now, as every creature is quelibet talis ydea creature sit suprema propria racio identical with its created creature eiusdem, et cum ipsa creatura sit tota sua measure of 35 racio creata, incomparabiliter minus nobilis quam racio being, a fortiori it is identical illa increata, et quecunque res est sua pocius tota with its supreme essencialis prestantissima racio quam ipsa sit racio sua increate minus nobilis — [quod] quelibet creature est sua talis measure, its Divine Idea. racio increata. Et ulterius ipsa creatura nequaquam 40 secundum suam ad extra existenciam, sed secundum suam illam ydeam in mente divina, est ipsa vita prima: 199 6. sunt deest MS. 14. insiftet' MS. 18. niet illam MS. 38. quod deest MS.
CAP. III. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 13 divina essencia et est deus. Non tamen ydea formaliter each Idea is the Divine est essencia divina vel deus, sicud nec tota ignis quid- essence; but as fire itself is not ditas est formaliter ipse ignis vel eius essencia cor- that which porea, que transit de uno esse substanciali in aliud. underlies the change from 5 Nec est putandam quod, si ille ydee in mente divina one substantial form to sunt eternaliter forme, quod igitur [sunt] forme infor- another, so mantes divinam essenciam vel aliquod suppositum vel in-these Ideas are not identical dividuum alicuius nature. Cum enim solum sint forme with the Divine Essence as exemplares, contra racionem earum est quod sint ali- principiating them. They are ro cuius essencie vel alicuius suppositi vel individui cuius- forms indeed, cunque nature forme informantes; nec sunt forme exem- but as mere exemplars of plares divine essencie vel suppositi divini, sed solum things to be created, not as rerum ad extra producibilium, et illis solum concretive intrinsically nominant vel denominant exemplariter, et non insistenter determinants in the Divine 15 vel inexistenter. Et sic secundum ydeam equi non deus Essence itself. vel divina essencia dicitur formabilis, sed solus equus; The Divine Idea of a horse, et ita de aliis. Et quelibet earum nominat formaliter v. g. is merely the pattern se esse illam racionem ydealem, et quelibet earum according to which God can ydearum secundum suum per se primum proprium et create a horse. 20 adequatum modum est pulchra, nobilis, formosa, ama- All these Ideas are infinitely bilis, deliciosa, delectabilis, et preciosa nimis infinite; beautiful, quamvis nullum earum habeat essenciam vel naturam though none have any creatam vel increatam in se per modum forme in- essence at all of their own, existentis, sed ex hoc quod ipsa ydea secundum suum except as patterns, and 25 proprium modum est et habet essenciam divinam, et in so far, each est ipsa essencia divina, ut dictum est: ipsa secundum is the essence of the Divine suum per se primum et adequatum est sic nobilis et Mind. pulchra etc. Et videtur quod si per impossibile homo perpetuo To see a single one of them 30 clare et secure videret unicam earum, peccato ab eo for ever would remoto, ipse inenarrabiliter delectaretur in illam. Videtur secure ineffable bliss. ulterius primo aspectu simpliciter dicendum — cum Now, as every creature is quelibet talis ydea creature sit suprema propria racio identical with its created creature eiusdem, et cum ipsa creatura sit tota sua measure of 35 racio creata, incomparabiliter minus nobilis quam racio being, a fortiori it is identical illa increata, et quecunque res est sua pocius tota with its supreme essencialis prestantissima racio quam ipsa sit racio sua increate minus nobilis — [quod] quelibet creature est sua talis measure, its Divine Idea. racio increata. Et ulterius ipsa creatura nequaquam 40 secundum suam ad extra existenciam, sed secundum suam illam ydeam in mente divina, est ipsa vita prima: 199 6. sunt deest MS. 14. insiftet' MS. 18. niet illam MS. 38. quod deest MS.
Strana 14
14 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. III. iuxta illud Johannis 1°. "Quod factum est in ipso vita erat", sicud exponit Augustinus et doctores ecclesie post eum. Yet we must Nec tamen debet dici vel concedi quod asinus est not say that an deus vel quod equus est deus, quia] simplices existi- 199" ass is God ; for this, according mabunt, cum verba iuxta nostram capacitatem et usitatum to the usual sense of the intellectum sonant, quod asinus in sua exterius existencia words, would mean that both sit deus. Sic enim cum dicitur “asinus", apprehendimus are identical in asinum in sua propria existencia; et cum additur “est outward existence. deus', apprehendimus asinum in sua exterius existencia 10 We have no right to affirm esse deum; et ille sensus est hereticus. Igitur non a thing with sequitur: Asinus 2m suam racionem ydealem in mente restrictions and then to affirm divina est deus; igitur asinus est deus. Sicud enim, it without them; thus: secundum logicos, arguendo a termino aliquo cum An ass quà termino distrahente vel diminuente in significando a 15 existing in the Divine Mind, is racione formalis significati talis termini ad seipsum, God::. an ass deposito tali termino distrahente vel diminuente, non is God, is a fallacy. valet argumentum: ut non sequitur; "iste est bonus And if the restricted nequam; igitur iste est bonus": sic non valet argumentum proposition be a termino sumpto cum termino rapiente in significando 20 offensive to weak minds, a prima racione formalis significati ipsius termini ad better avoid making it. nimis superexcellentem racionem ad seipsum terminum sine rapiente termino sumptum pro modica racione formalis significati termini. Et sic non sequitur: “Asinus 2m suam racionem ydealem, vel secundum 25 esse ydeale, sive ydealiter, est deus: igitur asinus est deus." Et si infirmos offenderet hoc dictum: "Asinus secundum esse intelligibile vel ydeale est deus", caucius est tacendum. Yet modern Et multi moderni theologi et logici despiciunt et 30 theologians, whilst they are male kapiunt, cum dicitur quod asinus ydealiter vel scandalized 2m esse ydeale est deus. Et illos, 2m eorum theologiam thereby, admit that the Word et logicam simul, oporteret concedere quod asinus ne- being man, a cessario est deus, lapis necessario est deus, equus man is God ; and that He necessario est deus, capra necessario est deus. Nam 35 might have assumed any tales 2m theologiam suam concedunt quod verbum dei other animal, potest assumere in unitatem suppositi naturam asini, had He chosen, so that an ass equi, capre etc., sicud assumpsit naturam hominis. Et might be God without sic assumendo verbam dei esset asinus, esset capra, restrictions! esset equus etc. sicud modo est homo. Dicunt illi 40 secundo iuxta suam logicam quod in omni proposicione 5. et pro existimabunt MS. 11. nec MS. 21. apna MS.
14 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. III. iuxta illud Johannis 1°. "Quod factum est in ipso vita erat", sicud exponit Augustinus et doctores ecclesie post eum. Yet we must Nec tamen debet dici vel concedi quod asinus est not say that an deus vel quod equus est deus, quia] simplices existi- 199" ass is God ; for this, according mabunt, cum verba iuxta nostram capacitatem et usitatum to the usual sense of the intellectum sonant, quod asinus in sua exterius existencia words, would mean that both sit deus. Sic enim cum dicitur “asinus", apprehendimus are identical in asinum in sua propria existencia; et cum additur “est outward existence. deus', apprehendimus asinum in sua exterius existencia 10 We have no right to affirm esse deum; et ille sensus est hereticus. Igitur non a thing with sequitur: Asinus 2m suam racionem ydealem in mente restrictions and then to affirm divina est deus; igitur asinus est deus. Sicud enim, it without them; thus: secundum logicos, arguendo a termino aliquo cum An ass quà termino distrahente vel diminuente in significando a 15 existing in the Divine Mind, is racione formalis significati talis termini ad seipsum, God::. an ass deposito tali termino distrahente vel diminuente, non is God, is a fallacy. valet argumentum: ut non sequitur; "iste est bonus And if the restricted nequam; igitur iste est bonus": sic non valet argumentum proposition be a termino sumpto cum termino rapiente in significando 20 offensive to weak minds, a prima racione formalis significati ipsius termini ad better avoid making it. nimis superexcellentem racionem ad seipsum terminum sine rapiente termino sumptum pro modica racione formalis significati termini. Et sic non sequitur: “Asinus 2m suam racionem ydealem, vel secundum 25 esse ydeale, sive ydealiter, est deus: igitur asinus est deus." Et si infirmos offenderet hoc dictum: "Asinus secundum esse intelligibile vel ydeale est deus", caucius est tacendum. Yet modern Et multi moderni theologi et logici despiciunt et 30 theologians, whilst they are male kapiunt, cum dicitur quod asinus ydealiter vel scandalized 2m esse ydeale est deus. Et illos, 2m eorum theologiam thereby, admit that the Word et logicam simul, oporteret concedere quod asinus ne- being man, a cessario est deus, lapis necessario est deus, equus man is God ; and that He necessario est deus, capra necessario est deus. Nam 35 might have assumed any tales 2m theologiam suam concedunt quod verbum dei other animal, potest assumere in unitatem suppositi naturam asini, had He chosen, so that an ass equi, capre etc., sicud assumpsit naturam hominis. Et might be God without sic assumendo verbam dei esset asinus, esset capra, restrictions! esset equus etc. sicud modo est homo. Dicunt illi 40 secundo iuxta suam logicam quod in omni proposicione 5. et pro existimabunt MS. 11. nec MS. 21. apna MS.
Strana 15
CAP. III. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 15 200" de necessario in sensu diviso, subiecto non contracto, In their system, too, everything ipsum subiectum (cum supponat) supponit pro illo quod said of a necessary est vel potest esse huiusmodi: ut asinus necessario est subject is deus, i. e. illud quod est asinus vel potest esse asinus actually true: An ass might 5 necessario est deus, modo iuxta illa simul oporteret be God, and as all things in eos concedere quod asinus] necessario est deus, quia God are hoc necessario est deus (demonstrando verbum dei) et necessary, therefore it is hoc est vel potest esse asinus; igitur asinus necessario so! est deus. Et eciam quia illa, asinus necessario est 10 deus", iuxta eos significat quod illud quod est asinus vel potest esse asinus necessario est deus. Et hoc est verum, iuxta eos, quod verbum dei, quod est asinus vel potest esse asinus, necessario est deus. Prioris ergo theologie et logice colleccio videtur ex illo verbo ewan- 15 gelii, sicut legit ecclesia: 'Quod factum est in ipso vita erat", et a beato Augustino esse recipienda, tenenda, et sapienter docenda. Colleccio autem theologie et logice posterioris videtur caute esse tenenda, vel pocius dimittenda. It may be 20 Sed forte instatur adhuc contra superiorem logicam, urged that what is in its ubi conceditur: “Asinus secundum racionem ydealem ideal archetype est deus." Contra: sic sequitur: “asinus secundum is truly thus: if an ass is racionem ydealem est deus: igitur asinus secundum God in its ideal veritatem est deus." Ab inferiori ad suum superius archetype, it is truly God, and 25 affirmative cum ceteris paribus; et ex consequenti: without restrictions. asinus 2m veritatem est deus: igitur asinus vere est But here we deus: igitur asinus est deus". Respondetur negando make the consequenciam primam, quia non sunt cetera paria. meaning of the word ass pass Nam in antecedente sumitur ly “asinus", cum termino from ideal to real existence, 2o rapiente, cum in significando a racione parva ad super- and commit a fallacy. excellentem nimis racionem; in consequente autem non sic. Nam termini transcendentes, qualis est et ille ter- minus 'veritas" non minuunt, distrahunt, vel rapiunt terminos non transcendentes; neque omnes termini 35 speciales hoc faciunt, sed quedam sic, quedam sic, racionabili dei ordinacione, qui omnem veram logicam et locucionem bonam ordinat et disponit racionabiliter. It is therefore preferable to adhere to the old theology and to Augustine's reading of the words of St. John; the modern system is less safe. 10. quia MS. 25. Paribus. Add: recte arguitur, or words to the same effect.
CAP. III. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 15 200" de necessario in sensu diviso, subiecto non contracto, In their system, too, everything ipsum subiectum (cum supponat) supponit pro illo quod said of a necessary est vel potest esse huiusmodi: ut asinus necessario est subject is deus, i. e. illud quod est asinus vel potest esse asinus actually true: An ass might 5 necessario est deus, modo iuxta illa simul oporteret be God, and as all things in eos concedere quod asinus] necessario est deus, quia God are hoc necessario est deus (demonstrando verbum dei) et necessary, therefore it is hoc est vel potest esse asinus; igitur asinus necessario so! est deus. Et eciam quia illa, asinus necessario est 10 deus", iuxta eos significat quod illud quod est asinus vel potest esse asinus necessario est deus. Et hoc est verum, iuxta eos, quod verbum dei, quod est asinus vel potest esse asinus, necessario est deus. Prioris ergo theologie et logice colleccio videtur ex illo verbo ewan- 15 gelii, sicut legit ecclesia: 'Quod factum est in ipso vita erat", et a beato Augustino esse recipienda, tenenda, et sapienter docenda. Colleccio autem theologie et logice posterioris videtur caute esse tenenda, vel pocius dimittenda. It may be 20 Sed forte instatur adhuc contra superiorem logicam, urged that what is in its ubi conceditur: “Asinus secundum racionem ydealem ideal archetype est deus." Contra: sic sequitur: “asinus secundum is truly thus: if an ass is racionem ydealem est deus: igitur asinus secundum God in its ideal veritatem est deus." Ab inferiori ad suum superius archetype, it is truly God, and 25 affirmative cum ceteris paribus; et ex consequenti: without restrictions. asinus 2m veritatem est deus: igitur asinus vere est But here we deus: igitur asinus est deus". Respondetur negando make the consequenciam primam, quia non sunt cetera paria. meaning of the word ass pass Nam in antecedente sumitur ly “asinus", cum termino from ideal to real existence, 2o rapiente, cum in significando a racione parva ad super- and commit a fallacy. excellentem nimis racionem; in consequente autem non sic. Nam termini transcendentes, qualis est et ille ter- minus 'veritas" non minuunt, distrahunt, vel rapiunt terminos non transcendentes; neque omnes termini 35 speciales hoc faciunt, sed quedam sic, quedam sic, racionabili dei ordinacione, qui omnem veram logicam et locucionem bonam ordinat et disponit racionabiliter. It is therefore preferable to adhere to the old theology and to Augustine's reading of the words of St. John; the modern system is less safe. 10. quia MS. 25. Paribus. Add: recte arguitur, or words to the same effect.
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CAPITULUM QUARTUM. As God is the Sed reddeundo: sicud divina essencia est ydeis illis underlying essence of these peressencia, ita pulchritudo essencialis eiusdem essencie ideas, He is est illis peressenciali pulchritudine; et sic sunt omnes also their beauty, which pares, ymmo, et penitus eiusdem essencialis pulchritu-5 is in one sense dinis. Et sicud persona divina habet pulchritudinem the same for all, and in essencialem penitus eandem cum qualibet alia persona another diverse, divina, habet tamen, sicud realitatem personalem pro- priam, ita et pulchritudinem personalem propriam aliam a pulchritudine personali cuiuslibet alterius divine 10 persone; que tamen pulchritudo personalis non est alia ] a pulchritudine essenciali; differt tamen ab ea 200" 2m formam sive racionem sicud persona non est res alia ab essencia, differt tamen secundum racionem sive modaliter ab illa: sic quelibet ydea in mente dei cum 15 qualibet alia est eiusdem pulchritudinis essencialis, sed habet aliam pulchritudinem ydealem propriam a qualibet alia; que pulchritudo ydealis non est realiter differens a pulchritudine essenciali, sed 2m racionem. Et sicut pulchritudines personales divinarum personarum 20 sunt sibi pares cum per se sibi coequales, licet sint realiter et personaliter ille persone, sed non gradualiter 2m plus et minus differentes, sic videtur quod omnes pulchritudines ydeales proprie sint ad invicem priores, licet ydee ad invicem sint realiter et ydealiter differentes. 25 Vel sicud genus in creaturis est secundum se pulchrius quam sua species secundum se, et species 2m se pulchrior quam suum individuum 2m se, et una species pulchrior alia, sic eciam ydee proprie talium sint sic gradualiter pulchre. Adhuc forte quelibet earum est infinite pulchra ydealiter proprie. Cum autem ydea asini sit infinite just as the Divine Persons are the same yet different; or as genera differ in beauty from their species, and yet have something which is identical. And each is infinitely and ideally beautiful. 30 1. Capitulum Quartum deest. 3. p 4° MS. 26. si sicud MS. 2. Blank space for initial S. MS. 29. quod sic MS.
CAPITULUM QUARTUM. As God is the Sed reddeundo: sicud divina essencia est ydeis illis underlying essence of these peressencia, ita pulchritudo essencialis eiusdem essencie ideas, He is est illis peressenciali pulchritudine; et sic sunt omnes also their beauty, which pares, ymmo, et penitus eiusdem essencialis pulchritu-5 is in one sense dinis. Et sicud persona divina habet pulchritudinem the same for all, and in essencialem penitus eandem cum qualibet alia persona another diverse, divina, habet tamen, sicud realitatem personalem pro- priam, ita et pulchritudinem personalem propriam aliam a pulchritudine personali cuiuslibet alterius divine 10 persone; que tamen pulchritudo personalis non est alia ] a pulchritudine essenciali; differt tamen ab ea 200" 2m formam sive racionem sicud persona non est res alia ab essencia, differt tamen secundum racionem sive modaliter ab illa: sic quelibet ydea in mente dei cum 15 qualibet alia est eiusdem pulchritudinis essencialis, sed habet aliam pulchritudinem ydealem propriam a qualibet alia; que pulchritudo ydealis non est realiter differens a pulchritudine essenciali, sed 2m racionem. Et sicut pulchritudines personales divinarum personarum 20 sunt sibi pares cum per se sibi coequales, licet sint realiter et personaliter ille persone, sed non gradualiter 2m plus et minus differentes, sic videtur quod omnes pulchritudines ydeales proprie sint ad invicem priores, licet ydee ad invicem sint realiter et ydealiter differentes. 25 Vel sicud genus in creaturis est secundum se pulchrius quam sua species secundum se, et species 2m se pulchrior quam suum individuum 2m se, et una species pulchrior alia, sic eciam ydee proprie talium sint sic gradualiter pulchre. Adhuc forte quelibet earum est infinite pulchra ydealiter proprie. Cum autem ydea asini sit infinite just as the Divine Persons are the same yet different; or as genera differ in beauty from their species, and yet have something which is identical. And each is infinitely and ideally beautiful. 30 1. Capitulum Quartum deest. 3. p 4° MS. 26. si sicud MS. 2. Blank space for initial S. MS. 29. quod sic MS.
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CAP. IV. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 17 201“ pulchredinis videtur quod grossus asinus non sit illa sua ydea, quamvis superius fuerit motivum ad hoc aliquale adductum. Et forte posset dici quod superius motivum solum arguit quod asinus secundum suum purum esse ydeale est ydea sua et per consequens vita prima; sed non ex hoc oportet simpliciter dici quod asinus sit illa sua ydea; quia tunc asinus in sua existencia esset illa ydea. Unde, sicut multi negant quod creata res sit sua tota essencialis racio eciam 10 formaliter rei, manifesta — sic quod homo non sit humanitas, ignis non sit igneitas etc. — ita asserunt sic a maiori: creata res non est sua racio essencialis increata non formaliter creature inexistens. Et, dato quod crea- tura esset tota sua racio creata sibi intrinseca, non 15 propter hoc oporteret quod esset racio que non est sibi intrinseca et creata; quia hec secunda racio plus longe secundum puritatem distat a re creata quam racio formalis intrinseca. Verumtamen, quamvis ewangelium non dicat quod factum est in ipso vita erat", ne credatur] factura inesse facture vel inesse presencie temporalis esse vita prima; dicit tamen"quod factum est in ipso vita erat", scilicet, antequam haberet esse facture, sic videtur quod asinus erat ydea sua; erat quidem ante esse facture in esse 25 intelligibili vel ydeali. Nec videtur offendere sapientes dicere quod asinus est ydea sua, dummodo intelligatur quod non asinus in esse presencie temporalis sit ydea, nec quod asinus in sua forma existencie sit ydea, sed quod asinus ante et supra esse facture habeatur in 3o mente, ydeale proprium summi artificis. Et sic illud esse ydeale ante omnem facturam et ante tempus: et ecce cum bonum possibile sit omne ens esse et non potest esse melius quam omne ens, tunc eius transcendens quod est "omne ens esse" est optimum possibile. Et 35 tamen asinus grossus est illud ens transcendens, et e contra illud nobilissimum ens transcendens est asinus. Non quod asinus 2m racionem suam propriam formalem et intrinsecam sit ens transcendens, nec quod ens trans- cendens secundum suam propriam intrinsecam racionem 40 sit asinus, sed forte quod deus unitatem et ydemptitatem It follows that an ass really existing cannot be identical with its Idea, though it has been stated to be such. There are many who deny that an existing man is identical with existing Humanity, and a fortiori that anything is identical with its ideal Archetype. The sense of the text in St. John's Gospel is not that eternal life exists in a temporal being, but that its intelligibility existed eternally before it was produced in time. The ass is Transcendent Entity, not in its present and intrinsic measure of being, but in so far as it shares in the same entity as its archetype. 1. vide MS. ro. mats MS. 29. est pro esse MS. 29. habeat MS. De Universalibus.
CAP. IV. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 17 201“ pulchredinis videtur quod grossus asinus non sit illa sua ydea, quamvis superius fuerit motivum ad hoc aliquale adductum. Et forte posset dici quod superius motivum solum arguit quod asinus secundum suum purum esse ydeale est ydea sua et per consequens vita prima; sed non ex hoc oportet simpliciter dici quod asinus sit illa sua ydea; quia tunc asinus in sua existencia esset illa ydea. Unde, sicut multi negant quod creata res sit sua tota essencialis racio eciam 10 formaliter rei, manifesta — sic quod homo non sit humanitas, ignis non sit igneitas etc. — ita asserunt sic a maiori: creata res non est sua racio essencialis increata non formaliter creature inexistens. Et, dato quod crea- tura esset tota sua racio creata sibi intrinseca, non 15 propter hoc oporteret quod esset racio que non est sibi intrinseca et creata; quia hec secunda racio plus longe secundum puritatem distat a re creata quam racio formalis intrinseca. Verumtamen, quamvis ewangelium non dicat quod factum est in ipso vita erat", ne credatur] factura inesse facture vel inesse presencie temporalis esse vita prima; dicit tamen"quod factum est in ipso vita erat", scilicet, antequam haberet esse facture, sic videtur quod asinus erat ydea sua; erat quidem ante esse facture in esse 25 intelligibili vel ydeali. Nec videtur offendere sapientes dicere quod asinus est ydea sua, dummodo intelligatur quod non asinus in esse presencie temporalis sit ydea, nec quod asinus in sua forma existencie sit ydea, sed quod asinus ante et supra esse facture habeatur in 3o mente, ydeale proprium summi artificis. Et sic illud esse ydeale ante omnem facturam et ante tempus: et ecce cum bonum possibile sit omne ens esse et non potest esse melius quam omne ens, tunc eius transcendens quod est "omne ens esse" est optimum possibile. Et 35 tamen asinus grossus est illud ens transcendens, et e contra illud nobilissimum ens transcendens est asinus. Non quod asinus 2m racionem suam propriam formalem et intrinsecam sit ens transcendens, nec quod ens trans- cendens secundum suam propriam intrinsecam racionem 40 sit asinus, sed forte quod deus unitatem et ydemptitatem It follows that an ass really existing cannot be identical with its Idea, though it has been stated to be such. There are many who deny that an existing man is identical with existing Humanity, and a fortiori that anything is identical with its ideal Archetype. The sense of the text in St. John's Gospel is not that eternal life exists in a temporal being, but that its intelligibility existed eternally before it was produced in time. The ass is Transcendent Entity, not in its present and intrinsic measure of being, but in so far as it shares in the same entity as its archetype. 1. vide MS. ro. mats MS. 29. est pro esse MS. 29. habeat MS. De Universalibus.
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18 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. IV. primo debitam ente transcendenti communicat asino et cuilibet quantumlibet inperfecto enti in propria exi- stencia; et in illa unit et ydemptificat ens transcendens cum quolibet tali, et econtra; et sic asinus est ens transcendens et econtra. Sharing thus in Sic forte posset aliquis opiniative dicere quod deus the same unitatem et ydemptitatem, primo debitam ydee proprie entity, it becomes true asini, illam communicat asino et non alii creature cuius (in a sense) to non est ipsa ydea: et secundum hoc unit et ydempti- say that the ass is its Idea; but ficat ydeam propriam cum suo ydeato, et econtra. Et 10 this is a delicate and sic secundum talem unionem apud sapientes esset verum difficult quod asinus est sua ydea; et econtra est predicacio question. vel fundat predicacionem non formalem intrinsecam unius de altero secundum habitudinem qua unum est propria forma exemplaris alterius, unum recipit unitatem et ydemptitatem alterius; et sic uniuntur et ydempti- ficantur, ut asinus sit ydea, et econtra. Sentencia autem in hac materia est sciencie et pietatis. We should Unde caute tacenda est coram infirmis, ignaris disci- carefully avoid pulis, et protervis; et totum cum ] timore et pietate 201b scandalizing the weak and tractari debet. Et quia in hoc plurimum deficimus, non the perverse, est mirum quod modicum veritatis in hac re tam and treat the whole matter abscondita cognoscimus. Et quomodocunque altercacio with reverence and piety, in fiat et contencio de verbis huius materie, sentencialiter which we often fail. But we tenendum est quod asinus non est in sua propria for- 25 ought to hold mali existencia in mente divina ydea, nec ydea illa est firmly, on the one hand that in propria sua forma asinus, sed asinus habet quodam- the proper being of the ass modo esse proprie proprium ydeale in mente dei ante is not identical omne esse creatum. Et ipse asinus cum omne esse with ils Idea, and vice versá; creatum erat et est pure illud suum proprium esse 30 and that its intelligible ydeale; et sic ydea et asinus ante omne esse creatum. being is Sed illud purum esse proprium ydeale erat et est vita eternally identical prima; sed ydea non est asinus, quia nec est asinus therewith: ante esse creatum, cum non sit esse asinum ante esse creatum; nec ydea est asinus post esse creatum, cum 35 tamen ydea fieret asinus postquam prius non esset asinus, et sic ex eodem vita prima (puta deus) fieret asinus, leo, caper, equus, etc. quod est inconveniens. Nec si ad bonum sensum et intellectum, asinus est vel The Ideal ass is not the real erat ydea [sequitur], quod igitur ydea est vel erat 40 ass, for then it would be more asinus; quia asinus ante esse creature est vel erat sua 15 1. a suis MS. 20. totium MS. 40. sequitur deest MS.
18 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. IV. primo debitam ente transcendenti communicat asino et cuilibet quantumlibet inperfecto enti in propria exi- stencia; et in illa unit et ydemptificat ens transcendens cum quolibet tali, et econtra; et sic asinus est ens transcendens et econtra. Sharing thus in Sic forte posset aliquis opiniative dicere quod deus the same unitatem et ydemptitatem, primo debitam ydee proprie entity, it becomes true asini, illam communicat asino et non alii creature cuius (in a sense) to non est ipsa ydea: et secundum hoc unit et ydempti- say that the ass is its Idea; but ficat ydeam propriam cum suo ydeato, et econtra. Et 10 this is a delicate and sic secundum talem unionem apud sapientes esset verum difficult quod asinus est sua ydea; et econtra est predicacio question. vel fundat predicacionem non formalem intrinsecam unius de altero secundum habitudinem qua unum est propria forma exemplaris alterius, unum recipit unitatem et ydemptitatem alterius; et sic uniuntur et ydempti- ficantur, ut asinus sit ydea, et econtra. Sentencia autem in hac materia est sciencie et pietatis. We should Unde caute tacenda est coram infirmis, ignaris disci- carefully avoid pulis, et protervis; et totum cum ] timore et pietate 201b scandalizing the weak and tractari debet. Et quia in hoc plurimum deficimus, non the perverse, est mirum quod modicum veritatis in hac re tam and treat the whole matter abscondita cognoscimus. Et quomodocunque altercacio with reverence and piety, in fiat et contencio de verbis huius materie, sentencialiter which we often fail. But we tenendum est quod asinus non est in sua propria for- 25 ought to hold mali existencia in mente divina ydea, nec ydea illa est firmly, on the one hand that in propria sua forma asinus, sed asinus habet quodam- the proper being of the ass modo esse proprie proprium ydeale in mente dei ante is not identical omne esse creatum. Et ipse asinus cum omne esse with ils Idea, and vice versá; creatum erat et est pure illud suum proprium esse 30 and that its intelligible ydeale; et sic ydea et asinus ante omne esse creatum. being is Sed illud purum esse proprium ydeale erat et est vita eternally identical prima; sed ydea non est asinus, quia nec est asinus therewith: ante esse creatum, cum non sit esse asinum ante esse creatum; nec ydea est asinus post esse creatum, cum 35 tamen ydea fieret asinus postquam prius non esset asinus, et sic ex eodem vita prima (puta deus) fieret asinus, leo, caper, equus, etc. quod est inconveniens. Nec si ad bonum sensum et intellectum, asinus est vel The Ideal ass is not the real erat ydea [sequitur], quod igitur ydea est vel erat 40 ass, for then it would be more asinus; quia asinus ante esse creature est vel erat sua 15 1. a suis MS. 20. totium MS. 40. sequitur deest MS.
Strana 19
CAP. IV. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 19 propria ydea, cum erat purum suum esse intelligibile proprium. Ydea autem nec ante esse creature nec post, nec in esse creature, est asinus; nec est hic conversio consequencialis: "Asinus est vel erat ydea; igitur ydea est vel erat asinus." Sicut enim ipsa albedo est sua pura intrinseca quidditas, nec est nec potest esse alba; sic ipse asinus est vel erat sua pura intelligibilitas in deo; sed illa pura intelligibilitas nec est, nec erat, nec poterit esse, asinus. Nec videtur sollicitandum quomodo illa habeat con- As to the mode of converting verti: "Asinus est vel erat ydea sua in deo"; quotlibet the proposition concerning this enim sunt proposiciones kathegorice affirmative que non matter, it is of no possunt in forma converti. Si tamen contencio, si utique importance. voluerint extorquere huius proposicionis aliquam con- Yet we may say:The 15 versionem, potest dici quod sic convertatur: “Asinus exislent Ass is est vel erat ydea, igitur ydea est vel erat hoc," de- its Ideal: therefore the monstrando per ly “hoc" purum proprium et totale Ideal Ass is whatever is esse ydeale asini in mente dei, vel asinum possibilem intelligible in the former." in puro esse intelligibili existente. Multi enim concedunt But it is not „ 20 de conversione illius: "Nulla essencia divina generat." possible to convert all 202° Ego autem ad presens non video necessitatem [con- propositions, and therefore vertendi] proposiciones, nisi de quanto per syllogismum it is not expositorium conversio fundari poterit; quod impossibile necessary. vel nimis difficile est in plurimis, cum non possit 25 semper medium singulare adaptari cui secundum eandem racionem singularem utrumque extremum formaliter affirmative insit, vel unum affirmative et aliud negative desit. Ulterius de ydeis dubitatur si sint forme absolute Are these Ideas relations or 3o vel respective. Et videtur dicendum, cum ydea equi vel absolute forms? The latter, since hominis [sit prestancior] quam eius intrinseca forma they are more qua equus est equus vel homo est homo; et cum forma perfect than the substantial absoluta sit prestancior forma respectiva, ydee autem existing forms, made after their forme absolute, et hoc maxime rerum et formarum ab- pattern, which 35 solutarum ad extra; et cum ydola in specie corporali, si are certainly absolute. sunt forme, non videntur esse respective sed absolute The Idea of a horse is not forme; cum vero ydee in speculo divino sint forme relative to the relucentes in speculo illo spirituali et verissimo, sicud existing horse by itself, nor ydola sensibilium lucent in corporali speculo, videtur vice versa; 40 quod sint forme reales absolute. Eciam cum sint forme 10 than a pure intelligible entity. No one can say that Whileness is white. 5. ipse albus MS. 10. alba pro illa (!) MS. 21, 22. convertendi deest ** 22. nects ppones. 3o. abte ul retme MS. 31. sit prestancior MS. deest MS. 35. eciam pro et cum MS.
CAP. IV. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 19 propria ydea, cum erat purum suum esse intelligibile proprium. Ydea autem nec ante esse creature nec post, nec in esse creature, est asinus; nec est hic conversio consequencialis: "Asinus est vel erat ydea; igitur ydea est vel erat asinus." Sicut enim ipsa albedo est sua pura intrinseca quidditas, nec est nec potest esse alba; sic ipse asinus est vel erat sua pura intelligibilitas in deo; sed illa pura intelligibilitas nec est, nec erat, nec poterit esse, asinus. Nec videtur sollicitandum quomodo illa habeat con- As to the mode of converting verti: "Asinus est vel erat ydea sua in deo"; quotlibet the proposition concerning this enim sunt proposiciones kathegorice affirmative que non matter, it is of no possunt in forma converti. Si tamen contencio, si utique importance. voluerint extorquere huius proposicionis aliquam con- Yet we may say:The 15 versionem, potest dici quod sic convertatur: “Asinus exislent Ass is est vel erat ydea, igitur ydea est vel erat hoc," de- its Ideal: therefore the monstrando per ly “hoc" purum proprium et totale Ideal Ass is whatever is esse ydeale asini in mente dei, vel asinum possibilem intelligible in the former." in puro esse intelligibili existente. Multi enim concedunt But it is not „ 20 de conversione illius: "Nulla essencia divina generat." possible to convert all 202° Ego autem ad presens non video necessitatem [con- propositions, and therefore vertendi] proposiciones, nisi de quanto per syllogismum it is not expositorium conversio fundari poterit; quod impossibile necessary. vel nimis difficile est in plurimis, cum non possit 25 semper medium singulare adaptari cui secundum eandem racionem singularem utrumque extremum formaliter affirmative insit, vel unum affirmative et aliud negative desit. Ulterius de ydeis dubitatur si sint forme absolute Are these Ideas relations or 3o vel respective. Et videtur dicendum, cum ydea equi vel absolute forms? The latter, since hominis [sit prestancior] quam eius intrinseca forma they are more qua equus est equus vel homo est homo; et cum forma perfect than the substantial absoluta sit prestancior forma respectiva, ydee autem existing forms, made after their forme absolute, et hoc maxime rerum et formarum ab- pattern, which 35 solutarum ad extra; et cum ydola in specie corporali, si are certainly absolute. sunt forme, non videntur esse respective sed absolute The Idea of a horse is not forme; cum vero ydee in speculo divino sint forme relative to the relucentes in speculo illo spirituali et verissimo, sicud existing horse by itself, nor ydola sensibilium lucent in corporali speculo, videtur vice versa; 40 quod sint forme reales absolute. Eciam cum sint forme 10 than a pure intelligible entity. No one can say that Whileness is white. 5. ipse albus MS. 10. alba pro illa (!) MS. 21, 22. convertendi deest ** 22. nects ppones. 3o. abte ul retme MS. 31. sit prestancior MS. deest MS. 35. eciam pro et cum MS.
Strana 20
20 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. IV. pure positive, et non privative, si essent relative, tunc haberent per se extrema; et oporteret quod ydea equi per se esset respectivum ad equum, et econtra equus, ut huiusmodi, esset per se respectivum ad ydeam: quod non est verum. Nec dabitur que res 2m ydeam habet se respective ad aliud. Non enim equus habet se respective 2m ydeam suam ad quidquam, nec aliquod aliud habet se respective secundum propriam ydeam equi. Ydee ergo rerum absolutarum non sunt respective, sed absolute forme; ydee tamen ad invicem relativorum, to sicud paternitatis et filiationis, cum sint proprie propria presencia essencialia formalia et exemplaria relativorum ad invicem, ut huiusmodi sunt, forme relative exem- plares dicende sunt, sicud forme exemplate sunt forme relative exemplate. Nec est putandum quod ydee in mente dei, cum sunt Besides, we cannot class exemplaria principia formalia secundum exemplaria these Divine Ideas of infinite factibilium, quod sint ita modice debilis realitatis quod beauty and reality amongst inter encia racionis et inter encia relativa que ponuntur relations, which minime realitatis ipse sint comparande universaliter. 20 are pure Sicut enim, iuxta superius dicta, sunt infinite pulchri- notional entities. Where tudinis essencialis et infinite pulchritudinis realis, sic they are the principles of sunt infinite realitatis essencialis secundum essenciam absolute realities, they divinam. Sunt eciam infinite realitatis ydealis secundum 202b too are suum proprium per se et primum modum. Et ubi ydee 25 absolute ; where of things sunt principia formalia propria rerum absolutarum, sunt related, they indicate forme absolute; ubi autem rerum per se respectivarum relation, yet are most real. sunt ydee forme respective, semper tamen valde reales. Is there an Ulterius est dubium utrum sint simpliciter infinite infinite number ydee caliditatum, frigiditatum etc., 2m quod infinite 30 of Divine Ideas, corresponding possunt esse gradus caliditatis maiores et minores; et to each degree of heat, &c.? sic de singularibus, et aliis formes in infinitum inten- No ; for the higher degree sius. Et videtur dicendum quod non; nam, cum gradus being more caliditatis ut duo sit perfeccior quam gradus caliditatis perfect, comprises the ut unum, et per consequens prior via perfeccionis:35 lower, and there must be igitur propria ydea gradus caliditatis ut duo existens a highest per se proprium et essenciale principium eiusdem gradus degree of all. 15 and we can find nothing else to relate it with. 7. aliquot MS. II. filia 4 MS. frigiditu MS. 36. I pro igitur MS. 12. pnea MS. 30. caliditu 5. Non est verum. Because the existing horse and its arche- type are only relative after the accident of the creation of the former; therefore per accidens, not per se.
20 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. IV. pure positive, et non privative, si essent relative, tunc haberent per se extrema; et oporteret quod ydea equi per se esset respectivum ad equum, et econtra equus, ut huiusmodi, esset per se respectivum ad ydeam: quod non est verum. Nec dabitur que res 2m ydeam habet se respective ad aliud. Non enim equus habet se respective 2m ydeam suam ad quidquam, nec aliquod aliud habet se respective secundum propriam ydeam equi. Ydee ergo rerum absolutarum non sunt respective, sed absolute forme; ydee tamen ad invicem relativorum, to sicud paternitatis et filiationis, cum sint proprie propria presencia essencialia formalia et exemplaria relativorum ad invicem, ut huiusmodi sunt, forme relative exem- plares dicende sunt, sicud forme exemplate sunt forme relative exemplate. Nec est putandum quod ydee in mente dei, cum sunt Besides, we cannot class exemplaria principia formalia secundum exemplaria these Divine Ideas of infinite factibilium, quod sint ita modice debilis realitatis quod beauty and reality amongst inter encia racionis et inter encia relativa que ponuntur relations, which minime realitatis ipse sint comparande universaliter. 20 are pure Sicut enim, iuxta superius dicta, sunt infinite pulchri- notional entities. Where tudinis essencialis et infinite pulchritudinis realis, sic they are the principles of sunt infinite realitatis essencialis secundum essenciam absolute realities, they divinam. Sunt eciam infinite realitatis ydealis secundum 202b too are suum proprium per se et primum modum. Et ubi ydee 25 absolute ; where of things sunt principia formalia propria rerum absolutarum, sunt related, they indicate forme absolute; ubi autem rerum per se respectivarum relation, yet are most real. sunt ydee forme respective, semper tamen valde reales. Is there an Ulterius est dubium utrum sint simpliciter infinite infinite number ydee caliditatum, frigiditatum etc., 2m quod infinite 30 of Divine Ideas, corresponding possunt esse gradus caliditatis maiores et minores; et to each degree of heat, &c.? sic de singularibus, et aliis formes in infinitum inten- No ; for the higher degree sius. Et videtur dicendum quod non; nam, cum gradus being more caliditatis ut duo sit perfeccior quam gradus caliditatis perfect, comprises the ut unum, et per consequens prior via perfeccionis:35 lower, and there must be igitur propria ydea gradus caliditatis ut duo existens a highest per se proprium et essenciale principium eiusdem gradus degree of all. 15 and we can find nothing else to relate it with. 7. aliquot MS. II. filia 4 MS. frigiditu MS. 36. I pro igitur MS. 12. pnea MS. 30. caliditu 5. Non est verum. Because the existing horse and its arche- type are only relative after the accident of the creation of the former; therefore per accidens, not per se.
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CAP. IV. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 21 20 203* caliditatis erit prior de per se in racione principii essencialis, formalis, et exemplaris (via perfeccionis pro- cedendo) quam ydea propria gradus caliditatis ut unum; et quia non contingit in infinitum procedere in prin- 5 cipiis per se essencialibus, formalibus, exemplaribus, respectu graduum caliditatis, attendendo principiacionem exemplarem, ordine et via perfeccionis, ut principiando, via perfeccionis, prius nobiliorem gradum, postea minus nobilem. Si enim contingeret sic simpliciter in infinitum 10 procedere, tunc non esset dari primum, proprium et essenciale, formale et exemplare principium gradus cali- ditatis, via perfeccionis computando. Igitur nec medium, ymmo omnia illa principia graduum caliditatis essent simul media; igitur ante omnia simul essent primum 15 principium exemplare essenciale: quod contradiccionem videtur implicare. Sic igitur videtur esse danda prima ydea caliditatis que simpliciter, via prime perfeccionis, possit exemplariter exemplare et proprie gradum cali- ditatis et gradus caliditatis quam illa ydea haberet proprie exemplare: sed ille existit in propria forma. Ipse enim summus possibilis: quia si de possibili daretur maior, et sic perfeccior, tunc illius propria ydea, via perfeccionis, haberet prius exemplare proprie quam ydea data prima, que primo potest via per- 25 feccionis exemplare: quod est impossibile. Et sic videtur ulterius quod in omni latitudine forma- rum est devenire ad summum gradum possibilem: ut ad summam caliditatem possibilem, summam frigiditatem possibilem etc. Videtur enim, iuxta dicta, quod deus necessario in eterno racionibus essencialibus constituit statum usque ad quantum potest pervenire. Sic eciam videtur deus omnia in disposicionibus essencialibus et accidentalibus disposuisse in numero, pondere, et men- sura, nedum de facto sed et de possibili. Unde, sicud 35 inconveniens esset procedere in infinitum in principiis formalibus, essencialibus, et intrinsecis cuiuscunque creature, sic inconsonum videtur quod contingeret in infinitum procedere in principiis essencialibus formalibus et exemplaribus cuiuscunque latitudinis formarum. Sic 40 enim nec quo ad viam generacionis, nec perfeccionis, Now if there were infinite degrees, none would be the highest, and consequently there would be none; which is self- contradictory. There is therefore one Divine Idea of heat, which in its perfection stands for all degrees, and at the same time represents the greatest possible heat. And in every species of form, we can arrive at the most perfect that is possible, God having disposed all things in perfect order, not only those which exist, but those which may exist; otherwise we should find no first or highest Idea of all. 12. 1 MS. 20. existat MS. 17. prime via MS. 20. proprie exemplare twice MS.
CAP. IV. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 21 20 203* caliditatis erit prior de per se in racione principii essencialis, formalis, et exemplaris (via perfeccionis pro- cedendo) quam ydea propria gradus caliditatis ut unum; et quia non contingit in infinitum procedere in prin- 5 cipiis per se essencialibus, formalibus, exemplaribus, respectu graduum caliditatis, attendendo principiacionem exemplarem, ordine et via perfeccionis, ut principiando, via perfeccionis, prius nobiliorem gradum, postea minus nobilem. Si enim contingeret sic simpliciter in infinitum 10 procedere, tunc non esset dari primum, proprium et essenciale, formale et exemplare principium gradus cali- ditatis, via perfeccionis computando. Igitur nec medium, ymmo omnia illa principia graduum caliditatis essent simul media; igitur ante omnia simul essent primum 15 principium exemplare essenciale: quod contradiccionem videtur implicare. Sic igitur videtur esse danda prima ydea caliditatis que simpliciter, via prime perfeccionis, possit exemplariter exemplare et proprie gradum cali- ditatis et gradus caliditatis quam illa ydea haberet proprie exemplare: sed ille existit in propria forma. Ipse enim summus possibilis: quia si de possibili daretur maior, et sic perfeccior, tunc illius propria ydea, via perfeccionis, haberet prius exemplare proprie quam ydea data prima, que primo potest via per- 25 feccionis exemplare: quod est impossibile. Et sic videtur ulterius quod in omni latitudine forma- rum est devenire ad summum gradum possibilem: ut ad summam caliditatem possibilem, summam frigiditatem possibilem etc. Videtur enim, iuxta dicta, quod deus necessario in eterno racionibus essencialibus constituit statum usque ad quantum potest pervenire. Sic eciam videtur deus omnia in disposicionibus essencialibus et accidentalibus disposuisse in numero, pondere, et men- sura, nedum de facto sed et de possibili. Unde, sicud 35 inconveniens esset procedere in infinitum in principiis formalibus, essencialibus, et intrinsecis cuiuscunque creature, sic inconsonum videtur quod contingeret in infinitum procedere in principiis essencialibus formalibus et exemplaribus cuiuscunque latitudinis formarum. Sic 40 enim nec quo ad viam generacionis, nec perfeccionis, Now if there were infinite degrees, none would be the highest, and consequently there would be none; which is self- contradictory. There is therefore one Divine Idea of heat, which in its perfection stands for all degrees, and at the same time represents the greatest possible heat. And in every species of form, we can arrive at the most perfect that is possible, God having disposed all things in perfect order, not only those which exist, but those which may exist; otherwise we should find no first or highest Idea of all. 12. 1 MS. 20. existat MS. 17. prime via MS. 20. proprie exemplare twice MS.
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22 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. IV. esset dare primam ydeam in aliqua latitudine formarum; These are the possibilities of et quotquot sunt ydee in mente divina, que sunt pro- things to be produced by ducibilitates rerum ad extra, et quoddam posse produci God ; He does talia producibilia, tot sunt posse producere formaliter not need them, since He needs in deo que sunt sicud quedam formales proprietates nothing; but He requires them. divine nature. Et licet deus non indigeat ydeis, sicud nec ipse potest aliquo modo 2m divinam naturam esse indigens, requirit tamen eas ad intelligendum, producendum, et conservandum producibilia ad extra. Est autem secundum beatum Augustinum, Egidium, et 10 alios, ydea forma exemplaris eterna 2m quam deus est productivus creature. Et sic 2m quosdam omnis et sola creature habet proprie ydeam in mente divina. Et sic peccata et defectus in moribus non habent ydeas in mente divina; privaciones autem et carencie, si quas 15 deus iuste infligit hominibus vel inmittit aliis creaturis, videntur habere ydeas in mente dei secundum quas eas inmittit vel infligit creaturis. De pulchritudine et claritate mundi architypi multa A further knowledge of possunt dici que occuli mentis non essent nobis relati. 20 the beauty of this world of Ydeo, cum deus nobis illum ad futuram vitam reservavit Ideas is reserved for the absconditum, contenti utcunque de iam dictis modicis next life. de formis universalibus ydealibus, ulterius tractatum ad formas communes rebus formaliter insitas aliqualiter longiorem comittamus. Sin, and moral defects, have no Divine Idea: but all other evils have. 25 3. quedam MS. 14. heat MS. 20. occli mtis MS. 20. non esset MS. 20. or quia pro que MS. 20. Que oculi. Unintelligible as regards construction.
22 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. IV. esset dare primam ydeam in aliqua latitudine formarum; These are the possibilities of et quotquot sunt ydee in mente divina, que sunt pro- things to be produced by ducibilitates rerum ad extra, et quoddam posse produci God ; He does talia producibilia, tot sunt posse producere formaliter not need them, since He needs in deo que sunt sicud quedam formales proprietates nothing; but He requires them. divine nature. Et licet deus non indigeat ydeis, sicud nec ipse potest aliquo modo 2m divinam naturam esse indigens, requirit tamen eas ad intelligendum, producendum, et conservandum producibilia ad extra. Est autem secundum beatum Augustinum, Egidium, et 10 alios, ydea forma exemplaris eterna 2m quam deus est productivus creature. Et sic 2m quosdam omnis et sola creature habet proprie ydeam in mente divina. Et sic peccata et defectus in moribus non habent ydeas in mente divina; privaciones autem et carencie, si quas 15 deus iuste infligit hominibus vel inmittit aliis creaturis, videntur habere ydeas in mente dei secundum quas eas inmittit vel infligit creaturis. De pulchritudine et claritate mundi architypi multa A further knowledge of possunt dici que occuli mentis non essent nobis relati. 20 the beauty of this world of Ydeo, cum deus nobis illum ad futuram vitam reservavit Ideas is reserved for the absconditum, contenti utcunque de iam dictis modicis next life. de formis universalibus ydealibus, ulterius tractatum ad formas communes rebus formaliter insitas aliqualiter longiorem comittamus. Sin, and moral defects, have no Divine Idea: but all other evils have. 25 3. quedam MS. 14. heat MS. 20. occli mtis MS. 20. non esset MS. 20. or quia pro que MS. 20. Que oculi. Unintelligible as regards construction.
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2030 CAPITULUM QUINTUM Et argumentum factum primum simul pro com- munibus ydeis et universalibus formis rebus inexistentibus hic pro repetito habeamus, adicientes aliqua plura, si forte veritasI huius materie dignaretur amplius, lacius, et profundius nobis ceterisque clarescere. Et videtur hic argumentandum tali modo. Placet deo simpliciter necesse omne bonum esse bonum, sicut deus placenter et simpliciter wult omne bonum esse bonum: igitur ex ro assumpto est placens deo simpliciter necessario omne bonum esse bonum nisi placens commune, scilicet com- mune bonum formaliter omnibus bonis inexistens. Ex consequente illo leviter deducitur communis humanitas in hominibus, communis equinitas in omnibus equis: 15 et sic de aliis. Et quomodo adversariis poterit salvare quod liceat cuicunque placenter diligere quod omne bonum est bonum, et tamen non liceat sibi placere quod omne bonum est bonum? aut quomodo diceret quod creature racionabiliter placet quod omne bonum est 20 bonum, et quod deo non placeret simpliciter necessario quod omne bonum est bonum? aut quomodo simplices fideles ferrent hoc, cum pagani obicerent eis: Quomodo deus vester est simpliciter bonus, cum non placeat sibi quod omne bonum est bonum? Quis eciam audebit 25 dogmatisare simplicibus fidelibus quod hoc non est tenen- dum, quod “omne bonum est bonum". Si autem hoc est tenendum, quod 'omne bonum est bonum", queritur quid demonstratur per ly “hoc"; et non dabitur nisi commune bonum formaliter omni enti: igitur simplices 30 firmiter tenentes hoc quod "omne bonum est bonum' firmiter tenent communem bonitatem omnibus. Item tunc non est predicandum, tenendum, et diligendum, quod ' quilibet predestinatus erit beatus', nec esset We shall now develop the argument in favour of the Universals existing in things. This proposition: Everything good is Good, is willed by God and pleasing to Him. Thence we readily deduce the Universals; and it is a principle not to be gainsaid. Whover denies the Universals, must deny the very idea of Everything good, likewise that general one of the Predestined, 2. a gap ; Blank space for initial E 1. Capitulum quintum deest. MS. 11. mſi MS.; ib. sed pro scilicet MS.
2030 CAPITULUM QUINTUM Et argumentum factum primum simul pro com- munibus ydeis et universalibus formis rebus inexistentibus hic pro repetito habeamus, adicientes aliqua plura, si forte veritasI huius materie dignaretur amplius, lacius, et profundius nobis ceterisque clarescere. Et videtur hic argumentandum tali modo. Placet deo simpliciter necesse omne bonum esse bonum, sicut deus placenter et simpliciter wult omne bonum esse bonum: igitur ex ro assumpto est placens deo simpliciter necessario omne bonum esse bonum nisi placens commune, scilicet com- mune bonum formaliter omnibus bonis inexistens. Ex consequente illo leviter deducitur communis humanitas in hominibus, communis equinitas in omnibus equis: 15 et sic de aliis. Et quomodo adversariis poterit salvare quod liceat cuicunque placenter diligere quod omne bonum est bonum, et tamen non liceat sibi placere quod omne bonum est bonum? aut quomodo diceret quod creature racionabiliter placet quod omne bonum est 20 bonum, et quod deo non placeret simpliciter necessario quod omne bonum est bonum? aut quomodo simplices fideles ferrent hoc, cum pagani obicerent eis: Quomodo deus vester est simpliciter bonus, cum non placeat sibi quod omne bonum est bonum? Quis eciam audebit 25 dogmatisare simplicibus fidelibus quod hoc non est tenen- dum, quod “omne bonum est bonum". Si autem hoc est tenendum, quod 'omne bonum est bonum", queritur quid demonstratur per ly “hoc"; et non dabitur nisi commune bonum formaliter omni enti: igitur simplices 30 firmiter tenentes hoc quod "omne bonum est bonum' firmiter tenent communem bonitatem omnibus. Item tunc non est predicandum, tenendum, et diligendum, quod ' quilibet predestinatus erit beatus', nec esset We shall now develop the argument in favour of the Universals existing in things. This proposition: Everything good is Good, is willed by God and pleasing to Him. Thence we readily deduce the Universals; and it is a principle not to be gainsaid. Whover denies the Universals, must deny the very idea of Everything good, likewise that general one of the Predestined, 2. a gap ; Blank space for initial E 1. Capitulum quintum deest. MS. 11. mſi MS.; ib. sed pro scilicet MS.
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24 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. V. firmiter tenendum et valde timendum quod quilibet finaliter malus perpetuo dampnabitur. Igitur nec est firmissime tenendum et nullatenus dubitandum quod omnes qui extra ecclesiam katholicam decedunt per- petuo dampnabuntur; et nec esset iustum neque dignum! quod, "quilibet homo est sub potestate dei", nec est iustum neque dignum quod “omnis creatura sit subia- cens dei imperio". Et sic eciam omnis falso iuraret a simili in prefacione aperte et quottidie cantans quia "vere dignum et iustum est, equum et salutare, nos tibi 1o semper et ubique gracias agere, domine sancte, pater omnipotens eterne deus", cum non esset dignum et iustum, quia nullum singulare iustum est nos semper 204 et ubique" agere gracias eterno patri omnipotenti, sed non commune iustum est universalis graciarum accio 15 semper et ubique existens. Eciam queritur que res est statutum ecclesie, videlicet, quod “omnis utriusque sexus semel in anno confiteatur circa festum pasche". Et queritur a negantibus communia statuta, sicut et com- munes res in pluribus per modum forme, que res est hoc 20 statutum, gracia exempli, quod quilibet ingrediens facul- tatem debet iurare obedienciam decano; et sic de aliis statutis. Et queritur si negantes communia bona aude- and should say rent dicere coram rege assertive: “Rex, non est iustum to the King nec dignum quod quilibet rusticus de regno tuo sit sub 25 that the men in his realm tua potestate sub tuo dominio, vel sub tua iurisdiccione", are not his subjects; he cum tamen secundum negantes bona communia sit hoc should even verum et firmiter dicendum in forma propria. Item, deny that all creatures tunc christiani per mundum dispersi non deberent hoc proceed from firmiter tenere, quod'"quelibet creatura est a deo", quia 30 God. si sic queritur quid per ly hoc demonstretur, non pro- posicio aliqua, quia nullam talem oportet Cristianos per universum mundum habere, nec aliquod singulare simplex vel aggregatum, quod esset ' quamlibet crea- turam esse a deo"; si demonstrat communem veritatem formaliter in omni creature existente habetur intentum. Item, sicut fides katholica est quod adventum Cristi ad finale iudicium omnes homines resurgere habent cum corporibus suis, ita est fides katholica quod quilibet homo resurgere habet cum corpore suo in adventu 40 Cristi ad iudicium. Queritur ergo que res et que veritas est ista fides katholica, que est "quemlibet hominem habere resurgere cum suo corpore ad adventum Cristi in iudicium?" Non est aliqua proposicio in mente, vel the words of the Preface in the Mass, the law of annual confession and communion, obedience to the Dean of a Faculty, He must deny this article of Christian faith that 'every" man must rise again ; for this is not a mere collection of singular propositions: "A, B, C... must rise again." 35 the axiom that Every creature is subject to God,
24 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. V. firmiter tenendum et valde timendum quod quilibet finaliter malus perpetuo dampnabitur. Igitur nec est firmissime tenendum et nullatenus dubitandum quod omnes qui extra ecclesiam katholicam decedunt per- petuo dampnabuntur; et nec esset iustum neque dignum! quod, "quilibet homo est sub potestate dei", nec est iustum neque dignum quod “omnis creatura sit subia- cens dei imperio". Et sic eciam omnis falso iuraret a simili in prefacione aperte et quottidie cantans quia "vere dignum et iustum est, equum et salutare, nos tibi 1o semper et ubique gracias agere, domine sancte, pater omnipotens eterne deus", cum non esset dignum et iustum, quia nullum singulare iustum est nos semper 204 et ubique" agere gracias eterno patri omnipotenti, sed non commune iustum est universalis graciarum accio 15 semper et ubique existens. Eciam queritur que res est statutum ecclesie, videlicet, quod “omnis utriusque sexus semel in anno confiteatur circa festum pasche". Et queritur a negantibus communia statuta, sicut et com- munes res in pluribus per modum forme, que res est hoc 20 statutum, gracia exempli, quod quilibet ingrediens facul- tatem debet iurare obedienciam decano; et sic de aliis statutis. Et queritur si negantes communia bona aude- and should say rent dicere coram rege assertive: “Rex, non est iustum to the King nec dignum quod quilibet rusticus de regno tuo sit sub 25 that the men in his realm tua potestate sub tuo dominio, vel sub tua iurisdiccione", are not his subjects; he cum tamen secundum negantes bona communia sit hoc should even verum et firmiter dicendum in forma propria. Item, deny that all creatures tunc christiani per mundum dispersi non deberent hoc proceed from firmiter tenere, quod'"quelibet creatura est a deo", quia 30 God. si sic queritur quid per ly hoc demonstretur, non pro- posicio aliqua, quia nullam talem oportet Cristianos per universum mundum habere, nec aliquod singulare simplex vel aggregatum, quod esset ' quamlibet crea- turam esse a deo"; si demonstrat communem veritatem formaliter in omni creature existente habetur intentum. Item, sicut fides katholica est quod adventum Cristi ad finale iudicium omnes homines resurgere habent cum corporibus suis, ita est fides katholica quod quilibet homo resurgere habet cum corpore suo in adventu 40 Cristi ad iudicium. Queritur ergo que res et que veritas est ista fides katholica, que est "quemlibet hominem habere resurgere cum suo corpore ad adventum Cristi in iudicium?" Non est aliqua proposicio in mente, vel the words of the Preface in the Mass, the law of annual confession and communion, obedience to the Dean of a Faculty, He must deny this article of Christian faith that 'every" man must rise again ; for this is not a mere collection of singular propositions: "A, B, C... must rise again." 35 the axiom that Every creature is subject to God,
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CAP. V. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 25 204 in voce, vel in scripto; talis enim quelibet esset insta- bilis nimis et inpermanens ad fideliter et firmiter cre- dendum eam; nec potest esse quod proposicio aliqua talis sit "quemlibet hominem habere resurgere"; quia 5 tunc nulla illa singularis res, que est illa proposicio, esset "illum hominem habere resurgere", et sic de singulis. Ergo est veritas katholica communis, que est e quemlibet hominem habere resurgere". Similiter, semper circumscriptis signis potest esse 10 quod "omne ens est bonum et non potest non esse quin omne ens est bonum; igitur necessarium est quod omne ens est bonum". Et sic necessarium est omne ens esse bonum. Et veritas necessaria, circumscriptis signis, est omne ens esse bonum; et que, nisi illa 15 veritas communissima formaliter omni enti, scilicet esse bonum, sive bonitas uniuscuiusque entis? Similiter, deus simpliciter necessario scit omne ens As God knows that Every esse bonum: igitur simpliciter necessario scit scitum Being is good, what is that vel scita, omne ens esse bonum": igitur simpliciter which He knows? 20 necessario scitum vel scita sunt “omne ens esse bonum"; Something sed non simpliciter scita sunt omne ens esse bonum. neither increate nor created, Quia queritur que simpliciter scita sunt “omne ens esse but abstracting from both, viz., bonum"; nec increata, nec creata, nec utrumque, ut faciliter the universal patet calculanti; igitur simpliciter necessario scitum est goodness of Being. 25 omne ens esse bonum. Et hec est bonitas analoga omnis entis simpliciter necessaria et necessario simpli- citer a deo scita. Similiter, cum philosophi determinate et distincte A philosopher's knowledge of sciunt quod "omne ens naturale est per se mobile", nature extends not only to 3o ad quid vel ad que terminatur principaliter talis sciencia the proposition, but to what it eorum distincta et determinata? Et non datur nisi signifies; which veritas communis que est “omne ens naturale esse per is something universal; se mobile"; et sic de: omnis ignis est calidus etc. Nec everybody knows that a philosophi determinant suas tales distinctas, actuales, et groat is more 35 habituales sciencias principaliter ad proposiciones men- than a farthing. tales, vel alia signa vocalia, vel scripta, cum et layci simplices querunt scire distincte, non proposiciones mentales, vocales vel scriptas, sed a parte rei pocius quod quilibet grossus suus valet plusquam unus obulus. Again, every being is good; if we admit this, we admit universal goodness to belong to Being. 20. nccia MS. q' al ad qua MS. 20. ſut MS. 21. ſut MS. 22. ſut MS. 30. ad 33. omni igne est calidum MS.
CAP. V. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 25 204 in voce, vel in scripto; talis enim quelibet esset insta- bilis nimis et inpermanens ad fideliter et firmiter cre- dendum eam; nec potest esse quod proposicio aliqua talis sit "quemlibet hominem habere resurgere"; quia 5 tunc nulla illa singularis res, que est illa proposicio, esset "illum hominem habere resurgere", et sic de singulis. Ergo est veritas katholica communis, que est e quemlibet hominem habere resurgere". Similiter, semper circumscriptis signis potest esse 10 quod "omne ens est bonum et non potest non esse quin omne ens est bonum; igitur necessarium est quod omne ens est bonum". Et sic necessarium est omne ens esse bonum. Et veritas necessaria, circumscriptis signis, est omne ens esse bonum; et que, nisi illa 15 veritas communissima formaliter omni enti, scilicet esse bonum, sive bonitas uniuscuiusque entis? Similiter, deus simpliciter necessario scit omne ens As God knows that Every esse bonum: igitur simpliciter necessario scit scitum Being is good, what is that vel scita, omne ens esse bonum": igitur simpliciter which He knows? 20 necessario scitum vel scita sunt “omne ens esse bonum"; Something sed non simpliciter scita sunt omne ens esse bonum. neither increate nor created, Quia queritur que simpliciter scita sunt “omne ens esse but abstracting from both, viz., bonum"; nec increata, nec creata, nec utrumque, ut faciliter the universal patet calculanti; igitur simpliciter necessario scitum est goodness of Being. 25 omne ens esse bonum. Et hec est bonitas analoga omnis entis simpliciter necessaria et necessario simpli- citer a deo scita. Similiter, cum philosophi determinate et distincte A philosopher's knowledge of sciunt quod "omne ens naturale est per se mobile", nature extends not only to 3o ad quid vel ad que terminatur principaliter talis sciencia the proposition, but to what it eorum distincta et determinata? Et non datur nisi signifies; which veritas communis que est “omne ens naturale esse per is something universal; se mobile"; et sic de: omnis ignis est calidus etc. Nec everybody knows that a philosophi determinant suas tales distinctas, actuales, et groat is more 35 habituales sciencias principaliter ad proposiciones men- than a farthing. tales, vel alia signa vocalia, vel scripta, cum et layci simplices querunt scire distincte, non proposiciones mentales, vocales vel scriptas, sed a parte rei pocius quod quilibet grossus suus valet plusquam unus obulus. Again, every being is good; if we admit this, we admit universal goodness to belong to Being. 20. nccia MS. q' al ad qua MS. 20. ſut MS. 21. ſut MS. 22. ſut MS. 30. ad 33. omni igne est calidum MS.
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26 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. V. God, without the aid of propositions, knows the Universal thing which they signify; knows the dependence of the individual upon the general, We know this thinking by means of propositions; A is an animal because all men are animals; it is animality in which the dependency consists. Item communius est apud studentes pragenses bibere cerevisiam quam bibere vinum, et bibere vinum minus commune, et commune est eis comedere carnes etc. De illo communi queritur... A man is an Similiter, circumscriptis signis, universaliter ita est 5 animal universally, but quod homo est animal, sed sicud fortiter laborare sine this cannot be fortitudinem implicat contradiccionem, sic universaliter without universal esse ita quod homo est animal a parte rei sine univer- animality. salitate a parte rei implicat contradiccionem. Is not "Who runs, moves' Igitur et queratur a laycis ydiotis si esset negandum 10 a universal truth? quod universaliter est ita quod, '"qui currit, ipse movetur", et ita de aliis consimilibus. Similiter oportet, ad hoc quod Sor est animal, quod omnis homo sit animal; igitur oportunum est ad Sortem esse animal, omnem hominem esse animal: queritur que res, que veritas sit 15 illud oportunum, et illa oportunitas: et non dabitur nisi animalitas communis omnis hominis. Similiter requiritur ad istum hominem esse, esse hominem; et 205“ non econtra. Consulatur ergo deus apud quem non est noticia confusa. Quid ergo? sic requiritur ad hominem 20 istum esse, et non econtra; et dabitur communis huma- nitas cuiuslibet hominis. Similiter prius naturaliter et consequencialiter, circumscriptis signis, est hominem esse quam sit istum hominem esse. Nam circumscriptis signis deus sine noticia et supposicione confusa tantum scit 25 quod si est istum hominem esse tunc est hominem esse; et non, si est hominem esse est istum hominem esse. Igitur deus, circumscriptis signis, aput semetipsum distingwit esse hominem, sicud prius naturaliter con- sequencialiter ad istum hominem esse, cum dicat apud 30 se non de signis sed de re extra: Si est esse istum hominem, tunc est esse hominem; et non, si est esse hominem, est esse istum hominem. Et si nos sine talibus instrumentis, scilicet proposicionibus, sciremus veritatem condicionalem et consequencialem, sicut scit deus, eciam 35 sic iudicaremus. Et videtur magna imperfeccio in nobis, 11. currit quod MS. 14. optunu MS. 23. quciater 1. comne MS. MS. 30. �uciater MS. 1. Pragenses. In other Bohemian MSS. of Wyclif's works, we frequently meet with Pragensis for Oxoniensis, &c. 4. Que- ritur. The end of this argument is wanting: but there is no gap in the text to show it.
26 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. V. God, without the aid of propositions, knows the Universal thing which they signify; knows the dependence of the individual upon the general, We know this thinking by means of propositions; A is an animal because all men are animals; it is animality in which the dependency consists. Item communius est apud studentes pragenses bibere cerevisiam quam bibere vinum, et bibere vinum minus commune, et commune est eis comedere carnes etc. De illo communi queritur... A man is an Similiter, circumscriptis signis, universaliter ita est 5 animal universally, but quod homo est animal, sed sicud fortiter laborare sine this cannot be fortitudinem implicat contradiccionem, sic universaliter without universal esse ita quod homo est animal a parte rei sine univer- animality. salitate a parte rei implicat contradiccionem. Is not "Who runs, moves' Igitur et queratur a laycis ydiotis si esset negandum 10 a universal truth? quod universaliter est ita quod, '"qui currit, ipse movetur", et ita de aliis consimilibus. Similiter oportet, ad hoc quod Sor est animal, quod omnis homo sit animal; igitur oportunum est ad Sortem esse animal, omnem hominem esse animal: queritur que res, que veritas sit 15 illud oportunum, et illa oportunitas: et non dabitur nisi animalitas communis omnis hominis. Similiter requiritur ad istum hominem esse, esse hominem; et 205“ non econtra. Consulatur ergo deus apud quem non est noticia confusa. Quid ergo? sic requiritur ad hominem 20 istum esse, et non econtra; et dabitur communis huma- nitas cuiuslibet hominis. Similiter prius naturaliter et consequencialiter, circumscriptis signis, est hominem esse quam sit istum hominem esse. Nam circumscriptis signis deus sine noticia et supposicione confusa tantum scit 25 quod si est istum hominem esse tunc est hominem esse; et non, si est hominem esse est istum hominem esse. Igitur deus, circumscriptis signis, aput semetipsum distingwit esse hominem, sicud prius naturaliter con- sequencialiter ad istum hominem esse, cum dicat apud 30 se non de signis sed de re extra: Si est esse istum hominem, tunc est esse hominem; et non, si est esse hominem, est esse istum hominem. Et si nos sine talibus instrumentis, scilicet proposicionibus, sciremus veritatem condicionalem et consequencialem, sicut scit deus, eciam 35 sic iudicaremus. Et videtur magna imperfeccio in nobis, 11. currit quod MS. 14. optunu MS. 23. quciater 1. comne MS. MS. 30. �uciater MS. 1. Pragenses. In other Bohemian MSS. of Wyclif's works, we frequently meet with Pragensis for Oxoniensis, &c. 4. Que- ritur. The end of this argument is wanting: but there is no gap in the text to show it.
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CAP. V. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 27 15 205b but it were et gravis ignorancia rerum, et ignorancia negacionis et very wrong of disposicionis, si prioritatem naturalem et consequen- us to ascribe this dependency cialem quam deus apud se diiudicat et quam nos per only to the instrumenta proposicionalia debemus cognoscere, quod instruments by which we talem prioritatem principaliter et totaliter instrumentis know it. nostris attribuimus, rebus derelictis. Et quis artifex vellet principaliter et totaliter cognoscitive insudare circa in- strumenta, ut huiusmodi sunt? Item, deus dicit apud se quod Sorti, sed non solum 10 sibi, convenit scilicet esse hominem. Dignetur ergo deus edicere, cum dicat Sorti, sed non solum sibi, convenire esse hominem, que veritas, que res est esse hominem ibi in tali dicencia dei? Et certum est quod beatus in patria dicit, et nichil confuse sed distinctissime. Igitur, esse hominem predicatum sit de Sorte; sed deo non solum est communis sua, sed et aliorum, humanitas. Item, si nichil esset commune essenciale intrinsecum Sorti et Platoni, sed in quolibet solum esset essenciale singulare, tunc Sor non plus essencialiter differt a lapide 20 quam a Platone, et econtra Plato a Sorte. Nam per omne illud per quod differt essencialiter a lapide, per omne illud essencialiter differt a Platone, et econtra. Nec plus convenit essencialiter cum Platone et econtra quam cum lapide, cum albedine, cum quacunque re mundi; nec plus vel minus I essencialiter ab eodem different. Item, per quid Sor esset essencialiter similis Platoni? Non per humanitatem suam singularem, quia per illam differt essencialiter a Platone. Nec per ra- cionabilitatem suam singularem, quia per illam essen- 3o cialiter differt, et per consequens est dissimilis; cum per illam sic singulariter essencialiter est racionalis, et Plato nequaquam sic singulariter essencialiter est ra- cionalis. Et sic tolleretur omnis essencialis conveniencia et Now this contradicts 35 similitudo intrinseca rerum ad invicem, cum tamen Genesis, saying that animals dicatur Gen. primo: 'Creavitque cete grandia et omnem were created in their genera animam viventem ac motabilem quam produxerant aque and species: in species suas, et omne volatile secundum genus suum." which cannot mean the Et infra: “Et fecit deus bestias terre secundum species Divine Ideas of these beings, 40 suas, et iumenta, et omne reptile terre in genere suo." nor the Non possunt autem ibi intelligi per genera et species successive God says: A and others are men': what does 'to be men' signify in God's mind, save Universal humanity? f A and B had nothing really in common, they would each differ from the other as essentially as from a stone; there would be no resemblance at all ; for it could not proceed from their individuality, by which A and B necessarily differ. 7. 9gtme = congregative? MS. 39. fis MS.
CAP. V. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 27 15 205b but it were et gravis ignorancia rerum, et ignorancia negacionis et very wrong of disposicionis, si prioritatem naturalem et consequen- us to ascribe this dependency cialem quam deus apud se diiudicat et quam nos per only to the instrumenta proposicionalia debemus cognoscere, quod instruments by which we talem prioritatem principaliter et totaliter instrumentis know it. nostris attribuimus, rebus derelictis. Et quis artifex vellet principaliter et totaliter cognoscitive insudare circa in- strumenta, ut huiusmodi sunt? Item, deus dicit apud se quod Sorti, sed non solum 10 sibi, convenit scilicet esse hominem. Dignetur ergo deus edicere, cum dicat Sorti, sed non solum sibi, convenire esse hominem, que veritas, que res est esse hominem ibi in tali dicencia dei? Et certum est quod beatus in patria dicit, et nichil confuse sed distinctissime. Igitur, esse hominem predicatum sit de Sorte; sed deo non solum est communis sua, sed et aliorum, humanitas. Item, si nichil esset commune essenciale intrinsecum Sorti et Platoni, sed in quolibet solum esset essenciale singulare, tunc Sor non plus essencialiter differt a lapide 20 quam a Platone, et econtra Plato a Sorte. Nam per omne illud per quod differt essencialiter a lapide, per omne illud essencialiter differt a Platone, et econtra. Nec plus convenit essencialiter cum Platone et econtra quam cum lapide, cum albedine, cum quacunque re mundi; nec plus vel minus I essencialiter ab eodem different. Item, per quid Sor esset essencialiter similis Platoni? Non per humanitatem suam singularem, quia per illam differt essencialiter a Platone. Nec per ra- cionabilitatem suam singularem, quia per illam essen- 3o cialiter differt, et per consequens est dissimilis; cum per illam sic singulariter essencialiter est racionalis, et Plato nequaquam sic singulariter essencialiter est ra- cionalis. Et sic tolleretur omnis essencialis conveniencia et Now this contradicts 35 similitudo intrinseca rerum ad invicem, cum tamen Genesis, saying that animals dicatur Gen. primo: 'Creavitque cete grandia et omnem were created in their genera animam viventem ac motabilem quam produxerant aque and species: in species suas, et omne volatile secundum genus suum." which cannot mean the Et infra: “Et fecit deus bestias terre secundum species Divine Ideas of these beings, 40 suas, et iumenta, et omne reptile terre in genere suo." nor the Non possunt autem ibi intelligi per genera et species successive God says: A and others are men': what does 'to be men' signify in God's mind, save Universal humanity? f A and B had nothing really in common, they would each differ from the other as essentially as from a stone; there would be no resemblance at all ; for it could not proceed from their individuality, by which A and B necessarily differ. 7. 9gtme = congregative? MS. 39. fis MS.
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28 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. V. multitude of ydee rerum in mente divina; quia aque non produxerunt them all, animam viventem et motabilem in illas ydeas. Nec possunt from then to the end of the intelligi conceptus noster vel nostra signa, que dicimus world. genera et species. Nec possunt ibi intelligi multitudines successive bestiarum a principio mundi usque in finem; quia aque in principio mundi non produxerant bestias terre secundum aliquam talem multitudinem omnium leonum vel omnium equorum etc. We must Intelligende ergo ibi sunt rerum illarum magis et understand by minus communes quidditates et naturales, ac essenciales 10 genera and species their rerum similitudines per genera et species. Nam videtur essential resemblances quod in illas et secundum illas quidditates et similitu- by which they dines essenciales intrinsecas ille bestie producantur. Et are thus classed. queritur ab adversariis quid pertinenter intelligitur per In fact, if the genus et speciem, cum dicitur: "illa sunt eiusdem ge- words do not neris," si non quiditatés generales et quiditates speciales mean this, they mean nothing, intelligantur iuxta diffinicionem generis et speciei, ubi for they cannot dicunt logici quod genus est quod predicatur de pluri- stand for the bus specie differentibus, in eo "quod quid hoc est' mere logical conception of secundum quod est quiditas predicata de pluribus specie 20 classes, but for the intrinsic differentibus in eo "quod est quid": quod non convenit reason from signo loycali, ut huiusmodi, nec alicui quiditati singulari which the classification quantumcunque per communem conceptum concipiatur springs. quiditas. Igitur generalitas predicatur, quia manifestatur, dicitur, et significatur de pluribus differentibus specie 25 2m quod est eorum quiditas. Et ita de specie respectu eorum que numero differunt. 15 16. quidatis generalis et quiditatis specialis intelligantur MS.
28 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. V. multitude of ydee rerum in mente divina; quia aque non produxerunt them all, animam viventem et motabilem in illas ydeas. Nec possunt from then to the end of the intelligi conceptus noster vel nostra signa, que dicimus world. genera et species. Nec possunt ibi intelligi multitudines successive bestiarum a principio mundi usque in finem; quia aque in principio mundi non produxerant bestias terre secundum aliquam talem multitudinem omnium leonum vel omnium equorum etc. We must Intelligende ergo ibi sunt rerum illarum magis et understand by minus communes quidditates et naturales, ac essenciales 10 genera and species their rerum similitudines per genera et species. Nam videtur essential resemblances quod in illas et secundum illas quidditates et similitu- by which they dines essenciales intrinsecas ille bestie producantur. Et are thus classed. queritur ab adversariis quid pertinenter intelligitur per In fact, if the genus et speciem, cum dicitur: "illa sunt eiusdem ge- words do not neris," si non quiditatés generales et quiditates speciales mean this, they mean nothing, intelligantur iuxta diffinicionem generis et speciei, ubi for they cannot dicunt logici quod genus est quod predicatur de pluri- stand for the bus specie differentibus, in eo "quod quid hoc est' mere logical conception of secundum quod est quiditas predicata de pluribus specie 20 classes, but for the intrinsic differentibus in eo "quod est quid": quod non convenit reason from signo loycali, ut huiusmodi, nec alicui quiditati singulari which the classification quantumcunque per communem conceptum concipiatur springs. quiditas. Igitur generalitas predicatur, quia manifestatur, dicitur, et significatur de pluribus differentibus specie 25 2m quod est eorum quiditas. Et ita de specie respectu eorum que numero differunt. 15 16. quidatis generalis et quiditatis specialis intelligantur MS.
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CAPITULUM SEXTUM. I Item, cum substancie materiales possunt habere Why should not many causam efficientem agentem eis communem, causam beings have the same formal per se finalem eis communem, causam materialem eis intrinsic cause, 5 communem (ut quando ex stramine fit ignis vel ex one common to them all, if they igne aqua), quare non potuerunt substancie huiusmodi can have the same efficient, habere eandem racionem formalem substancialem com- final, and munem, cum habeant supremas, scilicet agentem et material cause? finalem communes, et habeant infimam, scilicet mate- 10 rialem communem, qualiter non possunt mediam, scilicet formalem substancialem, habere communem in qua conveniret substancialiter? Et si talem habuerint, iam erit forma, substancialis, et per consequens quiditas substancie communis multis suppositis. Et hoc est uni- 15 versale a parte rei. Nec valet dicere quod forma substancialis est actus Objection: The Form, substancialis rei, et actus separat et distingwit (1mo according to methaphysice). Nam cum partes continui sunt in actu Aristotle, is that which perfecto per se standi, tunc sunt separate; quando non, separates. 20 tunc non; quod non valeat hoc dicere ad propositum. Nam res plures non bene separantur et distingwuntur ab aliis, nisi fuerint congregate et in unum collecte per formam; True, but it et virtus vivendi et congregandi 2m se est appetibilior separates from quam virtus separandi et distingwendi. Igitur forma, things which have it not; 25 etsi habet virtutem separandi et distingwendi, habet and its function is on the tamen aliam nobiliorem virtutem, scilicet uniendi et contrary to unite those congregandi; sic namque forma mixti, propter quod things which sunt elementa, manutenet elementa ne ab invicem have it. Separation dissolvantur. Superveniente autem violencia corrumpente ensues upon 3o formam mixti, in materia dissolvuntur ab invicem the destruction of a form. elementa; sicud videmus, igne applicato ad lignum ad 206“ 1. Capitulum Sextum deest. 14. Etos MS. 16. quia MS. 2. Blank space for initial I MS. 18—20. Nam... propositum. This sentence is marked (!) in the copy of the MS. 28. Manutenet = maintient or maintains.
CAPITULUM SEXTUM. I Item, cum substancie materiales possunt habere Why should not many causam efficientem agentem eis communem, causam beings have the same formal per se finalem eis communem, causam materialem eis intrinsic cause, 5 communem (ut quando ex stramine fit ignis vel ex one common to them all, if they igne aqua), quare non potuerunt substancie huiusmodi can have the same efficient, habere eandem racionem formalem substancialem com- final, and munem, cum habeant supremas, scilicet agentem et material cause? finalem communes, et habeant infimam, scilicet mate- 10 rialem communem, qualiter non possunt mediam, scilicet formalem substancialem, habere communem in qua conveniret substancialiter? Et si talem habuerint, iam erit forma, substancialis, et per consequens quiditas substancie communis multis suppositis. Et hoc est uni- 15 versale a parte rei. Nec valet dicere quod forma substancialis est actus Objection: The Form, substancialis rei, et actus separat et distingwit (1mo according to methaphysice). Nam cum partes continui sunt in actu Aristotle, is that which perfecto per se standi, tunc sunt separate; quando non, separates. 20 tunc non; quod non valeat hoc dicere ad propositum. Nam res plures non bene separantur et distingwuntur ab aliis, nisi fuerint congregate et in unum collecte per formam; True, but it et virtus vivendi et congregandi 2m se est appetibilior separates from quam virtus separandi et distingwendi. Igitur forma, things which have it not; 25 etsi habet virtutem separandi et distingwendi, habet and its function is on the tamen aliam nobiliorem virtutem, scilicet uniendi et contrary to unite those congregandi; sic namque forma mixti, propter quod things which sunt elementa, manutenet elementa ne ab invicem have it. Separation dissolvantur. Superveniente autem violencia corrumpente ensues upon 3o formam mixti, in materia dissolvuntur ab invicem the destruction of a form. elementa; sicud videmus, igne applicato ad lignum ad 206“ 1. Capitulum Sextum deest. 14. Etos MS. 16. quia MS. 2. Blank space for initial I MS. 18—20. Nam... propositum. This sentence is marked (!) in the copy of the MS. 28. Manutenet = maintient or maintains.
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30 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. VI. It seems therefore that we have no reason thus to limit God's power, saying that a form must inform only one being. corrupcionem forme ligni, distrahit materia tota ligni. Nam partim ignis in flamma sursum tendit ad speram ignis; fumus aereus ad speram aeris dispergitur; aqua fugiens ignem contrarium in locum adversum igni decurrit; terra in cinere ultimo residet. Sic quod, licet forma materias suas ab aliis separat et distingwat, plus tamen unit et adunat easdem. Plus enim pro subsistencia rei est materias suas rei unitas et adunatas esse, quam ipsas ab aliis superatas et districtas. Videtur enim multum derogare deo et generi esse 10 formalis substancialis quod ipse deus potest facere causam agentem divisim et communiter agere plura supposita et ante materialem divisim; (et consequenter materiare plura supposita), et non posset facere causam 206b formalem substancialem communiter indivisim formare 15 substancialiter plura suppisita, ymmo, cum qualitas sym- bolo manens vicissim in utroque elementorum habencium ad invicem symbolum et transmutatorum in se invicem, ne supervacue qualitas eiusdem racionis corrumperetur et iterum generaretur; cum, inquam, talis sic vicissim 20 informat plura supposita, quomodo forma substancialis pocior non poterit communiter plura supposita, sed solum proprietorie unicum suppositum substancialiter performare? Derogacio magna videtur quod non poterit A peasant knows that all causa formalis communiter, sed solum proprietorie, 25 fire is fire; this causare suppositum unicum causacione, que est informacio. is a tacit admission of Nec tamen materia possit communiter materiando plura the one Universal form supposita causare; nec communis causa formalis sub- of gneity. stancialis plurium suppositorum divisim est ita latens et abscondita; cum nedum philosophis sed et ydiotis et 30 grossis rusticis sit manifestum et valde certum quem- libet ignem esse ignem. Et valde extraneum est dicere quod talis proposicio mentalis, “quilibet ignis est ignis" [non] est eis manifesta et valde certa, cum eciam esse quod est manifestum et 35 certissimum de re manifesta et certa non sit eis notum, manifestum, et valde certum de aliquo tali signo, propo- sicione, vel disposicione, in mente scilicet “quilibet ignis est calidum". Nam, quesito ab aliquo tali ydiota To answer that he knows nothing about the mental proposition concerning it is quite irrelevant; he knows and will swear that 9. quam ipsas esse MS. 6. materialis MS. 10. gui' MS. 11. for IMS. 13. an much blurred MS. 14. mate'are MS. 17. hnciu MS. 36. mata MS. 34. non deest MS.
30 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. VI. It seems therefore that we have no reason thus to limit God's power, saying that a form must inform only one being. corrupcionem forme ligni, distrahit materia tota ligni. Nam partim ignis in flamma sursum tendit ad speram ignis; fumus aereus ad speram aeris dispergitur; aqua fugiens ignem contrarium in locum adversum igni decurrit; terra in cinere ultimo residet. Sic quod, licet forma materias suas ab aliis separat et distingwat, plus tamen unit et adunat easdem. Plus enim pro subsistencia rei est materias suas rei unitas et adunatas esse, quam ipsas ab aliis superatas et districtas. Videtur enim multum derogare deo et generi esse 10 formalis substancialis quod ipse deus potest facere causam agentem divisim et communiter agere plura supposita et ante materialem divisim; (et consequenter materiare plura supposita), et non posset facere causam 206b formalem substancialem communiter indivisim formare 15 substancialiter plura suppisita, ymmo, cum qualitas sym- bolo manens vicissim in utroque elementorum habencium ad invicem symbolum et transmutatorum in se invicem, ne supervacue qualitas eiusdem racionis corrumperetur et iterum generaretur; cum, inquam, talis sic vicissim 20 informat plura supposita, quomodo forma substancialis pocior non poterit communiter plura supposita, sed solum proprietorie unicum suppositum substancialiter performare? Derogacio magna videtur quod non poterit A peasant knows that all causa formalis communiter, sed solum proprietorie, 25 fire is fire; this causare suppositum unicum causacione, que est informacio. is a tacit admission of Nec tamen materia possit communiter materiando plura the one Universal form supposita causare; nec communis causa formalis sub- of gneity. stancialis plurium suppositorum divisim est ita latens et abscondita; cum nedum philosophis sed et ydiotis et 30 grossis rusticis sit manifestum et valde certum quem- libet ignem esse ignem. Et valde extraneum est dicere quod talis proposicio mentalis, “quilibet ignis est ignis" [non] est eis manifesta et valde certa, cum eciam esse quod est manifestum et 35 certissimum de re manifesta et certa non sit eis notum, manifestum, et valde certum de aliquo tali signo, propo- sicione, vel disposicione, in mente scilicet “quilibet ignis est calidum". Nam, quesito ab aliquo tali ydiota To answer that he knows nothing about the mental proposition concerning it is quite irrelevant; he knows and will swear that 9. quam ipsas esse MS. 6. materialis MS. 10. gui' MS. 11. for IMS. 13. an much blurred MS. 14. mate'are MS. 17. hnciu MS. 36. mata MS. 34. non deest MS.
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CAP. VI. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 31 207* vel simplici, si constet sibi quod quilibet ignis est ignis, fatetur quod sic. Ymmo per iuramentum secure hoc assereret quod omnis ignis est ignis. Si autem queritur ab eo si constet sibi alio de tali signo tali proposicione 5 vel tali disposicione in mente sua, scilicet “quilibet ignis est ignis", respondebit se nescire. Et sicud simplex laycus affectans quodlibet membrum sui corporis esse sanum, non affectat illam proposicionem mentalem “quodlibet membrum corporis mei est sanum", sed And even such 10 affectat sanitatem in quolibet membro corporis. Sic, as deny the cum manifestum est sibi, et valde certum, quod qui- Universals are forced to admit libet ignis est ignis, non est sibi valde certum quid- this, and quam et manifestum de illa proposicione: "quilibet ignis tacitly to admit them too. est ignis", sed est manifestum sibi et valde certum de igneitate cuiuslibet ignis. Et experiencia docet quod homines sapientes et simplices, negantes universales formas in rebus, sine deliberacione ex instinctu utique naturali prorumpuntur et dicunt: hoc est manifestum, hoc est valde certum quod quilibet ignis est ignis; non 20 intendentes de proposicione mentali sicud dictum. Unde videtur magna protervia in negantibus formas communes in diversis suppositis: ex deliberacione animi menti contingit ne tali instinctu naturali, negando hoc esse manifestum et valde certum in toto mundo quod 25 quilibet ignis est ignis, et illud manifestum et valde certum in toto mundo quod est quemlibet ignem esse ignem, et communis igneitas in quolibet igne. Sicque, cum hoc sit valde manifestum, et valde certum et multum firmum in toto mundo, quod quilibet ignis 3o est ignis, sed quod iste ignis est ignis est servate notum et non sic manifestum, certum et firmum; manifestum est quod igneitas communis longe plus manifestat se et certificat se esse (quia in toto mundo), cum sit quem- libet ignem esse ignem, quam igneitas singularis se 35 manifestat obiective et certificat se esse. Sic eciam, cum sit manifestum in toto mundo et certum, non ut signum, sed ut obiectum quoddam primarium alicuius distincte noticie quod quilibet ignis est calidum, caliditas The truth is that the Universal fact of All fire being fire is better known than the particular one, of this fire being fire. the fact is 80, hough he may know nothing about propositions. 5. menta MS. 7. affctans MS. 9. sui MS. 16. negantes con- cedentes MS. 22. am 9t ne MS. 20. This paragraph seems to be incomprehensible. 30. Ser- vate. Perhaps this means: Known in an inferior way, i. e. em- pirically. 38. Calidum. We have already met with this strange form several times. No doubt aliquod is understand.
CAP. VI. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 31 207* vel simplici, si constet sibi quod quilibet ignis est ignis, fatetur quod sic. Ymmo per iuramentum secure hoc assereret quod omnis ignis est ignis. Si autem queritur ab eo si constet sibi alio de tali signo tali proposicione 5 vel tali disposicione in mente sua, scilicet “quilibet ignis est ignis", respondebit se nescire. Et sicud simplex laycus affectans quodlibet membrum sui corporis esse sanum, non affectat illam proposicionem mentalem “quodlibet membrum corporis mei est sanum", sed And even such 10 affectat sanitatem in quolibet membro corporis. Sic, as deny the cum manifestum est sibi, et valde certum, quod qui- Universals are forced to admit libet ignis est ignis, non est sibi valde certum quid- this, and quam et manifestum de illa proposicione: "quilibet ignis tacitly to admit them too. est ignis", sed est manifestum sibi et valde certum de igneitate cuiuslibet ignis. Et experiencia docet quod homines sapientes et simplices, negantes universales formas in rebus, sine deliberacione ex instinctu utique naturali prorumpuntur et dicunt: hoc est manifestum, hoc est valde certum quod quilibet ignis est ignis; non 20 intendentes de proposicione mentali sicud dictum. Unde videtur magna protervia in negantibus formas communes in diversis suppositis: ex deliberacione animi menti contingit ne tali instinctu naturali, negando hoc esse manifestum et valde certum in toto mundo quod 25 quilibet ignis est ignis, et illud manifestum et valde certum in toto mundo quod est quemlibet ignem esse ignem, et communis igneitas in quolibet igne. Sicque, cum hoc sit valde manifestum, et valde certum et multum firmum in toto mundo, quod quilibet ignis 3o est ignis, sed quod iste ignis est ignis est servate notum et non sic manifestum, certum et firmum; manifestum est quod igneitas communis longe plus manifestat se et certificat se esse (quia in toto mundo), cum sit quem- libet ignem esse ignem, quam igneitas singularis se 35 manifestat obiective et certificat se esse. Sic eciam, cum sit manifestum in toto mundo et certum, non ut signum, sed ut obiectum quoddam primarium alicuius distincte noticie quod quilibet ignis est calidum, caliditas The truth is that the Universal fact of All fire being fire is better known than the particular one, of this fire being fire. the fact is 80, hough he may know nothing about propositions. 5. menta MS. 7. affctans MS. 9. sui MS. 16. negantes con- cedentes MS. 22. am 9t ne MS. 20. This paragraph seems to be incomprehensible. 30. Ser- vate. Perhaps this means: Known in an inferior way, i. e. em- pirically. 38. Calidum. We have already met with this strange form several times. No doubt aliquod is understand.
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32 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. VI. This is true Communis cuilibet igni obiective manifestat se et certi- of all universal forms, which are said to be predicated (or manifested) unlike particular forms. Were this not so, there would be no self- evident principles of science, For if we knew not the proposition, the science of the thing. would remain knowable as now. These self- evident principles are so, independently of their being or not being enunciated in set terms. There is really no need to prove this: if the adversary denies the objective existence of things in ficat se esse toti mundo; et sic de consimilibus formis communibus substancialibus et accidentalibus in diversis suppositis. Unde et forme communes substanciales et accidentales, quia publicant et manifestant se in toto 5 mundo, dicuntur a philosophis predicari, cum sic in toto mundo publicantur et manifestantur. Forme vero singulares propter ipsarum privatum esse, ubi nec sic per mundum publicantur et manifestantur, sed privatim in tempore, vel in loco, vel utrumque, ostenduntur, dicuntur non predicari sed solum dici proprie a philo- sophis. Item, nisi essent vires tales communes a parte rei, tunc non essent propria per se principia in scienciis per se manifesta. Si enim non est hoc principium per se notum a parte rei quod omnis motus est, sed solum talis: "'proposicio, omnis motus est est principium in sciencia naturali"; ......et quia, quacunque tali pro- posicione existente, vel non existente, non minus esset et maneret sciencia naturalis | de quibuscunque veris scibilibus et proprie naturalibus. Similiter, quocunque termino tali, ens mobile vel ens naturale, existente vel non existente, non minus manet ipsa sciencia naturalis. Ubi ergo remanent propria per se principia per se manifesta, science naturalis (et sic de aliis) communissima ergo et stabilis ac firma in omnibus rebus naturalibus naturalitas vel eciam mobilitas in toto mundo [est] per se manifesta; et similiter illa firma et stabilis a parte rei. Et in toto orbe manifesta veritas, scilicet, '*omnis motus est", sunt propria prin- cipia per se manifesta sciendi, et demonstrandum philo- sophice occultas et necessarias veritates naturales: et ita de aliis. Et quid necesse est temptare ostendere, ex nocioribus secundum intellectum vel secundum sensum, veritates 3 vel formas universales in rebus? Nam sicud manifestum et apertissimum in toto mundo secundum intellectum est esse ens; ymmo, quod omne ens est ens (alioquin — 8, puaíu MS. — 13. Vi* MS. — 14. eff? MS. — 15. manifestam MS. 20. ve^ MS. 28. est deest MS. 28. fit MS. 3o. vie MS. 18. E/ quia. Some words must be wanting before these. o c 2
32 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. VI. This is true Communis cuilibet igni obiective manifestat se et certi- of all universal forms, which are said to be predicated (or manifested) unlike particular forms. Were this not so, there would be no self- evident principles of science, For if we knew not the proposition, the science of the thing. would remain knowable as now. These self- evident principles are so, independently of their being or not being enunciated in set terms. There is really no need to prove this: if the adversary denies the objective existence of things in ficat se esse toti mundo; et sic de consimilibus formis communibus substancialibus et accidentalibus in diversis suppositis. Unde et forme communes substanciales et accidentales, quia publicant et manifestant se in toto 5 mundo, dicuntur a philosophis predicari, cum sic in toto mundo publicantur et manifestantur. Forme vero singulares propter ipsarum privatum esse, ubi nec sic per mundum publicantur et manifestantur, sed privatim in tempore, vel in loco, vel utrumque, ostenduntur, dicuntur non predicari sed solum dici proprie a philo- sophis. Item, nisi essent vires tales communes a parte rei, tunc non essent propria per se principia in scienciis per se manifesta. Si enim non est hoc principium per se notum a parte rei quod omnis motus est, sed solum talis: "'proposicio, omnis motus est est principium in sciencia naturali"; ......et quia, quacunque tali pro- posicione existente, vel non existente, non minus esset et maneret sciencia naturalis | de quibuscunque veris scibilibus et proprie naturalibus. Similiter, quocunque termino tali, ens mobile vel ens naturale, existente vel non existente, non minus manet ipsa sciencia naturalis. Ubi ergo remanent propria per se principia per se manifesta, science naturalis (et sic de aliis) communissima ergo et stabilis ac firma in omnibus rebus naturalibus naturalitas vel eciam mobilitas in toto mundo [est] per se manifesta; et similiter illa firma et stabilis a parte rei. Et in toto orbe manifesta veritas, scilicet, '*omnis motus est", sunt propria prin- cipia per se manifesta sciendi, et demonstrandum philo- sophice occultas et necessarias veritates naturales: et ita de aliis. Et quid necesse est temptare ostendere, ex nocioribus secundum intellectum vel secundum sensum, veritates 3 vel formas universales in rebus? Nam sicud manifestum et apertissimum in toto mundo secundum intellectum est esse ens; ymmo, quod omne ens est ens (alioquin — 8, puaíu MS. — 13. Vi* MS. — 14. eff? MS. — 15. manifestam MS. 20. ve^ MS. 28. est deest MS. 28. fit MS. 3o. vie MS. 18. E/ quia. Some words must be wanting before these. o c 2
Strana 33
CAP. VI. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 33 2084 nichil erit apertum et manifestum in toto mundo); et general, or of such things sicut manifestissimum et apertissimum secundum sensum as strike the senses, est per se sensibile: ut esse lucidum, coloratum, sonans, sapidum, olficiens, calidum, frigidum, humidum vel siccum: 5 si ergo negans universalia in rebus proterviendo wult negare istam veritatem, scilicet esse ens per se mani- festum secundum intellectum toto mundo; vel istam: esse sensibile per se notum secundum sensum per totum mundum, quid ultra est contra eum disputandum? 10 Si autem concedit ultra signum per modum obiecti If he admit the objective esse ens, sicut per se notum secundum intellectum toti existence of Being, he must mundo, queritur ab eodem si talis sit veritas singularis admit it as a vel communis pluribus? Primum dare non poterit; general truth ; igitur dabit veritatem communem per se manifestam 15 secundum intellectum apud totum mundum. Sic eciam arguitur de esse sensibili quo ad per se notum toti mundo secundum sensum. Si autem adversarius ultra signum noluerit concedere per modum obiecti esse ens, sicud per se manifestum toti mundo secundum intellectum, 2o nec est sensibile sicud per se manifestum secundum sensum in toto mundo, quid cum illo de rebus est disputandum doctrinaliter? Licet enim tales concedant signa per se principiorum sciendi per se manifestorum, ultra tamen talia signa vocibus constanter negant per se principia sciendi per se manifesta; et cum habeant instinctum naturalem, sicud quicunque alii homines, ad profitendum eciam indeliberate in corde talia per se principia per se manifesta ipsi cordi, profitentur veritates in formas 3o communes per se manifestas in rebus, vocibus autem negant: sicud illi qui ore negabant illud principium negativum, impossibile est idem secundum idem et simpli- citer et pro eodem inesse et non inesse. Corde autem negare non poterant, cum non possint opiniones con- 35 trariorum adinvicem contrarie eidem simul inesse. Omnis ergo qui ex instinctu naturali ultra signa in corde pro- fitetur hoc, quod omne ens est ens, et profitetur hoc quod omnis motus est, et profitetur hoc quod omne totum be is beyond reasoning with. and the same may be said of senaible being. If not, discussion is useless. They deny verbally that our principles of knowledge are anything but signs ; they admit this in reality, like those whose lips deny the Principle of Contradiction 4. olfcus MS. 16. sensibile (!) MS. 17. pro adversarius vlis MS. 18. voluerit. 4. Olficiens. The MS. has something more like olfactus, but perhaps this guess is nearer the sense. De Universalibus. 3
CAP. VI. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 33 2084 nichil erit apertum et manifestum in toto mundo); et general, or of such things sicut manifestissimum et apertissimum secundum sensum as strike the senses, est per se sensibile: ut esse lucidum, coloratum, sonans, sapidum, olficiens, calidum, frigidum, humidum vel siccum: 5 si ergo negans universalia in rebus proterviendo wult negare istam veritatem, scilicet esse ens per se mani- festum secundum intellectum toto mundo; vel istam: esse sensibile per se notum secundum sensum per totum mundum, quid ultra est contra eum disputandum? 10 Si autem concedit ultra signum per modum obiecti If he admit the objective esse ens, sicut per se notum secundum intellectum toti existence of Being, he must mundo, queritur ab eodem si talis sit veritas singularis admit it as a vel communis pluribus? Primum dare non poterit; general truth ; igitur dabit veritatem communem per se manifestam 15 secundum intellectum apud totum mundum. Sic eciam arguitur de esse sensibili quo ad per se notum toti mundo secundum sensum. Si autem adversarius ultra signum noluerit concedere per modum obiecti esse ens, sicud per se manifestum toti mundo secundum intellectum, 2o nec est sensibile sicud per se manifestum secundum sensum in toto mundo, quid cum illo de rebus est disputandum doctrinaliter? Licet enim tales concedant signa per se principiorum sciendi per se manifestorum, ultra tamen talia signa vocibus constanter negant per se principia sciendi per se manifesta; et cum habeant instinctum naturalem, sicud quicunque alii homines, ad profitendum eciam indeliberate in corde talia per se principia per se manifesta ipsi cordi, profitentur veritates in formas 3o communes per se manifestas in rebus, vocibus autem negant: sicud illi qui ore negabant illud principium negativum, impossibile est idem secundum idem et simpli- citer et pro eodem inesse et non inesse. Corde autem negare non poterant, cum non possint opiniones con- 35 trariorum adinvicem contrarie eidem simul inesse. Omnis ergo qui ex instinctu naturali ultra signa in corde pro- fitetur hoc, quod omne ens est ens, et profitetur hoc quod omnis motus est, et profitetur hoc quod omne totum be is beyond reasoning with. and the same may be said of senaible being. If not, discussion is useless. They deny verbally that our principles of knowledge are anything but signs ; they admit this in reality, like those whose lips deny the Principle of Contradiction 4. olfcus MS. 16. sensibile (!) MS. 17. pro adversarius vlis MS. 18. voluerit. 4. Olficiens. The MS. has something more like olfactus, but perhaps this guess is nearer the sense. De Universalibus. 3
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34 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. VI. There are thus two sorti of men, the first whose mind agrees with their words, and the second whose mind does not thus agree, and who deliberately deny what their nature impels them to confess. They ought to yield to nature; they will never be able to destroy, either in themselves or in others, this natural instinct of the truth. integrale est maius sua parte integrali (et sic de aliis) corde profitetur universales veritates quomodocunque vocibus eas negaverit. Si enim in corde ultra signa pro- fitetur per signa quod in omni enti convenit esse ens, tunc profitetur, eo ipso, quod omni enti convenit esse: ens, istam veritatem. Et ecce, cum concedentes veritates communes corde et ore profiteantur, sicud manifestissimum et certissimum a parte rei, quod omne ens est ens, negantes autem communia talia in rebus vocibus, constanter ultra signa 10 negant esse a parte rei quod quodlibet ens est ens. Quis ergo illam altercacionem tollet? Sed cum primi videantur ex instinctu naturali profiteri sicut et totus mundus prorumpit indeliberate, et profitetur hoc esse manifestissimum et certissimum quod omne ens est ens; 15 secundi autem videntur hoc negare voce ex deliberacione contra instinctum et pulsum naturalem, ne cogantur ex vocibus propriis concedere formas et veritates in rebus communes, videtur quod secundi debent se vincere, et cum primis, ymmo, cum toto mundo concordare: quoniam 20 ex impulsu naturali indeliberate prorumpit in verba et dicit quod hoc est manifestissimum, et certum valde, quod omne ens est ens. Eciam cum tales non possint in seipsis tollere vel in illis aliis quibuscunque, sapientibus vel simplicibus, doctis vel indoctis, illiteratis vel literatis, tales instinctus vel impulsus naturales, quibus indeliberate prorumpunt in professione, et profitentur quod hoc est certum et manifestum a parte rei quod omne ens est ens, et ultra signa profitentur quod hoc est manifestum et notum quod quilibet ignis est calidus: videtur quod 30 debeant in formas universales, postposita contencione, consentire. Nobilitas autem, honestas, et utilitas talium communium formarum in rebus, inferius exponetur. 25 208" 6. ista veritas MS. 19. vinc'e MS.
34 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. VI. There are thus two sorti of men, the first whose mind agrees with their words, and the second whose mind does not thus agree, and who deliberately deny what their nature impels them to confess. They ought to yield to nature; they will never be able to destroy, either in themselves or in others, this natural instinct of the truth. integrale est maius sua parte integrali (et sic de aliis) corde profitetur universales veritates quomodocunque vocibus eas negaverit. Si enim in corde ultra signa pro- fitetur per signa quod in omni enti convenit esse ens, tunc profitetur, eo ipso, quod omni enti convenit esse: ens, istam veritatem. Et ecce, cum concedentes veritates communes corde et ore profiteantur, sicud manifestissimum et certissimum a parte rei, quod omne ens est ens, negantes autem communia talia in rebus vocibus, constanter ultra signa 10 negant esse a parte rei quod quodlibet ens est ens. Quis ergo illam altercacionem tollet? Sed cum primi videantur ex instinctu naturali profiteri sicut et totus mundus prorumpit indeliberate, et profitetur hoc esse manifestissimum et certissimum quod omne ens est ens; 15 secundi autem videntur hoc negare voce ex deliberacione contra instinctum et pulsum naturalem, ne cogantur ex vocibus propriis concedere formas et veritates in rebus communes, videtur quod secundi debent se vincere, et cum primis, ymmo, cum toto mundo concordare: quoniam 20 ex impulsu naturali indeliberate prorumpit in verba et dicit quod hoc est manifestissimum, et certum valde, quod omne ens est ens. Eciam cum tales non possint in seipsis tollere vel in illis aliis quibuscunque, sapientibus vel simplicibus, doctis vel indoctis, illiteratis vel literatis, tales instinctus vel impulsus naturales, quibus indeliberate prorumpunt in professione, et profitentur quod hoc est certum et manifestum a parte rei quod omne ens est ens, et ultra signa profitentur quod hoc est manifestum et notum quod quilibet ignis est calidus: videtur quod 30 debeant in formas universales, postposita contencione, consentire. Nobilitas autem, honestas, et utilitas talium communium formarum in rebus, inferius exponetur. 25 208" 6. ista veritas MS. 19. vinc'e MS.
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CAPITULUM SEPTIMUM. Quia igitur ultra signa a parte rei est nobis intel- lectualiter hoc valde certum, et sicut per se mani- festissimum, quod omne ens est ens; alioquin ultra 5 signa a parte rei ex eadem racione nichil intellectualiter vel sensualiter est nobis certum et manifestum; et quia hoc certum, "omne ens est ens" est entitas communis; de necessitate omnis entitas (sicut esse hoc ens) est entitas huiusmodi, et hoc, et esse hoc ens est huius 10 entitatis (et ita de aliis) constat quod est forma com- munissima in rebus, que est quid valde certum, et sicud per se manifestissimum. Quam si voce negare [quis] vellet, corde nos eam profiteri oportet, cum sit per se primum objectum intellectus per se manifestissimum apud eundem maxime et communissime per modum forme essencialis prime; et per consequens per modum lucis spiritualis prime omnium simul intelligibilium in ipsis vise formaliter. Et licet illa sit forma communis in multis, et de 20 multis quodammodo, non tamen est universale de quinque universalibus que dicuntur genus, species, differencia, proprium et accidens communis; tamen poterit vocari universale vel universalis, cum sit univer- sorum entitas. Verumtamen forma communis inexistens 25 est in plus quam proprie universale reale, vel univer- salitas realis inexistens. Est autem inexistens forma communis, ad differenciam forme communis exemplaris, que non pluribus divisim potest formaliter inexistere. Sic videtur quod deus sit inexistens forma communis 3o tribus divinis suppositis, et entitas transcendens forma communis in existens omni enti. Nulla tamen est formaliter universale inexistens vel universalis inexistens, prout universale dividitur in illa quinque, genus, species, etc. 15 We have then this Universal, Entity, which cannot be denied except verbally, and which is the first object of the mind which thinks, It is in many and said of many, yet not like those other Universals, the Genus, the Species, the Difference, the Property and the Accident ; nor yet like the Exemplar Form which does not exist formally in many; but somewhat like the Deity in the Three Persons, that are all God. 1, 2. Septimum deest; blank space for Initial QMS. deest MS. 13. quis 3 *
CAPITULUM SEPTIMUM. Quia igitur ultra signa a parte rei est nobis intel- lectualiter hoc valde certum, et sicut per se mani- festissimum, quod omne ens est ens; alioquin ultra 5 signa a parte rei ex eadem racione nichil intellectualiter vel sensualiter est nobis certum et manifestum; et quia hoc certum, "omne ens est ens" est entitas communis; de necessitate omnis entitas (sicut esse hoc ens) est entitas huiusmodi, et hoc, et esse hoc ens est huius 10 entitatis (et ita de aliis) constat quod est forma com- munissima in rebus, que est quid valde certum, et sicud per se manifestissimum. Quam si voce negare [quis] vellet, corde nos eam profiteri oportet, cum sit per se primum objectum intellectus per se manifestissimum apud eundem maxime et communissime per modum forme essencialis prime; et per consequens per modum lucis spiritualis prime omnium simul intelligibilium in ipsis vise formaliter. Et licet illa sit forma communis in multis, et de 20 multis quodammodo, non tamen est universale de quinque universalibus que dicuntur genus, species, differencia, proprium et accidens communis; tamen poterit vocari universale vel universalis, cum sit univer- sorum entitas. Verumtamen forma communis inexistens 25 est in plus quam proprie universale reale, vel univer- salitas realis inexistens. Est autem inexistens forma communis, ad differenciam forme communis exemplaris, que non pluribus divisim potest formaliter inexistere. Sic videtur quod deus sit inexistens forma communis 3o tribus divinis suppositis, et entitas transcendens forma communis in existens omni enti. Nulla tamen est formaliter universale inexistens vel universalis inexistens, prout universale dividitur in illa quinque, genus, species, etc. 15 We have then this Universal, Entity, which cannot be denied except verbally, and which is the first object of the mind which thinks, It is in many and said of many, yet not like those other Universals, the Genus, the Species, the Difference, the Property and the Accident ; nor yet like the Exemplar Form which does not exist formally in many; but somewhat like the Deity in the Three Persons, that are all God. 1, 2. Septimum deest; blank space for Initial QMS. deest MS. 13. quis 3 *
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36 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. VII. Antequam autem hic ulterius descendatur ad uni- We must premise that as versale inexistente, est advertendum quod universalitas there is metaphysical, dicitur, sicud et veritas, tripliciter : methaphysice, logice, logical, and grammatical et grammatice; sicud veritas methaphysica dicitur mera 209" truth, so there rei entitas, logica dicitur quoddam ens racionis circa5 are three corresponding composicionem et divisionem consistens: ut, cum dicitur sorts of esse est, dicitur verum. Si autem dicatur solum sic: Universality. esse, non dicitur verum; nec si dicatur solum sic: est, dicitur verum. Sed cum dicitur simul, esse est, dicitur verum, et veritas (scilicet loyca). A parte autem rei 10 non plus vel minus dicatur, cum dicitur esse est, quam si solum dicitur esse vel solum est. Veritas autem grammatica est contractibilis proposicio, habens signifi- catum suum primarium a parte rei; vel habicio signifi- cati primarii a parte rei in ipsa grammaticali propo- 15 sicione dicitur veritas grammatica. Sic universalitas methaphysice dicitur, quasi cuiusdam universalitatis entitas, universalitas methaphysica et universale methaphysicum. Sic enim dicunt idem uni- versale et universalitas; nec universale, sic methaphysice 20 dictum, dicit pro formali aliquam intencionem loycalem, sed ipsam entitatem communem universitati quorumdam. Secundo dicitur universalitas loyce, consistens circa abstraccionem nature per intellectum ab individuantibus condicionibus, ut quoddam esse non reale, sed intencionale 25 solum; et loycale debetur nature humane, quando ipsa per intelleccionem abstrahitur ab individuantibus con- dicionibus intellectu; sic non realiter sed solum inten- cionaliter circa eam agentem: propter quod non realem rem, sed solum intencionale quoddam seu loycale causat 30 circa ipsam naturam. Et hoc vocatur universalitas loyca; et secundum illam ipsam naturam ab extrinseco deno- minat universale, de quanto habet esse abstractum a condicionibus individui, et sic esse indifferens ad esse in isto vel quocunque alio supposito. Et illud esse ab- stractum est illud esse secundum hoc indifferens ad esse in hoc vel quocunque alio supposito; est solum esse loycum et intencionale, non in natura humana subiectatum, sed est ens circa abstraccionem activam intellectus, denominans nichilominus ab extrinseco, non 40 ipsam abstraccionem activam intellectivi, nec ipsum Metaphysical Universality means a Universal entity, that which is common to many. Logical universality is the abstraction (by the power of the mind) from the conditions of individuality; and this has no real entity, except in the thinking mind, though it denotes and makes known the Universal and real entity 35 For it cannot either stand for the act of abstraction which produces 18. entitas dicitur MS.
36 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. VII. Antequam autem hic ulterius descendatur ad uni- We must premise that as versale inexistente, est advertendum quod universalitas there is metaphysical, dicitur, sicud et veritas, tripliciter : methaphysice, logice, logical, and grammatical et grammatice; sicud veritas methaphysica dicitur mera 209" truth, so there rei entitas, logica dicitur quoddam ens racionis circa5 are three corresponding composicionem et divisionem consistens: ut, cum dicitur sorts of esse est, dicitur verum. Si autem dicatur solum sic: Universality. esse, non dicitur verum; nec si dicatur solum sic: est, dicitur verum. Sed cum dicitur simul, esse est, dicitur verum, et veritas (scilicet loyca). A parte autem rei 10 non plus vel minus dicatur, cum dicitur esse est, quam si solum dicitur esse vel solum est. Veritas autem grammatica est contractibilis proposicio, habens signifi- catum suum primarium a parte rei; vel habicio signifi- cati primarii a parte rei in ipsa grammaticali propo- 15 sicione dicitur veritas grammatica. Sic universalitas methaphysice dicitur, quasi cuiusdam universalitatis entitas, universalitas methaphysica et universale methaphysicum. Sic enim dicunt idem uni- versale et universalitas; nec universale, sic methaphysice 20 dictum, dicit pro formali aliquam intencionem loycalem, sed ipsam entitatem communem universitati quorumdam. Secundo dicitur universalitas loyce, consistens circa abstraccionem nature per intellectum ab individuantibus condicionibus, ut quoddam esse non reale, sed intencionale 25 solum; et loycale debetur nature humane, quando ipsa per intelleccionem abstrahitur ab individuantibus con- dicionibus intellectu; sic non realiter sed solum inten- cionaliter circa eam agentem: propter quod non realem rem, sed solum intencionale quoddam seu loycale causat 30 circa ipsam naturam. Et hoc vocatur universalitas loyca; et secundum illam ipsam naturam ab extrinseco deno- minat universale, de quanto habet esse abstractum a condicionibus individui, et sic esse indifferens ad esse in isto vel quocunque alio supposito. Et illud esse ab- stractum est illud esse secundum hoc indifferens ad esse in hoc vel quocunque alio supposito; est solum esse loycum et intencionale, non in natura humana subiectatum, sed est ens circa abstraccionem activam intellectus, denominans nichilominus ab extrinseco, non 40 ipsam abstraccionem activam intellectivi, nec ipsum Metaphysical Universality means a Universal entity, that which is common to many. Logical universality is the abstraction (by the power of the mind) from the conditions of individuality; and this has no real entity, except in the thinking mind, though it denotes and makes known the Universal and real entity 35 For it cannot either stand for the act of abstraction which produces 18. entitas dicitur MS.
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CAP. VII. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. intellectum esse universalem, sed naturam circa quam versatur illa abstraccio, Et sic "universale" dicens [dicit] duo simul, scilicet naturam per modum subiecti, et ipsam universalitatem, que est intencio loyca circa 209" abstraccionem | activam, consistens in anima. lpsum universale sic dictum aggregatum est partim in anima, scilicet 2? universalitatem, et partem extra, scilicet 2m naturam que abstracta est; sicut veritas logica, con- sistens circa composicionem et divisionem in mente, 10 denominat ab extrinseco id quod primarie per compo- sicionem vel divisionem dicitur. Et sic 2" multos famosos, sicud materia dicta solum a parte rei, habet esse, nequaquam est materia prima (quia 2" eos, dum solum est a parte rei, nequaquam 13est separata a disposicionibus eciam accidentalibus; sed dum per intellectum in hoc subtiliorem quam sit natura abstrahitur et deprivatur, non realiter sed intencionaliter ab omni forma accidentali et eciam substanciali quantum neutra est de eius mera racione essenciali, tunc ipsa 20 est materia prima): sic eciam dicunt quod nec natura hominis, nec asini, nec cuiuscunque creature, dum solum habet esse a parte nature et rei nequaquam est universalis, quia sic non habet existere separatum et depuratum ab individuis condicionibus, sed dum intel- 25lectus nature abstrahit eas a condicionibus individuanti- bus, tunc habet esse abstractum et esse in divinis, inten- cionaliter, non realiter a parte rei; et sic esse univer- sale. Et per consequens intellectus per sui abstraccionem fabricat universalitatem in rebus que dicuntur universalia. 3o Quamvis autem verum sit quod creatus intellectus fabricat talem universalitatem circa res per activam et intencionalem suam abstraccionem nature a condicionibus individui, sicud creatus intellectus per sui activam composicionem aut divisionem fabricat verum seu veri- 35tatem logicam denominantem autem ab intrinseco ad quod primarie per composicionem vel divisionem dicitur; et sic intellectus dicit tunc verum, id est, rem primarie significatam per composicionem vel divisionem que dicitur verum vel veritas logica; et sic 2" philo- 40 sophum et multos alios ''Universale est dum intelligitur", 3. dicit deest MS. 12. dicitur MS. 24 depu'atü MS. 40. in- telliguntur MS. 37 it, or for the intellect which is not Universal. Thus Universal means both a nature which is sucli, and the act of abstraction which takes place in the mind. Theory of those who sav that as matter, if it has determined existence in any way, cannot be primordial matter, but this indetermination accrues 10 it from mental abstraction; so a given being Cannot lave universahty in itself, but only by means of the samc mental facultv of abstraction. But, although it is true that we torm thc Universal in our minds by our act of abstraction,
CAP. VII. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. intellectum esse universalem, sed naturam circa quam versatur illa abstraccio, Et sic "universale" dicens [dicit] duo simul, scilicet naturam per modum subiecti, et ipsam universalitatem, que est intencio loyca circa 209" abstraccionem | activam, consistens in anima. lpsum universale sic dictum aggregatum est partim in anima, scilicet 2? universalitatem, et partem extra, scilicet 2m naturam que abstracta est; sicut veritas logica, con- sistens circa composicionem et divisionem in mente, 10 denominat ab extrinseco id quod primarie per compo- sicionem vel divisionem dicitur. Et sic 2" multos famosos, sicud materia dicta solum a parte rei, habet esse, nequaquam est materia prima (quia 2" eos, dum solum est a parte rei, nequaquam 13est separata a disposicionibus eciam accidentalibus; sed dum per intellectum in hoc subtiliorem quam sit natura abstrahitur et deprivatur, non realiter sed intencionaliter ab omni forma accidentali et eciam substanciali quantum neutra est de eius mera racione essenciali, tunc ipsa 20 est materia prima): sic eciam dicunt quod nec natura hominis, nec asini, nec cuiuscunque creature, dum solum habet esse a parte nature et rei nequaquam est universalis, quia sic non habet existere separatum et depuratum ab individuis condicionibus, sed dum intel- 25lectus nature abstrahit eas a condicionibus individuanti- bus, tunc habet esse abstractum et esse in divinis, inten- cionaliter, non realiter a parte rei; et sic esse univer- sale. Et per consequens intellectus per sui abstraccionem fabricat universalitatem in rebus que dicuntur universalia. 3o Quamvis autem verum sit quod creatus intellectus fabricat talem universalitatem circa res per activam et intencionalem suam abstraccionem nature a condicionibus individui, sicud creatus intellectus per sui activam composicionem aut divisionem fabricat verum seu veri- 35tatem logicam denominantem autem ab intrinseco ad quod primarie per composicionem vel divisionem dicitur; et sic intellectus dicit tunc verum, id est, rem primarie significatam per composicionem vel divisionem que dicitur verum vel veritas logica; et sic 2" philo- 40 sophum et multos alios ''Universale est dum intelligitur", 3. dicit deest MS. 12. dicitur MS. 24 depu'atü MS. 40. in- telliguntur MS. 37 it, or for the intellect which is not Universal. Thus Universal means both a nature which is sucli, and the act of abstraction which takes place in the mind. Theory of those who sav that as matter, if it has determined existence in any way, cannot be primordial matter, but this indetermination accrues 10 it from mental abstraction; so a given being Cannot lave universahty in itself, but only by means of the samc mental facultv of abstraction. But, although it is true that we torm thc Universal in our minds by our act of abstraction,
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38 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. VII. yet the scilicet sic abstractive: non tamen est verum quod comparison materia sit materia prima, circumscripta operacione as to primordial intellectus creati, nec quod natura sit universalis a matter fails, parte rei, inscripta operacione creati intellectus. Nam for neither this depends on a cum materia, prius naturaliter capax forme cuiuscunque mental operation, nor quam habeat illam, pro illo vero gradu essendi vel does the Universal, as durandi materia a parte rei est informis, nuda, et pura, existing, 210' et abstracta ] a qualibet forma substanciali vel acciden- depend thus. For primordial tali que potest sibi inesse et non inesse; per consequens matter is in itself a pure pro illa mensura vere est materia prima a parte rei 10 capacity for solum, et intellectus divinus (qui intelleccione sua non receiving forms. and though solum intencionaliter sed realiter agit circa materiam never formless et ordinem in materia) ipse intelligit vere materiam in time, still this capacity prius esse capacem et pro illo prior, esse denudatum is naturally prior to any et deprivatum ab omni forma quam potest post illum 15 form receivable. gradum prioritatis recipere, et intelligit eam posterius esse formatam forma accidentali et substanciali; et ipse intellectus secundum sui intelleccionem ponit materiam in ordine ut ipsa prius naturaliter a parte rei sit prima materia nuda et depurata a qualibet illa 20 forma, et post illum gradum mensure essendi vel durandi ponit eam inesse formato forma substanciali et accidentali. Et sic materia prima pro aliqua men- sura essendi vel durandi a parte rei est materia prima, pura et denudata ab omni forma non essen-25 ciali illi prius materie, licet non sit postea in aliquo tempore vel in instanti temporis informis vel nuda absque forma. Sic humanitas simpliciter, vel equinitas simpliciter, prius (quo ad naturam et consequenciam) a parte rei 30 est quam quicunque singularis homo vel singularis equus et sic pro illo “priori a parte rei" humanitas est communis et non singularis deo per intelleccionem suam, sic ordinante; et per consequens natura humana ex communius et realis a parte et natura rei absque hoc 35 quod intellectus fabricat universalitatem logicam. Et sic deus, 2m intelleccionem suam in rebus, fabricat universalitatem methaphysicam, que est universitalitatis cuiusdam entis formalis, sicud et ipse ante verum loycum veritatem methaphysicam fabricat in rebus 40 universi. Et sic universalitas metaphysica equorum, cum In like manner the Universal man, &c. is naturally, not temporally prior to any individual man whether it be arrived at by abstraction, or not. God is the Author of this as He is the author of metaphysical truth, prior to logical truth. And this priority is real, not notional, and exists independently of all forms. 1. non est MS. 22. formatum MS. 30. qu am MS.
38 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. VII. yet the scilicet sic abstractive: non tamen est verum quod comparison materia sit materia prima, circumscripta operacione as to primordial intellectus creati, nec quod natura sit universalis a matter fails, parte rei, inscripta operacione creati intellectus. Nam for neither this depends on a cum materia, prius naturaliter capax forme cuiuscunque mental operation, nor quam habeat illam, pro illo vero gradu essendi vel does the Universal, as durandi materia a parte rei est informis, nuda, et pura, existing, 210' et abstracta ] a qualibet forma substanciali vel acciden- depend thus. For primordial tali que potest sibi inesse et non inesse; per consequens matter is in itself a pure pro illa mensura vere est materia prima a parte rei 10 capacity for solum, et intellectus divinus (qui intelleccione sua non receiving forms. and though solum intencionaliter sed realiter agit circa materiam never formless et ordinem in materia) ipse intelligit vere materiam in time, still this capacity prius esse capacem et pro illo prior, esse denudatum is naturally prior to any et deprivatum ab omni forma quam potest post illum 15 form receivable. gradum prioritatis recipere, et intelligit eam posterius esse formatam forma accidentali et substanciali; et ipse intellectus secundum sui intelleccionem ponit materiam in ordine ut ipsa prius naturaliter a parte rei sit prima materia nuda et depurata a qualibet illa 20 forma, et post illum gradum mensure essendi vel durandi ponit eam inesse formato forma substanciali et accidentali. Et sic materia prima pro aliqua men- sura essendi vel durandi a parte rei est materia prima, pura et denudata ab omni forma non essen-25 ciali illi prius materie, licet non sit postea in aliquo tempore vel in instanti temporis informis vel nuda absque forma. Sic humanitas simpliciter, vel equinitas simpliciter, prius (quo ad naturam et consequenciam) a parte rei 30 est quam quicunque singularis homo vel singularis equus et sic pro illo “priori a parte rei" humanitas est communis et non singularis deo per intelleccionem suam, sic ordinante; et per consequens natura humana ex communius et realis a parte et natura rei absque hoc 35 quod intellectus fabricat universalitatem logicam. Et sic deus, 2m intelleccionem suam in rebus, fabricat universalitatem methaphysicam, que est universitalitatis cuiusdam entis formalis, sicud et ipse ante verum loycum veritatem methaphysicam fabricat in rebus 40 universi. Et sic universalitas metaphysica equorum, cum In like manner the Universal man, &c. is naturally, not temporally prior to any individual man whether it be arrived at by abstraction, or not. God is the Author of this as He is the author of metaphysical truth, prior to logical truth. And this priority is real, not notional, and exists independently of all forms. 1. non est MS. 22. formatum MS. 30. qu am MS.
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CAP. VII. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 39 sit tantum equinitas, ipsa est pura et nuda ab omni condicione individuali; et ita de aliis. Nec sunt audiendi philosophi quicunque qui negant in rebus universalitatem metaphysicam, ponentes solum 5 universalitatem loycam circa naturas rerum, modo quo dictum est. Sic forte voluit philosophus primo de Anima et 7mo methaphysice; cum primo de anima dixit: "Universale animal aut nichil est universalitate metha- 210' physica"; cum forte videbatur | sic sibi quod impossibile 10 esset esse animalitatem separatam, nudam, et puram a condicionibus individuantibus a parte rei solum ex ordinacione intellectus divini, “aut universale animal posterius est', scilicet animali singulari in natura sic quod universalitas logica animalis fabricata sibi per intellectum abstrahentem animalitatem a condicionibus individuantibus est posterior animali singulari in natura. Et tale universale seu universalitatem talem logicam, quam solum forte dixit in rebus reperiri 1mo metha- physice, vocat accidens in natura rei, cum per abstrac- 20 cionem intellectus accidit nature rei, et de existente tali abstraccione de esse huiusmodi universalitas. Sed, ut dictum est, non est standum tali sentencie, cum tunc oportet dici quod intellectus divinus intellec- cione sua non diceret nec fabricaret hanc veritatem 25 methaphysicam a parte rei, scilicet, omnem hominem esse animal; et ita de aliis dicendum est. Ergo pro gloria domini veritatis, quod sicud ipse preter veritatem logicam in mente creata fabricat ex parte rei veritatem methaphysicam illam quod omnis homo est animal, sic 3o preter universalitatem loycam quam concedit ipse fabricare intellectum creatum, fabricat idem dominus a parte rei universalitatem methaphysicam simpliciter, que est, omnem hominem esse animal et unumquodque animal esse animal. Et illi qui ponunt universale solum 35 secundum universalitatem logicam non possunt dare quod genus predicatur de pluribus differentibus specie secundum quod est quiditas uniuscuiusque earum: quia non possunt dare simpliciter que res et que natura a parte rei est quiditas plurium specie differencium; nisi 40 forte, more trutannorum, darent quod (simpliciter loquendo) nulla res est quiditas, nec aliqua natura est 15 Such philosophers as deny metaphysical. and only admit logical Universality should not be listened to. Aristotle was perhaps ot hese, when he said: The Universal is either nothing, or is posterior to its singular; “nothing. because he believed it could not exist without its singulars; "posterior meaning the logical Universal. But we must not admit this, for as the Lord created metaphysical truth, vel gave man the faculty to arrive at truth that is logical; so He also created the metaphysically Universal, vet gave man the power to produce the Logical Universal. And indeed, such as maintain no other Universa! but the latter. are obliged to deny that anything has an essence common to many species, except it be that very 20. assit MS. 40. trutanor MS.
CAP. VII. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 39 sit tantum equinitas, ipsa est pura et nuda ab omni condicione individuali; et ita de aliis. Nec sunt audiendi philosophi quicunque qui negant in rebus universalitatem metaphysicam, ponentes solum 5 universalitatem loycam circa naturas rerum, modo quo dictum est. Sic forte voluit philosophus primo de Anima et 7mo methaphysice; cum primo de anima dixit: "Universale animal aut nichil est universalitate metha- 210' physica"; cum forte videbatur | sic sibi quod impossibile 10 esset esse animalitatem separatam, nudam, et puram a condicionibus individuantibus a parte rei solum ex ordinacione intellectus divini, “aut universale animal posterius est', scilicet animali singulari in natura sic quod universalitas logica animalis fabricata sibi per intellectum abstrahentem animalitatem a condicionibus individuantibus est posterior animali singulari in natura. Et tale universale seu universalitatem talem logicam, quam solum forte dixit in rebus reperiri 1mo metha- physice, vocat accidens in natura rei, cum per abstrac- 20 cionem intellectus accidit nature rei, et de existente tali abstraccione de esse huiusmodi universalitas. Sed, ut dictum est, non est standum tali sentencie, cum tunc oportet dici quod intellectus divinus intellec- cione sua non diceret nec fabricaret hanc veritatem 25 methaphysicam a parte rei, scilicet, omnem hominem esse animal; et ita de aliis dicendum est. Ergo pro gloria domini veritatis, quod sicud ipse preter veritatem logicam in mente creata fabricat ex parte rei veritatem methaphysicam illam quod omnis homo est animal, sic 3o preter universalitatem loycam quam concedit ipse fabricare intellectum creatum, fabricat idem dominus a parte rei universalitatem methaphysicam simpliciter, que est, omnem hominem esse animal et unumquodque animal esse animal. Et illi qui ponunt universale solum 35 secundum universalitatem logicam non possunt dare quod genus predicatur de pluribus differentibus specie secundum quod est quiditas uniuscuiusque earum: quia non possunt dare simpliciter que res et que natura a parte rei est quiditas plurium specie differencium; nisi 40 forte, more trutannorum, darent quod (simpliciter loquendo) nulla res est quiditas, nec aliqua natura est 15 Such philosophers as deny metaphysical. and only admit logical Universality should not be listened to. Aristotle was perhaps ot hese, when he said: The Universal is either nothing, or is posterior to its singular; “nothing. because he believed it could not exist without its singulars; "posterior meaning the logical Universal. But we must not admit this, for as the Lord created metaphysical truth, vel gave man the faculty to arrive at truth that is logical; so He also created the metaphysically Universal, vet gave man the power to produce the Logical Universal. And indeed, such as maintain no other Universa! but the latter. are obliged to deny that anything has an essence common to many species, except it be that very 20. assit MS. 40. trutanor MS.
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40 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. V But a Universa! which does not exist in cach o its individuals is impossible. quiditas hominis et asini, sed animalis, ut est abstracta per intellectum a condicionibus individuantibus, sic predicatur de homine et de asino. Sicud eciam, quando queritur ubi vel quomodo materia est materia prima a parte rei, dicunt quod non simpliciter a parte rei? materia est prima materia, sed [non] nisi in quantum per intellectum abstrahitur ab omni forma; ita quod sine addita replicacione nesciunt dare nec exprimere quid pre- dicaretur] de pluribus differentibus specie in “eo quod 211“ quid est", nec sciunt dicere et exprimere quomodo materia 10 est materia prima, vel que, nisi cum reduplicacione. Qui autem innituntur abstractioni intellectus divini et abstractioni methaphysice a parte rei et depura- tive ac denudative in ordine non temporali sed me- thaphysico, illi simpliciter sciunt dicere et exprimere 15 In our theory, quod illa [essencia] animalis, communis a parte rei, it is easy to circumscripta eciam universalitate loyca quam creatus show how a universal intellectus fabricaret, predicatur per intellectum divinum essence exists and belongs to et ipsa seipsam predicat de qualibet specie animalis, ut its inferior species; and ipsa est quiditas uniuscuiusque earum. Sic eciam sciunt 20 how it can be dicere quod illa materia pro quadam sua certa mensura truly said that matter is in essendi et durandi est penitus nuda ab omni forma some measure really denuded cuius est capax per transmutacionem substancialem vel of all form, aliam accidentalem mutacionem; et ponere universali- and the universal tatem methaphysicam separatam, depuratam, et denu- 25 likewise is apart from datam a condicionibus individuantibus, sic quod nulla individual talis possit sibi formaliter competere, est multum racio- determinations. nale. Nam pura humanitas non potest esse alba, nec calida, nec frigida, cum tunc esset formaliter huiusmodi; et cum humanitas formaliter sit esse hominem, igitur 30 humanitas et esse hominem formaliter esset esse hominem album, sicud humanitas formaliter esset alba humanitas. Sed quidquid est formaliter esse hominem hoc album est albedo hominis, qua sola est formaliter homo albus: igitur, humanitas esset albedo hominis: quod non con-35 venit. Ponere autem universalitatem methaphysicam separatam ab individuis, sic quod ipsa non posset inexistere formaliter alicui individuo, hoc est impossibile, cum illa 2m propria sui condicione apta sit esse cuiusdam viventis formalis intrinseca entitas. Et forte 40 abstraction made by the mind. 6. non deest MS. 12, 13. abstractivi? MS. 16. essencia deest MS. 23. tuſumcone MS. 29. ho 3 above huiusmodi and in another hand MS. 31. est pro et MS. 40. vui ntis MS.
40 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. V But a Universa! which does not exist in cach o its individuals is impossible. quiditas hominis et asini, sed animalis, ut est abstracta per intellectum a condicionibus individuantibus, sic predicatur de homine et de asino. Sicud eciam, quando queritur ubi vel quomodo materia est materia prima a parte rei, dicunt quod non simpliciter a parte rei? materia est prima materia, sed [non] nisi in quantum per intellectum abstrahitur ab omni forma; ita quod sine addita replicacione nesciunt dare nec exprimere quid pre- dicaretur] de pluribus differentibus specie in “eo quod 211“ quid est", nec sciunt dicere et exprimere quomodo materia 10 est materia prima, vel que, nisi cum reduplicacione. Qui autem innituntur abstractioni intellectus divini et abstractioni methaphysice a parte rei et depura- tive ac denudative in ordine non temporali sed me- thaphysico, illi simpliciter sciunt dicere et exprimere 15 In our theory, quod illa [essencia] animalis, communis a parte rei, it is easy to circumscripta eciam universalitate loyca quam creatus show how a universal intellectus fabricaret, predicatur per intellectum divinum essence exists and belongs to et ipsa seipsam predicat de qualibet specie animalis, ut its inferior species; and ipsa est quiditas uniuscuiusque earum. Sic eciam sciunt 20 how it can be dicere quod illa materia pro quadam sua certa mensura truly said that matter is in essendi et durandi est penitus nuda ab omni forma some measure really denuded cuius est capax per transmutacionem substancialem vel of all form, aliam accidentalem mutacionem; et ponere universali- and the universal tatem methaphysicam separatam, depuratam, et denu- 25 likewise is apart from datam a condicionibus individuantibus, sic quod nulla individual talis possit sibi formaliter competere, est multum racio- determinations. nale. Nam pura humanitas non potest esse alba, nec calida, nec frigida, cum tunc esset formaliter huiusmodi; et cum humanitas formaliter sit esse hominem, igitur 30 humanitas et esse hominem formaliter esset esse hominem album, sicud humanitas formaliter esset alba humanitas. Sed quidquid est formaliter esse hominem hoc album est albedo hominis, qua sola est formaliter homo albus: igitur, humanitas esset albedo hominis: quod non con-35 venit. Ponere autem universalitatem methaphysicam separatam ab individuis, sic quod ipsa non posset inexistere formaliter alicui individuo, hoc est impossibile, cum illa 2m propria sui condicione apta sit esse cuiusdam viventis formalis intrinseca entitas. Et forte 40 abstraction made by the mind. 6. non deest MS. 12, 13. abstractivi? MS. 16. essencia deest MS. 23. tuſumcone MS. 29. ho 3 above huiusmodi and in another hand MS. 31. est pro et MS. 40. vui ntis MS.
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CAP. VII. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 41 211 15 25 in tali equivocacione abstraccionis laboraverunt Aristo- teles cum Platone. Utrum autem deus posset servare in puro esse metha- Whether God could make it physico universalem equinitatem, absque hoc quod 2m to exist without them 5 eam aliquis individuus equus esset equus, sicut creditur (as quantity exists in the per ecclesiam in sacramento altaris salvare quantitatem Sacrament absque hoc quod 2m eam aliquid sit subiective forma- without any subject) is liter quantum, est alterius negocii. Verumtamen deus another servat equinitatem universalem pro sua prima et propria question. At any rate, mensura essendi, que est alcior, nobilior, et] amplior God makes it exist in a way longe quam mensura temporalis cuiuscunque individui different from, and nobler equi temporaliter existentis; servat, dico, pro illa men- than, its sura, sic quod equinitas nequaquam pro illa sua prima subjects, whether this mensura est esse aliquem equum individualem, cum existence can or cannot secundum talem mensuram sit ante omnem equum possibly be individuum. Quod si deus potest ea servare in illa sola maintained alone and mensura sua prima, nullam mensuram durandi vel without any other. essendi equum posteriorem sibi superaddendo, tunc superioris questionis pars affirmativa est vera. Si non 20 potest servare equinitatem illam in illa sola mensura sine superaddicione posterioris mensure equi, sicud non potest servare substanciam creatam sine sui dependencia a deo, qui est veritas relativa posterior illa substancia. tunc aliter sumendum est. Universalitas autem grammaticalis est signum gram- maticale, significans primarie universalitatem metha- physicam; vel modus significandi grammaticalis, secun- dum quem primarie et universaliter significat ipsam universalitatem methaphysicam, est universalitas gram- 3o maticalis. Et sic intencio methaphysica, que est univer- salitas methaphysica, et intencio loyca, que est loycalis universalitas, et intencio grammatica que est univer- salitas grammatica, pulchre sibi correspondent. Et has tres intenciones, quantum loyca appropriate respicit 35 dici, grammaticalis vero significare, et methaphysica respicit esse, philosophus videtur mira subtilitate fuisse complexus cum dixit quia "univoca dicuntur, quorum nomen est commune et racio substancie secundum nomen est eadem". 40 Et antiqui soliti sunt dicere quoddam universale ante rem, ut ydeam in mente dei; et universale in re, ut The Grammatical Universal is a word which stands for the Metaphiysical. so that the latter is Universal in being, the Logical in affirming, the Grammatical in signifying, cach beautifully corresponding to the other. Aristotle's general definition of them all shows marvellous acumen. Another ancient division: 18. cqw MS. 37. � MS.
CAP. VII. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 41 211 15 25 in tali equivocacione abstraccionis laboraverunt Aristo- teles cum Platone. Utrum autem deus posset servare in puro esse metha- Whether God could make it physico universalem equinitatem, absque hoc quod 2m to exist without them 5 eam aliquis individuus equus esset equus, sicut creditur (as quantity exists in the per ecclesiam in sacramento altaris salvare quantitatem Sacrament absque hoc quod 2m eam aliquid sit subiective forma- without any subject) is liter quantum, est alterius negocii. Verumtamen deus another servat equinitatem universalem pro sua prima et propria question. At any rate, mensura essendi, que est alcior, nobilior, et] amplior God makes it exist in a way longe quam mensura temporalis cuiuscunque individui different from, and nobler equi temporaliter existentis; servat, dico, pro illa men- than, its sura, sic quod equinitas nequaquam pro illa sua prima subjects, whether this mensura est esse aliquem equum individualem, cum existence can or cannot secundum talem mensuram sit ante omnem equum possibly be individuum. Quod si deus potest ea servare in illa sola maintained alone and mensura sua prima, nullam mensuram durandi vel without any other. essendi equum posteriorem sibi superaddendo, tunc superioris questionis pars affirmativa est vera. Si non 20 potest servare equinitatem illam in illa sola mensura sine superaddicione posterioris mensure equi, sicud non potest servare substanciam creatam sine sui dependencia a deo, qui est veritas relativa posterior illa substancia. tunc aliter sumendum est. Universalitas autem grammaticalis est signum gram- maticale, significans primarie universalitatem metha- physicam; vel modus significandi grammaticalis, secun- dum quem primarie et universaliter significat ipsam universalitatem methaphysicam, est universalitas gram- 3o maticalis. Et sic intencio methaphysica, que est univer- salitas methaphysica, et intencio loyca, que est loycalis universalitas, et intencio grammatica que est univer- salitas grammatica, pulchre sibi correspondent. Et has tres intenciones, quantum loyca appropriate respicit 35 dici, grammaticalis vero significare, et methaphysica respicit esse, philosophus videtur mira subtilitate fuisse complexus cum dixit quia "univoca dicuntur, quorum nomen est commune et racio substancie secundum nomen est eadem". 40 Et antiqui soliti sunt dicere quoddam universale ante rem, ut ydeam in mente dei; et universale in re, ut The Grammatical Universal is a word which stands for the Metaphiysical. so that the latter is Universal in being, the Logical in affirming, the Grammatical in signifying, cach beautifully corresponding to the other. Aristotle's general definition of them all shows marvellous acumen. Another ancient division: 18. cqw MS. 37. � MS.
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42 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. VII. Universals animalitatem communem in individuis Et universale prior to, in, post rem ut vel animalitatem logicam vel universalitatem and posterior to, their grammaticam. Et Lincolniensis super primum posteriorum singulars. Grosseteste's ponit primum universale rerum materialium, esse quintuple ipsarum ydeale in mente divina, secundum universale: division of the same. esse ydeale in mente intelligente. Et 3m universale racionem communem 2m quam sunt in corporibus celestibus, et 4tum universale formam communem eis insitam. Et hoc universale, dicit, Aristoteles vocat uni- versale unum in multis et de multis. Quintum autem 10 genus universalium pro signis nostris grammaticalibus abicit sicud sibi impertinens, cum hoc nomen, “animal", dicitur universale, sicud urina dicitur sana.
42 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. VII. Universals animalitatem communem in individuis Et universale prior to, in, post rem ut vel animalitatem logicam vel universalitatem and posterior to, their grammaticam. Et Lincolniensis super primum posteriorum singulars. Grosseteste's ponit primum universale rerum materialium, esse quintuple ipsarum ydeale in mente divina, secundum universale: division of the same. esse ydeale in mente intelligente. Et 3m universale racionem communem 2m quam sunt in corporibus celestibus, et 4tum universale formam communem eis insitam. Et hoc universale, dicit, Aristoteles vocat uni- versale unum in multis et de multis. Quintum autem 10 genus universalium pro signis nostris grammaticalibus abicit sicud sibi impertinens, cum hoc nomen, “animal", dicitur universale, sicud urina dicitur sana.
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CAPITULUM OCTAVUM. 2123 Supposita autem illa descripcione universalis quod universale est quod aptum natum est esse unum in multis et de multis" tanquam bona et adequata, difficile videtur quomodo universale solum dividitur in hec quinque, scilicet, genus, species, differenciam, proprium, et accidens. Videtur enim quod deus sic sit universale; videtur eciam quod ens transcendens sic sit universale, et neutrum horum est genus, species etc. Videtur eciam 10 quod instans commune ad hoc et hoc instans etc. sit universale. Et tamen nec sic est genus nec species etc. Sic racionalitas communis respectu huius et huius racionalitatis videtur universale; et nullum eorum. Sic et risibilitas respectu huius et istius risibilitatis videtur 15 universale; et nullum dictorum. Sic eciam materia respectu huius et illius materie videtur universale; et nullum horum. Sic eciam substancia, dicta secundum analogiam de composita forma et materia, videtur universale; et nullum istorum. Item, cum universale sit 20 proprie predicatum, quid igitur videtur primo et proprie subiectum respectu universalis? Item, ad quid valet universalitas methaphysica in rebus, ut ad quid valet communis humanitas, si non potest currere laborare feliciter vivere, etc. Et videtur quod singularis homo 25 sit melior et dignior humanitate tali communi. Item, si natura universalis superior sit alia natura quam natura inferior? Item, si illa quinque universalia a parte rei, genus, species etc. ponunt in numerum. Item, si sit dare singularitatem communem, et universalitatem vel 3o communitatem penitus incommunicabilem multis. Item, si species humana est risibilis, et equina humibilis, Difficulties: According to the definition, God, Being, the shortest period of possible duration, rationality. risibility and matter in a general sense, would seem to be Universals: yet they do not enter the division into genera, species, &c. The Universal must be properly a predicate; what will its subject be? Of what use is a Universal man, who can do nothing? Is the Universal of anofher nature than its singular? Can any member of the five Universals be counted, and thus possess individuality ? 1. Capitulum &c. deest MS. 20. igr MS. 2. Blank space for initial S. 13. Eorum. Understand: "est genus, species &c.", and so likewise for the ends of the next three sentences.
CAPITULUM OCTAVUM. 2123 Supposita autem illa descripcione universalis quod universale est quod aptum natum est esse unum in multis et de multis" tanquam bona et adequata, difficile videtur quomodo universale solum dividitur in hec quinque, scilicet, genus, species, differenciam, proprium, et accidens. Videtur enim quod deus sic sit universale; videtur eciam quod ens transcendens sic sit universale, et neutrum horum est genus, species etc. Videtur eciam 10 quod instans commune ad hoc et hoc instans etc. sit universale. Et tamen nec sic est genus nec species etc. Sic racionalitas communis respectu huius et huius racionalitatis videtur universale; et nullum eorum. Sic et risibilitas respectu huius et istius risibilitatis videtur 15 universale; et nullum dictorum. Sic eciam materia respectu huius et illius materie videtur universale; et nullum horum. Sic eciam substancia, dicta secundum analogiam de composita forma et materia, videtur universale; et nullum istorum. Item, cum universale sit 20 proprie predicatum, quid igitur videtur primo et proprie subiectum respectu universalis? Item, ad quid valet universalitas methaphysica in rebus, ut ad quid valet communis humanitas, si non potest currere laborare feliciter vivere, etc. Et videtur quod singularis homo 25 sit melior et dignior humanitate tali communi. Item, si natura universalis superior sit alia natura quam natura inferior? Item, si illa quinque universalia a parte rei, genus, species etc. ponunt in numerum. Item, si sit dare singularitatem communem, et universalitatem vel 3o communitatem penitus incommunicabilem multis. Item, si species humana est risibilis, et equina humibilis, Difficulties: According to the definition, God, Being, the shortest period of possible duration, rationality. risibility and matter in a general sense, would seem to be Universals: yet they do not enter the division into genera, species, &c. The Universal must be properly a predicate; what will its subject be? Of what use is a Universal man, who can do nothing? Is the Universal of anofher nature than its singular? Can any member of the five Universals be counted, and thus possess individuality ? 1. Capitulum &c. deest MS. 20. igr MS. 2. Blank space for initial S. 13. Eorum. Understand: "est genus, species &c.", and so likewise for the ends of the next three sentences.
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44 I, 'Mankiud' capable of laughing ? How does Universal Substance belong to ils class? Are there three divisions of Universals? How can the same Universal thing bc an ass and a man? Do essential generic perfections belong to the species and the individuals? If we take the usual definition, these consider the Universal as a form which exists in many beings, and consists of many. From this definition we may easily infer our proposition. We take the Individual Substance as the proper subject of the Universal, which may inhere in it either essentially or not. It the first, the Universal either comprises the forme JOHANNIS WYCLIF, CAP. VIII. asinina rudibilis. Item, si substancia dividitur in com- munem ef singularem, utrum communis aut singularis. Item, si sit universale quoddam actuale, potenciale, et intellectuale, et aliquod potenciale tantum et intel- lectuale, et aliquod solum intellectuale. Item: si genus animalis est asinus, igitur est non homo; et per con- sequens genus animalis non est homo, Item, si essen- cialis perfeccio generis sit essencialis perfeccio sue speciei. Item, si perfeccio essencialis speciei sit perfeccio essencialis sui individui, Ista et alia materiam universalium circumstancia sunt satis difficilia, accepta illa definicione universalis, quod "universale est quod aptum natum est esse unum in multis et de multis", Intelligenda videtur sic: quod universale sit res quod apta est esse unum per modum 1 in multis divisim, et de multis materialiter subiective; ita quod universale in sua unitate aptum sit inexistenter performare | multa divisim, et econtra materiari subiective ab eisdem. Sicud enim materia et forma reciproce se causant, ita ex hac et superius [dictis] argutis supponitur esse formas communes que in unitate sua inexistenter performant multa divisim, et econtra materiantur subiective ab eisdem, ut equinitas communis in unitate sua performat inexistenter multos et ab eisdem causatur materialiter subiective, quamvis 25 nullo equorum singularium causetur per se materialiter subiective. Tunc iuxta hoc potest dici quod omne universale, quod sic actu vel aptitudine est unum in multis et de multis, est genus, species, differencia, proprium et 3o accidens. Nam, cum solum individuum predicamenti substancie sit proprie, principaliter, et maxime subiectum (non potenciale sed actuale respectu universalis, sicut predicatum est in multis et de multis existentibus); respectu ergo prime substancie potissime distincte huius- 35 modi universalis debet accipi. In prima ergo substancia potest esse universale duobus modis: aut ut substanciale sibi, aut non ut substanciale sibi. Si primo modo potest esse tripliciter. Nam substancia dicitur 35"5 modis, aut quia per se stat (sicut compositum), aut quia substat 4o (sicut materia) aut quia superstat (sicut forma). Sic 5 IO 4. potencionale MS. 21. dictis deest MS. 23. materiari MS.
44 I, 'Mankiud' capable of laughing ? How does Universal Substance belong to ils class? Are there three divisions of Universals? How can the same Universal thing bc an ass and a man? Do essential generic perfections belong to the species and the individuals? If we take the usual definition, these consider the Universal as a form which exists in many beings, and consists of many. From this definition we may easily infer our proposition. We take the Individual Substance as the proper subject of the Universal, which may inhere in it either essentially or not. It the first, the Universal either comprises the forme JOHANNIS WYCLIF, CAP. VIII. asinina rudibilis. Item, si substancia dividitur in com- munem ef singularem, utrum communis aut singularis. Item, si sit universale quoddam actuale, potenciale, et intellectuale, et aliquod potenciale tantum et intel- lectuale, et aliquod solum intellectuale. Item: si genus animalis est asinus, igitur est non homo; et per con- sequens genus animalis non est homo, Item, si essen- cialis perfeccio generis sit essencialis perfeccio sue speciei. Item, si perfeccio essencialis speciei sit perfeccio essencialis sui individui, Ista et alia materiam universalium circumstancia sunt satis difficilia, accepta illa definicione universalis, quod "universale est quod aptum natum est esse unum in multis et de multis", Intelligenda videtur sic: quod universale sit res quod apta est esse unum per modum 1 in multis divisim, et de multis materialiter subiective; ita quod universale in sua unitate aptum sit inexistenter performare | multa divisim, et econtra materiari subiective ab eisdem. Sicud enim materia et forma reciproce se causant, ita ex hac et superius [dictis] argutis supponitur esse formas communes que in unitate sua inexistenter performant multa divisim, et econtra materiantur subiective ab eisdem, ut equinitas communis in unitate sua performat inexistenter multos et ab eisdem causatur materialiter subiective, quamvis 25 nullo equorum singularium causetur per se materialiter subiective. Tunc iuxta hoc potest dici quod omne universale, quod sic actu vel aptitudine est unum in multis et de multis, est genus, species, differencia, proprium et 3o accidens. Nam, cum solum individuum predicamenti substancie sit proprie, principaliter, et maxime subiectum (non potenciale sed actuale respectu universalis, sicut predicatum est in multis et de multis existentibus); respectu ergo prime substancie potissime distincte huius- 35 modi universalis debet accipi. In prima ergo substancia potest esse universale duobus modis: aut ut substanciale sibi, aut non ut substanciale sibi. Si primo modo potest esse tripliciter. Nam substancia dicitur 35"5 modis, aut quia per se stat (sicut compositum), aut quia substat 4o (sicut materia) aut quia superstat (sicut forma). Sic 5 IO 4. potencionale MS. 21. dictis deest MS. 23. materiari MS.
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CAP. VIII. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 45 213. universale substanciale in prima substancia aut est in whole essence of the ea universale substanciale sicud per se stans respectu individual, and is a species; alterius universalis substancialis (et sic est species); aut or it underlies another est sicud substans respectu alterius universalis in ipsa Universal in substancia prima (et sic est et vocatur genus); aut est the given individual sicud superstans in prima substancia respectu alterius (genus); or it universalis substancialis (et sic est et dicitur differencia). determines another Si autem est universale in prima substancia non sibi (difference). If it is not substanciale, hoc est duobus modis: quia oportet quod essential, either 10 tale insit sibi post et secundum completum esse essen- it supervenes to the abstract ciale commune, vel post et secundum completum esse essence and is a property; or essenciale vel individuale. Et alii dicunt sub aliis verbis, to the concrete videlicet: aut inest 2m principia speciei aut 2m principia individual, and is an accident. individui, sicud dicitur X° metaphysice. Si primum, sic 15 est proprie proprium; si secundum, sic est accidens. Et quemadmodum in prima substancia primo et potissime solum quintuplicia universalia distingwi habent, et cum deitas non sit genus, nec species, nec differencia, nec proprium, neque accidens per formalem inexisten- 20 ciam (quia ipsa non potest unum in multis et de multis dici) non potest esse [universale] quia non potest esse de aliquibus materialiter subiective, vel 2m alios, quia non potest] esse unum in multis diversis essencia- liter; vel eciam quia philosophi gentiles non crediderunt 25 quod Deus posset esse formaliter in pluribus suppo- sitis, cum tamen sit formaliter in talibus. De predicatis Entity again is not predicated transcendentalibus potest dici quod non sit unum in of all things in the sense given. multis et de multis, ita quod non sit de multis ad Nor is Bliss a generic or sensum expositum, quia non materialiter subiective est specific term, 3o ens transcendens de multis. Et eciam beatitudo formalis or any other of the five. Some communis, cum non sit genus neque species, nec say that the same entity differencia, nec proprium, nec accidens, non est uni- cannot be ín versale, quia non est sic de multis. Alii autem dicerent: all its subjects; but I think the quia non potest esse eadem entitas formaliter in reason is 35 omnibus rebus. Videtur tamen, sicud tactum est, quod because the Universal universale unum versans circa singularia, debet illa should be to respicere sic quod illa inexistenter performaret et its singulars as Form is to Matter. Now Deity is none of these, and therefore cannot be a Universal, according to our modified definition. 8. p'a MS. 21. universale deest MS. 24. phy MS. 35. In other terms, the Universal must determine all its singulars, and belong to them, in the same way. Now God is a Being ; but Entity belongs to Him in a different way from that affirmed of creatures.
CAP. VIII. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 45 213. universale substanciale in prima substancia aut est in whole essence of the ea universale substanciale sicud per se stans respectu individual, and is a species; alterius universalis substancialis (et sic est species); aut or it underlies another est sicud substans respectu alterius universalis in ipsa Universal in substancia prima (et sic est et vocatur genus); aut est the given individual sicud superstans in prima substancia respectu alterius (genus); or it universalis substancialis (et sic est et dicitur differencia). determines another Si autem est universale in prima substancia non sibi (difference). If it is not substanciale, hoc est duobus modis: quia oportet quod essential, either 10 tale insit sibi post et secundum completum esse essen- it supervenes to the abstract ciale commune, vel post et secundum completum esse essence and is a property; or essenciale vel individuale. Et alii dicunt sub aliis verbis, to the concrete videlicet: aut inest 2m principia speciei aut 2m principia individual, and is an accident. individui, sicud dicitur X° metaphysice. Si primum, sic 15 est proprie proprium; si secundum, sic est accidens. Et quemadmodum in prima substancia primo et potissime solum quintuplicia universalia distingwi habent, et cum deitas non sit genus, nec species, nec differencia, nec proprium, neque accidens per formalem inexisten- 20 ciam (quia ipsa non potest unum in multis et de multis dici) non potest esse [universale] quia non potest esse de aliquibus materialiter subiective, vel 2m alios, quia non potest] esse unum in multis diversis essencia- liter; vel eciam quia philosophi gentiles non crediderunt 25 quod Deus posset esse formaliter in pluribus suppo- sitis, cum tamen sit formaliter in talibus. De predicatis Entity again is not predicated transcendentalibus potest dici quod non sit unum in of all things in the sense given. multis et de multis, ita quod non sit de multis ad Nor is Bliss a generic or sensum expositum, quia non materialiter subiective est specific term, 3o ens transcendens de multis. Et eciam beatitudo formalis or any other of the five. Some communis, cum non sit genus neque species, nec say that the same entity differencia, nec proprium, nec accidens, non est uni- cannot be ín versale, quia non est sic de multis. Alii autem dicerent: all its subjects; but I think the quia non potest esse eadem entitas formaliter in reason is 35 omnibus rebus. Videtur tamen, sicud tactum est, quod because the Universal universale unum versans circa singularia, debet illa should be to respicere sic quod illa inexistenter performaret et its singulars as Form is to Matter. Now Deity is none of these, and therefore cannot be a Universal, according to our modified definition. 8. p'a MS. 21. universale deest MS. 24. phy MS. 35. In other terms, the Universal must determine all its singulars, and belong to them, in the same way. Now God is a Being ; but Entity belongs to Him in a different way from that affirmed of creatures.
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46 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. VIII. econtra, quia ab eis materietur subiective. Et talem debent habere ad invicem colliganciam universale et singulare. Et debet universale inesse singulari suo ut quoddam in ipso formale et substanciale principium. Et hoc vel ut per se stans, comparative ad aliud uni- versale substanciale, vel ut substans, vel ut superstans, vel universale debet inesse singulari ut quoddam formale in ipso principiatum post et secundum esse completum commune essenciale vel post et secundum esse com- pletum essenciale singulare. Item, universale debet esse unum in multis et de multis, ut actus formalis limitatus; quia materiatus subiective et limitans et determinans, separans et distingwens. Propter quod deus et ens transcendens non possunt esse universalia sic in multis et de multis; nec 15 beatitudo formalis communis pluribus in propria; propter hoc quod res vere potissimas, scilicet substancias intel- ligibiles creatas, ipsas totaliter et formaliter deificando et transformando in deum, nimis transcendit et nimis vehementer ad primum purum actum, qui limitibus 20 predicamentorum subesse non potest, accedit. Eciam materia prima, communis multis particularibus, non est sic universale; quia non inest particularibus materiis Again, as God, a pure act, is ut actus formalis, sed ut materia; nec videtur con- beyond the limits of the venienter dictum quod ista materia formaliter est 25 predicaments, so is also materia, sed quod ipsa materialiter est materia; et ita matter, as pure de aliis. Materia ergo prima, quia est pura passiva potentiality; and therefore potencia, non potest per se cadere in limitibus predi- it is in no wise form, camentorum, sed est inhabilis per se ad illos limites determines nothing, and is sicut econtra purus actus (puta deus) ] nimis auffugit not a Universal. propter sui activitatem infinitam limites predicamentorum. The unit, the Et quia unitas que est principium numeri, punctus, point, the instant, which et instans, nimium accedunt ad materiam primam, cum are that of sint solum esse materialia, numeri, linee, et temporis, which number, time, and space quamvis illa sint universalia minus proprie accidentes, 35 consist, are like primal matter, sic quod quodlibet illorum sit quodammodo universale and for the accidens; ut unitas substancie unius, punctus substancie Besides, if the Universal is a Form, it limits ; and both God and Entity are unlimited: and heavenly bliss, transforming and deifying intellectual creatures, is too near the Godhead to be called a Universal. 10 213b 17. potissimas quite plain MS. 30. puros M.S. 35. accidntis MS. 32. Punctus et instans. A short explanation may be useful here. Every point is the beginning of one line and the end of another; likewise, every instant begins one period, of time and ends another. They are thus in a sense funum in multis'.
46 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. VIII. econtra, quia ab eis materietur subiective. Et talem debent habere ad invicem colliganciam universale et singulare. Et debet universale inesse singulari suo ut quoddam in ipso formale et substanciale principium. Et hoc vel ut per se stans, comparative ad aliud uni- versale substanciale, vel ut substans, vel ut superstans, vel universale debet inesse singulari ut quoddam formale in ipso principiatum post et secundum esse completum commune essenciale vel post et secundum esse com- pletum essenciale singulare. Item, universale debet esse unum in multis et de multis, ut actus formalis limitatus; quia materiatus subiective et limitans et determinans, separans et distingwens. Propter quod deus et ens transcendens non possunt esse universalia sic in multis et de multis; nec 15 beatitudo formalis communis pluribus in propria; propter hoc quod res vere potissimas, scilicet substancias intel- ligibiles creatas, ipsas totaliter et formaliter deificando et transformando in deum, nimis transcendit et nimis vehementer ad primum purum actum, qui limitibus 20 predicamentorum subesse non potest, accedit. Eciam materia prima, communis multis particularibus, non est sic universale; quia non inest particularibus materiis Again, as God, a pure act, is ut actus formalis, sed ut materia; nec videtur con- beyond the limits of the venienter dictum quod ista materia formaliter est 25 predicaments, so is also materia, sed quod ipsa materialiter est materia; et ita matter, as pure de aliis. Materia ergo prima, quia est pura passiva potentiality; and therefore potencia, non potest per se cadere in limitibus predi- it is in no wise form, camentorum, sed est inhabilis per se ad illos limites determines nothing, and is sicut econtra purus actus (puta deus) ] nimis auffugit not a Universal. propter sui activitatem infinitam limites predicamentorum. The unit, the Et quia unitas que est principium numeri, punctus, point, the instant, which et instans, nimium accedunt ad materiam primam, cum are that of sint solum esse materialia, numeri, linee, et temporis, which number, time, and space quamvis illa sint universalia minus proprie accidentes, 35 consist, are like primal matter, sic quod quodlibet illorum sit quodammodo universale and for the accidens; ut unitas substancie unius, punctus substancie Besides, if the Universal is a Form, it limits ; and both God and Entity are unlimited: and heavenly bliss, transforming and deifying intellectual creatures, is too near the Godhead to be called a Universal. 10 213b 17. potissimas quite plain MS. 30. puros M.S. 35. accidntis MS. 32. Punctus et instans. A short explanation may be useful here. Every point is the beginning of one line and the end of another; likewise, every instant begins one period, of time and ends another. They are thus in a sense funum in multis'.
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CAP. VIII. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 47 punctalis, instans corporei; respectu tamen illorum est same reason, excluded from genus, vel species, vel differencia. Nam instans individuum the Universals. non est res alicuius predicamenti, cum nullum instans sit quiditative substancia, vel quantitas, vel relacio. Nec 5 proprie hoc instans formaliter, sed pocius materialiter, est instans: contingit enim materiale per modum materie vel materialis multiplicari particularia, sicud formare per modum forme. Vel forte potest dici quod univer- sale debet esse in aliquo individuo forma, et per modum 10 forme, ut sit universale. Et sic, licet instans commune esset in instanti individuo per modum forme, non est tamen ipso forma. Et [sic] de materia communi respectu particularis. Nam licet genus habeat se per modum substantis in individuo respectu differencie, et differencia 15 per modum superstantis, et species per modum in se stantis; non tamen in individuo genus proprie est substans, nec differencia superstans, nec species per se stans. Sic instans commune habet se per modum forme in instanti particulari; non tamen in eo est forma 20 proprie, cum in instanti in individuo materialiter princi- pietur tempus, licet instans sit forma in isto mundo corporeo accidentalis. Ubi ergo proprie debet esse forma in eo cuius est universale et per modum forme, debet esse eciam in illo qualiter non est demonstranti communi 25 respectu singularis. Nam cum instans commune in particularibus instantibus secundum se materialiter principiet tempus, non est in eis proprie forma et per modum forme. De racionalitate communi posset forte dici uno modo. 30 Dato quod sit eciam racionalitas singularis non solum quo ad subiectum sicud singulare quo ad subiectum est me esse racionale, sed eciam sic singularis quo ad materiam vel condicionem forme; tunc, inquam, forte dici potest quod racionalitas singularis non proprie 35 materialiter subiectatet racionalitatem communem, nec proprie potest esse subiectum quemadmodum materians communem racionalitatem, sed esset pure forma] et haberet se solum in racione forme; igitur racionalitas communis non est universale ad singularem racionali- 40 tatem. Vel potest dici forte quod non est singularis The difliculty as to singular rationality may be solved by saving that it is a pure form, and by no means the matter of universal rationality; Thev may be like forms as regards their singulars, but thev are not forms. 214 20. principiet MS. 24. enim 7. mir MS. 12. sic deest MS. 31. ad subiectum' MS. pro eciam MS. 30. dato eciam MS. 35. subiective MS.
CAP. VIII. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 47 punctalis, instans corporei; respectu tamen illorum est same reason, excluded from genus, vel species, vel differencia. Nam instans individuum the Universals. non est res alicuius predicamenti, cum nullum instans sit quiditative substancia, vel quantitas, vel relacio. Nec 5 proprie hoc instans formaliter, sed pocius materialiter, est instans: contingit enim materiale per modum materie vel materialis multiplicari particularia, sicud formare per modum forme. Vel forte potest dici quod univer- sale debet esse in aliquo individuo forma, et per modum 10 forme, ut sit universale. Et sic, licet instans commune esset in instanti individuo per modum forme, non est tamen ipso forma. Et [sic] de materia communi respectu particularis. Nam licet genus habeat se per modum substantis in individuo respectu differencie, et differencia 15 per modum superstantis, et species per modum in se stantis; non tamen in individuo genus proprie est substans, nec differencia superstans, nec species per se stans. Sic instans commune habet se per modum forme in instanti particulari; non tamen in eo est forma 20 proprie, cum in instanti in individuo materialiter princi- pietur tempus, licet instans sit forma in isto mundo corporeo accidentalis. Ubi ergo proprie debet esse forma in eo cuius est universale et per modum forme, debet esse eciam in illo qualiter non est demonstranti communi 25 respectu singularis. Nam cum instans commune in particularibus instantibus secundum se materialiter principiet tempus, non est in eis proprie forma et per modum forme. De racionalitate communi posset forte dici uno modo. 30 Dato quod sit eciam racionalitas singularis non solum quo ad subiectum sicud singulare quo ad subiectum est me esse racionale, sed eciam sic singularis quo ad materiam vel condicionem forme; tunc, inquam, forte dici potest quod racionalitas singularis non proprie 35 materialiter subiectatet racionalitatem communem, nec proprie potest esse subiectum quemadmodum materians communem racionalitatem, sed esset pure forma] et haberet se solum in racione forme; igitur racionalitas communis non est universale ad singularem racionali- 40 tatem. Vel potest dici forte quod non est singularis The difliculty as to singular rationality may be solved by saving that it is a pure form, and by no means the matter of universal rationality; Thev may be like forms as regards their singulars, but thev are not forms. 214 20. principiet MS. 24. enim 7. mir MS. 12. sic deest MS. 31. ad subiectum' MS. pro eciam MS. 30. dato eciam MS. 35. subiective MS.
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48 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. VIII. or that there is racionalitas quo ad materiam forme, sed solum communis no snch thing as singular, but specifica; quamvis esset bene singularis quo ad subiectum. only universal Et causa esset, quia tunc species specialissima, huma- specific nitas, contraheretur per racionalitatem singularem ad rationality, which at the individuum humanum, sicud genus animalis contrahitur 5 same time is singular as per racionalitatem ad humanam speciem. Et sic ex concerns its specie humana et racionalitate singulari fieret per se subject; unum suppositum, sicud ex genere et differencia speci- But this cannot fica fit species, et per consequens humanitas communis be; for then the essential esset pars quiditativa humanitatis singularis vel homines 10 definition of a singularis, sicud genus est pars quiditativa speciei; quod man would not stand for the non convenit; cum tunc diffinicio quiditativa speciei essence of any individual man. humane completa non indicaret totam quiditatem indi- vidui humani. Non ergo videtur quod racionalitas quo ad naturam illius forme singularis superaddatur speciei 15 per esse individui humani, sed quod solum communis racionalitas in sorte existat, vel alio individuo homine, et quod illa in se et secundum se et quo ad naturam sue forme sit communis, sed in Sor, quo ad illud subiectum, sit singularis, quia Sortem esse racionalem 20 sicut Sortem esse accidentatum est singulare quo ad subiectum; quia nulli alii subiecto a Sorte convenit quod ipsum sit Sor accidentatus; et per consequens nulli The individual alii tali convenit. Ipsum esse Sor accidentatum est essence has multum commune quo ad formam, quia est quantitas, 25 many accidents. qualitas, relacio, accio, passio, ubi, quando, posicio, et habere Sortis. Sic eciam humanitas specifica non videtur universale quo ad humanitatem singularem quo ad formam, sed est universale quo ad suppositum vel individuum humanum, quia non videtur primo aspectu 30 esse aliqua singularis humanitas quo ad formam distinctam formaliter ab individuo humano; sicut natura vel qui- ditas, distingwuntur formaliter a supposito, cum suppo- situm sit album formaliter vel calidum etc.: nuda autem It would follow quiditas rei non sic. Unde videtur quod nulla sit 35 that there is no humanitas singularis quo ad formam, cum talis forma- distinction between Nature liter esset individuum substanciale communis humani- and Person: an tatis: sicud albedo singularis est formaliter individuum absurd conclusion. communis albedinis. Consequens inconveniens, cum quiditas et natura, eciam natura divina, formaliter a 40 supposito distingwatur. Humanitas igitur secundum se, et quo ad formam substancie communis in supposito et quo ad illud, redditur singularis quo ad illud 214' subiectum. Eciam sit, gracia exempli Sortem esse hominem; It may be said that Universal Humanity is simply Universal as to the persons it contains. Humanity, universal in itself, is singular in each of its persons.
48 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. VIII. or that there is racionalitas quo ad materiam forme, sed solum communis no snch thing as singular, but specifica; quamvis esset bene singularis quo ad subiectum. only universal Et causa esset, quia tunc species specialissima, huma- specific nitas, contraheretur per racionalitatem singularem ad rationality, which at the individuum humanum, sicud genus animalis contrahitur 5 same time is singular as per racionalitatem ad humanam speciem. Et sic ex concerns its specie humana et racionalitate singulari fieret per se subject; unum suppositum, sicud ex genere et differencia speci- But this cannot fica fit species, et per consequens humanitas communis be; for then the essential esset pars quiditativa humanitatis singularis vel homines 10 definition of a singularis, sicud genus est pars quiditativa speciei; quod man would not stand for the non convenit; cum tunc diffinicio quiditativa speciei essence of any individual man. humane completa non indicaret totam quiditatem indi- vidui humani. Non ergo videtur quod racionalitas quo ad naturam illius forme singularis superaddatur speciei 15 per esse individui humani, sed quod solum communis racionalitas in sorte existat, vel alio individuo homine, et quod illa in se et secundum se et quo ad naturam sue forme sit communis, sed in Sor, quo ad illud subiectum, sit singularis, quia Sortem esse racionalem 20 sicut Sortem esse accidentatum est singulare quo ad subiectum; quia nulli alii subiecto a Sorte convenit quod ipsum sit Sor accidentatus; et per consequens nulli The individual alii tali convenit. Ipsum esse Sor accidentatum est essence has multum commune quo ad formam, quia est quantitas, 25 many accidents. qualitas, relacio, accio, passio, ubi, quando, posicio, et habere Sortis. Sic eciam humanitas specifica non videtur universale quo ad humanitatem singularem quo ad formam, sed est universale quo ad suppositum vel individuum humanum, quia non videtur primo aspectu 30 esse aliqua singularis humanitas quo ad formam distinctam formaliter ab individuo humano; sicut natura vel qui- ditas, distingwuntur formaliter a supposito, cum suppo- situm sit album formaliter vel calidum etc.: nuda autem It would follow quiditas rei non sic. Unde videtur quod nulla sit 35 that there is no humanitas singularis quo ad formam, cum talis forma- distinction between Nature liter esset individuum substanciale communis humani- and Person: an tatis: sicud albedo singularis est formaliter individuum absurd conclusion. communis albedinis. Consequens inconveniens, cum quiditas et natura, eciam natura divina, formaliter a 40 supposito distingwatur. Humanitas igitur secundum se, et quo ad formam substancie communis in supposito et quo ad illud, redditur singularis quo ad illud 214' subiectum. Eciam sit, gracia exempli Sortem esse hominem; It may be said that Universal Humanity is simply Universal as to the persons it contains. Humanity, universal in itself, is singular in each of its persons.
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CAP. VIII. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 49 et sic in se communis est multipliciter singularis quo ad subiecta multiplicia. Et sic videtur venerabilis Anshelmus in libello suo Anselm seems to hold the de incarnacione verbi sentire; quod filius dei assumpsit view that the Word assumed 5 humanitatem communem et non humanitatem quo ad Universal, not formam singularem. Nam, si qua talis est, ipsa est singular humanity ; for formaliter individuum formalitatis humanitatis. Et per it were blasphemous consequens assumpsisset individuum humanum, et sic to say He took the person of individuum suppositum; quod nephas est dicere. a man. 10 luxta ergo hec dicta videtur quod non sit humanitas There is no singular singularis quo ad formam, que forma esset individuum humanity which is the humanum, nec quod sit humanitas singularis quo ad individual, and formam, que formaliter distingweretur ab individuo yet which is distinct from humanitatis, et per consequens a supposito humano, the individual ; Universal 15 sicud nec singularis albedo quo ad formam distingwitur humanity is ab individuo albedinis; et per consequens non sit such, in so far as it is a form; singularis humanitas quo ad formam, sed quod huma- in its many nitas abstractive dicta solum sit communis quo ad subjects it is singular. formam, multipliciter singularis secundum subiecta 20 multiplicia. Est humanitas in me; est singularis quo ad subiectum in me, cum sit me esse hominem, sicud me esse qualem, cum sit me esse calidum, me esse humidum, me esse coloratum etc. est singulare quo ad subiectum, et quo ad formam, commune. Verumtamen contra istam sentenciam arguitur sic: quia tunc humanitas in suppositis humanis est alia et alia quoad suppositum, sicud deitas est penitus eadem quo ad formam in tribus suppositis divinis, que tamen esset alia et alia secundum aliud et aliud suppositum, 3o ut quod aliud esset suppositum primum patris esse deum, et aliud suppositum secundum, scilicet filium, esse deum, et aliud esset suppositum 3m, puta spiritum sanctum, esse deum, sicut assumitur de suppositis humanitas quo ad esse hominem. Quod si hoc esset 35 verum, tunc, sicud supposita divina non sunt plures dii propter deitatem penitus eandem quo ad formam in illis tribus suppositis divinis, sic supposita humana non essent plures homines (quod est inconveniens); cum nec differrent inter se intellectualiter essencialiter, 40 et sic esset unus et idem intellectus, et non alius et 215° alius in alio et alio homine. Et multa inconveniencia heretica sequerentur; ut si unus salvaretur, tunc et quilibet. Objection: you say that the Universal Man is each of its individuals; but since Deity is in the same way each of the Persons, yet there is but one God, just so there would be but one Man and many human persons. Which is absurd. 25 30. ptis MS. 36. tandem pro eandem MS. De Universalibus.
CAP. VIII. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 49 et sic in se communis est multipliciter singularis quo ad subiecta multiplicia. Et sic videtur venerabilis Anshelmus in libello suo Anselm seems to hold the de incarnacione verbi sentire; quod filius dei assumpsit view that the Word assumed 5 humanitatem communem et non humanitatem quo ad Universal, not formam singularem. Nam, si qua talis est, ipsa est singular humanity ; for formaliter individuum formalitatis humanitatis. Et per it were blasphemous consequens assumpsisset individuum humanum, et sic to say He took the person of individuum suppositum; quod nephas est dicere. a man. 10 luxta ergo hec dicta videtur quod non sit humanitas There is no singular singularis quo ad formam, que forma esset individuum humanity which is the humanum, nec quod sit humanitas singularis quo ad individual, and formam, que formaliter distingweretur ab individuo yet which is distinct from humanitatis, et per consequens a supposito humano, the individual ; Universal 15 sicud nec singularis albedo quo ad formam distingwitur humanity is ab individuo albedinis; et per consequens non sit such, in so far as it is a form; singularis humanitas quo ad formam, sed quod huma- in its many nitas abstractive dicta solum sit communis quo ad subjects it is singular. formam, multipliciter singularis secundum subiecta 20 multiplicia. Est humanitas in me; est singularis quo ad subiectum in me, cum sit me esse hominem, sicud me esse qualem, cum sit me esse calidum, me esse humidum, me esse coloratum etc. est singulare quo ad subiectum, et quo ad formam, commune. Verumtamen contra istam sentenciam arguitur sic: quia tunc humanitas in suppositis humanis est alia et alia quoad suppositum, sicud deitas est penitus eadem quo ad formam in tribus suppositis divinis, que tamen esset alia et alia secundum aliud et aliud suppositum, 3o ut quod aliud esset suppositum primum patris esse deum, et aliud suppositum secundum, scilicet filium, esse deum, et aliud esset suppositum 3m, puta spiritum sanctum, esse deum, sicut assumitur de suppositis humanitas quo ad esse hominem. Quod si hoc esset 35 verum, tunc, sicud supposita divina non sunt plures dii propter deitatem penitus eandem quo ad formam in illis tribus suppositis divinis, sic supposita humana non essent plures homines (quod est inconveniens); cum nec differrent inter se intellectualiter essencialiter, 40 et sic esset unus et idem intellectus, et non alius et 215° alius in alio et alio homine. Et multa inconveniencia heretica sequerentur; ut si unus salvaretur, tunc et quilibet. Objection: you say that the Universal Man is each of its individuals; but since Deity is in the same way each of the Persons, yet there is but one God, just so there would be but one Man and many human persons. Which is absurd. 25 30. ptis MS. 36. tandem pro eandem MS. De Universalibus.
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CAPITULUM NONUM. We say then Sic igitur videtur secundum veritatem theologicam that the humanity of et methaphysicam dicendum quod unusquisque homo every man is habet suam humanitatem, quo ad formam, singularem; singular in the nec illam oportet esse formaliter individuum humani- subjects it informs ; is the tatis, sed individuam vel singularem naturam individui individual nature of a. humani. Et quod obicitur de albedine singulari quo ad person, but is not that person. formam qua illa est individuum albedinis .... . Potest As to the tamen dici quod est distinccio formalis inter individuum difficulty which albedinis, et eius singularem naturam, sicud distinccio 10 supposes two est inter individuam substanciam et eius singularem sorts of whiteness, one naturam. Et tunc humanitas communis non habet universal, comprising all racionem informantis et materiati subiective respectu white things, the other humanitatis singularis quo ad formam, nec humanitas singular, belonging only talis singularis habet racionem materiantis subiective 15 to one, we may et informati respectu humanitatis communis. Ideo non deny it, admitting only sunt ad invicem universale et singulare. a formal Et sic eciam de risibilitate communi et singulari, et distinction between the de racionabilitate communi et singulari, si sunt in white individual and homine. Et videtur utique quod alia singularis humanitas 20 its individual whiteness ; habeat aliam racionalitatem singularem, et maxime and this can be aliam risibilitatem consequentem. Et sicut ex animalitate applied to all similar cases, generali et differencia specifica constituitur quiditative so that each species humana, sic (ut videtur) ex animalitate singulari individual man has his own et racionalitate singulari quiditative componitur humanitas 25 individual singularis. Si enim, ut videtur prima facie, singularis rationality &c. The parts of animalitas et singularis racionabilitas non sunt partes the individual essence make quiditative humanitatis singularis, quomodo communes up the whole erunt partes quiditative communiter humanitatis? Nec individual. Yet there can oportet propter hoc esse individui diffinicionem quidi- be no knowledge of tativam facientem scienciam habitualem, cum singulare such essences as individuals. non fixe maneat de quo haberetur firma et certa sciencia 30 1. Capitulum &c. deest. 2. Blank space for initial S MS. 8. After albedinis, no gap MS. 10—12. sicud—naturam twice MS. 30. individuum MS. 22. 9nte MS.
CAPITULUM NONUM. We say then Sic igitur videtur secundum veritatem theologicam that the humanity of et methaphysicam dicendum quod unusquisque homo every man is habet suam humanitatem, quo ad formam, singularem; singular in the nec illam oportet esse formaliter individuum humani- subjects it informs ; is the tatis, sed individuam vel singularem naturam individui individual nature of a. humani. Et quod obicitur de albedine singulari quo ad person, but is not that person. formam qua illa est individuum albedinis .... . Potest As to the tamen dici quod est distinccio formalis inter individuum difficulty which albedinis, et eius singularem naturam, sicud distinccio 10 supposes two est inter individuam substanciam et eius singularem sorts of whiteness, one naturam. Et tunc humanitas communis non habet universal, comprising all racionem informantis et materiati subiective respectu white things, the other humanitatis singularis quo ad formam, nec humanitas singular, belonging only talis singularis habet racionem materiantis subiective 15 to one, we may et informati respectu humanitatis communis. Ideo non deny it, admitting only sunt ad invicem universale et singulare. a formal Et sic eciam de risibilitate communi et singulari, et distinction between the de racionabilitate communi et singulari, si sunt in white individual and homine. Et videtur utique quod alia singularis humanitas 20 its individual whiteness ; habeat aliam racionalitatem singularem, et maxime and this can be aliam risibilitatem consequentem. Et sicut ex animalitate applied to all similar cases, generali et differencia specifica constituitur quiditative so that each species humana, sic (ut videtur) ex animalitate singulari individual man has his own et racionalitate singulari quiditative componitur humanitas 25 individual singularis. Si enim, ut videtur prima facie, singularis rationality &c. The parts of animalitas et singularis racionabilitas non sunt partes the individual essence make quiditative humanitatis singularis, quomodo communes up the whole erunt partes quiditative communiter humanitatis? Nec individual. Yet there can oportet propter hoc esse individui diffinicionem quidi- be no knowledge of tativam facientem scienciam habitualem, cum singulare such essences as individuals. non fixe maneat de quo haberetur firma et certa sciencia 30 1. Capitulum &c. deest. 2. Blank space for initial S MS. 8. After albedinis, no gap MS. 10—12. sicud—naturam twice MS. 30. individuum MS. 22. 9nte MS.
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CAP. IX. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 51 215b habitualis, sed quando singularia corruptibilia sunt extra sensum nescitur si tunc existant an non. Et oportet sic dici ulterius quod, sicut substancia dividitur in primam et secundam substanciam, et prima 5 substancia formaliter est substancia sed non formaliter est substancia 2a vel communis, sic humanitas dividitur in communem et singularem. Et similiter animalitas, racionalitas, risibilitas; et singularis racionalitas forma- liter est racionalitas, sed non est formaliter racionalitas communis; et ita de aliis. Si tamen posset salvari quod supposita humana secundum seipsa et non 2m humanitates differant a se essencialiter, tunc supposita humana essent plures homines, et tamen non solum una humanitas quo ad 15 formam esset, et non essent plures humanitates forma- liter singulares. Verumtamen, quia unus homo habet aliud corpus numerale quam alius, et aliam animam quam alius (iuxta illud psalmi de anima: Qui finxit sigilatim corda eorum) homines habent alias et alias 20 humanitates quo ad formam, et nedum quo ad subiectum singulares. Cum enim anima intellectiva in Sorte sit eius singulare principium substanciale et formale vivendi intellectualiter [et] sensualiter, igitur unus homo habet aliud principium formale substanciale singulare quam 25 alius; et per consequens aliam quiditatem singularem, et sic humanitatem. Et oppositum antecedentis est hereticum. Et cum natura corporea sensitiva, in Sorte, gracia exempli, sit sicud sensualitas, et anima intellectiva sicud racionalitas; igitur Sortis singularis humanitas 30 habet in se singularem animalitatem et singularem racionalitatem; nec racionalitas singularis in individuo addit aliquam perfeccionem essencialem ultra racionali- tatem communem, sicut racionalitas communis addit super animalitatem communem; nec singularis animalitas 35 addit ultra communem animalitatem, sicud nec pars singularis integralis, cum non sit ultra suum totum quantitative, non addit ultra suum totum quantita- tive; racionalitas autem singularis non est pars subiectiva racionalitatis communis proprie, licet racionalitas forma- 40 liter dicatur de racionalitate singulariter, sic dicendo: Racionalitas ista est racionalitas; sed est pars eius talis Individual substance is such formally, but is not formally universal; therefore there are two different sorts of humanity, &c. If we could suppose that the persons A, B, C, differ independently of their humanities, we might admit one for them all; but this is against Scripture, and would land us in a heretical conclusion. These attributes, when singular, do not add anything to the perfection of the whole, as they do when Universal. 18, 19. Ps. XXXII, 15. 23. et deest MS. 37. quat MS. 38. qua* MS.
CAP. IX. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 51 215b habitualis, sed quando singularia corruptibilia sunt extra sensum nescitur si tunc existant an non. Et oportet sic dici ulterius quod, sicut substancia dividitur in primam et secundam substanciam, et prima 5 substancia formaliter est substancia sed non formaliter est substancia 2a vel communis, sic humanitas dividitur in communem et singularem. Et similiter animalitas, racionalitas, risibilitas; et singularis racionalitas forma- liter est racionalitas, sed non est formaliter racionalitas communis; et ita de aliis. Si tamen posset salvari quod supposita humana secundum seipsa et non 2m humanitates differant a se essencialiter, tunc supposita humana essent plures homines, et tamen non solum una humanitas quo ad 15 formam esset, et non essent plures humanitates forma- liter singulares. Verumtamen, quia unus homo habet aliud corpus numerale quam alius, et aliam animam quam alius (iuxta illud psalmi de anima: Qui finxit sigilatim corda eorum) homines habent alias et alias 20 humanitates quo ad formam, et nedum quo ad subiectum singulares. Cum enim anima intellectiva in Sorte sit eius singulare principium substanciale et formale vivendi intellectualiter [et] sensualiter, igitur unus homo habet aliud principium formale substanciale singulare quam 25 alius; et per consequens aliam quiditatem singularem, et sic humanitatem. Et oppositum antecedentis est hereticum. Et cum natura corporea sensitiva, in Sorte, gracia exempli, sit sicud sensualitas, et anima intellectiva sicud racionalitas; igitur Sortis singularis humanitas 30 habet in se singularem animalitatem et singularem racionalitatem; nec racionalitas singularis in individuo addit aliquam perfeccionem essencialem ultra racionali- tatem communem, sicut racionalitas communis addit super animalitatem communem; nec singularis animalitas 35 addit ultra communem animalitatem, sicud nec pars singularis integralis, cum non sit ultra suum totum quantitative, non addit ultra suum totum quantita- tive; racionalitas autem singularis non est pars subiectiva racionalitatis communis proprie, licet racionalitas forma- 40 liter dicatur de racionalitate singulariter, sic dicendo: Racionalitas ista est racionalitas; sed est pars eius talis Individual substance is such formally, but is not formally universal; therefore there are two different sorts of humanity, &c. If we could suppose that the persons A, B, C, differ independently of their humanities, we might admit one for them all; but this is against Scripture, and would land us in a heretical conclusion. These attributes, when singular, do not add anything to the perfection of the whole, as they do when Universal. 18, 19. Ps. XXXII, 15. 23. et deest MS. 37. quat MS. 38. qua* MS.
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52 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. IX. Every compound being is thus matter, form and compound ; whilst these differ from one another, they must yet have the same essence. A given man is identical with any of his attributes, but these are not identical with each other. 2m quam individuum racionale parcialiter subicitur communi racionalitati. Sic eciam de animalitate singu- lari respectu communis, et de humanitate singulari et risibilitate singulari respectu singularium quas indivi- duum participat in talibus singularibus, animalitate,5 racionalitate, et humanitate. Et licet homo sit sua animalitas [et] racionalitas, sicut et sua humanitas, cum in dictis secundum se est idem ipsum et ipsum esse, non tamen aliqua illarum naturarum est reliqua, ut videtur puta false; sicut in 10 essencia singulariter corporea tres nature multum 216" dispares, scilicet: materia, forma, altera pars compositi, et totalis essencialis natura compositi, quarum prima inperfectissima inter eas est, 2a perfeccior, et 3a per- fectissima, omnes sunt tamen eadem essencia singularis 15 corporea. Nam cum quelibet earum sit essencia aliqua, sicud et est realis et essencialis entitas, non alia essencia erit materia, alia forma. Cum enim forma (sicud, gracia exempli, igneitas) sit essencia corporea esse ignem actualiter, si essencia illius forme que, sicud est illa 20 Matter forma, ita est esse ignem; si, inquam, illa essencia esset indicates a given thing, alia ab essencia materie, cum illi essencie ipsius forme inchoatively conveniat esse ignem corporaliter et actualiter, tunc (illa such; form is the same essencia circumscripta) eciam materia esset ignis corpora- nature, terminatively liter. Quod est impossibile. Cum igitur prima illarum 25 such; and the naturarum sit materia, sit essenciam corpoream esse idea of the compound iniciative ignem, et secunda, scilicet forma, altera pars embraces both ; but in all three compositi, sit eandem essenciam corpoream esse termina- cases the tive ignem et 3a natura sit illam eandem essenciam esse subject is the same. complete et totaliter tam iniciative quam finitive esse 30 ignem; et quelibet illarum est aliqua essencia corporea: quelibet illorum erit una et eadem essencia corporea. Ille eciam res nature sic dispares sunt omnino, simul They are not only the same et divisim, idem suppositum corporeum, ut videtur. Nam essence, but one and the cum prima natura (scilicet, materia) sit suppositum 35 same individual thing, since the ignis, gracia exempli, est iniciative ignem; quod est essence is dictum 2m se de illo supposito ignis. Igitur secundum singular. auctorem ex 7mo methaphisice superius allegatum, ipsum suppositum ignis erit illa natura, et econtra, eciam 3. hua' MS. 38. aucte MS. 10. False. I confess I can make nothing of the abbreviation in the MS. Perhaps it should be facile. 4. ri" MS. 7. et deest MS. 10. fa. MS.
52 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. IX. Every compound being is thus matter, form and compound ; whilst these differ from one another, they must yet have the same essence. A given man is identical with any of his attributes, but these are not identical with each other. 2m quam individuum racionale parcialiter subicitur communi racionalitati. Sic eciam de animalitate singu- lari respectu communis, et de humanitate singulari et risibilitate singulari respectu singularium quas indivi- duum participat in talibus singularibus, animalitate,5 racionalitate, et humanitate. Et licet homo sit sua animalitas [et] racionalitas, sicut et sua humanitas, cum in dictis secundum se est idem ipsum et ipsum esse, non tamen aliqua illarum naturarum est reliqua, ut videtur puta false; sicut in 10 essencia singulariter corporea tres nature multum 216" dispares, scilicet: materia, forma, altera pars compositi, et totalis essencialis natura compositi, quarum prima inperfectissima inter eas est, 2a perfeccior, et 3a per- fectissima, omnes sunt tamen eadem essencia singularis 15 corporea. Nam cum quelibet earum sit essencia aliqua, sicud et est realis et essencialis entitas, non alia essencia erit materia, alia forma. Cum enim forma (sicud, gracia exempli, igneitas) sit essencia corporea esse ignem actualiter, si essencia illius forme que, sicud est illa 20 Matter forma, ita est esse ignem; si, inquam, illa essencia esset indicates a given thing, alia ab essencia materie, cum illi essencie ipsius forme inchoatively conveniat esse ignem corporaliter et actualiter, tunc (illa such; form is the same essencia circumscripta) eciam materia esset ignis corpora- nature, terminatively liter. Quod est impossibile. Cum igitur prima illarum 25 such; and the naturarum sit materia, sit essenciam corpoream esse idea of the compound iniciative ignem, et secunda, scilicet forma, altera pars embraces both ; but in all three compositi, sit eandem essenciam corpoream esse termina- cases the tive ignem et 3a natura sit illam eandem essenciam esse subject is the same. complete et totaliter tam iniciative quam finitive esse 30 ignem; et quelibet illarum est aliqua essencia corporea: quelibet illorum erit una et eadem essencia corporea. Ille eciam res nature sic dispares sunt omnino, simul They are not only the same et divisim, idem suppositum corporeum, ut videtur. Nam essence, but one and the cum prima natura (scilicet, materia) sit suppositum 35 same individual thing, since the ignis, gracia exempli, est iniciative ignem; quod est essence is dictum 2m se de illo supposito ignis. Igitur secundum singular. auctorem ex 7mo methaphisice superius allegatum, ipsum suppositum ignis erit illa natura, et econtra, eciam 3. hua' MS. 38. aucte MS. 10. False. I confess I can make nothing of the abbreviation in the MS. Perhaps it should be facile. 4. ri" MS. 7. et deest MS. 10. fa. MS.
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CAP. IX. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 53 216 cum quelibet talis singularis natura sit individua natura substancialis, et substancie sit esse individuum sub- stancie; igitur quecunque talis existens in individuante substancie, ipsa 2m hoc erit individuum substancie. 5 Et cum omne individuum substancie sit suppositum substanciale, igitur quelibet talis natura corporea [habens] super se individualitatem sive ydemptitatem supponibilem substancie, erit suppositum substancie. Et sic videtur quod spiritus racionalis sit ymago 10 trinitatis beate et increate, cum videatur esse 3es res collectim et divisim penitus eiusdem nature, scilicet, intellectualis. Suppositum autem corporeum irracionale, ut lapis, vel essencia corporea, videtur sic esse vestigium sancte trinitatis que est 3es nature dispares collectim et divisim, sicut deus est tres persone divisim et collectim; non autem est ymago dei, vel eciam ad ymaginem; quia non est 3es res collectim et divisim que essent penitus eiusdem nature, et penitus — nedum pares — sed eiusdem substancialis intellectualis perfeccionis, sicud 20 videtur esse in spiritu racionali creato. Sic in acci- dentibus quelibet completa res videtur vestigium trini- tatis sancte; quia videtur quod illa res sit natura sui generis, natura sue differencie, et natura sue speciei divisim et collectim; quartum nulla est reliqua. Sed 25 hec communiter evidencia . . . . quod gracia exempli in supposito humano animalitas sit una natura universalis, et racionalitas alia; et quod ille due simul constituunt quiditative terciam completam, scilicet humanitatem; et quare prima in supposito humano habet se ut univer- 3o sale substanciale substans, et quare racionalitas ut superstans, et quare humanitas ut per se stans. Videtur enim quod humanitas sit animalitas communis. Nam cum esse hominem sit formaliter esse animal, sicud est formaliter esse substanciam (et per consequens sub- 35 stanciam sensitivam et quidquid formaliter est), esse substanciam sensitivam est animalitas. Ymmo sufficit nobis, cum humanitas formaliter sit esse substanciam, ipsa erit substancialitas, et per idem substancialitas generalissima; tunc operi est animalis. Thus intelligent beings, made up of three things of the same nature, are images of the Trinity ; corporal beings have only a vestige of the Trinity, because all in them is not of the same nature. In all things there is genus, difference, and species; these, too, are vestiges of the Trinity. In man, animation is one thing, rationality a second, and both together make up a third, humanity; one of these underlying the other, the other determining the first. 7. habens deest: ib. ſr' ſe individuate ſme vdeptite 3. quiq MS. ſuppoils MS. 20. create MS. 25. after evidencia a gap filled up withMS. 29. qr' MS.
CAP. IX. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 53 216 cum quelibet talis singularis natura sit individua natura substancialis, et substancie sit esse individuum sub- stancie; igitur quecunque talis existens in individuante substancie, ipsa 2m hoc erit individuum substancie. 5 Et cum omne individuum substancie sit suppositum substanciale, igitur quelibet talis natura corporea [habens] super se individualitatem sive ydemptitatem supponibilem substancie, erit suppositum substancie. Et sic videtur quod spiritus racionalis sit ymago 10 trinitatis beate et increate, cum videatur esse 3es res collectim et divisim penitus eiusdem nature, scilicet, intellectualis. Suppositum autem corporeum irracionale, ut lapis, vel essencia corporea, videtur sic esse vestigium sancte trinitatis que est 3es nature dispares collectim et divisim, sicut deus est tres persone divisim et collectim; non autem est ymago dei, vel eciam ad ymaginem; quia non est 3es res collectim et divisim que essent penitus eiusdem nature, et penitus — nedum pares — sed eiusdem substancialis intellectualis perfeccionis, sicud 20 videtur esse in spiritu racionali creato. Sic in acci- dentibus quelibet completa res videtur vestigium trini- tatis sancte; quia videtur quod illa res sit natura sui generis, natura sue differencie, et natura sue speciei divisim et collectim; quartum nulla est reliqua. Sed 25 hec communiter evidencia . . . . quod gracia exempli in supposito humano animalitas sit una natura universalis, et racionalitas alia; et quod ille due simul constituunt quiditative terciam completam, scilicet humanitatem; et quare prima in supposito humano habet se ut univer- 3o sale substanciale substans, et quare racionalitas ut superstans, et quare humanitas ut per se stans. Videtur enim quod humanitas sit animalitas communis. Nam cum esse hominem sit formaliter esse animal, sicud est formaliter esse substanciam (et per consequens sub- 35 stanciam sensitivam et quidquid formaliter est), esse substanciam sensitivam est animalitas. Ymmo sufficit nobis, cum humanitas formaliter sit esse substanciam, ipsa erit substancialitas, et per idem substancialitas generalissima; tunc operi est animalis. Thus intelligent beings, made up of three things of the same nature, are images of the Trinity ; corporal beings have only a vestige of the Trinity, because all in them is not of the same nature. In all things there is genus, difference, and species; these, too, are vestiges of the Trinity. In man, animation is one thing, rationality a second, and both together make up a third, humanity; one of these underlying the other, the other determining the first. 7. habens deest: ib. ſr' ſe individuate ſme vdeptite 3. quiq MS. ſuppoils MS. 20. create MS. 25. after evidencia a gap filled up withMS. 29. qr' MS.
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54 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. IX. Sed posset hic dici, cum substancialitas, sicut et Discussion as to the relative animalitas, dividitur in substancialitatem communem et differences between individuam; et communis substancialitas in commu- animality, ationality and nissimam et minus communem, et animalitas in gene- humanity. ralem et specialem; quod, licet humanitas sit sub-5 stancialitas, sit eciam animalitas, non tamen ipsa est communissima substancialitas, sed specialis; nec generalis animalitas, sed specialis; ut oportet, si humanitas, cum sit entitas, est et entitas transcendens; quod sic ipsa, cum sit substancialis, sit substancialitas communissima, 10 cum substancialitas communissima in hoc sit limitata natura, et per consequens habens limitem quo secer- nitur a particulari vel minus communi substancialitate. Entitas autem transcendens non habet huiusmodi limitem, sed est omne ens et omnem entitatem esse ens. Sed 15 contra, cum omnis substancialitas sit substancialitas, est omnem substancialitatem esse substancialitatem; et que nisi communissima substancialitas, est quelibet sub- stancialitas, et econtra? Sed poterit hic dici quod substancialitas dicitur dupli-20 citer communis, scilicet per modum forme, scilicet, qua omnis substancia formaliter] est substancia. Et loquimur 217 hic, tollendo equivocacionem de sola substancia predica- mentali. Isto ergo modo substancialitas communis est genus generalissimum, et natura generalissima predica-25 menti substancie, et substancialitas isto modo communis non esset omnem substancialitatem esse substancialitatem, sicud nec substancialitas illo modo communis dividitur in secundam et primam substancialitatem, vel in sub- stancialitatem formaliter communem multis et incom-30 municabile multis formaliter. Alio modo substancialitas dicitur communis per modum materie, sicud suppo- situm est commune suis naturis non per modum forme, sed per modum materie; ut cum suppositum est natura corporea sua, singularis est, et sua natura intellectualis 35 singularis. Et sic substancialitas divisibilis per illas duas intenciones logicales, scilicet incommunicabilitatem forma- 16. substancialis (?) MS. 1. In this and the following paragraphs the writer plunges into a very crabbed discussion which I have not been able to follow sufficiently. The clue is probably in the position (first made by Duns Scotus) of ‘formal distinctions a natura rei'. But very few, even amongst Scholastics, are now acquainted with that theory.
54 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. IX. Sed posset hic dici, cum substancialitas, sicut et Discussion as to the relative animalitas, dividitur in substancialitatem communem et differences between individuam; et communis substancialitas in commu- animality, ationality and nissimam et minus communem, et animalitas in gene- humanity. ralem et specialem; quod, licet humanitas sit sub-5 stancialitas, sit eciam animalitas, non tamen ipsa est communissima substancialitas, sed specialis; nec generalis animalitas, sed specialis; ut oportet, si humanitas, cum sit entitas, est et entitas transcendens; quod sic ipsa, cum sit substancialis, sit substancialitas communissima, 10 cum substancialitas communissima in hoc sit limitata natura, et per consequens habens limitem quo secer- nitur a particulari vel minus communi substancialitate. Entitas autem transcendens non habet huiusmodi limitem, sed est omne ens et omnem entitatem esse ens. Sed 15 contra, cum omnis substancialitas sit substancialitas, est omnem substancialitatem esse substancialitatem; et que nisi communissima substancialitas, est quelibet sub- stancialitas, et econtra? Sed poterit hic dici quod substancialitas dicitur dupli-20 citer communis, scilicet per modum forme, scilicet, qua omnis substancia formaliter] est substancia. Et loquimur 217 hic, tollendo equivocacionem de sola substancia predica- mentali. Isto ergo modo substancialitas communis est genus generalissimum, et natura generalissima predica-25 menti substancie, et substancialitas isto modo communis non esset omnem substancialitatem esse substancialitatem, sicud nec substancialitas illo modo communis dividitur in secundam et primam substancialitatem, vel in sub- stancialitatem formaliter communem multis et incom-30 municabile multis formaliter. Alio modo substancialitas dicitur communis per modum materie, sicud suppo- situm est commune suis naturis non per modum forme, sed per modum materie; ut cum suppositum est natura corporea sua, singularis est, et sua natura intellectualis 35 singularis. Et sic substancialitas divisibilis per illas duas intenciones logicales, scilicet incommunicabilitatem forma- 16. substancialis (?) MS. 1. In this and the following paragraphs the writer plunges into a very crabbed discussion which I have not been able to follow sufficiently. The clue is probably in the position (first made by Duns Scotus) of ‘formal distinctions a natura rei'. But very few, even amongst Scholastics, are now acquainted with that theory.
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CAP. IX. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 55 217 liter pluribus substanciis, dicitur communis per modum materie, et est ut totum in modo. Sed substancialitas primo modo dicta, ut totum universale, et substancialitas communis 2° est omnem substancialitatem esse sub- 5 stancialitatem, sicut et dividitur in omnem tam com- munem quam singularem substancialitatem. Sic ergo videtur quod humanitas, etsi est animalitas, sicud est substancialitas, non tamen est animalitas generalis. Sed statim hic sequitur quod, si aliqua humanitas est 10 animalitas, tunc humanitas singularis est animalitas sua singularis. Et sic in supposito humano singularis humanitas non differt realiter ab animalitate singulari, que esset una sua pars quiditativa, et singularis raciona- litas alia pars, et non tota natura quiditativa vel tota 15 quiditas. Propter quod videtur verius dicendum est quod, sicut essencia est persona, et econtra (licet inter eas sit differencia formalis racionis, sive modalis) sic quiditas generalissima hominis est quiditas subalterna et est 20 quiditas specialissima, est quiditas individua et est qualitas essencialis hominis, licet quiditas generalissima sit amplior perfeccionaliter (et sic prior naturaliter) quam quiditas subalterna, specialissima, vel individua. Et sicut est differencia, non realis sed modalis, formalis, 25 seu racionis, quiditatis superioris a qualitate essenciali contrahente ipsam quiditatem superiorem, et a quidi- tate inferiori, sic eciam videtur non realis composicio generis ad differenciam, nec realis composicio speciei ex genere et differencia, sed composicio formalis, mo- 3o dalis, seu 2m racionem; licet illa composicio racionis sit vere et vera a parte rei composicio, circumscripto quocumque actu intellectus creati, sicut differencia racionis seu formalis essencie a supposito est vera et vere a parte rei differencia. Et illa differencia est 35 realis; et illa composicio est realis, licet non sit differencia realis, nec composicio illa sit composicio realis; sicut aliquis tyrannus est bonus, licet ipse non sit bonus tyrannus. Conclusion: that those differences, though not real but only modal, formal, or notional, are yet true a parte rei. 37. tyrandus (!) MS. 31. Vera a parte rei. This is just the most unintelligible point in Duns Scotus' Theory. How can the formal differences between animality and rationality be true a parte rei, if the two are not different things? Wyclif boldly makes them so: Duns Scotus hesitates.
CAP. IX. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 55 217 liter pluribus substanciis, dicitur communis per modum materie, et est ut totum in modo. Sed substancialitas primo modo dicta, ut totum universale, et substancialitas communis 2° est omnem substancialitatem esse sub- 5 stancialitatem, sicut et dividitur in omnem tam com- munem quam singularem substancialitatem. Sic ergo videtur quod humanitas, etsi est animalitas, sicud est substancialitas, non tamen est animalitas generalis. Sed statim hic sequitur quod, si aliqua humanitas est 10 animalitas, tunc humanitas singularis est animalitas sua singularis. Et sic in supposito humano singularis humanitas non differt realiter ab animalitate singulari, que esset una sua pars quiditativa, et singularis raciona- litas alia pars, et non tota natura quiditativa vel tota 15 quiditas. Propter quod videtur verius dicendum est quod, sicut essencia est persona, et econtra (licet inter eas sit differencia formalis racionis, sive modalis) sic quiditas generalissima hominis est quiditas subalterna et est 20 quiditas specialissima, est quiditas individua et est qualitas essencialis hominis, licet quiditas generalissima sit amplior perfeccionaliter (et sic prior naturaliter) quam quiditas subalterna, specialissima, vel individua. Et sicut est differencia, non realis sed modalis, formalis, 25 seu racionis, quiditatis superioris a qualitate essenciali contrahente ipsam quiditatem superiorem, et a quidi- tate inferiori, sic eciam videtur non realis composicio generis ad differenciam, nec realis composicio speciei ex genere et differencia, sed composicio formalis, mo- 3o dalis, seu 2m racionem; licet illa composicio racionis sit vere et vera a parte rei composicio, circumscripto quocumque actu intellectus creati, sicut differencia racionis seu formalis essencie a supposito est vera et vere a parte rei differencia. Et illa differencia est 35 realis; et illa composicio est realis, licet non sit differencia realis, nec composicio illa sit composicio realis; sicut aliquis tyrannus est bonus, licet ipse non sit bonus tyrannus. Conclusion: that those differences, though not real but only modal, formal, or notional, are yet true a parte rei. 37. tyrandus (!) MS. 31. Vera a parte rei. This is just the most unintelligible point in Duns Scotus' Theory. How can the formal differences between animality and rationality be true a parte rei, if the two are not different things? Wyclif boldly makes them so: Duns Scotus hesitates.
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56 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAD. IX. Thus God first — Et videtur ulterius quod deus constituat primo quidi- „produces te) tatem generalissimam, et postea quiditatem essencialem uc tenet. ning inmediatam, et illi qualitati essenciali communicat them in "ydemptitatem ipsius quiditatis generalissime. Et sic identity; redditur illa quiditas eadem cum quiditate generalissima, ut hec sit illa; non tamen formaliter sive secundum per se primum modum essendi, constituitque inter istam leaving them, et illam non differenciam realem (que dicet hanc esse different by an et illam, sed neutram esse reliquam) sed differenciam essential mode racionis que dicit hanc esse alicuius sui per se primi other words modi essendi et non illam; et econtra componit illas formally’. dnas mnaturas, non duas secundum rem, sicud nec differentes secundum rem, sed duas dualitate racionis sive modi per se primi essendi; componitque, dico, non composicione reali sed composicione secundum racionem sive secundum modum per se primum uniuscuiusque earum, sicud et distingwit eas non secundum rem distinccione sed distinccione formali. And of these Et. tunc ex illis duabus naturis dualitate racionis He makes the . . . TT species, lower COmponit speciem subalternam sive quiditative sub- universal, to alternam, _composicione vera, sed modali a parte rei; the lowest of postea illi quiditati eciam ydemptificat inmediatam ah ultimam differenciam essencialem; et distingwit, et componit sicud prius. Et sic usque ad speciem special- issimam inclusive, postea deus, cum causis aliis corre- quisitis quas ipse ordinat ad principiandum individuum hominem et eius individualitatem, que est eius perso- and to the nalitas et ydemptitas personalis, principlat sic homi- immediately nem et eius personalitatem humanam et inprimit ei contained — essencialiter ultimam quiditatem specificam cum omni under it; quiditate et qualitate essenciali precedente; inprimit- que sibi nichilominus quiditatem individuam sibi pro- priam | ut Sorti Sorteitatem etc., qua quiditas individua, ut videtur, non componitur ex aliqua quiditate singulari so that the €t qualitate essenciali similiter singulari, eo quod nulla iden pesson d reliqua habet excessum in communitate, sicud est is not made upin composicione speciei. Sed quilibet existens pure of any singularis non reddit aliquam composicionem quidita- partial . . . . . . . essences, onc. tivam, cum insit pure singularibus, non insit aliqua 5 20 25 30 218^ 35 prior to naturalis et essencialis prioritas et per consequens nec 40 another in any me Le, LES way. essencialis ordo composicionis quiditative. r. ofi*t MS, 27. individual above MS. 31. inprimunt MS. 33, quiditatem individuam MS. 38. r'ddnt' MS.
56 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAD. IX. Thus God first — Et videtur ulterius quod deus constituat primo quidi- „produces te) tatem generalissimam, et postea quiditatem essencialem uc tenet. ning inmediatam, et illi qualitati essenciali communicat them in "ydemptitatem ipsius quiditatis generalissime. Et sic identity; redditur illa quiditas eadem cum quiditate generalissima, ut hec sit illa; non tamen formaliter sive secundum per se primum modum essendi, constituitque inter istam leaving them, et illam non differenciam realem (que dicet hanc esse different by an et illam, sed neutram esse reliquam) sed differenciam essential mode racionis que dicit hanc esse alicuius sui per se primi other words modi essendi et non illam; et econtra componit illas formally’. dnas mnaturas, non duas secundum rem, sicud nec differentes secundum rem, sed duas dualitate racionis sive modi per se primi essendi; componitque, dico, non composicione reali sed composicione secundum racionem sive secundum modum per se primum uniuscuiusque earum, sicud et distingwit eas non secundum rem distinccione sed distinccione formali. And of these Et. tunc ex illis duabus naturis dualitate racionis He makes the . . . TT species, lower COmponit speciem subalternam sive quiditative sub- universal, to alternam, _composicione vera, sed modali a parte rei; the lowest of postea illi quiditati eciam ydemptificat inmediatam ah ultimam differenciam essencialem; et distingwit, et componit sicud prius. Et sic usque ad speciem special- issimam inclusive, postea deus, cum causis aliis corre- quisitis quas ipse ordinat ad principiandum individuum hominem et eius individualitatem, que est eius perso- and to the nalitas et ydemptitas personalis, principlat sic homi- immediately nem et eius personalitatem humanam et inprimit ei contained — essencialiter ultimam quiditatem specificam cum omni under it; quiditate et qualitate essenciali precedente; inprimit- que sibi nichilominus quiditatem individuam sibi pro- priam | ut Sorti Sorteitatem etc., qua quiditas individua, ut videtur, non componitur ex aliqua quiditate singulari so that the €t qualitate essenciali similiter singulari, eo quod nulla iden pesson d reliqua habet excessum in communitate, sicud est is not made upin composicione speciei. Sed quilibet existens pure of any singularis non reddit aliquam composicionem quidita- partial . . . . . . . essences, onc. tivam, cum insit pure singularibus, non insit aliqua 5 20 25 30 218^ 35 prior to naturalis et essencialis prioritas et per consequens nec 40 another in any me Le, LES way. essencialis ordo composicionis quiditative. r. ofi*t MS, 27. individual above MS. 31. inprimunt MS. 33, quiditatem individuam MS. 38. r'ddnt' MS.
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CAPITULUM DECIMUM. Quod autem sit quiditas proprie dicta in homine, vel asino, vel alia re, patet; quia alias in toto periret questio querens quid proprie res est: cum tamen et 5 sapientes et indocti ex instinctu naturali solent sic querere. Quod autem sit quiditas proprie dicta communis in re, patet, quia querendo quid est homo omnes famant quod sit substancia, quod sit animal etc. Et cum non unico homini individuo conveniat esse animal, sed sit 10 commune omni homini esse animal, patet quod sit quiditas communis in re, ymmo et quiditas magis communis et quiditas minus communis, si convenienter ad questionem “quid est homo?" querentem respondetur quod est substancia, respondetur eciam quod est animal. 15 Et cum quiditas rei sit eius essencialis bonitas, et quiditas rei communior est amplior quam minus com- munis; igitur et quiditas communior est amplior bonitas essencialis in re quam minus communis quiditas; et per consequens est natura essencialis perfeccior, que 20 est communior, et minus perfecta essencialiter, que minus communis est. Nec oportet in infinitum ascendere vel in infinitum descendere in ordine essenciali minus communis et magis communis quiditatis, cum tunc nulla esset prima 2é nec aliqua ultima, et per consequens omnes essent medie. Et sic ante omnes et post omnes simul esset, prior et posterior; quod contradiccionem implicat. Quod autem deus possit ydemptitatem quiditatis God can identify a less communioris essenciali ordine communicare quiditati general 3o minus communi, et sic eas inter se ydemptificare, Universal entity with one videtur uno modo a simili vel maiori patere; quia, that is more so, just as He secundum multos, spiritui racionali hominis in quo unites an primo (ut dicunt) personalitas reservatur, illi unitur inferior being, This essence must be common, not singular. What is man? An animal. This is true of every man, not only of one. Every creature must have its quiddity, i. e. that in it which answers to the question: What (quid) is this? There must be a first and a last amongst these, in order of universality. The more universal the essence, the more perfect it is. 1. Capitulum &c. deest. famat MS. 30. 9nis MS. 2. Blank space for initial Q MS. 7. oms 32. ſpui MS. 33. plitas MS.
CAPITULUM DECIMUM. Quod autem sit quiditas proprie dicta in homine, vel asino, vel alia re, patet; quia alias in toto periret questio querens quid proprie res est: cum tamen et 5 sapientes et indocti ex instinctu naturali solent sic querere. Quod autem sit quiditas proprie dicta communis in re, patet, quia querendo quid est homo omnes famant quod sit substancia, quod sit animal etc. Et cum non unico homini individuo conveniat esse animal, sed sit 10 commune omni homini esse animal, patet quod sit quiditas communis in re, ymmo et quiditas magis communis et quiditas minus communis, si convenienter ad questionem “quid est homo?" querentem respondetur quod est substancia, respondetur eciam quod est animal. 15 Et cum quiditas rei sit eius essencialis bonitas, et quiditas rei communior est amplior quam minus com- munis; igitur et quiditas communior est amplior bonitas essencialis in re quam minus communis quiditas; et per consequens est natura essencialis perfeccior, que 20 est communior, et minus perfecta essencialiter, que minus communis est. Nec oportet in infinitum ascendere vel in infinitum descendere in ordine essenciali minus communis et magis communis quiditatis, cum tunc nulla esset prima 2é nec aliqua ultima, et per consequens omnes essent medie. Et sic ante omnes et post omnes simul esset, prior et posterior; quod contradiccionem implicat. Quod autem deus possit ydemptitatem quiditatis God can identify a less communioris essenciali ordine communicare quiditati general 3o minus communi, et sic eas inter se ydemptificare, Universal entity with one videtur uno modo a simili vel maiori patere; quia, that is more so, just as He secundum multos, spiritui racionali hominis in quo unites an primo (ut dicunt) personalitas reservatur, illi unitur inferior being, This essence must be common, not singular. What is man? An animal. This is true of every man, not only of one. Every creature must have its quiddity, i. e. that in it which answers to the question: What (quid) is this? There must be a first and a last amongst these, in order of universality. The more universal the essence, the more perfect it is. 1. Capitulum &c. deest. famat MS. 30. 9nis MS. 2. Blank space for initial Q MS. 7. oms 32. ſpui MS. 33. plitas MS.
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58 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. X. probabiliter per deum corpus animatum sensitivum, ut idem suppositum sit spiritus racionalis et sic corpus 2185 animatum. Igitur hic, quiditates, quarum una est essencialis et intrinseca, alteri sic poterit adonare: ſergo] a maiori. Ymmo, cum quiditas superior sic 5 intrinseca essencialiter quiditati inferiori est, eius amplior essencialis bonitas quam sua propria bonitas est, que est formaliter ipsamet. Et per consequens est sic magis eius tota essencialis bonitas. Et per consequens quiditas minus communis est quiditas magis communis, et 10 econtra. Cum autem qualitas essencialis speciei sit intrinseca et essencialis quiditati inferiori, si illa non esset quiditas magis communis, et econtra, sed esset aliena ab illa, et tamen illa superior quiditas sit tota quiditas inferioris plus quam ipsamet sua sit quiditas 15 vel bonitas essencialis; illa qualitas esset aliena a tota quiditate et bonitate essenciali ipsius rei. Item, si qualitas illa essencialis non esset quiditas General and specific specifica quam constituit cum quiditate generali, sed quiddities are not separate esset eius pars realis vel essencialis, igitur esset dare 20 parts of the being, but the aliam partem essencialem vel realem, cum qua consti- whole tueret speciem. Sed, sicud argutum est, quiditas generalis modified, and therefore non est pars realis vel essencialis quiditatis specialis, no universal quality which sed eius ampla tota essencialis bonitas, quam ipsa is a separate specialis quiditas sit sua propria et adequata essencialis 25 part can be an essential, either bonitas. Igitur nec quiditas generalis vel qualitas essen- generic or specific. cialis est pars naturalis vel essencialis quiditatis specifice, vel specialis; sed quelibet illarum est eius pars modalis, sive secundum racionem. Et ipsa est totum 2m racionem respectu cuiuslibet illarum duarum. There are three Unde sicud triplex in re invenitur distinccio et differences distancia, maxima, media, et tenuissima vel minima; amongst things ; the maxima, essencialis et realis qualitas, est inter deum et greatest, which is real and creaturam puram, media que est realis et non essen- essential; the cialis, que est inter 3es personas divinas. Et 3a formaliter 35 less, which is real but not sive secundum racionem que est tenuissima et non essential, and the least, which realis, sicud est inter personam divinam et essenciam is merely dei. Et primam illarum eciam grossi percipiunt, nec ſormal. illam putant esse nisi in divinis. Secundam subtiles et medii philosophi percipiunt et theologi. Terciam autem 40 If the specific part of two essential properties were not more universal than the other, it could no longer be essential. 30 the body, to one superior, the soul, to make the compound, a Man. 4. potr't MS. 5. ergo deest MS. 1. plitS MS. 24. Quam is probably a mistake. I would substitute quoniam, which agrees with the sense, but for sit in the next line.
58 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. X. probabiliter per deum corpus animatum sensitivum, ut idem suppositum sit spiritus racionalis et sic corpus 2185 animatum. Igitur hic, quiditates, quarum una est essencialis et intrinseca, alteri sic poterit adonare: ſergo] a maiori. Ymmo, cum quiditas superior sic 5 intrinseca essencialiter quiditati inferiori est, eius amplior essencialis bonitas quam sua propria bonitas est, que est formaliter ipsamet. Et per consequens est sic magis eius tota essencialis bonitas. Et per consequens quiditas minus communis est quiditas magis communis, et 10 econtra. Cum autem qualitas essencialis speciei sit intrinseca et essencialis quiditati inferiori, si illa non esset quiditas magis communis, et econtra, sed esset aliena ab illa, et tamen illa superior quiditas sit tota quiditas inferioris plus quam ipsamet sua sit quiditas 15 vel bonitas essencialis; illa qualitas esset aliena a tota quiditate et bonitate essenciali ipsius rei. Item, si qualitas illa essencialis non esset quiditas General and specific specifica quam constituit cum quiditate generali, sed quiddities are not separate esset eius pars realis vel essencialis, igitur esset dare 20 parts of the being, but the aliam partem essencialem vel realem, cum qua consti- whole tueret speciem. Sed, sicud argutum est, quiditas generalis modified, and therefore non est pars realis vel essencialis quiditatis specialis, no universal quality which sed eius ampla tota essencialis bonitas, quam ipsa is a separate specialis quiditas sit sua propria et adequata essencialis 25 part can be an essential, either bonitas. Igitur nec quiditas generalis vel qualitas essen- generic or specific. cialis est pars naturalis vel essencialis quiditatis specifice, vel specialis; sed quelibet illarum est eius pars modalis, sive secundum racionem. Et ipsa est totum 2m racionem respectu cuiuslibet illarum duarum. There are three Unde sicud triplex in re invenitur distinccio et differences distancia, maxima, media, et tenuissima vel minima; amongst things ; the maxima, essencialis et realis qualitas, est inter deum et greatest, which is real and creaturam puram, media que est realis et non essen- essential; the cialis, que est inter 3es personas divinas. Et 3a formaliter 35 less, which is real but not sive secundum racionem que est tenuissima et non essential, and the least, which realis, sicud est inter personam divinam et essenciam is merely dei. Et primam illarum eciam grossi percipiunt, nec ſormal. illam putant esse nisi in divinis. Secundam subtiles et medii philosophi percipiunt et theologi. Terciam autem 40 If the specific part of two essential properties were not more universal than the other, it could no longer be essential. 30 the body, to one superior, the soul, to make the compound, a Man. 4. potr't MS. 5. ergo deest MS. 1. plitS MS. 24. Quam is probably a mistake. I would substitute quoniam, which agrees with the sense, but for sit in the next line.
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CAP. X. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 59 altissimi philosophi et theologi deprehenderunt. Et has tres distincciones et distancias,] differencias et divisiones a parte rei esse non licet cuiquam nec katholico nec infideli negare. Proporcionaliter ad has differencias, distincciones, et divisiones seu distancias, est ponenda triplex in re composicio: grossa, media, et tenuissima. Prima, sicut realis et essencialis. Secunda, realis et non essencialis; 3a non realis et essencialis sed secundum racionem seu 1o formalis. Prima est quantitativa ex partibus quantita- tivis inter se essencialiter et realiter differentibus, sicud ex corde, capite, etc.; et illam eciam grossi percipiunt et populares. Secunda est subtilior que potest dici realis non essencialiter, scilicet qualitativa, que est ex 15 materia et forma substanciali in eadem essencia corporea que materia et forma, ut superius fuit tactum, realiter sed non essencialiter differunt. Et partes prioris compo- sicionis possunt dici essenciales et reales; cum compo- nendo essencialiter et realiter differunt, partes autem 20 2e composicionis poterant dici partes reales sive secundum rem, et non essenciales sive 2m essenciam; et hanc composicionem qualitativam mediocriter subtiles philosophi percipiunt. Tercia est composicio in re quiditativa minima et tenuissima, correspondenter ad 25 terciam differenciam. Et hec potest vocari composicio formalis, seu secundum racionem, vel secundum modum per se primum, et partes huius composicionis dicuntur partes non secundum essenciam nec secundum rem sed secundum racionem sive secundum formam vel modum. 30 Et hanc composicionem tenuissimam acutissimi philo- sophi deprehenderunt vi huius vel consimilis argumenti moti et adiuti: Ad hominem quemcunque esse quiditative hominem requiritur quiditative esse animal; et non sufficit 2m se in propria forma esse animal ad esse 35 hominem; cum tunc et equus esset homo. Igitur requiritur aliquid essenciale homini superaddi ad esse animal, ut resultet quiditative esse hominem: quod ponitur racionale, sive racionalitas specifica. Cum igitur esse animal (sive animalitas) 2m se sit quiditas et 40 natura essencialis prior requisita intrinsece, sed non sufficiens ad esse quiditative hominem, cui oportet 5 So likewise there are three sorts of composition ; quantitative, that is, made of parts really and essentially different; qualitative, of matter and form, really distinct, but forming one essence; and a third, the most subtle of all, a merely formal composition, of things that differ neither really nor essentially. Rationality is something essential to man, which, added to sensitivity, makes man. 219" 18. cum igitur MS. 27. hij pro huius MS. 29. rem pro racio- nem MS. 32. quidite MS.
CAP. X. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 59 altissimi philosophi et theologi deprehenderunt. Et has tres distincciones et distancias,] differencias et divisiones a parte rei esse non licet cuiquam nec katholico nec infideli negare. Proporcionaliter ad has differencias, distincciones, et divisiones seu distancias, est ponenda triplex in re composicio: grossa, media, et tenuissima. Prima, sicut realis et essencialis. Secunda, realis et non essencialis; 3a non realis et essencialis sed secundum racionem seu 1o formalis. Prima est quantitativa ex partibus quantita- tivis inter se essencialiter et realiter differentibus, sicud ex corde, capite, etc.; et illam eciam grossi percipiunt et populares. Secunda est subtilior que potest dici realis non essencialiter, scilicet qualitativa, que est ex 15 materia et forma substanciali in eadem essencia corporea que materia et forma, ut superius fuit tactum, realiter sed non essencialiter differunt. Et partes prioris compo- sicionis possunt dici essenciales et reales; cum compo- nendo essencialiter et realiter differunt, partes autem 20 2e composicionis poterant dici partes reales sive secundum rem, et non essenciales sive 2m essenciam; et hanc composicionem qualitativam mediocriter subtiles philosophi percipiunt. Tercia est composicio in re quiditativa minima et tenuissima, correspondenter ad 25 terciam differenciam. Et hec potest vocari composicio formalis, seu secundum racionem, vel secundum modum per se primum, et partes huius composicionis dicuntur partes non secundum essenciam nec secundum rem sed secundum racionem sive secundum formam vel modum. 30 Et hanc composicionem tenuissimam acutissimi philo- sophi deprehenderunt vi huius vel consimilis argumenti moti et adiuti: Ad hominem quemcunque esse quiditative hominem requiritur quiditative esse animal; et non sufficit 2m se in propria forma esse animal ad esse 35 hominem; cum tunc et equus esset homo. Igitur requiritur aliquid essenciale homini superaddi ad esse animal, ut resultet quiditative esse hominem: quod ponitur racionale, sive racionalitas specifica. Cum igitur esse animal (sive animalitas) 2m se sit quiditas et 40 natura essencialis prior requisita intrinsece, sed non sufficiens ad esse quiditative hominem, cui oportet 5 So likewise there are three sorts of composition ; quantitative, that is, made of parts really and essentially different; qualitative, of matter and form, really distinct, but forming one essence; and a third, the most subtle of all, a merely formal composition, of things that differ neither really nor essentially. Rationality is something essential to man, which, added to sensitivity, makes man. 219" 18. cum igitur MS. 27. hij pro huius MS. 29. rem pro racio- nem MS. 32. quidite MS.
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60 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. X. superaddere ab intrinseco racionalitatem, ut resultet ab intrinseco esse hominem sive humanitas; igitur est ibi ab intrinseco composicio animalitatis | ad racionalitatem, 219" ut resultet humanitas. Igitur ibi sunt componencia et compositum, et cum non differant talia a se realiter 5 nec essencialiter, sed 2m racionem tantum, erit ibi composicio 2m racionem tantum. Cum igitur hec tria: animalitas, racionalitas, et humanitas, insint per ordinem essencialem supposito humano, quodlibet eorum insit ei sicud commune performans ipsum humanum suppo- 10 situm, et e converso subiective ab eodem. Et per con- sequens, cum quotlibet illorum sit sic universale, alias nullibi daretur ubi forma essencialis performaret suppo- situm et reciproce subiectaretur ab eodem. Et cum quodlibet illorum trium sit universale substanciale in 15 supposito humano, primum (scilicet animalitas) cum sit sicud materiale et sicud substratum, cum superadditur racionalitas sicut forma superstans, et ex hiis resultet humanitas, sicud per se stans; nec daretur substanciale nisi aut ut substans, aut ut superstans, aut ut per se 20 stans, patet tria et solum tria esse universalia substan- cialia in individuo: scilicet genus, differenciam, et speciem. Quod autem animalitas habet se ut materiale, et raciona- Proof of this analogy. litas ut formale, et humanitas ut compositum [patet sic]. Animality is the principle of Nam animalitas appropriate est principium substanciale 25 feeling; rationality, of formale senciendi, racionalitas raciocinandi, humanitas reasoning; vero senciendi et raciocinandi simul, vel eciam principium humanity, of both. appropriate ex sensatis et sensacione raciocinandi et intelligendi, sentire autem ex quo fit raciocinari vel provenit, est sicud materiale, et raciocinari sicud 30 formale; et raciocinari (vel discurrere racionabiliter) ex sensatis et sensacione, sicud compositum: igitur consi- militer de principiis sibi appropriatis est iudicandum; sic quod patet quod illa tria universalia, genus, diffe- We count these as modes, but rencia, et species, in eodem supposito non ponunt in 35 as modes of the same being numerum realem, sed ponunt in numerum racionis seu modi per se primi. Et quamvis genus predicetur de differencia, dicendo We can say that rationality quod racionalitas est substancialitas, hoc tamen non is substantiality, but improperly poterit esse formaliter, cum genus non poterit se habere 40 so; nor can in modum forme respectu differencie; nec possunt esse Here we have a compound and components, which differ neither really nor essentially and therefore this is the third kind of composition. It has a striking analogy with matter, form, and the compound resulting from these. 7. t7 MS. 24. se ut se (!) MS. 24. patet sic deest MS.
60 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. X. superaddere ab intrinseco racionalitatem, ut resultet ab intrinseco esse hominem sive humanitas; igitur est ibi ab intrinseco composicio animalitatis | ad racionalitatem, 219" ut resultet humanitas. Igitur ibi sunt componencia et compositum, et cum non differant talia a se realiter 5 nec essencialiter, sed 2m racionem tantum, erit ibi composicio 2m racionem tantum. Cum igitur hec tria: animalitas, racionalitas, et humanitas, insint per ordinem essencialem supposito humano, quodlibet eorum insit ei sicud commune performans ipsum humanum suppo- 10 situm, et e converso subiective ab eodem. Et per con- sequens, cum quotlibet illorum sit sic universale, alias nullibi daretur ubi forma essencialis performaret suppo- situm et reciproce subiectaretur ab eodem. Et cum quodlibet illorum trium sit universale substanciale in 15 supposito humano, primum (scilicet animalitas) cum sit sicud materiale et sicud substratum, cum superadditur racionalitas sicut forma superstans, et ex hiis resultet humanitas, sicud per se stans; nec daretur substanciale nisi aut ut substans, aut ut superstans, aut ut per se 20 stans, patet tria et solum tria esse universalia substan- cialia in individuo: scilicet genus, differenciam, et speciem. Quod autem animalitas habet se ut materiale, et raciona- Proof of this analogy. litas ut formale, et humanitas ut compositum [patet sic]. Animality is the principle of Nam animalitas appropriate est principium substanciale 25 feeling; rationality, of formale senciendi, racionalitas raciocinandi, humanitas reasoning; vero senciendi et raciocinandi simul, vel eciam principium humanity, of both. appropriate ex sensatis et sensacione raciocinandi et intelligendi, sentire autem ex quo fit raciocinari vel provenit, est sicud materiale, et raciocinari sicud 30 formale; et raciocinari (vel discurrere racionabiliter) ex sensatis et sensacione, sicud compositum: igitur consi- militer de principiis sibi appropriatis est iudicandum; sic quod patet quod illa tria universalia, genus, diffe- We count these as modes, but rencia, et species, in eodem supposito non ponunt in 35 as modes of the same being numerum realem, sed ponunt in numerum racionis seu modi per se primi. Et quamvis genus predicetur de differencia, dicendo We can say that rationality quod racionalitas est substancialitas, hoc tamen non is substantiality, but improperly poterit esse formaliter, cum genus non poterit se habere 40 so; nor can in modum forme respectu differencie; nec possunt esse Here we have a compound and components, which differ neither really nor essentially and therefore this is the third kind of composition. It has a striking analogy with matter, form, and the compound resulting from these. 7. t7 MS. 24. se ut se (!) MS. 24. patet sic deest MS.
Strana 61
CAP. X. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 61 220* quiditative, cum differencia sit pura qualitas essencialis. Et sic differencia essencialis non poterit esse per se in predicamento aliquo, cum nullum generalissimum possit de aliqua tali differencia formaliter et in eo quod quid est' predicari: quod tamen requiretur. Nec potest differ- encia predicari qualitative essencialiter de genere, quod contrahit et dividit; quia non potest illi inesse actualiter ut qualitas eius essencialis. Sed differencia est in genere potestate, actualiter vero non. Si enim differencia 1o aliquando esset actualiter in genere superiori, oportet quod esset sibi actualiter et per consequens formaliter, non accidentaliter, sed substancialiter. Et sic animal secundum se ipsum ut huius[modi] esset qualitative essencialiter racionale et sic hoc omni animali conveniret: 15 quod est inconveniens. Philosophus tamen, tercio methaphysice, videtur sonare (et plures post eum) quod nequaquam genus predicatur de differencia, vel econtra; cum utrumque sit pars speciei, et una parcium non predicatur de reliqua. Unde 20 ex hoc wult probare quod ens non potest esse genus, quia, si sic, tunc nulla differencia essencialis erit ens, quia genus non predicatur de aliqua essenciali sua differencia. Sed tamen, quidquid philosophus ille vel alii in hoc materia intenderunt, videtur pro argumento 25 sufficere quod ens non possit esse genus, quia tunc aliqua differencia essencialis non esset formaliter ens: quod est inconveniens. Et tenet consequencia, cum non possit genus predicari formaliter de sua specie essencia- liter inferiori differencia. 30 Et patet [quod] genus est universale quod de pluribus predicatur specie differentibus in eo quod quid est id est, 2m quod est quiditas predicatur in quid', id est, precopulatur (sive ab ante copulatur) speciei sicud prior forma essencialis, vel predicatur, i. e. publice vel mani- 35 feste dicitur, ostenditur, vel manifestatur de speciebus For if, v. g. the difference reasonable were actually included in the idea animal, then every animal would be reasonable. Aristotle even says that the genus cannot be in any sense predicated of the difference. At any rate, Entity is not genus, or the specific difference would be nothing. A genus 1s a universal which is predicated of the essence of anything, not individually but in general. we properly predicate any of these of each other. 13. modi deest MS. 23. illi MS. 3o. quod deest MS. 32. i pro p id est MS.; ib. i. pro id est MS. 9. Potestate. This may be a mistake for potestative; at any rate it means the same as the ablative potenciâ. 27. Incon- veniens. The idea of the difference is not included in that of the genus; animal does not imply actually reasonable. If now Being or Anything were a generic term, you must divide it by a term that is not implied by Being. But every difference must be something.
CAP. X. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 61 220* quiditative, cum differencia sit pura qualitas essencialis. Et sic differencia essencialis non poterit esse per se in predicamento aliquo, cum nullum generalissimum possit de aliqua tali differencia formaliter et in eo quod quid est' predicari: quod tamen requiretur. Nec potest differ- encia predicari qualitative essencialiter de genere, quod contrahit et dividit; quia non potest illi inesse actualiter ut qualitas eius essencialis. Sed differencia est in genere potestate, actualiter vero non. Si enim differencia 1o aliquando esset actualiter in genere superiori, oportet quod esset sibi actualiter et per consequens formaliter, non accidentaliter, sed substancialiter. Et sic animal secundum se ipsum ut huius[modi] esset qualitative essencialiter racionale et sic hoc omni animali conveniret: 15 quod est inconveniens. Philosophus tamen, tercio methaphysice, videtur sonare (et plures post eum) quod nequaquam genus predicatur de differencia, vel econtra; cum utrumque sit pars speciei, et una parcium non predicatur de reliqua. Unde 20 ex hoc wult probare quod ens non potest esse genus, quia, si sic, tunc nulla differencia essencialis erit ens, quia genus non predicatur de aliqua essenciali sua differencia. Sed tamen, quidquid philosophus ille vel alii in hoc materia intenderunt, videtur pro argumento 25 sufficere quod ens non possit esse genus, quia tunc aliqua differencia essencialis non esset formaliter ens: quod est inconveniens. Et tenet consequencia, cum non possit genus predicari formaliter de sua specie essencia- liter inferiori differencia. 30 Et patet [quod] genus est universale quod de pluribus predicatur specie differentibus in eo quod quid est id est, 2m quod est quiditas predicatur in quid', id est, precopulatur (sive ab ante copulatur) speciei sicud prior forma essencialis, vel predicatur, i. e. publice vel mani- 35 feste dicitur, ostenditur, vel manifestatur de speciebus For if, v. g. the difference reasonable were actually included in the idea animal, then every animal would be reasonable. Aristotle even says that the genus cannot be in any sense predicated of the difference. At any rate, Entity is not genus, or the specific difference would be nothing. A genus 1s a universal which is predicated of the essence of anything, not individually but in general. we properly predicate any of these of each other. 13. modi deest MS. 23. illi MS. 3o. quod deest MS. 32. i pro p id est MS.; ib. i. pro id est MS. 9. Potestate. This may be a mistake for potestative; at any rate it means the same as the ablative potenciâ. 27. Incon- veniens. The idea of the difference is not included in that of the genus; animal does not imply actually reasonable. If now Being or Anything were a generic term, you must divide it by a term that is not implied by Being. But every difference must be something.
Strana 62
62 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. X. suis, cum habeat non privatum esse sicud individuum, sed publicum et aptum. Species autem habentes in se genus predicant hoc esse, publice dicunt et ostendunt ipsum de seipsis sicud materiatum et subiectatum. Eciam deus predicat genus de suis speciebus. Eciam nos predicamus genus de suis speciebus; et recte, compendiose, et sufficienter sine briga dictum est, quod genus predicatur de pluribus differentibus specie 'in eo quod quid est' nec oportet aliquid addi, deponi, vel variari, ad corrigendum illam descripcionem. Et videtur quod genus oporteat habere, licet non simul, omnes suas species possibiles. Nam si aliquod generalissimum ] caret a principio mundi usque in 220b eternum quacunque sua specie possibili, cum species sint sicud partes formales ipsius generis, individua vero 15 sicud partes materiales, iam tunc tale generalissimum est colobum, sicud corpus aliquis carens aliqua sui parte formali. Et licet post diem iudicii multe species rerum non erunt, nisi quis dixerit corpus humanum ex omni specie carnis animati non humani componi perpetuo, et 20 sic in eo salvari speciem leonis secundum minimum sui naturale, speciem equi, et sic de aliis singulis ani- malibus et plantis (quod tamen non videtur verum de istis nec de cete grandibus), ubi forte minimum naturale est ante vel amplius in quantitate, sicud corpus 25 humanum supposito quod multe tales species non erunt post iudicii diem; tamen adhuc, quando oportet tempore suo habere genus speciem aliquam, tunc eam habet, et hoc sufficit ad perfectum et completum esse generis, sic enim totum tempus mundi est perfectum et com-30 pletum, et tamen in nullo die nec in aliqua hora habet tantum de tempore quantum sibi ad esse deest. Et genus bene et sufficienter dividitur in genus A genus is either the most generalissimum et genus subalternum. general of all, or specialized Et species est universale predicabile de pluribus 35 to some extent. Species is numero differentibus in eo quod quid est positum sub predicated essentially of genere; et (quodammodo equivoce) species est quiditas things that are ut per se stans in differentibus numero, genus vero est included in the same genus quiditas ut substans in differentibus specie; et, limitando and differ as to number ; Note that every genus must at some time or other have all its possible species in existence; if not, it would be mutilated and incomplete. And though many species will not exist after Doomsday, they will have existed at the right time, so that every genus will have all its species. 10 2. pueu MS. 17. colobue€ MS. 24. decete gra'dibus MS. 32. det tpis MS. 17. Colobum. I have substituted this word because it is to be found in Du Cange, whilst the other is not.
62 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. X. suis, cum habeat non privatum esse sicud individuum, sed publicum et aptum. Species autem habentes in se genus predicant hoc esse, publice dicunt et ostendunt ipsum de seipsis sicud materiatum et subiectatum. Eciam deus predicat genus de suis speciebus. Eciam nos predicamus genus de suis speciebus; et recte, compendiose, et sufficienter sine briga dictum est, quod genus predicatur de pluribus differentibus specie 'in eo quod quid est' nec oportet aliquid addi, deponi, vel variari, ad corrigendum illam descripcionem. Et videtur quod genus oporteat habere, licet non simul, omnes suas species possibiles. Nam si aliquod generalissimum ] caret a principio mundi usque in 220b eternum quacunque sua specie possibili, cum species sint sicud partes formales ipsius generis, individua vero 15 sicud partes materiales, iam tunc tale generalissimum est colobum, sicud corpus aliquis carens aliqua sui parte formali. Et licet post diem iudicii multe species rerum non erunt, nisi quis dixerit corpus humanum ex omni specie carnis animati non humani componi perpetuo, et 20 sic in eo salvari speciem leonis secundum minimum sui naturale, speciem equi, et sic de aliis singulis ani- malibus et plantis (quod tamen non videtur verum de istis nec de cete grandibus), ubi forte minimum naturale est ante vel amplius in quantitate, sicud corpus 25 humanum supposito quod multe tales species non erunt post iudicii diem; tamen adhuc, quando oportet tempore suo habere genus speciem aliquam, tunc eam habet, et hoc sufficit ad perfectum et completum esse generis, sic enim totum tempus mundi est perfectum et com-30 pletum, et tamen in nullo die nec in aliqua hora habet tantum de tempore quantum sibi ad esse deest. Et genus bene et sufficienter dividitur in genus A genus is either the most generalissimum et genus subalternum. general of all, or specialized Et species est universale predicabile de pluribus 35 to some extent. Species is numero differentibus in eo quod quid est positum sub predicated essentially of genere; et (quodammodo equivoce) species est quiditas things that are ut per se stans in differentibus numero, genus vero est included in the same genus quiditas ut substans in differentibus specie; et, limitando and differ as to number ; Note that every genus must at some time or other have all its possible species in existence; if not, it would be mutilated and incomplete. And though many species will not exist after Doomsday, they will have existed at the right time, so that every genus will have all its species. 10 2. pueu MS. 17. colobue€ MS. 24. decete gra'dibus MS. 32. det tpis MS. 17. Colobum. I have substituted this word because it is to be found in Du Cange, whilst the other is not.
Strana 63
CAP. X. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 63 "in eo quod quid" ad primum sensum, videtur illa descripcio speciei sufficere: "Species est que predicatur de pluribus differentibus numero in eo quod quid est." Nec descripcio talis sensus competeret generi genera- 5 lissimo, cum talis non possit predicari ut quiditas per se stans, sed solum ut substans. Et species dividitur satis in speciem specialissimam et subalternam. Et species specialissima est que predi- catur in eo quod quid est de solis numero differentibus, to intelligendo quod ly solis' dicat sensum exclusivum et non sophistice exclusum predicatum. it is divided into most special' and “more general' the former comprising no other species under it, but only individuals.
CAP. X. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 63 "in eo quod quid" ad primum sensum, videtur illa descripcio speciei sufficere: "Species est que predicatur de pluribus differentibus numero in eo quod quid est." Nec descripcio talis sensus competeret generi genera- 5 lissimo, cum talis non possit predicari ut quiditas per se stans, sed solum ut substans. Et species dividitur satis in speciem specialissimam et subalternam. Et species specialissima est que predi- catur in eo quod quid est de solis numero differentibus, to intelligendo quod ly solis' dicat sensum exclusivum et non sophistice exclusum predicatum. it is divided into most special' and “more general' the former comprising no other species under it, but only individuals.
Strana 64
A specilic difference is a difference of essential ‘howness’ affirmable of many things which difter in kind. No genus can be divided sufficiently with only one difference, it must have several. uantity is divided into *continuous' and 'non- continuous”, into ‘having position’ and ‘not havin position of parts’. These may be considered as dividing the genus formally (though with CAPITULUM DECIMUM PRIMUM. Differencia autem specifica est universale predicatum de pluribus in eo quod quale essenciale. Videtur autem quod debeat addi 'specie', ut dicatur: differencia specifica est que predicatur de pluribus differentibus specie in eo 5 quod quale essenciale; ut dicit Porphyrius. Nam, cum differencia specifica sit universale (et sic quoddam commune essenciale respectu speciei, sicud est consti- tutiva speciei) sed nihil est commune essenciale respectu alicuius nisi sibi et alii ab illo possit essencialiter ro communicari. Videtur prima facie igitur quod omnis vera et proprie dicta differencia specifica sit predicabilis de pluribus specie differentibus. Et sic videtur ulterius quod nullum genus cum unica differencia specifica aliquam suam speciem adequate 15 constituat, sed oportet ipsum habere in adiutorium duas aut plures differencias specificas. Et tunc forte oportet ulterius dici quod sicud illud generalissimum ‘quantitas’ habet differenciam essencialem, differenciam immediatam, scilicet: in quantitatem continuam et quantitatem discretam, 20 et iterum in quantitatem habentem posicionem in partibus et non habentem. Et habet duplices differencias essen- ciales oppositas et annectas (illas quidem que dividerent genus secundum esse suum quodammodo materiale per respectum ad formale est genus, et econtra alias que a5 dividerent ipsum genus 2? quoddam suum esse formale per respectum ad materiale. Et sic forte quodlibet genus, nedum subalternum, de quo leviter apparet, sed et I. Capitulum &c. deest. 10. mfi lu 2. Blank space for initial D MS. 17. dra ffcas MS. MS. 25. ge MS. 10, Misi. I have already noted this MS. form which has puzzled me not a little: neither here nor elsewhere can I make any sense of it. 22. Habentem. This requires some explanation. Number is non-continuous quantity; all other is continuous. Time does not imply position, nor does number; but all other sorts of quantity do. 221"
A specilic difference is a difference of essential ‘howness’ affirmable of many things which difter in kind. No genus can be divided sufficiently with only one difference, it must have several. uantity is divided into *continuous' and 'non- continuous”, into ‘having position’ and ‘not havin position of parts’. These may be considered as dividing the genus formally (though with CAPITULUM DECIMUM PRIMUM. Differencia autem specifica est universale predicatum de pluribus in eo quod quale essenciale. Videtur autem quod debeat addi 'specie', ut dicatur: differencia specifica est que predicatur de pluribus differentibus specie in eo 5 quod quale essenciale; ut dicit Porphyrius. Nam, cum differencia specifica sit universale (et sic quoddam commune essenciale respectu speciei, sicud est consti- tutiva speciei) sed nihil est commune essenciale respectu alicuius nisi sibi et alii ab illo possit essencialiter ro communicari. Videtur prima facie igitur quod omnis vera et proprie dicta differencia specifica sit predicabilis de pluribus specie differentibus. Et sic videtur ulterius quod nullum genus cum unica differencia specifica aliquam suam speciem adequate 15 constituat, sed oportet ipsum habere in adiutorium duas aut plures differencias specificas. Et tunc forte oportet ulterius dici quod sicud illud generalissimum ‘quantitas’ habet differenciam essencialem, differenciam immediatam, scilicet: in quantitatem continuam et quantitatem discretam, 20 et iterum in quantitatem habentem posicionem in partibus et non habentem. Et habet duplices differencias essen- ciales oppositas et annectas (illas quidem que dividerent genus secundum esse suum quodammodo materiale per respectum ad formale est genus, et econtra alias que a5 dividerent ipsum genus 2? quoddam suum esse formale per respectum ad materiale. Et sic forte quodlibet genus, nedum subalternum, de quo leviter apparet, sed et I. Capitulum &c. deest. 10. mfi lu 2. Blank space for initial D MS. 17. dra ffcas MS. MS. 25. ge MS. 10, Misi. I have already noted this MS. form which has puzzled me not a little: neither here nor elsewhere can I make any sense of it. 22. Habentem. This requires some explanation. Number is non-continuous quantity; all other is continuous. Time does not imply position, nor does number; but all other sorts of quantity do. 221"
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CAP. XI. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 65 2213 generalissimum, habet quodammodo esse materiale essenciale, et esse quodammodo formale essenciale. Et 2m hoc quodlibet tale haberet duplicem divisionem essencialem immediatam; et per consequens duplices 5 differencias essenciales immediatas illas oppositas, sicud materiales, que dividerent genus 2m esse suum quodam- modo materiale (sub respectu tamen ad formale); et alias oppositas sicud formales, dividentes genus secundum esse suum formale per respectum ad esse materiale. Et 10 sic differencia specifica materialis et differencia specifica formalis mutuo se iuvarent et ipsum genus, et quodam- modo se contraherent ad constituendam speciem specia- lissimam adequate. Quamvis tamen inter eas aliqua sit ultima] simpliciter, non tamen adequata speciei. 15 Ista est sentencia Linconensis super secunda priorum. Et philosophus in textu dicit ibi quod diffinicio debet dari per ea quorum quodlibet est in plus, totum tamen in eque cum diffinito; sicud exemplificat de diffinicione ternarii: ternarius est numerus impar, primus, incompo- 20 situs; totum est in eque et quelibet pars in plus. Egidius autem Romanus et glosator dicit ibidem super But others say that such textu illo quod diffinicio quedam est bona in casu, et definitions cannot be de tali intelligit philosophus. Diffinicio autem quiditativa really essential, although they simpliciter non sic debet dari per ea quorum quodlibet may have their 25 sit in plus, cum ultima differencia specifica constituens uses ; for the last difference speciem specialissimam non sit in plus nec per aliam which makes differenciam contrahibilis; et arguit quod oportet naturam up the ultimate species cannot ordinate procedere in constitucione speciei, quousque be anything outside of the deveniatur ad actum seu differenciam adequatam illi essence of the genus, and all 3o speciei specialissime. Et pro illa sentencia sic arguitur; other essential capto generalissimo, addatur sibi una differencia tantum; differences should be illa cum genere faceret speciem. Et illa differencia de like it. illa specie, et nulla alia (nisi forte de sua inferiori), predicabitur. Et iterum ad illam subalternam speciem 35 sit constitutiva; sic eciam, una essencialis differencia addita, iterum cum illo genere constituet speciem sic specialissimam. Tunc illa solum de illa specie specia- lissima predicabitur, alias genus illud proximum cum regard to its matter) and materially (though with regard to its form), these divisions mutually supporting each other. This is Grosseteste's explanation of Aristotle's saying concerning definitions. 17. quarum (!) MS. 21. Ronus et glosar MS. 37. ſi ſſama MS. 19. Impar, primus, incompositus. Each of these determina- tions separately belong to other numbers than 3 (in plus); but together only to it (in eque). De Universalibus.
CAP. XI. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 65 2213 generalissimum, habet quodammodo esse materiale essenciale, et esse quodammodo formale essenciale. Et 2m hoc quodlibet tale haberet duplicem divisionem essencialem immediatam; et per consequens duplices 5 differencias essenciales immediatas illas oppositas, sicud materiales, que dividerent genus 2m esse suum quodam- modo materiale (sub respectu tamen ad formale); et alias oppositas sicud formales, dividentes genus secundum esse suum formale per respectum ad esse materiale. Et 10 sic differencia specifica materialis et differencia specifica formalis mutuo se iuvarent et ipsum genus, et quodam- modo se contraherent ad constituendam speciem specia- lissimam adequate. Quamvis tamen inter eas aliqua sit ultima] simpliciter, non tamen adequata speciei. 15 Ista est sentencia Linconensis super secunda priorum. Et philosophus in textu dicit ibi quod diffinicio debet dari per ea quorum quodlibet est in plus, totum tamen in eque cum diffinito; sicud exemplificat de diffinicione ternarii: ternarius est numerus impar, primus, incompo- 20 situs; totum est in eque et quelibet pars in plus. Egidius autem Romanus et glosator dicit ibidem super But others say that such textu illo quod diffinicio quedam est bona in casu, et definitions cannot be de tali intelligit philosophus. Diffinicio autem quiditativa really essential, although they simpliciter non sic debet dari per ea quorum quodlibet may have their 25 sit in plus, cum ultima differencia specifica constituens uses ; for the last difference speciem specialissimam non sit in plus nec per aliam which makes differenciam contrahibilis; et arguit quod oportet naturam up the ultimate species cannot ordinate procedere in constitucione speciei, quousque be anything outside of the deveniatur ad actum seu differenciam adequatam illi essence of the genus, and all 3o speciei specialissime. Et pro illa sentencia sic arguitur; other essential capto generalissimo, addatur sibi una differencia tantum; differences should be illa cum genere faceret speciem. Et illa differencia de like it. illa specie, et nulla alia (nisi forte de sua inferiori), predicabitur. Et iterum ad illam subalternam speciem 35 sit constitutiva; sic eciam, una essencialis differencia addita, iterum cum illo genere constituet speciem sic specialissimam. Tunc illa solum de illa specie specia- lissima predicabitur, alias genus illud proximum cum regard to its matter) and materially (though with regard to its form), these divisions mutually supporting each other. This is Grosseteste's explanation of Aristotle's saying concerning definitions. 17. quarum (!) MS. 21. Ronus et glosar MS. 37. ſi ſſama MS. 19. Impar, primus, incompositus. Each of these determina- tions separately belong to other numbers than 3 (in plus); but together only to it (in eque). De Universalibus.
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66 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XI. illa differencia non adequate constituent illam speciem; quod est contra assumptum. Si autem iterum constituitur species subalterna, addatur iterum unica differencia specifica, et cum non sit procedere in infinitum, devenietur tandem quod aliquod ultimum genus, cum 5 unica ultima differencia, adequate speciem specialissimam constituet; et tunc illa differencia de illa sola specie predicabitur, eo quod aggregatum ex illo genere et illa differencia cum specie convertitur, nisi fingeretur quod illud genus et illa differencia mutuo et reciproce se 10 contrahent ad quantitatem cum illa specie: quod est inconveniens. Hic forte dicetur, sicud prius, cum quecunque diffe- rencia specifica insit speciei quam constituit sicud universale eius intrinsecum! et per consequens sicud sibi commune intrinsecum principium. Sed non est possibile aliquid esse ut commune intrinsecum principium alicui, nisi sibi et aliis poterit sic esse principium. Alias esset proprie proprium et non ut universale principium, et ut universalis et communis eius forma; 20 cum tamen de racione differencie specifice sit quod predicetur de sua specie ut universale. Unde dicetur ulterius quod non est possibile sub aliquo genere constitui duas solas immediatas species et quamlibet earum per unicam differenciam essencialem 25 sibi debitam; sed constituuntur sole due species inmediate ex opposito quo ad esse quodammodo materiale ipsius generis appropriate per duas differencias quasi materiales. Two differences Et constituuntur due species inmediate ex opposito quo in a genus ad esse quodammodo formale ipsius generis appropriate 30 make four species in the per differencias quasi formales. Eciam et prime inmediate same. species due, et secunde inmediate species due, per respectum vel sub respectu esse quodammodo materiale ipsius generis ad esse quodammodo formale generis eiusdem et econtra constituuntur. Et sic differencia 35 quasi materialis, appropriate constituens unam speciem quasi materialem, convenit alicui de speciebus quasi formalibus, licet non appropriate; et econtra quelibet It may be answered that a difference must be a universal, intrinsic principle of division ; which is impossible unless it belongs to more than one species. It is said, further, that you cannot divide a genus only into 2 species by means of one difference only. 2223 14. constituunt MS. 26. de fs MS.; ib. I mte MS. 29. i mete MS. 33. materiales MS. 18. Sibi et aliis. Thus impar is a difference which belongs not only to 3 but to 5, 7 ....: primus, not only to 3, but to 2, 5, 7 .... — Evidently, these differences are not of the same character as 'Animal rationale aut irrationale'.
66 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XI. illa differencia non adequate constituent illam speciem; quod est contra assumptum. Si autem iterum constituitur species subalterna, addatur iterum unica differencia specifica, et cum non sit procedere in infinitum, devenietur tandem quod aliquod ultimum genus, cum 5 unica ultima differencia, adequate speciem specialissimam constituet; et tunc illa differencia de illa sola specie predicabitur, eo quod aggregatum ex illo genere et illa differencia cum specie convertitur, nisi fingeretur quod illud genus et illa differencia mutuo et reciproce se 10 contrahent ad quantitatem cum illa specie: quod est inconveniens. Hic forte dicetur, sicud prius, cum quecunque diffe- rencia specifica insit speciei quam constituit sicud universale eius intrinsecum! et per consequens sicud sibi commune intrinsecum principium. Sed non est possibile aliquid esse ut commune intrinsecum principium alicui, nisi sibi et aliis poterit sic esse principium. Alias esset proprie proprium et non ut universale principium, et ut universalis et communis eius forma; 20 cum tamen de racione differencie specifice sit quod predicetur de sua specie ut universale. Unde dicetur ulterius quod non est possibile sub aliquo genere constitui duas solas immediatas species et quamlibet earum per unicam differenciam essencialem 25 sibi debitam; sed constituuntur sole due species inmediate ex opposito quo ad esse quodammodo materiale ipsius generis appropriate per duas differencias quasi materiales. Two differences Et constituuntur due species inmediate ex opposito quo in a genus ad esse quodammodo formale ipsius generis appropriate 30 make four species in the per differencias quasi formales. Eciam et prime inmediate same. species due, et secunde inmediate species due, per respectum vel sub respectu esse quodammodo materiale ipsius generis ad esse quodammodo formale generis eiusdem et econtra constituuntur. Et sic differencia 35 quasi materialis, appropriate constituens unam speciem quasi materialem, convenit alicui de speciebus quasi formalibus, licet non appropriate; et econtra quelibet It may be answered that a difference must be a universal, intrinsic principle of division ; which is impossible unless it belongs to more than one species. It is said, further, that you cannot divide a genus only into 2 species by means of one difference only. 2223 14. constituunt MS. 26. de fs MS.; ib. I mte MS. 29. i mete MS. 33. materiales MS. 18. Sibi et aliis. Thus impar is a difference which belongs not only to 3 but to 5, 7 ....: primus, not only to 3, but to 2, 5, 7 .... — Evidently, these differences are not of the same character as 'Animal rationale aut irrationale'.
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CAP. XI. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 67 222b differencia quasi formalis, constituens quasi speciem formalem appropriate, convenit alicui specierum quasi materialium non appropriate. Sed quod iam dictum non probet intentum quod per 5 illud quis vellet sic ostenditur. Nam, capto quocunque genere generalissimo vel subalterno, et admisso quod habeat duplicem talem divisionem inmediatum in quatuor species, puta a b ex opposito et in c d ex opposito, tunc oportet unam de secundis speciebus esse 10 sub aliquam de primis speciebus; et econtra oportet aliquam de primis duabus esse sub aliqua de secundis duabus, et unam de primis duabus universaliter negari de una aliqua secundarum, et econtra. Hoc nunquam potest fallere si diccio utrobique fuerit inmediata, ut in 15 uno exemplo sint ille dicciones inmediate et essenciales quantitatis: in continuam quantitatem et discretam ex opposito. Item, si in quantitatibus habentibus posicionem in partibus et quantitatem ] sine posicione in partibus; tunc quantitas discreta universaliter sicud species con- 20 tinetur sub 4ta specie, scilicet quantitate sine posicione in partibus. Et 3a species, scilicet quantitas habens posicionem in partibus, universaliter continetur sub prima specie, scilicet quantitatem continuam. Et secunda et 3a species, scilicet quantitas discreta et quantitas 25 habens posicionem in partibus de se universaliter negatur. Si est divisio realis et essencialis modo, tunc nulla differencia appropriate constituens secundam speciem potest competere prime speciei, cum propria et appropriata racio distincte quantitatis repugnet quanti- 3o tati continue. Et econtra. Ymmo sic oporteret econtra appropriatam differenciam quantitatis continue econ- verso competere quantitati discrete. Et sic ille due appropriate differencie, quantitatis continue, et quanti- tatis discrete, cum generalissimo [genere] quantitatis in 35 utroque illarum specierum, scilicet, continue et discrete quantitatis, solum unam speciem constituerent: quod est inconveniens. Nec appropriata differencia vel appro- priate constituens secundam speciem potest competere 3e, vel econtra, cum illa secundum proprias raciones 40 distingwatur. Ymmo, sicut iam argutum est, ille due appropriate differencie in illis speciebus cum eodem But these arguments can be shown to be worthless. For each of the differences in question taken together with the genus, forms a genus which is determined by the other difference and becomes a species. Thus we have the genus divided into 2 species by one difference, but twice divided. If not, you suppose that, until the four species are constituted, all the other partial divisions form only one genus; this is impossible. 8. m pro in MS. 14. di'o MS. 26. ajo; a) = M? pro modo MS. 29. disticte MS. 34. genere deest MS. 39. ille MS. 5*
CAP. XI. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 67 222b differencia quasi formalis, constituens quasi speciem formalem appropriate, convenit alicui specierum quasi materialium non appropriate. Sed quod iam dictum non probet intentum quod per 5 illud quis vellet sic ostenditur. Nam, capto quocunque genere generalissimo vel subalterno, et admisso quod habeat duplicem talem divisionem inmediatum in quatuor species, puta a b ex opposito et in c d ex opposito, tunc oportet unam de secundis speciebus esse 10 sub aliquam de primis speciebus; et econtra oportet aliquam de primis duabus esse sub aliqua de secundis duabus, et unam de primis duabus universaliter negari de una aliqua secundarum, et econtra. Hoc nunquam potest fallere si diccio utrobique fuerit inmediata, ut in 15 uno exemplo sint ille dicciones inmediate et essenciales quantitatis: in continuam quantitatem et discretam ex opposito. Item, si in quantitatibus habentibus posicionem in partibus et quantitatem ] sine posicione in partibus; tunc quantitas discreta universaliter sicud species con- 20 tinetur sub 4ta specie, scilicet quantitate sine posicione in partibus. Et 3a species, scilicet quantitas habens posicionem in partibus, universaliter continetur sub prima specie, scilicet quantitatem continuam. Et secunda et 3a species, scilicet quantitas discreta et quantitas 25 habens posicionem in partibus de se universaliter negatur. Si est divisio realis et essencialis modo, tunc nulla differencia appropriate constituens secundam speciem potest competere prime speciei, cum propria et appropriata racio distincte quantitatis repugnet quanti- 3o tati continue. Et econtra. Ymmo sic oporteret econtra appropriatam differenciam quantitatis continue econ- verso competere quantitati discrete. Et sic ille due appropriate differencie, quantitatis continue, et quanti- tatis discrete, cum generalissimo [genere] quantitatis in 35 utroque illarum specierum, scilicet, continue et discrete quantitatis, solum unam speciem constituerent: quod est inconveniens. Nec appropriata differencia vel appro- priate constituens secundam speciem potest competere 3e, vel econtra, cum illa secundum proprias raciones 40 distingwatur. Ymmo, sicut iam argutum est, ille due appropriate differencie in illis speciebus cum eodem But these arguments can be shown to be worthless. For each of the differences in question taken together with the genus, forms a genus which is determined by the other difference and becomes a species. Thus we have the genus divided into 2 species by one difference, but twice divided. If not, you suppose that, until the four species are constituted, all the other partial divisions form only one genus; this is impossible. 8. m pro in MS. 14. di'o MS. 26. ajo; a) = M? pro modo MS. 29. disticte MS. 34. genere deest MS. 39. ille MS. 5*
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68 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XI. genere eandem solam speciem constituerent; nec diffe- rencia constituens appropriate secundam speciem potest ut differencia competere quarte speciei, cum secunda species (scilicet quantitas discreta) sit species 4te speciei, scilicet quantitatis sine posicione. Let us take any Et breviter, sicud 4°r immediate species, vel solum one of these due, capta quacunque tali vera inmediata specie, queritur four species, as existing, and si habet differenciam sibi soli debitam, ita quod non ask whether it has a proper alii speciei, vel non? Si primum, habetur quod non difference oportet differenciam esse sic universalem respectu speciei 10 which belongs to no other. et communem quod eciam alii speciei sit communi- If so, this difference is cabilis; sed sufficit eam sibi esse universalem, quia sufficiently universaliter pro suis suppositis sibi inest sicud proprie universal because it proprium est universale; quia universaliter pro suppo- exists in many sitis speciei inest, et non respectu alterius speciei potest 15 individuals, and we require competere tale proprium. Si dicatur quod nulla est sibi no more. If not, to what propria, sed quelibet sua convenit alii speciei: capiatur other species does it belong? ergo, gracia exempli, prima species (quantitas continua) None can be cuius quelibet specifica differencia conveniat alii speciei. found but such as belong to Queritur cui alii, non tercie alii, scilicet posicionem 20 the same habere in partibus? Illa non est alia, cum sit species genus. prime speciei, scilicet quantitatis continue. Nec eciam convenit secunde, quia tunc e converso eciam quelibet 2e speciei conveniret prime; et per consequens omnes 223. ille differencie simul cum generalissimo non aliam 25 speciem in prima specie constituerent quam in secunda; et e converso, cum, positis per totum omnibus eisdem causis intrinsecis, idem causatum ubique poneretur sibi proprium, sicud apparebit; tunc talis cum generalissimo sufficienter illam speciem constituet. Unde cum sub 30 quolibet genere possit esse, nisi [sint] due species in- mediate, quarum neutra de reliqua predicaretur et in quas universaliter et sufficienter illud genus divideretur, quelibet illarum specierum habebit sub illo inmediato genere differenciam sibi universalem et propriam, que 35 solum illi speciei et sibi inferioribus poterit competere. Et per consequens illa differencia, cum illo inmediato genere, sufficienter constitueret speciem illam. Et iterum illa species subalterna cum differencia una superaddita constituet sufficienter speciem, et sic usque ad specia- 40 But this would not suffice to constitute a properly different and independent species. 25. alium MS. 31. n' MS. ; ib. sint deest MS. 5. Sine posicione. What sort of quantity is without position ? No doubt Wyclif is here alluding to time, or duration.
68 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XI. genere eandem solam speciem constituerent; nec diffe- rencia constituens appropriate secundam speciem potest ut differencia competere quarte speciei, cum secunda species (scilicet quantitas discreta) sit species 4te speciei, scilicet quantitatis sine posicione. Let us take any Et breviter, sicud 4°r immediate species, vel solum one of these due, capta quacunque tali vera inmediata specie, queritur four species, as existing, and si habet differenciam sibi soli debitam, ita quod non ask whether it has a proper alii speciei, vel non? Si primum, habetur quod non difference oportet differenciam esse sic universalem respectu speciei 10 which belongs to no other. et communem quod eciam alii speciei sit communi- If so, this difference is cabilis; sed sufficit eam sibi esse universalem, quia sufficiently universaliter pro suis suppositis sibi inest sicud proprie universal because it proprium est universale; quia universaliter pro suppo- exists in many sitis speciei inest, et non respectu alterius speciei potest 15 individuals, and we require competere tale proprium. Si dicatur quod nulla est sibi no more. If not, to what propria, sed quelibet sua convenit alii speciei: capiatur other species does it belong? ergo, gracia exempli, prima species (quantitas continua) None can be cuius quelibet specifica differencia conveniat alii speciei. found but such as belong to Queritur cui alii, non tercie alii, scilicet posicionem 20 the same habere in partibus? Illa non est alia, cum sit species genus. prime speciei, scilicet quantitatis continue. Nec eciam convenit secunde, quia tunc e converso eciam quelibet 2e speciei conveniret prime; et per consequens omnes 223. ille differencie simul cum generalissimo non aliam 25 speciem in prima specie constituerent quam in secunda; et e converso, cum, positis per totum omnibus eisdem causis intrinsecis, idem causatum ubique poneretur sibi proprium, sicud apparebit; tunc talis cum generalissimo sufficienter illam speciem constituet. Unde cum sub 30 quolibet genere possit esse, nisi [sint] due species in- mediate, quarum neutra de reliqua predicaretur et in quas universaliter et sufficienter illud genus divideretur, quelibet illarum specierum habebit sub illo inmediato genere differenciam sibi universalem et propriam, que 35 solum illi speciei et sibi inferioribus poterit competere. Et per consequens illa differencia, cum illo inmediato genere, sufficienter constitueret speciem illam. Et iterum illa species subalterna cum differencia una superaddita constituet sufficienter speciem, et sic usque ad specia- 40 But this would not suffice to constitute a properly different and independent species. 25. alium MS. 31. n' MS. ; ib. sint deest MS. 5. Sine posicione. What sort of quantity is without position ? No doubt Wyclif is here alluding to time, or duration.
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CAP. XI. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 69 lissimam inclusive; et illo consimili argumento habebit differenciam constitutivam sibi propriam. Videtur ergo quod differencia specifica sit universale predicabile de specie in eo quod quale essenciale'. 5 Quare autem Porphyrius dicit quod differencia est que predicatur de pluribus differentibus specie in eo quod quale?' Potest forte dici quod Porphyrius fuit illius sentencie quod quamlibet speciem oporteat sub suo inmediato genere per differencias sese mutuo contra- 10 hentes constitui; sicud putavit “racionale" esse diffe- renciam substancialiter convenientem hominibus qui essent substancialiter mortales cum bestiis, et con- venientem diis qui sunt substancialiter inmortales, cum intelligenciis. Et Albertus Magnus in commento suo 15 super Porphyrio sentenciat quod differencia speciei specialissime, considerata ut constituencia, sic de una illa sola specie predicatur. Alio modo, considerata ut divisiva generis, sic oportet quod sumatur sub distinc- cione ad differenciam sibi oppositam; ut, cum dicitur 20 omne animal aut est racionale aut irracionale", et secundum hoc dicit ipse differenciam predicari de pluribus specie differentibus in eo quod quale. Et cum differencia non retineat proprie racionem differencie ut est constitutiva, sed ut est divisiva, inde est 2m eum, 25 quod differencia specifica (ut est differencia) predicatur 223' de pluribus specie| differentibus in eo quod quale; et hoc essenciale. Posset forte eciam dici quod differencia potest accipi Again, we may say that uno modo ut est distancia inter unam speciem et aliam difference, taken as a 3o sibi oppositam, et 2m hoc non plus respicit unam distance speciem quam aliam sibi oppositam. Et sic racionalitas, between two species, does ut esset distancia inter hominem et animal, racionale not belong more to one non plus respiceret unum distancium quam reliquum, than to the sicud distancia inter corpora non plus unum quam other. But if taken as 35 alterum respicit. Alio modo recipitur differencia ut the distance from one to esset distare unam speciem ab alia sibi opposita; ut de the other, it quanto racionaliter esset distare substancialiter hominem would belong to the first a bestia. Et illo modo convenit homini et non bestie. only. But if the specific difference is an essential predication concerning thusness in one species, how can it be said to affect different species? It may be that Porphyry was of the preceding opinion, as seems from his famous tree'. Albert the Great thinks that a difference (without the consideration of its opposite) belongs only to one species; with that consideration, it belongs to many. In the former sense it consitutes a species, but s not properly a difference. 13. e pro sunt (!) MS. 34. Int' pro inter MS. 13. In Porphyry's 'Tree', we find animal divided by the two cross differences, reasonable, and mortal. Animal reasonable, mortal = man; animal reasonable, immortal = a god; animal irrational mortal = a brute.
CAP. XI. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 69 lissimam inclusive; et illo consimili argumento habebit differenciam constitutivam sibi propriam. Videtur ergo quod differencia specifica sit universale predicabile de specie in eo quod quale essenciale'. 5 Quare autem Porphyrius dicit quod differencia est que predicatur de pluribus differentibus specie in eo quod quale?' Potest forte dici quod Porphyrius fuit illius sentencie quod quamlibet speciem oporteat sub suo inmediato genere per differencias sese mutuo contra- 10 hentes constitui; sicud putavit “racionale" esse diffe- renciam substancialiter convenientem hominibus qui essent substancialiter mortales cum bestiis, et con- venientem diis qui sunt substancialiter inmortales, cum intelligenciis. Et Albertus Magnus in commento suo 15 super Porphyrio sentenciat quod differencia speciei specialissime, considerata ut constituencia, sic de una illa sola specie predicatur. Alio modo, considerata ut divisiva generis, sic oportet quod sumatur sub distinc- cione ad differenciam sibi oppositam; ut, cum dicitur 20 omne animal aut est racionale aut irracionale", et secundum hoc dicit ipse differenciam predicari de pluribus specie differentibus in eo quod quale. Et cum differencia non retineat proprie racionem differencie ut est constitutiva, sed ut est divisiva, inde est 2m eum, 25 quod differencia specifica (ut est differencia) predicatur 223' de pluribus specie| differentibus in eo quod quale; et hoc essenciale. Posset forte eciam dici quod differencia potest accipi Again, we may say that uno modo ut est distancia inter unam speciem et aliam difference, taken as a 3o sibi oppositam, et 2m hoc non plus respicit unam distance speciem quam aliam sibi oppositam. Et sic racionalitas, between two species, does ut esset distancia inter hominem et animal, racionale not belong more to one non plus respiceret unum distancium quam reliquum, than to the sicud distancia inter corpora non plus unum quam other. But if taken as 35 alterum respicit. Alio modo recipitur differencia ut the distance from one to esset distare unam speciem ab alia sibi opposita; ut de the other, it quanto racionaliter esset distare substancialiter hominem would belong to the first a bestia. Et illo modo convenit homini et non bestie. only. But if the specific difference is an essential predication concerning thusness in one species, how can it be said to affect different species? It may be that Porphyry was of the preceding opinion, as seems from his famous tree'. Albert the Great thinks that a difference (without the consideration of its opposite) belongs only to one species; with that consideration, it belongs to many. In the former sense it consitutes a species, but s not properly a difference. 13. e pro sunt (!) MS. 34. Int' pro inter MS. 13. In Porphyry's 'Tree', we find animal divided by the two cross differences, reasonable, and mortal. Animal reasonable, mortal = man; animal reasonable, immortal = a god; animal irrational mortal = a brute.
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70 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XI. Verumptamen nec dictum Alberti Magni nec dictum But this does sequens videtur esse ad intencionem et de mente not agree at all Porphyrii, cum similiter exemplificet quod "racionale' with Porphyry's view; predicetur de diis et hominibus in eo quod quale. Et besides, a difference ita de aliis differenciis ymaginatur. Et quo ad dictum 5 which only Alberti, si “racionale" sub distinccione deberet predicari answers a question in eo quod quale essenciale (ut videtur ipse exponere) ambiguously, by means of a tunc, querendo qualis est homo essencialiter, si respon- distinction, debitur: Est racionalis vel irracionalis, in hoc nunquam cannot satisfy. satisfiet questioni; et querenti cum respondens sub 1o distinccione diversorum non satis certificat querentem. Et quo ad sensum dictum, videtur quod racionalitas non sit distancia inter hominem et bestiam, sed sit distare hominem a bestia, et non est distare bestiam ab homine; et nulla res in medio interiacens est realis que 15 esset distancia essencialis inter hominem et bestiam sub genere animalis; sed in hominem est unum distare essencialiter hominem a bestia; et illud distare est racionalitas hominis; et bestiam essencialiter distare ab homine est irracionalitas in bestia; non quod irracionalitas 20 sit privacio, sed qualitas substancialis positiva, nominata sub privacione per respectum ad oppositam differenciam substancialem. Rationality is not the distance between man and brute, but is man's being distant from a brute; and vice-versâ; the opposite difference, irrationality, being as positive as the first, though in the form of a privation. 15. ral' (racionalis?) MS.
70 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XI. Verumptamen nec dictum Alberti Magni nec dictum But this does sequens videtur esse ad intencionem et de mente not agree at all Porphyrii, cum similiter exemplificet quod "racionale' with Porphyry's view; predicetur de diis et hominibus in eo quod quale. Et besides, a difference ita de aliis differenciis ymaginatur. Et quo ad dictum 5 which only Alberti, si “racionale" sub distinccione deberet predicari answers a question in eo quod quale essenciale (ut videtur ipse exponere) ambiguously, by means of a tunc, querendo qualis est homo essencialiter, si respon- distinction, debitur: Est racionalis vel irracionalis, in hoc nunquam cannot satisfy. satisfiet questioni; et querenti cum respondens sub 1o distinccione diversorum non satis certificat querentem. Et quo ad sensum dictum, videtur quod racionalitas non sit distancia inter hominem et bestiam, sed sit distare hominem a bestia, et non est distare bestiam ab homine; et nulla res in medio interiacens est realis que 15 esset distancia essencialis inter hominem et bestiam sub genere animalis; sed in hominem est unum distare essencialiter hominem a bestia; et illud distare est racionalitas hominis; et bestiam essencialiter distare ab homine est irracionalitas in bestia; non quod irracionalitas 20 sit privacio, sed qualitas substancialis positiva, nominata sub privacione per respectum ad oppositam differenciam substancialem. Rationality is not the distance between man and brute, but is man's being distant from a brute; and vice-versâ; the opposite difference, irrationality, being as positive as the first, though in the form of a privation. 15. ral' (racionalis?) MS.
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CAPITULUM DECIMUM SECUNDUM. 224* 15 Eciam esse genus et esse speciem convenit simpliciter Accidents may belong to et proprie disposicionibus substancialibus in prima genera and species, like substancia, inproprie autem et secundum quid convenit substances, but improperly. accidentibus; ut humanitas proprie et simpliciter I est species hominis et animalitas eius genus; albedo autem est species huius albedinis, et color genus, sed inproprie et secundum quid. Nam si albedo vel color est solum 2m quid, est inproprie quiditas vel entitas cuiuscunque 10 simpliciter et non proprie; tunc eciam, cum albedo sit species vel color genus, solum 2m quid et inproprie sunt huiusmodi. Sed albedo et color, cum sint eque vel plus informative in propria substancia quam in illa albedine, cum finaliter sint ad informandum substanciam, non plus albedo vel color sunt quiditas vel entitas huius albedinis quam istius substancie in qua sunt informative; ut, gracia exempli, Sortis. Sed albedo non est simpliciter et proprie quiditas vel entitas Sortis, cum Sor 2m albedinem nec sit hoc quid vel hoc ens 20 (demonstrato Sorte et quacunque natura essenciali Sortis), nec secundum eam est aliud quid vel ens, ut per totum est notum, sed secundum albedinem Sor solum est alicuiusmodi vel aliquale ens; igitur albedo non est simpliciter entitas nec quiditas: igitur [nec] 25 substancia prima; et per consequens in nulla re est simpliciter et proprie sed 2m quid et inproprie est entitas et quiditas. Similiter, idem est "generari albedinem in Sorte' et 'Sortem generari album". In hoc enim ipse quid 30 generatur? albedo in Sorte generatur, Sor albus, et econtra. Sed quia “Sortem generari album" non est simpliciter, sed solum secundum quid generari, sicud in hoc quod "Sor generatur albus" non simpliciter Whiteness is the species to which this shade of whitenes belongs; and colour is its genus; but these determinations affect the substance in which they inhere at least as much as they do the genus colour. They do not make their substance to be this something, but to be thus. Again, if whiteness appears in A, it is the same as A turning white ; this is not simply the production of A, but the production of white A'; thus whiteness, 1. Capitulum &c. deest. 2. Blank space for Initial E MS. 13. 1forwe MS. 24 nec deest MS. 29. 1pe b' MS.
CAPITULUM DECIMUM SECUNDUM. 224* 15 Eciam esse genus et esse speciem convenit simpliciter Accidents may belong to et proprie disposicionibus substancialibus in prima genera and species, like substancia, inproprie autem et secundum quid convenit substances, but improperly. accidentibus; ut humanitas proprie et simpliciter I est species hominis et animalitas eius genus; albedo autem est species huius albedinis, et color genus, sed inproprie et secundum quid. Nam si albedo vel color est solum 2m quid, est inproprie quiditas vel entitas cuiuscunque 10 simpliciter et non proprie; tunc eciam, cum albedo sit species vel color genus, solum 2m quid et inproprie sunt huiusmodi. Sed albedo et color, cum sint eque vel plus informative in propria substancia quam in illa albedine, cum finaliter sint ad informandum substanciam, non plus albedo vel color sunt quiditas vel entitas huius albedinis quam istius substancie in qua sunt informative; ut, gracia exempli, Sortis. Sed albedo non est simpliciter et proprie quiditas vel entitas Sortis, cum Sor 2m albedinem nec sit hoc quid vel hoc ens 20 (demonstrato Sorte et quacunque natura essenciali Sortis), nec secundum eam est aliud quid vel ens, ut per totum est notum, sed secundum albedinem Sor solum est alicuiusmodi vel aliquale ens; igitur albedo non est simpliciter entitas nec quiditas: igitur [nec] 25 substancia prima; et per consequens in nulla re est simpliciter et proprie sed 2m quid et inproprie est entitas et quiditas. Similiter, idem est "generari albedinem in Sorte' et 'Sortem generari album". In hoc enim ipse quid 30 generatur? albedo in Sorte generatur, Sor albus, et econtra. Sed quia “Sortem generari album" non est simpliciter, sed solum secundum quid generari, sicud in hoc quod "Sor generatur albus" non simpliciter Whiteness is the species to which this shade of whitenes belongs; and colour is its genus; but these determinations affect the substance in which they inhere at least as much as they do the genus colour. They do not make their substance to be this something, but to be thus. Again, if whiteness appears in A, it is the same as A turning white ; this is not simply the production of A, but the production of white A'; thus whiteness, 1. Capitulum &c. deest. 2. Blank space for Initial E MS. 13. 1forwe MS. 24 nec deest MS. 29. 1pe b' MS.
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72 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XII. abstracted from generatur, cum in hoc non fiat aliquid, sed solum 2m A is only a quid generatur, cum fiat solum alicuiusmodi vel aliqualis partial entity. qualis non fuit: igitur generari albedinem in Sorte' non est simpliciter sed solum secundum quid generari. Et cum generari Sortem in albedine" sit passiva 5 generacio ipsius albedinis que fit in Sorte, igitur generacio ipsius albedinis solum 2m quid est entitas et ens et per consequens 2m quid solum habet genus, differenciam, et diffinicionem; sicud et ostenditur 7mo methaphysice. Verumptamen quamvis color non simpliciter et proprie sed ] solum 2m quid et inproprie est genus et species; 224" nichilominus tamen est genus et species. Albedo enim est ens et entitas, licet non simpliciter sed 2m quid sit ens et entitas. Et simpliciter et sine addito dico 15 quod color est ens et color est genus; sed non dico quod color simpliciter est ens; nec dico quod color simpliciter est genus; sed dico quod solum 2m quid est genus, et solum 2m quid est ens vel entitas, iuxta superius arguta ex intencione philosophi 7° methaphysice, 20 et primo de generacione. Sed forte queritur qualiter albedo est species respectu But why is there a species huius et huius albedinis et non risibilitas respectu huius of whiteness in respect to et huius risibilitatis. Potest forte dici pro una causa shades of that colour, and not quod risibilitas non habet essenciam propriam aliam ab 25 a species of essencia hominis cuius est proprium, et cuius quid- risibility in respect to itatem de per se consequitur. Alias videtur quod non individual esset homo per se secundario tamen risibilis, sicud risibilities? Because ipse per se primo est animal racionale; sed ipse per “risibility" has not an essence aliud et extraneum secundario esset risibilis. Ymmo 30 separate from „man", it is videtur quod sicud veritas, unitas, et bonitas, non too closely connected with realiter sed solum modaliter distingwuntur ab entitate his essence, seu ab ente cuius sunt per se passiones; sic risibilitas and there is no real difference solum 2m modum ab homine distingwatur et non between them; realiter. Sed quia albedo et essencialiter et realiter ab 35 whereas this is not the case homine vel alia substancia in qua est distingwitur, for whiteness. igitur poterit habere quiditatem propriam, qualiter non risibilitas. Eciam quia de per se risibilitas unitur And every man is necessarily homini, albedo autem non, sed de per accidens; et capable of laughing, but illud invariabiliter, hoc variabiliter: propter ergo illam 40 not necessarily white, which nimis vehementem unionem per modum forme per se colour is variable and et proprie non relinquitur sibi propria essencia et Yet, though partial, I still maintain that the entity is real, and accidents therefore really have species and genera, in a sense. 10 20. philosophorum MS.
72 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XII. abstracted from generatur, cum in hoc non fiat aliquid, sed solum 2m A is only a quid generatur, cum fiat solum alicuiusmodi vel aliqualis partial entity. qualis non fuit: igitur generari albedinem in Sorte' non est simpliciter sed solum secundum quid generari. Et cum generari Sortem in albedine" sit passiva 5 generacio ipsius albedinis que fit in Sorte, igitur generacio ipsius albedinis solum 2m quid est entitas et ens et per consequens 2m quid solum habet genus, differenciam, et diffinicionem; sicud et ostenditur 7mo methaphysice. Verumptamen quamvis color non simpliciter et proprie sed ] solum 2m quid et inproprie est genus et species; 224" nichilominus tamen est genus et species. Albedo enim est ens et entitas, licet non simpliciter sed 2m quid sit ens et entitas. Et simpliciter et sine addito dico 15 quod color est ens et color est genus; sed non dico quod color simpliciter est ens; nec dico quod color simpliciter est genus; sed dico quod solum 2m quid est genus, et solum 2m quid est ens vel entitas, iuxta superius arguta ex intencione philosophi 7° methaphysice, 20 et primo de generacione. Sed forte queritur qualiter albedo est species respectu But why is there a species huius et huius albedinis et non risibilitas respectu huius of whiteness in respect to et huius risibilitatis. Potest forte dici pro una causa shades of that colour, and not quod risibilitas non habet essenciam propriam aliam ab 25 a species of essencia hominis cuius est proprium, et cuius quid- risibility in respect to itatem de per se consequitur. Alias videtur quod non individual esset homo per se secundario tamen risibilis, sicud risibilities? Because ipse per se primo est animal racionale; sed ipse per “risibility" has not an essence aliud et extraneum secundario esset risibilis. Ymmo 30 separate from „man", it is videtur quod sicud veritas, unitas, et bonitas, non too closely connected with realiter sed solum modaliter distingwuntur ab entitate his essence, seu ab ente cuius sunt per se passiones; sic risibilitas and there is no real difference solum 2m modum ab homine distingwatur et non between them; realiter. Sed quia albedo et essencialiter et realiter ab 35 whereas this is not the case homine vel alia substancia in qua est distingwitur, for whiteness. igitur poterit habere quiditatem propriam, qualiter non risibilitas. Eciam quia de per se risibilitas unitur And every man is necessarily homini, albedo autem non, sed de per accidens; et capable of laughing, but illud invariabiliter, hoc variabiliter: propter ergo illam 40 not necessarily white, which nimis vehementem unionem per modum forme per se colour is variable and et proprie non relinquitur sibi propria essencia et Yet, though partial, I still maintain that the entity is real, and accidents therefore really have species and genera, in a sense. 10 20. philosophorum MS.
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CAP. XII. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 73 propria quiditas, sed essencia hominis et quiditas hominis sunt sibi pro essencia et quiditate. Si enim risibilitas haberet propriam essenciam et quiditatem, iam non esset per se prima forma hominis, cum esset 5 formaliter, et formaliter in sua propria essencia, et sic forma, et in alio. Albedo autem, cum sit realis forma et non per se propria alicui substancie, sed vaga, variabilis, nedum secundum speciem suam potens existere, nunc in uno supposito substancie et postea in 10 alio alterius generis vel speciei, sed eciam quandoque eadem materialis forma accidentalis eadem duo quo ad naturam forme potest vicissim esse nunc in uno supposito et nunc in alio alterius generis: sicud patet 225a de situ materiali meo in quo iam ego sum; et quia 15 eciam forme tales quandoque gradualiter possunt variari, propter quod deus et natura providerunt talibus proprias essencias, naturas, et quiditates. Et argumentum a posteriori est quod risibilitas non sit species; cum aut componeretur ex genere et diffe- 20 rencia et illa principia intrinseca in eo causarent iterum propriam passionem que a pari iterum esset species, et sic fieret processus in infinitum in per se passionibus: quod est inconveniens; igitur, etc. Quod autem sit quoddam universale, quod sit proprie 25 proprium, sicut dicunt loyci et supra factum fuit, videtur constare ex hoc. Nam quoddam universale inest post completum et secundum completum esse individuum: ut “esse marem", “esse feminam" sunt universalia que insunt post completum esse, cum alias 3o essent substancialia. Et per consequens mas et femina in eadem specie different substancialiter universaliter; quod non convenit. Insunt eciam 2m completum esse rei, quia non indifferenter cuicunque, sed solis animalibus conveniunt, et insunt secundum esse non specifico 35 (cum tunc non plus mari inesset esse masculum quam femine, et econtra esse feminam non plus mulieri quam masculo inesset); igitur 2m completum esse indi- viduum et secundum principia individui. Si ergo res post completum et secundum completum esse individui 40 et secundum principia individuancia, tenet in se uni- versale quoddam posterius; a pari, ymmo pocius a may exist in many species of substances; and the same accident of position, for instance, may in turn belong to many different subjects. Besides, risibility is not made up of genus and species. That there are Universals, called properties, is certain, for there are attributes which exist outside of the complete abstract essence, and exist in many within certain fixed limits: as sex in animais. Now this is a universal which is constant in individuals; a fortiori, the specific essence 5. forl' & forl' MS. 40. tunc pro tenet MS. 8. vai'ls MS. 28. individua (l) MS.
CAP. XII. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 73 propria quiditas, sed essencia hominis et quiditas hominis sunt sibi pro essencia et quiditate. Si enim risibilitas haberet propriam essenciam et quiditatem, iam non esset per se prima forma hominis, cum esset 5 formaliter, et formaliter in sua propria essencia, et sic forma, et in alio. Albedo autem, cum sit realis forma et non per se propria alicui substancie, sed vaga, variabilis, nedum secundum speciem suam potens existere, nunc in uno supposito substancie et postea in 10 alio alterius generis vel speciei, sed eciam quandoque eadem materialis forma accidentalis eadem duo quo ad naturam forme potest vicissim esse nunc in uno supposito et nunc in alio alterius generis: sicud patet 225a de situ materiali meo in quo iam ego sum; et quia 15 eciam forme tales quandoque gradualiter possunt variari, propter quod deus et natura providerunt talibus proprias essencias, naturas, et quiditates. Et argumentum a posteriori est quod risibilitas non sit species; cum aut componeretur ex genere et diffe- 20 rencia et illa principia intrinseca in eo causarent iterum propriam passionem que a pari iterum esset species, et sic fieret processus in infinitum in per se passionibus: quod est inconveniens; igitur, etc. Quod autem sit quoddam universale, quod sit proprie 25 proprium, sicut dicunt loyci et supra factum fuit, videtur constare ex hoc. Nam quoddam universale inest post completum et secundum completum esse individuum: ut “esse marem", “esse feminam" sunt universalia que insunt post completum esse, cum alias 3o essent substancialia. Et per consequens mas et femina in eadem specie different substancialiter universaliter; quod non convenit. Insunt eciam 2m completum esse rei, quia non indifferenter cuicunque, sed solis animalibus conveniunt, et insunt secundum esse non specifico 35 (cum tunc non plus mari inesset esse masculum quam femine, et econtra esse feminam non plus mulieri quam masculo inesset); igitur 2m completum esse indi- viduum et secundum principia individui. Si ergo res post completum et secundum completum esse individui 40 et secundum principia individuancia, tenet in se uni- versale quoddam posterius; a pari, ymmo pocius a may exist in many species of substances; and the same accident of position, for instance, may in turn belong to many different subjects. Besides, risibility is not made up of genus and species. That there are Universals, called properties, is certain, for there are attributes which exist outside of the complete abstract essence, and exist in many within certain fixed limits: as sex in animais. Now this is a universal which is constant in individuals; a fortiori, the specific essence 5. forl' & forl' MS. 40. tunc pro tenet MS. 8. vai'ls MS. 28. individua (l) MS.
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74 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XII. forciori, res post et secundum completum esse speci- ficum et secundum principia specifica tenet in se quoddam universale; et illud inerit omni, soli, et semper, sicud esse completum, specificum, et adequatum, prin- cipia specifica secundum que adequate illud universale 5 causatur in esse, omni, soli, et semper insunt; et tale universale, cum sit post completum esse et secundum com- pletum esse commune insit, cum soli et semper, ipsum erit proprie proprium et per consequens universale quod per se 2° convertibiliter inest, sicud quiditas specifica 10 est universale quod per se primo convertibiliter inexistit. Et nedum 2m esse completum specificum, sed et genera- lissimum. Ymmo et secundum esse transcendens insunt per se secundario quedam passiones. Et sicud superius argutum quod illa 3a universalia, 15 genus, differencia, et species, ex hiis non differunt ab invicem realiter in eorum .. .. . I sic nec propria passio 225b differt realiter sed solum modaliter a quiditate completa rei; ut, si risibilitas est propria passio hominis, non realiter sed 2m racionem differt ab humanitate. Nam 20 cum talis propria passio sit eiusdem essencie cum humanitate, non habens aliam sibi propriam essenciam (alioquin non esset proprie proprium homini, ut superius fuit argutum), cum autem in essencia propria hominis genus animalitas sit sicut materia, racionalitas sicud 25 forma, et humanitas sicud completa tota natura in eadem propria essencia; risibilitas non poterit poni res alia ultra humanitatem in essencia propria hominis. Alioquin in illa essencia ex humanitate et risibilitate aliqua tercia res per se una componeretur sicud ex 30 per se subiecto et per se forma, realiter condistinctis. for then there Si enim risibilitas est per se nature alicuius sic incom- would be two plete, tunc cum alia, et sic maxime cum humanitate, distinct natures in one componeret, si est natura completa; due nature com- compound and plete erunt simul eiusdem essencie penitus: quod non 35 that compound would not be humanity, but convenit. Non poterit ergo risibilitas esse res alia, something else. These properties do not differ really, but only modally, form the essence of the thing itself Risibility is humanity from a certain point of view ; for we cannot conceive it as anything superadded to humanity, or species, may have properties which are constant, being in all individuals of that species, only in them, and for ever; so may genera and even Transcendent determinations have such properties. 2. tunc pro tenet MS. 7. esse deest MS. 15. argu MS. 17. per se pro propria MS. 25. alis MS. 31. rar MS. 32. si pro sic (1) MS. 17. Eorum ... sic. There is no gap, but some word is evidently wanting to make sense. The MS. is a very bad one ; the copyist, as we have seen, makes extraordinary mistakes of grammar, and omissions which often render the sentence im- possible to construe.
74 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XII. forciori, res post et secundum completum esse speci- ficum et secundum principia specifica tenet in se quoddam universale; et illud inerit omni, soli, et semper, sicud esse completum, specificum, et adequatum, prin- cipia specifica secundum que adequate illud universale 5 causatur in esse, omni, soli, et semper insunt; et tale universale, cum sit post completum esse et secundum com- pletum esse commune insit, cum soli et semper, ipsum erit proprie proprium et per consequens universale quod per se 2° convertibiliter inest, sicud quiditas specifica 10 est universale quod per se primo convertibiliter inexistit. Et nedum 2m esse completum specificum, sed et genera- lissimum. Ymmo et secundum esse transcendens insunt per se secundario quedam passiones. Et sicud superius argutum quod illa 3a universalia, 15 genus, differencia, et species, ex hiis non differunt ab invicem realiter in eorum .. .. . I sic nec propria passio 225b differt realiter sed solum modaliter a quiditate completa rei; ut, si risibilitas est propria passio hominis, non realiter sed 2m racionem differt ab humanitate. Nam 20 cum talis propria passio sit eiusdem essencie cum humanitate, non habens aliam sibi propriam essenciam (alioquin non esset proprie proprium homini, ut superius fuit argutum), cum autem in essencia propria hominis genus animalitas sit sicut materia, racionalitas sicud 25 forma, et humanitas sicud completa tota natura in eadem propria essencia; risibilitas non poterit poni res alia ultra humanitatem in essencia propria hominis. Alioquin in illa essencia ex humanitate et risibilitate aliqua tercia res per se una componeretur sicud ex 30 per se subiecto et per se forma, realiter condistinctis. for then there Si enim risibilitas est per se nature alicuius sic incom- would be two plete, tunc cum alia, et sic maxime cum humanitate, distinct natures in one componeret, si est natura completa; due nature com- compound and plete erunt simul eiusdem essencie penitus: quod non 35 that compound would not be humanity, but convenit. Non poterit ergo risibilitas esse res alia, something else. These properties do not differ really, but only modally, form the essence of the thing itself Risibility is humanity from a certain point of view ; for we cannot conceive it as anything superadded to humanity, or species, may have properties which are constant, being in all individuals of that species, only in them, and for ever; so may genera and even Transcendent determinations have such properties. 2. tunc pro tenet MS. 7. esse deest MS. 15. argu MS. 17. per se pro propria MS. 25. alis MS. 31. rar MS. 32. si pro sic (1) MS. 17. Eorum ... sic. There is no gap, but some word is evidently wanting to make sense. The MS. is a very bad one ; the copyist, as we have seen, makes extraordinary mistakes of grammar, and omissions which often render the sentence im- possible to construe.
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CAP. XII. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 75 sicud nec alia natura in propria essencia hominis. Alia dico ab humanitate; sed humanitas est sibi pro quidi- tate et essencia hominis pro essencia, sicut dictum fuit superius, sicud mundo architypo, puta, multitudine 5 ydearum, deitas est pro essencia. Nec mirum quod supra completam quiditatem hominis, puta humanitatem, ponitur proprietas per se, eiusdem tamen essencie et nature cum ipsa humanitate, cum “posse deum efficere creaturam" ponatur per se passio formaliter inexistens 10 deo 2m eius deitatem, que non posset essencialiter vel realiter a deitate differre; sic quod videtur ista quatuor universalia, genus, species, differenciam, et proprium, in eodem supposito non differre realiter. Unumquodque tamen secundum suum proprium (et proprium per se) 15 modum essendi differt a reliquo. Quintum autem uni- versale, puta accidens, a quolibet predictorum in eodem supposito realiter et per essenciam differre videtur. Et secundum Porphyrium proprie proprium est quod The Property belongs to inest omni, soli, et semper; inest autem sicud forma every individual of the species 20 communis, non essencialis, nec accidentalis, sed sicud without media inter has per se 2° inexistens. Inest autem omni: exception, only to those, and 226. cui "omni" (scilicet, universitati rerum ipsius ] speciei, invariably, so long as the vel ipsius generis, vel ipsius analogi, vel alterius species endures. communis) sic quod universis rebus ipsius speciei vel 25 generis etc. sic insit. Et inest soli rei eiusdem speciei vel communis etc. Et inest semper, scilicet, universitati rerum eiusdem speciei vel generis, etc. Hoc est quod semper, dum manet universitas illa, sibi sic insit. Unde proprium de quinque universalibus est universale quod 3o inest rei post et secundum esse essenciale suum commune. Et hoc oportet inesse modo iam dicto omni, soli, et semper. Accidens autem (dicit Porphyrius) est quod adest vel abest preter subiecti corrupcionem. Et cum triplex sit forma rei: essencialis, accidentalis, et media; inter has 35 prima est forma que appropriate preest rei. Media autem que appropriate inest rei. Tercia autem que appropriate adest rei. Videtur autem intelligendus Porphyrius quod accidens est quod aptum est adesse per modum forme, et aptum est abesse 2m eius absen- 40 ciam in subiecto suo preter ipsius subiecti corrupcio- nem ex tali absencia vel ad talem absenciam, ita quod ad talem absenciam subiectum corrumpi non oportet. Et Porphyrius sentenciat quod, licet sit accidens quod non sit separabile a subiecto per naturam et We may say that God's creative power is His property, which is essentially the same as God. Thus the foregoing 4 Universals differ only modally whilst the fifth, the Accident, differs really from these. Definition of the accident : what may come and go, without destruction of the subject. Some are in reality inseparable
CAP. XII. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 75 sicud nec alia natura in propria essencia hominis. Alia dico ab humanitate; sed humanitas est sibi pro quidi- tate et essencia hominis pro essencia, sicut dictum fuit superius, sicud mundo architypo, puta, multitudine 5 ydearum, deitas est pro essencia. Nec mirum quod supra completam quiditatem hominis, puta humanitatem, ponitur proprietas per se, eiusdem tamen essencie et nature cum ipsa humanitate, cum “posse deum efficere creaturam" ponatur per se passio formaliter inexistens 10 deo 2m eius deitatem, que non posset essencialiter vel realiter a deitate differre; sic quod videtur ista quatuor universalia, genus, species, differenciam, et proprium, in eodem supposito non differre realiter. Unumquodque tamen secundum suum proprium (et proprium per se) 15 modum essendi differt a reliquo. Quintum autem uni- versale, puta accidens, a quolibet predictorum in eodem supposito realiter et per essenciam differre videtur. Et secundum Porphyrium proprie proprium est quod The Property belongs to inest omni, soli, et semper; inest autem sicud forma every individual of the species 20 communis, non essencialis, nec accidentalis, sed sicud without media inter has per se 2° inexistens. Inest autem omni: exception, only to those, and 226. cui "omni" (scilicet, universitati rerum ipsius ] speciei, invariably, so long as the vel ipsius generis, vel ipsius analogi, vel alterius species endures. communis) sic quod universis rebus ipsius speciei vel 25 generis etc. sic insit. Et inest soli rei eiusdem speciei vel communis etc. Et inest semper, scilicet, universitati rerum eiusdem speciei vel generis, etc. Hoc est quod semper, dum manet universitas illa, sibi sic insit. Unde proprium de quinque universalibus est universale quod 3o inest rei post et secundum esse essenciale suum commune. Et hoc oportet inesse modo iam dicto omni, soli, et semper. Accidens autem (dicit Porphyrius) est quod adest vel abest preter subiecti corrupcionem. Et cum triplex sit forma rei: essencialis, accidentalis, et media; inter has 35 prima est forma que appropriate preest rei. Media autem que appropriate inest rei. Tercia autem que appropriate adest rei. Videtur autem intelligendus Porphyrius quod accidens est quod aptum est adesse per modum forme, et aptum est abesse 2m eius absen- 40 ciam in subiecto suo preter ipsius subiecti corrupcio- nem ex tali absencia vel ad talem absenciam, ita quod ad talem absenciam subiectum corrumpi non oportet. Et Porphyrius sentenciat quod, licet sit accidens quod non sit separabile a subiecto per naturam et We may say that God's creative power is His property, which is essentially the same as God. Thus the foregoing 4 Universals differ only modally whilst the fifth, the Accident, differs really from these. Definition of the accident : what may come and go, without destruction of the subject. Some are in reality inseparable
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76 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XII. A raven is always black ; but we can think it losing that blackness, and therefore blackness is ar accident. Such is the power of reason, given to us by God. Our faculty of conceiving primordial matter clear of all determinations is a case in point. Thus, though an accident may inhere inseparably in its subject, we may think oſ it as not inhering; which is impossible for the first three Universals, which make up the very essence of the thing thought, virtutem eius, quia tunc separaretur a subiecto suo realiter quod de multis accidentibus (sicud de potenciis natura- libus in specie secunda qualitatis, de numero, quantitate continua, et sie de aliis infinitis) nobis est impossibile. Intellectus tamen, qui est agens sepe solum intencionaliter, sicud natura semper est agens naturaliter et realiter, ipse intellectus separando potest separare intencionaliter et sic causare intencionalem absenciam accidentis in subiecto. Et secundum talem intellectualem et inten- cionalem, non autem realem et naturalem absenciam, 10 accidens naturaliter et realiter inseparabile aptum est abesse preter subiecti corrupcionem eciam intencionalem. Unde, dato quod non posset intelligi albus corwus, potest tamen corwus intelligi albus. Nam, si intellectus circa corwum intellectum potest facere absenciam ni- 15 gredinis intencionalem, ipse] poterit facere circa corwum 226" intellectum presenciam albedinis intencionalem creato intellectui. Ergo deus concessit et reservat virtutem faciendi circa formas rerum intellectas presencias vel absencias intencionales, ubi natura non concessit vim 20 efficiendi circa illas res absencias quascumque realiter et reales. Sic eciam 2m philosophos, intellectus humanus potest intencionaliter separare et depurare materiam primam a quibuscunque formis substancialibus vel acci- dentalibus, cum ipse sciat dicere quod “materia prima 25 nec est quid, nec quale, nec quantum", etc. Sed natura non potest sic realiter separare et depurare primam materiam a morpheiis et passionibus pro aliquo tempore vel instanti temporis. Et sic, 2m Porphyrium, licet accidens quoddam non 30 possit abesse absencia reali preter subiecti corrupcionem realem ad talem absenciam, potest tamen abesse ab- sencia intencionali, cum non per se insit rei preter subiecti corrupcionem; sed genus, species, et differencia, cum per se et primo insint rei proprie, proprium 35 autem cum per se 2° inest rei nec reali absencia nec intencionali possunt abesse preter subiecti corrupcionem. Genus enim, differencia, et species, sunt de intellectu essenciali et quiditativa eius, cuius sunt talia. Non ergo contra essencialem et quiditativum intellectum rei potest 40 ipse intellectus fabricare absenciam intencionalem alicuius from their subjects; but they are separable by the mind, and that suffices. 1. v'� MS. 31. ſbis MS.
76 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XII. A raven is always black ; but we can think it losing that blackness, and therefore blackness is ar accident. Such is the power of reason, given to us by God. Our faculty of conceiving primordial matter clear of all determinations is a case in point. Thus, though an accident may inhere inseparably in its subject, we may think oſ it as not inhering; which is impossible for the first three Universals, which make up the very essence of the thing thought, virtutem eius, quia tunc separaretur a subiecto suo realiter quod de multis accidentibus (sicud de potenciis natura- libus in specie secunda qualitatis, de numero, quantitate continua, et sie de aliis infinitis) nobis est impossibile. Intellectus tamen, qui est agens sepe solum intencionaliter, sicud natura semper est agens naturaliter et realiter, ipse intellectus separando potest separare intencionaliter et sic causare intencionalem absenciam accidentis in subiecto. Et secundum talem intellectualem et inten- cionalem, non autem realem et naturalem absenciam, 10 accidens naturaliter et realiter inseparabile aptum est abesse preter subiecti corrupcionem eciam intencionalem. Unde, dato quod non posset intelligi albus corwus, potest tamen corwus intelligi albus. Nam, si intellectus circa corwum intellectum potest facere absenciam ni- 15 gredinis intencionalem, ipse] poterit facere circa corwum 226" intellectum presenciam albedinis intencionalem creato intellectui. Ergo deus concessit et reservat virtutem faciendi circa formas rerum intellectas presencias vel absencias intencionales, ubi natura non concessit vim 20 efficiendi circa illas res absencias quascumque realiter et reales. Sic eciam 2m philosophos, intellectus humanus potest intencionaliter separare et depurare materiam primam a quibuscunque formis substancialibus vel acci- dentalibus, cum ipse sciat dicere quod “materia prima 25 nec est quid, nec quale, nec quantum", etc. Sed natura non potest sic realiter separare et depurare primam materiam a morpheiis et passionibus pro aliquo tempore vel instanti temporis. Et sic, 2m Porphyrium, licet accidens quoddam non 30 possit abesse absencia reali preter subiecti corrupcionem realem ad talem absenciam, potest tamen abesse ab- sencia intencionali, cum non per se insit rei preter subiecti corrupcionem; sed genus, species, et differencia, cum per se et primo insint rei proprie, proprium 35 autem cum per se 2° inest rei nec reali absencia nec intencionali possunt abesse preter subiecti corrupcionem. Genus enim, differencia, et species, sunt de intellectu essenciali et quiditativa eius, cuius sunt talia. Non ergo contra essencialem et quiditativum intellectum rei potest 40 ipse intellectus fabricare absenciam intencionalem alicuius from their subjects; but they are separable by the mind, and that suffices. 1. v'� MS. 31. ſbis MS.
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CAP. XII. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 77 77 talium Proprie autem proprium, cum non habeat and also for the fourth propriam essenciam et quiditatem aliam a subiecto (property) which has no (sicud habet accidens), sed essencia et quiditas subiecti essence distinct sunt sibi sicud pro essencia et quiditate 2m quas debet from the subject. 5 sicud essencialiter et quiditative saltem materialiter intelligi, non potest intellectus fabricare absenciam in- tencionalem proprie passionis a subiecto, essencia et quiditate eius. Eciam quamvis vis nature non possit accidens inseparabile realiter et naturaliter a subiecto 10 [separare], intellectus tamen divinus sufficiencie omnis simpliciter infinite, qui potest creaturam racionalem eciam supra seipsam elevare graciose, sicut summe precipue patet de homine in Cristo; ille eciam poterit rem quamcunque in sui puritate sine accidente realiter 15 condistinctim conservare, licet non temporaliter vel 227° instanter; sed instans] tunc est in accidente sibi realiter condistincto. Potest autem rem in qualibet sua per se mensura essendi vel durandi pure conservare, nullum accidens realitatis condistinctum admiscendo. Ymmo 20 ille intellectus divinus, cum mere graciose communicet causis infra et extra se existentibus vim, efficaciam et exercicium causandi, ipse existens undique omnis suffi- ciencie infinite forte poterit causare, componere, et constituere eciam compositum quantificatum, qualifi- 25 catum, et quiditativum, et conservare absque ulla con- causacione parcium quantitativarum, qualitativarum, vel quiditativarum eiusdem compositi, quamvis ille partes de necessitate illi composito inexistant, si ipsum sic sit compositum. Nec videtur oportere sequi de necessitate, 30 si alique tales partes sint ordine essenciali priores illi composito, quod igitur dent sibi esse. Omnes enim materie prime, quarum nulla est pars alterius, videntur eque prime esse in ordine; et tamen non, si una illarum alicui composito materialiter dat esse, quod ergo que- 35 libet illarum. Propter quod, si ordine essenciali genus sit prius sua specie, quia forma eius essencialis nobilior But God has the power of really separating the essence of a substance from its accidents and of preserving its being without any quality or quantity or even essential parts. For the parts of a being do not necessarily give it existence. Why should not God be able, even without 10. separare deest MS.; ib. fuffie MS.; ib. omis (omnipotens?) MS. 16. p instans under 12. groſe MS. 14. purte MS. 15. 9disticti MS. line MS. 22. omis (omnipotens?) MS. 8. Here the author begins to develope a theory of which not a trace has yet been found in any other of Wyclif's works already published, and which seems contrary to his well-known doctrine — the denial of absolute accidents.
CAP. XII. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 77 77 talium Proprie autem proprium, cum non habeat and also for the fourth propriam essenciam et quiditatem aliam a subiecto (property) which has no (sicud habet accidens), sed essencia et quiditas subiecti essence distinct sunt sibi sicud pro essencia et quiditate 2m quas debet from the subject. 5 sicud essencialiter et quiditative saltem materialiter intelligi, non potest intellectus fabricare absenciam in- tencionalem proprie passionis a subiecto, essencia et quiditate eius. Eciam quamvis vis nature non possit accidens inseparabile realiter et naturaliter a subiecto 10 [separare], intellectus tamen divinus sufficiencie omnis simpliciter infinite, qui potest creaturam racionalem eciam supra seipsam elevare graciose, sicut summe precipue patet de homine in Cristo; ille eciam poterit rem quamcunque in sui puritate sine accidente realiter 15 condistinctim conservare, licet non temporaliter vel 227° instanter; sed instans] tunc est in accidente sibi realiter condistincto. Potest autem rem in qualibet sua per se mensura essendi vel durandi pure conservare, nullum accidens realitatis condistinctum admiscendo. Ymmo 20 ille intellectus divinus, cum mere graciose communicet causis infra et extra se existentibus vim, efficaciam et exercicium causandi, ipse existens undique omnis suffi- ciencie infinite forte poterit causare, componere, et constituere eciam compositum quantificatum, qualifi- 25 catum, et quiditativum, et conservare absque ulla con- causacione parcium quantitativarum, qualitativarum, vel quiditativarum eiusdem compositi, quamvis ille partes de necessitate illi composito inexistant, si ipsum sic sit compositum. Nec videtur oportere sequi de necessitate, 30 si alique tales partes sint ordine essenciali priores illi composito, quod igitur dent sibi esse. Omnes enim materie prime, quarum nulla est pars alterius, videntur eque prime esse in ordine; et tamen non, si una illarum alicui composito materialiter dat esse, quod ergo que- 35 libet illarum. Propter quod, si ordine essenciali genus sit prius sua specie, quia forma eius essencialis nobilior But God has the power of really separating the essence of a substance from its accidents and of preserving its being without any quality or quantity or even essential parts. For the parts of a being do not necessarily give it existence. Why should not God be able, even without 10. separare deest MS.; ib. fuffie MS.; ib. omis (omnipotens?) MS. 16. p instans under 12. groſe MS. 14. purte MS. 15. 9disticti MS. line MS. 22. omis (omnipotens?) MS. 8. Here the author begins to develope a theory of which not a trace has yet been found in any other of Wyclif's works already published, and which seems contrary to his well-known doctrine — the denial of absolute accidents.
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78 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XII. quam propria forma essencialis speciei, non videtur oportere quod deus — qui est undique et per consequens ante genus et post genus alicuius speciei, simpliciter infinite sufficiencie, et in ipso genere — quod talis non possit sine exigua et velut nulla concausacione generis? possit et ante genus et in genere et post illud genus dare ipsi speciei esse post genus ordine essenciali. Quid A million of powerful enim mille milia equorum fortissimorum bene applicati horses do not need the help ad trahendum aratrum in agro requirerent contraccionem of a fly to draw a plough. unius musce? Quanto minus deus requirit contraccionem 10 alicuius creature diminute et parvule comparacione sui Thus He might ad causandum quemcunquelibet effectum! Quod si sic create a est, poterit et substanciam sine quocunque accidente substance without sibi realiter condistincte conservare; quamvis non possit accidents; there would esse aliqua substancia post deum nisi habeat relacionem 15 indeed be causati ad deum illi substancie condistinctam, nec illam 227" relation — that of the creature oportet esse relacionem realem et spiritualem de genere to God; but relacionis, cum illi non correspondeat relativum in deo this is only fictive, not real. consimilem. Cum enim non possumus videre omnes angulos in quibus iacent veritates abscondite, et deus 20 [sit] undique et in omni angulo omnis sufficiencie simpli- citer infinite, quid de infinitis pocius diffinire quod deus talia non possit? Verumptamen utrobique cavendum est ne omnipotencie dei fiat blasphemia, ascribendo sibi quod est simpliciter 25 impossibile, et per consequens omnino irracionabile, vel denegando sibi quod ipse scit sibi possibile. "Noli' ergo “altum sapere", sed time, stans contentus in quali- cunque noticia, quod accidens, ut est unum de quinque universalibus, est forma universalis inexistens rei post 30 et secundum completum esse individuum; et quamlibet An accident is a form which talem potest deus (si sibi placuerit) extra substanciam has a different essence from in sua puritate et sua pura manencia conservare. Nec its subject, and videtur sequi, si albedo seipsa et nulla alia forma est can be separated substanciam esse albam (et ita consimiliter de aliis acci-35 therefrom. Whiteness is dentibus realibus) quod igitur non possit esse albedo the being white of a substance; nisi ipsa sit substanciam esse albam. Sic enim situs meus We must be equally in guard against denying God's power, and ascribing to Him what is absurd. the concourse of the genus, to create a species? His power is infinite. 7. quo pro quid MS. 11. cae pro creature MS. 40 5. g° MS. 12. � cuq lib; MS. 21. sit deest MS. 26. raconale! MS. 15. Relacionem. Relation was considered by Schoolmen to be an accident, but only relation of a certain sort. 33. Conser- vare. See note, p. 77.
78 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XII. quam propria forma essencialis speciei, non videtur oportere quod deus — qui est undique et per consequens ante genus et post genus alicuius speciei, simpliciter infinite sufficiencie, et in ipso genere — quod talis non possit sine exigua et velut nulla concausacione generis? possit et ante genus et in genere et post illud genus dare ipsi speciei esse post genus ordine essenciali. Quid A million of powerful enim mille milia equorum fortissimorum bene applicati horses do not need the help ad trahendum aratrum in agro requirerent contraccionem of a fly to draw a plough. unius musce? Quanto minus deus requirit contraccionem 10 alicuius creature diminute et parvule comparacione sui Thus He might ad causandum quemcunquelibet effectum! Quod si sic create a est, poterit et substanciam sine quocunque accidente substance without sibi realiter condistincte conservare; quamvis non possit accidents; there would esse aliqua substancia post deum nisi habeat relacionem 15 indeed be causati ad deum illi substancie condistinctam, nec illam 227" relation — that of the creature oportet esse relacionem realem et spiritualem de genere to God; but relacionis, cum illi non correspondeat relativum in deo this is only fictive, not real. consimilem. Cum enim non possumus videre omnes angulos in quibus iacent veritates abscondite, et deus 20 [sit] undique et in omni angulo omnis sufficiencie simpli- citer infinite, quid de infinitis pocius diffinire quod deus talia non possit? Verumptamen utrobique cavendum est ne omnipotencie dei fiat blasphemia, ascribendo sibi quod est simpliciter 25 impossibile, et per consequens omnino irracionabile, vel denegando sibi quod ipse scit sibi possibile. "Noli' ergo “altum sapere", sed time, stans contentus in quali- cunque noticia, quod accidens, ut est unum de quinque universalibus, est forma universalis inexistens rei post 30 et secundum completum esse individuum; et quamlibet An accident is a form which talem potest deus (si sibi placuerit) extra substanciam has a different essence from in sua puritate et sua pura manencia conservare. Nec its subject, and videtur sequi, si albedo seipsa et nulla alia forma est can be separated substanciam esse albam (et ita consimiliter de aliis acci-35 therefrom. Whiteness is dentibus realibus) quod igitur non possit esse albedo the being white of a substance; nisi ipsa sit substanciam esse albam. Sic enim situs meus We must be equally in guard against denying God's power, and ascribing to Him what is absurd. the concourse of the genus, to create a species? His power is infinite. 7. quo pro quid MS. 11. cae pro creature MS. 40 5. g° MS. 12. � cuq lib; MS. 21. sit deest MS. 26. raconale! MS. 15. Relacionem. Relation was considered by Schoolmen to be an accident, but only relation of a certain sort. 33. Conser- vare. See note, p. 77.
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CAP. XII. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 79 seipso est me esse situatum. Nisi forte dicatur quod but may it not be otherwise ? albedo per informacionem sibi quodammodo distinctam Whiteness in a sit substanciam esse albam, quamvis illa informacio nequa-subject gives it a certain quam possit esse substanciam esse albam. Et licet albedo determination; but if the possit esse sine substancia quam informaret propter determination should not take ipsum albedinis absolutum in se esse, tamen informacioni place, there illa albedo (cum sit per se respectivum) non poterit would still remain the sic sine albedine subsistere. essence of whiteness. 3. inſe MS.
CAP. XII. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 79 seipso est me esse situatum. Nisi forte dicatur quod but may it not be otherwise ? albedo per informacionem sibi quodammodo distinctam Whiteness in a sit substanciam esse albam, quamvis illa informacio nequa-subject gives it a certain quam possit esse substanciam esse albam. Et licet albedo determination; but if the possit esse sine substancia quam informaret propter determination should not take ipsum albedinis absolutum in se esse, tamen informacioni place, there illa albedo (cum sit per se respectivum) non poterit would still remain the sic sine albedine subsistere. essence of whiteness. 3. inſe MS.
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CAPITULUM DECIMUM TERCIUM. The first three Cum autem universalia quinque insint et predicentur Universals are de hiis quorum sunt universalia, quorum prima tria per said to be predicated, the predicari sunt descripta et non per esse, ultima vero others to inhere; because duo per inesse: igitur factum est, quia ultima duo uni-5 those are deeper and versalia sunt sicud exterius in superficie rei apparencia, greater in prima autem tria sicud interius in profundo latencia; importance ; aud yet the igitur ultima duo per inesse sunt descripta. Sed quia de reality of their primis tribus multum fuit dubium si subsisterent vel si existence is doubted; essent in solis a mundis purisque intellectibus posita, igitur 10 whereas the others are more non per esse sed per predicari illa descripsit; vel quia striking and yet might be prima tria habuerunt magnam, licet nimis latentem, conceived as existenciam; ultima autem duo pura, licet apparentem 228s merely fictions of the mind. existenciam. Ideo ultima duo, ne videntur solum esse And it may be that Porphyrius in nomine, [non] per predicari, sed per inesse descripsit. 15 only thought Prima autem tria, ne propter sui magnam existenciam the 3 former to be also logical viderentur auffugere deminutum esse logicale, per pre- entities, and so dicari sunt descripta, iubente vel permittente deo, vel used the word predicate. quia putavit prima tria solum et pure esse in intellectum universalia. Et cum mencio facta est et nunc et prius de predi- cari, videtur dicendum quot modis est predicacio, et quotupliciter aliquid de aliquo predicetur. Cum autem hoc verbum predico, predicas, componatur de pre et dico, dicas (quod est copulare), predicacio 25 tantum videtur uno modo sonare, sicud precopulacio. Igitur sicud differencia vel distancia est triplex: maxima, scilicet essencialis et realis, media, scilicet realis et non essencialis, et minima, videlicet differencia racionis: sic videtur quod predicacio, ut est copulacio vel unio 30 alicuius ad aliud, est triplex: maxima, que diceretur essencialis et realis, media, que diceretur realis et [non essencialis, et minima, que diceretur predicacio secundum There are three sorts of predication, the greatest, the medium, and the least, according to the intensity with which subject and predicate are united. 20 1. Capitulum &c. deest. 2. Blank space for Initial C MS. MS. 15. non deest MS. MS. 10. audis 31. esse MS. deest MS. 3. qr 32. non
CAPITULUM DECIMUM TERCIUM. The first three Cum autem universalia quinque insint et predicentur Universals are de hiis quorum sunt universalia, quorum prima tria per said to be predicated, the predicari sunt descripta et non per esse, ultima vero others to inhere; because duo per inesse: igitur factum est, quia ultima duo uni-5 those are deeper and versalia sunt sicud exterius in superficie rei apparencia, greater in prima autem tria sicud interius in profundo latencia; importance ; aud yet the igitur ultima duo per inesse sunt descripta. Sed quia de reality of their primis tribus multum fuit dubium si subsisterent vel si existence is doubted; essent in solis a mundis purisque intellectibus posita, igitur 10 whereas the others are more non per esse sed per predicari illa descripsit; vel quia striking and yet might be prima tria habuerunt magnam, licet nimis latentem, conceived as existenciam; ultima autem duo pura, licet apparentem 228s merely fictions of the mind. existenciam. Ideo ultima duo, ne videntur solum esse And it may be that Porphyrius in nomine, [non] per predicari, sed per inesse descripsit. 15 only thought Prima autem tria, ne propter sui magnam existenciam the 3 former to be also logical viderentur auffugere deminutum esse logicale, per pre- entities, and so dicari sunt descripta, iubente vel permittente deo, vel used the word predicate. quia putavit prima tria solum et pure esse in intellectum universalia. Et cum mencio facta est et nunc et prius de predi- cari, videtur dicendum quot modis est predicacio, et quotupliciter aliquid de aliquo predicetur. Cum autem hoc verbum predico, predicas, componatur de pre et dico, dicas (quod est copulare), predicacio 25 tantum videtur uno modo sonare, sicud precopulacio. Igitur sicud differencia vel distancia est triplex: maxima, scilicet essencialis et realis, media, scilicet realis et non essencialis, et minima, videlicet differencia racionis: sic videtur quod predicacio, ut est copulacio vel unio 30 alicuius ad aliud, est triplex: maxima, que diceretur essencialis et realis, media, que diceretur realis et [non essencialis, et minima, que diceretur predicacio secundum There are three sorts of predication, the greatest, the medium, and the least, according to the intensity with which subject and predicate are united. 20 1. Capitulum &c. deest. 2. Blank space for Initial C MS. MS. 15. non deest MS. MS. 10. audis 31. esse MS. deest MS. 3. qr 32. non
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CAP. XIII. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 81 racionem, quam alii dicunt predicacionem secundum The greatest is predication of habitudinem. something Et 2m hoc, illud quod per se primo est res ipsa, essential to the subject; as: "Man is an vel in ipsa re, ita quod est essenciale intrinsecum rei, animated 5 maxime unitur rei. Et sic maxima predicacione de re being." predicatur: sicud, 'Homo est animal". Illud autem quod realiter intrinsece, sed non essen- The next is the predication of cialiter sed accidentaliter, unitur rei, qua res, non est something real in, but not simpliciter ens vel simpliciter quid, sed est res realiter essential to, the subject; as, 10 intrinsece esse alicuiusmodi; illud predicatur de re A is white" ; realiter, sed non essencialiter; sicud dicendo “Sor est this predication is real but not albus", predicatur albedo de Sorte realiter non essen- essential else. cialiter, cum realiter intrinsece uniatur sibi sicud modus suus realis, intrinsecus, non autem essencialis, et est 15 realiter intrinsece ipsi Sorte esse Sortem album. Et talis predicacio est realis, non essencialis, et media; et unio huiusmodi rei ad rem est unio media. Tercia autem et minima predicacio diceretur predi- cacio secundum racionem, sicud est quedam non maxima, 20 essencialis et realis, nec media realis non essencialis, sed minima unio secundum racionem (rei tamen ad esse); et illo modo quod non ab intrinseco essencialiter vel 2285 accidentaliter, sed penitus extrinsece! et ab extrinseco adiacet rei et unitur rei, secundum racionem tantum 25 predicatur de re minima predicacione. Et sic encia logi- calia predicantur de re reali, ut: "deum amari a me, deum diligi a Sorte, deum significari per talem terminum, deus." Et sic de aliis; ut, lapidem videri a me, bonum vel malum hominis divulgari per mundum etc. predicantur 3o ista minima predicacione secundum racionem. Et istiusmodi predicacionis sunt iste vere predicaciones scripture sacre: "Johannes Baptista est Helias“, Cristus enim unigenitus dei omnipotens dixit: 'Si wultis recipere, ipse est Helias." Igitur verum est hoc dictum: "Johannes 35 est Helias." Sic a simili spiritus sanctus per Joseph dixit, Gen. 41°; “Septem boves pulchre et septem spice plene septem ubertatis anni sunt." Igitur hoc est verum dictum ad sensum quem spiritus sanctus wult esse verum in hiis verbis. Et sicud ens logicum (ut, gracia exempli, deum 40 cognosci a me) penitus ab extrinseco unitur et predi- The third is logical predication, neither essential nor real, but in which something is ruly predicated of something. Thus when we say, “God is loved by me' , "this stone is seen by me", these argue nothing real in God or in the stone. Examples of various true predications of this kind in Holy Scripture. The subject and predicate are here joined 27. fr. MS. 16. sed unio pro et unio MS. 20. nec pro non MS. 33. vm" MS.; ib. accipere MS. 36. Gen. XLI, 26. De Universalibus. 6
CAP. XIII. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 81 racionem, quam alii dicunt predicacionem secundum The greatest is predication of habitudinem. something Et 2m hoc, illud quod per se primo est res ipsa, essential to the subject; as: "Man is an vel in ipsa re, ita quod est essenciale intrinsecum rei, animated 5 maxime unitur rei. Et sic maxima predicacione de re being." predicatur: sicud, 'Homo est animal". Illud autem quod realiter intrinsece, sed non essen- The next is the predication of cialiter sed accidentaliter, unitur rei, qua res, non est something real in, but not simpliciter ens vel simpliciter quid, sed est res realiter essential to, the subject; as, 10 intrinsece esse alicuiusmodi; illud predicatur de re A is white" ; realiter, sed non essencialiter; sicud dicendo “Sor est this predication is real but not albus", predicatur albedo de Sorte realiter non essen- essential else. cialiter, cum realiter intrinsece uniatur sibi sicud modus suus realis, intrinsecus, non autem essencialis, et est 15 realiter intrinsece ipsi Sorte esse Sortem album. Et talis predicacio est realis, non essencialis, et media; et unio huiusmodi rei ad rem est unio media. Tercia autem et minima predicacio diceretur predi- cacio secundum racionem, sicud est quedam non maxima, 20 essencialis et realis, nec media realis non essencialis, sed minima unio secundum racionem (rei tamen ad esse); et illo modo quod non ab intrinseco essencialiter vel 2285 accidentaliter, sed penitus extrinsece! et ab extrinseco adiacet rei et unitur rei, secundum racionem tantum 25 predicatur de re minima predicacione. Et sic encia logi- calia predicantur de re reali, ut: "deum amari a me, deum diligi a Sorte, deum significari per talem terminum, deus." Et sic de aliis; ut, lapidem videri a me, bonum vel malum hominis divulgari per mundum etc. predicantur 3o ista minima predicacione secundum racionem. Et istiusmodi predicacionis sunt iste vere predicaciones scripture sacre: "Johannes Baptista est Helias“, Cristus enim unigenitus dei omnipotens dixit: 'Si wultis recipere, ipse est Helias." Igitur verum est hoc dictum: "Johannes 35 est Helias." Sic a simili spiritus sanctus per Joseph dixit, Gen. 41°; “Septem boves pulchre et septem spice plene septem ubertatis anni sunt." Igitur hoc est verum dictum ad sensum quem spiritus sanctus wult esse verum in hiis verbis. Et sicud ens logicum (ut, gracia exempli, deum 40 cognosci a me) penitus ab extrinseco unitur et predi- The third is logical predication, neither essential nor real, but in which something is ruly predicated of something. Thus when we say, “God is loved by me' , "this stone is seen by me", these argue nothing real in God or in the stone. Examples of various true predications of this kind in Holy Scripture. The subject and predicate are here joined 27. fr. MS. 16. sed unio pro et unio MS. 20. nec pro non MS. 33. vm" MS.; ib. accipere MS. 36. Gen. XLI, 26. De Universalibus. 6
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82 by a copula which is guite extrinsical; it makes no real difference 10 God whether He be known by me or not; and He is certainly not known essentially. When this is the case, we have logical predication. Why is it more true to say that John is Elias, than that Peter is Paul? Because Christ's Word has effected this union, and . . . . . we know not if sufficiens est ex ordinacione dei ut Helias de it exists in the other case. This identity, besides, is not personal, but figurative. Can we say: The goat Abraham offered was figuratively Christ; therefore it was . JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XIII. catur de deo secundum racionem et non essencialiter, cum tunc deus essencialiter cognosceretur a me, nec secundum realitatem; cum autem reale accidens adiacet deo, cum possit deo deesse quod ipse cognoscitur a me; sic deus verbo suo omnipotenti dicendo potest addere rem realem alteri penitus extrinsece et ab ex- trinseco unire et facere predicari de illa non 2" quod esset ens aliqua intrinseca essencialis vel accidentalis realitas, vel quod 2" aliquam essencialitatem vel reali- tatem esset sibi unita, sed quod solum 2" modum quemdam vel racionem unitur sibi; qui modus vel que racio sufficit ad hoc ex ordinacione dei omnipotentis, ut hoc de illo minima predicacione predicetur. Et ubi talis modus inter rem et aliam rem realem tenet, vel eciam circa rem realem et rem racionis, ibi predicacio illa habet locum; et ubi non, ibi non erit talis predi- cacio. Et sicud alicuius ad aliquid— puta, alicuius a se ipso, — nulla penitus est differencia, ita eciam alicuius de aliquo nulla penitus est predicacio. 5 - o Quod si queratur quare pocius verum est dicere quod 2o "Johannes est Helias" quam quod "Petrus est Paulus", vel "lapis est lignum", vel "deitas est humanitas"; respondetur quod ex efficaci verbo, quod Cristus est, ‘per quod facta sunt omnia"', inter Johannem et Heliam currit unio | secundum racionem, que racio pertinens et Johanne minimo genere predicacionis predicetur; Sic autem non factum est inter Petrum et Paulum; velsi, nobis insciis, inter eos factum consimiliter 2" talem non essencialem, non realem, sed racionalem unionem de se predicantur; et ita de aliis; Et Joannes non personaliter est Helias; et similiter septem boves non suppositaliter vel secundum ydemptitatem numeralem sunt septem anni, sed figuraliter. Et si dicatur: *'Hircus quem immolavit Abraham pro filio suo Ysaac figuravit Cristum; igitur fuit figuraliter 35 Cristus, igitur hircus ille fuit Cristus; respondetur quod non quecunque figuracio inter rem et rem reddit unam Christ? No, for lllarum esse figuraliter reliquam, et sic in predicacione not every figure suffices for this figurative secundum racionem vel 2" habitudinem illam esse illam; sic enim quodlibet de quolibet predicaretur. 14./t MS. 25.“ MS. — 28. nób ifcie MS. 17. Ad aliquid. 1 have let the text stand, but I think it ought to be ab aliquo. 7. em'e (vivere?) MS. Sed sicut 40
82 by a copula which is guite extrinsical; it makes no real difference 10 God whether He be known by me or not; and He is certainly not known essentially. When this is the case, we have logical predication. Why is it more true to say that John is Elias, than that Peter is Paul? Because Christ's Word has effected this union, and . . . . . we know not if sufficiens est ex ordinacione dei ut Helias de it exists in the other case. This identity, besides, is not personal, but figurative. Can we say: The goat Abraham offered was figuratively Christ; therefore it was . JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XIII. catur de deo secundum racionem et non essencialiter, cum tunc deus essencialiter cognosceretur a me, nec secundum realitatem; cum autem reale accidens adiacet deo, cum possit deo deesse quod ipse cognoscitur a me; sic deus verbo suo omnipotenti dicendo potest addere rem realem alteri penitus extrinsece et ab ex- trinseco unire et facere predicari de illa non 2" quod esset ens aliqua intrinseca essencialis vel accidentalis realitas, vel quod 2" aliquam essencialitatem vel reali- tatem esset sibi unita, sed quod solum 2" modum quemdam vel racionem unitur sibi; qui modus vel que racio sufficit ad hoc ex ordinacione dei omnipotentis, ut hoc de illo minima predicacione predicetur. Et ubi talis modus inter rem et aliam rem realem tenet, vel eciam circa rem realem et rem racionis, ibi predicacio illa habet locum; et ubi non, ibi non erit talis predi- cacio. Et sicud alicuius ad aliquid— puta, alicuius a se ipso, — nulla penitus est differencia, ita eciam alicuius de aliquo nulla penitus est predicacio. 5 - o Quod si queratur quare pocius verum est dicere quod 2o "Johannes est Helias" quam quod "Petrus est Paulus", vel "lapis est lignum", vel "deitas est humanitas"; respondetur quod ex efficaci verbo, quod Cristus est, ‘per quod facta sunt omnia"', inter Johannem et Heliam currit unio | secundum racionem, que racio pertinens et Johanne minimo genere predicacionis predicetur; Sic autem non factum est inter Petrum et Paulum; velsi, nobis insciis, inter eos factum consimiliter 2" talem non essencialem, non realem, sed racionalem unionem de se predicantur; et ita de aliis; Et Joannes non personaliter est Helias; et similiter septem boves non suppositaliter vel secundum ydemptitatem numeralem sunt septem anni, sed figuraliter. Et si dicatur: *'Hircus quem immolavit Abraham pro filio suo Ysaac figuravit Cristum; igitur fuit figuraliter 35 Cristus, igitur hircus ille fuit Cristus; respondetur quod non quecunque figuracio inter rem et rem reddit unam Christ? No, for lllarum esse figuraliter reliquam, et sic in predicacione not every figure suffices for this figurative secundum racionem vel 2" habitudinem illam esse illam; sic enim quodlibet de quolibet predicaretur. 14./t MS. 25.“ MS. — 28. nób ifcie MS. 17. Ad aliquid. 1 have let the text stand, but I think it ought to be ab aliquo. 7. em'e (vivere?) MS. Sed sicut 40
Strana 83
CAP. XIII. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 83 differencia 2m racionem tantum habet suum per se identity; some do, and some primum et proprium modum qui non ubique, sed ali- do not; who will know the cubi, et alicubi non currit, sic predicacio 2m racionem reason why, let tantum habet consimiliter modum suum primum et him search in the hidden 5 proprium non inter quaslibet res, sed inter aliquas et counsels of God. aliquas non currentem. Et volens investigare quare inter illa et non inter ista currit predicacio 2m racionem tantum, querat, si potest, in secreto et abscondito consilio dei. Nec est novum significatum de tali predicacione 2m to habitudinem sive 2m racionem, sed est antiquum sacra- mentum, cum et patres (ut Sanctus Thomas, Egidius, et ceteri doctores) concedant quod rosa est flos, nulla rosa existente in tali predicacione; et in tali predicacione dicit Ewangelium Johannis primo, "Quod factum est in 15 ipso vita erat," iuxta lecturam et pausam sancte Romane ecclesie. Et sicut supra dictum est quod grossi solum differenciam essencialem et non 2am vel terciam racione percipiunt sed fide, et tamen sapientes ultra fidem omnes illas 3es 2m plus et minus eciam racione capiunt; sic 20 et hoc de triplici supradicta predicacione. Nam et multi non capiunt quod albedo predicetur de sub- stancia, cum tunc (ut estimant) substancia esset albedo! Sed tamen albedo, sicut et sanitas, vere predicatur de substancia;] ut, querenti quid dicis de amico meo, 229° 25 respondetur quod dico esse sanum. Ecce esse sanum, quod est sanitas, dicitur de substancia amico. Et secundum [hoc] cum sic dicitur, vere et naturaliter est ita quod deus diligitur a regina mundi. Unus sensus est quod in veritate et a parte rei circumscripta nostra 3o affirmacione est quod deus diligitur a regina mundi. Et ille sensus est verus. Si autem intelligeretur quod deum diligi a regina mundi secundum unionem realem uniretur et predicaretur de deo, et per consequens secundum predicacionem realem, non est sensus ille 35 concedendus; et sic de aliis loqucionibus, ubi predicacio secundum racionem tantum habet veritatem et locum et non realis vel essencialis. Et sicut differencia racionis tantum ad ab aliquo vere differt, licet non essencialiter nec realiter, sic predicacione secundum racionem tantum 40 ad de aliquo vere predicatur licet non [essencialiter], ut iam dictum est. Et sicut nemo potest negare quin deum Many of the unlearned do not know this; nor will they admit that whiteness can be predicated of a substance, for then the substance would be whiteness! This abstract noun only stands for the affirmation of something concrete. Of course, this predication is true only when taken in its proper sense; if made to mean another sort of predication, it becomes false. God is loved by St. Peter; this is undeniable; but though true, it is a predicate of mere reason. As the Father his is no new doctrine, but one admitted by all the Fathers and Doctors ; they explain many things thereby. 27. hoc deest MS. 28. r'gia MS. 30. r'gia MS. 21. pdicatr MS. 40. essencialiter deest MS. 6*
CAP. XIII. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 83 differencia 2m racionem tantum habet suum per se identity; some do, and some primum et proprium modum qui non ubique, sed ali- do not; who will know the cubi, et alicubi non currit, sic predicacio 2m racionem reason why, let tantum habet consimiliter modum suum primum et him search in the hidden 5 proprium non inter quaslibet res, sed inter aliquas et counsels of God. aliquas non currentem. Et volens investigare quare inter illa et non inter ista currit predicacio 2m racionem tantum, querat, si potest, in secreto et abscondito consilio dei. Nec est novum significatum de tali predicacione 2m to habitudinem sive 2m racionem, sed est antiquum sacra- mentum, cum et patres (ut Sanctus Thomas, Egidius, et ceteri doctores) concedant quod rosa est flos, nulla rosa existente in tali predicacione; et in tali predicacione dicit Ewangelium Johannis primo, "Quod factum est in 15 ipso vita erat," iuxta lecturam et pausam sancte Romane ecclesie. Et sicut supra dictum est quod grossi solum differenciam essencialem et non 2am vel terciam racione percipiunt sed fide, et tamen sapientes ultra fidem omnes illas 3es 2m plus et minus eciam racione capiunt; sic 20 et hoc de triplici supradicta predicacione. Nam et multi non capiunt quod albedo predicetur de sub- stancia, cum tunc (ut estimant) substancia esset albedo! Sed tamen albedo, sicut et sanitas, vere predicatur de substancia;] ut, querenti quid dicis de amico meo, 229° 25 respondetur quod dico esse sanum. Ecce esse sanum, quod est sanitas, dicitur de substancia amico. Et secundum [hoc] cum sic dicitur, vere et naturaliter est ita quod deus diligitur a regina mundi. Unus sensus est quod in veritate et a parte rei circumscripta nostra 3o affirmacione est quod deus diligitur a regina mundi. Et ille sensus est verus. Si autem intelligeretur quod deum diligi a regina mundi secundum unionem realem uniretur et predicaretur de deo, et per consequens secundum predicacionem realem, non est sensus ille 35 concedendus; et sic de aliis loqucionibus, ubi predicacio secundum racionem tantum habet veritatem et locum et non realis vel essencialis. Et sicut differencia racionis tantum ad ab aliquo vere differt, licet non essencialiter nec realiter, sic predicacione secundum racionem tantum 40 ad de aliquo vere predicatur licet non [essencialiter], ut iam dictum est. Et sicut nemo potest negare quin deum Many of the unlearned do not know this; nor will they admit that whiteness can be predicated of a substance, for then the substance would be whiteness! This abstract noun only stands for the affirmation of something concrete. Of course, this predication is true only when taken in its proper sense; if made to mean another sort of predication, it becomes false. God is loved by St. Peter; this is undeniable; but though true, it is a predicate of mere reason. As the Father his is no new doctrine, but one admitted by all the Fathers and Doctors ; they explain many things thereby. 27. hoc deest MS. 28. r'gia MS. 30. r'gia MS. 21. pdicatr MS. 40. essencialiter deest MS. 6*
Strana 84
84 differs truly, but not rea y from the God- head, so Elias is truly John, but not really nor personally so. However this may be explained, few are able to conceive of such predication, in matters not of faith, as few can conceive of the corresponding ditference. Yet the difficulties JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XIII. diligi a sancto Petro, quod est inter ens racionis vere et tantum solum secundum racionem, sicud solum est ens racionis, predicatur de deo qui summe et maxime est ens; sic non est negandum quin res realis vere (sed 2" racionem tantum) differt; ut patet de patre in divinis 5 et divina essencia, Unde, ut dictum est, cum Cristus dixit, "Si wultis recipere, Joannes et Helias," vere pre- dicatur Helias de Johanne, sed non personaliter, realiter, vel essencialiter, sed 2” racionem. Illam autem specialem racionem dicunt aliqui figurali- tatem non quamcunque, sed que inter illos constituta est, reddens vere unum esse reliquum, non realiter sed 2" racionem tantum. Verum, sicud rei realis ad rem realem differenciam secundum racionem tantum, ut ¢ dictum est, pauci possunt capere, saltem preter vel ultra fidem, sic et predicacionem 2? racionem tantum propter sui minimam tenuitatem, Nec valent sophismata, ut: m o - o **Si Joannes est Helias, et made are mere Helias fuit et vixit humanitus pluribus centennis annorum sophisms, confusing the meanings of ‘truly’ and ‘really’. What is true, is true in a certain way, and this way. is real; but i it followed that Et dato ky meant rea vt then the Father, truly different from the Godhead, would be really so. We need not be ashamed to adduce instances taken trom Theology. 'Two sorts of notional predication a notional entity ante Cristum, quod igitur sic Joannes." Et: '*Si Joannes 2o vere est Helias, igitur realiter est Helias"; nisi ly "realiter" dicat sensum talem quod preter nostram affirmacionem a parte rei est quod Johannes est Helias, Nec: "Si Johannes est Helias, igitur substancialiter vel accidentaliter realiter"; sed sufficit quod modaliter | sive secundum modum; et sic tamen vere est Helias. quod omnis veritas sit realitas, et omnis modus sit realitas, cum tamen non omnis veritas 27? suum primum per se modum sit realitas, sicud nec omnis modus 2" suum per se primum modum essendi est 3o realitas, non sequitur: ''Si vere et modaliter Johannes est Helias, quod igitur realiter", nisi equivocando in ly ''realiter", ut est dictum: quia sic argueretur quod persona patris in divinis realiter differret ab essencia vel distinguitur, quia aliquid predicaretur de divina 35 essencia et non de persona patris; et econtra. Nec erubescimus hic exempla theologica inducere; quia finem nostre cognicionis in scriptura sacra con- stituere debemus, Et 2" iam superius dicta, predicacio 2" racionem tantum videtur habere sub se duos modos: 4o 25 aut quia res racionis tantum predicatur de aliquo, et illa, sicud non potest esse nisi res racionis tantum, sic I9. ce tenis MS. 230"
84 differs truly, but not rea y from the God- head, so Elias is truly John, but not really nor personally so. However this may be explained, few are able to conceive of such predication, in matters not of faith, as few can conceive of the corresponding ditference. Yet the difficulties JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XIII. diligi a sancto Petro, quod est inter ens racionis vere et tantum solum secundum racionem, sicud solum est ens racionis, predicatur de deo qui summe et maxime est ens; sic non est negandum quin res realis vere (sed 2" racionem tantum) differt; ut patet de patre in divinis 5 et divina essencia, Unde, ut dictum est, cum Cristus dixit, "Si wultis recipere, Joannes et Helias," vere pre- dicatur Helias de Johanne, sed non personaliter, realiter, vel essencialiter, sed 2” racionem. Illam autem specialem racionem dicunt aliqui figurali- tatem non quamcunque, sed que inter illos constituta est, reddens vere unum esse reliquum, non realiter sed 2" racionem tantum. Verum, sicud rei realis ad rem realem differenciam secundum racionem tantum, ut ¢ dictum est, pauci possunt capere, saltem preter vel ultra fidem, sic et predicacionem 2? racionem tantum propter sui minimam tenuitatem, Nec valent sophismata, ut: m o - o **Si Joannes est Helias, et made are mere Helias fuit et vixit humanitus pluribus centennis annorum sophisms, confusing the meanings of ‘truly’ and ‘really’. What is true, is true in a certain way, and this way. is real; but i it followed that Et dato ky meant rea vt then the Father, truly different from the Godhead, would be really so. We need not be ashamed to adduce instances taken trom Theology. 'Two sorts of notional predication a notional entity ante Cristum, quod igitur sic Joannes." Et: '*Si Joannes 2o vere est Helias, igitur realiter est Helias"; nisi ly "realiter" dicat sensum talem quod preter nostram affirmacionem a parte rei est quod Johannes est Helias, Nec: "Si Johannes est Helias, igitur substancialiter vel accidentaliter realiter"; sed sufficit quod modaliter | sive secundum modum; et sic tamen vere est Helias. quod omnis veritas sit realitas, et omnis modus sit realitas, cum tamen non omnis veritas 27? suum primum per se modum sit realitas, sicud nec omnis modus 2" suum per se primum modum essendi est 3o realitas, non sequitur: ''Si vere et modaliter Johannes est Helias, quod igitur realiter", nisi equivocando in ly ''realiter", ut est dictum: quia sic argueretur quod persona patris in divinis realiter differret ab essencia vel distinguitur, quia aliquid predicaretur de divina 35 essencia et non de persona patris; et econtra. Nec erubescimus hic exempla theologica inducere; quia finem nostre cognicionis in scriptura sacra con- stituere debemus, Et 2" iam superius dicta, predicacio 2" racionem tantum videtur habere sub se duos modos: 4o 25 aut quia res racionis tantum predicatur de aliquo, et illa, sicud non potest esse nisi res racionis tantum, sic I9. ce tenis MS. 230"
Strana 85
CAP. XIII. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 85 230" non potest predicari nisi secundum racionem tantum; predicated of another, aut quia res realis de se de re essencialiter et realiter or a real thing truly predicated alia vere predicatur, et hoc 2m racionem tantum, quam of another real deus scit. Et potest constituere inter rem unam et rem thing, this truth depending upon 5 aliam 2m quam inter se unirentur et de se predicarentur, God's ordinance. non minus quam ipse scit; et potest constituere diffe- For He can renciam racionis tantum, vel ens racionis tantum, quod make a difference to tamen vere et concretive de re realissima predicatur. exist, or a notional entity Et vocando predicacionem essencialem, modo quo to be true of a 1o dictum est, maximam, et realem non essencialem apro- real thing. A real thing is prietate mediam, et 2m racionem tantum minimam, predicated of itself tunc res realis de se ipsa predicacione essenciali pre- essentially; a dicatur sed nequaquam predicacione 2m racionem tantum, form in a real thing, really nec predicacione reali non essenciali. Forma autem but not essentially; a 15 realis in re, condistincta realiter ab ipsa re in qua est, notional entity predicatur predicacione non essenciali, sed reali non can only be predicated essenciali. Res autem racionis tantum de se ipsa et de notionally. Thus quocumque probabiliter solum secundum racionem pre- predication is dicatur. Et prima divisio predicacionis est in realem divided into real and 20 et in predicacionem 2m racionem tantum. Et realis in notional; real, into essential duo dividitur: scilicet, in essencialem realem, et in and non- realem non essencialem. Et materia de istis predi- essential. This very cacionibus diligenter videtur pensanda; et quidem hoc inadequate sketch of the nimis modicum dictum est supplendum, et si quid matter requires falsum admixtum ] est reiciendum. Et sic predicacio, ita much consideration, et differencia, dividitur in realem et racionis tantum; development, and possibly et realis in realem essencialem et in realem non essen- correction. cialem. Quod si queratur argumentum faciens fidem quod How do we prove these 3o debeat esse talis triplex predicacio, respondetur suppo- three degrees nendo quod completus et perfectus ascensus gradualis, of predication? Thus : if et similiter descensus, debet habere minimum, medium, there is any difference in et maximum. Propter talem perfectum gradualem perfection, we ascensum et descensum in perfeccione angelorum in must admit a greater, a less 35 celo ponitur triplex ierarchia: maxima sive suprema, and a least. This order media, et minima sive infima; et quelibet illarum adhuc obtains dividitur in ordinem illius ierarchie, supremum, et amongst the Angels, and medium, et infimum. Et sic sunt novem chori angelorum. the three hierarchies Sic quod predicacio essencialis realis: ut, “Sor est being again divided into 40 homo", est maior quam predicacio realis non essencialis, ut dicendo: 'Sor est albus"; et quia talis descensus gradualis ipsius predicacionis debet esse perfectus et 10, 11. app'ete MS. 15. ipsi re MS. 17. ipso (!) MS. 18. pb'r MS.
CAP. XIII. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 85 230" non potest predicari nisi secundum racionem tantum; predicated of another, aut quia res realis de se de re essencialiter et realiter or a real thing truly predicated alia vere predicatur, et hoc 2m racionem tantum, quam of another real deus scit. Et potest constituere inter rem unam et rem thing, this truth depending upon 5 aliam 2m quam inter se unirentur et de se predicarentur, God's ordinance. non minus quam ipse scit; et potest constituere diffe- For He can renciam racionis tantum, vel ens racionis tantum, quod make a difference to tamen vere et concretive de re realissima predicatur. exist, or a notional entity Et vocando predicacionem essencialem, modo quo to be true of a 1o dictum est, maximam, et realem non essencialem apro- real thing. A real thing is prietate mediam, et 2m racionem tantum minimam, predicated of itself tunc res realis de se ipsa predicacione essenciali pre- essentially; a dicatur sed nequaquam predicacione 2m racionem tantum, form in a real thing, really nec predicacione reali non essenciali. Forma autem but not essentially; a 15 realis in re, condistincta realiter ab ipsa re in qua est, notional entity predicatur predicacione non essenciali, sed reali non can only be predicated essenciali. Res autem racionis tantum de se ipsa et de notionally. Thus quocumque probabiliter solum secundum racionem pre- predication is dicatur. Et prima divisio predicacionis est in realem divided into real and 20 et in predicacionem 2m racionem tantum. Et realis in notional; real, into essential duo dividitur: scilicet, in essencialem realem, et in and non- realem non essencialem. Et materia de istis predi- essential. This very cacionibus diligenter videtur pensanda; et quidem hoc inadequate sketch of the nimis modicum dictum est supplendum, et si quid matter requires falsum admixtum ] est reiciendum. Et sic predicacio, ita much consideration, et differencia, dividitur in realem et racionis tantum; development, and possibly et realis in realem essencialem et in realem non essen- correction. cialem. Quod si queratur argumentum faciens fidem quod How do we prove these 3o debeat esse talis triplex predicacio, respondetur suppo- three degrees nendo quod completus et perfectus ascensus gradualis, of predication? Thus : if et similiter descensus, debet habere minimum, medium, there is any difference in et maximum. Propter talem perfectum gradualem perfection, we ascensum et descensum in perfeccione angelorum in must admit a greater, a less 35 celo ponitur triplex ierarchia: maxima sive suprema, and a least. This order media, et minima sive infima; et quelibet illarum adhuc obtains dividitur in ordinem illius ierarchie, supremum, et amongst the Angels, and medium, et infimum. Et sic sunt novem chori angelorum. the three hierarchies Sic quod predicacio essencialis realis: ut, “Sor est being again divided into 40 homo", est maior quam predicacio realis non essencialis, ut dicendo: 'Sor est albus"; et quia talis descensus gradualis ipsius predicacionis debet esse perfectus et 10, 11. app'ete MS. 15. ipsi re MS. 17. ipso (!) MS. 18. pb'r MS.
Strana 86
86 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XIII. three, we have completus, igitur ex supposicione debet habere predi- the nine choirs cacionem maximam (que est realis essencialis), et of Angels. mediam (que est realis non essencialis) et infimam (que est secundum racionem tantum). Et quelibet illarum trium predicacionum debet habere 5 adhuc tres gradus, maximum, medium, et minimum. Maximus gradus predicacionis realis essencialis esset predicacio essencialis formalis tantum: ut, "pater est deus". Medius gradus predicacio realis essencialis sicud materialis tantum: ut “pater est deitas". Sic in predi- 10 cacione reali non essenciali prima formalis tantum, ut: "Sor est albus", secunda mixtum ut, “Sor est pater", tercia, ut pure materialis ut, “Sor est quantum". Sic igitur, predicacione secundum racionem tantum, quedam est sicud formalis tantum: ut, “Sor est singularis", homo est universalis", “deus diligitur a petro", etc. Quedam, sicud mixtum formalis et materialis: ut “com- munitas speciei humane est singularis". Sicud enim humanitas, communis homo individuus est, sicud materia sic singularitas videtur esse sicud materia communitatis 20 speciei humane, uno modo; et alio modo, sicud forma quedam penitus extrinseca. Quedam autem est sicud materialis tantum: ut, “Johannis est Helias". Sicut enim in re quoddam est sicut essenciale pure formale, quoddam sicud pure materiale, quoddam sicud mixtim; sic et in predicacionibus est iudicandum. Eciam est sciendum quia est predicacio realis essen- cialis rei realis de re reali, et est predicacio realis non essencialis rei realis de re reali; et ille gradus est minor priore; igitur pro complemento talis gradualis 30 descensus predicacionis rei realis de re reali oportet esse predicacionem secundum racionem tantum: ut, se "Dies est lacio solis super terram", “Johannes est Helias", “quod factum est in ipso vita erat", etc. Et predicacio 2m racionem tantum rei realis de re reali 35 habet suam propriam materiam, sic quod non cuius- libet rei de alia est predicacio 2m racionem tantum, sicud et alie predicaciones suam habent materiam pro- priam in qua versantur. De differencia eciam maxima, media, et minima, est arguendum sicud de predicacione. 40 Each of these orders of predication is also divided into three. Examples. ce Other divisions. 15 231 23. et pro est (!) MS.
86 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XIII. three, we have completus, igitur ex supposicione debet habere predi- the nine choirs cacionem maximam (que est realis essencialis), et of Angels. mediam (que est realis non essencialis) et infimam (que est secundum racionem tantum). Et quelibet illarum trium predicacionum debet habere 5 adhuc tres gradus, maximum, medium, et minimum. Maximus gradus predicacionis realis essencialis esset predicacio essencialis formalis tantum: ut, "pater est deus". Medius gradus predicacio realis essencialis sicud materialis tantum: ut “pater est deitas". Sic in predi- 10 cacione reali non essenciali prima formalis tantum, ut: "Sor est albus", secunda mixtum ut, “Sor est pater", tercia, ut pure materialis ut, “Sor est quantum". Sic igitur, predicacione secundum racionem tantum, quedam est sicud formalis tantum: ut, “Sor est singularis", homo est universalis", “deus diligitur a petro", etc. Quedam, sicud mixtum formalis et materialis: ut “com- munitas speciei humane est singularis". Sicud enim humanitas, communis homo individuus est, sicud materia sic singularitas videtur esse sicud materia communitatis 20 speciei humane, uno modo; et alio modo, sicud forma quedam penitus extrinseca. Quedam autem est sicud materialis tantum: ut, “Johannis est Helias". Sicut enim in re quoddam est sicut essenciale pure formale, quoddam sicud pure materiale, quoddam sicud mixtim; sic et in predicacionibus est iudicandum. Eciam est sciendum quia est predicacio realis essen- cialis rei realis de re reali, et est predicacio realis non essencialis rei realis de re reali; et ille gradus est minor priore; igitur pro complemento talis gradualis 30 descensus predicacionis rei realis de re reali oportet esse predicacionem secundum racionem tantum: ut, se "Dies est lacio solis super terram", “Johannes est Helias", “quod factum est in ipso vita erat", etc. Et predicacio 2m racionem tantum rei realis de re reali 35 habet suam propriam materiam, sic quod non cuius- libet rei de alia est predicacio 2m racionem tantum, sicud et alie predicaciones suam habent materiam pro- priam in qua versantur. De differencia eciam maxima, media, et minima, est arguendum sicud de predicacione. 40 Each of these orders of predication is also divided into three. Examples. ce Other divisions. 15 231 23. et pro est (!) MS.
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CAPITULUM DECIMUM QUARTUM. Ulterius secundum quod silogisacio expositoria videtur fundari super predicacione. Ideo pro presenti apparet quod, si medium fuerit singulare, si tunc aliquid pre- 5 dicatur de illo medio predicacione essenciali et formali, quidquid tunc affirmabitur vel negabitur proporcionabi- liter de illo quolibet quod sic de medio predicatur: ut, a si a singulare fit predicacione essenciali et formali b, et a sit c vel d (vel non sit) tunc erit: b consimiliter est 10c vel d (vel non sic est). Verumptamen, quia ars silo- gisandi expositorie vel aliter, requirit diffusum tractatum, ideo ad presens de illa arte ulterius supersedemus, et he sophisticaciones contra universalia possunt tolli. Nam cum arguitur, "Omnis res est singularis; species 15 humana est res, igitur est singularis', negatur maior. Et si dicatur quod inductive patet, dicitur quod non, quia ibi est distribucio tam pro rebus communibus quam singularibus; modo de nulla re communi demon- strata verum est dicere quod ipsa est singularis. Et 20 cum dicitur: Omne genus generalissimum substancie est asinus; sed homo est genus generalissimum sub- stancie; igitur homo est asinus", negatur consequencia. 231b Hoc ] enim medium (scilicet, "genus generalissimum substancie"), non distribuitur pro aliqua speciali sub- 25 stancia, sicut nec supponit pro aliqua speciali sub- stancia, sed solum pro substancia generalissima; nec est ille terminus, "genus generalissimum," distribuibilis, sicud nec ille terminus “Sor"; igitur quo ad formam arguendi idem est in toto ac si argueretur: Genus 3o generalissimum substancie est asinus, et homo est genus generalissimum substancie; igitur homo est asinus". Et consimiliter non valet argucio: "Omnis essencia divina The expositorial syllogism is that in which the middle term is a singular. This requires long tractate, but setting aside other questions for the present, we need only refute objections to the Universals brought forward under the name of this syllogism. “Every thing is singular; mankind is a thing : therefore mankind is singular. Major denied. Proved by induction. Induction denied, because it evidently cannot apply to Universals. “The Genus Substance is identical with an ass; man is identical with the genus substance: man is an ass. Here again we have a fallacy, for 'Genus Substance' is not taken distributively. A like fallacy 1. Capitulum &c. deest. 2. Blank space for initial U MS. 9. Tunc erit. "Then this will be true." Supply verum quod. 18. Modo. Perhaps a mistake for quomodo, itself a mistake for quoniam.
CAPITULUM DECIMUM QUARTUM. Ulterius secundum quod silogisacio expositoria videtur fundari super predicacione. Ideo pro presenti apparet quod, si medium fuerit singulare, si tunc aliquid pre- 5 dicatur de illo medio predicacione essenciali et formali, quidquid tunc affirmabitur vel negabitur proporcionabi- liter de illo quolibet quod sic de medio predicatur: ut, a si a singulare fit predicacione essenciali et formali b, et a sit c vel d (vel non sit) tunc erit: b consimiliter est 10c vel d (vel non sic est). Verumptamen, quia ars silo- gisandi expositorie vel aliter, requirit diffusum tractatum, ideo ad presens de illa arte ulterius supersedemus, et he sophisticaciones contra universalia possunt tolli. Nam cum arguitur, "Omnis res est singularis; species 15 humana est res, igitur est singularis', negatur maior. Et si dicatur quod inductive patet, dicitur quod non, quia ibi est distribucio tam pro rebus communibus quam singularibus; modo de nulla re communi demon- strata verum est dicere quod ipsa est singularis. Et 20 cum dicitur: Omne genus generalissimum substancie est asinus; sed homo est genus generalissimum sub- stancie; igitur homo est asinus", negatur consequencia. 231b Hoc ] enim medium (scilicet, "genus generalissimum substancie"), non distribuitur pro aliqua speciali sub- 25 stancia, sicut nec supponit pro aliqua speciali sub- stancia, sed solum pro substancia generalissima; nec est ille terminus, "genus generalissimum," distribuibilis, sicud nec ille terminus “Sor"; igitur quo ad formam arguendi idem est in toto ac si argueretur: Genus 3o generalissimum substancie est asinus, et homo est genus generalissimum substancie; igitur homo est asinus". Et consimiliter non valet argucio: "Omnis essencia divina The expositorial syllogism is that in which the middle term is a singular. This requires long tractate, but setting aside other questions for the present, we need only refute objections to the Universals brought forward under the name of this syllogism. “Every thing is singular; mankind is a thing : therefore mankind is singular. Major denied. Proved by induction. Induction denied, because it evidently cannot apply to Universals. “The Genus Substance is identical with an ass; man is identical with the genus substance: man is an ass. Here again we have a fallacy, for 'Genus Substance' is not taken distributively. A like fallacy 1. Capitulum &c. deest. 2. Blank space for initial U MS. 9. Tunc erit. "Then this will be true." Supply verum quod. 18. Modo. Perhaps a mistake for quomodo, itself a mistake for quoniam.
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88 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XIV. as regards the est pater in divinis; filius dei est essencia divina; igitur Trinity. filius dei est pater in divinis". Nec sequitur: 'Nullus homo est asinus; genus generalissimum substancie est homo; igitur genus generalissimum substancie est asinus." Non enim subsumitur sub medio distributo, sed supra- sumitur magis commune; et hoc viciat formam arguendi. Sic non sequitur: “Nulla persona divina esttrinitas; essencia „ divina est persona; igitur essencia divina non est trinitas." Sed querit adversarius: quomodo ergo in illis 3 bus terminis, homo, genus generalissimum substancie, et 10 asinus, debent argui in Celarent, ponendo ly “homo' pro medio? Dicitur quod in minori ad designandum quod genus generalissimum subsumeretur sub homine deberet sic dici; Sed genus generalissimum substancie formaliter est homo eciam particularis," vel quod genus 15 generalissimum substancie formaliter et particulariter est homo: tunc concludetur. Nec sufficit sic arguere: ce Omnis equus sentit: sed species equina formaliter est equus;" sed oportet assumi quod formaliter et parti- culariter sit equus; alias non fit subsumpcio et sub-20 distribucio. Oportet enim expresse designari fieri per- tinentem subsumpcionem, etsi plurimum, causa brevitatis, hoc pretermittitur. Eciam non sequitur: Iste pater generat, et iste pater est essencia divinas: igitur illa generat". Nisi enim a parte rei res medii sylogismi ex-25 positorii sit in prima forma, res minoris extremitatis ipsa erit inpertinens ad coniungendum a parte rei res extremorum. Oportet ergo in syllogismo expositorio denotari quod res medii in prima forma sit res minoris extremitatis; ut sic sumendo: “Iste pater generat, et iste pater in propria sua forma sive proprie formaliter est essencia divina," tunc concluditur quod essencia divina generat". Sed tunc minor est inpossibilis, cum tunc pater non distingweretur secundum suam propriam formam ab essencia divina; quod est inconveniens, cum 35 iste pater 2m suam propriam formam sit unica sub- sistencia divina, et nullo modo potest esse plures persone. Essencia autem divina necessario est 3es essencie divine. But, says our opponent, how then can we form any argument with these three terms in Celarent, man being the middle term? We should have to assume that the genus substance is identical with every particular man We cannot conclude anything from Every horse feels ; now the Universal Horse is a horse; unless we added that it is a particular horse. Example from the mystery of the Trinity. 232" 7. m o pro non MS. 38. ce pro essencie MS. 38. Essencie. I have rendered the abbreviation in this way, because I can find no other more likely word to put in its place ; but this cannot be correct. Wyclif was never accused of such a heresy as that. The copyist must have made a slip for persone.
88 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XIV. as regards the est pater in divinis; filius dei est essencia divina; igitur Trinity. filius dei est pater in divinis". Nec sequitur: 'Nullus homo est asinus; genus generalissimum substancie est homo; igitur genus generalissimum substancie est asinus." Non enim subsumitur sub medio distributo, sed supra- sumitur magis commune; et hoc viciat formam arguendi. Sic non sequitur: “Nulla persona divina esttrinitas; essencia „ divina est persona; igitur essencia divina non est trinitas." Sed querit adversarius: quomodo ergo in illis 3 bus terminis, homo, genus generalissimum substancie, et 10 asinus, debent argui in Celarent, ponendo ly “homo' pro medio? Dicitur quod in minori ad designandum quod genus generalissimum subsumeretur sub homine deberet sic dici; Sed genus generalissimum substancie formaliter est homo eciam particularis," vel quod genus 15 generalissimum substancie formaliter et particulariter est homo: tunc concludetur. Nec sufficit sic arguere: ce Omnis equus sentit: sed species equina formaliter est equus;" sed oportet assumi quod formaliter et parti- culariter sit equus; alias non fit subsumpcio et sub-20 distribucio. Oportet enim expresse designari fieri per- tinentem subsumpcionem, etsi plurimum, causa brevitatis, hoc pretermittitur. Eciam non sequitur: Iste pater generat, et iste pater est essencia divinas: igitur illa generat". Nisi enim a parte rei res medii sylogismi ex-25 positorii sit in prima forma, res minoris extremitatis ipsa erit inpertinens ad coniungendum a parte rei res extremorum. Oportet ergo in syllogismo expositorio denotari quod res medii in prima forma sit res minoris extremitatis; ut sic sumendo: “Iste pater generat, et iste pater in propria sua forma sive proprie formaliter est essencia divina," tunc concluditur quod essencia divina generat". Sed tunc minor est inpossibilis, cum tunc pater non distingweretur secundum suam propriam formam ab essencia divina; quod est inconveniens, cum 35 iste pater 2m suam propriam formam sit unica sub- sistencia divina, et nullo modo potest esse plures persone. Essencia autem divina necessario est 3es essencie divine. But, says our opponent, how then can we form any argument with these three terms in Celarent, man being the middle term? We should have to assume that the genus substance is identical with every particular man We cannot conclude anything from Every horse feels ; now the Universal Horse is a horse; unless we added that it is a particular horse. Example from the mystery of the Trinity. 232" 7. m o pro non MS. 38. ce pro essencie MS. 38. Essencie. I have rendered the abbreviation in this way, because I can find no other more likely word to put in its place ; but this cannot be correct. Wyclif was never accused of such a heresy as that. The copyist must have made a slip for persone.
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CAP. XIV. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 89 Sic similiter in alio zophismate arguendo de Sorte et specie humana, et cursum, est dicendum. Quod autem philosophus et ceteri sequaces non ex- primunt talem unitatem, ydemptitatem, vel composicionem 5 medii ad minorem extremitatem [est] quia presupponunt eam denotari usitate in eorum modo loquendi. Unde ad tantum confitetur philosophus primo Physicorum eciam tempore sui predicacionem alicuius de aliquo solum 2m formam viguisse et non aliam, quod ipse 10 dicat: "Non dicimus quod statua est lapis, sed statua est lapidea." Ecce non potuit negare quod statua est lapis, cum lapis sit statua, quia res sic figurata; et tamen dicit 'non dicimus quod statua est lapis, sed lapidea". Unde quia proprie predicatum est forma, 15 subiectum vero materia (primo physicorum) iuxta usi- tatam tunc locucionem oporteret quod, si vere dicatur quod "Iste pater est essencia divina," tunc “iste pater in propria sua forma sive proprie formaliter est divina essencia". Quia autem verum et katholicum est quod 20 iste pater est essencia divina", sed non 2m talem predicacionem vel copulacionem, sicud tempore Aristotelis fuit verum quod statua est lapis, quamvis non soleat dici. Ideo conceditur katholice quod "iste pater generat" et "iste pater est essencia divina", et negatur con- 25 sequens quod "essencia divina generat". Oporteret autem sumi pro unione extremorum quod: "iste pater proprie formaliter est essencia divina, vel 2m formam suam propriam est essencia divina. Unde queritur ab adversariis eciam non Cristianis 30 quid dicerent ad talem arguciam: 'Ista statua est lapidea, et ista statua est lapis: igitur lapis est lapideus." Argumentum negare! non possunt, et consequens sonaret 232b eis inconvenienter, quod lapis est sibi ipsi materia ex qua esset lapis. Quia ergo ista statua solum sicut 35 materialiter, et non proprie formaliter, est lapis, oportet iuxta eos assumi: "Ista statua est lapidea, et ista statua est proprie formaliter lapis: igitur lapis est lapideus.' Ignorancia ergo artis sylogisandi expositorie et secundum universalisacionem medii multos depressit. Et presumitur 40 quod hodie, si non tam per ecclesiam materia bene- dicta increate trinitatis esset lucide diffinita, multi Aristotle and his followers do not express themselves thus, but he himself confesses that he uses the popular node of speech. A statue is of stone, 1. c. 1s a stone modified in a certain way. The Father is God from a certain point of view. This restriction must be understood in both cases. And when the middle term is understood differently, we have a fallacy, either against faitli, or against reason, and in any case proceeding from ignorance of the expositorial syllogism; 5. est deest MS. 15. p. phys. underlined MS.
CAP. XIV. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 89 Sic similiter in alio zophismate arguendo de Sorte et specie humana, et cursum, est dicendum. Quod autem philosophus et ceteri sequaces non ex- primunt talem unitatem, ydemptitatem, vel composicionem 5 medii ad minorem extremitatem [est] quia presupponunt eam denotari usitate in eorum modo loquendi. Unde ad tantum confitetur philosophus primo Physicorum eciam tempore sui predicacionem alicuius de aliquo solum 2m formam viguisse et non aliam, quod ipse 10 dicat: "Non dicimus quod statua est lapis, sed statua est lapidea." Ecce non potuit negare quod statua est lapis, cum lapis sit statua, quia res sic figurata; et tamen dicit 'non dicimus quod statua est lapis, sed lapidea". Unde quia proprie predicatum est forma, 15 subiectum vero materia (primo physicorum) iuxta usi- tatam tunc locucionem oporteret quod, si vere dicatur quod "Iste pater est essencia divina," tunc “iste pater in propria sua forma sive proprie formaliter est divina essencia". Quia autem verum et katholicum est quod 20 iste pater est essencia divina", sed non 2m talem predicacionem vel copulacionem, sicud tempore Aristotelis fuit verum quod statua est lapis, quamvis non soleat dici. Ideo conceditur katholice quod "iste pater generat" et "iste pater est essencia divina", et negatur con- 25 sequens quod "essencia divina generat". Oporteret autem sumi pro unione extremorum quod: "iste pater proprie formaliter est essencia divina, vel 2m formam suam propriam est essencia divina. Unde queritur ab adversariis eciam non Cristianis 30 quid dicerent ad talem arguciam: 'Ista statua est lapidea, et ista statua est lapis: igitur lapis est lapideus." Argumentum negare! non possunt, et consequens sonaret 232b eis inconvenienter, quod lapis est sibi ipsi materia ex qua esset lapis. Quia ergo ista statua solum sicut 35 materialiter, et non proprie formaliter, est lapis, oportet iuxta eos assumi: "Ista statua est lapidea, et ista statua est proprie formaliter lapis: igitur lapis est lapideus.' Ignorancia ergo artis sylogisandi expositorie et secundum universalisacionem medii multos depressit. Et presumitur 40 quod hodie, si non tam per ecclesiam materia bene- dicta increate trinitatis esset lucide diffinita, multi Aristotle and his followers do not express themselves thus, but he himself confesses that he uses the popular node of speech. A statue is of stone, 1. c. 1s a stone modified in a certain way. The Father is God from a certain point of view. This restriction must be understood in both cases. And when the middle term is understood differently, we have a fallacy, either against faitli, or against reason, and in any case proceeding from ignorance of the expositorial syllogism; 5. est deest MS. 15. p. phys. underlined MS.
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90 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XIV. this ignorance graviter deviarent. Sufficit autem quod fides necessitet might lead ad recte credendum. Et a deridentibus datum modum many astray, were it not for silogisandi, queritur, propositis istis tribus terminis: the dogmatical iste pater, generat, et essencia divina, quod faciant sylo- declarations of the Church. For whatever gismum expositorium ex eis ad illam conclusionem in 5 form of forma: "essencia divina generat, quamcunque bonam argument is directed against formam sylogisandi dabunt, sic quod antecedens erit the Universals, impossibile sicud consequens, eandem in materia uni- attacks the mystery of the versalium retinebunt. Si autem dicunt quod illa in Holy Trinity propria forma non est sylogisabilis expositorie, tunc 10 likewise, in one way or another. nec illa et consimiles: “Species humana currit." Et dent regulam que indefinite in propria forma sit sylo- gisabilis, et que non. Si autem vellent concludere '“Quod est Essencia divina generat," sic et “hoc quod est species humana 15 currit," et quodcunque argumentum pretenditur osten- sivum vel ad impossibile contra universalia rerum in essendo; videtur consimiliter peccare in materia vel in forma vel in utrisque contra verissimam materiam It is therefore sancte trinitatis. Ideo utile videtur in materia rerum 20 well to know creatarum videre et scire dissolvere argucias sophisticas how to reply to such sophistical contra communitatem rerum in essendo; ut ex hinc subtleties. materiam altissimam et secretissimam fidei cristiane, exclusis erroribus, valeam secure tenere. 6. quacunque MS.
90 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XIV. this ignorance graviter deviarent. Sufficit autem quod fides necessitet might lead ad recte credendum. Et a deridentibus datum modum many astray, were it not for silogisandi, queritur, propositis istis tribus terminis: the dogmatical iste pater, generat, et essencia divina, quod faciant sylo- declarations of the Church. For whatever gismum expositorium ex eis ad illam conclusionem in 5 form of forma: "essencia divina generat, quamcunque bonam argument is directed against formam sylogisandi dabunt, sic quod antecedens erit the Universals, impossibile sicud consequens, eandem in materia uni- attacks the mystery of the versalium retinebunt. Si autem dicunt quod illa in Holy Trinity propria forma non est sylogisabilis expositorie, tunc 10 likewise, in one way or another. nec illa et consimiles: “Species humana currit." Et dent regulam que indefinite in propria forma sit sylo- gisabilis, et que non. Si autem vellent concludere '“Quod est Essencia divina generat," sic et “hoc quod est species humana 15 currit," et quodcunque argumentum pretenditur osten- sivum vel ad impossibile contra universalia rerum in essendo; videtur consimiliter peccare in materia vel in forma vel in utrisque contra verissimam materiam It is therefore sancte trinitatis. Ideo utile videtur in materia rerum 20 well to know creatarum videre et scire dissolvere argucias sophisticas how to reply to such sophistical contra communitatem rerum in essendo; ut ex hinc subtleties. materiam altissimam et secretissimam fidei cristiane, exclusis erroribus, valeam secure tenere. 6. quacunque MS.
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CAPITULUM DECIMUM QUINTUM. 233 Sed tamen alique instancie videntur difficiles in hac materia. Oportebit enim eodem argumento quo arguitur universalia dare communissimam entitatem deo et 5 omnibus rebus suis; quod videtur multipliciter incon- veniens. Primo, quia tunc quilibet effectus esset ita pulcher essencialiter sicud primum ens, quia pulcritudine essen- ciali communissima dei et aliorum. Sed certum est quod omnis essencialis pulchritudo! dei est simpliciter infinita, igitur quilibet effectus secundum communissimam essencialem pulchritudinem dei et suam esset simpliciter infinite pulcher. Item, tunc talis entitas vel bonitas formaliter com- 15 munis deo et effectui esset divinior quam deitas: quod est oppositum in adiecto. Et consequencia videtur tenere, quod illa entitas cuilibet rei formaliter inest; igitur, cum illa entitas sit communior quam deitas, et hec communior non in malo sed in bono, igitur divinior. 20 Item tercio: "Ista entitas anologa est deitas, et est effectus purus; igitur est non deitas (ab inferiori ad suum superius vel convertibili) cum omnis effectus purus sit non deitas; et ex consequenti; si ista entitas est non deitas, igitur ista entitas non est deitas." Et sic 25 illa eadem precise entitas est deitas et non est deitas: quod est contradiccio. Ymmo sic dicendo: ista entitas est deitas et ista entitas est non deitas, predicaret contra- dictoria in connexa de eodem penitus. Item, 4to, tunc essencialis bonitas et formalis ipsius rei 30 esset melior quam ipsamet res; cum equus solum finite sit bonus, et bonitas sua transcendens esset infinita. Other arguments against the Doctrine of Universals, bearing upon the transcendent entity, common both to God and to His creatures. (1) Every being would be as beautiful as God; i. e. infinitely so. (2) Transcendent entity would be more divine than God Himself. (3) This entity would at the same time be God and not God. 1. Capitulum &c. deest. 15. quia MS. 17. cuiuslibet MS. 2. Blank space for initial S MS. (4) The goodness and entity of anything would be infinite, though the thing were finite. 22. After deitas, Suppl. arguendo. 29. In connexa. I have never met with this expression in any book of Scholastic Logic. I suppose predicatione is understood.
CAPITULUM DECIMUM QUINTUM. 233 Sed tamen alique instancie videntur difficiles in hac materia. Oportebit enim eodem argumento quo arguitur universalia dare communissimam entitatem deo et 5 omnibus rebus suis; quod videtur multipliciter incon- veniens. Primo, quia tunc quilibet effectus esset ita pulcher essencialiter sicud primum ens, quia pulcritudine essen- ciali communissima dei et aliorum. Sed certum est quod omnis essencialis pulchritudo! dei est simpliciter infinita, igitur quilibet effectus secundum communissimam essencialem pulchritudinem dei et suam esset simpliciter infinite pulcher. Item, tunc talis entitas vel bonitas formaliter com- 15 munis deo et effectui esset divinior quam deitas: quod est oppositum in adiecto. Et consequencia videtur tenere, quod illa entitas cuilibet rei formaliter inest; igitur, cum illa entitas sit communior quam deitas, et hec communior non in malo sed in bono, igitur divinior. 20 Item tercio: "Ista entitas anologa est deitas, et est effectus purus; igitur est non deitas (ab inferiori ad suum superius vel convertibili) cum omnis effectus purus sit non deitas; et ex consequenti; si ista entitas est non deitas, igitur ista entitas non est deitas." Et sic 25 illa eadem precise entitas est deitas et non est deitas: quod est contradiccio. Ymmo sic dicendo: ista entitas est deitas et ista entitas est non deitas, predicaret contra- dictoria in connexa de eodem penitus. Item, 4to, tunc essencialis bonitas et formalis ipsius rei 30 esset melior quam ipsamet res; cum equus solum finite sit bonus, et bonitas sua transcendens esset infinita. Other arguments against the Doctrine of Universals, bearing upon the transcendent entity, common both to God and to His creatures. (1) Every being would be as beautiful as God; i. e. infinitely so. (2) Transcendent entity would be more divine than God Himself. (3) This entity would at the same time be God and not God. 1. Capitulum &c. deest. 15. quia MS. 17. cuiuslibet MS. 2. Blank space for initial S MS. (4) The goodness and entity of anything would be infinite, though the thing were finite. 22. After deitas, Suppl. arguendo. 29. In connexa. I have never met with this expression in any book of Scholastic Logic. I suppose predicatione is understood.
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92 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XV. (6) God's entity, being that of any stone, God and a stone would be one being. (7) All things would be one being; for each entity would be the same Transcendent one, and numerically the same. (8) If each entity can be numbered, no one can be common with another. (9) Every entity is individual; none therefore are universal. For entity supposes unity and to be one is to be undivided in itself and divided from any other. Item, 5to, tunc primum ens nichil haberet formaliter ultra suum quemcunque exilem effectum: quod est in- convenientissimum. Et videtur consequencia tenere. Si enim primum ens, puta deus, habet formaliter infinitam bonitatem, et quilibet suus effectus eciam similiter 5 habet formaliter infinitam bonitatem analogam. Item, 6to, tunc penitus unum et idem esset deus et lapis: quod videtur inconveniens. Et patet consequencia; quia penitus illa una et eadem communissima entitas. Item, septimo, tunc penitus una et eadem numeralis 10 entitas esset deus, lapis, equus, et sic de singulis. Et sic penitus idem in numero esset deus et omnis crea- tura; quod est inconvenientissimum. Et videtur patere consequencia; quia, signata quacunque entitate, ipsa est illa una et non plures; ille igitur est bonitas 15 numeralis illa. Consequencia tenet, quia esse unum et non plura est esse numerale, sive unum in numero: igitur esse entitatem illam unam solum et non plures illas est illam esse illam numeralem. Si igitur entitas 233b illa est illa numeralis numeraliter et non pluraliter, 20 igitur ipsa est numeralis. Item, octavo: Omnis entitas est numeralis entitas: igitur nulla est communis pluribus. Antecedens arguitur, quia quacunque entitate data, ipsa est illamet singularis incommunicabiliter et numeraliter, cum sit illa non 25 pluraliter nec communiter vel communicabiliter, sed ita singulariter et numeraliter est ipsa illamet, sicud Sor est Sor, alias idem possit esse commune sibi ipsi. Et sic a pari singularissimum esset sibi ipsi commune; quod est oppositum in adiecto, cum tunc esset com-30 municabile multis. Item, nono: Omnis entitas est individua entitas: igitur nulla est communis pluribus entibus et entitatibus. Et antecedens arguitur; quia quelibet talis est indivisa in se ipso et divisa a quolibet alio, si est aliud ab ea: 35 igitur est individua ex interpretacione nominis. Et ante- cedens patet; quia, cum quelibet talis entitas sit solum semel et nequaquam pluraliter ipsa illa entitas, igitur est indivisa in seipsa. Non enim est divisa in seipsam, sicud nec aliquid potest esse divisum in seipsum, cum 40 (5) God would in no wise be better than the lowest of His creatures. 34. ansr MS. 37. ausz MS. 15. Ille no doubt stands here for deus in the preceding sentence.
92 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XV. (6) God's entity, being that of any stone, God and a stone would be one being. (7) All things would be one being; for each entity would be the same Transcendent one, and numerically the same. (8) If each entity can be numbered, no one can be common with another. (9) Every entity is individual; none therefore are universal. For entity supposes unity and to be one is to be undivided in itself and divided from any other. Item, 5to, tunc primum ens nichil haberet formaliter ultra suum quemcunque exilem effectum: quod est in- convenientissimum. Et videtur consequencia tenere. Si enim primum ens, puta deus, habet formaliter infinitam bonitatem, et quilibet suus effectus eciam similiter 5 habet formaliter infinitam bonitatem analogam. Item, 6to, tunc penitus unum et idem esset deus et lapis: quod videtur inconveniens. Et patet consequencia; quia penitus illa una et eadem communissima entitas. Item, septimo, tunc penitus una et eadem numeralis 10 entitas esset deus, lapis, equus, et sic de singulis. Et sic penitus idem in numero esset deus et omnis crea- tura; quod est inconvenientissimum. Et videtur patere consequencia; quia, signata quacunque entitate, ipsa est illa una et non plures; ille igitur est bonitas 15 numeralis illa. Consequencia tenet, quia esse unum et non plura est esse numerale, sive unum in numero: igitur esse entitatem illam unam solum et non plures illas est illam esse illam numeralem. Si igitur entitas 233b illa est illa numeralis numeraliter et non pluraliter, 20 igitur ipsa est numeralis. Item, octavo: Omnis entitas est numeralis entitas: igitur nulla est communis pluribus. Antecedens arguitur, quia quacunque entitate data, ipsa est illamet singularis incommunicabiliter et numeraliter, cum sit illa non 25 pluraliter nec communiter vel communicabiliter, sed ita singulariter et numeraliter est ipsa illamet, sicud Sor est Sor, alias idem possit esse commune sibi ipsi. Et sic a pari singularissimum esset sibi ipsi commune; quod est oppositum in adiecto, cum tunc esset com-30 municabile multis. Item, nono: Omnis entitas est individua entitas: igitur nulla est communis pluribus entibus et entitatibus. Et antecedens arguitur; quia quelibet talis est indivisa in se ipso et divisa a quolibet alio, si est aliud ab ea: 35 igitur est individua ex interpretacione nominis. Et ante- cedens patet; quia, cum quelibet talis entitas sit solum semel et nequaquam pluraliter ipsa illa entitas, igitur est indivisa in seipsa. Non enim est divisa in seipsam, sicud nec aliquid potest esse divisum in seipsum, cum 40 (5) God would in no wise be better than the lowest of His creatures. 34. ansr MS. 37. ausz MS. 15. Ille no doubt stands here for deus in the preceding sentence.
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CAP. XV. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 93 15 234 tunc idem possit esse sui ipsius pars et totum: quod est inconveniens. Et quod sit divisa a quolibet alio, si est aliud ab ea, quia alietas divisio est: igitur etc. Item, Xmo, tunc quilibet effectus summa unitate et 5 ydemptitate esset idem et unum cum deo: quod videtur omnino impossibile, quia tunc pater et filius in divinis non essent plus unum et idem quam quicunque effectus, cum eis alias pater et filius maiori unitate et ydempti- tate erunt unum et idem, quam effectus erit unitate et 10 ydemptitate unum et idem cum deo: quod est contra assumptum. Et consequencia prima videtur patere, quia effectus unitate et ydemptitate entitatis transcendentis esset unum et idem cum deo; et talis unitas et ydemptitas esset summa entitas: igitur, etc. Item XI°, tunc consimiliter est dare singularitatem com- munem hominibus individuis, sicud communem animali- tatem. Nam, sicud commune est cum homine individuo esse animal, ita commune est cuilibet tali esse singula- rem; et si singularitas est communis pluribus, tunc oppo- sita de seipsis predicantur;] ut communitas de singulari- tate: quod videtur inconveniens: Ymmo, sic esset persona communis, sicud est animal commune. Et sic una et eadem persona divina esset omnis persona divina: quod est absurdum. Ymmo, cum persona ut huius[modi] sit 25 individua subsistencia, et sic individua, et incommuni- cabilis pluribus personis, repugnat si una eademque persona esset plures persone. Item XII°, universalia, cum non agunt nec aliquid (12) Universals have no boni faciunt, ad quid prosunt mundo? Ymmo, cum homo activity; of what use are 3o individuus vivit feliciter et deifice, non sic autem potest they in the world? An communis humanitas, melior est homo singularis quam individual man communis. Substancia enim que potest intelligere, velle, may enjoy happiness and et feliciter vivere, dignior et melior est coram deo, union with atque accepcior; et que sic vivit quam que non sic God ; the Universal man 35 potest. Et esset dare syllogismum communem, propo- cannot. Action is also sicionem communem, leccionem, cursum, et risum universal ; what communem, etc. Queritur ergo: quid primo currit cursu is it that produces this communi, legit leccione communi? Non individuum, universal act? Neither an quia qua racione unum individuum et eadem racione individual nor 40 aliud. Non substancia communis, cum illa non possit the Universal substance. currere, etc. (10) The unity of all things with God, being the greatest possible, or identity, there would be no difference between the unity of the Persons with the Godhead and that of His creatures. (11) Each man being singular, there would be a universal singularity: which is absurd. A person would be a universal, and one person would be many. 24. modi deest MS. 26. e pro si MS. 35. sym MS. 37. currit currit MS.
CAP. XV. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 93 15 234 tunc idem possit esse sui ipsius pars et totum: quod est inconveniens. Et quod sit divisa a quolibet alio, si est aliud ab ea, quia alietas divisio est: igitur etc. Item, Xmo, tunc quilibet effectus summa unitate et 5 ydemptitate esset idem et unum cum deo: quod videtur omnino impossibile, quia tunc pater et filius in divinis non essent plus unum et idem quam quicunque effectus, cum eis alias pater et filius maiori unitate et ydempti- tate erunt unum et idem, quam effectus erit unitate et 10 ydemptitate unum et idem cum deo: quod est contra assumptum. Et consequencia prima videtur patere, quia effectus unitate et ydemptitate entitatis transcendentis esset unum et idem cum deo; et talis unitas et ydemptitas esset summa entitas: igitur, etc. Item XI°, tunc consimiliter est dare singularitatem com- munem hominibus individuis, sicud communem animali- tatem. Nam, sicud commune est cum homine individuo esse animal, ita commune est cuilibet tali esse singula- rem; et si singularitas est communis pluribus, tunc oppo- sita de seipsis predicantur;] ut communitas de singulari- tate: quod videtur inconveniens: Ymmo, sic esset persona communis, sicud est animal commune. Et sic una et eadem persona divina esset omnis persona divina: quod est absurdum. Ymmo, cum persona ut huius[modi] sit 25 individua subsistencia, et sic individua, et incommuni- cabilis pluribus personis, repugnat si una eademque persona esset plures persone. Item XII°, universalia, cum non agunt nec aliquid (12) Universals have no boni faciunt, ad quid prosunt mundo? Ymmo, cum homo activity; of what use are 3o individuus vivit feliciter et deifice, non sic autem potest they in the world? An communis humanitas, melior est homo singularis quam individual man communis. Substancia enim que potest intelligere, velle, may enjoy happiness and et feliciter vivere, dignior et melior est coram deo, union with atque accepcior; et que sic vivit quam que non sic God ; the Universal man 35 potest. Et esset dare syllogismum communem, propo- cannot. Action is also sicionem communem, leccionem, cursum, et risum universal ; what communem, etc. Queritur ergo: quid primo currit cursu is it that produces this communi, legit leccione communi? Non individuum, universal act? Neither an quia qua racione unum individuum et eadem racione individual nor 40 aliud. Non substancia communis, cum illa non possit the Universal substance. currere, etc. (10) The unity of all things with God, being the greatest possible, or identity, there would be no difference between the unity of the Persons with the Godhead and that of His creatures. (11) Each man being singular, there would be a universal singularity: which is absurd. A person would be a universal, and one person would be many. 24. modi deest MS. 26. e pro si MS. 35. sym MS. 37. currit currit MS.
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94 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XV. Item, XIII°. Si est propria passio a parte rei, ipsa erit propria passio speciei humane vel alterius; et sic risi- bilitas esset propria passio speciei humane; et sic humanitas speciei (vel species humana) esset risibilis et sic poterit ridere: quod non convenit, igitur etc. Quantum ad primum argumentum conceditur quod oportet esse ens transcendens communissimum. Nam cum illo communissimo conceptu ens concipiatur in mente humana distincte conceptum, — alioquin nullo communi conceptu conciperetur distincte conceptum 10 tali concepta: — tunc si illo conceptu ens distincte et determinate concipitur conceptum, et non singulare (quia non singulare plus unum quam quodlibet reliquum, nec quodlibet singulare distincte concipitur et deter- minate tali conceptu, cum tunc quilibet habens illum conceptum omnia distincte et determinate conciperet: quod est notorie falsum). Et consimili argumento arguitur quod non aliquod ens speciale; igitur ens communis- simum omni enti. We cannot Nec valet hic dicere quod illo conceptu ens concipitur 20 say that Being is conceived distincte] singulare, sed nullum “singulare" distincte con- 234 distinctly, without any cipitur illo conceptu; ita quod ly singulare stet confuse particular being tantum; quia tunc deus referret illam distinctam con- distinctly conceived; for cepcionem ad rem conceptam distincte per eam et non even should man not know possit scire ad quid vel ad que ipsam sic referret: 25 what the object quod est inconveniens. Et patet consequencia; quia of his concept is, God must deus distinctissime scit quod ista distincta concepcio know it, and est distincta concepcio rei concepte, et per adversarium know that the concept is of a non potest scire cuius vel quorum est distincta con- certain object. cepcio: igitur etc. Et idem argumentum est de primaria 30 The same argument holds et distincta significacione terminorum communium good of all Universal secundum unam racionem essencialem non equivoce, concepts. sicud sunt tales, homo, animal, lapis; et sic de nominibus infinitis. Sed cum infertur ulterius quod effectus esset ita 35 But the objection pulcher essencialiter sicud deus, quia haberet in se proves nothing, for the effect formaliter infinitam essencialem pulchritudinem, respon- possesses the beauty of its detur quod non sequitur; quia effectus etsi habet forma- cause only in a certain finite liter pulchritudinem essencialem, que est dei et omnium, (13) A property belongs to the species; thus the Universal man should be capable of laughter : which is absurd. Answers. (1) It is necessary to admit the existence of Universal Being. 15 32. nobis MS. 17. Falsum. There is no doubt something wanting in the preceding sentence, of which I can make nothing. I have supposed that the end is missing.
94 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XV. Item, XIII°. Si est propria passio a parte rei, ipsa erit propria passio speciei humane vel alterius; et sic risi- bilitas esset propria passio speciei humane; et sic humanitas speciei (vel species humana) esset risibilis et sic poterit ridere: quod non convenit, igitur etc. Quantum ad primum argumentum conceditur quod oportet esse ens transcendens communissimum. Nam cum illo communissimo conceptu ens concipiatur in mente humana distincte conceptum, — alioquin nullo communi conceptu conciperetur distincte conceptum 10 tali concepta: — tunc si illo conceptu ens distincte et determinate concipitur conceptum, et non singulare (quia non singulare plus unum quam quodlibet reliquum, nec quodlibet singulare distincte concipitur et deter- minate tali conceptu, cum tunc quilibet habens illum conceptum omnia distincte et determinate conciperet: quod est notorie falsum). Et consimili argumento arguitur quod non aliquod ens speciale; igitur ens communis- simum omni enti. We cannot Nec valet hic dicere quod illo conceptu ens concipitur 20 say that Being is conceived distincte] singulare, sed nullum “singulare" distincte con- 234 distinctly, without any cipitur illo conceptu; ita quod ly singulare stet confuse particular being tantum; quia tunc deus referret illam distinctam con- distinctly conceived; for cepcionem ad rem conceptam distincte per eam et non even should man not know possit scire ad quid vel ad que ipsam sic referret: 25 what the object quod est inconveniens. Et patet consequencia; quia of his concept is, God must deus distinctissime scit quod ista distincta concepcio know it, and est distincta concepcio rei concepte, et per adversarium know that the concept is of a non potest scire cuius vel quorum est distincta con- certain object. cepcio: igitur etc. Et idem argumentum est de primaria 30 The same argument holds et distincta significacione terminorum communium good of all Universal secundum unam racionem essencialem non equivoce, concepts. sicud sunt tales, homo, animal, lapis; et sic de nominibus infinitis. Sed cum infertur ulterius quod effectus esset ita 35 But the objection pulcher essencialiter sicud deus, quia haberet in se proves nothing, for the effect formaliter infinitam essencialem pulchritudinem, respon- possesses the beauty of its detur quod non sequitur; quia effectus etsi habet forma- cause only in a certain finite liter pulchritudinem essencialem, que est dei et omnium, (13) A property belongs to the species; thus the Universal man should be capable of laughter : which is absurd. Answers. (1) It is necessary to admit the existence of Universal Being. 15 32. nobis MS. 17. Falsum. There is no doubt something wanting in the preceding sentence, of which I can make nothing. I have supposed that the end is missing.
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CAP. XV. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 95 235* habet tamen eam sic secundum quid, solum diminutive, degree, whereas God possesses et quodammodo tantum participative et equivoce respectu it absolutely. St. Peter in dei. Deus autem habet eam sic simpliciter, totaliter, et Heaven enjoys infinite perfecte, et omnino simpliciter. Et igitur non the same infinite 5 solum ex parte pulchritudinis essencialis cuiuslibet habite, happiness as God; but he sed ex non habendi res debent pulchre essencialiter does not enjoy estimari. Unde beatus Petrus in patria possidet summum it to an infinite extent. similiter infinitum bonum; et deus possidet illud; tamen in possessione infinite est dicior, sicut potencior et 10 sapiencior, quam beatus Petrus, quia infinito perfecciori modo possidet deus summum bonum quam beatus Petrus. Et per idem ad 7mum argumentum hic superius motum potest dici. Nam etsi deus non haberet ultra suum exilem effectum in habito, quia et effectus formaliter 15 haberet infinitam entitatem de gracia dei, tamen in habendo vel in modo habendi simpliciter infinite excedit; et sic plus habet, habendo transcendentem entitatem infinite quo ad modum habendi formaliter, quam qui- libet suus effectus. Unde deus est formaliter deus. Et est 20 simpliciter formaliter omnis bonitas simpliciter infinite; quod nullo modo effectis convenit. Vel dicendum quod deus eciam in habito superexcedit quemlibet effectum infinite.] Ultra enim et preter predicata que sunt per- feccionis simpliciter et analoga deo et creature, habet 25 deus formalia predicata simpliciter perfeccionis que sibi solum possunt competere: ut quod ipse est deus omni- potens, creativus omnium, etc., sic quod, et habitis predicatis, et in modo habendi, infinite plus habet, nedum super exilem, sed super summum et optimum effectum. 30 Pro materia secundi argumenti. Sciendum quod deus prius est ens incommunicabiliter quam ipse sit ens communicabiliter cum suis effectibus et causatis; et sic entitate que formaliter est deitas (et econtra) et tali entitate sive deitate precedit causaliter entitatem trans- 35 cendentem, analogam formaliter sibi et effectibus, qua communicabiliter et non incommunicabiliter est ens As God took cum aliis suis rebus. Unde, sicud deus ex tempore flesh upon contingenter et graciose fecit se esse hominem aliis Himself in time so in eternity, hominibus, ita cum deus eternaliter, formaliter, et sic He took this entity upon 40 incommunicabiliter cum aliis rebus, esset deus et ens; Himself, This answer will also serve for the 7th Objection. For even if God had nothing beyond the lowest creature as to entity itself, He would still possess it in a way infinitely more perfect. But we may also say that, beyond simple entity, God possesses special attributes that belong to no creature. (2) God's in- communicable entity precedes that by which He is one with all beings. 1. du'mte MS. 5. qualib, MS. 13. ut si MS. 19. for- MS. 23. quo MS. 29. vltimum et before optimum MS.
CAP. XV. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 95 235* habet tamen eam sic secundum quid, solum diminutive, degree, whereas God possesses et quodammodo tantum participative et equivoce respectu it absolutely. St. Peter in dei. Deus autem habet eam sic simpliciter, totaliter, et Heaven enjoys infinite perfecte, et omnino simpliciter. Et igitur non the same infinite 5 solum ex parte pulchritudinis essencialis cuiuslibet habite, happiness as God; but he sed ex non habendi res debent pulchre essencialiter does not enjoy estimari. Unde beatus Petrus in patria possidet summum it to an infinite extent. similiter infinitum bonum; et deus possidet illud; tamen in possessione infinite est dicior, sicut potencior et 10 sapiencior, quam beatus Petrus, quia infinito perfecciori modo possidet deus summum bonum quam beatus Petrus. Et per idem ad 7mum argumentum hic superius motum potest dici. Nam etsi deus non haberet ultra suum exilem effectum in habito, quia et effectus formaliter 15 haberet infinitam entitatem de gracia dei, tamen in habendo vel in modo habendi simpliciter infinite excedit; et sic plus habet, habendo transcendentem entitatem infinite quo ad modum habendi formaliter, quam qui- libet suus effectus. Unde deus est formaliter deus. Et est 20 simpliciter formaliter omnis bonitas simpliciter infinite; quod nullo modo effectis convenit. Vel dicendum quod deus eciam in habito superexcedit quemlibet effectum infinite.] Ultra enim et preter predicata que sunt per- feccionis simpliciter et analoga deo et creature, habet 25 deus formalia predicata simpliciter perfeccionis que sibi solum possunt competere: ut quod ipse est deus omni- potens, creativus omnium, etc., sic quod, et habitis predicatis, et in modo habendi, infinite plus habet, nedum super exilem, sed super summum et optimum effectum. 30 Pro materia secundi argumenti. Sciendum quod deus prius est ens incommunicabiliter quam ipse sit ens communicabiliter cum suis effectibus et causatis; et sic entitate que formaliter est deitas (et econtra) et tali entitate sive deitate precedit causaliter entitatem trans- 35 cendentem, analogam formaliter sibi et effectibus, qua communicabiliter et non incommunicabiliter est ens As God took cum aliis suis rebus. Unde, sicud deus ex tempore flesh upon contingenter et graciose fecit se esse hominem aliis Himself in time so in eternity, hominibus, ita cum deus eternaliter, formaliter, et sic He took this entity upon 40 incommunicabiliter cum aliis rebus, esset deus et ens; Himself, This answer will also serve for the 7th Objection. For even if God had nothing beyond the lowest creature as to entity itself, He would still possess it in a way infinitely more perfect. But we may also say that, beyond simple entity, God possesses special attributes that belong to no creature. (2) God's in- communicable entity precedes that by which He is one with all beings. 1. du'mte MS. 5. qualib, MS. 13. ut si MS. 19. for- MS. 23. quo MS. 29. vltimum et before optimum MS.
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96 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XV. That entity is more universal in predication does not make it more divine than God ; for God who is its cause, is more universal in causation, and it cannot be given to creatures but by God's creative act. Therefore the extension of a predicate does not necessarily prove its perfection. There is a difference between body and soul in man which is greater than that bet ween the Father and the Son, yet the second difference makes for infinite perfection on both sides. Colour has greater extension than humanity, yet the latter is nobler. What makes for perfection is universality as to causation, pro gloria magnificencie et virtutis sue communicacione necessario eternaliter reddit se esse ens communicabiliter cum aliis rebus, causando necessario eternaliter entitatem analogam sibi et aliis, in qua formaliter cum aliis posset communicare. Et licet entitas illa analoga predi- cacione formali sit communior deitate, hoc tamen non adauget ut ipsa sit eciam aliquo modo divinior deitate, sed pocius reddit eam post deitatem esse divinam, cum deitas causacione sit communior illa entitate analoga, quia principiat illam entitatem analogam, que entitas 10 seipsam non potest principiare. Et ultra: quidquid illa entitas causat vel principiat, hoc eciam prius ipsa deitas propter aliquam sui strictitudinem habet hoc quod non possit esse communis predicacione formali alicui post deum; sed propter sui simpliciter primevi- tatem et summitatem non potest predicacione tali communicari rebus posterioribus post deum, sed causa- cione. Et 2m aliquos predicacione secundum causam omnibus se communicat, ut volunt ex illo Jo. primo. "Quod factum est in ipso vita erat." Et sic non semper maior latitudo predicacionis formalis unius] predicati respectu alterius arguit primum 235b divinius secundo, sicut nec maior latitudo differencie spiritus et corporis in homine, ad differenciam patris et filii in divinis, arguit perfeccius differre corpus et 25 spiritum in homine quam patrem et filium in divinis. [Est] in homine et essencialis differencia inter spiritum et corpus, in divinis inter patrem et filium, realis non essencialis; est tamen infinite perfeccior differencia inter patrem et filium in trinitate deitatis quam inter spiritum 30 et carnem in homine; sicut eciam maior latitudo parvi- tatis non arguit perfeccius parvum vel maiorem per- feccionem parvitatis, sed pocius minorem. Eciam maior est latitudo predicacionis formalis generis coloris quam speciei humane, cum de pluribus sit predicabilis forma- 35 liter ipse color, vel genus coloris, quam species humana. Est tamen species humana dignior genere coloris. Sed hoc videtur regulariter verum quod bonum pre- dicatum quanto alio est principiacione vel causacione communius, tanto ipsum origine vel auctoritate precedit; 40 vel bonum predicatum in eodem genere, quanto in illo 15 20 in order to communicate it to the creatures that were to be. 15, 16. pmenite MS. 12. pus MS. 3, 4. 22. wni or honi vro unius MS. 17. por 9 pt9 MS. 27. Est deest MS. 19. Jo. I.
96 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XV. That entity is more universal in predication does not make it more divine than God ; for God who is its cause, is more universal in causation, and it cannot be given to creatures but by God's creative act. Therefore the extension of a predicate does not necessarily prove its perfection. There is a difference between body and soul in man which is greater than that bet ween the Father and the Son, yet the second difference makes for infinite perfection on both sides. Colour has greater extension than humanity, yet the latter is nobler. What makes for perfection is universality as to causation, pro gloria magnificencie et virtutis sue communicacione necessario eternaliter reddit se esse ens communicabiliter cum aliis rebus, causando necessario eternaliter entitatem analogam sibi et aliis, in qua formaliter cum aliis posset communicare. Et licet entitas illa analoga predi- cacione formali sit communior deitate, hoc tamen non adauget ut ipsa sit eciam aliquo modo divinior deitate, sed pocius reddit eam post deitatem esse divinam, cum deitas causacione sit communior illa entitate analoga, quia principiat illam entitatem analogam, que entitas 10 seipsam non potest principiare. Et ultra: quidquid illa entitas causat vel principiat, hoc eciam prius ipsa deitas propter aliquam sui strictitudinem habet hoc quod non possit esse communis predicacione formali alicui post deum; sed propter sui simpliciter primevi- tatem et summitatem non potest predicacione tali communicari rebus posterioribus post deum, sed causa- cione. Et 2m aliquos predicacione secundum causam omnibus se communicat, ut volunt ex illo Jo. primo. "Quod factum est in ipso vita erat." Et sic non semper maior latitudo predicacionis formalis unius] predicati respectu alterius arguit primum 235b divinius secundo, sicut nec maior latitudo differencie spiritus et corporis in homine, ad differenciam patris et filii in divinis, arguit perfeccius differre corpus et 25 spiritum in homine quam patrem et filium in divinis. [Est] in homine et essencialis differencia inter spiritum et corpus, in divinis inter patrem et filium, realis non essencialis; est tamen infinite perfeccior differencia inter patrem et filium in trinitate deitatis quam inter spiritum 30 et carnem in homine; sicut eciam maior latitudo parvi- tatis non arguit perfeccius parvum vel maiorem per- feccionem parvitatis, sed pocius minorem. Eciam maior est latitudo predicacionis formalis generis coloris quam speciei humane, cum de pluribus sit predicabilis forma- 35 liter ipse color, vel genus coloris, quam species humana. Est tamen species humana dignior genere coloris. Sed hoc videtur regulariter verum quod bonum pre- dicatum quanto alio est principiacione vel causacione communius, tanto ipsum origine vel auctoritate precedit; 40 vel bonum predicatum in eodem genere, quanto in illo 15 20 in order to communicate it to the creatures that were to be. 15, 16. pmenite MS. 12. pus MS. 3, 4. 22. wni or honi vro unius MS. 17. por 9 pt9 MS. 27. Est deest MS. 19. Jo. I.
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CAP. XV. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 97 genere ordine essenciali est lacius predicacione formali, tanto dignius; quia tanto pluribus est tota substancialitas, vel totalis quantitas, vel qualitas, accio, vel passio, etc. Vel melius potest dici quod bonum predicatum respectu 5 rei vel rerum non infinite sed finite perfeccionis, de quanto respectu talium rerum fuerit communius pre- dicacione formali, de tanto divinius. Et si fuerit simpli- citer per se communius predicacione formali respectu talium, tanto erit simpliciter et per se divinius. Si 10 autem solum secundum quid predicacione formali fuerit communius, tunc eciam secundum quid erit melius. Et sic “esse coloratum", de quanto est communius predi- cacione formali quam species humana, de tanto est melius; non tamen est melius ac si “esse coloratum 15 predicacione formali simpliciter per se esset communius quo ad aliquas res finite perfeccionis, quam esset species humana quo ad easdem. Tunc “esse coloratum", sive genus coloris, esset simpliciter divinius quam species humana. 20 Et sic universaliter, si inter duo predicata bona quo 236° ad easdem res finite perfeccionis, unum fuerit] com- munius predicacione formali, tanto est divinius. Et si fuerit simpliciter et per se predicacione divinius, respectu autem rei simpliciter infinite perfeccionis, sive bonum 25 predicatum simpliciter et per se predicacione formali, sit primum (sive minus commune sive maius commune) non est divinius vel minus divinum; cum sit undique infinite perfeccionis simpliciter quodlibet universale pre- dicatum. Et sic ista quatuor predicata: ista res (demon- 3o strando personam patris in divinis) principium spiritus sancti, deus, ens, quorum primum est proprium patri, secundum commune patri et filio tantum, tercium commune tribus personis divinis et non aliis rebus, 4tum commune deo et creaturis, neutrum est reliquo 35 magis vel minus divinum vel bonum, sed quodlibet simpliciter infinite bonum. Prima tamen tria sunt sine analogio et 4tum est analogum, simpliciter deo con- veniens predicacione formali et effectibus 2m quid. Ubi autem predicata finite bonitatis, de quanto unum when we have to do with 40 eorum respectu eorumdem respectuum est communius predicates formali predicacione, de tanto melius. Et si simpliciter concerning creatures, the In general, of two things that are formally predicated of a third, the one which is most universal is most perfect. But in some cases, neither predicate is more perfect than the other as: The Father, Principle of the Holy Ghost, God and Being: each successively has greater extension, yet neither makes more for perfection. or as to anything good that is predicated ; if one thing is simply more universal than another in this sense, it is simply more perfect; if with restrictions, its perfection is also restricted. 32. � pro commune MS. De Universalibus.
CAP. XV. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 97 genere ordine essenciali est lacius predicacione formali, tanto dignius; quia tanto pluribus est tota substancialitas, vel totalis quantitas, vel qualitas, accio, vel passio, etc. Vel melius potest dici quod bonum predicatum respectu 5 rei vel rerum non infinite sed finite perfeccionis, de quanto respectu talium rerum fuerit communius pre- dicacione formali, de tanto divinius. Et si fuerit simpli- citer per se communius predicacione formali respectu talium, tanto erit simpliciter et per se divinius. Si 10 autem solum secundum quid predicacione formali fuerit communius, tunc eciam secundum quid erit melius. Et sic “esse coloratum", de quanto est communius predi- cacione formali quam species humana, de tanto est melius; non tamen est melius ac si “esse coloratum 15 predicacione formali simpliciter per se esset communius quo ad aliquas res finite perfeccionis, quam esset species humana quo ad easdem. Tunc “esse coloratum", sive genus coloris, esset simpliciter divinius quam species humana. 20 Et sic universaliter, si inter duo predicata bona quo 236° ad easdem res finite perfeccionis, unum fuerit] com- munius predicacione formali, tanto est divinius. Et si fuerit simpliciter et per se predicacione divinius, respectu autem rei simpliciter infinite perfeccionis, sive bonum 25 predicatum simpliciter et per se predicacione formali, sit primum (sive minus commune sive maius commune) non est divinius vel minus divinum; cum sit undique infinite perfeccionis simpliciter quodlibet universale pre- dicatum. Et sic ista quatuor predicata: ista res (demon- 3o strando personam patris in divinis) principium spiritus sancti, deus, ens, quorum primum est proprium patri, secundum commune patri et filio tantum, tercium commune tribus personis divinis et non aliis rebus, 4tum commune deo et creaturis, neutrum est reliquo 35 magis vel minus divinum vel bonum, sed quodlibet simpliciter infinite bonum. Prima tamen tria sunt sine analogio et 4tum est analogum, simpliciter deo con- veniens predicacione formali et effectibus 2m quid. Ubi autem predicata finite bonitatis, de quanto unum when we have to do with 40 eorum respectu eorumdem respectuum est communius predicates formali predicacione, de tanto melius. Et si simpliciter concerning creatures, the In general, of two things that are formally predicated of a third, the one which is most universal is most perfect. But in some cases, neither predicate is more perfect than the other as: The Father, Principle of the Holy Ghost, God and Being: each successively has greater extension, yet neither makes more for perfection. or as to anything good that is predicated ; if one thing is simply more universal than another in this sense, it is simply more perfect; if with restrictions, its perfection is also restricted. 32. � pro commune MS. De Universalibus.
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98 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XV. more universal et per se communius, tunc et sic melius. Nec oportet, of two, including the si genus pluralitate predicacione formali simpliciter et other in its per se sit communius quam species humana, quod illud extension, will be more genus multis speciebus et pluribus individuis quam perfect, if the species humana [consistit], quod ergo genus plante sit 5 predication be formal. simpliciter et per se melius specie humana: sed si respectu earundem rerum finite perfeccionis ita esset, tunc videtur hoc oportere sequi. 2. plu'ace MS. 3. humana quia species humana quia MS. 5. con- sistit deest MS.
98 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XV. more universal et per se communius, tunc et sic melius. Nec oportet, of two, including the si genus pluralitate predicacione formali simpliciter et other in its per se sit communius quam species humana, quod illud extension, will be more genus multis speciebus et pluribus individuis quam perfect, if the species humana [consistit], quod ergo genus plante sit 5 predication be formal. simpliciter et per se melius specie humana: sed si respectu earundem rerum finite perfeccionis ita esset, tunc videtur hoc oportere sequi. 2. plu'ace MS. 3. humana quia species humana quia MS. 5. con- sistit deest MS.
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CAPITULUM DECIMUM SEXTUM. Ad tercium argumentum respondetur quod consimile argumentum est zophisticum: “Illa essencia divina est filius in divinis; igitur non est pater in divinis; igitur 5 est non pater in divinis. Certum quod est sophisticum. Unde negatur illa consequencia: '"Ista entitas analoga est effectus purus; igitur est non deitas". Et quando assumitur: "Quilibet purus effectus est non deitas“, verum est; "igitur, si illa entitas est purus effectus, tunc 10 est non deitas“, negatur argumentum. Et si dicatur hoc, arguitur ab inferiori ad suum superius affirmative 236° sine distribucione inferioris] et superioris: “Ista entitas est caliditas; igitur ista entitas est non deitas, cum omnis caliditas sit non deitas, et econtra". Stat enim 15 aliquid probari universaliter de inferiori, et non econtra, et tamen non de inferiori; sicut contingencia ad utrum- libet predicatur de omni humanitate, dicendo, "Omnis humanitas est contingens ad utrumlibet que potest esse et non esse," et non est verum quod entitas analoga 20 est contingens ad utrumlibet. Sic ergo quod si arguatur ab una parte ab inferiori ad suum superius affirmative, non tamen ceteris paribus, cum in consequente sit uni- versaliter abnegacio deitatis de entitate analoga sicut fuit in antecedente, non stat universaliter negare aliquid 25 de inferiori et non de superiori. Et, si arguitur; “illa entitas est res que non est You have no right, because humanitas; igitur est non humanitas:" dicitur quod Entity is something that non sequitur; sed bene sequitur quod illa entitas est res is not God, to say that it excludes God. (3) The argument resembles this fallacy: The Divine Essence is the Son: . is the Not-Father: . is not the Father." And as this is a fallacy, so is this one too: "Entity is an effect, therefore it is not God. To say: "We rise from particular to general entity, each of which we find to be effects and therefore not God, and conclude the same of Universal Entity", is a wrong process, for we arrive at a total denial of Deity to Entity, which is not legitimate. 2. Blank space for initial A MS. 1. Capitulum &c. deest MS. 24. mo MS. 13. illa MS. 14. sce pro stat MS. 4. The order of these words is very important. The Son is not the Father, but we cannot conclude thence that the Divine Essence is the Not-Father. 14. Econtra. Some words are missing here no doubt, denying the force of the objection; the reasons for the denial follow.
CAPITULUM DECIMUM SEXTUM. Ad tercium argumentum respondetur quod consimile argumentum est zophisticum: “Illa essencia divina est filius in divinis; igitur non est pater in divinis; igitur 5 est non pater in divinis. Certum quod est sophisticum. Unde negatur illa consequencia: '"Ista entitas analoga est effectus purus; igitur est non deitas". Et quando assumitur: "Quilibet purus effectus est non deitas“, verum est; "igitur, si illa entitas est purus effectus, tunc 10 est non deitas“, negatur argumentum. Et si dicatur hoc, arguitur ab inferiori ad suum superius affirmative 236° sine distribucione inferioris] et superioris: “Ista entitas est caliditas; igitur ista entitas est non deitas, cum omnis caliditas sit non deitas, et econtra". Stat enim 15 aliquid probari universaliter de inferiori, et non econtra, et tamen non de inferiori; sicut contingencia ad utrum- libet predicatur de omni humanitate, dicendo, "Omnis humanitas est contingens ad utrumlibet que potest esse et non esse," et non est verum quod entitas analoga 20 est contingens ad utrumlibet. Sic ergo quod si arguatur ab una parte ab inferiori ad suum superius affirmative, non tamen ceteris paribus, cum in consequente sit uni- versaliter abnegacio deitatis de entitate analoga sicut fuit in antecedente, non stat universaliter negare aliquid 25 de inferiori et non de superiori. Et, si arguitur; “illa entitas est res que non est You have no right, because humanitas; igitur est non humanitas:" dicitur quod Entity is something that non sequitur; sed bene sequitur quod illa entitas est res is not God, to say that it excludes God. (3) The argument resembles this fallacy: The Divine Essence is the Son: . is the Not-Father: . is not the Father." And as this is a fallacy, so is this one too: "Entity is an effect, therefore it is not God. To say: "We rise from particular to general entity, each of which we find to be effects and therefore not God, and conclude the same of Universal Entity", is a wrong process, for we arrive at a total denial of Deity to Entity, which is not legitimate. 2. Blank space for initial A MS. 1. Capitulum &c. deest MS. 24. mo MS. 13. illa MS. 14. sce pro stat MS. 4. The order of these words is very important. The Son is not the Father, but we cannot conclude thence that the Divine Essence is the Not-Father. 14. Econtra. Some words are missing here no doubt, denying the force of the objection; the reasons for the denial follow.
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100 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XVI. non deitas; et non sequitur, ultra: “est res non deitas, igitur est non deitas: cum in consequente sit abnegacio universalis deitatis de illa entitate et non in antecedente. Alio modo potest distingwi illa: “illa entitas est non deitas"; quia vel ly "non deitas" tenetur materialiter significative et infinitanter, ita quod sit sensus: "Entitas est res que non est deitas," tunc illa est vera. Et non sequitur quod "illa entitas non sit deitas". Alio modo quod [si] ly "non deitas" teneatur formaliter, signifi- cative, et infinitanter, ita quod sit sensus quod "ista 10 entitas sit nequaquam deitas; tunc est falsa. Et sequitur tunc ex illa quod “illa entitas non sit deitas" in tali sensu secundum regulam illam: ab affirmativo de pre- dicato infinito ad negativam de predicato finito est "No stone bona consequencia; sed non sequitur 2m primum sensum. 15 exists" may Quod autem ly "non deitas" possit sic dupliciter accipi mean either the non-existence videtur patere a simili; quia ista proposicio: "verum et of any stone, and be true, or bonum est nullum lapidem existere" habet duos sensus, the existence of unum verum et alium falsum. Ut si ly "nullum lapidem No stone; and be false. existere" tenetur materialiter significative pro re que 20 est non existencia lapidis, tunc est illa vera: “verum et bonum est nullum lapidem existere" quia hoc (demon- strando verum est nullum lapidem existere, quia hoc est. Igitur vel "est lapidem existere" vel "est non lapidem existere"; sed non primum, igitur secundum. Et per 25 consequens] hoc verum et bonum est, nullum lapidem 237" existere, in tali sensu. Alio modo accepitur ly “nullum lapidem existere" formaliter significative pro negacione, seu pro forma pure negative a parte rei contradictorie opposita huic veritati affirmative “lapidem existere". 30 Et consimiliter videtur dicendum de duplici sensu talis proposicionis: 'illa entitas analoga est non deitas." Est tamen advertendum quod si ly “lapidem existere" et ly 'nullum lapidem existere" tenentur formaliter signifi- cative et non materialiter, tunc non sequitur hoc verum 35 et bonum, puta; deus est: igitur est lapidem existere' vel est “nullum lapidem existere". Tercia responsio est distingwendo illam: "Ista entitas analoga est non deitas" 2m predicacionem duplicem. Uno modo quod ly non deitas" predicetur sicut for-40 maliter et adiective de ly “illa entitas"; et erit sensus In like manner Non-Deity may be affirmed of Being, but Deity cannot be denied of it without falsehood. Other distinctions may be taken We may also reply that entity may be predicated of non-Deity, but Deity may also be predicated thereof. 9. si deest MS. 6. ſ catine MS. 9, 10. ſo tine MS. 20. ſine MS. 23. deum pro verum MS. 28. ſo tine MS.
100 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XVI. non deitas; et non sequitur, ultra: “est res non deitas, igitur est non deitas: cum in consequente sit abnegacio universalis deitatis de illa entitate et non in antecedente. Alio modo potest distingwi illa: “illa entitas est non deitas"; quia vel ly "non deitas" tenetur materialiter significative et infinitanter, ita quod sit sensus: "Entitas est res que non est deitas," tunc illa est vera. Et non sequitur quod "illa entitas non sit deitas". Alio modo quod [si] ly "non deitas" teneatur formaliter, signifi- cative, et infinitanter, ita quod sit sensus quod "ista 10 entitas sit nequaquam deitas; tunc est falsa. Et sequitur tunc ex illa quod “illa entitas non sit deitas" in tali sensu secundum regulam illam: ab affirmativo de pre- dicato infinito ad negativam de predicato finito est "No stone bona consequencia; sed non sequitur 2m primum sensum. 15 exists" may Quod autem ly "non deitas" possit sic dupliciter accipi mean either the non-existence videtur patere a simili; quia ista proposicio: "verum et of any stone, and be true, or bonum est nullum lapidem existere" habet duos sensus, the existence of unum verum et alium falsum. Ut si ly "nullum lapidem No stone; and be false. existere" tenetur materialiter significative pro re que 20 est non existencia lapidis, tunc est illa vera: “verum et bonum est nullum lapidem existere" quia hoc (demon- strando verum est nullum lapidem existere, quia hoc est. Igitur vel "est lapidem existere" vel "est non lapidem existere"; sed non primum, igitur secundum. Et per 25 consequens] hoc verum et bonum est, nullum lapidem 237" existere, in tali sensu. Alio modo accepitur ly “nullum lapidem existere" formaliter significative pro negacione, seu pro forma pure negative a parte rei contradictorie opposita huic veritati affirmative “lapidem existere". 30 Et consimiliter videtur dicendum de duplici sensu talis proposicionis: 'illa entitas analoga est non deitas." Est tamen advertendum quod si ly “lapidem existere" et ly 'nullum lapidem existere" tenentur formaliter signifi- cative et non materialiter, tunc non sequitur hoc verum 35 et bonum, puta; deus est: igitur est lapidem existere' vel est “nullum lapidem existere". Tercia responsio est distingwendo illam: "Ista entitas analoga est non deitas" 2m predicacionem duplicem. Uno modo quod ly non deitas" predicetur sicut for-40 maliter et adiective de ly “illa entitas"; et erit sensus In like manner Non-Deity may be affirmed of Being, but Deity cannot be denied of it without falsehood. Other distinctions may be taken We may also reply that entity may be predicated of non-Deity, but Deity may also be predicated thereof. 9. si deest MS. 6. ſ catine MS. 9, 10. ſo tine MS. 20. ſine MS. 23. deum pro verum MS. 28. ſo tine MS.
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CAP. XVI. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 101 237 quod “illa entitas est nequaquam deitas"; vel quod isti entitati insit abnegacio deitatis", et hoc a parte rei; tunc sensus est falsus. Et in tali sensu infert quod ce ista entitas non sit deitas". Alio modo quod ly "non 5 deitas" predicetur sicud materialiter et sicut per se substantivum et substantivatum, ita quod sit sensus: ce illa entitas analoga est res que est non deitas", vel, ce cui a parte rei inest abnegacio deitatis vel esse vel racio deitatis". Et tunc antecedens est verum; et non 10 sequitur ex illo quod ergo “illa entitas analoga non sit deitas". Et consimiliter dicitur de illa "Ista deitas est non filius in divinis". Et patet distinccio iam dicta a simili. Nam ista proposicio "Universale est singulare": quia vel ly “singulare" predicatur sicud formaliter et 15 adiective, et erit sensus talis impossibilis: "universalitati inest vel convenit per modum forme singularitas et incommunicabilitas multis"; et in tali sensu bene sequitur: ce 'Universale est singulare; igitur universale non potest communicari multis individuis per modum forme." Alio 20 modo ly "singulare" predicatur sicud materialiter et sicud per se substantive. Tunc erit sensus: "Universale est res cui convenit vel inest singularitas"; et hoc est verum, I quia universale animal est iste equus, cui inest singularitas. Et in tali sensu non sequitur: "Universale 25 est singulare, igitur universale non potest communicari per modum forme multis individuis. Et ultime due responsiones ad istam: “Illa entitas These last two answers seem analoga est non deitas" videntur multum concordare preferable, but the first will do et in eundem sensum tendere. Unde acceptande sunt for such as do not know the 3o plus quam prima. Si autem contenciosus aliquis minus right Logic. expertus in vera logica vellet distincciones illas satis logice fundatas quas non intelligeret deridere et nollet eas admittere, tunc occurrendum videtur tali proter- vienti satis cum prima via respondendi. Et sic, si hic 35 dicatur quare, loquendo de rebus extra, refugitur hic ad distinccionem terminorum et proposicionum, respon- detur quia multiplicitas sensuum et significatorum a parte rei est obiective in terminis et proposicionibus; ideo satis licet et expedit in terminis et proposicionibus 40 per quos illi sensus significantur et feruntur in disputa- A like distinction may be applied to the question of the Trinity. We may also affirm that the Universal is a singular in the absurd sense of its being so formally (or qua Universal) and then the objection would have weight; or say that the Singular merely belongs to the Universal, and then there is no conclusion. If it be asked why, when we have to do with things, we discuss words and propositions, I answer that since we can only deal with things by 6. ſbstatmu MS.; ib. sbstatmatu MS. 15. vli MS. 14. Quia. There is again a probable gap before this word.
CAP. XVI. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 101 237 quod “illa entitas est nequaquam deitas"; vel quod isti entitati insit abnegacio deitatis", et hoc a parte rei; tunc sensus est falsus. Et in tali sensu infert quod ce ista entitas non sit deitas". Alio modo quod ly "non 5 deitas" predicetur sicud materialiter et sicut per se substantivum et substantivatum, ita quod sit sensus: ce illa entitas analoga est res que est non deitas", vel, ce cui a parte rei inest abnegacio deitatis vel esse vel racio deitatis". Et tunc antecedens est verum; et non 10 sequitur ex illo quod ergo “illa entitas analoga non sit deitas". Et consimiliter dicitur de illa "Ista deitas est non filius in divinis". Et patet distinccio iam dicta a simili. Nam ista proposicio "Universale est singulare": quia vel ly “singulare" predicatur sicud formaliter et 15 adiective, et erit sensus talis impossibilis: "universalitati inest vel convenit per modum forme singularitas et incommunicabilitas multis"; et in tali sensu bene sequitur: ce 'Universale est singulare; igitur universale non potest communicari multis individuis per modum forme." Alio 20 modo ly "singulare" predicatur sicud materialiter et sicud per se substantive. Tunc erit sensus: "Universale est res cui convenit vel inest singularitas"; et hoc est verum, I quia universale animal est iste equus, cui inest singularitas. Et in tali sensu non sequitur: "Universale 25 est singulare, igitur universale non potest communicari per modum forme multis individuis. Et ultime due responsiones ad istam: “Illa entitas These last two answers seem analoga est non deitas" videntur multum concordare preferable, but the first will do et in eundem sensum tendere. Unde acceptande sunt for such as do not know the 3o plus quam prima. Si autem contenciosus aliquis minus right Logic. expertus in vera logica vellet distincciones illas satis logice fundatas quas non intelligeret deridere et nollet eas admittere, tunc occurrendum videtur tali proter- vienti satis cum prima via respondendi. Et sic, si hic 35 dicatur quare, loquendo de rebus extra, refugitur hic ad distinccionem terminorum et proposicionum, respon- detur quia multiplicitas sensuum et significatorum a parte rei est obiective in terminis et proposicionibus; ideo satis licet et expedit in terminis et proposicionibus 40 per quos illi sensus significantur et feruntur in disputa- A like distinction may be applied to the question of the Trinity. We may also affirm that the Universal is a singular in the absurd sense of its being so formally (or qua Universal) and then the objection would have weight; or say that the Singular merely belongs to the Universal, and then there is no conclusion. If it be asked why, when we have to do with things, we discuss words and propositions, I answer that since we can only deal with things by 6. ſbstatmu MS.; ib. sbstatmatu MS. 15. vli MS. 14. Quia. There is again a probable gap before this word.
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102 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XVI. means of cione, distingwere et dividere multiplicacionem illarum words, and sensuum et significatorum, sic obiective in terminis et words have many proposicionibus existentem. Et si dicatur: 'Tamen pre- significations, „ dicacio est a parte rei, preter terminos et proposiciones, we are forced to explain verum est; sed distincta et convoluta, et non involuta 5 these. What is et indistincta, sicud est sepe in terminis et propo- predicated of things is made sicionibus. Et dicendum est eciam hic quod cum dicitur: known to us c "Ista entitas analoga est non deitas", predicacio a parte by words, and we must needs rei potest et debet pocius distingwi [quam] ipsa predi- use distinctions cacio in terminis et proposicionibus nostris. Verum, 10 on that account. quia per terminos et proposiciones obiciuntur et asse- runtur nobis predicaciones a parte rei, ideo convenienter in eis illas distingwimus. Et patet ex dictis quomodo secundum rectam logicam We see how to understand debet intelligi regula arguendi ab affirmativa de predi- 15 the rule of inference from cato infinito ad negativam de predicato finito, et decet, an affirmation with a negative et necessarium est, logicum katholicum talem logicam predicate to a negation with contra infideles noscere, ne diceret materiam sancte an affirmative fidei katholice de trinitate personarum in divinis et predicate, so as not to interfere unitate substancie esse impossibile, cum] tolleret iuxta with the eos argumentum necessarium ab affirmativa de predi- Catholic faith, nor with the cato infinito ad negativam de predicato finito, sic doctrine of the arguendo: Illa essencia divina est non filius; igitur, illa Universals. non est filius. Patet autem secundum logicam superius recitatam quomodo ad antecedens et consequens ad 25 consequenciam est dicendum, salvata summe necessaria veritate de trinitate personarum et unitate substancie in deo, et consimiliter in suo ente anologo et in suis universalibus que rebus singularibus mundi indidit. Ad quartum conceditur quod bonitas essencialis 30 (4) The essential transcendens alicuius rei est melior quam ipsa res sic goodness of a thing is indeed bona essencialiter pro tanto, quia talis res (sicud equus, better than the thing itself, gracia exempli) solum secundum quid et non simpliciter because the habet illam bonitatem analogam sic simpliciter. Indi- thing is only partly in viduum alicuius speciei vel generis igitur non habet 35 possession totaliter, sed parcialiter, tantam bonitatem sue speciei of it. We may say vel sui generis; igitur non est individuum tam bonum it is of infinite essencialiter sicud sua species est bona, vel sicud genus goodness, but not infinitely suum est bonum. Et potest hic concedi quod sicut good. quelibet res habet in se formaliter infinitam bonitatem 40 238* 1. multiplicate MS. 9. quam deest MS. 15. Arguendi. In ordinary cases, a very plain rule; This is a not-apple: .. this is not an apple.
102 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XVI. means of cione, distingwere et dividere multiplicacionem illarum words, and sensuum et significatorum, sic obiective in terminis et words have many proposicionibus existentem. Et si dicatur: 'Tamen pre- significations, „ dicacio est a parte rei, preter terminos et proposiciones, we are forced to explain verum est; sed distincta et convoluta, et non involuta 5 these. What is et indistincta, sicud est sepe in terminis et propo- predicated of things is made sicionibus. Et dicendum est eciam hic quod cum dicitur: known to us c "Ista entitas analoga est non deitas", predicacio a parte by words, and we must needs rei potest et debet pocius distingwi [quam] ipsa predi- use distinctions cacio in terminis et proposicionibus nostris. Verum, 10 on that account. quia per terminos et proposiciones obiciuntur et asse- runtur nobis predicaciones a parte rei, ideo convenienter in eis illas distingwimus. Et patet ex dictis quomodo secundum rectam logicam We see how to understand debet intelligi regula arguendi ab affirmativa de predi- 15 the rule of inference from cato infinito ad negativam de predicato finito, et decet, an affirmation with a negative et necessarium est, logicum katholicum talem logicam predicate to a negation with contra infideles noscere, ne diceret materiam sancte an affirmative fidei katholice de trinitate personarum in divinis et predicate, so as not to interfere unitate substancie esse impossibile, cum] tolleret iuxta with the eos argumentum necessarium ab affirmativa de predi- Catholic faith, nor with the cato infinito ad negativam de predicato finito, sic doctrine of the arguendo: Illa essencia divina est non filius; igitur, illa Universals. non est filius. Patet autem secundum logicam superius recitatam quomodo ad antecedens et consequens ad 25 consequenciam est dicendum, salvata summe necessaria veritate de trinitate personarum et unitate substancie in deo, et consimiliter in suo ente anologo et in suis universalibus que rebus singularibus mundi indidit. Ad quartum conceditur quod bonitas essencialis 30 (4) The essential transcendens alicuius rei est melior quam ipsa res sic goodness of a thing is indeed bona essencialiter pro tanto, quia talis res (sicud equus, better than the thing itself, gracia exempli) solum secundum quid et non simpliciter because the habet illam bonitatem analogam sic simpliciter. Indi- thing is only partly in viduum alicuius speciei vel generis igitur non habet 35 possession totaliter, sed parcialiter, tantam bonitatem sue speciei of it. We may say vel sui generis; igitur non est individuum tam bonum it is of infinite essencialiter sicud sua species est bona, vel sicud genus goodness, but not infinitely suum est bonum. Et potest hic concedi quod sicut good. quelibet res habet in se formaliter infinitam bonitatem 40 238* 1. multiplicate MS. 9. quam deest MS. 15. Arguendi. In ordinary cases, a very plain rule; This is a not-apple: .. this is not an apple.
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CAP. XVI. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 103 238b essencialem transcendentem, ita est infinite bonitatis essencialis. Sed non sequitur ex hinc quod igitur sit infinite bona essencialiter. Et causa, quia solummodo 2m quid et non simpliciter ac totaliter est infinite 5 bonitatis essencialis, et solum secundum quid habet illam in se formaliter. Sed contra obicitur: qua racione res quecunque habet The adversary insists that in se formaliter bonitatem essencialem infinitam, et this 18 tantamount to conceditur habere, et talem solum secundum quid con- saying it is infinitely good, 10 ceditur habere? Et sic similiter de esse bonitatis essen- but only to a cialis infinite, eadem racione debet concedi quod que- certain extent. cunque res est infinite bona essencialiter, sed solum secundum quid et non simpliciter est bona essencialiter infinite. Hic respondetur quod non est simile; nam eo 15 ipso quod res esset infinita bona essencialiter, igitur est oppositum in adiecto quod res secundum quid solum sit infinite bona essencialiter. Sed non eo ipso quod res habet formaliter infinitam bonitatem essencialem, simpliciter habet eam, vel totaliter; sed stat quod solum secundum quid] vel per partem habeat illam, vel aliam bonitatem essencialem. Igitur non est simile. Sic similiter non videtur sequi, si res est illius bonitatis essencialis infinite, quod igitur sit simpliciter illius bonitatis, sed solum secundum quid; sicut solum secundum quid est 25 in illa bonitate essenciali sicut in sua forma compara- tive ad deum, qui simpliciter est in illa bonitate, sicud in sua forma. Omne autem aliud a deo mere 2m quid respectu sui est secum in illa bonitate, sicud in sua forma essenciali. 30 Si tamen quis penitus pro eodem wult habere hoc: But if they will have it that esse [in] finite bonitatis essencialis," et hoc: “esse infinite the distinction is worthless, bonum essencialiter," tunc negandum est in tali sensu then we deny quamlibet rem esse infinite bonitatis essencialis, sicud that any creature has et negandum est quamlibet rem esse infinite bonam infinite essential 35 essencialiter. goodness. (6) If it be Ad 6tum. Cum infertur quod penitus unum et idem meant, one and esset deus et lapis, si ly “penitus" determinat solum the same thing absolutely (i. e. hoc quod est unum et idem, tunc scilicet “hoc (scilicet Entity) is a entitas analoga) est penitus hoc"; ita est penitus hoc stone and is God, we admit this. We deny the parity; for we do not say that the thing is infinitely good, but that it has infinite goodness; which is quite another thing. Creatures do not possess this goodness simply, as God does. 3. c MS.; ib. ſoluco MS. 22. Sic similiter sic MS. 31. in deest MS. 36. Ad 6'um. Note that the fifth objection is left unanswered here; it is not a mere numeral-mistake.
CAP. XVI. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 103 238b essencialem transcendentem, ita est infinite bonitatis essencialis. Sed non sequitur ex hinc quod igitur sit infinite bona essencialiter. Et causa, quia solummodo 2m quid et non simpliciter ac totaliter est infinite 5 bonitatis essencialis, et solum secundum quid habet illam in se formaliter. Sed contra obicitur: qua racione res quecunque habet The adversary insists that in se formaliter bonitatem essencialem infinitam, et this 18 tantamount to conceditur habere, et talem solum secundum quid con- saying it is infinitely good, 10 ceditur habere? Et sic similiter de esse bonitatis essen- but only to a cialis infinite, eadem racione debet concedi quod que- certain extent. cunque res est infinite bona essencialiter, sed solum secundum quid et non simpliciter est bona essencialiter infinite. Hic respondetur quod non est simile; nam eo 15 ipso quod res esset infinita bona essencialiter, igitur est oppositum in adiecto quod res secundum quid solum sit infinite bona essencialiter. Sed non eo ipso quod res habet formaliter infinitam bonitatem essencialem, simpliciter habet eam, vel totaliter; sed stat quod solum secundum quid] vel per partem habeat illam, vel aliam bonitatem essencialem. Igitur non est simile. Sic similiter non videtur sequi, si res est illius bonitatis essencialis infinite, quod igitur sit simpliciter illius bonitatis, sed solum secundum quid; sicut solum secundum quid est 25 in illa bonitate essenciali sicut in sua forma compara- tive ad deum, qui simpliciter est in illa bonitate, sicud in sua forma. Omne autem aliud a deo mere 2m quid respectu sui est secum in illa bonitate, sicud in sua forma essenciali. 30 Si tamen quis penitus pro eodem wult habere hoc: But if they will have it that esse [in] finite bonitatis essencialis," et hoc: “esse infinite the distinction is worthless, bonum essencialiter," tunc negandum est in tali sensu then we deny quamlibet rem esse infinite bonitatis essencialis, sicud that any creature has et negandum est quamlibet rem esse infinite bonam infinite essential 35 essencialiter. goodness. (6) If it be Ad 6tum. Cum infertur quod penitus unum et idem meant, one and esset deus et lapis, si ly “penitus" determinat solum the same thing absolutely (i. e. hoc quod est unum et idem, tunc scilicet “hoc (scilicet Entity) is a entitas analoga) est penitus hoc"; ita est penitus hoc stone and is God, we admit this. We deny the parity; for we do not say that the thing is infinitely good, but that it has infinite goodness; which is quite another thing. Creatures do not possess this goodness simply, as God does. 3. c MS.; ib. ſoluco MS. 22. Sic similiter sic MS. 31. in deest MS. 36. Ad 6'um. Note that the fifth objection is left unanswered here; it is not a mere numeral-mistake.
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104 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XVI. unum et idem; et per consequens penitus unum et idem est lapis et deus. Si autem ly “penitus" determinat hoc verbum: Est, ita quod sit sensus quod deus et lapis penitus et omnino sint unum et idem, tunc est sensus hereticus; quia tunc deus et lapis unirentur et 5 ydemptificarentur in substancia divina omnino et penitus. Et tamen hec penitus et omnino unirentur et ydempti- ficarentur in substancia singularis lapidis: quod est summe absurdum. Non ergo deus et lapis penitus sunt unum et idem. Ad septimum respondetur: si entitas numeralis vocatur entitas que sic est una quod nequaquam est plures res maxime essencialiter distincte, sicut videtur solere vocari, tunc omnino negatur consequencia quod penitus eadem numeralis res esset deus, equus etc., et quod 15 penitus idem in numero esset deus, equus, etc. Si autem vocetur entitas numeralis que sic est una in sua prima et propria forma quod nequaquam est in eadem sua prima et propria forma plures entitates, vel que forma- liter proprie est entitas una et nequaquam est formaliter 20 proprie plures entitates, vel que sic est formaliter et proprie entitas aliqua quod nequaquam est pluraliter et multipliciter illa] entitas, vel eciam quecunque plures; 239" et hoc semper 2m propriam suam formam: tunc in tali sensu concedendum est quod entitas numeralis 25 eadem est deus, equus, et mulus, etc.; et per consequens quod penitus eadem numeralis entitas determinat, sicud fuit consimiliter dictum in argumento priori solito. Et sic similiter ad consimilem sensum quod penitus idem in numero est deus et equus. Et per distinccionem iam premissam respondetur ad (8) The same reply; a argumentum 8vum, et conceditur quod omne quod est distinction between unum et idem in numero est ad talem sensum, quod numerical omne quod est in sua prima et propria forma est sic identity of a thing which unum et idem quod nequaquam in eadem est pluraliter 35 excludes others absolutely, or vel multipliciter illud idem, et quecunque plura. Et sic only excludes commune in se ipso primo non est plura, sed in suis them from its proper and minus communibus est ipsum illa plura minus communia. primary mode of being. Ad nonum argumentum respondetur: Si individua (9) If you mean by individual' entitas dicatur, quia non potest dividi inter plures res, 40 that which eciam essencialiter distinctas, quarum quelibet est entitas cannot be If it be meant that God and a stone are identical, it is heretical and to be denied. (7) If by 'numeral entity a thing is meant that cannot be more than one, we deny the conclusion. If we mean a thing which in its own and primary form is one and not many, or whose entity 1s such that it cannot be multiplied, existing in many: then we admit the inference. 10 30 1. onu MS. 17. in sua twice MS.
104 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XVI. unum et idem; et per consequens penitus unum et idem est lapis et deus. Si autem ly “penitus" determinat hoc verbum: Est, ita quod sit sensus quod deus et lapis penitus et omnino sint unum et idem, tunc est sensus hereticus; quia tunc deus et lapis unirentur et 5 ydemptificarentur in substancia divina omnino et penitus. Et tamen hec penitus et omnino unirentur et ydempti- ficarentur in substancia singularis lapidis: quod est summe absurdum. Non ergo deus et lapis penitus sunt unum et idem. Ad septimum respondetur: si entitas numeralis vocatur entitas que sic est una quod nequaquam est plures res maxime essencialiter distincte, sicut videtur solere vocari, tunc omnino negatur consequencia quod penitus eadem numeralis res esset deus, equus etc., et quod 15 penitus idem in numero esset deus, equus, etc. Si autem vocetur entitas numeralis que sic est una in sua prima et propria forma quod nequaquam est in eadem sua prima et propria forma plures entitates, vel que forma- liter proprie est entitas una et nequaquam est formaliter 20 proprie plures entitates, vel que sic est formaliter et proprie entitas aliqua quod nequaquam est pluraliter et multipliciter illa] entitas, vel eciam quecunque plures; 239" et hoc semper 2m propriam suam formam: tunc in tali sensu concedendum est quod entitas numeralis 25 eadem est deus, equus, et mulus, etc.; et per consequens quod penitus eadem numeralis entitas determinat, sicud fuit consimiliter dictum in argumento priori solito. Et sic similiter ad consimilem sensum quod penitus idem in numero est deus et equus. Et per distinccionem iam premissam respondetur ad (8) The same reply; a argumentum 8vum, et conceditur quod omne quod est distinction between unum et idem in numero est ad talem sensum, quod numerical omne quod est in sua prima et propria forma est sic identity of a thing which unum et idem quod nequaquam in eadem est pluraliter 35 excludes others absolutely, or vel multipliciter illud idem, et quecunque plura. Et sic only excludes commune in se ipso primo non est plura, sed in suis them from its proper and minus communibus est ipsum illa plura minus communia. primary mode of being. Ad nonum argumentum respondetur: Si individua (9) If you mean by individual' entitas dicatur, quia non potest dividi inter plures res, 40 that which eciam essencialiter distinctas, quarum quelibet est entitas cannot be If it be meant that God and a stone are identical, it is heretical and to be denied. (7) If by 'numeral entity a thing is meant that cannot be more than one, we deny the conclusion. If we mean a thing which in its own and primary form is one and not many, or whose entity 1s such that it cannot be multiplied, existing in many: then we admit the inference. 10 30 1. onu MS. 17. in sua twice MS.
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CAP. XVI. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. illa, vel guarum cuiuslibet ipsa est entitas, tunc negatur assumptum; nec apparens ulterior probacio contra hoc in aliquó procedit. Si autem placet vocare individuam entitatem que est formaliter entitas una et nequaquam 5proprie potest esse formaliter et multipliciter illa vel quecunque plures entitates, tunc conceditur ad talem sensum quamlibet entitatem esse entitatem individuam. Et non ex tali sensu sequitur quod nulla entitas sit communis multis entibus et communiter multa encia 10 collectim et divisim, Pro materia X"! dicitur quod omnino impossibile 105 divided so as to belong to several, we deny it. But if you Choose to call individual a thing of which the formal essence cannot be divided amongst many, we admit it. (10) We deny that an est quod equus vel aliqua alia talis creatura summe creature can be sit unum et idem cum deo. Verumptamen sicud equus est ens cum deo summa entitate, non tamen simpli- 15citer, sed mere 2" quid est ens cum deo illa summa entitate, sic equus est unum cum deo summa unitate et ydemptitate entitatis summe anologe, sed non simpli- citer; sed mere secundum quid est unum et idem cum deo illa summa veritate et ydemptitate. Quod si equus zototaliter et simpliciter esset unum et idem cum deo illa summa entitate et ydemptitate...... cum equus summe esset unum et idem cum deo sicut pater in cedens est summe hereticum sicud et consequens. 25 Et in responsione iam data suppono quod entitati proporcionabiliter correspondet unitas et ydemptitas; ut maxime entitati, maxima unitas et ydemptitas, etc. Si autem summa unitas et jydemptitas aliquorum vocaretur, que tolleret eorum ad invicem distinccionem 3oet differenciam, tunc nequaquam deus et equus tali unitate et ydemptitate summa essent unum, nec possunt esse. Aliter posset dici pro materia argumenti quod, sicut universale est singulare, non tamen universale aliqua singularitate est singulare, cum non predicacione 35formali universale sit singulare; sic deus et equus sunt unum et idem ens analogum, nec tamen aliqua unitate vel ydemptitate sunt unum et idem ens analogum. Et sic equus non est unus cum deo, nec econtra, sed equus est unum cum deo et deus est unum (scilicet 19. unitate MS. 21. no gap MS. 38. Unus... unum. It is impossible to explain this distinc- tion adequately in the side-notes. Yet it is famous, when applied to the Trinity. Paler est unum, non unus cum Filio. absolutely identical with God. It may, however, be partially so; but if it were absolutely so, it would bc equal to the Father. 239^ divinis cum suo filio et spiritu sancto. | Sed ante- The hypothesis 1s ran heresy. Entity and unity correspond; therefore a unity which would destroy the necessary difference between God and the creature is impossible. God and the creature are one and the same Being, they are the same hing, but not the samec.
CAP. XVI. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. illa, vel guarum cuiuslibet ipsa est entitas, tunc negatur assumptum; nec apparens ulterior probacio contra hoc in aliquó procedit. Si autem placet vocare individuam entitatem que est formaliter entitas una et nequaquam 5proprie potest esse formaliter et multipliciter illa vel quecunque plures entitates, tunc conceditur ad talem sensum quamlibet entitatem esse entitatem individuam. Et non ex tali sensu sequitur quod nulla entitas sit communis multis entibus et communiter multa encia 10 collectim et divisim, Pro materia X"! dicitur quod omnino impossibile 105 divided so as to belong to several, we deny it. But if you Choose to call individual a thing of which the formal essence cannot be divided amongst many, we admit it. (10) We deny that an est quod equus vel aliqua alia talis creatura summe creature can be sit unum et idem cum deo. Verumptamen sicud equus est ens cum deo summa entitate, non tamen simpli- 15citer, sed mere 2" quid est ens cum deo illa summa entitate, sic equus est unum cum deo summa unitate et ydemptitate entitatis summe anologe, sed non simpli- citer; sed mere secundum quid est unum et idem cum deo illa summa veritate et ydemptitate. Quod si equus zototaliter et simpliciter esset unum et idem cum deo illa summa entitate et ydemptitate...... cum equus summe esset unum et idem cum deo sicut pater in cedens est summe hereticum sicud et consequens. 25 Et in responsione iam data suppono quod entitati proporcionabiliter correspondet unitas et ydemptitas; ut maxime entitati, maxima unitas et ydemptitas, etc. Si autem summa unitas et jydemptitas aliquorum vocaretur, que tolleret eorum ad invicem distinccionem 3oet differenciam, tunc nequaquam deus et equus tali unitate et ydemptitate summa essent unum, nec possunt esse. Aliter posset dici pro materia argumenti quod, sicut universale est singulare, non tamen universale aliqua singularitate est singulare, cum non predicacione 35formali universale sit singulare; sic deus et equus sunt unum et idem ens analogum, nec tamen aliqua unitate vel ydemptitate sunt unum et idem ens analogum. Et sic equus non est unus cum deo, nec econtra, sed equus est unum cum deo et deus est unum (scilicet 19. unitate MS. 21. no gap MS. 38. Unus... unum. It is impossible to explain this distinc- tion adequately in the side-notes. Yet it is famous, when applied to the Trinity. Paler est unum, non unus cum Filio. absolutely identical with God. It may, however, be partially so; but if it were absolutely so, it would bc equal to the Father. 239^ divinis cum suo filio et spiritu sancto. | Sed ante- The hypothesis 1s ran heresy. Entity and unity correspond; therefore a unity which would destroy the necessary difference between God and the creature is impossible. God and the creature are one and the same Being, they are the same hing, but not the samec.
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106 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XVI. The predication ens analogum) cum equo. Nulla tamen unitate, quia is not forma but material and excludes unity. (11) We must admit that there is a Universal Singularity; and there is nothing absurd in that, if understood roperly. An angle has no quantity, yet we rightly attribute guantity to it, and truth may be uttered respectin falsehood. But it must never be granted that one individual is many, or that these can be one Universal Person. There is such a thing in the abstract — a Person — but not in the concrete: as soon as it becomes abstract, it non predicacione formali, sed quasi penitus materiali, equus et deus sunt unum et idem, scilicet analogum. Et tunc, sicud perfeccio essencialis speciel vel specifica non denominat formaliter et primo ipsum individuum, cum tunc individuum esset tam perfectum essencialiter sicud sua species, sic unitas vel ydemptitas entitatis transcendentis non denominat formaliter et primo equum vel asinum, etc. Si enim unitas vel ydemptitas illa secundum seipsam denominaret equum vel asinum, tunc videtur quod equus formaliter esset summe unum et idem: quod est inconveniens, llla tamen unitas et ydemptitas facit equum denominari unum et idem secundum unitatem et ydemptitatem minorem et in- feriorem. Ad XI" videtur concedendum quod est dare singulari- tatem communem pluribus individuis. Nec videtur in- conveniens quod singularitas et communitas opposite ad invicem predicentur concretive, non autem abstractive predicentur. Dico 2'" habitudinem de se invicem, denomi- nacione penitus extrinseca, sicut de angulo mathematico, qui est inextensus et indivisibilis extensive 2"! sub- stanciam, predicatur magnitudo respectiva predicacione secundum habitudinem et denominacione extrinseca, cum unus angulus mathematicus dicatur duplus ad alium | vel triplus etc., non 2? quantitatem discretam sed 2" quantitatem continuam, denominacione tamen penitus extrinseca. Sic igitur veritas videtur predicari de pura falsitate moris, dicendo, ''luciferum peccare mortaliter est verum," ''esse peccatum gravissimum est verum", Verumptamen, quamvis singularitas, individualitas, et personalitas sint communes pluribus personis divinis, nequaquam tamen est concedendum quod unum indi- viduum sit plura divisim, vel quod una et eadem per- sona sit plures persone, vel quod sit persona communis, sicut est animal commune. Unde miro modo personalitas in abstracto recipit hoc predicatum esse commune pluribus personis, non autem persona in concreto. Perso- nalitas enim, propter sui abstraccionem a re personali Us 20 30 35 et sic incommunicabili pluribus personis, potest recipere 4o huiusmodi predicatum, scilicet esse commune pluribus 29. pu'a MS.; ib. mo'is MS.; ib. above luciferum, pe zu small letters MS. 3o. mor'r MS. 36. vr pro unde MS,
106 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XVI. The predication ens analogum) cum equo. Nulla tamen unitate, quia is not forma but material and excludes unity. (11) We must admit that there is a Universal Singularity; and there is nothing absurd in that, if understood roperly. An angle has no quantity, yet we rightly attribute guantity to it, and truth may be uttered respectin falsehood. But it must never be granted that one individual is many, or that these can be one Universal Person. There is such a thing in the abstract — a Person — but not in the concrete: as soon as it becomes abstract, it non predicacione formali, sed quasi penitus materiali, equus et deus sunt unum et idem, scilicet analogum. Et tunc, sicud perfeccio essencialis speciel vel specifica non denominat formaliter et primo ipsum individuum, cum tunc individuum esset tam perfectum essencialiter sicud sua species, sic unitas vel ydemptitas entitatis transcendentis non denominat formaliter et primo equum vel asinum, etc. Si enim unitas vel ydemptitas illa secundum seipsam denominaret equum vel asinum, tunc videtur quod equus formaliter esset summe unum et idem: quod est inconveniens, llla tamen unitas et ydemptitas facit equum denominari unum et idem secundum unitatem et ydemptitatem minorem et in- feriorem. Ad XI" videtur concedendum quod est dare singulari- tatem communem pluribus individuis. Nec videtur in- conveniens quod singularitas et communitas opposite ad invicem predicentur concretive, non autem abstractive predicentur. Dico 2'" habitudinem de se invicem, denomi- nacione penitus extrinseca, sicut de angulo mathematico, qui est inextensus et indivisibilis extensive 2"! sub- stanciam, predicatur magnitudo respectiva predicacione secundum habitudinem et denominacione extrinseca, cum unus angulus mathematicus dicatur duplus ad alium | vel triplus etc., non 2? quantitatem discretam sed 2" quantitatem continuam, denominacione tamen penitus extrinseca. Sic igitur veritas videtur predicari de pura falsitate moris, dicendo, ''luciferum peccare mortaliter est verum," ''esse peccatum gravissimum est verum", Verumptamen, quamvis singularitas, individualitas, et personalitas sint communes pluribus personis divinis, nequaquam tamen est concedendum quod unum indi- viduum sit plura divisim, vel quod una et eadem per- sona sit plures persone, vel quod sit persona communis, sicut est animal commune. Unde miro modo personalitas in abstracto recipit hoc predicatum esse commune pluribus personis, non autem persona in concreto. Perso- nalitas enim, propter sui abstraccionem a re personali Us 20 30 35 et sic incommunicabili pluribus personis, potest recipere 4o huiusmodi predicatum, scilicet esse commune pluribus 29. pu'a MS.; ib. mo'is MS.; ib. above luciferum, pe zu small letters MS. 3o. mor'r MS. 36. vr pro unde MS,
Strana 107
CAP. XVI. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 107 personis. Alioquin personalitas non videtur posse vere capere abstraccionem a re personali, sed nomen per- sone, eo ipso quod concernit rem personalem, et per- sona, eo ipso quod rem personalem et sic incommuni- 5 cabilem personis pluribus concernit, nequaquam tale predicatum potest recepere. Nec est simile quod, si est animalitas communis et animal commune, quod ergo sic, si est personalitas communis, quod sit et persona communis; quia animal non concernit 2m se rem indivi- 10 dualem et personalem sicud pater. Quod si sic, tunc, sicud non potest esse persona communis pluribus per- sonis, sic nec animal commune pluribus animalibus. Et sicud dictum est quod singularitas est communis, et communitas est singularis, ita esse contingens ad utrum- 15 libet est absolute necessarium, quia potest esse quod sit contingens ad utrumlibet et non potest non esse quod sit contingens ad utrumlibet; quia, dato quod non sit contingens ad utrumlibet, tunc verum contingens ad utrumlibet est quod non est contingens ad utrumlibet: 20 quod implicat contradiccionem. Igitur simpliciter neces- sarium est esse contingens ad utrumlibet. loses its incommuni- cability. It does not follow, because there is universal Personality, that there is a concrete universal Person. We grant a universal Singularity and a singular Universal, in different senses, as we grant that the Contingent is necessary. 3. 9c'nit MS. 5. 9c'nit MS. 10. P MS.
CAP. XVI. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 107 personis. Alioquin personalitas non videtur posse vere capere abstraccionem a re personali, sed nomen per- sone, eo ipso quod concernit rem personalem, et per- sona, eo ipso quod rem personalem et sic incommuni- 5 cabilem personis pluribus concernit, nequaquam tale predicatum potest recepere. Nec est simile quod, si est animalitas communis et animal commune, quod ergo sic, si est personalitas communis, quod sit et persona communis; quia animal non concernit 2m se rem indivi- 10 dualem et personalem sicud pater. Quod si sic, tunc, sicud non potest esse persona communis pluribus per- sonis, sic nec animal commune pluribus animalibus. Et sicud dictum est quod singularitas est communis, et communitas est singularis, ita esse contingens ad utrum- 15 libet est absolute necessarium, quia potest esse quod sit contingens ad utrumlibet et non potest non esse quod sit contingens ad utrumlibet; quia, dato quod non sit contingens ad utrumlibet, tunc verum contingens ad utrumlibet est quod non est contingens ad utrumlibet: 20 quod implicat contradiccionem. Igitur simpliciter neces- sarium est esse contingens ad utrumlibet. loses its incommuni- cability. It does not follow, because there is universal Personality, that there is a concrete universal Person. We grant a universal Singularity and a singular Universal, in different senses, as we grant that the Contingent is necessary. 3. 9c'nit MS. 5. 9c'nit MS. 10. P MS.
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CAPITULUM DECIMUM SEPTIMUM. Sed contra prius dicta instatur, quia tunc concedendum est quod quilibet homo est singularis homo. Et sic eciam quilibet homo est aliquis homo. Queritur ergo pro quo supponit ibi “singularis homo", et quis singularis 5 homo est "quilibet homo"? Nequaquam dabitur, nec valet evasio volentibus magnificare universalia et eorum posicionem! quod ly ' singularis homo" supponat ibi confuse tantum. Et consimiliter ly “aliquis homo"; et non aliter ad verificandum illam proposicionem: 'Qui- 10 libet homo est singularis homo." Et consimiliter: “Qui- libet homo est aliquis homo"; tum quia iuxta tales verum est quod quilibet homo est singularis homo, illud oportebit dare, illud verum quod est, 'quemlibet hominem esse singularem hominem". Et per consequens 15 oportebit quod illud verum quod est "quemlibet hominem esse singularem hominem", quod illud sit singularis homo, qui est quemlibet hominem esse hominem"; tum eciam quia sic consimiliter verificabuntur omnes tales: "Omnis homo est animal, omnis cignus est albus, 20 etc., sic quod predicatum solum confuse tantum supponat et non simpliciter; et peribit tota fundacio universalium. This is Hic dicitur quod in illa: 'Quilibet homo est singularis answered by homo," vel ly “singularis homo" supponit simpliciter our admission of universal pro "'esse singularem hominem"; (et sic est illa vera, 25 singularity, in which sense quod quilibet homo est singularis homo; nec tunc we admit the oportet dare singularem hominem qui sit quilibet homo, proposition, but if 'singular vel quemlibet hominem esse singularem hominem; sed stands for a particular man sufficit quod detur communis singularitas hominum que with his est quemlibet hominem esse singularem hominem). Si 30 individuality, we deny it. autem ly “singularis homo" supponit personaliter pro homine cui inest singularitas, tunc illa est falsa 2m talem supposicionem,“ Quilibet homo est singularis homo", We admit then that every man is singular; and our opponent urges us: How can the Universal man be singular? Every man is a man' must mean that a man and a singular man are one and the same. 240% 1. Capitulum &c. deest MS. 2. Blank space for Initial S MS. 10. vidu MS. 22. simr M.S. 29. quod detur quod MS.
CAPITULUM DECIMUM SEPTIMUM. Sed contra prius dicta instatur, quia tunc concedendum est quod quilibet homo est singularis homo. Et sic eciam quilibet homo est aliquis homo. Queritur ergo pro quo supponit ibi “singularis homo", et quis singularis 5 homo est "quilibet homo"? Nequaquam dabitur, nec valet evasio volentibus magnificare universalia et eorum posicionem! quod ly ' singularis homo" supponat ibi confuse tantum. Et consimiliter ly “aliquis homo"; et non aliter ad verificandum illam proposicionem: 'Qui- 10 libet homo est singularis homo." Et consimiliter: “Qui- libet homo est aliquis homo"; tum quia iuxta tales verum est quod quilibet homo est singularis homo, illud oportebit dare, illud verum quod est, 'quemlibet hominem esse singularem hominem". Et per consequens 15 oportebit quod illud verum quod est "quemlibet hominem esse singularem hominem", quod illud sit singularis homo, qui est quemlibet hominem esse hominem"; tum eciam quia sic consimiliter verificabuntur omnes tales: "Omnis homo est animal, omnis cignus est albus, 20 etc., sic quod predicatum solum confuse tantum supponat et non simpliciter; et peribit tota fundacio universalium. This is Hic dicitur quod in illa: 'Quilibet homo est singularis answered by homo," vel ly “singularis homo" supponit simpliciter our admission of universal pro "'esse singularem hominem"; (et sic est illa vera, 25 singularity, in which sense quod quilibet homo est singularis homo; nec tunc we admit the oportet dare singularem hominem qui sit quilibet homo, proposition, but if 'singular vel quemlibet hominem esse singularem hominem; sed stands for a particular man sufficit quod detur communis singularitas hominum que with his est quemlibet hominem esse singularem hominem). Si 30 individuality, we deny it. autem ly “singularis homo" supponit personaliter pro homine cui inest singularitas, tunc illa est falsa 2m talem supposicionem,“ Quilibet homo est singularis homo", We admit then that every man is singular; and our opponent urges us: How can the Universal man be singular? Every man is a man' must mean that a man and a singular man are one and the same. 240% 1. Capitulum &c. deest MS. 2. Blank space for Initial S MS. 10. vidu MS. 22. simr M.S. 29. quod detur quod MS.
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CAP. XVII. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 109 quocunque homini singulari demonstrato. Et sic ly singularis homo" quo ad supposicionem personalem est singulare vagum, sicud ly "iste homo"; tamen quo ad significatum formale vel de quanto supponit pro- 5 singularitate hominis, tunc est terminus communis supponens primarie pro intencione logicali communi pluribus; scilicet pro singularitate communi omnibus hominibus. Sic similiter videtur dicendum de ly 'aliquis homo'; 10 de quanto supponit personaliter pro homine cui inest particularitas sub specie humana, est terminus singularis vagus reddens illam proposicionem falsam 'Quilibet homo est aliquis homo," sicut illa est falsa: “Quilibet homo est ille homo," quocunque singulari singulariter 15 primarie demonstrato. Si autem ly “aliquis homo" supponeret pro “esse particularem hominem", tunc vera esset illa ad talem sensum, quod cuilibet homini inest particularitas hominis sub specie humana. Tamen, si aliquis homo" solum supponat personaliter pro parti- 20 culari homine sub specie humana, et non pro parti- cularitate hominum, propter hoc quod ly “ aliquis" est purum sinkategorema solum limitans hoc] agregatum 241b ce aliquis homo", supponere personaliter et singulariter pro suppositis humanis, tunc illa est falsa, et in nullo 25 suo pertinenti sensu vera, "Quilibet homo est aliquis homo"; nec est tunc consimile, sicud de illa “Quilibet homo est singularis homo", cum ly 'singularis" sit terminus kathegorewmaticus, supponens per se personali- tatem qualiter non est de ly Aliquis. 30 Sed adhuc instatur gravius. Ille sunt vere: "Neces- sarium absolute est aliquid contingens non necessarium existere"; similiter, "Necessario aliquod illorum est verum". Et: 'Simpliciter necesse est aliquod illorum esse verum" (demonstrando duas possibiles contradictorias 35 veritates, ut Sortem currere, Sortem non currere), alio- quin esset possibile quod nullum est contingens non necessarium, et possibile esset quod nec Sor curreret nec Sor non curreret: consequens est inconveniens. Queritur igitur pro quo supponit “aliquod contingens' 40 ad verificandum illam primam proposicionem? Et pro Likewise it is as false to say, "Every man is some man", in the sense of one only amongst them all, as it would be to say. Every man is this man", but true in the sense that every man apart is somebody. It is again false, if some man' is used for any man in particular. The adversary continues, asking what “something contingent' and what "one of them" stand for in certain propositions. ce 1. homi MS.; ib. fin" MS. 11. ſb. ſe MS. 22. fi kams MS. 28. kathegrewe MS.
CAP. XVII. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 109 quocunque homini singulari demonstrato. Et sic ly singularis homo" quo ad supposicionem personalem est singulare vagum, sicud ly "iste homo"; tamen quo ad significatum formale vel de quanto supponit pro- 5 singularitate hominis, tunc est terminus communis supponens primarie pro intencione logicali communi pluribus; scilicet pro singularitate communi omnibus hominibus. Sic similiter videtur dicendum de ly 'aliquis homo'; 10 de quanto supponit personaliter pro homine cui inest particularitas sub specie humana, est terminus singularis vagus reddens illam proposicionem falsam 'Quilibet homo est aliquis homo," sicut illa est falsa: “Quilibet homo est ille homo," quocunque singulari singulariter 15 primarie demonstrato. Si autem ly “aliquis homo" supponeret pro “esse particularem hominem", tunc vera esset illa ad talem sensum, quod cuilibet homini inest particularitas hominis sub specie humana. Tamen, si aliquis homo" solum supponat personaliter pro parti- 20 culari homine sub specie humana, et non pro parti- cularitate hominum, propter hoc quod ly “ aliquis" est purum sinkategorema solum limitans hoc] agregatum 241b ce aliquis homo", supponere personaliter et singulariter pro suppositis humanis, tunc illa est falsa, et in nullo 25 suo pertinenti sensu vera, "Quilibet homo est aliquis homo"; nec est tunc consimile, sicud de illa “Quilibet homo est singularis homo", cum ly 'singularis" sit terminus kathegorewmaticus, supponens per se personali- tatem qualiter non est de ly Aliquis. 30 Sed adhuc instatur gravius. Ille sunt vere: "Neces- sarium absolute est aliquid contingens non necessarium existere"; similiter, "Necessario aliquod illorum est verum". Et: 'Simpliciter necesse est aliquod illorum esse verum" (demonstrando duas possibiles contradictorias 35 veritates, ut Sortem currere, Sortem non currere), alio- quin esset possibile quod nullum est contingens non necessarium, et possibile esset quod nec Sor curreret nec Sor non curreret: consequens est inconveniens. Queritur igitur pro quo supponit “aliquod contingens' 40 ad verificandum illam primam proposicionem? Et pro Likewise it is as false to say, "Every man is some man", in the sense of one only amongst them all, as it would be to say. Every man is this man", but true in the sense that every man apart is somebody. It is again false, if some man' is used for any man in particular. The adversary continues, asking what “something contingent' and what "one of them" stand for in certain propositions. ce 1. homi MS.; ib. fin" MS. 11. ſb. ſe MS. 22. fi kams MS. 28. kathegrewe MS.
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11O JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XVII. quo supponit ly “aliquod illorum" ad verificandum residuas duas proposiciones. But there is no Hic dicitur uno modo quod, sicut illa est affirmativa need that this should stand et vera, 'Chymera non potest currere", et tamen subiectum for anything in eius pro nullo supponit ad verificandum illam propo- particular. A proposition sicionem, sic quelibet predictarum proposicionum est may be true, vera et necessaria absque hoc quod aliquid illorum although its subject has no terminorum 'aliquod contingens', 'aliquod illorum' sup- real counter- ponat pro quacunque, requisite ad verificandum aliquam part. The illarum proposicionum. Et hoc est verum, dummodo 10 propositions proposiciones ille teneantur in sensu composito. Si enim given are true without any in sensu diviso tenerentur, false essent, et pro veritate such, provided that they are earum requirerent terminos supponere personaliter pro understood certo dando contingenti vel aliquo illorum duorum. in sensu composito'. Unde tamen dicitur; "Necessario alterum illorum duorum 15 They would be false 'in sensu est verum" (demonstratis illis possibilibus, Sor currere, diviso'. One of two Sortem non currere). Ille modus necessario determinat contradictories composicionem huius necessarii', quod est verum non must be true'; the must absolute ad aliquod illorum duorum, sed indifferenter belongs to the two together, ad quodlibet, vel quodcunque illorum sub distinccione 20 not separately. ad reliquum; vel pocius et verius ad disiunctivam exi- stenciam illorum. Et tamen existencia disiunctiva illorum, et similiter composicio huius necessarii, quod est verum, sunt simpliciter necessarie, sicut simpliciter necessarium est esse verum. Propter hoc ergo verum est quod 25 necessario alterum illorum est verum; et similiter neces- sarium est alterum | illorum esse verum. Et similiter, 241' cum dicitur “Necessarium est aliquod contingens ad utrumlibet existere", designatur necessaria composicio existencie necessarie ad disiunctivam existenciam omnium 30 possibilium contingencium ad utrumlibet; et talis est simpliciter necessaria. Sed cum dicitur, “Necessarium est hoc contingens, gracia exempli, Sortem currere, existere, denominatur composicio necessaria existencie ad hoc contingens, Sor currere. Et talis non est plus 35 necessaria quam illud contingens ad utrumlibet. Et consimiliter de aliis est iudicandum. 'Something contingent must exist'; must belongs to none in particular, but to all taken together. 4. non potest non MS. 22. After et a word, very indistinct; causa, tam, or tamen MS. 23. 9 poico MS. 34. denominata MS. 2. The difficulty is that the answer must be a singular. The reply gets rid of it very cleverly. 11. In sensu composito — diviso. See Introduction. It is impossible to explain the meaning of this either in a marginal or in a foot-note.
11O JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XVII. quo supponit ly “aliquod illorum" ad verificandum residuas duas proposiciones. But there is no Hic dicitur uno modo quod, sicut illa est affirmativa need that this should stand et vera, 'Chymera non potest currere", et tamen subiectum for anything in eius pro nullo supponit ad verificandum illam propo- particular. A proposition sicionem, sic quelibet predictarum proposicionum est may be true, vera et necessaria absque hoc quod aliquid illorum although its subject has no terminorum 'aliquod contingens', 'aliquod illorum' sup- real counter- ponat pro quacunque, requisite ad verificandum aliquam part. The illarum proposicionum. Et hoc est verum, dummodo 10 propositions proposiciones ille teneantur in sensu composito. Si enim given are true without any in sensu diviso tenerentur, false essent, et pro veritate such, provided that they are earum requirerent terminos supponere personaliter pro understood certo dando contingenti vel aliquo illorum duorum. in sensu composito'. Unde tamen dicitur; "Necessario alterum illorum duorum 15 They would be false 'in sensu est verum" (demonstratis illis possibilibus, Sor currere, diviso'. One of two Sortem non currere). Ille modus necessario determinat contradictories composicionem huius necessarii', quod est verum non must be true'; the must absolute ad aliquod illorum duorum, sed indifferenter belongs to the two together, ad quodlibet, vel quodcunque illorum sub distinccione 20 not separately. ad reliquum; vel pocius et verius ad disiunctivam exi- stenciam illorum. Et tamen existencia disiunctiva illorum, et similiter composicio huius necessarii, quod est verum, sunt simpliciter necessarie, sicut simpliciter necessarium est esse verum. Propter hoc ergo verum est quod 25 necessario alterum illorum est verum; et similiter neces- sarium est alterum | illorum esse verum. Et similiter, 241' cum dicitur “Necessarium est aliquod contingens ad utrumlibet existere", designatur necessaria composicio existencie necessarie ad disiunctivam existenciam omnium 30 possibilium contingencium ad utrumlibet; et talis est simpliciter necessaria. Sed cum dicitur, “Necessarium est hoc contingens, gracia exempli, Sortem currere, existere, denominatur composicio necessaria existencie ad hoc contingens, Sor currere. Et talis non est plus 35 necessaria quam illud contingens ad utrumlibet. Et consimiliter de aliis est iudicandum. 'Something contingent must exist'; must belongs to none in particular, but to all taken together. 4. non potest non MS. 22. After et a word, very indistinct; causa, tam, or tamen MS. 23. 9 poico MS. 34. denominata MS. 2. The difficulty is that the answer must be a singular. The reply gets rid of it very cleverly. 11. In sensu composito — diviso. See Introduction. It is impossible to explain the meaning of this either in a marginal or in a foot-note.
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CAP. XVII. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. III 242 Et hic queritur primo que res sit illa disiunctiva What is this disjunctive existencia illorum duorum possibilium scilicet Sor currere, existence' of two Sor non currere, et similiter illorum omnium contin- contradictories, gencium que possunt existere. Secundo queritur quare upon which the truth of the pocius in tali proposicione “Necessarium est aliquod proposition depends? illorum esse verum" designatur composicio necessaria huius [modi] quod est "esse verum ad disiunctivam existenciam illorum", dato quod talis a parte rei sit quod ad “aliquod illorum"; cum tamen per ly “illorum", 10 plus et principalius recte de vi vocis importetur aliquod illorum quam existencia disiuncta illorum; et ita de aliis. Hic videtur dicendum quod disiuncta illa existencia est indifferens existencia illorum. Et illa indifferens existencia cuiuscunque illorum est sicud materialis et 15 potencialis existencia ad existenciam disiunctivam vel decentem cuiuscunque illorum. Et sicut materia corpo- ralium naturaliter prius est informis quam sit formata aliqua forma cuiuscunque generis predicamentalis, sic naturaliter et necessario prius est indifferens existencia 20 alicuius eorum; et sicud informitas materie prime corporalium necessario precedit formacionem cuiusdam materie, sic hec differencia existencie necessario precedit disiunccionem vel differenciam existencie. Et sicud in- formitas prime materie est privacio formacionis eiusdem 25 materie, sic hec indifferencia existencie respectu distinc- cionis et differencie existencie ad existenciam talem. Ergo indifferenter refertur composicio, cum dicitur ce Necessario aliquid illorum est verum". Vel eciam ad quodcunque illorum sic nude est sub tali indifferencia 3o existencie; et ita de aliis. Ex istis videtur patere responsio ad secundam que- stionem. Nam cum indifferens existencia sit prior requi- sita ante disiunctam alicuius eorum existenciam! et non possit esse disiuncta alicuius illorum existencia, 35 nisi sit prius indifferens existencia, et non econtra: igitur ad eam et non ad disiunctam existenciam est composicio. Unde et illa signa particularia vaga, “aliquid illorum", “aliquod contingens", etc., propter hoc quod vaga et indeterminata sunt in signo, pocius dicunt in- Disjunctive existence is existence that is indifferent to the subjects in which it occurs ; in saying One of these must be true', we predicate existence unitedly, but indifferently of either. 7. modi deest MS. 10. ipter MS. 16. dente MS. 16. Decentem. Possibly a mistake for disiunctam. 31. Re- sponsio. As I have failed to understand the second question, I have given no side-notes here.
CAP. XVII. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. III 242 Et hic queritur primo que res sit illa disiunctiva What is this disjunctive existencia illorum duorum possibilium scilicet Sor currere, existence' of two Sor non currere, et similiter illorum omnium contin- contradictories, gencium que possunt existere. Secundo queritur quare upon which the truth of the pocius in tali proposicione “Necessarium est aliquod proposition depends? illorum esse verum" designatur composicio necessaria huius [modi] quod est "esse verum ad disiunctivam existenciam illorum", dato quod talis a parte rei sit quod ad “aliquod illorum"; cum tamen per ly “illorum", 10 plus et principalius recte de vi vocis importetur aliquod illorum quam existencia disiuncta illorum; et ita de aliis. Hic videtur dicendum quod disiuncta illa existencia est indifferens existencia illorum. Et illa indifferens existencia cuiuscunque illorum est sicud materialis et 15 potencialis existencia ad existenciam disiunctivam vel decentem cuiuscunque illorum. Et sicut materia corpo- ralium naturaliter prius est informis quam sit formata aliqua forma cuiuscunque generis predicamentalis, sic naturaliter et necessario prius est indifferens existencia 20 alicuius eorum; et sicud informitas materie prime corporalium necessario precedit formacionem cuiusdam materie, sic hec differencia existencie necessario precedit disiunccionem vel differenciam existencie. Et sicud in- formitas prime materie est privacio formacionis eiusdem 25 materie, sic hec indifferencia existencie respectu distinc- cionis et differencie existencie ad existenciam talem. Ergo indifferenter refertur composicio, cum dicitur ce Necessario aliquid illorum est verum". Vel eciam ad quodcunque illorum sic nude est sub tali indifferencia 3o existencie; et ita de aliis. Ex istis videtur patere responsio ad secundam que- stionem. Nam cum indifferens existencia sit prior requi- sita ante disiunctam alicuius eorum existenciam! et non possit esse disiuncta alicuius illorum existencia, 35 nisi sit prius indifferens existencia, et non econtra: igitur ad eam et non ad disiunctam existenciam est composicio. Unde et illa signa particularia vaga, “aliquid illorum", “aliquod contingens", etc., propter hoc quod vaga et indeterminata sunt in signo, pocius dicunt in- Disjunctive existence is existence that is indifferent to the subjects in which it occurs ; in saying One of these must be true', we predicate existence unitedly, but indifferently of either. 7. modi deest MS. 10. ipter MS. 16. dente MS. 16. Decentem. Possibly a mistake for disiunctam. 31. Re- sponsio. As I have failed to understand the second question, I have given no side-notes here.
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112 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XVII. Remarks. (1) The Universal is to the Particular what form is to matter. (2) The Universal is either a contingent or a necessary form. (3) As Matter is at first absolutely indeterminate and well-nigh inconceivable; so the Particular at first belongs to no distinct individual, time nor place, and is so hard to conceive, that some have thought it existed only as an abstraction; differentem existenciam individuorum. Signa autem deter- minata individua disiunctam et differentem individuam existenciam important. In hac tamen materia difficili videtur ulterius aliqua dicenda: primum quod commune est sicud forma respectu sui minus communis et particularis; et minus commune, sive particularis, sicud materia in qua subiective vel informative ipsum commune est. Secundum, quod commune necessarium est sicud forma necessaria in minus communi, et commune 10 contingens sicud forma contingens in minus communi. Tercium quod, sicud materia corporalium primo est informis, illimitata, et abstracta ab omni forma predi- camentali substanciali vel accidentali, et secundum hoc non est hic tantum, nec nunc tantum, sed ubique et 15 semper, nec huius vel huius corporis materia, nec sic disposita, et difficilime eciam a philosophis sic apprehenditur, et ab ydiotis et popularibus sicud im- possibiliter sic apprehenditur; a deo autem clare et faciliter summe; et 2m plures philosophos non potest 20 esse sic in natura nisi sic habet esse secundum abstrac- cionem intellectus; postea autem materia est formata, limitata, et coniuncta cum morpheiis et passionibus, et secundum hoc habet determinate esse hic et nunc: sic commune quod est forma necessaria, habet primo minus 25 commune sive particulare, vagum vel indeterminatum, quod est sicud materia intellecta, informis, indistincta, et abstracta a morpheys et passionibus individui, sive a principiis vel condicionibus individuantibus. Et 2m hoc non est huius vel illius modi cuiuscunque deter- 30 minati individui vel particularis sub illa forma communis necessaria. Et secundum hoc non habet esse contingenter et aliquando, sed necessario et semper sub illa forma communi necessarii. Et difficilime a philosophis et sicut impossibiliter a grossis est 2m hunc modum apprehen-35 sibile; a deo autem clare et a beatis in patria. Et 242b 3. Gap of half a line MS. 10. nccy MS. 16. corrs MS. 22. sic pro est MS. 23. morpheys MS. 32. ncci and further on MS. 34. sic' MS. 10. Necessaria. I have already noticed that the abbreviated form would correspond to necessarii; the same recurs again and again. 25. Minus commune. Remark that by this term is meant not the Individual, but the vague Universal (Some ....).
112 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XVII. Remarks. (1) The Universal is to the Particular what form is to matter. (2) The Universal is either a contingent or a necessary form. (3) As Matter is at first absolutely indeterminate and well-nigh inconceivable; so the Particular at first belongs to no distinct individual, time nor place, and is so hard to conceive, that some have thought it existed only as an abstraction; differentem existenciam individuorum. Signa autem deter- minata individua disiunctam et differentem individuam existenciam important. In hac tamen materia difficili videtur ulterius aliqua dicenda: primum quod commune est sicud forma respectu sui minus communis et particularis; et minus commune, sive particularis, sicud materia in qua subiective vel informative ipsum commune est. Secundum, quod commune necessarium est sicud forma necessaria in minus communi, et commune 10 contingens sicud forma contingens in minus communi. Tercium quod, sicud materia corporalium primo est informis, illimitata, et abstracta ab omni forma predi- camentali substanciali vel accidentali, et secundum hoc non est hic tantum, nec nunc tantum, sed ubique et 15 semper, nec huius vel huius corporis materia, nec sic disposita, et difficilime eciam a philosophis sic apprehenditur, et ab ydiotis et popularibus sicud im- possibiliter sic apprehenditur; a deo autem clare et faciliter summe; et 2m plures philosophos non potest 20 esse sic in natura nisi sic habet esse secundum abstrac- cionem intellectus; postea autem materia est formata, limitata, et coniuncta cum morpheiis et passionibus, et secundum hoc habet determinate esse hic et nunc: sic commune quod est forma necessaria, habet primo minus 25 commune sive particulare, vagum vel indeterminatum, quod est sicud materia intellecta, informis, indistincta, et abstracta a morpheys et passionibus individui, sive a principiis vel condicionibus individuantibus. Et 2m hoc non est huius vel illius modi cuiuscunque deter- 30 minati individui vel particularis sub illa forma communis necessaria. Et secundum hoc non habet esse contingenter et aliquando, sed necessario et semper sub illa forma communi necessarii. Et difficilime a philosophis et sicut impossibiliter a grossis est 2m hunc modum apprehen-35 sibile; a deo autem clare et a beatis in patria. Et 242b 3. Gap of half a line MS. 10. nccy MS. 16. corrs MS. 22. sic pro est MS. 23. morpheys MS. 32. ncci and further on MS. 34. sic' MS. 10. Necessaria. I have already noticed that the abbreviated form would correspond to necessarii; the same recurs again and again. 25. Minus commune. Remark that by this term is meant not the Individual, but the vague Universal (Some ....).
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CAP. XVII. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 113 secundum quosdam philosophos non sic esset particulare vagum a parte rei, sed [non] nisi 2m abstraccionem intel- lectus; deus tamen per intelleccionem suam reddit sic esse particulare vagum a parte rei sub forma necessaria, postea sub eadem forma necessaria redduntur particu- laria. Et eciam individua determinata que sunt illius forme necessarie, sicud materia limitata, distincta, et coniuncta principiis vel condicionibus individuantibus; et plurima sic particularia et individua non sunt neces- 1o sario et semper, sed contingenter et aliquando tantum. Quartum, quod, sicud non obstat plurimas esse corpo- ralium rerum materias primas primo informes, illimitatas et abstractas a morpheys et passionibus, sic non obstat sub eadem forma communi necessaria plurima esse 15 particularia, vaga, illimitata principia, et abstracta a principiis vel condicionibus individuantibus, vel parti- cularisantibus ad esse determinatum particulare vel individuum. Et talia particularia 2m hoc non sunt contingenter et aliquando sub sua forma necessaria, 20 sed necessario et semper sicud materie prime, secundum quod prime sunt informes et abstracte, non hic sunt et nunc tantum, sed ubique et semper, modo per formalem adhesionem ubitatis, loci, temporis; vel quando talibus materiebus vel materiis sic informibus et abstractis; 25 sed 2m quandam similitudinem analogam, sicud deus est ubique et semper. Vel dicuntur ubique et semper, quia 2m hoc ille materie habent esse illimitatum ad quod- cunque ubi vel tempus. Quintum, dicendum quod commune quod est forma 3o necessaria potest componi vel copulari ad suum parti- culare vagum et determinatum, vel ad aliqua vel plurima vel eciam omnia sui. Et talis composicio est semper et necessaria, sicud forma illa est semper et necessario. Et similiter particularia eius vaga et indeterminata, 35 propter quod omnes tales sunt vere: 'Necessario aliquod "Necessario, omne contingens existit", contingens existit", God, by knowing it, gives it real entity, but this is vaguc, until it is conditioned by determinate subjects. (4.) As there may be several primordial matters, so there may be several vague Particulars, which, abstracting from time and space, have some analogy with God's eternity and ubiquity. 2. non deest MS. 13. abstracta MS. 24. matlieb9 ul matys MS. 33. necr MS. 4. Necessaria. All along the abbreviation used corresponds with necessarii. I cannot understand this genitive. 23. Ubitatis, loci. The Predicaments of Aristotle distinguish between where- abouts and position. 29. Quintum. I confess that I am quite unable to follow the subtle hypothesis expounded in this para- graph and the next. De Universalibus. 8
CAP. XVII. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 113 secundum quosdam philosophos non sic esset particulare vagum a parte rei, sed [non] nisi 2m abstraccionem intel- lectus; deus tamen per intelleccionem suam reddit sic esse particulare vagum a parte rei sub forma necessaria, postea sub eadem forma necessaria redduntur particu- laria. Et eciam individua determinata que sunt illius forme necessarie, sicud materia limitata, distincta, et coniuncta principiis vel condicionibus individuantibus; et plurima sic particularia et individua non sunt neces- 1o sario et semper, sed contingenter et aliquando tantum. Quartum, quod, sicud non obstat plurimas esse corpo- ralium rerum materias primas primo informes, illimitatas et abstractas a morpheys et passionibus, sic non obstat sub eadem forma communi necessaria plurima esse 15 particularia, vaga, illimitata principia, et abstracta a principiis vel condicionibus individuantibus, vel parti- cularisantibus ad esse determinatum particulare vel individuum. Et talia particularia 2m hoc non sunt contingenter et aliquando sub sua forma necessaria, 20 sed necessario et semper sicud materie prime, secundum quod prime sunt informes et abstracte, non hic sunt et nunc tantum, sed ubique et semper, modo per formalem adhesionem ubitatis, loci, temporis; vel quando talibus materiebus vel materiis sic informibus et abstractis; 25 sed 2m quandam similitudinem analogam, sicud deus est ubique et semper. Vel dicuntur ubique et semper, quia 2m hoc ille materie habent esse illimitatum ad quod- cunque ubi vel tempus. Quintum, dicendum quod commune quod est forma 3o necessaria potest componi vel copulari ad suum parti- culare vagum et determinatum, vel ad aliqua vel plurima vel eciam omnia sui. Et talis composicio est semper et necessaria, sicud forma illa est semper et necessario. Et similiter particularia eius vaga et indeterminata, 35 propter quod omnes tales sunt vere: 'Necessario aliquod "Necessario, omne contingens existit", contingens existit", God, by knowing it, gives it real entity, but this is vaguc, until it is conditioned by determinate subjects. (4.) As there may be several primordial matters, so there may be several vague Particulars, which, abstracting from time and space, have some analogy with God's eternity and ubiquity. 2. non deest MS. 13. abstracta MS. 24. matlieb9 ul matys MS. 33. necr MS. 4. Necessaria. All along the abbreviation used corresponds with necessarii. I cannot understand this genitive. 23. Ubitatis, loci. The Predicaments of Aristotle distinguish between where- abouts and position. 29. Quintum. I confess that I am quite unable to follow the subtle hypothesis expounded in this para- graph and the next. De Universalibus. 8
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114 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XVII. "Necessario omne ens existit", 'Necessario alterum illorum est verum", quia contingencia est forma com- munis necessaria, et entitas est forma communis neces- saria, et esse unum illorum (demonstratis possibilibus veritatibus contradictoriis) est forma communis neces-5 saria, I propter quod sub illis dantur primo particularia 243 vaga, indeterminata et abstracta simpliciter necessarii, et cum existere et esse verum sint forme non contin- gentes sed necessarie, composicio eorum ad illa parti- cularia necessaria eciam erit necessaria et non con- 10 tingens. Advertendum tamen: quod est esse verum non potest universaliter sed solum particulariter inesse huic communi quod est esse unum illorum (demonstratis possibilibus veritatibus contradictoriis). Ideo non potest esse verum 15 quod "Necessario omne contingens existit". Et si que- ratur pro quo vel quibus supponit ibi ly “contingens", cum dicitur: "Necessario omne contingens existit"; ad verificandum illam proposicionem, respondetur quod pro omni particulari; primo, vago, et abstracto, huius 20 forme communis necessarie, que est contingencia. Et sic de aliis consimilibus proposicionibus; et intellige quod supponit pro illis vagis et abstractis, 2m quod sic sunt illimitata et abstracta. Et proposiciones in sensu composito, suos terminos supponentes pro particularibus 25 vagis, faciunt pertinenter supponere pro illis ut sunt particularia primo, illimitata, et abstracta; quia ibi minus non distingwit inter extremum et extremum sicud inter materiam et formam, sed determinat vel modificat composicionem nudam et primam extremi ad extremum; 30 que composicio non requirit particularia esse determinata et limitata, sed requirit et sufficit sibi esse primo vaga et indeterminata, cum forma communis primo insit suis particularibus 2m quod primo sunt illimitata et abstracta, et postea inest eis 2m quod sunt determinata 35 et circumstancionata; sed in sensu diviso, quia modus distingwit inter extrema, sicud inter materiam et formam. Et sic quodammodo determinat terminos supponentes pro particularibus determinatis sub esse determinato. Unde tales in sensu diviso sunt false: Aliquod con-40 tingens necessario existit"; Alterum istorum necessario est verum". Ibi subiecta illarum proposicionum retor- Thus such a proposition as 'Some contingent being must 36. mo9 MS.
114 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XVII. "Necessario omne ens existit", 'Necessario alterum illorum est verum", quia contingencia est forma com- munis necessaria, et entitas est forma communis neces- saria, et esse unum illorum (demonstratis possibilibus veritatibus contradictoriis) est forma communis neces-5 saria, I propter quod sub illis dantur primo particularia 243 vaga, indeterminata et abstracta simpliciter necessarii, et cum existere et esse verum sint forme non contin- gentes sed necessarie, composicio eorum ad illa parti- cularia necessaria eciam erit necessaria et non con- 10 tingens. Advertendum tamen: quod est esse verum non potest universaliter sed solum particulariter inesse huic communi quod est esse unum illorum (demonstratis possibilibus veritatibus contradictoriis). Ideo non potest esse verum 15 quod "Necessario omne contingens existit". Et si que- ratur pro quo vel quibus supponit ibi ly “contingens", cum dicitur: "Necessario omne contingens existit"; ad verificandum illam proposicionem, respondetur quod pro omni particulari; primo, vago, et abstracto, huius 20 forme communis necessarie, que est contingencia. Et sic de aliis consimilibus proposicionibus; et intellige quod supponit pro illis vagis et abstractis, 2m quod sic sunt illimitata et abstracta. Et proposiciones in sensu composito, suos terminos supponentes pro particularibus 25 vagis, faciunt pertinenter supponere pro illis ut sunt particularia primo, illimitata, et abstracta; quia ibi minus non distingwit inter extremum et extremum sicud inter materiam et formam, sed determinat vel modificat composicionem nudam et primam extremi ad extremum; 30 que composicio non requirit particularia esse determinata et limitata, sed requirit et sufficit sibi esse primo vaga et indeterminata, cum forma communis primo insit suis particularibus 2m quod primo sunt illimitata et abstracta, et postea inest eis 2m quod sunt determinata 35 et circumstancionata; sed in sensu diviso, quia modus distingwit inter extrema, sicud inter materiam et formam. Et sic quodammodo determinat terminos supponentes pro particularibus determinatis sub esse determinato. Unde tales in sensu diviso sunt false: Aliquod con-40 tingens necessario existit"; Alterum istorum necessario est verum". Ibi subiecta illarum proposicionum retor- Thus such a proposition as 'Some contingent being must 36. mo9 MS.
Strana 115
CAP. XVII. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 115 243 quentur ad particularia determinata, cum in eorum exist' is false if referred to any contradictoriis fiat distribucio ad particularia determinata. one in particular; Sic autem non est in sensu composito, ubi in compo- but true if understood sicione non divisio et determinacio, sed pocius indivisio without any et indistinccio materie, ceteris paribus, requiritur. Est such reference. autem eciam sciendum quod quedam sunt particularia pure indeterminata 2m se et quo ad materiam et quo ad formam, sicud “aliquis homo",“aliquis bos"; quedam determinata quo ad materiam tantum sicud "iste homo" 10 iste bos'; quedam determinata quoad materiam et formam simul, sicud "Petrus", “Paulus". Et licet parti- culare indeterminatum et quo ad materiam et quo ad formam 2m se reddat proposicionem in sensu composito veram et in sensu diviso falsam, sicud hec, “Necessario 15 alterum illorum est verum", et “Alteram illorum neces- sario est verum"; tamen, si fuerit particulare determi- natum tantum quo ad materiam, non sic; sed in utroque sensu est falsa. Unde utrumque est falsum, ce Hoc illorum necessario est verum", et “Necessario 20 hoc illorum est verum"; et ita de aliis. Et si queratur pro quo supponat ibi ly “alterum illorum", dicendo, "Necessario alterum illorum est verum", potest forte dici, uno modo, quo ly alterum illorum" supponit pro quocunque particularium huius 25 quod est “esse unum illorum sub esse indeterminato, quodcunque libuerit concipere sic". Unde sic ly “ali- quis", signum particulare, videtur limitare terminum cui additur ad concipiendum quodcunque libuerit parti- culare, sub esse tamen illimitato ad determinatam 30 materiam vel determinatam formam individui. Some particulars are quite indeterminate, some partially, others completely determinate; the first only is true in one sense; the others are false in either sense. We can then say that 'one of the two’ stands for either particular of Being-one-of- the-two, indeterminately. 7. et determinata MS. 15. alto MS. 8*
CAP. XVII. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 115 243 quentur ad particularia determinata, cum in eorum exist' is false if referred to any contradictoriis fiat distribucio ad particularia determinata. one in particular; Sic autem non est in sensu composito, ubi in compo- but true if understood sicione non divisio et determinacio, sed pocius indivisio without any et indistinccio materie, ceteris paribus, requiritur. Est such reference. autem eciam sciendum quod quedam sunt particularia pure indeterminata 2m se et quo ad materiam et quo ad formam, sicud “aliquis homo",“aliquis bos"; quedam determinata quo ad materiam tantum sicud "iste homo" 10 iste bos'; quedam determinata quoad materiam et formam simul, sicud "Petrus", “Paulus". Et licet parti- culare indeterminatum et quo ad materiam et quo ad formam 2m se reddat proposicionem in sensu composito veram et in sensu diviso falsam, sicud hec, “Necessario 15 alterum illorum est verum", et “Alteram illorum neces- sario est verum"; tamen, si fuerit particulare determi- natum tantum quo ad materiam, non sic; sed in utroque sensu est falsa. Unde utrumque est falsum, ce Hoc illorum necessario est verum", et “Necessario 20 hoc illorum est verum"; et ita de aliis. Et si queratur pro quo supponat ibi ly “alterum illorum", dicendo, "Necessario alterum illorum est verum", potest forte dici, uno modo, quo ly alterum illorum" supponit pro quocunque particularium huius 25 quod est “esse unum illorum sub esse indeterminato, quodcunque libuerit concipere sic". Unde sic ly “ali- quis", signum particulare, videtur limitare terminum cui additur ad concipiendum quodcunque libuerit parti- culare, sub esse tamen illimitato ad determinatam 30 materiam vel determinatam formam individui. Some particulars are quite indeterminate, some partially, others completely determinate; the first only is true in one sense; the others are false in either sense. We can then say that 'one of the two’ stands for either particular of Being-one-of- the-two, indeterminately. 7. et determinata MS. 15. alto MS. 8*
Strana 116
CAPITULUM DECIMUM OCTAVUM. We can also break the sentence into two propositions, connected by or. And as you may have such a disjunctive proposition true at a time when neither Of its parts is true, so the necessity exists in its singulars when it is in neither of them separately. If we say “only man laughs", Alio modo videtur dicendum quod idem valet dicere Necessario alterum illorum est verum", sicud "Neces- sario hoc illorum vel hoc illorum est verum". Et tunc, sicud forma communis est in suis minus communibus vel in suis subiectis, copulatim et copulative sumptis, ita quo ad aliquas circumstancias est quandoque solum disiunctim et sub disiunccione tantum in singulari suo, vel singularibus, vel subiecto, vel subiectis; et sicud disiunctiva veritas pro aliqua mensura, ymmo, pro aliquo 10 tempore est pro quo non est veritas alicuius partis disiunctive; — ut ista veritas, "Ego loquor, vel ego non loquor", est pro omni tempore, et illa “Ego non loquor", nunquam est, et ista “Ego loquor", in pauco tempore est; — sic forma communis necessarii de necessitate 15 est in singulari vel singularibus suis sub disiunccione, ubi tamen non 1 est de necessitate in aliquo illorum. 2443 Eciam quandoque forma communis solum sub distinc- cione respectu aliquarum circumstanciarum inest singulari vel singularibus subiecto vel subiectis; et non quo ad 20 tales circumstancias alicui singulari vel alicui subiecto inest. Et sic hic: "Tantum homo ridet"; risus com- munis denotatur solum sub disiunccione inesse homini vel hominibus singularibus, et denotatur inesse communi homini, nec denotatur alicui sine disiunccione respectu 25 solitudinis importate per ly “tantum" inesse, cum tunc tantum "Sor rideret", vel “solum Plato rideret", etc., quod falsum est. Et sicut veritas istius disiunctive: “Ego loquor vel ego non loquor", non est veritas alicuius ce we do not mean 'Only one man in particular', and it is said of none such; 1. Gap of half a line. Capitulum deest. 2. Space for initial A MS. 14. Ego non MS. 26. i'ptate MS. 2. Alio. I have reckoned the chapters by the spaces for initial letters. Here, however, the sense runs on from one chapter to another, without more than a break in punctuation. 14. Nunquam. Because, “if I speak, it is never true that I do not speak". Such at least I take to be the meaning.
CAPITULUM DECIMUM OCTAVUM. We can also break the sentence into two propositions, connected by or. And as you may have such a disjunctive proposition true at a time when neither Of its parts is true, so the necessity exists in its singulars when it is in neither of them separately. If we say “only man laughs", Alio modo videtur dicendum quod idem valet dicere Necessario alterum illorum est verum", sicud "Neces- sario hoc illorum vel hoc illorum est verum". Et tunc, sicud forma communis est in suis minus communibus vel in suis subiectis, copulatim et copulative sumptis, ita quo ad aliquas circumstancias est quandoque solum disiunctim et sub disiunccione tantum in singulari suo, vel singularibus, vel subiecto, vel subiectis; et sicud disiunctiva veritas pro aliqua mensura, ymmo, pro aliquo 10 tempore est pro quo non est veritas alicuius partis disiunctive; — ut ista veritas, "Ego loquor, vel ego non loquor", est pro omni tempore, et illa “Ego non loquor", nunquam est, et ista “Ego loquor", in pauco tempore est; — sic forma communis necessarii de necessitate 15 est in singulari vel singularibus suis sub disiunccione, ubi tamen non 1 est de necessitate in aliquo illorum. 2443 Eciam quandoque forma communis solum sub distinc- cione respectu aliquarum circumstanciarum inest singulari vel singularibus subiecto vel subiectis; et non quo ad 20 tales circumstancias alicui singulari vel alicui subiecto inest. Et sic hic: "Tantum homo ridet"; risus com- munis denotatur solum sub disiunccione inesse homini vel hominibus singularibus, et denotatur inesse communi homini, nec denotatur alicui sine disiunccione respectu 25 solitudinis importate per ly “tantum" inesse, cum tunc tantum "Sor rideret", vel “solum Plato rideret", etc., quod falsum est. Et sicut veritas istius disiunctive: “Ego loquor vel ego non loquor", non est veritas alicuius ce we do not mean 'Only one man in particular', and it is said of none such; 1. Gap of half a line. Capitulum deest. 2. Space for initial A MS. 14. Ego non MS. 26. i'ptate MS. 2. Alio. I have reckoned the chapters by the spaces for initial letters. Here, however, the sense runs on from one chapter to another, without more than a break in punctuation. 14. Nunquam. Because, “if I speak, it is never true that I do not speak". Such at least I take to be the meaning.
Strana 117
CAP. XVIII. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 117 suarum parcium, nec est collectim, nec veritates suarum parcium, sic forma communis respectu alicuius circum- stancie sua singularia vel sua subiecta sub disiunccione esse alicuiusmodi, non est “aliquod illorum esse illius 5 modi" nec illa collectim vel divisim, nec “tantum hominem ridere", nec “tantum illos divisim ridere"; sed est “tantum illum, vel illum etc. ridere", et risus tantum hominis; nec est risus communis tantum, nec est risus singularis hominis tantum; sed est risus com- 10 munis, tantum illius vel illius hominis etc. Et sic quando queritur que veritas et que res est ce- Tantum hominem ridere", dicitur quod est risus com- munis sub solitudine illius vel illius hominis, etc. Et sicud in illa proposicione, "Tantum iste homo, vel iste 15 homo, vel iste homo, vel iste homo, etc. ridet, ly iste vel iste vel iste homo etc. non supponit communem hominem, vel aliquem singularem hominem cum soli- tudine et exclusione casus communis; sed respectu talis solitudinis et exclusionis sub disiunccione; et non aliter 20 supponit homines singulares illi cursui, sic et illa: Tantum homo currit". Et sicut aliquando forma com- munis solum sub disiunccione primarie significatur in esse, ita et ipsa 2m aliquam vel aliquas circumstancias solum sub disiunccione inest singularibus; ut dicendo 25 "tantum Sor vel Plato est unus istorum duorum riden- cium" (eis demonstratis). Et non sequitur illa propo- sicio: "Tantum homo ridet", vel "Tantum iste vel iste etc. ridet", supponit singulares homines sub disiunccione cum solitudine et exclusione risui communi; igitur ipsa 3o aliquid vel aliqua supponit cum solitudine et exclusione 244' tali eidem communi risui. Et sic, formam communem solum sub disiunccione inesse singularibus, non est ipsam ut sic inesse alicui singulari vel aliquibus singularibus. Ex quo sequitur quod deus distinctissime sciens 35 formam aliquam communem 2m aliquas circumstancias vel aliquam circumstanciam solum sub disiunccione singularibus inesse, non scit eam 2m talem vel tales circumstancias alicui eorum vel aliquibus eorum inesse. Unde forma communis respectu simpliciter necessitatis, 40 respectu exclusionis et solitudinis, respectu indistincte apprehensionis appeticionis signantes et promissionis nor do we say it of all mankind, but of some men indeterminately. This laughter is therefore a Universal, belonging to some one or other in particular, not to the whole species. God sees how a subject is in certain cases affected by such a determination; but He cannot see which subject is thus affected. These remarks concern propositions 2. formam communem MS. 18. casui MS. 22. socar MS. 41. fig.) MS.
CAP. XVIII. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 117 suarum parcium, nec est collectim, nec veritates suarum parcium, sic forma communis respectu alicuius circum- stancie sua singularia vel sua subiecta sub disiunccione esse alicuiusmodi, non est “aliquod illorum esse illius 5 modi" nec illa collectim vel divisim, nec “tantum hominem ridere", nec “tantum illos divisim ridere"; sed est “tantum illum, vel illum etc. ridere", et risus tantum hominis; nec est risus communis tantum, nec est risus singularis hominis tantum; sed est risus com- 10 munis, tantum illius vel illius hominis etc. Et sic quando queritur que veritas et que res est ce- Tantum hominem ridere", dicitur quod est risus com- munis sub solitudine illius vel illius hominis, etc. Et sicud in illa proposicione, "Tantum iste homo, vel iste 15 homo, vel iste homo, vel iste homo, etc. ridet, ly iste vel iste vel iste homo etc. non supponit communem hominem, vel aliquem singularem hominem cum soli- tudine et exclusione casus communis; sed respectu talis solitudinis et exclusionis sub disiunccione; et non aliter 20 supponit homines singulares illi cursui, sic et illa: Tantum homo currit". Et sicut aliquando forma com- munis solum sub disiunccione primarie significatur in esse, ita et ipsa 2m aliquam vel aliquas circumstancias solum sub disiunccione inest singularibus; ut dicendo 25 "tantum Sor vel Plato est unus istorum duorum riden- cium" (eis demonstratis). Et non sequitur illa propo- sicio: "Tantum homo ridet", vel "Tantum iste vel iste etc. ridet", supponit singulares homines sub disiunccione cum solitudine et exclusione risui communi; igitur ipsa 3o aliquid vel aliqua supponit cum solitudine et exclusione 244' tali eidem communi risui. Et sic, formam communem solum sub disiunccione inesse singularibus, non est ipsam ut sic inesse alicui singulari vel aliquibus singularibus. Ex quo sequitur quod deus distinctissime sciens 35 formam aliquam communem 2m aliquas circumstancias vel aliquam circumstanciam solum sub disiunccione singularibus inesse, non scit eam 2m talem vel tales circumstancias alicui eorum vel aliquibus eorum inesse. Unde forma communis respectu simpliciter necessitatis, 40 respectu exclusionis et solitudinis, respectu indistincte apprehensionis appeticionis signantes et promissionis nor do we say it of all mankind, but of some men indeterminately. This laughter is therefore a Universal, belonging to some one or other in particular, not to the whole species. God sees how a subject is in certain cases affected by such a determination; but He cannot see which subject is thus affected. These remarks concern propositions 2. formam communem MS. 18. casui MS. 22. socar MS. 41. fig.) MS.
Strana 118
118 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XVIII. We should note carefully how a disjunctive proposition may be true when neither of its parts are true. Here we must point out that as there are three degrees in difference and in predication, so there are also three in this inherence of the Universal in its particulars. The lowest is when it inheres vaguely, in one or another ; the next when The difficulty 1s to say whaf thing corresponds to the disjunctive truth of such propositions. (et si qua sunt similia) designatur inesse vel inest solum disiunctim sive sub disiunccione suis inferioribus, suis subiectis, vel suis obiectis. Et pro materia hac multum valet intelligere illud quod tactum fuit superius, scilicet, quod pro aliqua5 mensura vel aliquo tempore est verum disiunctive solum quod "ego loquor, vel ego non loquor". Et non est tunc verum quod “'ego loquor", nec est verum quod ego non loquor". Et quamvis leve videtur dicere quod formam communem respectu alicuius modi vel circum- 10 stancie suis singularibus, suis subiectis, vel suis obiectis inexistere sub disiunccione solum sit solitudo inexistencie, sub disiunccione ipsius forme communis suis singularibus subiectis vel obiectis respectu talis modi vel circum- stancie; tamen difficultas maxima videtur que veritas 15 vel que res primarie fuit talis inexistencia sub disiunc- cione ipsius forme communis in singularibus subiectis vel obiectis suis respectu alicuius modi vel circum- stancie. Et hic dicendum videtur quod, sicut superius fuit 20 posita triplex pars, triplex differencia, triplex predicacio, scilicet, minima, media, et maxima; sic triplex, minima, media, et maxima, est inexistencia forme communis in suis inferioribus particularibus, vel in suis subiectis particularibus, vel in suis obiectis particularibus. Minima, 25 que est sub disiunccione inexistencia; media, que est inexistencia disiunctive; maxima, que est inexistencia copulative vel inexistencia copulata et copulativa ipsius forme communis. Ad idem veniunt; et inexistencia sub disiunccione est prima, et media est inexistencia 30 2m racionem tantum ipsis inferioribus; vel subiectis particularibus vel obiectivis particularibus. Inexisten- cia autem disjunctiva ] est media; et sicut partim 245a realis et partim 2m racionem, de tanto est realis, quia ubicunque est inexistencia disiuncta forme communis, 35 ibi minime uni particularium inexistit realiter et vere. Est autem de tanto 2m racionem, de quanto veritas it is disjunctive (if disiunctive priorem naturaliter et quoad consequenciam in one, not in the other); and quam veritas cuiuscunque suarum parcium. Et pro illo the highest, when it is in priori est inexistencia 2m racionem in particularibus et 40 many at once. non 2m rem. Inexistencia autem copulativa est maxima regarding necessity, exclusion, &c. 9. lene MS. 15. minima MS. 36. mime MS.
118 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XVIII. We should note carefully how a disjunctive proposition may be true when neither of its parts are true. Here we must point out that as there are three degrees in difference and in predication, so there are also three in this inherence of the Universal in its particulars. The lowest is when it inheres vaguely, in one or another ; the next when The difficulty 1s to say whaf thing corresponds to the disjunctive truth of such propositions. (et si qua sunt similia) designatur inesse vel inest solum disiunctim sive sub disiunccione suis inferioribus, suis subiectis, vel suis obiectis. Et pro materia hac multum valet intelligere illud quod tactum fuit superius, scilicet, quod pro aliqua5 mensura vel aliquo tempore est verum disiunctive solum quod "ego loquor, vel ego non loquor". Et non est tunc verum quod “'ego loquor", nec est verum quod ego non loquor". Et quamvis leve videtur dicere quod formam communem respectu alicuius modi vel circum- 10 stancie suis singularibus, suis subiectis, vel suis obiectis inexistere sub disiunccione solum sit solitudo inexistencie, sub disiunccione ipsius forme communis suis singularibus subiectis vel obiectis respectu talis modi vel circum- stancie; tamen difficultas maxima videtur que veritas 15 vel que res primarie fuit talis inexistencia sub disiunc- cione ipsius forme communis in singularibus subiectis vel obiectis suis respectu alicuius modi vel circum- stancie. Et hic dicendum videtur quod, sicut superius fuit 20 posita triplex pars, triplex differencia, triplex predicacio, scilicet, minima, media, et maxima; sic triplex, minima, media, et maxima, est inexistencia forme communis in suis inferioribus particularibus, vel in suis subiectis particularibus, vel in suis obiectis particularibus. Minima, 25 que est sub disiunccione inexistencia; media, que est inexistencia disiunctive; maxima, que est inexistencia copulative vel inexistencia copulata et copulativa ipsius forme communis. Ad idem veniunt; et inexistencia sub disiunccione est prima, et media est inexistencia 30 2m racionem tantum ipsis inferioribus; vel subiectis particularibus vel obiectivis particularibus. Inexisten- cia autem disjunctiva ] est media; et sicut partim 245a realis et partim 2m racionem, de tanto est realis, quia ubicunque est inexistencia disiuncta forme communis, 35 ibi minime uni particularium inexistit realiter et vere. Est autem de tanto 2m racionem, de quanto veritas it is disjunctive (if disiunctive priorem naturaliter et quoad consequenciam in one, not in the other); and quam veritas cuiuscunque suarum parcium. Et pro illo the highest, when it is in priori est inexistencia 2m racionem in particularibus et 40 many at once. non 2m rem. Inexistencia autem copulativa est maxima regarding necessity, exclusion, &c. 9. lene MS. 15. minima MS. 36. mime MS.
Strana 119
CAP. XVIII. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 119 et totaliter realis, quia ubicunque et quandocunque est inexistencia copulativa forme communis respectu ali- quorum particularium suorum inferiorum, vel subiectorum, vel obiectorum, ibi semper cuilibet talium particularium 5 ipsa forma communis realiter inexistit sicud inferiori, vel sicud subiecto, vel sicud obiecto. Et sicud differencia secundum racionem tantum est vere differencia non realis, minime perceptibilis a grossis, ymmo, et a sapientibus: sic forme communis inexistencie 2m racionem ro tantum, sive sub disiunccione tantum in particularibus, est vera eius inexistencia non realis in particularibus minime perceptibilis propter sui minimam modicitatem. Et cum illa inexistencia sub disiunccione tantum, sive 2m rem tantum, sit solum sicud secundum quid 15 inexistencia forme communis in particularibus respectu inexistencie disiunctive vel copulative, solet dici, sicud fuit superius dictum, quod non sit inexistencia forme communis in particulari vel particularibus. Hoc autem venit propter grossiciem mentis nostre et eius depres- 20 sionem per ymagines corporales et fantasmata corpo- ralium et sensibilium. Propter illa enim aut non possumus, aut nimis debiliter possumus, apprehendere illam nimis tenuem inexistenciam esse inexistenciam qualemcunque forme communis in particularibus. Et 25 quia loquendum est ut plures, sapiendum vero ut pauci, estimo quod sapiendum sit quod abstractiva et deprivativa locucione dicendum sit quod inexistencia sub disiunccione tantum, vel 2m racionem tantum forme communis in particularibus est eius inexistencia in eisdem secundum 3o quod intellectu divino abstracta sunt a distincta materia et a distincta forma sue particularitatis, ita quod talis inexistencia respectu modi vel circumstancie alicuius ipsius forme communis] non ponat inexistenciam eius 2453 alicui particulari in sua propria forma, respectu talis 35 modi vel talis circumstancie. Et patet quam racionabile est triplicem esse suppo- sicionem termini communis pro rebus particularibus, scilicet, copulativam, disiunctivam, et de disiuncto ex- tremo, que aliis nominibus vocantur: supposicio distri- 40 butiva determinata, et confuse tantum. Et oportet esse proporcionabiliter tria signa ad tales supposiciones, The lowest is the least perceptible, and has been denied by minds that lack the requisite acumen. We are too deeply plunged in the senses, and this hampers us. But we ought to think with the wise minority, and admit that a Universal Form may inhere in its subjects yet in none of them in particular. Other names are generally given to these forms of Supposition: distributive, 27. sub disiunccione twice MS. 41. t'ria MS.
CAP. XVIII. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 119 et totaliter realis, quia ubicunque et quandocunque est inexistencia copulativa forme communis respectu ali- quorum particularium suorum inferiorum, vel subiectorum, vel obiectorum, ibi semper cuilibet talium particularium 5 ipsa forma communis realiter inexistit sicud inferiori, vel sicud subiecto, vel sicud obiecto. Et sicud differencia secundum racionem tantum est vere differencia non realis, minime perceptibilis a grossis, ymmo, et a sapientibus: sic forme communis inexistencie 2m racionem ro tantum, sive sub disiunccione tantum in particularibus, est vera eius inexistencia non realis in particularibus minime perceptibilis propter sui minimam modicitatem. Et cum illa inexistencia sub disiunccione tantum, sive 2m rem tantum, sit solum sicud secundum quid 15 inexistencia forme communis in particularibus respectu inexistencie disiunctive vel copulative, solet dici, sicud fuit superius dictum, quod non sit inexistencia forme communis in particulari vel particularibus. Hoc autem venit propter grossiciem mentis nostre et eius depres- 20 sionem per ymagines corporales et fantasmata corpo- ralium et sensibilium. Propter illa enim aut non possumus, aut nimis debiliter possumus, apprehendere illam nimis tenuem inexistenciam esse inexistenciam qualemcunque forme communis in particularibus. Et 25 quia loquendum est ut plures, sapiendum vero ut pauci, estimo quod sapiendum sit quod abstractiva et deprivativa locucione dicendum sit quod inexistencia sub disiunccione tantum, vel 2m racionem tantum forme communis in particularibus est eius inexistencia in eisdem secundum 3o quod intellectu divino abstracta sunt a distincta materia et a distincta forma sue particularitatis, ita quod talis inexistencia respectu modi vel circumstancie alicuius ipsius forme communis] non ponat inexistenciam eius 2453 alicui particulari in sua propria forma, respectu talis 35 modi vel talis circumstancie. Et patet quam racionabile est triplicem esse suppo- sicionem termini communis pro rebus particularibus, scilicet, copulativam, disiunctivam, et de disiuncto ex- tremo, que aliis nominibus vocantur: supposicio distri- 40 butiva determinata, et confuse tantum. Et oportet esse proporcionabiliter tria signa ad tales supposiciones, The lowest is the least perceptible, and has been denied by minds that lack the requisite acumen. We are too deeply plunged in the senses, and this hampers us. But we ought to think with the wise minority, and admit that a Universal Form may inhere in its subjects yet in none of them in particular. Other names are generally given to these forms of Supposition: distributive, 27. sub disiunccione twice MS. 41. t'ria MS.
Strana 120
120 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XVIII. determined and terminos communes limitancia signa universalia, ut vague ; and "omnis, quilibet", etc., limitant ad supposicionem pri- they employ appropriate mam, signa particularia; ut aliquis, quidam" etc. ad signs. supposicionem 2am. Et signa modalia et signa exclusiva: ut, "necessario" et "tantum", etc. (et [si] signa sunt5 similia) limitant ad supposicionem terciam. Et patet eciam quod in hoc veritate, "Necessario aliquod ens est', ens forma communis inest sub disiunc- cione tantum suis particularibus inferioribus. In hac autem: "Tantum homo ridet", hec forma communis, 10 ce risus" inest sub disiunccione tantum suis subiectis particularibus in quibus potest esse, ut accidens in subiecto. In hiis autem veritatibus: "Equus appetit comedere awenam", 'Sor wult bibere vinum", "Pro- mitto tibi denarium" (et sic de consimilibus) communis 15 commestio respectu obiecti, communis bibicio, et simi- liter communis promissio respectu obiecti, insunt sub disiunccione tantum suis particularibus obiectis. Et deus, distinctissime sciens hoc, scit nullam illarum formarum communium 2m illas veritates disiunctive vel copulative 20 inesse alicui vel aliquibus particularibus. Et patet hic ulterius quod volebamus principaliter; quod propter supposicionem confusam tantum termini communis pro rebus particularibus, et propter inexi- stenciam sub disiunccione tantum forme communis suis 25 particularibus inferioribus, vel subiectis vel obiectis, respectu alicuius modi vel circumstancie; propter illa, inquam, in nullo adiuvantur adversarii ad defendendum quod non sint universalia, vel ad tollendum quod sunt ponenda universalia, cum secundum eos, per suppo-30 sicionem confusam tantum undique excluderentur suppo- sicio simplex pro rebus communibus et universalibus et motiva universalistarum, ubi ex proposicionibus de terminis communibus volunt arguere universalia. Ista 35 enim est communis veritas: "Tantum homo ridet". Et "tantum hominem ridere" est communis veritas, et 246- communis risus; et ista est communis veritas: "Neces- sario aliquod istorum est verum". Et tamen in illis " Necessario Tantum homo ridet", proposicionibus, In every possible case, we have the Universal existing in its inferiors in various modes. This is the main point we wanted to show ; for the adversaries take up a universal proposition, Every man is an animal"; and say, in what does animality inhere? In every man". Then, taking "One of these things must be true", they defy us to point out in what must be true' inheres. This I have answered. 5. si deest MS. 16. 9mestio MS. 19. ſois MS. 19. Scil. It is scis in the MS.; but an invocation to the Deity appeared misplaced here.
120 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XVIII. determined and terminos communes limitancia signa universalia, ut vague ; and "omnis, quilibet", etc., limitant ad supposicionem pri- they employ appropriate mam, signa particularia; ut aliquis, quidam" etc. ad signs. supposicionem 2am. Et signa modalia et signa exclusiva: ut, "necessario" et "tantum", etc. (et [si] signa sunt5 similia) limitant ad supposicionem terciam. Et patet eciam quod in hoc veritate, "Necessario aliquod ens est', ens forma communis inest sub disiunc- cione tantum suis particularibus inferioribus. In hac autem: "Tantum homo ridet", hec forma communis, 10 ce risus" inest sub disiunccione tantum suis subiectis particularibus in quibus potest esse, ut accidens in subiecto. In hiis autem veritatibus: "Equus appetit comedere awenam", 'Sor wult bibere vinum", "Pro- mitto tibi denarium" (et sic de consimilibus) communis 15 commestio respectu obiecti, communis bibicio, et simi- liter communis promissio respectu obiecti, insunt sub disiunccione tantum suis particularibus obiectis. Et deus, distinctissime sciens hoc, scit nullam illarum formarum communium 2m illas veritates disiunctive vel copulative 20 inesse alicui vel aliquibus particularibus. Et patet hic ulterius quod volebamus principaliter; quod propter supposicionem confusam tantum termini communis pro rebus particularibus, et propter inexi- stenciam sub disiunccione tantum forme communis suis 25 particularibus inferioribus, vel subiectis vel obiectis, respectu alicuius modi vel circumstancie; propter illa, inquam, in nullo adiuvantur adversarii ad defendendum quod non sint universalia, vel ad tollendum quod sunt ponenda universalia, cum secundum eos, per suppo-30 sicionem confusam tantum undique excluderentur suppo- sicio simplex pro rebus communibus et universalibus et motiva universalistarum, ubi ex proposicionibus de terminis communibus volunt arguere universalia. Ista 35 enim est communis veritas: "Tantum homo ridet". Et "tantum hominem ridere" est communis veritas, et 246- communis risus; et ista est communis veritas: "Neces- sario aliquod istorum est verum". Et tamen in illis " Necessario Tantum homo ridet", proposicionibus, In every possible case, we have the Universal existing in its inferiors in various modes. This is the main point we wanted to show ; for the adversaries take up a universal proposition, Every man is an animal"; and say, in what does animality inhere? In every man". Then, taking "One of these things must be true", they defy us to point out in what must be true' inheres. This I have answered. 5. si deest MS. 16. 9mestio MS. 19. ſois MS. 19. Scil. It is scis in the MS.; but an invocation to the Deity appeared misplaced here.
Strana 121
CAP. XVIII. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 121 aliquod istorum est verum", idem termini supponunt homo", et ly "aliquod confuse tantum, scilicet ly“ istorum". Sed, cum sit veritas quod “Omnis homo est animal", oportet dare illam veritatem que est “Omnem 5 hominem esse animal". Et talis veritas erit animalitas uniuscuiuscunque hominis. Et ergo in illa: "Omnis homo est animal", non supponit personaliter confuse tantum, sed supponit simpliciter significative pro ani- malitate communi. 8. ſotine MS.
CAP. XVIII. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 121 aliquod istorum est verum", idem termini supponunt homo", et ly "aliquod confuse tantum, scilicet ly“ istorum". Sed, cum sit veritas quod “Omnis homo est animal", oportet dare illam veritatem que est “Omnem 5 hominem esse animal". Et talis veritas erit animalitas uniuscuiuscunque hominis. Et ergo in illa: "Omnis homo est animal", non supponit personaliter confuse tantum, sed supponit simpliciter significative pro ani- malitate communi. 8. ſotine MS.
Strana 122
CAPITULUM DECIMUM NONUM. Not in a particular man, for this is not an individual characteristic; not in mankind, for the Universal man does not laugh. Ulterius dubitatur, cum risibilitas sit propria passio hominis, rudibilitas propria passio asini, hynnibilitas propria passio equi, ut communiter ponitur, et suppono hic, gracia exempli, [quod] queritur pro quo supponat 5 ibi ly “hominis", et pro quo ly “equi" vel ly "asini". Vel, dicendo in recto: "Homo habet suam propriam passionem risibilitatem", et: "Equus, hynnibilitatem", etc. pro quo supponunt ly “homo", "equus', etc. Et consimiles termini non pro homine simpliciter, quia 10 nullius talis est propria passio risibilitas, nec pro homine communi, quia tunc procederetur in sentencia quod homo communis habet risibilitatem suam propriam passionem, et per consequens homo communis est risibilis. Et sic homo communis posset ridere; et, dato quod sic ali- 15 quando homo communis rideret, et species humana, penitus abstracta quiditas hominis, rideret: quod est inconveniens. Et si risibilitas est propria passio speciei humane, tunc inest sibi formaliter; igitur species humana est risibilis, et sic poterit ridere, et sic sepe ridebit. 20 Hic autem solet negari de universalibus. Hic forte posset uno modo dici quod propria passio It may be answered that 2m arguta superius non distingwitur realiter, sed solum the property inheres in the modaliter a specie rei cuius est propria passio; ideo species; potest concretive predicari de esse. Et sic est verum 25 but it does not follow that the dicere quod species humana est risibilis. Sed non Universal man can laugh, sequitur quod species humana possit ridere, eo quod which would sit possibile quod species humana rideat; quia posse be an accidental and ridere dicit potenciam materialem, que est qualitas variable faculty existing accidentalis, variabiliter et dispariter, gradualiter in-30 in the individuals. existens individuis, realiter et essencialiter condistincta speciei humane inexistens 2m principia individua ipsis individuis; qualiter non est de risibilitate. It we say, "Man's property is being able to laugh, in what subject does the Universal risibility' inhere? 1. Gap of half a line ; Capitulum &c. deest. 2. Blank space for 10. homi MS. 12. pced'etr MS. 5. quod deest MS. initial U MS.
CAPITULUM DECIMUM NONUM. Not in a particular man, for this is not an individual characteristic; not in mankind, for the Universal man does not laugh. Ulterius dubitatur, cum risibilitas sit propria passio hominis, rudibilitas propria passio asini, hynnibilitas propria passio equi, ut communiter ponitur, et suppono hic, gracia exempli, [quod] queritur pro quo supponat 5 ibi ly “hominis", et pro quo ly “equi" vel ly "asini". Vel, dicendo in recto: "Homo habet suam propriam passionem risibilitatem", et: "Equus, hynnibilitatem", etc. pro quo supponunt ly “homo", "equus', etc. Et consimiles termini non pro homine simpliciter, quia 10 nullius talis est propria passio risibilitas, nec pro homine communi, quia tunc procederetur in sentencia quod homo communis habet risibilitatem suam propriam passionem, et per consequens homo communis est risibilis. Et sic homo communis posset ridere; et, dato quod sic ali- 15 quando homo communis rideret, et species humana, penitus abstracta quiditas hominis, rideret: quod est inconveniens. Et si risibilitas est propria passio speciei humane, tunc inest sibi formaliter; igitur species humana est risibilis, et sic poterit ridere, et sic sepe ridebit. 20 Hic autem solet negari de universalibus. Hic forte posset uno modo dici quod propria passio It may be answered that 2m arguta superius non distingwitur realiter, sed solum the property inheres in the modaliter a specie rei cuius est propria passio; ideo species; potest concretive predicari de esse. Et sic est verum 25 but it does not follow that the dicere quod species humana est risibilis. Sed non Universal man can laugh, sequitur quod species humana possit ridere, eo quod which would sit possibile quod species humana rideat; quia posse be an accidental and ridere dicit potenciam materialem, que est qualitas variable faculty existing accidentalis, variabiliter et dispariter, gradualiter in-30 in the individuals. existens individuis, realiter et essencialiter condistincta speciei humane inexistens 2m principia individua ipsis individuis; qualiter non est de risibilitate. It we say, "Man's property is being able to laugh, in what subject does the Universal risibility' inhere? 1. Gap of half a line ; Capitulum &c. deest. 2. Blank space for 10. homi MS. 12. pced'etr MS. 5. quod deest MS. initial U MS.
Strana 123
DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 123 CAP. XIX. Another Secundo solet dici quod non sequitur: "Risibilitas answer is that inest speciei humane sicud sua propria passio; igitur the predication being ideal in species humana est per se 2° convertibiliter risibilis": the first case. quia in antecedente est predicacio 2m habitudinem vel and real in the second, this 2m racionem tantum, et in consequente inportatur pre- argument proves nothing, dicacio 2m rem et realis unius extremi ad reliquum. except that every man, Modo non oportet, si unius extremi ad reliquum est quà man, is habitudo 2m racionem tantum, quod inter ea sit pre- able to laugh. dicacio realis. Unde, quia inesse risibilitatem speciei 1o humane, sicud propria passio est quoddam predicatum 2m habitudinem vel racionem tantum de risibilitate, non videtur quod inferat predicacionem realem unius eorum de altero, eciam concretive. Sed bene sequitur quod homo sit risibilis, vel forte eciam quod homo per 15 se 2° convertibiliter sit risibilis. Sed si queritur: "Vel homo specificus, vel homo in-It is urged that either mankind dividuus est per se 2° convertibiliter risibilis", potest quà mankind, is thus capable, forte dici uno modo quod homo specificus est per se or that every man is, as an 2° convertibiliter risibilis, sic tamen quod ly “homo individual 20 specificus" sumatur ut tantum non ultimate abstrac- characteristic. cionis pro nuda et abstracta quiditate specifica hominis, sed sit terminus sicud medie abstraccionis, non pure pro quiditate, nec pure pro supposito humano supponens, sed pro re quasi media inter nudam quiditatem et 25 nudam naturam substancialem hominis et suppositum humanum; sicud theologi concedunt quod natura humana in Xto sit passa, utendo illo termino "Natura humana" in Xto sicud termino medie abstraccionis, non pure pro supposito Xi, nec pure et nude pro nuda et pura natura 30 humana Xi, sed pro homine in Xto, qui 2m aliquos theologos est et natura humana Xti et suppositum Xti. Alio modo diceretur quod non sequitur “Homo est per se 2° convertibiliter risibilis, igitur vel homo specificus communis vel homo individuus". Nullum illorum, sed 35 homo 2m se dictus; nec communis specificus, nec indi- viduus est per se 2° convertibiliter risibilis. Advertendum tamen hic quod sicud substancia dicitur dupliciter communis, ut dictum est, ita et homo. Sub- stancia enim uno modo dividitur per substanciam But man' may be taken, not as a pure abstraction nor as an individual, but as something between. A theological instance. Or we may reply: Man, neither specifically nor as an individual, but simply quã man, is capable of laughing. We must note here that Substance, c. g. is divided into 246b 5. iptatr MS. 16. Queritur. Arguitur would perhaps be better. Only the first part of the argument is given, and the rest understood. 20. Tantum is possibly a mistake for terminus.
DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 123 CAP. XIX. Another Secundo solet dici quod non sequitur: "Risibilitas answer is that inest speciei humane sicud sua propria passio; igitur the predication being ideal in species humana est per se 2° convertibiliter risibilis": the first case. quia in antecedente est predicacio 2m habitudinem vel and real in the second, this 2m racionem tantum, et in consequente inportatur pre- argument proves nothing, dicacio 2m rem et realis unius extremi ad reliquum. except that every man, Modo non oportet, si unius extremi ad reliquum est quà man, is habitudo 2m racionem tantum, quod inter ea sit pre- able to laugh. dicacio realis. Unde, quia inesse risibilitatem speciei 1o humane, sicud propria passio est quoddam predicatum 2m habitudinem vel racionem tantum de risibilitate, non videtur quod inferat predicacionem realem unius eorum de altero, eciam concretive. Sed bene sequitur quod homo sit risibilis, vel forte eciam quod homo per 15 se 2° convertibiliter sit risibilis. Sed si queritur: "Vel homo specificus, vel homo in-It is urged that either mankind dividuus est per se 2° convertibiliter risibilis", potest quà mankind, is thus capable, forte dici uno modo quod homo specificus est per se or that every man is, as an 2° convertibiliter risibilis, sic tamen quod ly “homo individual 20 specificus" sumatur ut tantum non ultimate abstrac- characteristic. cionis pro nuda et abstracta quiditate specifica hominis, sed sit terminus sicud medie abstraccionis, non pure pro quiditate, nec pure pro supposito humano supponens, sed pro re quasi media inter nudam quiditatem et 25 nudam naturam substancialem hominis et suppositum humanum; sicud theologi concedunt quod natura humana in Xto sit passa, utendo illo termino "Natura humana" in Xto sicud termino medie abstraccionis, non pure pro supposito Xi, nec pure et nude pro nuda et pura natura 30 humana Xi, sed pro homine in Xto, qui 2m aliquos theologos est et natura humana Xti et suppositum Xti. Alio modo diceretur quod non sequitur “Homo est per se 2° convertibiliter risibilis, igitur vel homo specificus communis vel homo individuus". Nullum illorum, sed 35 homo 2m se dictus; nec communis specificus, nec indi- viduus est per se 2° convertibiliter risibilis. Advertendum tamen hic quod sicud substancia dicitur dupliciter communis, ut dictum est, ita et homo. Sub- stancia enim uno modo dividitur per substanciam But man' may be taken, not as a pure abstraction nor as an individual, but as something between. A theological instance. Or we may reply: Man, neither specifically nor as an individual, but simply quã man, is capable of laughing. We must note here that Substance, c. g. is divided into 246b 5. iptatr MS. 16. Queritur. Arguitur would perhaps be better. Only the first part of the argument is given, and the rest understood. 20. Tantum is possibly a mistake for terminus.
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124 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XIX. corpoream et incorpoream; vel in substanciam corpoream et incorpoream. Et illa est divisio qua forma communis dividitur in suas partes subiectivas. Et per consequens substancia 2m illam divisionem divisibilis est communis per modum forme. Alio modo substancia dividitur in? substanciam communem communicabilem (scilicet pluri- bus) per modum forme substancialis, et in substanciam singularem incommunicabilem (videlicet pluribus) per modum forme substancialis. Et substancia 2m illam divisionem divisibilis est communis per modum] materie, quando dividitur per illos duos modos: communitas et singularitas substancie, que sunt encia racionis, ab ex- trinseco adiacencia substancie. Sic ergo substancia 2m primam divisionem est, sicud totum universale, divisum in partes subiectivas; et sicud commune per modum 15 forme divisum in materias subiectivas. Secundo autem modo, tunc substancia est sicud totum in modo divisum in partes in modo. Et sicud commune per modum materie divisum per modos sicud accidentales, modo potest dici, cum dicebatur: 'Hic est per se 2° con-20 vertibiliter risibilis", quod nec homo communis per modum forme nec homo individuus, sed homo 2m se communis per modum materie. Other answers. Vel potest dici quod homo 2m se, abstractus ab in- Distinction between the dividualitate et a communitate per modum forme, et a 25 subject quo communitate per modum materie, est per se 2° con- and the subject quod. vertibiliter risibilis. Aliter adhuc poterit dici quod duplex Humanity est subiectum, scilicet [primo] subiectum quo et subiectum takes here the place of the quod aliquid inest subiective. Secundo, subiectum quod former ; and the latter subiectat et in quo est aliquid subiective. Et tunc species 30 is unnecessary humana est subiectum quo primum et convertibile 2m quod risibilitas inest homini; et ad talem sensum est verum quod risibilitas est propria passio speciei humane. Nec ex hoc sequitur quod species humana est per se 2° convertibiliter risibilis, nec quod ipsa est risibilis; 35 sed quod 2m eam convertibiliter homo est risibilis. Et licet species humana, sive humanitas, specifica sit subiectum quo per se et convertibile risibilitatis communis, non tamen ex hoc oportet aliquod esse subiectum quod subiectat et in quo per se et convertibiliter est com-40 munis risibilitas; quia non videtur aliquid esse subiectum or into general and individual. The former divides substance formally, the other materially. A like division is here adopted for man; and we can take the former, admitting that man, as a universal considered materially (i. e. in its subjects) is capable of laughter. 247 bodily, and unbodied, 7. 11 pro et in MS. 17. mo MS. 18. mo MS. 19. mo MS. 28. primo deest MS. 38. 9'ntible risiths MS.
124 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XIX. corpoream et incorpoream; vel in substanciam corpoream et incorpoream. Et illa est divisio qua forma communis dividitur in suas partes subiectivas. Et per consequens substancia 2m illam divisionem divisibilis est communis per modum forme. Alio modo substancia dividitur in? substanciam communem communicabilem (scilicet pluri- bus) per modum forme substancialis, et in substanciam singularem incommunicabilem (videlicet pluribus) per modum forme substancialis. Et substancia 2m illam divisionem divisibilis est communis per modum] materie, quando dividitur per illos duos modos: communitas et singularitas substancie, que sunt encia racionis, ab ex- trinseco adiacencia substancie. Sic ergo substancia 2m primam divisionem est, sicud totum universale, divisum in partes subiectivas; et sicud commune per modum 15 forme divisum in materias subiectivas. Secundo autem modo, tunc substancia est sicud totum in modo divisum in partes in modo. Et sicud commune per modum materie divisum per modos sicud accidentales, modo potest dici, cum dicebatur: 'Hic est per se 2° con-20 vertibiliter risibilis", quod nec homo communis per modum forme nec homo individuus, sed homo 2m se communis per modum materie. Other answers. Vel potest dici quod homo 2m se, abstractus ab in- Distinction between the dividualitate et a communitate per modum forme, et a 25 subject quo communitate per modum materie, est per se 2° con- and the subject quod. vertibiliter risibilis. Aliter adhuc poterit dici quod duplex Humanity est subiectum, scilicet [primo] subiectum quo et subiectum takes here the place of the quod aliquid inest subiective. Secundo, subiectum quod former ; and the latter subiectat et in quo est aliquid subiective. Et tunc species 30 is unnecessary humana est subiectum quo primum et convertibile 2m quod risibilitas inest homini; et ad talem sensum est verum quod risibilitas est propria passio speciei humane. Nec ex hoc sequitur quod species humana est per se 2° convertibiliter risibilis, nec quod ipsa est risibilis; 35 sed quod 2m eam convertibiliter homo est risibilis. Et licet species humana, sive humanitas, specifica sit subiectum quo per se et convertibile risibilitatis communis, non tamen ex hoc oportet aliquod esse subiectum quod subiectat et in quo per se et convertibiliter est com-40 munis risibilitas; quia non videtur aliquid esse subiectum or into general and individual. The former divides substance formally, the other materially. A like division is here adopted for man; and we can take the former, admitting that man, as a universal considered materially (i. e. in its subjects) is capable of laughter. 247 bodily, and unbodied, 7. 11 pro et in MS. 17. mo MS. 18. mo MS. 19. mo MS. 28. primo deest MS. 38. 9'ntible risiths MS.
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CAP. XIX. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 125 247 25 quod subiectaret et in quo esset subiective communis risibilitas, nisi quod suppositat et est suppositum speciei humane, vel humanitatis specifice. Sed nichil est quod suppositaret et esset suppositum speciei humane conver- 5 tibiliter; igitur nichil est subiectum quod et in quo convertibiliter esset communis risibilitas. Et quamvis aggregatum suppositum humanum ex omnibus hominibus qui sunt in magno et toto tempore mundi sit via per- feccionis, primum suppositans speciem humanam; vel 10 quamvis forte deus sciat unum simplex et non aggre- gatum suppositum humanum, quem oportet primum suppositare humanam speciem, non est tamen suppo- situm simplex vel aggregatum dabile quod convertibiliter suppositaret speciem humanam, sic quod in eo esset 15 convertibiliter suppositum. Eodem modo est dicendum de subiectacione cursus communis, risus communis, motus communis, accionis communis; et sic de aliis communibus formis accidentalibus. Et non oportet cursum communem habere 20 subiectum communem adequatum, in quo sit subiective, nec subiectum singulare; sed sufficit quod habeat subiectum agregatum primum via perfeccionis in subiec- tando cursum communem; et quod forte habeat primum simplex quod oportet primo inter subiecta simplicia cursum illum subiectare. Unde, cum cursus communis sit informative in cursu singulari, et non denominat eum formaliter currere, patet quod in eo est sicut racio essencialis formalis, 2m quam ipse cursus singularis formaliter denominat subiectum suum primum currere. 30 Et forme accidentales singulares habent subiecta sua prima et adequata, exceptis forte paucis generacionibus formarum accidentalium singularium, ut sitibus singu- laribus, et forte latitudinibus singularibus. Forme autem communes de predicamentis accidencium non habent 35 subiecta prima et adequata que formaliter primo et adequate denominarent, nec proprie denominant sub- stancias, sicut nec communes substancie agunt, currunt, legunt, vel disputant; sed ille forme communes de pre- dicamentis accidencium pocius sunt raciones essenciales, 40 formales formis accidentalibus singularibus, ut 2m illas denominent proprie primo formaliter et adequate subiecta Like answers may be given to objections concerning other Universals. Singular accidental ſorms have their individual subjects, but not general forms, because the latter are the very ratio essendi of the former. 31. gmb9 MS. 33. I—b9 MS.
CAP. XIX. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 125 247 25 quod subiectaret et in quo esset subiective communis risibilitas, nisi quod suppositat et est suppositum speciei humane, vel humanitatis specifice. Sed nichil est quod suppositaret et esset suppositum speciei humane conver- 5 tibiliter; igitur nichil est subiectum quod et in quo convertibiliter esset communis risibilitas. Et quamvis aggregatum suppositum humanum ex omnibus hominibus qui sunt in magno et toto tempore mundi sit via per- feccionis, primum suppositans speciem humanam; vel 10 quamvis forte deus sciat unum simplex et non aggre- gatum suppositum humanum, quem oportet primum suppositare humanam speciem, non est tamen suppo- situm simplex vel aggregatum dabile quod convertibiliter suppositaret speciem humanam, sic quod in eo esset 15 convertibiliter suppositum. Eodem modo est dicendum de subiectacione cursus communis, risus communis, motus communis, accionis communis; et sic de aliis communibus formis accidentalibus. Et non oportet cursum communem habere 20 subiectum communem adequatum, in quo sit subiective, nec subiectum singulare; sed sufficit quod habeat subiectum agregatum primum via perfeccionis in subiec- tando cursum communem; et quod forte habeat primum simplex quod oportet primo inter subiecta simplicia cursum illum subiectare. Unde, cum cursus communis sit informative in cursu singulari, et non denominat eum formaliter currere, patet quod in eo est sicut racio essencialis formalis, 2m quam ipse cursus singularis formaliter denominat subiectum suum primum currere. 30 Et forme accidentales singulares habent subiecta sua prima et adequata, exceptis forte paucis generacionibus formarum accidentalium singularium, ut sitibus singu- laribus, et forte latitudinibus singularibus. Forme autem communes de predicamentis accidencium non habent 35 subiecta prima et adequata que formaliter primo et adequate denominarent, nec proprie denominant sub- stancias, sicut nec communes substancie agunt, currunt, legunt, vel disputant; sed ille forme communes de pre- dicamentis accidencium pocius sunt raciones essenciales, 40 formales formis accidentalibus singularibus, ut 2m illas denominent proprie primo formaliter et adequate subiecta Like answers may be given to objections concerning other Universals. Singular accidental ſorms have their individual subjects, but not general forms, because the latter are the very ratio essendi of the former. 31. gmb9 MS. 33. I—b9 MS.
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126 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XIX. Thus genera and species are mere abstractions in accidents, which we assimilate to substances, and only their singulars ure real. sua prima et adequata. Sicut ergo non potest dari cursus singularis qui per modum individui proprium convertibiliter et adequate in se subiectaret cursum communem, eo quod talis sit essencialis racio et com- munis omni singulari cursui; sic non potest dari subiecta que primo et adequate subiectaret cursum communem, vel quam cursus communis ille primo et convertibiliter denominaret; eo quod sit racio essencialis multis formis singularibus accidentalibus denominandi varias et multas substancias singulares; ymmo, quia communis generacio 10 substancialis formaliter inexistens generacioni substanciali individuali non potest eam tam vere denominare generari substancialiter, cum ipsa talis generacio substancialis sit accidens, non substancia. Ideo forte non potest sub- stanciam denominare generari substancialiter, sed est 15 vere racio essencialis communis 2m quam generacio singularis substancialis vere et proprium subiectum denominat substancialiter generari. Et forte idem est iudicium de aliis formis accidentalibus communibus in predicamentis ] accidencium. Et vocarentur forme acci- dentales substancialium seu substanciarum, quia sunt raciones essenciales formarum vere accidentalium, que vere accidunt substanciis et eas accidentaliter denominant. Unde, cum genus et species accidencium sint quidi- tates abstracte, modo possunt assimilari substanciis ut 25 racionem generis et speciei possint salvare, non proprie videtur dictum quod talia genera et tales species acce- dant et sint accidencia substanciarum, sed sunt raciones essenciales eorum, que vere et proprie accidunt. Aliqui ponunt differenciam inter subiectum inhesionis et 30 subiectum denominacionis, ut materiam primam dicunt subiectum inhesionis et non denominacionis formarum substancialium et accidentalium. Compositum autem dicunt subiectum denominacionis; et nescio ad presens si distinccio hec in presenti materia possit efficaciter 35 iuvare. Gauderem tamen, si diccio vera est, quod veritas veritatem fulciret et explanaret. 248 1. dare MS. 25. mo MS.; ib. a pro assimilari MS.
126 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XIX. Thus genera and species are mere abstractions in accidents, which we assimilate to substances, and only their singulars ure real. sua prima et adequata. Sicut ergo non potest dari cursus singularis qui per modum individui proprium convertibiliter et adequate in se subiectaret cursum communem, eo quod talis sit essencialis racio et com- munis omni singulari cursui; sic non potest dari subiecta que primo et adequate subiectaret cursum communem, vel quam cursus communis ille primo et convertibiliter denominaret; eo quod sit racio essencialis multis formis singularibus accidentalibus denominandi varias et multas substancias singulares; ymmo, quia communis generacio 10 substancialis formaliter inexistens generacioni substanciali individuali non potest eam tam vere denominare generari substancialiter, cum ipsa talis generacio substancialis sit accidens, non substancia. Ideo forte non potest sub- stanciam denominare generari substancialiter, sed est 15 vere racio essencialis communis 2m quam generacio singularis substancialis vere et proprium subiectum denominat substancialiter generari. Et forte idem est iudicium de aliis formis accidentalibus communibus in predicamentis ] accidencium. Et vocarentur forme acci- dentales substancialium seu substanciarum, quia sunt raciones essenciales formarum vere accidentalium, que vere accidunt substanciis et eas accidentaliter denominant. Unde, cum genus et species accidencium sint quidi- tates abstracte, modo possunt assimilari substanciis ut 25 racionem generis et speciei possint salvare, non proprie videtur dictum quod talia genera et tales species acce- dant et sint accidencia substanciarum, sed sunt raciones essenciales eorum, que vere et proprie accidunt. Aliqui ponunt differenciam inter subiectum inhesionis et 30 subiectum denominacionis, ut materiam primam dicunt subiectum inhesionis et non denominacionis formarum substancialium et accidentalium. Compositum autem dicunt subiectum denominacionis; et nescio ad presens si distinccio hec in presenti materia possit efficaciter 35 iuvare. Gauderem tamen, si diccio vera est, quod veritas veritatem fulciret et explanaret. 248 1. dare MS. 25. mo MS.; ib. a pro assimilari MS.
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CAPITULUM VIGESIMUM. 2485 Adhuc fuit superius dubitatum si est universale reale, non ydeale, aliquod potenciale tantum, et aliquod intel- lectuale tantum, sicud est aliquod reale et actuale quod 5 actualiter communicatur multis individuis. Et ponuntur sol, luna, mercurius, etc., universalia realia non actualia actualiter pluribus individuis communicata, sed poten- cialia, quia per potenciam supernaturalem possunt esse plures soles, plures lune, ymmo et plures mundi, ut 10 solet poni, quamvis tales mundi non possunt esse simul, nec successive. Et illi qui ponunt sicud Thomiste qui sanctum Thomam secuntur in hoc quod omnes angeli inter se differunt specie, et quod non ponunt esse plures eiusdem speciei; quia distinccio numeralis rerum in 15 eadem specie debent esse 2m eos per materiam. Et tales non habent materiam. Videtur igitur secundum hoc quod species angelorum et intelligenciarum sunt universalia intellectualia tantum, et non potencialia, neque actualia, cum non possint tales species per plura 20 individua multiplicari; per intellectum tamen divinum, ymmo, et per creatum separatur quiditas uniuscuiusque angeli a supposito angelico, et 2m talem separacionem habebit essenciale intellectuale tantum, cum sic sit separatum a condicionibus individuantibus et individui, nec possit illa quiditas pluribus realiter differentibus communicari, erit ipse universale intellectuale tantum. Unde videtur hic ulterius dicendum, cum universale actuale sit, ut sic, perfeccius quam potenciale ad com- plendum talem gradualem descensum, quod est dare 30 maximum universale, medium, et minimum; ista quod universale actuale est maximum possibile universale, potenciale tantum, sicud medium, universale vero in re; intellectuale tantum sicud minimum universale: non Are there Universals which arc simply real, Others potential, and others merely intellectual? There cannot be more than one sun, one moon, &c., save by supernatural Power, therefore their Universals are potential. St. Thomas holds that each angel is of a different species; and that they cannot be multiplied, but we can conceive their Universal in thought. Tliere are threc degrees of Universality: Actual, the greatest; potential, intermediate; conceptual, the least of all. Capitulum deest. 2. Blank space for initial A MS. 5. ponur MS. 14. ſſe MS. 15. dent MS.
CAPITULUM VIGESIMUM. 2485 Adhuc fuit superius dubitatum si est universale reale, non ydeale, aliquod potenciale tantum, et aliquod intel- lectuale tantum, sicud est aliquod reale et actuale quod 5 actualiter communicatur multis individuis. Et ponuntur sol, luna, mercurius, etc., universalia realia non actualia actualiter pluribus individuis communicata, sed poten- cialia, quia per potenciam supernaturalem possunt esse plures soles, plures lune, ymmo et plures mundi, ut 10 solet poni, quamvis tales mundi non possunt esse simul, nec successive. Et illi qui ponunt sicud Thomiste qui sanctum Thomam secuntur in hoc quod omnes angeli inter se differunt specie, et quod non ponunt esse plures eiusdem speciei; quia distinccio numeralis rerum in 15 eadem specie debent esse 2m eos per materiam. Et tales non habent materiam. Videtur igitur secundum hoc quod species angelorum et intelligenciarum sunt universalia intellectualia tantum, et non potencialia, neque actualia, cum non possint tales species per plura 20 individua multiplicari; per intellectum tamen divinum, ymmo, et per creatum separatur quiditas uniuscuiusque angeli a supposito angelico, et 2m talem separacionem habebit essenciale intellectuale tantum, cum sic sit separatum a condicionibus individuantibus et individui, nec possit illa quiditas pluribus realiter differentibus communicari, erit ipse universale intellectuale tantum. Unde videtur hic ulterius dicendum, cum universale actuale sit, ut sic, perfeccius quam potenciale ad com- plendum talem gradualem descensum, quod est dare 30 maximum universale, medium, et minimum; ista quod universale actuale est maximum possibile universale, potenciale tantum, sicud medium, universale vero in re; intellectuale tantum sicud minimum universale: non Are there Universals which arc simply real, Others potential, and others merely intellectual? There cannot be more than one sun, one moon, &c., save by supernatural Power, therefore their Universals are potential. St. Thomas holds that each angel is of a different species; and that they cannot be multiplied, but we can conceive their Universal in thought. Tliere are threc degrees of Universality: Actual, the greatest; potential, intermediate; conceptual, the least of all. Capitulum deest. 2. Blank space for initial A MS. 5. ponur MS. 14. ſſe MS. 15. dent MS.
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128 It takes nothing from the perfection of a creature that its Universal should be of low degree; for in the Deity there is tlie smallest ditference of all, which is merely conceptual. Thus both the adherence of a Universal in its subject and its degree of perfection in niversality have three degrees. What is the Universal that is merely intellectual ? JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAD. XX. sic intelligendo quod res que est universalis intellectui tantum sit minus digna et nobilis quam quecunque res que est universalis actu communicata pluribus; sed quod ipsa universalitas 2" quam res est universale, intellectuale tantum, est sicud minimi gradus. Et uni- 5 versalitas 27? quam res est universale actuale est sicud maximi gradus; et universalitas 2" quam res est universale potenciale tantum, sicud medii gradus in graduali latitudine universalitatis, Nec derogaret rei que est species nobilissima 2?" essencialem naturam rei quod 10 illi conveniat universalitas minimi gradus, scilicet uni- versalitas intellectualis tantum; cum essencie divine que est simpliciter dignissima conveniat differencia minimi gradus, scilicet differencia 2" racionem tantum respectu persone divine, cum essencia divina 2? racionem tantum 15 differat a persona divina. Et maximus gradus differencie que est differencia essencialis, in divinis ad intra non potest habere locum, licet bene quoad res extra creatas locum habeat. Sic igitur, sicud inexistencia forme communis in parti- 20 cularibus est triplex, et (sicut de existencia accidentis a subiecto) est triplex: actualis, secundum rem, perfectissi- ma; potencialis tantum, 2" rem minus perfecta, et media; intellectualis tantum, sive 2" intellectum tantum, minima: sic eciam videtur dicenda triplex rerum universalitas; 25 realis actualis, realis potencialis, et intellectualis tantum, ultimam tamen — propter sui nimiam tenuitatem — difficilimam, Et videtur quod deus, sicud inmediate et pure apud suum intellectum fabricat alicuius rei realis extra se existentis universalitatem intellectualem tantum, 30 sicud universalitatem tenuissimam, et hinc nobis diffi- cilime perceptibilem; et quod deus, sicud distancius fabricat rei realis universalitatem potencialem tantum, sicud magis spissam, et inde nobis plus perceptibilem; et quod tercio, sicud distantissime fabricat rei ad extra 35 universalitatem actualem sicud maxime spissam, et hinc | vel pre ceteris facilius perceptibilem. Ita ergo est 249' triplex gradus universalitatis circa res ad extra. Que autem res ad extra sit universale intellectuale tantum, dicetur sequendo sentencias Sancti Thome, quod 40 supposita, nature, et quiditas angelorum sint huiusmodi. 7. maximum MS. 23.mcdio MS. 27. minimam MS. 41. suppo- sitam quod MS.
128 It takes nothing from the perfection of a creature that its Universal should be of low degree; for in the Deity there is tlie smallest ditference of all, which is merely conceptual. Thus both the adherence of a Universal in its subject and its degree of perfection in niversality have three degrees. What is the Universal that is merely intellectual ? JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAD. XX. sic intelligendo quod res que est universalis intellectui tantum sit minus digna et nobilis quam quecunque res que est universalis actu communicata pluribus; sed quod ipsa universalitas 2" quam res est universale, intellectuale tantum, est sicud minimi gradus. Et uni- 5 versalitas 27? quam res est universale actuale est sicud maximi gradus; et universalitas 2" quam res est universale potenciale tantum, sicud medii gradus in graduali latitudine universalitatis, Nec derogaret rei que est species nobilissima 2?" essencialem naturam rei quod 10 illi conveniat universalitas minimi gradus, scilicet uni- versalitas intellectualis tantum; cum essencie divine que est simpliciter dignissima conveniat differencia minimi gradus, scilicet differencia 2" racionem tantum respectu persone divine, cum essencia divina 2? racionem tantum 15 differat a persona divina. Et maximus gradus differencie que est differencia essencialis, in divinis ad intra non potest habere locum, licet bene quoad res extra creatas locum habeat. Sic igitur, sicud inexistencia forme communis in parti- 20 cularibus est triplex, et (sicut de existencia accidentis a subiecto) est triplex: actualis, secundum rem, perfectissi- ma; potencialis tantum, 2" rem minus perfecta, et media; intellectualis tantum, sive 2" intellectum tantum, minima: sic eciam videtur dicenda triplex rerum universalitas; 25 realis actualis, realis potencialis, et intellectualis tantum, ultimam tamen — propter sui nimiam tenuitatem — difficilimam, Et videtur quod deus, sicud inmediate et pure apud suum intellectum fabricat alicuius rei realis extra se existentis universalitatem intellectualem tantum, 30 sicud universalitatem tenuissimam, et hinc nobis diffi- cilime perceptibilem; et quod deus, sicud distancius fabricat rei realis universalitatem potencialem tantum, sicud magis spissam, et inde nobis plus perceptibilem; et quod tercio, sicud distantissime fabricat rei ad extra 35 universalitatem actualem sicud maxime spissam, et hinc | vel pre ceteris facilius perceptibilem. Ita ergo est 249' triplex gradus universalitatis circa res ad extra. Que autem res ad extra sit universale intellectuale tantum, dicetur sequendo sentencias Sancti Thome, quod 40 supposita, nature, et quiditas angelorum sint huiusmodi. 7. maximum MS. 23.mcdio MS. 27. minimam MS. 41. suppo- sitam quod MS.
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CAP. XX. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 129 Et, dato quod nesciremus rem distincte dari, que talis esset universalitas, nichilominus, propter iam adducta, videtur sentenciandum quod aliqua talis sit; et verisimile et probabile est quod supposita natura angelica sit 5 huiusmodi. Nec videtur ponendum quod homo sit eiusdem speciei specialissime cum angelis, et quod non sint plures species angelorum. Nam ad Hebreos 2° dicitur de filio dei quod per unionem suppositalem nusquam appre- 10 hendit angelos, sed semen Abrahe. Unde, si angelus esset eiusdem speciei specialissime cum homine quoad spiritum intellectualem hominis, tunc natura angelica predicaretur concretive de filio dei, sicud natura humana, cum naturam specialissimam angeli assumpsisset, eo 15 quod eadem sit natura specialissima (per adversarium) angeli et hominis. Hoc autem est contra textum nunc allegatum, cum 2m naturam illam specialissimam angeli ita denominaretur concretive sicud 2m humanitatem dicitur homo. Et quia ille textus iam allegatus dicit 20 in plurali numero, “Nusquam apprehendit angelos', videtur quod innuat angelos differre specie. Alias per- tinencius dixisset, ut videtur, “"Nusquam apprehendit angelum", id est, naturam angelicam, si tantum una specifica esset in omnibus. Ymmo, si in rebus mate- 25 rialibus gradualis varietas et ascensus 2m diversitatem specierum materialium est pro decore universi, videtur quod longe amplius in natura spirituali sit talis varietas et mixtura nobilis. Et pluralitas yerarchiarum et ordinum angelorum videntur hoc satis innuere. Et, si natura in- 3o tellectualis increata simpliciter infinite distat a natura intellectuali creata, quomodo deus non posset facere naturas intellectuales re vel intellectu universales inter se essencialiter multum distantes? Sed, ad propositum quasi reddeundo, videtur quod 35 deus rem constituit quam voluit esse tantum intellectua- liter vel racionem essencialem, de quanto solum intel- lectum; et solum 2m racionem] habet et abstractum ab 249" individuo vel supposito et a condicionibus individuantibus. Et 2m hoc ei non repugnat, sed convenit, universalitas 40 intelligibilis; et sicud illud quod ad aliquid habet diffe- We answer, according to St. Thomas, that the natures of the Angels are such. We can neither admit that man is of the same species as the Angels, nor that they are all of one species. Both these theories seem incompatible with Holy Writ. And if God differs infinitely from created beings, why should He not create other beings which differ exceedingly from each other ? Close analog between the degrees of 1. dare MS. 10. ſemie MS. 13. p re MS. 8. Hebr. II. 16. De Universalibus.
CAP. XX. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 129 Et, dato quod nesciremus rem distincte dari, que talis esset universalitas, nichilominus, propter iam adducta, videtur sentenciandum quod aliqua talis sit; et verisimile et probabile est quod supposita natura angelica sit 5 huiusmodi. Nec videtur ponendum quod homo sit eiusdem speciei specialissime cum angelis, et quod non sint plures species angelorum. Nam ad Hebreos 2° dicitur de filio dei quod per unionem suppositalem nusquam appre- 10 hendit angelos, sed semen Abrahe. Unde, si angelus esset eiusdem speciei specialissime cum homine quoad spiritum intellectualem hominis, tunc natura angelica predicaretur concretive de filio dei, sicud natura humana, cum naturam specialissimam angeli assumpsisset, eo 15 quod eadem sit natura specialissima (per adversarium) angeli et hominis. Hoc autem est contra textum nunc allegatum, cum 2m naturam illam specialissimam angeli ita denominaretur concretive sicud 2m humanitatem dicitur homo. Et quia ille textus iam allegatus dicit 20 in plurali numero, “Nusquam apprehendit angelos', videtur quod innuat angelos differre specie. Alias per- tinencius dixisset, ut videtur, “"Nusquam apprehendit angelum", id est, naturam angelicam, si tantum una specifica esset in omnibus. Ymmo, si in rebus mate- 25 rialibus gradualis varietas et ascensus 2m diversitatem specierum materialium est pro decore universi, videtur quod longe amplius in natura spirituali sit talis varietas et mixtura nobilis. Et pluralitas yerarchiarum et ordinum angelorum videntur hoc satis innuere. Et, si natura in- 3o tellectualis increata simpliciter infinite distat a natura intellectuali creata, quomodo deus non posset facere naturas intellectuales re vel intellectu universales inter se essencialiter multum distantes? Sed, ad propositum quasi reddeundo, videtur quod 35 deus rem constituit quam voluit esse tantum intellectua- liter vel racionem essencialem, de quanto solum intel- lectum; et solum 2m racionem] habet et abstractum ab 249" individuo vel supposito et a condicionibus individuantibus. Et 2m hoc ei non repugnat, sed convenit, universalitas 40 intelligibilis; et sicud illud quod ad aliquid habet diffe- We answer, according to St. Thomas, that the natures of the Angels are such. We can neither admit that man is of the same species as the Angels, nor that they are all of one species. Both these theories seem incompatible with Holy Writ. And if God differs infinitely from created beings, why should He not create other beings which differ exceedingly from each other ? Close analog between the degrees of 1. dare MS. 10. ſemie MS. 13. p re MS. 8. Hebr. II. 16. De Universalibus.
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130 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XX. difference and of Universality. renciam 2m racionem tantum, non potest ex hinc habere differenciam realem, sic quod habet universalitatem intellectualem tantum, ex hinc non potest habere uni- versalitatem realem actualem vel potencialem 2m quam posset realiter multis informative communicari; sicud5 tamen quod 2m racionem tantum differt ab aliquo differt ab illo, licet non realiter, sic quod est universale intellectuale tantum est universale, sed non quod posset multis formaliter communicari.
130 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XX. difference and of Universality. renciam 2m racionem tantum, non potest ex hinc habere differenciam realem, sic quod habet universalitatem intellectualem tantum, ex hinc non potest habere uni- versalitatem realem actualem vel potencialem 2m quam posset realiter multis informative communicari; sicud5 tamen quod 2m racionem tantum differt ab aliquo differt ab illo, licet non realiter, sic quod est universale intellectuale tantum est universale, sed non quod posset multis formaliter communicari.
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CAPITULUM VIGESIMUM PRIMUM. Ulterius est hic dubium unum prius tactum amplius tractandum. Hoc valet: Utrum possit esse universale aliquod quod a principio mundi usque in sempiternum 5 non existit aliquando in propria sua forma. Et videtur visibiliter et probabiliter quod non. Pro quo primo supponendum est hic X esse genera- lissima formalia intrinseca principia rerum, nec posse esse plura; unum, substancie, cum in generibus com- 10 munioribus non possit esse processus in infinitum; et novem accidencium, quorum necessitas et sufficiencia uno modo videtur sumenda 2m triplex esse totum ipsius substancie, ut substancia. Primo modo est tota quidi- tative ex partibus quiditativis, scilicet genere et diffe- 15 rencia. Secundo modo est tota ex partibus qualitativis, sicud sunt materia et forma. Et 3° modo est tota ex partibus quantitativis, ut homo ex capite, corde etc. Et una illarum trium totalitatum est maxima, alia media, alia minima; igitur tot et non plures in sub- 20 stancia possunt repperiri. Et quia idem est totum et perfectum, tripliciter ergo sic substancia est perfecta substancialiter. Verumptamen, quia sic non est perfecta simpliciter, sed solum in genere, et sicud 2m quid; et substancia talis tripliciter perfecta per se existens non 25 est hoc modo quo res perficiatur, sed est quod per- ficitur, et perfectibile est; igitur ipsa substancialiter et intrinsece secundum quid et diminute perfecta est ipsa accidentaliter et extrinsece perfectibilis 2m hoc quod ipsa est sic substancialiter et intrinsece tripliciter Can there be a Universal which never exists in its own proper form ? No. First note that there are ten categories, and ten only: Substance and nine sorts of accidents. Substance may be perfected quidditatively. qualitatively, or quantitatively. But this is only a possibility; to make it actual, something exterior is required, and that is the accident. 1. A gap towards the end of the line; Capitulum &c. deest MS. 2. Blank space for Initial U MS. 9. plua vnu ſbe MS. 12. vnoo MS. 20. rpp'i MS. 5. Forma. The Author here enquires whether, v. g. Humanity could be possible, if no men were ever to exist; and he thinks not. This is the foundation of Wyclif's idea of a Possible: some- thing that has existed or will exist. See. W.'s Miscellanea Philo- sophica, vol. I. Introductory Essay. 9*
CAPITULUM VIGESIMUM PRIMUM. Ulterius est hic dubium unum prius tactum amplius tractandum. Hoc valet: Utrum possit esse universale aliquod quod a principio mundi usque in sempiternum 5 non existit aliquando in propria sua forma. Et videtur visibiliter et probabiliter quod non. Pro quo primo supponendum est hic X esse genera- lissima formalia intrinseca principia rerum, nec posse esse plura; unum, substancie, cum in generibus com- 10 munioribus non possit esse processus in infinitum; et novem accidencium, quorum necessitas et sufficiencia uno modo videtur sumenda 2m triplex esse totum ipsius substancie, ut substancia. Primo modo est tota quidi- tative ex partibus quiditativis, scilicet genere et diffe- 15 rencia. Secundo modo est tota ex partibus qualitativis, sicud sunt materia et forma. Et 3° modo est tota ex partibus quantitativis, ut homo ex capite, corde etc. Et una illarum trium totalitatum est maxima, alia media, alia minima; igitur tot et non plures in sub- 20 stancia possunt repperiri. Et quia idem est totum et perfectum, tripliciter ergo sic substancia est perfecta substancialiter. Verumptamen, quia sic non est perfecta simpliciter, sed solum in genere, et sicud 2m quid; et substancia talis tripliciter perfecta per se existens non 25 est hoc modo quo res perficiatur, sed est quod per- ficitur, et perfectibile est; igitur ipsa substancialiter et intrinsece secundum quid et diminute perfecta est ipsa accidentaliter et extrinsece perfectibilis 2m hoc quod ipsa est sic substancialiter et intrinsece tripliciter Can there be a Universal which never exists in its own proper form ? No. First note that there are ten categories, and ten only: Substance and nine sorts of accidents. Substance may be perfected quidditatively. qualitatively, or quantitatively. But this is only a possibility; to make it actual, something exterior is required, and that is the accident. 1. A gap towards the end of the line; Capitulum &c. deest MS. 2. Blank space for Initial U MS. 9. plua vnu ſbe MS. 12. vnoo MS. 20. rpp'i MS. 5. Forma. The Author here enquires whether, v. g. Humanity could be possible, if no men were ever to exist; and he thinks not. This is the foundation of Wyclif's idea of a Possible: some- thing that has existed or will exist. See. W.'s Miscellanea Philo- sophica, vol. I. Introductory Essay. 9*
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132 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XXI. Now, if the substance be perfected in each of these ways, and each in three degrees (little, more and most we have nine modifications. perfecta et tota. Et per consequens 2m hoc est ipsa tripliciter perfectibilis accidentaliter extrinsece. Et voco hec omnia accidencia extrinseca ipsi substancie, de quanto realiter accidunt sibi, et sic accidunt ad eam et in eam. Et sic ipsa est aproprietate perfectibilis accidentaliter extrinsece, 2m quod ipsa est tota quidi- tative primo modo. 2° modo est aproprietate perfecti- bilis accidentaliter extrinsece 2m quod ipsa est tota qualitative. Et 3° modo est perfectibilis aproprietate accidentaliter extrinsece, 2m quod ipsa est tota quanti- 10 tative. Et quia ulterius ipsa substancia tota, quolibet illorum trium modorum quo est tota, habet ipsa unam manierem partis vel parcium que habet racionem numeri quo ad "sic totum esse". Et habet aliam manierem partis vel parcium que habet racionem medii quo ad illud sic totum; et habet tunc 3° totalitatem que habet racionem maximi quo ad illud "sic totum". Igitur ipsa substancia tota illis tribus modis totalitatis quo ad quodlibet sui "totum esse" est tripliciter per- fectibilis accidentaliter extrinsece; minime, medie, et 20 maxime. Minime quo ad manierem partis vel parcium, que manieres habet racionem minimi substancialis et intrinseci; medie, quo ad manierem partis vel parcium; que manieres habet racionem medii substancialis in- trinseci ipsius tocius substancie; et maxime quo ad 25 totalitatem ipsius substancie. Igitur ulterius oportet dare genus rerum, sicud minime perficiencium accidentaliter substanciam primo modo totam, et secundum genus rerum medie perficiencium, et genus rerum sicud maxime perficiencium accidentaliter extrinsece substanciam primo 30 modo totam. Et consimiliter oportet dare tria genera rerum perficiencium accidentaliter extrinsece substanciam 2° totam. Et hoc minime, medie, et maxime. Et 3° modo oportet consimiliter dare tria genera rerum per- ficiencium accidentaliter extrinsece, minime, medie, et 35 maxime substanciam 3° modo totam. Sic ergo novem oportet esse manieres vel genera rerum accidentaliter extrinsece perficiencium substanciam tripliciter totam substancialiter; nec poterint plures manieres rerum excogitari quam ille novem ad perficiendum acciden-40 taliter substanciam et extrinsece. 250* 15 And there can be no more. 5. app'ete MS. 7. app'ete MS. 9. app'ets MS. 14. numi MS.
132 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XXI. Now, if the substance be perfected in each of these ways, and each in three degrees (little, more and most we have nine modifications. perfecta et tota. Et per consequens 2m hoc est ipsa tripliciter perfectibilis accidentaliter extrinsece. Et voco hec omnia accidencia extrinseca ipsi substancie, de quanto realiter accidunt sibi, et sic accidunt ad eam et in eam. Et sic ipsa est aproprietate perfectibilis accidentaliter extrinsece, 2m quod ipsa est tota quidi- tative primo modo. 2° modo est aproprietate perfecti- bilis accidentaliter extrinsece 2m quod ipsa est tota qualitative. Et 3° modo est perfectibilis aproprietate accidentaliter extrinsece, 2m quod ipsa est tota quanti- 10 tative. Et quia ulterius ipsa substancia tota, quolibet illorum trium modorum quo est tota, habet ipsa unam manierem partis vel parcium que habet racionem numeri quo ad "sic totum esse". Et habet aliam manierem partis vel parcium que habet racionem medii quo ad illud sic totum; et habet tunc 3° totalitatem que habet racionem maximi quo ad illud "sic totum". Igitur ipsa substancia tota illis tribus modis totalitatis quo ad quodlibet sui "totum esse" est tripliciter per- fectibilis accidentaliter extrinsece; minime, medie, et 20 maxime. Minime quo ad manierem partis vel parcium, que manieres habet racionem minimi substancialis et intrinseci; medie, quo ad manierem partis vel parcium; que manieres habet racionem medii substancialis in- trinseci ipsius tocius substancie; et maxime quo ad 25 totalitatem ipsius substancie. Igitur ulterius oportet dare genus rerum, sicud minime perficiencium accidentaliter substanciam primo modo totam, et secundum genus rerum medie perficiencium, et genus rerum sicud maxime perficiencium accidentaliter extrinsece substanciam primo 30 modo totam. Et consimiliter oportet dare tria genera rerum perficiencium accidentaliter extrinsece substanciam 2° totam. Et hoc minime, medie, et maxime. Et 3° modo oportet consimiliter dare tria genera rerum per- ficiencium accidentaliter extrinsece, minime, medie, et 35 maxime substanciam 3° modo totam. Sic ergo novem oportet esse manieres vel genera rerum accidentaliter extrinsece perficiencium substanciam tripliciter totam substancialiter; nec poterint plures manieres rerum excogitari quam ille novem ad perficiendum acciden-40 taliter substanciam et extrinsece. 250* 15 And there can be no more. 5. app'ete MS. 7. app'ete MS. 9. app'ets MS. 14. numi MS.
Strana 133
CAP. XXI. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 133 Et est hic sermo de manieribus rerum accidentaliter seu accidentalium que insunt substancie, ut perfecciones accidentales eius, ipsam proprie denominantes, que ab intrinseco sunt nature complete et finite essencialiter, 5 propter quod oportet tales res accidentales materiales, perficientes sic accidentaliter substanciam, et ipsam proprie denominantes, sicud id quod denominat et non sicud quo sit denominacio, et existentes ab extrinseco 250b nature complete et finite essencialiter esse res in specie 10 et in genere et in differencia, cum ex genere et diffe- rencia complentur et finiuntur essencialiter et extrinsece. Igitur res accidentales prime maneriey de novem manieriebus iam dictis oportet esse eiusdem generis generalissimi, quo ad illam manieriem rerum, cum in generibus illius maneriey non potest procedi in infinitum versus communius genus. Et sic similiter in secunda manerie. Et sic de omnibus novem. Igitur oportet esse generalissima talium accidencium novem et non plura. Nec possunt alique tales res eiusdem maneriei de 20 dictis novem maneriebus rerum accidentalium esse non eiusdem generis generalissimi; quia, cum quelibet earum sit res alicuius generis predicamentalis, si non esset eiusdem generis generalissimi, nec esset eiusdem manerieii de illis novem maneriebus. Nec eciam potest esse quod res unius maneriei et res alterius maneriey de dictis sepe novem maneriebus rerum accidentalium sint eiusdem generis generalissimo; quia tunc aliqua maneries rerum predicata esset ad invicem realiter permixte, cum tamen iuxta dicta ille 30 maneries incommixte sunt et esse debent. Sic igitur est unum genus generalissimum substancie Thus we have Substance, et novem genera generalissima accidencium, nec plura Quantity. Relation, esse possunt, iuxta deducta superius; et veri metha- Quality, physici veritate compulsi vel manuducti sunt ad ponendum Action, Passion, 35 et asserendum decem esse genera generalissima et non Whereabouts, Time, Position, plura. Nominant autem ea Substanciam, Quantitatem, Ad and Belonging. Aliquid, Qualitatem, Accionem, Passionem, Ubi, Quando, Posicionem, et Habere (sive habitum). Nec est vis nimia vel multa facienda in nominibus et signis, dummodo Each accident which signifies the same one of these nine modifications belongs to the same ultimate genus, whether to the first or the second, or any other. For this special modification of the substance is one of the nine ultimate genera of accidents. Nor can two different modifications belong to the same genus. 15 25 3. d'nomiante MS. 5. miales = numerales? MS. 11. 9pler et funts MS. 22. pnl MS. 28. predicte MS. 31. Sic MS.; ib. gamd pro genus generalissimum MS. 32. gname pro genera generalissima MS.
CAP. XXI. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 133 Et est hic sermo de manieribus rerum accidentaliter seu accidentalium que insunt substancie, ut perfecciones accidentales eius, ipsam proprie denominantes, que ab intrinseco sunt nature complete et finite essencialiter, 5 propter quod oportet tales res accidentales materiales, perficientes sic accidentaliter substanciam, et ipsam proprie denominantes, sicud id quod denominat et non sicud quo sit denominacio, et existentes ab extrinseco 250b nature complete et finite essencialiter esse res in specie 10 et in genere et in differencia, cum ex genere et diffe- rencia complentur et finiuntur essencialiter et extrinsece. Igitur res accidentales prime maneriey de novem manieriebus iam dictis oportet esse eiusdem generis generalissimi, quo ad illam manieriem rerum, cum in generibus illius maneriey non potest procedi in infinitum versus communius genus. Et sic similiter in secunda manerie. Et sic de omnibus novem. Igitur oportet esse generalissima talium accidencium novem et non plura. Nec possunt alique tales res eiusdem maneriei de 20 dictis novem maneriebus rerum accidentalium esse non eiusdem generis generalissimi; quia, cum quelibet earum sit res alicuius generis predicamentalis, si non esset eiusdem generis generalissimi, nec esset eiusdem manerieii de illis novem maneriebus. Nec eciam potest esse quod res unius maneriei et res alterius maneriey de dictis sepe novem maneriebus rerum accidentalium sint eiusdem generis generalissimo; quia tunc aliqua maneries rerum predicata esset ad invicem realiter permixte, cum tamen iuxta dicta ille 30 maneries incommixte sunt et esse debent. Sic igitur est unum genus generalissimum substancie Thus we have Substance, et novem genera generalissima accidencium, nec plura Quantity. Relation, esse possunt, iuxta deducta superius; et veri metha- Quality, physici veritate compulsi vel manuducti sunt ad ponendum Action, Passion, 35 et asserendum decem esse genera generalissima et non Whereabouts, Time, Position, plura. Nominant autem ea Substanciam, Quantitatem, Ad and Belonging. Aliquid, Qualitatem, Accionem, Passionem, Ubi, Quando, Posicionem, et Habere (sive habitum). Nec est vis nimia vel multa facienda in nominibus et signis, dummodo Each accident which signifies the same one of these nine modifications belongs to the same ultimate genus, whether to the first or the second, or any other. For this special modification of the substance is one of the nine ultimate genera of accidents. Nor can two different modifications belong to the same genus. 15 25 3. d'nomiante MS. 5. miales = numerales? MS. 11. 9pler et funts MS. 22. pnl MS. 28. predicte MS. 31. Sic MS.; ib. gamd pro genus generalissimum MS. 32. gname pro genera generalissima MS.
Strana 134
134 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XXI. ex parte rei habeantur quiditates X generalissime, una substanciarum, alia novem accidencium, que perficiunt et denominant substanciam sicud res nature complete et perfecte essencialiter intrinsece. Et 3es quiditates generalissime comprehendunt res accidentales; que per- ficiunt, alique ut minime, alique ut medie, et alie ut maxime substanciam, 2m quod tota est quiditative. Et alie 3es quiditates generalissime 2m istum modum respi- ciunt substanciam ut est tota quantitative. Et iterum alie 3es respiciunt substanciam 2m quod est tota quali- 10 tative. Et suppono quod novem predicamenta accidencium bene 251. fuerunt assignata 2m sua genera generalissima et nomina illorum generalissimorum, et 2m raciones illorum genera- lissimorum; quia non videtur verisimile quod metha- 15 physici huc usque deviassent in assignacione debita et vera novem predicamentorum accidencium cum suis though it is principiis generalissimis. Verum est tamen quod hoc certan that Metaphysicians est argumentum topicum satis debile, cum nesciant have in our days been hodie philosophi bene assignare genera subalterna in 20 unable to find illis generalissimis, si sunt vera generalissima; nec effi- the divisions of these ultimate caciter probare quod quantitas sit generalissimum, vel genera, and even to prove qualitas, vel accio etc. Eciam cum philosophi post that they are lapsum Ade huc usque extraneant in via verorum ultimate. Since the Fall morum; et post Cristum et beatam virginem Mariam 25 the best philosophers eciam sanctissimi philosophorum aliquando saltem venia- have sinned; liter extraneant in tali via morum, magis necessaria ad and sin is a salutem quam via vera et debita assignandi novem greater error than a mistake predicamentorum accidencium cum suis generalissimis in the Categories. et subalternis et specialissimis. Let us suppose Supposito tamen quod ita sit (quamvis huc usque this then (although the non satis scio ita esse, nec vidi nec audivi probacionem classification huius ad satis et efficacem; si scriptura sacra alicubi does not satisfy me), hoc diceret, nimis sufficeret michi); supposito igitur, and it becomes inquam, quod ita sit, difficile est dicere quis ternarius very difficult to assign each of predicamentorum accidencium appropriate correspondet the nine accidents substancie, ut est tota quiditative, et iterum quid to their illorum predicamentorum trium appropriate correspondet several I assume that hese categories are properly stated ; the reverse seems improbable, 30 35 1. gname MS. 5. gname MS.; ib. 9phndant MS. 9. qualitative MS. 12. supposito MS. 26. ſciſſimi MS. 27. nccy MS. 30. ſſamis MS. 24. Adam and Eve and afterwards, Jesus Christ and Mary were supposed to be the greatest philosophers that ever existed.
134 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XXI. ex parte rei habeantur quiditates X generalissime, una substanciarum, alia novem accidencium, que perficiunt et denominant substanciam sicud res nature complete et perfecte essencialiter intrinsece. Et 3es quiditates generalissime comprehendunt res accidentales; que per- ficiunt, alique ut minime, alique ut medie, et alie ut maxime substanciam, 2m quod tota est quiditative. Et alie 3es quiditates generalissime 2m istum modum respi- ciunt substanciam ut est tota quantitative. Et iterum alie 3es respiciunt substanciam 2m quod est tota quali- 10 tative. Et suppono quod novem predicamenta accidencium bene 251. fuerunt assignata 2m sua genera generalissima et nomina illorum generalissimorum, et 2m raciones illorum genera- lissimorum; quia non videtur verisimile quod metha- 15 physici huc usque deviassent in assignacione debita et vera novem predicamentorum accidencium cum suis though it is principiis generalissimis. Verum est tamen quod hoc certan that Metaphysicians est argumentum topicum satis debile, cum nesciant have in our days been hodie philosophi bene assignare genera subalterna in 20 unable to find illis generalissimis, si sunt vera generalissima; nec effi- the divisions of these ultimate caciter probare quod quantitas sit generalissimum, vel genera, and even to prove qualitas, vel accio etc. Eciam cum philosophi post that they are lapsum Ade huc usque extraneant in via verorum ultimate. Since the Fall morum; et post Cristum et beatam virginem Mariam 25 the best philosophers eciam sanctissimi philosophorum aliquando saltem venia- have sinned; liter extraneant in tali via morum, magis necessaria ad and sin is a salutem quam via vera et debita assignandi novem greater error than a mistake predicamentorum accidencium cum suis generalissimis in the Categories. et subalternis et specialissimis. Let us suppose Supposito tamen quod ita sit (quamvis huc usque this then (although the non satis scio ita esse, nec vidi nec audivi probacionem classification huius ad satis et efficacem; si scriptura sacra alicubi does not satisfy me), hoc diceret, nimis sufficeret michi); supposito igitur, and it becomes inquam, quod ita sit, difficile est dicere quis ternarius very difficult to assign each of predicamentorum accidencium appropriate correspondet the nine accidents substancie, ut est tota quiditative, et iterum quid to their illorum predicamentorum trium appropriate correspondet several I assume that hese categories are properly stated ; the reverse seems improbable, 30 35 1. gname MS. 5. gname MS.; ib. 9phndant MS. 9. qualitative MS. 12. supposito MS. 26. ſciſſimi MS. 27. nccy MS. 30. ſſamis MS. 24. Adam and Eve and afterwards, Jesus Christ and Mary were supposed to be the greatest philosophers that ever existed.
Strana 135
CAP. XXI. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 135 2515 ut minime inter illa tria perfectum substancie, ut est tota quiditative, et quid ut medie, et quid illorum ut maxime. Et simile est iudicium de aliis duobus ternariis predicamentorum accidencium quo ad substanciam, aliis 5 duobus modis totam, sed qualitative et quantitative. Hoc tamen certum videtur, 2m superius adducta, quod aliquis ternarius predicamentorum accidencium appropriate correspondet substancie, ut est tota quiditative, et alius ut est tota qualitative, et tercius ut est tota 10 quantitative. Et iterum, quod unum predicamentorum de primo ternario correspondet ut minime perfectum accidentaliter extrinsece ipsius substancie, ut est tota quiditative; et secundum, ut medie; et tercium, ut supreme: et ita de aliis ternariis, licet forte nos habeamus 15 hic in statu lapsus de hoc inseparabilem ignoranciam in pena peccati; que ignorancia tenet et impedit nos ne possimus in hac valle miserie istam materiam delec- tabilem efficaciter, distincte, et lucide calculare. Ideo forte, nisi deus graciose hanc materiam revelare voluerit, consultum videtur a studiosa — vel pocius I super racione laboriosa — calculacione huius materie super- sedere, dando operam quomodo in via morum debite ad patriam incedamus, cum inter sapientes terre in principiis huius materie sit contencio, que rixis turpiter 25 et graviter est deformata. Hodie enim, heu! sic contenditur pro universalibus I doubt indeed whether they a parte rei, si existant, vel si sola signa humana who reject them can naturalia, vel ad placitum instituta totaliter utilitatem prove the talem rerum excludant. Et non scio videre quod solis 10 categories. 30 signis in intelligendo obiective possit aliquis edocere tot (scilicet X) oportere esse predicamenta, et generalissima, et non plura. Sed reputo quod 2m inducta superius profundatus But a metaphysician methaphisicus eciam, ut est possibile, in hac via potest grounded in 35 satis arguere et probare sapientibus etsi non grossis, this doctrine can, I think. oportere esse X generalissima et predicamenta et non give an adequate plura. Distingwere autem et appropriare ea ad satis, proof; for a sicud superius fuit motum, et a nobis queritur et desi- complete one, revelation deratur: nescio si poterit, nisi deus graciose voluerit would be need- ful. 40 revelare. Quondam autem posui talem sufficienciam Every entity predicamentorum: Omnis res predicamentalis vel est either does not belong to a It may be that we are on this point condemned to everlasting ignorance, in this valley of misery. Better let the question drop; especially when we see such shameful strife amongst the learned as to the existence of the Universals. divisions, and to find which corresponds to which. 24. cpit' MS. 34. poto MS.
CAP. XXI. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 135 2515 ut minime inter illa tria perfectum substancie, ut est tota quiditative, et quid ut medie, et quid illorum ut maxime. Et simile est iudicium de aliis duobus ternariis predicamentorum accidencium quo ad substanciam, aliis 5 duobus modis totam, sed qualitative et quantitative. Hoc tamen certum videtur, 2m superius adducta, quod aliquis ternarius predicamentorum accidencium appropriate correspondet substancie, ut est tota quiditative, et alius ut est tota qualitative, et tercius ut est tota 10 quantitative. Et iterum, quod unum predicamentorum de primo ternario correspondet ut minime perfectum accidentaliter extrinsece ipsius substancie, ut est tota quiditative; et secundum, ut medie; et tercium, ut supreme: et ita de aliis ternariis, licet forte nos habeamus 15 hic in statu lapsus de hoc inseparabilem ignoranciam in pena peccati; que ignorancia tenet et impedit nos ne possimus in hac valle miserie istam materiam delec- tabilem efficaciter, distincte, et lucide calculare. Ideo forte, nisi deus graciose hanc materiam revelare voluerit, consultum videtur a studiosa — vel pocius I super racione laboriosa — calculacione huius materie super- sedere, dando operam quomodo in via morum debite ad patriam incedamus, cum inter sapientes terre in principiis huius materie sit contencio, que rixis turpiter 25 et graviter est deformata. Hodie enim, heu! sic contenditur pro universalibus I doubt indeed whether they a parte rei, si existant, vel si sola signa humana who reject them can naturalia, vel ad placitum instituta totaliter utilitatem prove the talem rerum excludant. Et non scio videre quod solis 10 categories. 30 signis in intelligendo obiective possit aliquis edocere tot (scilicet X) oportere esse predicamenta, et generalissima, et non plura. Sed reputo quod 2m inducta superius profundatus But a metaphysician methaphisicus eciam, ut est possibile, in hac via potest grounded in 35 satis arguere et probare sapientibus etsi non grossis, this doctrine can, I think. oportere esse X generalissima et predicamenta et non give an adequate plura. Distingwere autem et appropriare ea ad satis, proof; for a sicud superius fuit motum, et a nobis queritur et desi- complete one, revelation deratur: nescio si poterit, nisi deus graciose voluerit would be need- ful. 40 revelare. Quondam autem posui talem sufficienciam Every entity predicamentorum: Omnis res predicamentalis vel est either does not belong to a It may be that we are on this point condemned to everlasting ignorance, in this valley of misery. Better let the question drop; especially when we see such shameful strife amongst the learned as to the existence of the Universals. divisions, and to find which corresponds to which. 24. cpit' MS. 34. poto MS.
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136 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XXI. non in subiecto vel est in subiecto. Si est non in subiecto, tunc sufficit pro omni tali genus generalissimum substancie, in quo omnes tales res predicamentales que sunt non in subiecto convenient essencialiter quiditative; sicud omnes eque primo conveniunt in hac proprietate que est in subiecto non esse. Si autem est res in subiecto Belonging, it is principalis, vel est absoluta vel respectiva. Si absoluta, either something vel dependet ab esse potenciali, et tunc pro omni tali absolute, or re predicamentali que est in subiecto, dependens appro- relative. If absolute, and priate ab esse potenciali (sive a materia) substancie 10 it belongs to sufficit hoc generalissimum quantitas, cum in illo con- matter, it is Quantity ; veniunt essencialiter quiditative, sicud omnes tales con- veniunt eque primo in hac proprietate que est esse rem predicamentalem in subiecto dependentem appro- priate ab esse potenciali vel materiali substancie. Si 15 autem est absoluta, ut dependet appropriate ab esse actuali seu formali substancie, tunc pro omni tali eodem argumento, ut prius, sufficit hoc generalissimum — qualitas. Si autem est res predicamentalis respectiva, hoc est duobus modis: vel est per se respectivus, vel 20 quia causa concomittatur respectivus. Omnis res predi- camentalis 2m istum primum modum qui est per se respectivus erit in generalissimo ad aliquid. Si autem illa res est respectiva quia causa concomittatur respec- tivus et non est per se respectivus, vel principaliter et 25 appropriate dependet ab intrinseco vel ab extrinseco. Si ab intrinseco, hoc dupliciter; vel a parte qualitativa 252a vel quantitativa. Si primum, vel a forma, sic est predi- camentum accionis. Si autem a materia, sic est passio. Si autem a parte quantitativa, que est unius racionis, 30 et non diversificatur sicud pars qualitativa, tunc est posicio. Si autem dependet ab extrinseco principalius et appropriate: vel a respiciente sic totum ut est quali- tativum, vel ut est totum quantitativum. Si primum, hoc dicitur vel propter materiam: sic est Ubi; vel 35 propter formam, sic est Quando. Si autem respicit totum quantitativum, tunc pro illo sufficit Habere vel habitus, Xum generalissimum. if it belongs to form, it is Quality. If relative, it will be either Relation in general, or Action, Passion, Position, subject (and is a substance) or does. Whereabouts, Time determination, or Belonging. 15. app'etate MS. 22. que MS. 26. app'ate MS. 33. appro- prietate MS. 20. Respectivus. I have preserved the gender as in the MS. though here and further on it ought to be respecliva. Perhaps the copyist has given it the gender of modus.
136 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XXI. non in subiecto vel est in subiecto. Si est non in subiecto, tunc sufficit pro omni tali genus generalissimum substancie, in quo omnes tales res predicamentales que sunt non in subiecto convenient essencialiter quiditative; sicud omnes eque primo conveniunt in hac proprietate que est in subiecto non esse. Si autem est res in subiecto Belonging, it is principalis, vel est absoluta vel respectiva. Si absoluta, either something vel dependet ab esse potenciali, et tunc pro omni tali absolute, or re predicamentali que est in subiecto, dependens appro- relative. If absolute, and priate ab esse potenciali (sive a materia) substancie 10 it belongs to sufficit hoc generalissimum quantitas, cum in illo con- matter, it is Quantity ; veniunt essencialiter quiditative, sicud omnes tales con- veniunt eque primo in hac proprietate que est esse rem predicamentalem in subiecto dependentem appro- priate ab esse potenciali vel materiali substancie. Si 15 autem est absoluta, ut dependet appropriate ab esse actuali seu formali substancie, tunc pro omni tali eodem argumento, ut prius, sufficit hoc generalissimum — qualitas. Si autem est res predicamentalis respectiva, hoc est duobus modis: vel est per se respectivus, vel 20 quia causa concomittatur respectivus. Omnis res predi- camentalis 2m istum primum modum qui est per se respectivus erit in generalissimo ad aliquid. Si autem illa res est respectiva quia causa concomittatur respec- tivus et non est per se respectivus, vel principaliter et 25 appropriate dependet ab intrinseco vel ab extrinseco. Si ab intrinseco, hoc dupliciter; vel a parte qualitativa 252a vel quantitativa. Si primum, vel a forma, sic est predi- camentum accionis. Si autem a materia, sic est passio. Si autem a parte quantitativa, que est unius racionis, 30 et non diversificatur sicud pars qualitativa, tunc est posicio. Si autem dependet ab extrinseco principalius et appropriate: vel a respiciente sic totum ut est quali- tativum, vel ut est totum quantitativum. Si primum, hoc dicitur vel propter materiam: sic est Ubi; vel 35 propter formam, sic est Quando. Si autem respicit totum quantitativum, tunc pro illo sufficit Habere vel habitus, Xum generalissimum. if it belongs to form, it is Quality. If relative, it will be either Relation in general, or Action, Passion, Position, subject (and is a substance) or does. Whereabouts, Time determination, or Belonging. 15. app'etate MS. 22. que MS. 26. app'ate MS. 33. appro- prietate MS. 20. Respectivus. I have preserved the gender as in the MS. though here and further on it ought to be respecliva. Perhaps the copyist has given it the gender of modus.
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CAP. XXI. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 137 252" Aliquas autem consideraciones quas reputavi utiles I omit several arguments in et efficaces ad fundandum hanc calculacionem aliquando support of this classification, adduxi, quas hodie propter oblivionem ignoranciam et partly to avoid swelling tedium non sufficio. Nec curo hic instruere, quia tracta- this tractate, 5 tulus iste de universalibus nimis distenderetur, cum eciam already too lengthy on superius plura videantur satis pueriliter esse sepius account of my reppetita vel alia inpertinencia vel inutilia inserta. Et inexperience. difficile est inexpertis et inusitatis in scribendo talia prima facie declinare. Gratus tamen sum de pluribus 10 materiis hic insertis, quas reputo me utrumque invenisse et intellexisse, per qualescunque licet pueriles deduc- ciones; et spero quod michi et aliis volentibus studiose querere et advertere poterit melius et lucidius apparere, cum profectum deducendi ad oculciores et profundiores 15 materias methaphisice et sacre scripture. Sed reddeundo et supposito sic esse X generalissima Return to the main point. rerum, nec posse esse plura; supposito insuper quod These ten categories have quelibet species, que poterit esse species, potest esse all their species sicud pars formalis sui generis, quemadmodum partes as parts, even as the 20 organie et officiales in corpore animalis; sicud sunt members of a body; and as a manus, oculus, digitus, antis, pes, nerwus, cor, epar, body would be etc., sunt sicud partes materiales sui generis, sicud crippled if any member were simplex parcialis caro, vel parciale os, vel parcialis wanting, so each of these sangwis, etc., dicuntur partes materiales corporis ani- supreme genera would be 25 malis: supposito denique tercio quod, sicud corpus imperfect if animalis esset colobon si deexistat sibi aliqua sui pars any species were lacking. formalis, non autem si defluat sibi aliqua pars materialis, This God — quod sic genus aliquod generalissimum esset colobon could not permit. si non existeret sibi quecunque sua species possibilis, Therefore, at some time or non autem erit colobon si individua aliqua] sua nun- other, every quam sibi inexisterent: istis suppositis, visibile est et possible species must be in videtur quod deus non permittat aliquod de decem existence. generalissimis a principio creacionis mundi usque in sempiternum esse colobon, cum facillime possit et summe 35 sciat talem defectum, talem inperfeccionem, talemque monstruositatem a quolibet generalissimorum excludere et semovere. Contingeret autem aliquod generalissimorum esse colobon, si ipsum existens aliquam sui speciem posset habere quam tamen nunquam haberet. Videtur 21. ant9 MS. 26. colobo? MS. 21. Antis. I can find no word like this, but suspect that auris is meant. In careless writing, r and t were somewhat alike, and may have led to a mistake.
CAP. XXI. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 137 252" Aliquas autem consideraciones quas reputavi utiles I omit several arguments in et efficaces ad fundandum hanc calculacionem aliquando support of this classification, adduxi, quas hodie propter oblivionem ignoranciam et partly to avoid swelling tedium non sufficio. Nec curo hic instruere, quia tracta- this tractate, 5 tulus iste de universalibus nimis distenderetur, cum eciam already too lengthy on superius plura videantur satis pueriliter esse sepius account of my reppetita vel alia inpertinencia vel inutilia inserta. Et inexperience. difficile est inexpertis et inusitatis in scribendo talia prima facie declinare. Gratus tamen sum de pluribus 10 materiis hic insertis, quas reputo me utrumque invenisse et intellexisse, per qualescunque licet pueriles deduc- ciones; et spero quod michi et aliis volentibus studiose querere et advertere poterit melius et lucidius apparere, cum profectum deducendi ad oculciores et profundiores 15 materias methaphisice et sacre scripture. Sed reddeundo et supposito sic esse X generalissima Return to the main point. rerum, nec posse esse plura; supposito insuper quod These ten categories have quelibet species, que poterit esse species, potest esse all their species sicud pars formalis sui generis, quemadmodum partes as parts, even as the 20 organie et officiales in corpore animalis; sicud sunt members of a body; and as a manus, oculus, digitus, antis, pes, nerwus, cor, epar, body would be etc., sunt sicud partes materiales sui generis, sicud crippled if any member were simplex parcialis caro, vel parciale os, vel parcialis wanting, so each of these sangwis, etc., dicuntur partes materiales corporis ani- supreme genera would be 25 malis: supposito denique tercio quod, sicud corpus imperfect if animalis esset colobon si deexistat sibi aliqua sui pars any species were lacking. formalis, non autem si defluat sibi aliqua pars materialis, This God — quod sic genus aliquod generalissimum esset colobon could not permit. si non existeret sibi quecunque sua species possibilis, Therefore, at some time or non autem erit colobon si individua aliqua] sua nun- other, every quam sibi inexisterent: istis suppositis, visibile est et possible species must be in videtur quod deus non permittat aliquod de decem existence. generalissimis a principio creacionis mundi usque in sempiternum esse colobon, cum facillime possit et summe 35 sciat talem defectum, talem inperfeccionem, talemque monstruositatem a quolibet generalissimorum excludere et semovere. Contingeret autem aliquod generalissimorum esse colobon, si ipsum existens aliquam sui speciem posset habere quam tamen nunquam haberet. Videtur 21. ant9 MS. 26. colobo? MS. 21. Antis. I can find no word like this, but suspect that auris is meant. In careless writing, r and t were somewhat alike, and may have led to a mistake.
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138 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XXI. Some species, however, will surely exist no longer after Doomsday, though some think that all will be somehow preserved in the bodies of men risen again. The Universe is entire, but at no one period of time. igitur quod non possit esse species substancie vel acci- dentis in universo que non existat in propria forma in mundo aliquando, licet post diem iudicii multe species rerum materialium amplius non erunt, sicud forte postea tempus non erit, nec motus sensibilis proprie dictus, si: mundus erit totaliter consummatus. Et sic forte alique species rerum requiruntur per esse in consummacione mundi que cessabunt existere esse, consummacione mundi superveniente. Nec videtur sentencia valere que poneret omnes species corporum 10 materialium perpetuo remanere, saltem 2m sua minima naturalia in corporibus hominum, que sunt corpora ultima et summe mixtionis. Non enim videtur quomodo cete grandia 2m sua minima naturalia remanerent per- petuo in corporibus humanis, nec per subtilem divisionem 15 anatomia medicorum invenitur species leonis, vacce, equi, cete grandium, in corpore hominis 2m sua minima naturalia ipsum integrantes. Sicut ergo totum tempus mundi est perfectum et completum totaliter, sed in nulla hora nec in aliquo mense vel anno, sed in toto 20 magno tempore: sic quodlibet generalissimum completum in speciebus suis, absque hoc quod sit colobon, sed non in quocunque tempore vel in quacunque evitate oportet hoc ita esse. 8. presse 1 9fumato MS. 9. 24 pro esse MS. 10. os pro omnes MS. 16. atenora MS. 10. The text is here extremely corrupt, though, as often happens in these works, the sense is plain enough.
138 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XXI. Some species, however, will surely exist no longer after Doomsday, though some think that all will be somehow preserved in the bodies of men risen again. The Universe is entire, but at no one period of time. igitur quod non possit esse species substancie vel acci- dentis in universo que non existat in propria forma in mundo aliquando, licet post diem iudicii multe species rerum materialium amplius non erunt, sicud forte postea tempus non erit, nec motus sensibilis proprie dictus, si: mundus erit totaliter consummatus. Et sic forte alique species rerum requiruntur per esse in consummacione mundi que cessabunt existere esse, consummacione mundi superveniente. Nec videtur sentencia valere que poneret omnes species corporum 10 materialium perpetuo remanere, saltem 2m sua minima naturalia in corporibus hominum, que sunt corpora ultima et summe mixtionis. Non enim videtur quomodo cete grandia 2m sua minima naturalia remanerent per- petuo in corporibus humanis, nec per subtilem divisionem 15 anatomia medicorum invenitur species leonis, vacce, equi, cete grandium, in corpore hominis 2m sua minima naturalia ipsum integrantes. Sicut ergo totum tempus mundi est perfectum et completum totaliter, sed in nulla hora nec in aliquo mense vel anno, sed in toto 20 magno tempore: sic quodlibet generalissimum completum in speciebus suis, absque hoc quod sit colobon, sed non in quocunque tempore vel in quacunque evitate oportet hoc ita esse. 8. presse 1 9fumato MS. 9. 24 pro esse MS. 10. os pro omnes MS. 16. atenora MS. 10. The text is here extremely corrupt, though, as often happens in these works, the sense is plain enough.
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CAPITULUM VIGESIMUM SECUNDUM. 253a Ulterius dubitatur circa materiam universalium, cum universalis natura, ut dictum est, nobilior est essencialiter quam natura singularis sub ea, et perfeccior eciam, 5 sine proporcione racionali cuiuscunque finiti ad aliud finitum; alioquin agregatum individuum alicuius speciei posset parificari in perfeccione essenciali ipsi speciei; quod non convenit, 2m dicta superius. Si ergo ita est, tunc natura communis essencialis ad spiritus intel- lectuales singulares in hominibus ] erit dignior et per- feccior essencialiter eisdem. Quod non videtur verum: quia, cum quilibet talis spiritus racionalis singularis cuiuslibet hominis sit ymago ad ymaginem dei et trini- tatis increate, cum ipse sit unica essencia et unica 15 natura intellectualis, et tres res, quarum quelibet eque plene est ipse idem spiritus intellectualis, sicud deus est unica essencia, et unica natura, et tres res, quarum quelibet eque plene est idem deus; et natura intel- lectualis communis, cum sic non sit unica essencia et 20 natura, sed plures nature singulares intellectuales: ipsa non erit ymago dei et ad ymaginem, sed solum vestigium trinitatis increate; sed quia res que est ymago et ad ymaginem dei dignior et nobilior est essencialiter, quia deo similior quam que non est sic ymago ad ymaginem 25 dei: igitur, aut non est natura universalis intellectualis, aut universalia non sunt magis digna naturaliter suis singularibus. Hic plurimum negatur quod spiritus individualis et intellectualis sit ymago dei et ad ymaginem dei in hoc, 30 quod ipse esset unica natura et 3es res divisim et col- lectim substancialiter entes in illa natura, quarum que- libet eque plene esset idem spiritus totalis: quia sic esse trinum et unum videtur dignitas que soli deo Is the Universal more perfect than its singulars? It must be, and yet the individual man, and not the Universal is the Image of God, and his soul is the image of the Trinity. We should then conclude either that intellectual natures have no Universals, or that they are not more perfect than their singulars. Most writers deny that this image exists. 1. A gap of nearly a une ; Capitulum &c. deest. 2. Blank space for Initial U MS.
CAPITULUM VIGESIMUM SECUNDUM. 253a Ulterius dubitatur circa materiam universalium, cum universalis natura, ut dictum est, nobilior est essencialiter quam natura singularis sub ea, et perfeccior eciam, 5 sine proporcione racionali cuiuscunque finiti ad aliud finitum; alioquin agregatum individuum alicuius speciei posset parificari in perfeccione essenciali ipsi speciei; quod non convenit, 2m dicta superius. Si ergo ita est, tunc natura communis essencialis ad spiritus intel- lectuales singulares in hominibus ] erit dignior et per- feccior essencialiter eisdem. Quod non videtur verum: quia, cum quilibet talis spiritus racionalis singularis cuiuslibet hominis sit ymago ad ymaginem dei et trini- tatis increate, cum ipse sit unica essencia et unica 15 natura intellectualis, et tres res, quarum quelibet eque plene est ipse idem spiritus intellectualis, sicud deus est unica essencia, et unica natura, et tres res, quarum quelibet eque plene est idem deus; et natura intel- lectualis communis, cum sic non sit unica essencia et 20 natura, sed plures nature singulares intellectuales: ipsa non erit ymago dei et ad ymaginem, sed solum vestigium trinitatis increate; sed quia res que est ymago et ad ymaginem dei dignior et nobilior est essencialiter, quia deo similior quam que non est sic ymago ad ymaginem 25 dei: igitur, aut non est natura universalis intellectualis, aut universalia non sunt magis digna naturaliter suis singularibus. Hic plurimum negatur quod spiritus individualis et intellectualis sit ymago dei et ad ymaginem dei in hoc, 30 quod ipse esset unica natura et 3es res divisim et col- lectim substancialiter entes in illa natura, quarum que- libet eque plene esset idem spiritus totalis: quia sic esse trinum et unum videtur dignitas que soli deo Is the Universal more perfect than its singulars? It must be, and yet the individual man, and not the Universal is the Image of God, and his soul is the image of the Trinity. We should then conclude either that intellectual natures have no Universals, or that they are not more perfect than their singulars. Most writers deny that this image exists. 1. A gap of nearly a une ; Capitulum &c. deest. 2. Blank space for Initial U MS.
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140 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XXII. one man is three persons ; meritorious acts, or the reverse, will not belong any longer to the man himself. But we can admit this Trinity in the mind nevertheless. The three 'things' in the v uncreated Trinity are called Persons by the Church; potest competere; et videtur deo quod creatura sic eciam esset trina et una, et non potest aliqua creatura propter sui modicitatem et imperfeccionem hanc digni- tatem sumere: ymmo, sic eciam unus spiritus intel- lectualis Sortis vel Petri — ymmo, cuiuslibet hominis 5 proprius spiritus racionalis esset 3es persone, eadem racione qua deus est 3es persone. Et sic quilibet homo esset 3es persone humane, et per consequens tria suppo- sita humana. Et sic unicus homo esset tria supposita humana, quod est erroneum omnino et oppositum in 10 adiecto, cum quilibet unicus homo habet actus supposi- tales et personales qui solum illi individuo homini con- veniunt. Quod si 3es res spiritus racionalis ipsius hominis sunt 3es persone et ipse homo una alia quarta persona, tunc nulli actus personales meritorii et demeri- torii trium personarum et spiritu racionali ipsius hominis erunt actus ipsius hominis; et sic spiritus ipsius hominis meretur vel demeretur, pro quo homo nec premium nec supplicium reciperet. Sed admisso et concesso quod spiritus racionalis 253b Petri sit sic unica natura et tres res, cum — sicud deus sufficit essencialiter intendere intellectualiter se esse et ex hiis duobus tante quietatur in se, et suffi- ciencia est prima res in deo, scilicet pater; et intencio intellectualis secunda, scilicet filius verbum, etc. et quies 25 est tercia res, spiritus sanctus, amor, delectacio etc. — sic consimiliter argumentatur de spiritu racionali et intellectuali ipsius hominis. Verumptamen ille 3es res in spiritu increato, scilicet in deo, ex racionali et con- cordi consensu ecclesie vocantur 3es persone. Et ex 30 parte rei sunt 3es persone, quia tres, non substancie, sed subsistencie individue nature intellectualis, quarum quelibet est per se una (cum descriptive persona sit subsistencia individua nature intellectualis per se una). Tres autem res in spiritu intellectuali creato non 35 vocantur tres persone, sed una tantum persona, cum nullus sit accidentalis actus personalis inmanens, vel extra transiens unius illarum rerum, quin sit cuiuslibet earum. Verumptamen, — sicud in divinis prima sola producit ad intra secundam, et prima et secunda simul 40 terciam — quod si ecclesia admitteret et concederet 15 If the human soul is three things in one, it has what belongs to God alone ; if the Church had chosen to call the three created ‘things' persons too, 12, 13. que nunc pro conveniunt MS.
140 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XXII. one man is three persons ; meritorious acts, or the reverse, will not belong any longer to the man himself. But we can admit this Trinity in the mind nevertheless. The three 'things' in the v uncreated Trinity are called Persons by the Church; potest competere; et videtur deo quod creatura sic eciam esset trina et una, et non potest aliqua creatura propter sui modicitatem et imperfeccionem hanc digni- tatem sumere: ymmo, sic eciam unus spiritus intel- lectualis Sortis vel Petri — ymmo, cuiuslibet hominis 5 proprius spiritus racionalis esset 3es persone, eadem racione qua deus est 3es persone. Et sic quilibet homo esset 3es persone humane, et per consequens tria suppo- sita humana. Et sic unicus homo esset tria supposita humana, quod est erroneum omnino et oppositum in 10 adiecto, cum quilibet unicus homo habet actus supposi- tales et personales qui solum illi individuo homini con- veniunt. Quod si 3es res spiritus racionalis ipsius hominis sunt 3es persone et ipse homo una alia quarta persona, tunc nulli actus personales meritorii et demeri- torii trium personarum et spiritu racionali ipsius hominis erunt actus ipsius hominis; et sic spiritus ipsius hominis meretur vel demeretur, pro quo homo nec premium nec supplicium reciperet. Sed admisso et concesso quod spiritus racionalis 253b Petri sit sic unica natura et tres res, cum — sicud deus sufficit essencialiter intendere intellectualiter se esse et ex hiis duobus tante quietatur in se, et suffi- ciencia est prima res in deo, scilicet pater; et intencio intellectualis secunda, scilicet filius verbum, etc. et quies 25 est tercia res, spiritus sanctus, amor, delectacio etc. — sic consimiliter argumentatur de spiritu racionali et intellectuali ipsius hominis. Verumptamen ille 3es res in spiritu increato, scilicet in deo, ex racionali et con- cordi consensu ecclesie vocantur 3es persone. Et ex 30 parte rei sunt 3es persone, quia tres, non substancie, sed subsistencie individue nature intellectualis, quarum quelibet est per se una (cum descriptive persona sit subsistencia individua nature intellectualis per se una). Tres autem res in spiritu intellectuali creato non 35 vocantur tres persone, sed una tantum persona, cum nullus sit accidentalis actus personalis inmanens, vel extra transiens unius illarum rerum, quin sit cuiuslibet earum. Verumptamen, — sicud in divinis prima sola producit ad intra secundam, et prima et secunda simul 40 terciam — quod si ecclesia admitteret et concederet 15 If the human soul is three things in one, it has what belongs to God alone ; if the Church had chosen to call the three created ‘things' persons too, 12, 13. que nunc pro conveniunt MS.
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CAP. XXII. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 141 3es res in spiritu intellectuali creato sicud est in deo, we should have had to admit et vocaret eas personas, tunc sicud unicus spiritus that to be true. But on account increatus est 3es persone divine, ita concederetur quod of difficulties made by unicus spiritus angelicus est 3es persone angelice; et hereties, the 5 unicus spiritus humanus est tres persone humane, vel Church has merely decided spiritus humani 3es persone. Nec tunc oporteret dici as to the Three Divine quod Sanctus Michael est unicum suppositum et unica Persons, and persona angelica; sed quia ecclesia graves et vehementes left the rest free, only habuit inpugnaciones ab hereticis contra tres res in requiring us to believe that 10 divinis, cum tunc, 2m hereticos, deus esset 3es substancie, an angel is a cum tamen sit unica substancia sicud est unicus deus; pure spirit, which it calls ideo racionabiliter deerevit ex inspiracione dei vocare a person. illas tres res personas; de spiritu autem angelico vel humano non curat ecclesia determinare tanquam neces- 15 sario credendum katholico, si esset tres res vel si non esset, si credit de quolibet spiritu angelico quod ipse est substancia intellectualis per se existens non aptus informative inexistere alicui alii] a quo suppositaretur, 254 et quod talis exerceat actum intelligendi, eciam acciden- 20 talem et individualem, qui solum uni spiritui intellectuali debetur. Ideo, iuxta morem philosophorum vocat talem spiritum unam personam, et non plures. Et secundum illam sentenciam ecclesia racionabiliter et subtiliter equivocat; ut videtur, uno modo dicendi 25 vocando deum tres personas, et spiritum angelicum unicam personam; in spiritu eciam angelico 2m naturam suam intellectualem possunt currere actus intelligendi mere accidentales et individuales, quos non potest aliqua res substancialiter existens in illo spiritu angelico exer- 3o cere, nisi quelibet ibi sic existens eundem exerceat. Ideo 2m hoc vocat spiritum talem unicam personam. Nec profundat se ecclesia, si ibi sunt res quarum prima secundam causat vel producit, et ille due terciam, cum hoc non sit necessarium simplicibus ad credendum. In 35 deo autem, quia non possunt 2m deitatem tales actus accidentales currere, realiter differentes a deo, individuales, sed oportet ecclesiam credere ibi esse tres res, quarum prima secundam principiat, et ille simul terciam, ita quod prima sit solum perducens, 2a simul principians et principiata, tercia autem solum principiata, nec possunt pluribus quam hiis 3bus modis res in divinis cogitari, oportebat illas res vocari tres personas realiter distinctas. Reasonable and subtle equivocation of the Church in this matter. It was necessary to define one question, but not the other. 40 27. cre' MS. 28. � pro quos MS. 36. cre MS.
CAP. XXII. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 141 3es res in spiritu intellectuali creato sicud est in deo, we should have had to admit et vocaret eas personas, tunc sicud unicus spiritus that to be true. But on account increatus est 3es persone divine, ita concederetur quod of difficulties made by unicus spiritus angelicus est 3es persone angelice; et hereties, the 5 unicus spiritus humanus est tres persone humane, vel Church has merely decided spiritus humani 3es persone. Nec tunc oporteret dici as to the Three Divine quod Sanctus Michael est unicum suppositum et unica Persons, and persona angelica; sed quia ecclesia graves et vehementes left the rest free, only habuit inpugnaciones ab hereticis contra tres res in requiring us to believe that 10 divinis, cum tunc, 2m hereticos, deus esset 3es substancie, an angel is a cum tamen sit unica substancia sicud est unicus deus; pure spirit, which it calls ideo racionabiliter deerevit ex inspiracione dei vocare a person. illas tres res personas; de spiritu autem angelico vel humano non curat ecclesia determinare tanquam neces- 15 sario credendum katholico, si esset tres res vel si non esset, si credit de quolibet spiritu angelico quod ipse est substancia intellectualis per se existens non aptus informative inexistere alicui alii] a quo suppositaretur, 254 et quod talis exerceat actum intelligendi, eciam acciden- 20 talem et individualem, qui solum uni spiritui intellectuali debetur. Ideo, iuxta morem philosophorum vocat talem spiritum unam personam, et non plures. Et secundum illam sentenciam ecclesia racionabiliter et subtiliter equivocat; ut videtur, uno modo dicendi 25 vocando deum tres personas, et spiritum angelicum unicam personam; in spiritu eciam angelico 2m naturam suam intellectualem possunt currere actus intelligendi mere accidentales et individuales, quos non potest aliqua res substancialiter existens in illo spiritu angelico exer- 3o cere, nisi quelibet ibi sic existens eundem exerceat. Ideo 2m hoc vocat spiritum talem unicam personam. Nec profundat se ecclesia, si ibi sunt res quarum prima secundam causat vel producit, et ille due terciam, cum hoc non sit necessarium simplicibus ad credendum. In 35 deo autem, quia non possunt 2m deitatem tales actus accidentales currere, realiter differentes a deo, individuales, sed oportet ecclesiam credere ibi esse tres res, quarum prima secundam principiat, et ille simul terciam, ita quod prima sit solum perducens, 2a simul principians et principiata, tercia autem solum principiata, nec possunt pluribus quam hiis 3bus modis res in divinis cogitari, oportebat illas res vocari tres personas realiter distinctas. Reasonable and subtle equivocation of the Church in this matter. It was necessary to define one question, but not the other. 40 27. cre' MS. 28. � pro quos MS. 36. cre MS.
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142 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XXII. If the theory of the triplicity of the soul were derogatory to God's dignity, I would abjure it. But it is not so. As to the acts, meritorious or other wise, elicited by man, it may be admitted that they are elicited by the three parts of man together. Si tamen in minimo derogaret dignitati divine sic in unico spiritu creato intellectuali esse tres res, quarum quelibet eque plene esset idem spiritus et eadem penitus natura intellectualis, tunc fide universali qua in uni- versali omnem errorem contrarium recte fidei dete- stamur, eadem et hoc in universali dampnamus. Sed de obiectis superius contra hanc sentenciam videtur dicendum quod non derogat deo, sed attestatur super eius bonitate et sapiencia quod spiritus creatus est tres res et unica natura intellectualis, sicud non derogat 10 deo quod spiritus creatus est intellectivus et libere volitivus atque possessivus summi boni et omnium bonorum dei, sicud et deus. De alio autem argumento posset in uno sensu concedi, ut videtur, prima facie: quod spiritus racionalis in homine est 3es persone; et 15 quod ipse homo est ille 3es persone et quelibet earum, nec una illarum ] potest aliquem actum accidentalem 254 intelligendi vel volendi, vel sic de aliis, exercere merendo vel demerendo, nisi ipse homo (et quelibet earum trium rerum) illum exerceat; et sicud non male sed katholice 20 sonat quod unicus deus est unica supposita divina et 3es persone divine, ita eciam bene sonaret quod unicus homo esset tria supposita humana, et 3es persone humane interioris hominis. But the great Sed tunc insolubile argumentum videtur quod per-25 difficulty sona Cristi, que ab eterno ante incarnacionem erat touches Christ. How can He unica persona, quod illa iam esset tres persone sui be three Persons, in his interioris hominis. Et si ille sint alie a persona divina assumed Humanity? Cristi, Cristus erit plures persone, eciam nove. Et est The position simpliciter hereticum quod persona Cristi sit plures 30 is heretical. Perhaps these persone. Forte diceretur quod ille 3es res spiritus creati parts lose their in Cristo propter unionem suppositalem ad verbum dei hypostases on being assumed non habent proprias personalitates, sicud est in aliis by Him, or there are puris hominibus; et omnes et singule sunt unica per- in a created sona Cristi, sicud verbum, anima, et caro (secundum 35 being three constituents, beatum Augustinum) sunt unus Cristus. Vel forte melius but only one diceretur, — supposito quod sentencia sit vera de unica person. natura et tribus rebus spiritus creati, — quod licet tales 3es res sunt in spiritu creato, in nullo tamen tali possunt esse plures persone, sed unica persona; quia, 40 sicut ipsa natura intellectualis creata et unica unico 26. an in cacone MS. 41. vno MS.
142 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XXII. If the theory of the triplicity of the soul were derogatory to God's dignity, I would abjure it. But it is not so. As to the acts, meritorious or other wise, elicited by man, it may be admitted that they are elicited by the three parts of man together. Si tamen in minimo derogaret dignitati divine sic in unico spiritu creato intellectuali esse tres res, quarum quelibet eque plene esset idem spiritus et eadem penitus natura intellectualis, tunc fide universali qua in uni- versali omnem errorem contrarium recte fidei dete- stamur, eadem et hoc in universali dampnamus. Sed de obiectis superius contra hanc sentenciam videtur dicendum quod non derogat deo, sed attestatur super eius bonitate et sapiencia quod spiritus creatus est tres res et unica natura intellectualis, sicud non derogat 10 deo quod spiritus creatus est intellectivus et libere volitivus atque possessivus summi boni et omnium bonorum dei, sicud et deus. De alio autem argumento posset in uno sensu concedi, ut videtur, prima facie: quod spiritus racionalis in homine est 3es persone; et 15 quod ipse homo est ille 3es persone et quelibet earum, nec una illarum ] potest aliquem actum accidentalem 254 intelligendi vel volendi, vel sic de aliis, exercere merendo vel demerendo, nisi ipse homo (et quelibet earum trium rerum) illum exerceat; et sicud non male sed katholice 20 sonat quod unicus deus est unica supposita divina et 3es persone divine, ita eciam bene sonaret quod unicus homo esset tria supposita humana, et 3es persone humane interioris hominis. But the great Sed tunc insolubile argumentum videtur quod per-25 difficulty sona Cristi, que ab eterno ante incarnacionem erat touches Christ. How can He unica persona, quod illa iam esset tres persone sui be three Persons, in his interioris hominis. Et si ille sint alie a persona divina assumed Humanity? Cristi, Cristus erit plures persone, eciam nove. Et est The position simpliciter hereticum quod persona Cristi sit plures 30 is heretical. Perhaps these persone. Forte diceretur quod ille 3es res spiritus creati parts lose their in Cristo propter unionem suppositalem ad verbum dei hypostases on being assumed non habent proprias personalitates, sicud est in aliis by Him, or there are puris hominibus; et omnes et singule sunt unica per- in a created sona Cristi, sicud verbum, anima, et caro (secundum 35 being three constituents, beatum Augustinum) sunt unus Cristus. Vel forte melius but only one diceretur, — supposito quod sentencia sit vera de unica person. natura et tribus rebus spiritus creati, — quod licet tales 3es res sunt in spiritu creato, in nullo tamen tali possunt esse plures persone, sed unica persona; quia, 40 sicut ipsa natura intellectualis creata et unica unico 26. an in cacone MS. 41. vno MS.
Strana 143
CAP. XXII. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 143 supposito induitur, sic et ille 3es res eidem supposito induuntur. Et non possunt habere plures personalitates proprias, sicud nec natura humana in Cristo, 2m ali- quos theologos, potest habere propriam personalitatem, 5 sed necessario oportet personari verbi dei eandem, si ipsa debet personari sicud personatur; et sic non potuerit esse plures persone. Nec oportet sequi, si in divinis 3es res sint 3es persone unius dei, quod sic ille 3es sint 3es persone eiusdem angeli vel hominis; quia hic ille 3es 10 res cum natura intellectuali eidem supposito sunt indute, qualiter non est in divinis. Et illam responsionem puto eligendam et priorem dimittendam, admissis tribus rebus substancialiter in spiritu creato. Et si hec responsio non valet, puto quod prior omnino 15 sit invalida de argumento principali ubi arguebatur quod natura intellectualis singularis est ymago dei et ad ymaginem ! dei, et non natura intellectualis com- 255. munis in prima dignior. Non sequitur quod una illarum trium rerum in spiritu creato (si ipse est tres res et 20 unica natura) una, inquam, illarum trium rerum non est sic ymago et ad ymaginem trinitatis, quod ipsa sit una natura et tres res, sicud est deus trinitas. Et spiritus creatus, iuxta hanc sentenciam est sic ad ymaginem et ymago dei trinitatis. Et cum spiritus creatus est 25 dignior et nobilior aliqua illarum trium rerum, est plene illa ymago trinitatis: sic natura intellectualis creata communis substancialiter pluribus spiritibus intellectuali- bus est multe tales ymagines trinitatis increate simul et divisim. Et igitur, non solum cum digna et nobilis 30 sit naturaliter sicud aliqua illarum, ymmo, est naturaliter dignior qualitatibus illarum et omnibus illis simul, sicut due illarum sunt plus digne naturaliter quam altera tantum. Verumptamen, quia individuum intellectuale creatum recipit in se informative disposiciones gratuitas, 35 gratum facientes ipsum individuum deo; natura autem intellectualis specifica pure abstracta et nuda quiditas suppositorum intellectualium creatorum non potest in se tales recipere: ideo non est mirum quod individuum What is a Person in God, is not necessarily so in men or in angels. I prefer this answer. If this explanation be inadequate, we may deny that a singular intellectual nature being the image of God, its Universal is not so. On the contrary, since the Universal is many such natures, it is this image many times repeated. Yet the individual, being capable of receiving grace, may attain a greater 2. 1dunt MS. 1. 1 ditur MS. 24. t't 9 pro trinitatis MS.; ib. non est MS. 38. in deo pro ideo MS. 18. Non sequitur. I am not at all sure about the proper punctuation of the ten following lines, which are probably corrupt, or marred by omissions.
CAP. XXII. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 143 supposito induitur, sic et ille 3es res eidem supposito induuntur. Et non possunt habere plures personalitates proprias, sicud nec natura humana in Cristo, 2m ali- quos theologos, potest habere propriam personalitatem, 5 sed necessario oportet personari verbi dei eandem, si ipsa debet personari sicud personatur; et sic non potuerit esse plures persone. Nec oportet sequi, si in divinis 3es res sint 3es persone unius dei, quod sic ille 3es sint 3es persone eiusdem angeli vel hominis; quia hic ille 3es 10 res cum natura intellectuali eidem supposito sunt indute, qualiter non est in divinis. Et illam responsionem puto eligendam et priorem dimittendam, admissis tribus rebus substancialiter in spiritu creato. Et si hec responsio non valet, puto quod prior omnino 15 sit invalida de argumento principali ubi arguebatur quod natura intellectualis singularis est ymago dei et ad ymaginem ! dei, et non natura intellectualis com- 255. munis in prima dignior. Non sequitur quod una illarum trium rerum in spiritu creato (si ipse est tres res et 20 unica natura) una, inquam, illarum trium rerum non est sic ymago et ad ymaginem trinitatis, quod ipsa sit una natura et tres res, sicud est deus trinitas. Et spiritus creatus, iuxta hanc sentenciam est sic ad ymaginem et ymago dei trinitatis. Et cum spiritus creatus est 25 dignior et nobilior aliqua illarum trium rerum, est plene illa ymago trinitatis: sic natura intellectualis creata communis substancialiter pluribus spiritibus intellectuali- bus est multe tales ymagines trinitatis increate simul et divisim. Et igitur, non solum cum digna et nobilis 30 sit naturaliter sicud aliqua illarum, ymmo, est naturaliter dignior qualitatibus illarum et omnibus illis simul, sicut due illarum sunt plus digne naturaliter quam altera tantum. Verumptamen, quia individuum intellectuale creatum recipit in se informative disposiciones gratuitas, 35 gratum facientes ipsum individuum deo; natura autem intellectualis specifica pure abstracta et nuda quiditas suppositorum intellectualium creatorum non potest in se tales recipere: ideo non est mirum quod individuum What is a Person in God, is not necessarily so in men or in angels. I prefer this answer. If this explanation be inadequate, we may deny that a singular intellectual nature being the image of God, its Universal is not so. On the contrary, since the Universal is many such natures, it is this image many times repeated. Yet the individual, being capable of receiving grace, may attain a greater 2. 1dunt MS. 1. 1 ditur MS. 24. t't 9 pro trinitatis MS.; ib. non est MS. 38. in deo pro ideo MS. 18. Non sequitur. I am not at all sure about the proper punctuation of the ten following lines, which are probably corrupt, or marred by omissions.
Strana 144
144 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XXII. supernatural supra modum reddatur dignius, non naturaliter sed perfection than per graciam, ultra suam nudam speciem, quamvis eius the Universal, just as Christ's species sine proporcione formabili seu racionali est Humanity, united to the dignior naturaliter quam illud suum individuum sit Word, is more dignum naturaliter. Unde sic natura humana in Cristo, worthy than the whole per graciam unionis suppositalis que sibi debetur, 2m multitude of quod cum verbo dei et cum natura divina est idem men. suppositum verbi dei; per illam sine proporcione et ultra omnem proporcionem racionalem excedit totam multitudinem naturarum creatarum cuius multitudinis 10 ipsa est pars, cum illi multitudini non debetur talis sublimitas et exaltacio in unionem supervitalem cum filio dei; et tamen econtra illa multitudo naturarum creatarum est proporcionabiliter dignior naturaliter, si meretur dici digna naturaliter, quam certe illa natura 15 humana Cristi sit naturaliter digna. 15. c'te MS.
144 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XXII. supernatural supra modum reddatur dignius, non naturaliter sed perfection than per graciam, ultra suam nudam speciem, quamvis eius the Universal, just as Christ's species sine proporcione formabili seu racionali est Humanity, united to the dignior naturaliter quam illud suum individuum sit Word, is more dignum naturaliter. Unde sic natura humana in Cristo, worthy than the whole per graciam unionis suppositalis que sibi debetur, 2m multitude of quod cum verbo dei et cum natura divina est idem men. suppositum verbi dei; per illam sine proporcione et ultra omnem proporcionem racionalem excedit totam multitudinem naturarum creatarum cuius multitudinis 10 ipsa est pars, cum illi multitudini non debetur talis sublimitas et exaltacio in unionem supervitalem cum filio dei; et tamen econtra illa multitudo naturarum creatarum est proporcionabiliter dignior naturaliter, si meretur dici digna naturaliter, quam certe illa natura 15 humana Cristi sit naturaliter digna. 15. c'te MS.
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CAPITULUM VIGESIMUM TERCIUM. Ultimo hic quo ad aliud superius motum, quod uni- versalia talia sint superflua monstra et inutilia, cum nichil prosunt mundo, eo quod nichil possunt facere, respondetur quod hoc assumptum est falsum, quia uni- versalia substanciarum sunt cause formales essenciales naturales, et cause finales essenciales naturales sub- stanciarum individualium, et non econtra. Oportet uni- versale, et per consequens omnino oportunum est 2" 55* naturam, ad esse Sortem esse hominem; et non econtra. Et det adversarius illud oportunum quod oportunum est ad esse Sortem, esse hominem, et non econtra; et non dabit, nisi communem humanitatem, que est illa opor- tunitas, et oportunum illud, scilicet, ad esse Sortem, 15esse hominem; et non econtra, sic quod humanitas communis est causa essencialis naturalis et formalis individui Sortis, et non econtra, Est eciam causa essencialis finalis et naturalis, et non econtra. Cum enim deus propter signa sciat quod 20 necessarium est secundum naturam ad esse Sortem, esse hominem et non econtra, et illa negacio 2"! se, non esse hominem, esset incomparabiliter dampnosior in natura et in mundo quam esset illa negacio secundum se dampnosa non esse Sortem; igitur incomparabiliter ipsi 25nature et mundo plus prodest naturaliter esse hominem quam ei prosit naturaliter esse Sortem, et per consequens incomparabiliter humanitas communis est melior essen- cialiter naturaliter quam Sor sit naturaliter bonus et essencialiter. Et per consequens, cum oporteat iuxta 3o deductum superius humanitatem communem in natura esse, ad hoc quod Sor sit, et non econtra, humanitas communis est finalis essencialis naturalis Sortis in esse suo essenciali. Nec dubium de uno assumpto priori, ur 1. A gap of almost a line. Capitulum &c. deest. 2. .1 blank space for initial U MS. — 9. op vm MS.; ib. optunu MS. 19. pt MS. 32, 33. essc suo esse MS. De Universalibus. IO Are Universals useless and superfluous monsters? No. They arc the formal and essential causes of things. That an individual man may exist, it is necessary tor man to exist; the formcr could not exist without tlic latter. They are also final causes. The non- existence of universal humanity would be a far greater loss than the non- existence of any one individual, and therefore humanity is something incomparably more perfect in its nature.
CAPITULUM VIGESIMUM TERCIUM. Ultimo hic quo ad aliud superius motum, quod uni- versalia talia sint superflua monstra et inutilia, cum nichil prosunt mundo, eo quod nichil possunt facere, respondetur quod hoc assumptum est falsum, quia uni- versalia substanciarum sunt cause formales essenciales naturales, et cause finales essenciales naturales sub- stanciarum individualium, et non econtra. Oportet uni- versale, et per consequens omnino oportunum est 2" 55* naturam, ad esse Sortem esse hominem; et non econtra. Et det adversarius illud oportunum quod oportunum est ad esse Sortem, esse hominem, et non econtra; et non dabit, nisi communem humanitatem, que est illa opor- tunitas, et oportunum illud, scilicet, ad esse Sortem, 15esse hominem; et non econtra, sic quod humanitas communis est causa essencialis naturalis et formalis individui Sortis, et non econtra, Est eciam causa essencialis finalis et naturalis, et non econtra. Cum enim deus propter signa sciat quod 20 necessarium est secundum naturam ad esse Sortem, esse hominem et non econtra, et illa negacio 2"! se, non esse hominem, esset incomparabiliter dampnosior in natura et in mundo quam esset illa negacio secundum se dampnosa non esse Sortem; igitur incomparabiliter ipsi 25nature et mundo plus prodest naturaliter esse hominem quam ei prosit naturaliter esse Sortem, et per consequens incomparabiliter humanitas communis est melior essen- cialiter naturaliter quam Sor sit naturaliter bonus et essencialiter. Et per consequens, cum oporteat iuxta 3o deductum superius humanitatem communem in natura esse, ad hoc quod Sor sit, et non econtra, humanitas communis est finalis essencialis naturalis Sortis in esse suo essenciali. Nec dubium de uno assumpto priori, ur 1. A gap of almost a line. Capitulum &c. deest. 2. .1 blank space for initial U MS. — 9. op vm MS.; ib. optunu MS. 19. pt MS. 32, 33. essc suo esse MS. De Universalibus. IO Are Universals useless and superfluous monsters? No. They arc the formal and essential causes of things. That an individual man may exist, it is necessary tor man to exist; the formcr could not exist without tlic latter. They are also final causes. The non- existence of universal humanity would be a far greater loss than the non- existence of any one individual, and therefore humanity is something incomparably more perfect in its nature.
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146 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XXIII. We must admit that in so far as the loss of any quality is evil, in so far the having it is a good thing, and vice-versâ. Proof. This is true, whatever proportions you take to exemplify it. scilicet, quod illa negacio 2m se, non esse hominem, esset incomparabiliter dampnosior nature et mundo quam illa 2m se non esse Sortem, cum prima 2m se tolleret omnem existenciam naturalem humanam, secunda autem 2m se non tolleret nisi existenciam naturalem propriam Sortis. Sed nec oportet poni in dubium quin, quantum negacio vel privacio secundum se esset alicui dampnosa, quod tantum affirmacio vel habicio directe opposita tali negacioni vel privacioni esset proficua, et econtra. Et hoc semper 2m se, vel ad minimum proporcionabiliter, 10 ut negacio vel privacio secundum se est dampnosa, affirmacio vel habicio directe opposita est 2m se pro- ficua eidem; et econtra. Si enim aliqua duo bona, A et B, 2m se essent eque proficua eodem, puta C, ita quod A et B 2m se essent habitus vel affirmaciones ita 15 eidem eque proficui, tunc oportet quod D et E eorum directe negaciones vel privaciones 2m se essent eque dampnose eidem. Et econtra, si D et E negaciones vel privaciones 2m se essent eidem eque dampnose, tunc A et B] habitus vel affirmaciones directe opposite erunt eque proficui eidem C. Nam si non, tunc A habitum ab ipso C, loco B, non eque proficeret sibi 2m se, sicud B 2m se; vel econtra, B habitum a C, loco A, non eque proficeret 2m se ipsi C sicud A 2m se; quod est contra casum et positum. Et patet consequencia; quia 25 A habitum ab ipso C, loco B, et sic privacione ipsius B haberetur ab ipso C, cum magis vel minus dampnoso 2m se ipsi C quam si B haberetur ab ipso C; eo quod per adversarium D privacio directe ipsius A et E directe privacio ipsius B secundum se essent ineque dampnose. 30 Et per consequens 2m plus et minus ipsi C; et per consequens ille due regule de duabus affirmacionibus eque perficuis 2m se eidem et de duabus negacionibus 2m se eque dampnosis 2m eidem; ille, inquam, due regule sunt vere. Et ulterius sequitur quod, si A habitus secundum se est in duplo magis proficuus ipsi C quam esset B secundum se, tunc et privacio ipsius A, scilicet D, esset 2m se in duplo magis dampnosa ipsi C quam privacio ipsius B, puta E, esset dampnosa 2m se ipsi C; et 40 econtra, si privacio directa ipsius A, puta D, 2m se est 256 35 26. pnne MS.
146 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XXIII. We must admit that in so far as the loss of any quality is evil, in so far the having it is a good thing, and vice-versâ. Proof. This is true, whatever proportions you take to exemplify it. scilicet, quod illa negacio 2m se, non esse hominem, esset incomparabiliter dampnosior nature et mundo quam illa 2m se non esse Sortem, cum prima 2m se tolleret omnem existenciam naturalem humanam, secunda autem 2m se non tolleret nisi existenciam naturalem propriam Sortis. Sed nec oportet poni in dubium quin, quantum negacio vel privacio secundum se esset alicui dampnosa, quod tantum affirmacio vel habicio directe opposita tali negacioni vel privacioni esset proficua, et econtra. Et hoc semper 2m se, vel ad minimum proporcionabiliter, 10 ut negacio vel privacio secundum se est dampnosa, affirmacio vel habicio directe opposita est 2m se pro- ficua eidem; et econtra. Si enim aliqua duo bona, A et B, 2m se essent eque proficua eodem, puta C, ita quod A et B 2m se essent habitus vel affirmaciones ita 15 eidem eque proficui, tunc oportet quod D et E eorum directe negaciones vel privaciones 2m se essent eque dampnose eidem. Et econtra, si D et E negaciones vel privaciones 2m se essent eidem eque dampnose, tunc A et B] habitus vel affirmaciones directe opposite erunt eque proficui eidem C. Nam si non, tunc A habitum ab ipso C, loco B, non eque proficeret sibi 2m se, sicud B 2m se; vel econtra, B habitum a C, loco A, non eque proficeret 2m se ipsi C sicud A 2m se; quod est contra casum et positum. Et patet consequencia; quia 25 A habitum ab ipso C, loco B, et sic privacione ipsius B haberetur ab ipso C, cum magis vel minus dampnoso 2m se ipsi C quam si B haberetur ab ipso C; eo quod per adversarium D privacio directe ipsius A et E directe privacio ipsius B secundum se essent ineque dampnose. 30 Et per consequens 2m plus et minus ipsi C; et per consequens ille due regule de duabus affirmacionibus eque perficuis 2m se eidem et de duabus negacionibus 2m se eque dampnosis 2m eidem; ille, inquam, due regule sunt vere. Et ulterius sequitur quod, si A habitus secundum se est in duplo magis proficuus ipsi C quam esset B secundum se, tunc et privacio ipsius A, scilicet D, esset 2m se in duplo magis dampnosa ipsi C quam privacio ipsius B, puta E, esset dampnosa 2m se ipsi C; et 40 econtra, si privacio directa ipsius A, puta D, 2m se est 256 35 26. pnne MS.
Strana 147
CAP. XXIII. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 147 256% magis dampnosa ipsi C quam esset sibi dampnosa 2m se privacio ipsius B, puta E, tunc A affirmacio 2m se est magis proficua ipsi C quam B esset sibi 2m se pro- ficua. Et ita consimiliter arguitur de proporcione tripla, 5 quadrupla, et qualibet racionali proporcione. Ex quibus patet principale intentum, videlicet: Si ista It is thus clear that if the negacio, non esse hominem, 2m se esset magis dampnosa non-existence of Man is an ultra omnem proporcionem racionalem nature univer- evil sorum et ipsi mundo quam non esse Sortem esset 2m incomparably greater than ro se dampnosum nature vel mundo, tunc econtra esse the non- existence of an hominem 2m se ultra omnem proporcionem racionalem individual, his erit magis proficuum mundo quam esse Sortem 2m se existence is an incomparably esset sibi prodessens. Nec est hic cura si privacio non greater good. Though this esset 2m se precise tam mala sicud habitus et directe principle is not 15 oppositus 2m se est bonus. Defectus enim directe oppo- true as regards moral virtue situs bono vere virtutis et gracie, 2m quod illud est which is, all things equal, bonum honestum, non est 2m se tam malus sicud illud more lovely bonum virtutis, 2m quod est bonum honestum, est than its contrary is bonum. Alioquin sancti in coelo non essent plus accepti odious. deo quam sunt sibi] ingrati peccatores in inferno; quod est impium. Sic forte, inquam, privacio directe oppo- sita affirmacioni est tam dampnosa secundum se alicui quam proficua esset 2m se ipsa affirmacio eidem. Sufficit autem quod proporcionabiliter privacio 2m se sit dampnosa 25 alicui ut eius affirmacio directa 2m se esset bona eidem. Ulterius dicitur quod universalia substanciarum sunt magis proficua mundo quam sua singularia, cum effi- ciunt et faciunt omnia que efficiunt et faciunt sua singularia; et singularia non per se faciunt ipsa univer- 3o salia. Unde species humana facit intellecciones, voliciones, sensaciones, lecciones, discursus, mociones, giraciones, alteraciones et omnia talia que faciunt singulares homines, et omnes acciones eorum; non tamen ipsa species humana exercet in se aliquam talem accionem acciden- 35 talem. Sic facit cursum et commestionem Petri, sed non currit nec comedit, sicud Petrus; sicud eciam deus facit cursum et comestionem Petri, sed non currit nec comedit. Unde, sicud deus propter suam immensam dignitatem abstractus est ab omni accidente reali realiter 40 sibi condistincto (et dico abstractus 2m naturam divinam Cristi, 2m humanam naturam habet in se varia talia I add that the Universals do all that their singulars do; Man produces the acts of running, understanding, &c. in each individual, though Man neither runs nor understands, &c. formally. As God has no accident (1. e. quà God, not quà Christ the Man) distinct from His essence, so it is with Universals. which are the cause of every 5. quolibet MS. 9. quod MS. 20. quam sunt sibi [ quam sunt sibi MS. 31. lecones MS. o*
CAP. XXIII. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 147 256% magis dampnosa ipsi C quam esset sibi dampnosa 2m se privacio ipsius B, puta E, tunc A affirmacio 2m se est magis proficua ipsi C quam B esset sibi 2m se pro- ficua. Et ita consimiliter arguitur de proporcione tripla, 5 quadrupla, et qualibet racionali proporcione. Ex quibus patet principale intentum, videlicet: Si ista It is thus clear that if the negacio, non esse hominem, 2m se esset magis dampnosa non-existence of Man is an ultra omnem proporcionem racionalem nature univer- evil sorum et ipsi mundo quam non esse Sortem esset 2m incomparably greater than ro se dampnosum nature vel mundo, tunc econtra esse the non- existence of an hominem 2m se ultra omnem proporcionem racionalem individual, his erit magis proficuum mundo quam esse Sortem 2m se existence is an incomparably esset sibi prodessens. Nec est hic cura si privacio non greater good. Though this esset 2m se precise tam mala sicud habitus et directe principle is not 15 oppositus 2m se est bonus. Defectus enim directe oppo- true as regards moral virtue situs bono vere virtutis et gracie, 2m quod illud est which is, all things equal, bonum honestum, non est 2m se tam malus sicud illud more lovely bonum virtutis, 2m quod est bonum honestum, est than its contrary is bonum. Alioquin sancti in coelo non essent plus accepti odious. deo quam sunt sibi] ingrati peccatores in inferno; quod est impium. Sic forte, inquam, privacio directe oppo- sita affirmacioni est tam dampnosa secundum se alicui quam proficua esset 2m se ipsa affirmacio eidem. Sufficit autem quod proporcionabiliter privacio 2m se sit dampnosa 25 alicui ut eius affirmacio directa 2m se esset bona eidem. Ulterius dicitur quod universalia substanciarum sunt magis proficua mundo quam sua singularia, cum effi- ciunt et faciunt omnia que efficiunt et faciunt sua singularia; et singularia non per se faciunt ipsa univer- 3o salia. Unde species humana facit intellecciones, voliciones, sensaciones, lecciones, discursus, mociones, giraciones, alteraciones et omnia talia que faciunt singulares homines, et omnes acciones eorum; non tamen ipsa species humana exercet in se aliquam talem accionem acciden- 35 talem. Sic facit cursum et commestionem Petri, sed non currit nec comedit, sicud Petrus; sicud eciam deus facit cursum et comestionem Petri, sed non currit nec comedit. Unde, sicud deus propter suam immensam dignitatem abstractus est ab omni accidente reali realiter 40 sibi condistincto (et dico abstractus 2m naturam divinam Cristi, 2m humanam naturam habet in se varia talia I add that the Universals do all that their singulars do; Man produces the acts of running, understanding, &c. in each individual, though Man neither runs nor understands, &c. formally. As God has no accident (1. e. quà God, not quà Christ the Man) distinct from His essence, so it is with Universals. which are the cause of every 5. quolibet MS. 9. quod MS. 20. quam sunt sibi [ quam sunt sibi MS. 31. lecones MS. o*
Strana 148
148 act of their singulars, and still more perfectly than they themselves arc It does not follow that thev are agents. So they are causes of all JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP XXIII. accidencia) sic genera et species substanciarum, propter suam supereminentem dignitatem naturalem, propter indi- viduas substancias absolvuntur a perfeccione per acci- .dencia, que eis inexisterent, Sunt ergo talia genera ct species substanciarum raciones et principia intrinseca, substancialia, et formalia communia, et hec meliora substanciis individuis |racione] currendi, legendi, dolendi, amandi, laudandi, honorandi, deum etc, accionibus accidentalibus realiter ipsis substanciis condistinctis. Sed tales actiones non recipiunt in se informative, proper nimiam sui subiecti unitatem naturalem ultra supposita substancie naturaliter dignam. Et sic sunt principia, non que exercent tales acciones, sed quibus tales acciones exercentur. Nec oportet sequi, si universalia substanciarum efficiunt et faciunt tales res vel tales actus, quod igitur in genere cause agentis | illos vel illos actus faciunt. Cum enim prima materia habeat aliquem suum effectum, ipsam that is done by efficit et facit illum effectum suum, alias non erit their singulars, and far more perfectly. They arc on this account not less admirable, perhaps more so, than thcir singulars, for the Divine Grace in them effectus suus; non tamen materia prima in genere cause 20 agentis aliquid facit. Unde, sicud omnis causa rei que sit est causa efficiens et faciens illam rem, non tamen causa agens illam rem; eciam sic universalia sub- stanciarum primarum, ut vera principia quibus efficiunt et faciunt actus et opera suorum singularium, faciunt, dico, longe nobiliori modo, quamvis non ut agencia, quam faciant ea sua singularia. Et sic, quamvis singularia tales acciones in se exer- ceant et non sua universalia, non tamen minus extol- lenda sunt universalia pro talibus accionibus naturalibus quam singularia de accionibus gratuitis; forte secus est, cum tales ex gracia gratum faciente exercentur, Quia .autem universalia pro accionibus naturalibus singularium non minus sint extollenda quam ipsa singularia, licet sola singularia tales acciones in se exerceant, videtur The Son alone eX simili constare. Nam licet solus filius dei, et non redeemed the world, yet the pater, nec spiritus sanctus in se exercuerint humilia- Father and the cionem humidatissimam pro peccato et superbia generis Spirit are to be . . . praised equally humani, tamen non plus est filius pro illo laudandus quam pater vel spiritus sanctus, cum quilibet illorum 4o therefor. 6. loc MS. — 7. racione deest MS. 12. diga MS. — 3i. guit. MS. 32. fa® MS. — 38. limliacon hmudatiffimia MS. 35
148 act of their singulars, and still more perfectly than they themselves arc It does not follow that thev are agents. So they are causes of all JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP XXIII. accidencia) sic genera et species substanciarum, propter suam supereminentem dignitatem naturalem, propter indi- viduas substancias absolvuntur a perfeccione per acci- .dencia, que eis inexisterent, Sunt ergo talia genera ct species substanciarum raciones et principia intrinseca, substancialia, et formalia communia, et hec meliora substanciis individuis |racione] currendi, legendi, dolendi, amandi, laudandi, honorandi, deum etc, accionibus accidentalibus realiter ipsis substanciis condistinctis. Sed tales actiones non recipiunt in se informative, proper nimiam sui subiecti unitatem naturalem ultra supposita substancie naturaliter dignam. Et sic sunt principia, non que exercent tales acciones, sed quibus tales acciones exercentur. Nec oportet sequi, si universalia substanciarum efficiunt et faciunt tales res vel tales actus, quod igitur in genere cause agentis | illos vel illos actus faciunt. Cum enim prima materia habeat aliquem suum effectum, ipsam that is done by efficit et facit illum effectum suum, alias non erit their singulars, and far more perfectly. They arc on this account not less admirable, perhaps more so, than thcir singulars, for the Divine Grace in them effectus suus; non tamen materia prima in genere cause 20 agentis aliquid facit. Unde, sicud omnis causa rei que sit est causa efficiens et faciens illam rem, non tamen causa agens illam rem; eciam sic universalia sub- stanciarum primarum, ut vera principia quibus efficiunt et faciunt actus et opera suorum singularium, faciunt, dico, longe nobiliori modo, quamvis non ut agencia, quam faciant ea sua singularia. Et sic, quamvis singularia tales acciones in se exer- ceant et non sua universalia, non tamen minus extol- lenda sunt universalia pro talibus accionibus naturalibus quam singularia de accionibus gratuitis; forte secus est, cum tales ex gracia gratum faciente exercentur, Quia .autem universalia pro accionibus naturalibus singularium non minus sint extollenda quam ipsa singularia, licet sola singularia tales acciones in se exerceant, videtur The Son alone eX simili constare. Nam licet solus filius dei, et non redeemed the world, yet the pater, nec spiritus sanctus in se exercuerint humilia- Father and the cionem humidatissimam pro peccato et superbia generis Spirit are to be . . . praised equally humani, tamen non plus est filius pro illo laudandus quam pater vel spiritus sanctus, cum quilibet illorum 4o therefor. 6. loc MS. — 7. racione deest MS. 12. diga MS. — 3i. guit. MS. 32. fa® MS. — 38. limliacon hmudatiffimia MS. 35
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CAP. XXIII. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 149 257b eque plene illam humiliacionem fecerit et participaverit, In like manner, though the sicud ipse filius. Et sicud universalia substanciarum sunt Universuls taken apart principia substancialia formalia intrinseca suis individuis do not act, whatever they faciendi, agendi, et exercendi actus et opera; et ipsa may do in per se non agunt nec exercent tales actus et opera their state of union with proprie; nec sunt in sua puritate et nuditate essencialis their individuals; bonitatis, quamvis forte, sub esse medie abstraccionis. they are the puta de quanto quoddam medium teneret inter pura principles from which every supposita et nuditate sui per se primi modi essendi, accident to sicud aliquo modo similiter Cristus 2m hominem mediat springs, yet tliey themselves inter seipsum deum et purum hominem; quamvis, in- neither inform nor determine quam, sub tali medio essendi forte potuerit eis aliquo their subjects. modo vere attribui exercencia actum et operacionem: sic universalia accidencium sunt raciones essenciales et principia formalia intrinseca et essencialia suis prin- cipiis individuis ad informandum et denominandum indi- viduas substancias, et non proprie eas informant et denominant. Et sicud universalia principia substanciarum sunt principia communia suis individuis, ut sic com- 20 muniter concorditer et conformiter 2m illa faciant, agant, et exerceant actus et suas operaciones; sic uni- versalia accidencium suis principiis individuis sunt com- munia principia, et raciones communes essenciales ad informandum et denominandum communiter, concorditer, 25 et conformiter supposita substanciarum. Nequaquam ergo non multum prosunt universalia ipsi mundo, cum sic individua mundo faciunt esse unum, et sunt eorum ligamenta essencialia, quibus ad invicem uniuntur, colliguntur et adiuvantur, secundum 3o que universalia res eiusdem generis vel speciei concor- diter et consone serviunt deo et proficiunt mundo. Certum est quod, si, esset unus florenus qui eque pro- desset quotlibet amicis sicud unus florenus uni soli eorum prodesset, primus esset multo acceptior et utilior 35 ac melior quam secundus. Potencior autem communis humanitas quod prosit et proficiat omnibus, singulis, et quotlibet hominibus ad esse et facere quidquid naturaliter eque, ymmo longe plus quam singularis humanitas Sortis possit sibi prodesse ad existere et facere quid- 40 quid naturaliter fecerit. Igitur incomparabiliter melior est naturaliter mundo, et prodest communis humanitas, Universals are therefore of great utility in the world. If there were one forin that could be of as much use to a great number as an ordinary Horin is to one man, the former would be far preferable. So likewise. Universal is tar better than individual humanity. 8. quôda MS. 26. nunquam MS. 28. earum MS. 35. por MS.
CAP. XXIII. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 149 257b eque plene illam humiliacionem fecerit et participaverit, In like manner, though the sicud ipse filius. Et sicud universalia substanciarum sunt Universuls taken apart principia substancialia formalia intrinseca suis individuis do not act, whatever they faciendi, agendi, et exercendi actus et opera; et ipsa may do in per se non agunt nec exercent tales actus et opera their state of union with proprie; nec sunt in sua puritate et nuditate essencialis their individuals; bonitatis, quamvis forte, sub esse medie abstraccionis. they are the puta de quanto quoddam medium teneret inter pura principles from which every supposita et nuditate sui per se primi modi essendi, accident to sicud aliquo modo similiter Cristus 2m hominem mediat springs, yet tliey themselves inter seipsum deum et purum hominem; quamvis, in- neither inform nor determine quam, sub tali medio essendi forte potuerit eis aliquo their subjects. modo vere attribui exercencia actum et operacionem: sic universalia accidencium sunt raciones essenciales et principia formalia intrinseca et essencialia suis prin- cipiis individuis ad informandum et denominandum indi- viduas substancias, et non proprie eas informant et denominant. Et sicud universalia principia substanciarum sunt principia communia suis individuis, ut sic com- 20 muniter concorditer et conformiter 2m illa faciant, agant, et exerceant actus et suas operaciones; sic uni- versalia accidencium suis principiis individuis sunt com- munia principia, et raciones communes essenciales ad informandum et denominandum communiter, concorditer, 25 et conformiter supposita substanciarum. Nequaquam ergo non multum prosunt universalia ipsi mundo, cum sic individua mundo faciunt esse unum, et sunt eorum ligamenta essencialia, quibus ad invicem uniuntur, colliguntur et adiuvantur, secundum 3o que universalia res eiusdem generis vel speciei concor- diter et consone serviunt deo et proficiunt mundo. Certum est quod, si, esset unus florenus qui eque pro- desset quotlibet amicis sicud unus florenus uni soli eorum prodesset, primus esset multo acceptior et utilior 35 ac melior quam secundus. Potencior autem communis humanitas quod prosit et proficiat omnibus, singulis, et quotlibet hominibus ad esse et facere quidquid naturaliter eque, ymmo longe plus quam singularis humanitas Sortis possit sibi prodesse ad existere et facere quid- 40 quid naturaliter fecerit. Igitur incomparabiliter melior est naturaliter mundo, et prodest communis humanitas, Universals are therefore of great utility in the world. If there were one forin that could be of as much use to a great number as an ordinary Horin is to one man, the former would be far preferable. So likewise. Universal is tar better than individual humanity. 8. quôda MS. 26. nunquam MS. 28. earum MS. 35. por MS.
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150 We ought all to feel this bond of common humanity, be glad that we have it and help others to come to eternal life thereby. No one ought to be set against the Universals, unless he were sure that they did not exist; and such certainty is impossible in presence of so many proofs in“ their favour. Those who attack them are sophists who affect a common table, kitchen and meals with other men, vet refuse to have humanity in common with them. JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XXIII. quam humanitas quecunque singularis naturaliter. Et ita de universalibus aliis est iudicandum quo ad sua singularia. Unde, cum simile naturaliter diligit suum simile, quilibet homo naturali amicicia debet naturaliter favere 5 et congratulari omnibus et singulis hominibus quod secum habeant eamdem communem humanitatem que prodest et formaliter facit eque, ymmo, longe plus quam cuiuscunque singularis humanitas prosit et faciat ad ipsum esse hominem, et ad quodcunque suum facere 10 naturaliter humanitus, Et si homines naturali amicicia debent suis proximis una secum favere de tali eorum communi bono formali, scilicet, communi humanitate, quanto magis debent studere quod amicicia gratuita vite eterne | meritoria faveant suis proximis secum 258 tali magno bono naturali, Propter quod videtur quod nequaquam deberent homines scienter et voluntarie negare talia universalia in rebus, nisi evidenter cognoscerent talia non posse existere: quod nunquam contingit, cum manifestum est 20 quod quilibet homo est homo, et patet toti mundo quod quilibet equus est animal, Et placet deo quod quilibet fidelis diligit deum, et oportet quemlibet hominem esse hominem sub potestate dei, Et fides katholica est quod quilibet homo qui nondum resurrexit resurget cum 25 corpore suo; et tenendum est fideliter et katholice quod quilibet homo finaliter carus deo salvabitur; et defen- dendum est usque ad mortem quod quilibet sanctus in vita eterna clare videt deum, Et nullus Cristianus audet dicere quod hoc non esset iustum quod quilibet damp- 3o natus in inferno punitur miro modo graviter, Istas et consimiles veritates a parte rei non est dubium esse vel innuere formas communes et universales in rebus singularibus; sophisticent se quantumcunque voluerint persequentes a re has et consimiles veritates. Et cum 35 aliis. hominibus volunt habere mensam communem, coquinam communem, collacionem communem, etc. miror qualiter cum eisdem nolunt habere humanitatem communem, Volunt plus esse similes sibi in hoc quod sunt mensati communiter, coquinati, pransi, vel potati, 40 quam in eo quod sunt homines; cum ad eos esse com- 12. v* MS. 26. est quod MS. — 33. 5nu'e MS.
150 We ought all to feel this bond of common humanity, be glad that we have it and help others to come to eternal life thereby. No one ought to be set against the Universals, unless he were sure that they did not exist; and such certainty is impossible in presence of so many proofs in“ their favour. Those who attack them are sophists who affect a common table, kitchen and meals with other men, vet refuse to have humanity in common with them. JOHANNIS WYCLIF. CAP. XXIII. quam humanitas quecunque singularis naturaliter. Et ita de universalibus aliis est iudicandum quo ad sua singularia. Unde, cum simile naturaliter diligit suum simile, quilibet homo naturali amicicia debet naturaliter favere 5 et congratulari omnibus et singulis hominibus quod secum habeant eamdem communem humanitatem que prodest et formaliter facit eque, ymmo, longe plus quam cuiuscunque singularis humanitas prosit et faciat ad ipsum esse hominem, et ad quodcunque suum facere 10 naturaliter humanitus, Et si homines naturali amicicia debent suis proximis una secum favere de tali eorum communi bono formali, scilicet, communi humanitate, quanto magis debent studere quod amicicia gratuita vite eterne | meritoria faveant suis proximis secum 258 tali magno bono naturali, Propter quod videtur quod nequaquam deberent homines scienter et voluntarie negare talia universalia in rebus, nisi evidenter cognoscerent talia non posse existere: quod nunquam contingit, cum manifestum est 20 quod quilibet homo est homo, et patet toti mundo quod quilibet equus est animal, Et placet deo quod quilibet fidelis diligit deum, et oportet quemlibet hominem esse hominem sub potestate dei, Et fides katholica est quod quilibet homo qui nondum resurrexit resurget cum 25 corpore suo; et tenendum est fideliter et katholice quod quilibet homo finaliter carus deo salvabitur; et defen- dendum est usque ad mortem quod quilibet sanctus in vita eterna clare videt deum, Et nullus Cristianus audet dicere quod hoc non esset iustum quod quilibet damp- 3o natus in inferno punitur miro modo graviter, Istas et consimiles veritates a parte rei non est dubium esse vel innuere formas communes et universales in rebus singularibus; sophisticent se quantumcunque voluerint persequentes a re has et consimiles veritates. Et cum 35 aliis. hominibus volunt habere mensam communem, coquinam communem, collacionem communem, etc. miror qualiter cum eisdem nolunt habere humanitatem communem, Volunt plus esse similes sibi in hoc quod sunt mensati communiter, coquinati, pransi, vel potati, 40 quam in eo quod sunt homines; cum ad eos esse com- 12. v* MS. 26. est quod MS. — 33. 5nu'e MS.
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CAP. XXIII. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 151 If they dine muniter pransos est eis simul prandium commune, et together, they ad eos esse simul et communiter mensatos est eis simul have dinner in common ; mensa communis etc. Sed ad “eos esse simul homines" surely if they are men non est eis simul communis humanitas; volunt simul together, they 5 in communi esse hospitati et nolunt simul in communi have humanity in common. esse homines. But this they Ego autem affecto, ut possum, quod meritorie plus deny! For myself michi cum aliis esse eandem communem humanitatem; I wish to share this common et volo quod michi, sed non michi soli, insit humanitas; humanity ever 10 quia scio quod veritas ordinata a deo ex parte rei est more and more with others ; quod michi, sed non michi soli, inest humanitas quam for I know that it should be extollo et diligo, saltem naturaliter, longe super humani- loved and extolled far tatem meam singularem michi et omnibus ac singulis above my hominibus plus prodessentem ad esse et facere quam individuality. 15 michi mea singularis humanitas prosit. Et benedictus deus universorum qui non solum formas 208° rerum naturales singulares ] sicut res privatas instituit, sed eciam pocius formas rerum naturales communes condidit et rebus indidit, sicud res publicas, videns 20 huiusmodi formas communes, et sic res publicas, plus mundo naturaliter proficere quam singulares sibi prosint naturaliter. Et caveat homuncio exprobare et derogare factori suo, dicendo quod hoc non est bene ordinatum a deo, quod unumquodque animal est substancia; et 25 quod deus peccat si placet sibi voluntarie quod unum- quodque bonorum encium est bonum. Non sic, non sic! sed gaudeamus et supra modum congratulemur sibi de hoc quod unumquodque suorum creatorum plene subiacet sue regie maiestati etc. 30 Et sic est finis huius operis. Blessed be God, who not only made individuals. like private persons, but also Universals, like common- wealths, seeing how much superior they were to individuals. Let not a wretched man lay blame on his Maker for what He has done. No; let us rejoice and be exceeding glad in that the whole world is subject to Him. 20. placet MS. 30. Operis. On the same page and the next line, but in another hand, very cramped, abbreviated and hard to read, follow various extracts from Wyclif's philosophical treatises as follows.
CAP. XXIII. DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 151 If they dine muniter pransos est eis simul prandium commune, et together, they ad eos esse simul et communiter mensatos est eis simul have dinner in common ; mensa communis etc. Sed ad “eos esse simul homines" surely if they are men non est eis simul communis humanitas; volunt simul together, they 5 in communi esse hospitati et nolunt simul in communi have humanity in common. esse homines. But this they Ego autem affecto, ut possum, quod meritorie plus deny! For myself michi cum aliis esse eandem communem humanitatem; I wish to share this common et volo quod michi, sed non michi soli, insit humanitas; humanity ever 10 quia scio quod veritas ordinata a deo ex parte rei est more and more with others ; quod michi, sed non michi soli, inest humanitas quam for I know that it should be extollo et diligo, saltem naturaliter, longe super humani- loved and extolled far tatem meam singularem michi et omnibus ac singulis above my hominibus plus prodessentem ad esse et facere quam individuality. 15 michi mea singularis humanitas prosit. Et benedictus deus universorum qui non solum formas 208° rerum naturales singulares ] sicut res privatas instituit, sed eciam pocius formas rerum naturales communes condidit et rebus indidit, sicud res publicas, videns 20 huiusmodi formas communes, et sic res publicas, plus mundo naturaliter proficere quam singulares sibi prosint naturaliter. Et caveat homuncio exprobare et derogare factori suo, dicendo quod hoc non est bene ordinatum a deo, quod unumquodque animal est substancia; et 25 quod deus peccat si placet sibi voluntarie quod unum- quodque bonorum encium est bonum. Non sic, non sic! sed gaudeamus et supra modum congratulemur sibi de hoc quod unumquodque suorum creatorum plene subiacet sue regie maiestati etc. 30 Et sic est finis huius operis. Blessed be God, who not only made individuals. like private persons, but also Universals, like common- wealths, seeing how much superior they were to individuals. Let not a wretched man lay blame on his Maker for what He has done. No; let us rejoice and be exceeding glad in that the whole world is subject to Him. 20. placet MS. 30. Operis. On the same page and the next line, but in another hand, very cramped, abbreviated and hard to read, follow various extracts from Wyclif's philosophical treatises as follows.
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FRAGMENTA. There are Tres sunt modi respondendi, secundum quorum quem- three modes of libet potest se homo defendere in quocunque casu defence in the Exercise called fuerit, ne sibi concludatur. 'Obligations'. The first Primus modus respondendi est Magistri Richardi; consists in Surinhet; et ille modus respondendi est quodammodo admitting nothing but communis, secundum quod solum sunt tria in qua- the thing posited, cunque obligacione concedenda, videlicet positum et irrelevant sequens inmediate ex posito, et verum impertinens truths, and what scitum esse tale, ita quod penes illam viam id quod 10 immediately follows sequitur ex posito cum bene concesso vel cum bene thence. concessis cum opposito bene negati vel oppositis bene negatorum non debet concedi, sed solum tria predicta. Example: Unde, si ponatur illa: Omnis homo currit, et admit- If all men run, and you are a tatur illa, debet concedi. Et tunc si deinde proponatur: 15 man, you need not admit that Tu es homo, illud eciam est concedendum, quia verum you run. et inpertinens scitum a me fore tale. Et si tunc pro- For if the premises form ponatur: Tu curris, hoc est negandum, non obstante a copulative sentence (Every quod sequitur ex posito, cum bene concesso; quia illa man runs and non est regula, scilicet: Quod sequitur ex posito cum 20 you are a man) you can admit concesso est concedendum", sicud predictum est. Et si the argumentatur quod contra: Omnis homo currit, tu es consequence, and deny the homo: ergo, tu curris, dicitur concedendo consequenciam copulative without et negando antecedens. Et si queratur pro qua parte, denying either dicitur pro neutra parte. Unde, si maior proponatur, 25 Of iis parts. debet concedi, et si minor proponatur, debet eciam concedi; et semper, quandocunque fit idem argumentum, conceditur consequencia et negatur antecedens; tamen pro neutra parte. Et ita potest dici in omnibus obli- gacionibus vel insolubilibus quibuscunque; et ita quando- 30 cunque fit aliquod argumentum sive in casu, sive extra casum, si antecedens fuerit copulativa et non placuerit tibi concedere consequens, potes (si illa consequencia 2. Blank space for initial T; small t in the centre MS. 17. after fore, 4 crossed off MS. 31. ſy MS.; ib. ſy MS.
FRAGMENTA. There are Tres sunt modi respondendi, secundum quorum quem- three modes of libet potest se homo defendere in quocunque casu defence in the Exercise called fuerit, ne sibi concludatur. 'Obligations'. The first Primus modus respondendi est Magistri Richardi; consists in Surinhet; et ille modus respondendi est quodammodo admitting nothing but communis, secundum quod solum sunt tria in qua- the thing posited, cunque obligacione concedenda, videlicet positum et irrelevant sequens inmediate ex posito, et verum impertinens truths, and what scitum esse tale, ita quod penes illam viam id quod 10 immediately follows sequitur ex posito cum bene concesso vel cum bene thence. concessis cum opposito bene negati vel oppositis bene negatorum non debet concedi, sed solum tria predicta. Example: Unde, si ponatur illa: Omnis homo currit, et admit- If all men run, and you are a tatur illa, debet concedi. Et tunc si deinde proponatur: 15 man, you need not admit that Tu es homo, illud eciam est concedendum, quia verum you run. et inpertinens scitum a me fore tale. Et si tunc pro- For if the premises form ponatur: Tu curris, hoc est negandum, non obstante a copulative sentence (Every quod sequitur ex posito, cum bene concesso; quia illa man runs and non est regula, scilicet: Quod sequitur ex posito cum 20 you are a man) you can admit concesso est concedendum", sicud predictum est. Et si the argumentatur quod contra: Omnis homo currit, tu es consequence, and deny the homo: ergo, tu curris, dicitur concedendo consequenciam copulative without et negando antecedens. Et si queratur pro qua parte, denying either dicitur pro neutra parte. Unde, si maior proponatur, 25 Of iis parts. debet concedi, et si minor proponatur, debet eciam concedi; et semper, quandocunque fit idem argumentum, conceditur consequencia et negatur antecedens; tamen pro neutra parte. Et ita potest dici in omnibus obli- gacionibus vel insolubilibus quibuscunque; et ita quando- 30 cunque fit aliquod argumentum sive in casu, sive extra casum, si antecedens fuerit copulativa et non placuerit tibi concedere consequens, potes (si illa consequencia 2. Blank space for initial T; small t in the centre MS. 17. after fore, 4 crossed off MS. 31. ſy MS.; ib. ſy MS.
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DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 153 sit bona) concedere illam et negare antecedens; pro neutra tamen parte. Si vero tibi fiat aliquod argumentum cuius consequens If they do not form a fuerit contra te et antecedens non sit una copulativa, copulative, you can admit the 5 sed sit una cathegorica, tunc, si consequencia valeat, antecedent and concedas illam, sic dicendo: Concedo consequenciam, the consequence, et si antecedens videatur esse concedendum a te con- yet deny the consequent; cedas eciam antecedens, et constanter neges consequens. for the Et si opponens faciat tale argumentum (quia illud est adversary, wishing to 10 fortissimum argumentum quod potest fieri ex parte press his point, is obliged to opponentis): Illa consequencia est bona, scita a te esse make an bona, et totum antecedens est verum: ergo consequens: argument with a copulative, concedas consequenciam, et neges antecedens; pro neutra that you can treat as tamen parte, quia tunc est una copulativa in antece- before. 15 dente. Et ita respondebis ad illam sicud prius. Et, nisi No matter what the opponens sic, vel saltem consimili modo arguat, nunquam subject may be, you can always potest ipse quovismodo venire ad suum propositum. Et defend your point thus. ita non dubitabis, quin 2m illam oppinionem potes 259° defendere in quacunque materia a quocunque argu- 20 mento quod argumentum possibile est aliquid facere; quia manifestum est quod non est possibile aliquem argumentare contra te, nisi antecedens sit copulativa vel non copulativa. Si antecedens sit copulativa, dictum est qualiter tunc respondendum est; si vero non sit 25 copulativa, respondebis sicud ultimo dictum est. Alius modus respondendi est per quem potest sic In the second mode, vou aliter defendere in omni materia qualitercumque difficili admit the consequence, vel ignota. Isto modo, si fiat tibi aliquod argumentum, admit or deny cum consequens sit contra te, sive illud fiat in casu the antecedent as you think 3o aliquo sive extra casum, concedas consequenciam, sic fit, and always deny the dicendo: Concedo consequenciam; et eciam concedas consequent. antecedens illius argumenti, si apparuerit tibi con- cedendum, si vero antecedens non apparuerit tibi con- cedendum, sufficiens est evasio ad illud argumentum 35 negare antecedens; sed semper neges consequens illius qualitercunque fuerit, si videtur tibi quod ipsum fuerit 23. cova 10. forlissim MS. 15. rn deb MS. 20. 9.8 pro quod MS. AfS. 25. Cap al the end of line. 26. Blank space for initial A with small a in the centre MS. 34. Si fuffins MS. 5. Cathegorica. I have left the word as it stands, but I think it ought to be 'hypothetica'. Unfortunately the writer gives no example here to illustrate his meaning.
DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 153 sit bona) concedere illam et negare antecedens; pro neutra tamen parte. Si vero tibi fiat aliquod argumentum cuius consequens If they do not form a fuerit contra te et antecedens non sit una copulativa, copulative, you can admit the 5 sed sit una cathegorica, tunc, si consequencia valeat, antecedent and concedas illam, sic dicendo: Concedo consequenciam, the consequence, et si antecedens videatur esse concedendum a te con- yet deny the consequent; cedas eciam antecedens, et constanter neges consequens. for the Et si opponens faciat tale argumentum (quia illud est adversary, wishing to 10 fortissimum argumentum quod potest fieri ex parte press his point, is obliged to opponentis): Illa consequencia est bona, scita a te esse make an bona, et totum antecedens est verum: ergo consequens: argument with a copulative, concedas consequenciam, et neges antecedens; pro neutra that you can treat as tamen parte, quia tunc est una copulativa in antece- before. 15 dente. Et ita respondebis ad illam sicud prius. Et, nisi No matter what the opponens sic, vel saltem consimili modo arguat, nunquam subject may be, you can always potest ipse quovismodo venire ad suum propositum. Et defend your point thus. ita non dubitabis, quin 2m illam oppinionem potes 259° defendere in quacunque materia a quocunque argu- 20 mento quod argumentum possibile est aliquid facere; quia manifestum est quod non est possibile aliquem argumentare contra te, nisi antecedens sit copulativa vel non copulativa. Si antecedens sit copulativa, dictum est qualiter tunc respondendum est; si vero non sit 25 copulativa, respondebis sicud ultimo dictum est. Alius modus respondendi est per quem potest sic In the second mode, vou aliter defendere in omni materia qualitercumque difficili admit the consequence, vel ignota. Isto modo, si fiat tibi aliquod argumentum, admit or deny cum consequens sit contra te, sive illud fiat in casu the antecedent as you think 3o aliquo sive extra casum, concedas consequenciam, sic fit, and always deny the dicendo: Concedo consequenciam; et eciam concedas consequent. antecedens illius argumenti, si apparuerit tibi con- cedendum, si vero antecedens non apparuerit tibi con- cedendum, sufficiens est evasio ad illud argumentum 35 negare antecedens; sed semper neges consequens illius qualitercunque fuerit, si videtur tibi quod ipsum fuerit 23. cova 10. forlissim MS. 15. rn deb MS. 20. 9.8 pro quod MS. AfS. 25. Cap al the end of line. 26. Blank space for initial A with small a in the centre MS. 34. Si fuffins MS. 5. Cathegorica. I have left the word as it stands, but I think it ought to be 'hypothetica'. Unfortunately the writer gives no example here to illustrate his meaning.
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154 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. And when you contra te. Et, si opponens faciat tibi tale argumentum: are urged to admit the Illa consequencia est bona, et totum antecedens est consequent, concedendum a te: ergo consequens est concedendum refuse, because a te; negatur consequencia. Sed ad hoc quod argu- it entails self- contradiction. mentum valeat, oportet sic argumentare: Illa conse- The adversary will never be quencia est bona, scita a te esse bona, et totum able to go any farther. antecedens est concedendum a te, et non repugnat consequens, et sic concedendum a te; ergo consequens est concedendum a te. Et si sic arguitur, conceditur et illa consequencia ut prius, et eciam conceditur ante- 10 cedens eius, et negatur eius consequens. Et ita, quamvis in eternum arguerit opponens, nunquam, si voluerit, perveniet ad suum intentum. Exemplum illius pono tibi illam: Omnis homo currit. Admittitur; et si proponatur, concedatur. Deinde pro- 15 ponatur aliud, quod est: Homo non currit. Hoc repugnat posito; ideo illud est negandum. Et si argumentatur contra illud, sic: Tu non curris, et tu es aliquid quod est homo; ergo, aliquid quod est homo non currit: respondebis, concedendo consequenciam et eciam ante- 20 cedens, si proponatur; sed negabis consequens. Et si forte argumentatur sic: Hec consequencia est bona, scita a te esse bona, et antecedens est concedendum a te, et non repugnat antecedens esse concessum a te: ergo, consequens est concedendum a te: dicitur, con-25 cedendo consequenciam et negando eius consequens. Et tamen concedis eius antecedens omnino, ut dictum est. Et sic respondendo potes evitare nonnunquam deduc- ciones ad plura inconveniencia consequencia ad ea ad que videntur gratis deduci. Hic sciendum quod secundum 30 priorem modum respondendi et 2m modum presentem potes defendere indifferenter in casu vel extra casum; sed 2m modum 3m iam sequentem non est conveniens ita respondere nisi fueris obligatus. Example: Erery man runs. Admitted. Some man does not run. Denied. You do not run, and you are a man: admitted, but the consequent of that argument is denied, and also that of any argument to force you to admit that consequent. Here note that the two preceding modes can be used in any argument, but the following one is only to be used in Obligations'. The third mode is as follows ; answer as you think best, and when you have come to some absurd Tercius modus est ille; cum fueris ad aliquem casum 35 obligatus, respondeas continue sicud apparuerit tibi respondendum, quousque concedatur a te aliquod in- conveniens: et tunc, quam cito fit aliquod argumentum bonum, cuius consequens sit contra te, respondens illo 28. no uno MS. 8. si MS. 12. volui't' MS. 30. vnr MS. 31. pnte MS. 34. Gap of half a line MS. 35. Blank space, with small central t, for initial T MS.
154 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. And when you contra te. Et, si opponens faciat tibi tale argumentum: are urged to admit the Illa consequencia est bona, et totum antecedens est consequent, concedendum a te: ergo consequens est concedendum refuse, because a te; negatur consequencia. Sed ad hoc quod argu- it entails self- contradiction. mentum valeat, oportet sic argumentare: Illa conse- The adversary will never be quencia est bona, scita a te esse bona, et totum able to go any farther. antecedens est concedendum a te, et non repugnat consequens, et sic concedendum a te; ergo consequens est concedendum a te. Et si sic arguitur, conceditur et illa consequencia ut prius, et eciam conceditur ante- 10 cedens eius, et negatur eius consequens. Et ita, quamvis in eternum arguerit opponens, nunquam, si voluerit, perveniet ad suum intentum. Exemplum illius pono tibi illam: Omnis homo currit. Admittitur; et si proponatur, concedatur. Deinde pro- 15 ponatur aliud, quod est: Homo non currit. Hoc repugnat posito; ideo illud est negandum. Et si argumentatur contra illud, sic: Tu non curris, et tu es aliquid quod est homo; ergo, aliquid quod est homo non currit: respondebis, concedendo consequenciam et eciam ante- 20 cedens, si proponatur; sed negabis consequens. Et si forte argumentatur sic: Hec consequencia est bona, scita a te esse bona, et antecedens est concedendum a te, et non repugnat antecedens esse concessum a te: ergo, consequens est concedendum a te: dicitur, con-25 cedendo consequenciam et negando eius consequens. Et tamen concedis eius antecedens omnino, ut dictum est. Et sic respondendo potes evitare nonnunquam deduc- ciones ad plura inconveniencia consequencia ad ea ad que videntur gratis deduci. Hic sciendum quod secundum 30 priorem modum respondendi et 2m modum presentem potes defendere indifferenter in casu vel extra casum; sed 2m modum 3m iam sequentem non est conveniens ita respondere nisi fueris obligatus. Example: Erery man runs. Admitted. Some man does not run. Denied. You do not run, and you are a man: admitted, but the consequent of that argument is denied, and also that of any argument to force you to admit that consequent. Here note that the two preceding modes can be used in any argument, but the following one is only to be used in Obligations'. The third mode is as follows ; answer as you think best, and when you have come to some absurd Tercius modus est ille; cum fueris ad aliquem casum 35 obligatus, respondeas continue sicud apparuerit tibi respondendum, quousque concedatur a te aliquod in- conveniens: et tunc, quam cito fit aliquod argumentum bonum, cuius consequens sit contra te, respondens illo 28. no uno MS. 8. si MS. 12. volui't' MS. 30. vnr MS. 31. pnte MS. 34. Gap of half a line MS. 35. Blank space, with small central t, for initial T MS.
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DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 155 modo: Concedo consequenciam et nego consequens, si proponatur tibi. Et si argumentatur sic: Hec conse- quencia est bona, scita a te esse bona, et totum ante- cedens est verum: ergo et consequens; nisi plus addatur, 5 negatur consequencia; quia stat cum illo toto antece- dente quod consequens significet secundarie et non precise primarie; ideo. Sed si sic argumentatur: Hec consequencia est bona, scita a te esse bona, et ante- cedens et consequens significant precise primarie, et 1o antecedens est verum: ergo consequens est verum; sic respondebis: Nego quod illa consequencia est bona, et dices quod hoc repugnat casui et responsioni quod aliqua talis consequencia sit. Exemplum ponatur ille casus quod Sor nunquam 15 prius loquens loquatur, sed quod iam prius loquatur; et quod iuret super libro Evangeliarum quod ipse iuret est periurus, nec aliquis iuret nisi Sor; et potes admittere. Et si argumentatur: numquid Sor sit periurus vel non? dicas: Concedo, vel, Nego, vel qualitercunque 20 apparuerit tibi dicendum. Et si concedas quod est periurus, et opponens argumentat quod non; quia, si Sor est periurus, et ipse iurat falsum quod ipse est periurus: ergo, ipse iurat sicud est et per consequens ipse non est periurus; respondebis concedendo conse- 25 quenciam, et negando consequens, si proponatur; quia illud est contra responsionem tuam, et tamen tu con- cedes antecedens, si proponatur. Et tunc, cum argu- mentatur: Hec consequencia est bona, et antecedens est verum: ergo et consequens; sic respondebis: Nego quod 3o illa consequencia est bona. Et dicitur quod repugnat casui et responsioni quod aliqua talis consequencia sit; et tamen, quociescunque fiat tibi talis consequencia, oportet concedere illam, et respondere te concedere illam; sed semper dicas quod nulla talis sit, et quod 35 non stat cum toto casu, nec cum illa responsione, quod aliqua talis sit. Et sic potes te faciliter defendere in quacunque obligacione vel insolubili, eciam qualiter- cunque difficilis fuerit ille casus, licet adversari casum inpossibilem ex improviso. Faciliter adhuc potes evitare 40 inconveniens, nisi illa que secuntur ex illa responsione vel ad que ius gratis deduci. Et ideo non timeas, si conclusion, deny it. If the consequence is urged against you, deny it; because in these Obligations, words have lost their primary objective maning. Example: A man swears that be is committing perjury; you admit that. Then you are asked whether he is really committing perjury. You can reply, Yes, or No, as vou please. If Yes, the opponent proves that be s not perjured, since what he swears is (as you admit) the truth. You have merely to deny the conclusion, admitting all the rest. When he attacks your denial, you merely say that the consequence does not exist at all, the argument being unmeaning. and you have admitted it merely as an obligational exercise; if understood otherwise, it is nothing. Thus you can 17. fonpotes MS. 15. loq. MS. 16. fr liarp MS. y. 10 MS. 38. 1° ca9 13 admiſja'r, on being nearly a straight line MS.
DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 155 modo: Concedo consequenciam et nego consequens, si proponatur tibi. Et si argumentatur sic: Hec conse- quencia est bona, scita a te esse bona, et totum ante- cedens est verum: ergo et consequens; nisi plus addatur, 5 negatur consequencia; quia stat cum illo toto antece- dente quod consequens significet secundarie et non precise primarie; ideo. Sed si sic argumentatur: Hec consequencia est bona, scita a te esse bona, et ante- cedens et consequens significant precise primarie, et 1o antecedens est verum: ergo consequens est verum; sic respondebis: Nego quod illa consequencia est bona, et dices quod hoc repugnat casui et responsioni quod aliqua talis consequencia sit. Exemplum ponatur ille casus quod Sor nunquam 15 prius loquens loquatur, sed quod iam prius loquatur; et quod iuret super libro Evangeliarum quod ipse iuret est periurus, nec aliquis iuret nisi Sor; et potes admittere. Et si argumentatur: numquid Sor sit periurus vel non? dicas: Concedo, vel, Nego, vel qualitercunque 20 apparuerit tibi dicendum. Et si concedas quod est periurus, et opponens argumentat quod non; quia, si Sor est periurus, et ipse iurat falsum quod ipse est periurus: ergo, ipse iurat sicud est et per consequens ipse non est periurus; respondebis concedendo conse- 25 quenciam, et negando consequens, si proponatur; quia illud est contra responsionem tuam, et tamen tu con- cedes antecedens, si proponatur. Et tunc, cum argu- mentatur: Hec consequencia est bona, et antecedens est verum: ergo et consequens; sic respondebis: Nego quod 3o illa consequencia est bona. Et dicitur quod repugnat casui et responsioni quod aliqua talis consequencia sit; et tamen, quociescunque fiat tibi talis consequencia, oportet concedere illam, et respondere te concedere illam; sed semper dicas quod nulla talis sit, et quod 35 non stat cum toto casu, nec cum illa responsione, quod aliqua talis sit. Et sic potes te faciliter defendere in quacunque obligacione vel insolubili, eciam qualiter- cunque difficilis fuerit ille casus, licet adversari casum inpossibilem ex improviso. Faciliter adhuc potes evitare 40 inconveniens, nisi illa que secuntur ex illa responsione vel ad que ius gratis deduci. Et ideo non timeas, si conclusion, deny it. If the consequence is urged against you, deny it; because in these Obligations, words have lost their primary objective maning. Example: A man swears that be is committing perjury; you admit that. Then you are asked whether he is really committing perjury. You can reply, Yes, or No, as vou please. If Yes, the opponent proves that be s not perjured, since what he swears is (as you admit) the truth. You have merely to deny the conclusion, admitting all the rest. When he attacks your denial, you merely say that the consequence does not exist at all, the argument being unmeaning. and you have admitted it merely as an obligational exercise; if understood otherwise, it is nothing. Thus you can 17. fonpotes MS. 15. loq. MS. 16. fr liarp MS. y. 10 MS. 38. 1° ca9 13 admiſja'r, on being nearly a straight line MS.
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156 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. answer the greatest difficulties. opus fuerit sic respondere in quocunque casu fueris obligatus. Sed tamen extra omnem casum ubi non sis obligatus, non est illa responsio valida sive valde con- veniens. Sed, si fiat aliquid argumentum extra casum. pro eius solucione elige unam de duabus responsionibus 5 predictis, quia ille indifferenter in casu et extra casum deserviunt. Et tantum, etc. INSOLUBILIA PULCHRA. Some Quia inter casus loycales aliqui sunt aliis difficiliores, insoluble' cases are more et specialiter casus qui componuntur, proposiciones 10 difficult than significantes affirmative vel negative pro se ipsis ex others; and to solve these, quarum veritate sequitur illas esse falsas, et econtra: I take the rules Ideo, relinquendo vias erroneas famosiores in ista given by Wyclif in his materia volentibus per ipsas incedere, pro recciori Logica. responsione habenda ad huiusmodi casus positos insolu- 15 biles communiter nuncupatos, suppono quedam tradita in 3cio tractatu loyco Magistri Johannis Wycliff. 259" 7. End of the line blank MS. 8. Title at the lop of the page MS. 9. Blank space, with small central q, for initial letter MS. 15, 16. 1 folco pro insolubiles MS.
156 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. answer the greatest difficulties. opus fuerit sic respondere in quocunque casu fueris obligatus. Sed tamen extra omnem casum ubi non sis obligatus, non est illa responsio valida sive valde con- veniens. Sed, si fiat aliquid argumentum extra casum. pro eius solucione elige unam de duabus responsionibus 5 predictis, quia ille indifferenter in casu et extra casum deserviunt. Et tantum, etc. INSOLUBILIA PULCHRA. Some Quia inter casus loycales aliqui sunt aliis difficiliores, insoluble' cases are more et specialiter casus qui componuntur, proposiciones 10 difficult than significantes affirmative vel negative pro se ipsis ex others; and to solve these, quarum veritate sequitur illas esse falsas, et econtra: I take the rules Ideo, relinquendo vias erroneas famosiores in ista given by Wyclif in his materia volentibus per ipsas incedere, pro recciori Logica. responsione habenda ad huiusmodi casus positos insolu- 15 biles communiter nuncupatos, suppono quedam tradita in 3cio tractatu loyco Magistri Johannis Wycliff. 259" 7. End of the line blank MS. 8. Title at the lop of the page MS. 9. Blank space, with small central q, for initial letter MS. 15, 16. 1 folco pro insolubiles MS.
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NOTAE ET QUESTIONES VARIE. Nota; de se humanitas 2" modum communem est humanitas, et non de se humanitas 2"! quod huius est, illa neque illa; et sic de aliis, Igitur ipsa, cum sit illa 5humanitas de se, aut indifferens humanitas ad hoc quod sit illa vel illa. Etc. Vel sic: de se humanitas est indifferens ad hoc quod sit illa humanitas, vel quod sit illa (et sic de aliis); quanto de se erit singularis vel communis. Non singularis, quia contra racionem rosingularis humanitatis est esse de se indifferenter ad plures. Igitur est communis, Item, illa humanitas essencialiter et quiditative est humanitas. Vel igitur convertibiliter precise est illa humanitas singularis humanitas, vel non. Si sic, igitur i5 ubicunque est humanitas, et in quocunque loco, ibi erit ista humanitas: quod est inconveniens. Si non, tunc illa singularis humanitas est in minus vel in plus quam humanitas. Non in plus; igitur, in minus: et per con- sequens humanitas erit sibi communis. го ltem, Sortes est similis Platoni essencialiter vel sub- stancialiter. Vel igitur in humanitate communi (et tunc habetur propositum), vel in singulari, Non 2"', quia Sor sua singulari humanitate est sic homo quod non com- munis, Plato est sic homo .... et econtra, Et conse- 25quencia illata tenet in singulari humanitate sua: unus est alteri similis, et quod unus est homo sicut aliis. Item, quando aliquis scit de facto omnem hominem esse animal, non scitur de sciencia a tali, nisi ibi veritas sit communis, que est omnem hominem esse 3o animal, que est communis humanitas, quia non distincte scitur agregatum ex omnibus hominibus ut singuli distincte sciuntur. 5. ddt MS. 8. conclusio pro quanto () MS. 25. zu* ilaa teno MS. 28. acali MS. — 3o. quod pro quia MS. 1. From III G. 10. Prague University. Humanity, indifferent to being this or that person, cannot be singular, must be universal. If a given individual humanity were the same thing as humanity, the individual would be wherever humanity was. Two individuals are alike : where is the likeness? not in the individuals themselves, as such, for individuality is opposed to likeness. We know distinctly that all men are animals, vet this does not refer to all men, taken one by one.
NOTAE ET QUESTIONES VARIE. Nota; de se humanitas 2" modum communem est humanitas, et non de se humanitas 2"! quod huius est, illa neque illa; et sic de aliis, Igitur ipsa, cum sit illa 5humanitas de se, aut indifferens humanitas ad hoc quod sit illa vel illa. Etc. Vel sic: de se humanitas est indifferens ad hoc quod sit illa humanitas, vel quod sit illa (et sic de aliis); quanto de se erit singularis vel communis. Non singularis, quia contra racionem rosingularis humanitatis est esse de se indifferenter ad plures. Igitur est communis, Item, illa humanitas essencialiter et quiditative est humanitas. Vel igitur convertibiliter precise est illa humanitas singularis humanitas, vel non. Si sic, igitur i5 ubicunque est humanitas, et in quocunque loco, ibi erit ista humanitas: quod est inconveniens. Si non, tunc illa singularis humanitas est in minus vel in plus quam humanitas. Non in plus; igitur, in minus: et per con- sequens humanitas erit sibi communis. го ltem, Sortes est similis Platoni essencialiter vel sub- stancialiter. Vel igitur in humanitate communi (et tunc habetur propositum), vel in singulari, Non 2"', quia Sor sua singulari humanitate est sic homo quod non com- munis, Plato est sic homo .... et econtra, Et conse- 25quencia illata tenet in singulari humanitate sua: unus est alteri similis, et quod unus est homo sicut aliis. Item, quando aliquis scit de facto omnem hominem esse animal, non scitur de sciencia a tali, nisi ibi veritas sit communis, que est omnem hominem esse 3o animal, que est communis humanitas, quia non distincte scitur agregatum ex omnibus hominibus ut singuli distincte sciuntur. 5. ddt MS. 8. conclusio pro quanto () MS. 25. zu* ilaa teno MS. 28. acali MS. — 3o. quod pro quia MS. 1. From III G. 10. Prague University. Humanity, indifferent to being this or that person, cannot be singular, must be universal. If a given individual humanity were the same thing as humanity, the individual would be wherever humanity was. Two individuals are alike : where is the likeness? not in the individuals themselves, as such, for individuality is opposed to likeness. We know distinctly that all men are animals, vet this does not refer to all men, taken one by one.
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158 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. God knows the Item, requiritur ad veritatem que est “hominem esse' dependence of ee animal esse"; et non requiritur ad “hominem esse' Humanity upon istum hominem esse". Hoc bene scit deus. Queritur Animated Being'. ergo quid deus intelligat in hoc quod dicitur ad veri- Then He must tatem que est “hominem esse" et eius requisitum animal: know something in esse' in tali locucione, si deus cum intelligit distincte knowing this: but nothing quid est hoc dictum et quia omnino est intelligibilis singular. consequencia omnis quod deus per hoc dictum aliquid intelligat. Et non potest dici quod rem singularem; quia alias ipsa sunt falsa, et deus falsum non intelligit; ergo, 10 rem communem intelligit. Item, deum velle hominem esse, postquam ad con- sequenciam . . . . .. deum velle esse istum hominem (quemcunque homine demonstrando); quia sequitur: deus wult istum hominem esse; igitur wult hominem 15 esse et est .. . . . . . . . quam . . . . . . quia vult, istum hominem esse, igitur etc., Obiectum formale huius volicionis, "hominem esse", est prius quo ad conse- quenciam quam obiectum huius volicionis, "istum hominem esse". Et primum est "hominem esse". Et 20 secundum est "istum hominem esse". Igitur prius est quo ad consequenciam, “hominem esse" quam 'istum hominem esse". Et non singularem singulariter unum nec agregative unum, ut patet bene practicanti in ista materia. Has every truth a corresponding falsehood opposed to it? No, for there is no falsehood corresponding to the truth of God's existence. On the other hand, every true proposition is Utrum omnis veritas habeat sibi oppositam falsitatem. Respondetur quod non, quia non omne ens habet sibi oppositam non entitatem. Igitur non omnis veritas habet sibi oppositam falsitatem. Consequencia tenet a convertibili ad convertibile. Sed maior patet, quia prima 30 veritas, que est deum esse, non habet oppositam falsi- tatem. [In] oppositum sic argumentatur. Omnis propo- sicio vera habet sibi oppositam proposicionem falsam; igitur omnis veritas habet sibi oppositam falsitatem: consequencia tenet a convertibili ad convertibile a parte 35 5. ritm MS. 7. aio, or aro MS. 8. o, MS. 32. In deest MS. 12. Item. I have left several gaps in this passage, because it was impossible to make out the words. 25. 1b and the greater part of 2° contain the question Utrum omnis forma animati substancialiter producta sit indivisibilis quo ad molem already published in Dr. Beer's Quaestiones Tredecim, following on De Ente Predicamentali.
158 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. God knows the Item, requiritur ad veritatem que est “hominem esse' dependence of ee animal esse"; et non requiritur ad “hominem esse' Humanity upon istum hominem esse". Hoc bene scit deus. Queritur Animated Being'. ergo quid deus intelligat in hoc quod dicitur ad veri- Then He must tatem que est “hominem esse" et eius requisitum animal: know something in esse' in tali locucione, si deus cum intelligit distincte knowing this: but nothing quid est hoc dictum et quia omnino est intelligibilis singular. consequencia omnis quod deus per hoc dictum aliquid intelligat. Et non potest dici quod rem singularem; quia alias ipsa sunt falsa, et deus falsum non intelligit; ergo, 10 rem communem intelligit. Item, deum velle hominem esse, postquam ad con- sequenciam . . . . .. deum velle esse istum hominem (quemcunque homine demonstrando); quia sequitur: deus wult istum hominem esse; igitur wult hominem 15 esse et est .. . . . . . . . quam . . . . . . quia vult, istum hominem esse, igitur etc., Obiectum formale huius volicionis, "hominem esse", est prius quo ad conse- quenciam quam obiectum huius volicionis, "istum hominem esse". Et primum est "hominem esse". Et 20 secundum est "istum hominem esse". Igitur prius est quo ad consequenciam, “hominem esse" quam 'istum hominem esse". Et non singularem singulariter unum nec agregative unum, ut patet bene practicanti in ista materia. Has every truth a corresponding falsehood opposed to it? No, for there is no falsehood corresponding to the truth of God's existence. On the other hand, every true proposition is Utrum omnis veritas habeat sibi oppositam falsitatem. Respondetur quod non, quia non omne ens habet sibi oppositam non entitatem. Igitur non omnis veritas habet sibi oppositam falsitatem. Consequencia tenet a convertibili ad convertibile. Sed maior patet, quia prima 30 veritas, que est deum esse, non habet oppositam falsi- tatem. [In] oppositum sic argumentatur. Omnis propo- sicio vera habet sibi oppositam proposicionem falsam; igitur omnis veritas habet sibi oppositam falsitatem: consequencia tenet a convertibili ad convertibile a parte 35 5. ritm MS. 7. aio, or aro MS. 8. o, MS. 32. In deest MS. 12. Item. I have left several gaps in this passage, because it was impossible to make out the words. 25. 1b and the greater part of 2° contain the question Utrum omnis forma animati substancialiter producta sit indivisibilis quo ad molem already published in Dr. Beer's Quaestiones Tredecim, following on De Ente Predicamentali.
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DE UNIVERSALIBUS. subiecti et predicati. Nam 'proposicio vera' convertitur cum 'veritate' «t 'proposicio falsa! convertitur cum 'falsitate'. Et secundo quandoque omnis entitas dicitur veritas, sicud omne ens dicitur verum; et sic ille ter- 5 minus, 'veritas', significat omne ens positive, et ille terminus, 'falsitas', contradictorie significat convertibiliter significatum cum isto termino ‘non entitas'. Et talem falsitatem credo non posse significare, cum omne vere significans significat entitatem, | et per con- tosequens veritatem; et sic iste terminus, 'falsitas', signi- ficat omnem veritatem negative, Sed isti termini, Verum, Falsum et Veritas, superaddunt super ens nominaliter intellectum tempus verbi: ut, dico vel credo veritatem; dico ens quod est: ''proposicio significat verum vel 15falsum". Hoc est ens quod est, vel non est; et tunc dixi verum vel veritatem, quia tunc dixi ens quod tunc fuit; et falsum: tunc dixi vel concepi, quia ens, quod tunc non fuit; et ita verum vel veritas sunt passiones entis, significando ens, quod vere fuit, erit, vel potest esse. Sed sic non est ille terminus, "falsitas. Unde, si credo veritatem, credo ens quod est; vel si credo falsum, credo quod non est. Et sic secundo modo capitur veritas per adequacionem signi ad suum signatum et falsitas per defectum huiusmodi correspondencie, et talis 35 veritas et falsitas sunt in signo tantum, cum sic forma denominans ipsum est verum vel falsum; et omnis talis falsitas videtur michi veritas, et posse significari. Sic ergo, significare falsum est significare ens quod non est, ut illa: Homo est equus; significat quod homo est 3oequus, et hoc non est: igitur est falsum, Falsitatem autem primo modo acceptam inpossibile est esse, quia tunc est aliqua non entitas, ex quo sequitur quod omnis proposicio falsa secundarie significat falsum; quod ens quod non est, sed non falsitatem etc. Secundo, noto 35 quod omnes denominaciones positive signorum respectu suum signatorum sunt principaliter capte: ut iste terminus, 'habitus', capit a suo significato ad signifi- candum rem que est positiva; et iste terminus, ''pri- vacio", a re non positiva; et sic de aliis. Conclusio Prima. Veritas prima a parte rei (que cst deum esse) non habet sibi oppositam falsitatem, Pro- batur. Veritas prima est veritas optima; igitur veritas 20 40 32. (300 MS. 25. p d'fetu MS. 159 a truth, and vice-versa; but to every true proposition you can find a contradictory false onc. I do not believe that falschood can mcan non-entity ; any thing that hàs meaning must mean something, or entity. The words *false’ and ‘true’ give us, together with entity. an idea of time; what is true is true now, or then, or at some possible time; but falsehood is simply a belief that something which is, is not. It cannot be a belief in nothing, but always in an entity, and therefore falsehood docs not properlv correspond with. non-entitv. The First Truth (Go. existence; has no corresponding
DE UNIVERSALIBUS. subiecti et predicati. Nam 'proposicio vera' convertitur cum 'veritate' «t 'proposicio falsa! convertitur cum 'falsitate'. Et secundo quandoque omnis entitas dicitur veritas, sicud omne ens dicitur verum; et sic ille ter- 5 minus, 'veritas', significat omne ens positive, et ille terminus, 'falsitas', contradictorie significat convertibiliter significatum cum isto termino ‘non entitas'. Et talem falsitatem credo non posse significare, cum omne vere significans significat entitatem, | et per con- tosequens veritatem; et sic iste terminus, 'falsitas', signi- ficat omnem veritatem negative, Sed isti termini, Verum, Falsum et Veritas, superaddunt super ens nominaliter intellectum tempus verbi: ut, dico vel credo veritatem; dico ens quod est: ''proposicio significat verum vel 15falsum". Hoc est ens quod est, vel non est; et tunc dixi verum vel veritatem, quia tunc dixi ens quod tunc fuit; et falsum: tunc dixi vel concepi, quia ens, quod tunc non fuit; et ita verum vel veritas sunt passiones entis, significando ens, quod vere fuit, erit, vel potest esse. Sed sic non est ille terminus, "falsitas. Unde, si credo veritatem, credo ens quod est; vel si credo falsum, credo quod non est. Et sic secundo modo capitur veritas per adequacionem signi ad suum signatum et falsitas per defectum huiusmodi correspondencie, et talis 35 veritas et falsitas sunt in signo tantum, cum sic forma denominans ipsum est verum vel falsum; et omnis talis falsitas videtur michi veritas, et posse significari. Sic ergo, significare falsum est significare ens quod non est, ut illa: Homo est equus; significat quod homo est 3oequus, et hoc non est: igitur est falsum, Falsitatem autem primo modo acceptam inpossibile est esse, quia tunc est aliqua non entitas, ex quo sequitur quod omnis proposicio falsa secundarie significat falsum; quod ens quod non est, sed non falsitatem etc. Secundo, noto 35 quod omnes denominaciones positive signorum respectu suum signatorum sunt principaliter capte: ut iste terminus, 'habitus', capit a suo significato ad signifi- candum rem que est positiva; et iste terminus, ''pri- vacio", a re non positiva; et sic de aliis. Conclusio Prima. Veritas prima a parte rei (que cst deum esse) non habet sibi oppositam falsitatem, Pro- batur. Veritas prima est veritas optima; igitur veritas 20 40 32. (300 MS. 25. p d'fetu MS. 159 a truth, and vice-versa; but to every true proposition you can find a contradictory false onc. I do not believe that falschood can mcan non-entity ; any thing that hàs meaning must mean something, or entity. The words *false’ and ‘true’ give us, together with entity. an idea of time; what is true is true now, or then, or at some possible time; but falsehood is simply a belief that something which is, is not. It cannot be a belief in nothing, but always in an entity, and therefore falsehood docs not properlv correspond with. non-entitv. The First Truth (Go. existence; has no corresponding
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160 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. falsehood. If it prima non habet sibi oppositam falsitatem, sibi oppo- had, that would be sitam maliciam. Consequencia tenet a convertibili ad something, and convertibile. Si ergo habet sibi oppositam falsitatem vel something absolutely bad, maliciam, habet sibi oppositam maliciam pessimam, eo even as God is absolutely quod est veritas optima; et per consequens ponuntur 5 good; but duo extrema, quorum unum optimum et aliud pessi- there i5 n10 being which is mum; et per consequens non omne ens erit bonum, not good to et sic propria passio negabitur de suo subiecto; quia some extent. bonum de ente. In God there Corollarium. Veritas prima est simpliciter impas- 10 cun be no sibilis, ideo quia non habet sibi oppositam maliciam; passivity, since He has no igitur nec contrarium, etc. opposite. Conclusio 2a. Veritas 2a non habet sibi oppositam There is no falsehood falsitatem. Probatur. Esse productum non habet falsi- opposed to the Second Truth: tatem sibi oppositam, et esse productum est veritas 2a. the existence of creatures. Igitur conclusio vera. Maior probatur. Esse productum For the est optimum post deum esse. Igitur non habet falsitatem Opposite falsehood sibi oppositam; quia si non, da [quod] oppositum habet would be the falsitatem sibi oppositam. Igitur non entitatem con- worst of all things, tinentem omnem descripcionem falsitatis primo modo 20 since absolute Evil does not dicte; et, cum esse productum sit optimum post deum exist; and this ' Worst of all' esse, habebit oppositum pessimum post non deum esse; is impossible et per consequens erit productum pessimum, quod est for the same reason. contra conclusionem primam. Sed minor, scilicet quod omne productum est veritas 2a, probatur: Deum esse 25 est veritas prima, eo quod non habet sibi veritatem presuppositam causantem. Igitur est aliqua veritas 2a. Probatur. Deum differens ab ista, et quecunque dabitur potest esse productum erit inpertinens; igitur conclusio vera. Nam potest esse productum post deum esse, et 30 nulla est prior post deum esse producta esse; igitur productum esse post deum est primum, et per con- sequens prima veritas post deum esse; igitur est veritas 2a. Corollarium. Est dare optimum causatum: igitur 35 optimum effectum: igitur rem optime factam; et hoc est esse productum optimum; igitur quod deus facit est esse causatum, etc. 15 18. quod deest MS. 28. drs MS. 19. 9eite3 of MS. 20. d'ſc'pcoe MS. 28. Deum differens. The following sentences seem to be absolutely unintelligible. Yet there is a mark (!) on my transcript, showing that the MS. is sufficiently plain.
160 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. falsehood. If it prima non habet sibi oppositam falsitatem, sibi oppo- had, that would be sitam maliciam. Consequencia tenet a convertibili ad something, and convertibile. Si ergo habet sibi oppositam falsitatem vel something absolutely bad, maliciam, habet sibi oppositam maliciam pessimam, eo even as God is absolutely quod est veritas optima; et per consequens ponuntur 5 good; but duo extrema, quorum unum optimum et aliud pessi- there i5 n10 being which is mum; et per consequens non omne ens erit bonum, not good to et sic propria passio negabitur de suo subiecto; quia some extent. bonum de ente. In God there Corollarium. Veritas prima est simpliciter impas- 10 cun be no sibilis, ideo quia non habet sibi oppositam maliciam; passivity, since He has no igitur nec contrarium, etc. opposite. Conclusio 2a. Veritas 2a non habet sibi oppositam There is no falsehood falsitatem. Probatur. Esse productum non habet falsi- opposed to the Second Truth: tatem sibi oppositam, et esse productum est veritas 2a. the existence of creatures. Igitur conclusio vera. Maior probatur. Esse productum For the est optimum post deum esse. Igitur non habet falsitatem Opposite falsehood sibi oppositam; quia si non, da [quod] oppositum habet would be the falsitatem sibi oppositam. Igitur non entitatem con- worst of all things, tinentem omnem descripcionem falsitatis primo modo 20 since absolute Evil does not dicte; et, cum esse productum sit optimum post deum exist; and this ' Worst of all' esse, habebit oppositum pessimum post non deum esse; is impossible et per consequens erit productum pessimum, quod est for the same reason. contra conclusionem primam. Sed minor, scilicet quod omne productum est veritas 2a, probatur: Deum esse 25 est veritas prima, eo quod non habet sibi veritatem presuppositam causantem. Igitur est aliqua veritas 2a. Probatur. Deum differens ab ista, et quecunque dabitur potest esse productum erit inpertinens; igitur conclusio vera. Nam potest esse productum post deum esse, et 30 nulla est prior post deum esse producta esse; igitur productum esse post deum est primum, et per con- sequens prima veritas post deum esse; igitur est veritas 2a. Corollarium. Est dare optimum causatum: igitur 35 optimum effectum: igitur rem optime factam; et hoc est esse productum optimum; igitur quod deus facit est esse causatum, etc. 15 18. quod deest MS. 28. drs MS. 19. 9eite3 of MS. 20. d'ſc'pcoe MS. 28. Deum differens. The following sentences seem to be absolutely unintelligible. Yet there is a mark (!) on my transcript, showing that the MS. is sufficiently plain.
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DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 161 32 Conclusio 3a. Nulla veritas, capiendo veritatem primo modo et falsitatem, habet sibi oppositam falsitatem. Probatur. Nullum ens habet sibi oppositam non enti- tatem. Omnis veritas est ens; igitur nulla veritas habet 5 sibi oppositam non entitatem. Et per consequens nec falsitatem. Consequencia prima tenet in Celarent, et 2a ex notabili vel ex convertibili. Maior probatur; quia, si alio tempore ens habet sibi oppositam non entitatem, haberet oppositum contradictorium, quod est impossibile. Sed minor, quod omnis veritas est ens, patet inductive etc.; conclusio ut proponitur est prima etc. No truth has any opposite falsehood, taking the words in their meaning as things. For entity has no opposite non-entity that is contradictory to it. SOPHISMA. Sor albus et Sor calidus ponunt in numerum. Pro- Whiteness and heat are two batur. Sor esse album et Sor esse calidum ponunt in different things in A; .". 15 numerum; igitur Sor albus et Sor calidus ponunt in A white and A numerum. Consequencia tenet ab eodem ad idem; et hot make two. But A is the non oppositum sed eadem res penitus est Sor albus et same being as A .. they do Sor calidus; igitur non ponunt in numerum. Tenet not make two. consequencia; quia, si ponerent in numerum, tunc non We must deny the first 20 esset penitus idem suppositum, Igitur et respondendo assumption. negatur hoc supra. Utrum possibile est vere predicari affirmative et non abstractum de concreto? Nota primo quod abstractum" in terminis vocatur The abstract means the form 25 terminus qui significat formam substancialem vel acci- of an idea separated from dentalem primarie; sed “concretum" est terminus qui its subject; the formam et suppositum cuius est talis forma significat. concrete represents Termini ergo isti, “humanitas, albedo, substancialitas", it with its subject. vocantur abstracta. Tales vero, “homo, equus, albus, 3o grammaticus", vocantur concreta. Pro illa cognicione suppono dictum philosophi in predicamento quantitatis i. e., "Album solam qualitatem significat." Et ceterorum philosophorum qui in omnibus suis libris exemplificantes de accidente ponunt album, nigrum, iustum, et sic de 6. p tes pro tenet MS. 11. 90 pro conclusio questio MS.; ib. p'a MS. 17. 3 noppositu MS. 30. gnoc MS. 32. 9. pro i. c. MS. 11. This is a deep thought, which modern philosophers would do well to notice. Two real contradictories are so divided that the one cannot be predicated of the other. Now, as a fact, entity is predicated of non-entity: "Nothing is something we think of." De Universalibus. 11
DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 161 32 Conclusio 3a. Nulla veritas, capiendo veritatem primo modo et falsitatem, habet sibi oppositam falsitatem. Probatur. Nullum ens habet sibi oppositam non enti- tatem. Omnis veritas est ens; igitur nulla veritas habet 5 sibi oppositam non entitatem. Et per consequens nec falsitatem. Consequencia prima tenet in Celarent, et 2a ex notabili vel ex convertibili. Maior probatur; quia, si alio tempore ens habet sibi oppositam non entitatem, haberet oppositum contradictorium, quod est impossibile. Sed minor, quod omnis veritas est ens, patet inductive etc.; conclusio ut proponitur est prima etc. No truth has any opposite falsehood, taking the words in their meaning as things. For entity has no opposite non-entity that is contradictory to it. SOPHISMA. Sor albus et Sor calidus ponunt in numerum. Pro- Whiteness and heat are two batur. Sor esse album et Sor esse calidum ponunt in different things in A; .". 15 numerum; igitur Sor albus et Sor calidus ponunt in A white and A numerum. Consequencia tenet ab eodem ad idem; et hot make two. But A is the non oppositum sed eadem res penitus est Sor albus et same being as A .. they do Sor calidus; igitur non ponunt in numerum. Tenet not make two. consequencia; quia, si ponerent in numerum, tunc non We must deny the first 20 esset penitus idem suppositum, Igitur et respondendo assumption. negatur hoc supra. Utrum possibile est vere predicari affirmative et non abstractum de concreto? Nota primo quod abstractum" in terminis vocatur The abstract means the form 25 terminus qui significat formam substancialem vel acci- of an idea separated from dentalem primarie; sed “concretum" est terminus qui its subject; the formam et suppositum cuius est talis forma significat. concrete represents Termini ergo isti, “humanitas, albedo, substancialitas", it with its subject. vocantur abstracta. Tales vero, “homo, equus, albus, 3o grammaticus", vocantur concreta. Pro illa cognicione suppono dictum philosophi in predicamento quantitatis i. e., "Album solam qualitatem significat." Et ceterorum philosophorum qui in omnibus suis libris exemplificantes de accidente ponunt album, nigrum, iustum, et sic de 6. p tes pro tenet MS. 11. 90 pro conclusio questio MS.; ib. p'a MS. 17. 3 noppositu MS. 30. gnoc MS. 32. 9. pro i. c. MS. 11. This is a deep thought, which modern philosophers would do well to notice. Two real contradictories are so divided that the one cannot be predicated of the other. Now, as a fact, entity is predicated of non-entity: "Nothing is something we think of." De Universalibus. 11
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162 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. Every term may have a primary signification. That is the object towards which the mind is at first bent. This depends much upon the predicate. A man is an animal; you do not think of any particular man. A man runs; you think of A, B or C. The primary signification of white is whiteness existing in a subject, and the usage of ancient authors shows this abundantly. aliis; non falsificando exempla eorum pueriliter, cum non per falsitatem in scienciam nos talibus inducant. Suppono quod cuilibet termino significati est dare primarium significatum, innuendo illam sophisticam satis inutilem dicentem, “Homo primarie significat5 hominem, et tamen nichil homo primarie significat'; quia taliter sophistice ego promitterem denarium et nichil sibi dare. Pro intellectu tamen, nota quod primarium signifi- catum alicuius termini est significatum ad quod intel- 10 lectus tali audito immediate fertur intelligendus; ex quo sequitur quod omnis terminus communis significans habet duplex significatum, scilicet primarium et 2ndarium; sequitur quod omnis terminus habens predicatum debet principaliter sumi pro significato suo primario. Exempli 15 gracia, cum proponitur, “Homo est animal", intellectus audientis hanc proposicionem non fertur super Sor nec Platone, sed absolute super significato primario, quod est species humana que est humanitas. Si autem pro- ponitur cum predicata humanitate, videndum est si 20 predicatum limitat ipsum subiectum racione primarii significati vel secundarii. Et sic revertitur nobis illa antiqua regula et famosa: Talia sunt subiecta qualia permittuntur ab eorum predicatis. Exemplum ad signifi- catum primarium. Hec est regula vera: Homo com- 25 municatur multis, eo quod predicatum non potest com- petere significato primario huius termini homo, cum Sor non communicatur multis, licet Sor sit illa humanitas que communicatur multis". Exemplum 2i, scilicet signi- ficati secundarii, "homo currit" et predicatum limitat 30 subiectum ad significatum secundarium, cum non potest competere significato primario, eo quod humanitas, sive species humana, non potest currere, nisi sit currens. Et 3° suppono quod significatum termini concreti acci- dentalis primarium est accidens sive forma talem sub-35 stanciam denominans; ut huius termini, album, signifi- catum primarium est albedo substanciam albisans. Similiter huius termini iustum, est iusticia subiectum iustificans. Ista supposicio tenet per primam Aristotelis auctoritatem allegantem: "Album solam qualitatem 40 significat"; quod intelligitur primarie; sed substanciam 4. fumdo (?) MS.; ib. sophist'am MS. 14. ſptu pro sequitur MS.
162 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. Every term may have a primary signification. That is the object towards which the mind is at first bent. This depends much upon the predicate. A man is an animal; you do not think of any particular man. A man runs; you think of A, B or C. The primary signification of white is whiteness existing in a subject, and the usage of ancient authors shows this abundantly. aliis; non falsificando exempla eorum pueriliter, cum non per falsitatem in scienciam nos talibus inducant. Suppono quod cuilibet termino significati est dare primarium significatum, innuendo illam sophisticam satis inutilem dicentem, “Homo primarie significat5 hominem, et tamen nichil homo primarie significat'; quia taliter sophistice ego promitterem denarium et nichil sibi dare. Pro intellectu tamen, nota quod primarium signifi- catum alicuius termini est significatum ad quod intel- 10 lectus tali audito immediate fertur intelligendus; ex quo sequitur quod omnis terminus communis significans habet duplex significatum, scilicet primarium et 2ndarium; sequitur quod omnis terminus habens predicatum debet principaliter sumi pro significato suo primario. Exempli 15 gracia, cum proponitur, “Homo est animal", intellectus audientis hanc proposicionem non fertur super Sor nec Platone, sed absolute super significato primario, quod est species humana que est humanitas. Si autem pro- ponitur cum predicata humanitate, videndum est si 20 predicatum limitat ipsum subiectum racione primarii significati vel secundarii. Et sic revertitur nobis illa antiqua regula et famosa: Talia sunt subiecta qualia permittuntur ab eorum predicatis. Exemplum ad signifi- catum primarium. Hec est regula vera: Homo com- 25 municatur multis, eo quod predicatum non potest com- petere significato primario huius termini homo, cum Sor non communicatur multis, licet Sor sit illa humanitas que communicatur multis". Exemplum 2i, scilicet signi- ficati secundarii, "homo currit" et predicatum limitat 30 subiectum ad significatum secundarium, cum non potest competere significato primario, eo quod humanitas, sive species humana, non potest currere, nisi sit currens. Et 3° suppono quod significatum termini concreti acci- dentalis primarium est accidens sive forma talem sub-35 stanciam denominans; ut huius termini, album, signifi- catum primarium est albedo substanciam albisans. Similiter huius termini iustum, est iusticia subiectum iustificans. Ista supposicio tenet per primam Aristotelis auctoritatem allegantem: "Album solam qualitatem 40 significat"; quod intelligitur primarie; sed substanciam 4. fumdo (?) MS.; ib. sophist'am MS. 14. ſptu pro sequitur MS.
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DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 163 cui inest albedo secundarie. Ex quo patet quare Porphyrius, Aristoteles, Commentator et alii antiqui philosophi in exemplis suis utuntur talibus concretis formaliter pro significato primario. Si non admittitur supposicio, argu- 5 mentatur pro ea sic: "Album est denominatum, ergo ab albo, vel ab alio". Non ab alio, cum nec a nigre- dine nec a nigricia potest dici album. Ergo ab albedine. Et cum omne denominans, ut huius [modi], sit prius denominato, ut huiusmodi, sequitur quod a principali 10 debet capere suam primariam significacionem sed omnem etsi non sequitur quod album omnem substanciam significaret quod factum est. Cum enim Sor primo nec Platonem nec hominem 2m sequitur et sic de aliis ergo solum subiectum denominativum quod posterius est 15 denominatum ipsa albedine denominante. Conclusio Prima: esse abstractum substanciale predi- catur de suo denominato. Probatur. Omne tale est significatum primarium eiusdem a denominato: igitur conclusio vera. Assumptum patet in ista, et consequenter 20 in simili: 'Homo est humanitas." Nam si non predi- catur vere, tunc non idem est homo et humanitas. Ergo in dictis secundum se non idem est "ipsum" et "ipsum esse" contra textum septimi metaphysice. Racione sic: Hec est falsa per adversarium: homo est humanitas; 25 et cum sint termini significativi, habebunt signa dispa- rata; ergo, homo non erit humanitas. Et tamen humanitas non significat actum hominis, eo quod implicat contra- diccionem esse hominem pro aliquo gradu, et non esse humanitatem hominis. Ergo humanitas est substancia, 3o et non anima hominis a pari, nec corpus; sequitur quod non est substancia, cum non sit pars hominis nec homo. Quo dato, quero: humanitas est aliquid vel nichil? non 2m; ergo primum. Tunc humanitas est aliquid, et non accidens, ut ostenditur. Igitur substancia 35 vel corporea vel incorporea: si incorporea, tunc huma- nitas hominis est anima hominis; si corporea, vel racionalis vel non racionalis; si racionalis, sequitur What is it that makes white the colour it is? Either whiteness or some other colour: no other,.. whiteness. Man and humanity may be predicated of one another If not, then what is humanity ? Not an accident of man; not the soul, not the body, and not a substance. If anything, it must be identical with man. 1. quia MS. 8. modi deest MS. 18. adio MS, 23. septi MS. 37. nolis MS. 10. Sed omnem is not clear; but if we suppose secundum for sed, and add some such word as extensionem, we see light. After significaret (l. 12) to the end of the paragraph, we have only a confused jumble of words. 11
DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 163 cui inest albedo secundarie. Ex quo patet quare Porphyrius, Aristoteles, Commentator et alii antiqui philosophi in exemplis suis utuntur talibus concretis formaliter pro significato primario. Si non admittitur supposicio, argu- 5 mentatur pro ea sic: "Album est denominatum, ergo ab albo, vel ab alio". Non ab alio, cum nec a nigre- dine nec a nigricia potest dici album. Ergo ab albedine. Et cum omne denominans, ut huius [modi], sit prius denominato, ut huiusmodi, sequitur quod a principali 10 debet capere suam primariam significacionem sed omnem etsi non sequitur quod album omnem substanciam significaret quod factum est. Cum enim Sor primo nec Platonem nec hominem 2m sequitur et sic de aliis ergo solum subiectum denominativum quod posterius est 15 denominatum ipsa albedine denominante. Conclusio Prima: esse abstractum substanciale predi- catur de suo denominato. Probatur. Omne tale est significatum primarium eiusdem a denominato: igitur conclusio vera. Assumptum patet in ista, et consequenter 20 in simili: 'Homo est humanitas." Nam si non predi- catur vere, tunc non idem est homo et humanitas. Ergo in dictis secundum se non idem est "ipsum" et "ipsum esse" contra textum septimi metaphysice. Racione sic: Hec est falsa per adversarium: homo est humanitas; 25 et cum sint termini significativi, habebunt signa dispa- rata; ergo, homo non erit humanitas. Et tamen humanitas non significat actum hominis, eo quod implicat contra- diccionem esse hominem pro aliquo gradu, et non esse humanitatem hominis. Ergo humanitas est substancia, 3o et non anima hominis a pari, nec corpus; sequitur quod non est substancia, cum non sit pars hominis nec homo. Quo dato, quero: humanitas est aliquid vel nichil? non 2m; ergo primum. Tunc humanitas est aliquid, et non accidens, ut ostenditur. Igitur substancia 35 vel corporea vel incorporea: si incorporea, tunc huma- nitas hominis est anima hominis; si corporea, vel racionalis vel non racionalis; si racionalis, sequitur What is it that makes white the colour it is? Either whiteness or some other colour: no other,.. whiteness. Man and humanity may be predicated of one another If not, then what is humanity ? Not an accident of man; not the soul, not the body, and not a substance. If anything, it must be identical with man. 1. quia MS. 8. modi deest MS. 18. adio MS, 23. septi MS. 37. nolis MS. 10. Sed omnem is not clear; but if we suppose secundum for sed, and add some such word as extensionem, we see light. After significaret (l. 12) to the end of the paragraph, we have only a confused jumble of words. 11
Strana 164
164 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. And yet there is a difference between them. Every abstract term is truly and affirmatively predicated of its corresponding concrete term. propositum, quod humanitas est homo; si non racionalis, erit corpus hominis, et cum corpus non denominatur de sola humanitate, sequitur quod non sit corpus nec aliqua pars corporis, cum nulla talis dicitur esse homo ab humanitate. Corollarium. Quamvis idem est homo et humanitas, tamen humanitas differt ab homine. Patet, quia aliquid potest convenire humanitati, quod non potest convenire homini pro significato predicamentali. Patet, quia humanitas potest assumi ypostatice, et non sic homo. 10 Igitur corollarium verum. Conclusio 2a. Omne abstractum vere affirmative pre- dicatur de suo concreto. Probatur. Omne concretum, ut huius [modi], capit suum esse ab abstracto. Patet; nam album habet esse ab albedine, eo quod non potest 15 esse album nisi albedo dicat ipsum esse album. Sed ad rem intellegendo .. .. .. igitur conclusio vera. Sed assumptum patet in predicamentis, cum omne denomi- nativum denominatum cadat a suo formaliter denomi- nante. Corollarium. Omnes iste et tales proposiciones sunt vere: ' Album est albedo", nigrum est nigredo", me sedere est sessio mea", “me legere est leccio mea", me legere sum ego legens“, non obstantibus istis," album est substancia", nigrum est substancia". Corol-25 larium: quilibet audiens et intelligens, cum proponitur sibi “album", primarie intelligit “album", et secundarie substanciam subiectam albedini". Ergo pari racione istam prius debet concedere: Album est albedo", quam “ album est substancia". Corollarium: remissiores 30 sunt solum concedentes “Album esse substanciam" quam concedentes “album esse accidens"; sed utrique unum concedunt. Et patet, quia pulchre paralogizat sic arguens: Album est albedo", et “Album est substancia", igitur, 'Substancia est albedo". Similiter: Grammaticus est 35 substancia" et “Grammaticus est accidens", igitur, Accidens est substancia". Similiter, 'Nullus homo predicatur denominative, omnis grammaticus est homo; igitur nullus grammaticus predicatur denominative". Vel sic: "Omnis grammaticus est formaliter denomi-40 natum; sed homo est grammaticus; igitur homo est ce 20 9. pli MS. 14. modi deest MS. 30. 9ressiores MS. 33. con- cedant MS.
164 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. And yet there is a difference between them. Every abstract term is truly and affirmatively predicated of its corresponding concrete term. propositum, quod humanitas est homo; si non racionalis, erit corpus hominis, et cum corpus non denominatur de sola humanitate, sequitur quod non sit corpus nec aliqua pars corporis, cum nulla talis dicitur esse homo ab humanitate. Corollarium. Quamvis idem est homo et humanitas, tamen humanitas differt ab homine. Patet, quia aliquid potest convenire humanitati, quod non potest convenire homini pro significato predicamentali. Patet, quia humanitas potest assumi ypostatice, et non sic homo. 10 Igitur corollarium verum. Conclusio 2a. Omne abstractum vere affirmative pre- dicatur de suo concreto. Probatur. Omne concretum, ut huius [modi], capit suum esse ab abstracto. Patet; nam album habet esse ab albedine, eo quod non potest 15 esse album nisi albedo dicat ipsum esse album. Sed ad rem intellegendo .. .. .. igitur conclusio vera. Sed assumptum patet in predicamentis, cum omne denomi- nativum denominatum cadat a suo formaliter denomi- nante. Corollarium. Omnes iste et tales proposiciones sunt vere: ' Album est albedo", nigrum est nigredo", me sedere est sessio mea", “me legere est leccio mea", me legere sum ego legens“, non obstantibus istis," album est substancia", nigrum est substancia". Corol-25 larium: quilibet audiens et intelligens, cum proponitur sibi “album", primarie intelligit “album", et secundarie substanciam subiectam albedini". Ergo pari racione istam prius debet concedere: Album est albedo", quam “ album est substancia". Corollarium: remissiores 30 sunt solum concedentes “Album esse substanciam" quam concedentes “album esse accidens"; sed utrique unum concedunt. Et patet, quia pulchre paralogizat sic arguens: Album est albedo", et “Album est substancia", igitur, 'Substancia est albedo". Similiter: Grammaticus est 35 substancia" et “Grammaticus est accidens", igitur, Accidens est substancia". Similiter, 'Nullus homo predicatur denominative, omnis grammaticus est homo; igitur nullus grammaticus predicatur denominative". Vel sic: "Omnis grammaticus est formaliter denomi-40 natum; sed homo est grammaticus; igitur homo est ce 20 9. pli MS. 14. modi deest MS. 30. 9ressiores MS. 33. con- cedant MS.
Strana 165
DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 165 formaliter denominatum." Et sic, multipliciter miscendo 2m fallaciam figure diccionis multitudo, quid, in quale et aliquale in quid. Corollarium. "Omnis grammaticus est substancia; grammaticus supponit personaliter pro sub- 5 stancia". Corollarium 2m: "Omnis grammaticus est grammatica; grammaticus supponit simpliciter pro forma que est “hunc esse grammaticum, quod est grammatica". Et si obicitur: wulgares stomachabuntur cum sic conce- dentem audient; “habeo bonam scienciam grammaticam;' 1o non mirum si veritate non intellecta loycus turbatur, dum principalissimis hoc philosophis contingit. Intelligens vero non stomachatur, sed pocius consenciet huius veritatis. Corollarium ultimum. Ideo ut proponitur est verum. 15 4 SOPHISMA. Baccis est accidens. Probatur. Iam de petro non predicatur vere baccis; et inmediate post sic probabitur. Igitur contingenter inerit ei baccis. Igitur. In oppo- situm: Nulla substancia est accidens; sed omnis baccis 20 est substancia; igitur nullus baccis est accidens. Con- sequencia tenet in Celarent; maior nota de se, minor quod omnis est substancia. Probatur, quia omnis baccis est homo, igitur est substancia etc. Utrum inter omnia genita est possibile esse aliquid 25 genitum quod retineat primum gradum essendi per- fectissimum, etc.? Quod conclusio falsa, argumentatur sic. Nullum genitum est possibile esse perfectissimum, quia quocunque dato, potest eo esse perfectius, cum potencia dei non terminatur 3o ad maximum; igitur conclusio falsa. Quod conclusio sit vera, probatur. Est dare effectum optimum, igitur est genitum inter omnia genita, quod retinet gradum per- fectissimum: igitur conclusio vera, etc. Respondendo ad istam questionem, noto primo quod 35 sicud generacio est duplex, sic et genitum correspondenter est duplex, primo generacio, que est substancie, que ideo dicitur propria, quia est mutacio subita vel successiva a non existere ad existere, presupponens essenciam Is there any Begotten one who is the most perfect of all ? No, for there is no limit to God's power. Tes, for the limit is the highest possible point of perfection. Note that there are two kinds of generation, one proper, causing a new existence, and the other improper, 16. Bacce 9. or hec pro habeo (hed) MS.; ib. grammaticum MS. (and so on) MS.; ib. de peto MS. 17. p9. MS. 34. questio (in full) MS. 38. exiftet' MS.; ib. exist'e MS. 16. Baccis. I cannot find the word in Du Cange.
DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 165 formaliter denominatum." Et sic, multipliciter miscendo 2m fallaciam figure diccionis multitudo, quid, in quale et aliquale in quid. Corollarium. "Omnis grammaticus est substancia; grammaticus supponit personaliter pro sub- 5 stancia". Corollarium 2m: "Omnis grammaticus est grammatica; grammaticus supponit simpliciter pro forma que est “hunc esse grammaticum, quod est grammatica". Et si obicitur: wulgares stomachabuntur cum sic conce- dentem audient; “habeo bonam scienciam grammaticam;' 1o non mirum si veritate non intellecta loycus turbatur, dum principalissimis hoc philosophis contingit. Intelligens vero non stomachatur, sed pocius consenciet huius veritatis. Corollarium ultimum. Ideo ut proponitur est verum. 15 4 SOPHISMA. Baccis est accidens. Probatur. Iam de petro non predicatur vere baccis; et inmediate post sic probabitur. Igitur contingenter inerit ei baccis. Igitur. In oppo- situm: Nulla substancia est accidens; sed omnis baccis 20 est substancia; igitur nullus baccis est accidens. Con- sequencia tenet in Celarent; maior nota de se, minor quod omnis est substancia. Probatur, quia omnis baccis est homo, igitur est substancia etc. Utrum inter omnia genita est possibile esse aliquid 25 genitum quod retineat primum gradum essendi per- fectissimum, etc.? Quod conclusio falsa, argumentatur sic. Nullum genitum est possibile esse perfectissimum, quia quocunque dato, potest eo esse perfectius, cum potencia dei non terminatur 3o ad maximum; igitur conclusio falsa. Quod conclusio sit vera, probatur. Est dare effectum optimum, igitur est genitum inter omnia genita, quod retinet gradum per- fectissimum: igitur conclusio vera, etc. Respondendo ad istam questionem, noto primo quod 35 sicud generacio est duplex, sic et genitum correspondenter est duplex, primo generacio, que est substancie, que ideo dicitur propria, quia est mutacio subita vel successiva a non existere ad existere, presupponens essenciam Is there any Begotten one who is the most perfect of all ? No, for there is no limit to God's power. Tes, for the limit is the highest possible point of perfection. Note that there are two kinds of generation, one proper, causing a new existence, and the other improper, 16. Bacce 9. or hec pro habeo (hed) MS.; ib. grammaticum MS. (and so on) MS.; ib. de peto MS. 17. p9. MS. 34. questio (in full) MS. 38. exiftet' MS.; ib. exist'e MS. 16. Baccis. I cannot find the word in Du Cange.
Strana 166
166 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. causing only a subiectantem illam generacionem; que quidem essencia new mode of est ipsum generatum, etc. existence in a previously Alia generacio est inpropria, et vocatur ideo inpropria existent being. quia (secundum eam) aliquid non dicitur fieri quod prius non fuit, sed dicitur aliquale esse (vel fieri) quale 5 prius non fuit; et sic omnis naturalis sive creata generacio presupponit subiectum suum preexistere tempore vel natura proporcionabiliter. Genitum duplex proprium, quod est substancia producta; inproprium, quod est substanciam esse aliqualem vel alicuiusmodi, 10 qualis, vel cuiusmodi, prius non fuit. 2° nota de gradu essendi. Unde gradus essendi rerum est duplex, scilicet: gradus essendi essencialis, et alius accidentalis. Suppono ergo quod omne positivum habeat unum essendi gradum in ordine nature, quo gradu non 15 est alius sibi prior. Patet supposicio ex hoc; quia si a positivum sit prius naturaliter illo gradu, tunc est signare illum gradum prioritatis; et cum non sit processus in infinitum, 2m racionem Aristotelis, tunc est dare gradum quo primo naturaliter a est. Aliter non esset dare quid 20 primo est aliquid; et consequenter nec ordinem nature, quod incriminet totam philosophiam. Patet igitur quod respectu cuiuslibet rei est dare unum gradum nature quo essencialiter est id quod est, et illum oportet esse primum. Quo habito, quod nullus potest esse prius 25 naturaliter tali gradu, cum sic correspondenter graduatur; ergo, cum talis sit dandus, sequitur quod respectu cuiuslibet positivi est dare gradum essendi, quo ipsum non potest esse naturaliter prius: quod fuit probandum. Confirmacio huius: deus est in summo gradu nature 30 possibili, quo ipse non potest [esse] prior aut posterior; et quidquid citra deum est, est propter hoc in ordine nature prius, quod est deo propinquius. Sed quia gradus essendi dei est inmobilis, ita quod nullus gradus essen- cialis creature potest sibi esse propinquius aut distancius, 35 igitur nulla creatura potest esse prius in ordine nature aut posterius in natura. Istis stantibus, sit conclusio prima etc. Conclusio prima. Omnia genita positiva 2m unum esse eius primo sunt. Probatur. Omnia genita positiva 40 There are two grades of being, one essential, the other accidental. Every positive being has a certain fixed degree of entity, beyond which none can go. God has His fixed infinite perfection, and all beings are related to him in a given proportion. As He cannot change His being, neither can they theirs. 21. car een" MS. 24. pnd9 MS. 26. esse deest MS.; ib. a' a' MS. 32. q0 MS. 34. �o MS.
166 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. causing only a subiectantem illam generacionem; que quidem essencia new mode of est ipsum generatum, etc. existence in a previously Alia generacio est inpropria, et vocatur ideo inpropria existent being. quia (secundum eam) aliquid non dicitur fieri quod prius non fuit, sed dicitur aliquale esse (vel fieri) quale 5 prius non fuit; et sic omnis naturalis sive creata generacio presupponit subiectum suum preexistere tempore vel natura proporcionabiliter. Genitum duplex proprium, quod est substancia producta; inproprium, quod est substanciam esse aliqualem vel alicuiusmodi, 10 qualis, vel cuiusmodi, prius non fuit. 2° nota de gradu essendi. Unde gradus essendi rerum est duplex, scilicet: gradus essendi essencialis, et alius accidentalis. Suppono ergo quod omne positivum habeat unum essendi gradum in ordine nature, quo gradu non 15 est alius sibi prior. Patet supposicio ex hoc; quia si a positivum sit prius naturaliter illo gradu, tunc est signare illum gradum prioritatis; et cum non sit processus in infinitum, 2m racionem Aristotelis, tunc est dare gradum quo primo naturaliter a est. Aliter non esset dare quid 20 primo est aliquid; et consequenter nec ordinem nature, quod incriminet totam philosophiam. Patet igitur quod respectu cuiuslibet rei est dare unum gradum nature quo essencialiter est id quod est, et illum oportet esse primum. Quo habito, quod nullus potest esse prius 25 naturaliter tali gradu, cum sic correspondenter graduatur; ergo, cum talis sit dandus, sequitur quod respectu cuiuslibet positivi est dare gradum essendi, quo ipsum non potest esse naturaliter prius: quod fuit probandum. Confirmacio huius: deus est in summo gradu nature 30 possibili, quo ipse non potest [esse] prior aut posterior; et quidquid citra deum est, est propter hoc in ordine nature prius, quod est deo propinquius. Sed quia gradus essendi dei est inmobilis, ita quod nullus gradus essen- cialis creature potest sibi esse propinquius aut distancius, 35 igitur nulla creatura potest esse prius in ordine nature aut posterius in natura. Istis stantibus, sit conclusio prima etc. Conclusio prima. Omnia genita positiva 2m unum esse eius primo sunt. Probatur. Omnia genita positiva 40 There are two grades of being, one essential, the other accidental. Every positive being has a certain fixed degree of entity, beyond which none can go. God has His fixed infinite perfection, and all beings are related to him in a given proportion. As He cannot change His being, neither can they theirs. 21. car een" MS. 24. pnd9 MS. 26. esse deest MS.; ib. a' a' MS. 32. q0 MS. 34. �o MS.
Strana 167
DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 167 15 4 non inceperunt esse, et sunt, et quilibet divisim est. Igitur omnia genita positiva eque primo sunt, et eque primo quodlibet divisim cum altero est. Consequencia tenet, quia oppositum consequentis cum antecedente 5 implicant. Sed quod omnia genita non inceperunt esse probatur; nam exempli gracia, sit Sor qui incepit; tunc argumentatur: si Sor incepit esse sic hodie, igitur Sor ante hodie nullum habuit esse; consequens falsum. Tunc Sor nec in deo ante hodie habuisset esse, et sic incepit 10 in deo esse, et deus inciperet scire Sor esse, cum prius non scivit Sor esse, eo quod non fuit; et cum omnis sciencia dicitur relative ad scibile, sequitur quod si ante hodie scivit Sor esse, ante hodie habuit esse: quod est contra antecedens, etc. Corollarium. Omne genitum eternaliter habet esse. Corollarium. Non sequitur: Hoc generatur: igitur, non habet esse. Corollarium 3m. Non sequitur: Sor et Plato habent esse unum; igitur, si Sor hodie est, Plato hodie est. 20 Si obicitur quod illa conclusio est contra diffinicionem generacionis quam ponit commentator primo physicorum dicens quod generacio est transitus de non esse ad esse, et contra communem scolam, que ponit Sor incepisse esse et non eque primo Sor cum Platone habere esse, 25 posito quod Sor sit triennius et Plato biennius: solucio negat utrumque; primo quod est contra diffinicionem, quia diffinicio generacionis debet intelligi sic: generacio est transitus de non esse (quod est existere) ad tunc existere, cum quelibet res genita habet triplex esse, 3o scilicet, esse intelligibile precedens esse existere, quod est 2m, et esse in proprio genere. Unde iste est ordo rei genite in gradu essendi quod primo est, 2° fit, 3° existit, cum existere dicit quasi extra esse intelligibile sistere. Et sic via communis concedit quod Sor et Plato 35 non eque primo sunt, i. e. existunt, et quod Sor incepit esse, cum arguitur ab inferiori ad superius cum impedi- mento. Conclusio 2a. Primum esse productum, retinens primum gradum esse, inter cetera genita est perfectissi- mum. Probatur, quia ens anologum est primum pro- 40 ductum. Patet, quia est pridem productum et nullum prius; igitur. Quod nullum prius probatur, quia, si All positive entities exist in one first mode of being. Not one begins absolutely, for then its ideal being would also begin, and God would not know him as possible until a certain moment. If then God knows it as possible before any given time it has being before that time. Several corollaries. Solution of objection that this denies the definition of generation given by Averrhoës, and is against the common opinion, that one individual is before another. There are three sorts of being, intelligible, existing, and specific; and we admit that generation is the passage from non-being to being (in existence). Likewise, as to any two J. sic pro si MS. 18. vun MS. 25. t're MS.; ib. bigei MS. 36. quia MS.
DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 167 15 4 non inceperunt esse, et sunt, et quilibet divisim est. Igitur omnia genita positiva eque primo sunt, et eque primo quodlibet divisim cum altero est. Consequencia tenet, quia oppositum consequentis cum antecedente 5 implicant. Sed quod omnia genita non inceperunt esse probatur; nam exempli gracia, sit Sor qui incepit; tunc argumentatur: si Sor incepit esse sic hodie, igitur Sor ante hodie nullum habuit esse; consequens falsum. Tunc Sor nec in deo ante hodie habuisset esse, et sic incepit 10 in deo esse, et deus inciperet scire Sor esse, cum prius non scivit Sor esse, eo quod non fuit; et cum omnis sciencia dicitur relative ad scibile, sequitur quod si ante hodie scivit Sor esse, ante hodie habuit esse: quod est contra antecedens, etc. Corollarium. Omne genitum eternaliter habet esse. Corollarium. Non sequitur: Hoc generatur: igitur, non habet esse. Corollarium 3m. Non sequitur: Sor et Plato habent esse unum; igitur, si Sor hodie est, Plato hodie est. 20 Si obicitur quod illa conclusio est contra diffinicionem generacionis quam ponit commentator primo physicorum dicens quod generacio est transitus de non esse ad esse, et contra communem scolam, que ponit Sor incepisse esse et non eque primo Sor cum Platone habere esse, 25 posito quod Sor sit triennius et Plato biennius: solucio negat utrumque; primo quod est contra diffinicionem, quia diffinicio generacionis debet intelligi sic: generacio est transitus de non esse (quod est existere) ad tunc existere, cum quelibet res genita habet triplex esse, 3o scilicet, esse intelligibile precedens esse existere, quod est 2m, et esse in proprio genere. Unde iste est ordo rei genite in gradu essendi quod primo est, 2° fit, 3° existit, cum existere dicit quasi extra esse intelligibile sistere. Et sic via communis concedit quod Sor et Plato 35 non eque primo sunt, i. e. existunt, et quod Sor incepit esse, cum arguitur ab inferiori ad superius cum impedi- mento. Conclusio 2a. Primum esse productum, retinens primum gradum esse, inter cetera genita est perfectissi- mum. Probatur, quia ens anologum est primum pro- 40 ductum. Patet, quia est pridem productum et nullum prius; igitur. Quod nullum prius probatur, quia, si All positive entities exist in one first mode of being. Not one begins absolutely, for then its ideal being would also begin, and God would not know him as possible until a certain moment. If then God knows it as possible before any given time it has being before that time. Several corollaries. Solution of objection that this denies the definition of generation given by Averrhoës, and is against the common opinion, that one individual is before another. There are three sorts of being, intelligible, existing, and specific; and we admit that generation is the passage from non-being to being (in existence). Likewise, as to any two J. sic pro si MS. 18. vun MS. 25. t're MS.; ib. bigei MS. 36. quia MS.
Strana 168
168 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. aliquid, sit id a: quo dato, arguitur sic: a est prius quid ens anologum; igitur a est prius quam ens. Con- sequencia tenet a convertibili sine impedimento; et si a est prius quam ens, tunc a est prius quam est: quod implicat. Et hinc vere dicit auctor de Causis in 4a proposicione quod prima omnium rerum creaturarum est esse, et ante ipsum non est creatum aliquid; quia 2m glosam esse est supra sensum, et supra animam, et supra intelligenciam. Corollarium primum. Deus facit bonum quo non 10 potest melius facere; patet, quia produxit esse anologum, quo non potest melius facere. Nam, si aliquid pro- duceret esse anologum, diceretur de ipso, cum ens vere equaliter de omnibus dicitur. Corollarium 2m. Non sequitur: Si deus non potest 15 producere melius quam ens anologum, igitur non est omnipotens, sicud non sequitur: Deus non potest se destruere; igitur, non est omnipotens, nisi assumeretur in minori: Et hoc potest esse aliquid; et tunc conce- ditur consequencia, et negatur minor, etc. Conclusio tercia. Sicud est dare primum genitum, i. e. productum de esse intelligibili in esse actuale, sic est dare 2m genitum, quod est omnium genitorum post ipsum perfectissimum; et hoc est esse substanciam predi- camentalem. Nam esse est primum, esse substanciam 25 predicamentalem 2m, quamvis illa sint unum ydemptice, tamen distincta sunt formaliter i. e. 2m proprios modos essendi ipsius 2m primi entis volumptatem deputatos. Corollarium primum. Est ordo essencialis rerum 2m Corollaries. There is a prius et posterius in natura. Nam primum esse est ens, 30 regular order in nature, from 2m esse substanciam, 3m esse substanciam corpoream; first to last, et sic descendendo usque ad individua, ubi iubet Plato beginning with Transcendental quiescere, ut ait Porphyrius. Corollarium 2m. Quamvis Being, and ending with idem est Sor esse et substanciam esse, cum unum de individuals. altero predicetur; tamen prius est esse substanciam quam 35 esse Sor, et substancialiter ista sunt idem: igitur unum non est prius reliquo nature consequencia; sicud non sequitur: Materia et forma sunt idem, quia Sor; igitur materia non est prior forma; cum oppositum sit verum. Nam forma presupponit materiam, tanquam funda- 40 individuals. There is nothing anterior to being, which is above all things. Corollaries. Transcendental Entity is the best of all possible created things ; and this does not imply any restriction to God's omnipotence. As the first is Being, so the second is Substance. 20 28. pmi et? MS.; ib. volupttes M.S. 32. v'uibz plo MS. 36. ſufta MS. 37. �; 9� in marg. MS.
168 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. aliquid, sit id a: quo dato, arguitur sic: a est prius quid ens anologum; igitur a est prius quam ens. Con- sequencia tenet a convertibili sine impedimento; et si a est prius quam ens, tunc a est prius quam est: quod implicat. Et hinc vere dicit auctor de Causis in 4a proposicione quod prima omnium rerum creaturarum est esse, et ante ipsum non est creatum aliquid; quia 2m glosam esse est supra sensum, et supra animam, et supra intelligenciam. Corollarium primum. Deus facit bonum quo non 10 potest melius facere; patet, quia produxit esse anologum, quo non potest melius facere. Nam, si aliquid pro- duceret esse anologum, diceretur de ipso, cum ens vere equaliter de omnibus dicitur. Corollarium 2m. Non sequitur: Si deus non potest 15 producere melius quam ens anologum, igitur non est omnipotens, sicud non sequitur: Deus non potest se destruere; igitur, non est omnipotens, nisi assumeretur in minori: Et hoc potest esse aliquid; et tunc conce- ditur consequencia, et negatur minor, etc. Conclusio tercia. Sicud est dare primum genitum, i. e. productum de esse intelligibili in esse actuale, sic est dare 2m genitum, quod est omnium genitorum post ipsum perfectissimum; et hoc est esse substanciam predi- camentalem. Nam esse est primum, esse substanciam 25 predicamentalem 2m, quamvis illa sint unum ydemptice, tamen distincta sunt formaliter i. e. 2m proprios modos essendi ipsius 2m primi entis volumptatem deputatos. Corollarium primum. Est ordo essencialis rerum 2m Corollaries. There is a prius et posterius in natura. Nam primum esse est ens, 30 regular order in nature, from 2m esse substanciam, 3m esse substanciam corpoream; first to last, et sic descendendo usque ad individua, ubi iubet Plato beginning with Transcendental quiescere, ut ait Porphyrius. Corollarium 2m. Quamvis Being, and ending with idem est Sor esse et substanciam esse, cum unum de individuals. altero predicetur; tamen prius est esse substanciam quam 35 esse Sor, et substancialiter ista sunt idem: igitur unum non est prius reliquo nature consequencia; sicud non sequitur: Materia et forma sunt idem, quia Sor; igitur materia non est prior forma; cum oppositum sit verum. Nam forma presupponit materiam, tanquam funda- 40 individuals. There is nothing anterior to being, which is above all things. Corollaries. Transcendental Entity is the best of all possible created things ; and this does not imply any restriction to God's omnipotence. As the first is Being, so the second is Substance. 20 28. pmi et? MS.; ib. volupttes M.S. 32. v'uibz plo MS. 36. ſufta MS. 37. �; 9� in marg. MS.
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DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 169 mentum; et propter hoc Commentator appellat materiam fundamentum nature. Conclusio ultima. Sicud est inter omnia genita unum No two species nor individuals perfectissimum, gradum essencialem primum retinens, can be equally perfect; there quod est metrum et mensura omnium aliorum (quia is therefore one omnia producta in se claudens, et quia nullum aliud that is the most perfect potest ipsum in modo essendi transcendere, cum sit of all. communissimum) sic est dare unum specialissimum in suo gradu essendi perfectissimum, cum in modo essendi 10 essenciali non proceditur in infinitum deorsum, et nec due species specialissime sunt, nec possunt esse eque perfecte essencialiter; quod alias esset eorum penitus esse idem, quia eadem diffinicio specialissima: et per consequens non due species essent, sed penitus una: 15 quod est inconveniens. Two beings Corollarium primum. Ad esse specialissimum per- in the same fectissimum non sequitur individuum perfectissimum species cannot be one more essencialiter, quamvis nullius speciei specialissime unum perfect individuum est, vel potest alio individuo eiusdem speciei essentially than the other. 20 esse perfectissimus. Ex quo sequitur ulterius quod unus homo non est, nec potest esse, perfeccior alio essencia- liter; licet bene accidentaliter unus sit perfeccior alio. Corollarium 2m. Conclusio, ut proponitur, est vera ad racionem nunc antecedens. Et similiter 2m etc. 25 [Alia manu, valde abbreviata, hic additur]: Nota quod prudencia debet dirigere operaciones humanas ad rectitudinem racionis, scilicet ad . . . . . . . Sciencia autem moralis debet cognoscere qualiter pas- siones de subiecto, scilicet homo, libere concludantur, 3o ut sunt posse malum facere, iustum, etc. Que autem sunt factibilia est prudencie; quia non potest bonum opus actu facere nisi prudencia occurrente, regulante appetitum ad quantum possit prosequi licite opus suum, et virtute inclinante appetitum ad obediendum prudencie. 35 Ideo moralis philosophia de virtute prudencia debet pertractare. 4. gd MS. 17. esse nec pro non MS. 22. sit perfeccior twice MS. 23. q0 MS. 24. nc ans MS. 27. before Sciencia two very illegible words MS. 29. ho MS. 31. facica MS.
DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 169 mentum; et propter hoc Commentator appellat materiam fundamentum nature. Conclusio ultima. Sicud est inter omnia genita unum No two species nor individuals perfectissimum, gradum essencialem primum retinens, can be equally perfect; there quod est metrum et mensura omnium aliorum (quia is therefore one omnia producta in se claudens, et quia nullum aliud that is the most perfect potest ipsum in modo essendi transcendere, cum sit of all. communissimum) sic est dare unum specialissimum in suo gradu essendi perfectissimum, cum in modo essendi 10 essenciali non proceditur in infinitum deorsum, et nec due species specialissime sunt, nec possunt esse eque perfecte essencialiter; quod alias esset eorum penitus esse idem, quia eadem diffinicio specialissima: et per consequens non due species essent, sed penitus una: 15 quod est inconveniens. Two beings Corollarium primum. Ad esse specialissimum per- in the same fectissimum non sequitur individuum perfectissimum species cannot be one more essencialiter, quamvis nullius speciei specialissime unum perfect individuum est, vel potest alio individuo eiusdem speciei essentially than the other. 20 esse perfectissimus. Ex quo sequitur ulterius quod unus homo non est, nec potest esse, perfeccior alio essencia- liter; licet bene accidentaliter unus sit perfeccior alio. Corollarium 2m. Conclusio, ut proponitur, est vera ad racionem nunc antecedens. Et similiter 2m etc. 25 [Alia manu, valde abbreviata, hic additur]: Nota quod prudencia debet dirigere operaciones humanas ad rectitudinem racionis, scilicet ad . . . . . . . Sciencia autem moralis debet cognoscere qualiter pas- siones de subiecto, scilicet homo, libere concludantur, 3o ut sunt posse malum facere, iustum, etc. Que autem sunt factibilia est prudencie; quia non potest bonum opus actu facere nisi prudencia occurrente, regulante appetitum ad quantum possit prosequi licite opus suum, et virtute inclinante appetitum ad obediendum prudencie. 35 Ideo moralis philosophia de virtute prudencia debet pertractare. 4. gd MS. 17. esse nec pro non MS. 22. sit perfeccior twice MS. 23. q0 MS. 24. nc ans MS. 27. before Sciencia two very illegible words MS. 29. ho MS. 31. facica MS.
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DE MATERIA. 5a This question Utrum materia, nunc sub una forma substanciali et 135a supposes the existence of nunc sub alia existens, sit informis? primary Questio unum supponit et aliud querit. Supponit quod matter, which is also a materia prima nunc sub una forma substanciali et nunc 5 primary sub alia existat; et tunc querit utrum sit informis, etc. substance. It can never be Suppositum sit: materia prima est subiectum primum a predicate. ex quo aliquid fit, cum insit per se et non secundum accidens. Patet supposicio primo physicorum. Ex quo sequitur quod materia prima est substancia 10 prima. Patet, quia est subiectum primum, ut dicit supposicio. Igitur correlarium verum. 2° sequitur quod materia prima est solum subiectum et non potest esse formaliter predicatum, cum de necessitate semper subiciatur vel in subiectis procedatur 15 in infinitum. 3° sequitur quod prima substancia est materia prima perfectibilis a superstante. Patet exponendo per idem: subsistencia est materia prima perfectibilis a superstante, et nulla est prior nec aliqua; igitur corrollarium verum. 20 Correlarium. Non sequitur: Materia prima est prima substancia perfectibilis a superstante in ordine essendi rerum; igitur est prima substancia; cum deus sit prior substancia secundum verissimum ordinem rerum essendi. Aristotle seems Hic obicitur dictum Aristotelis in principio de anima 25 to say that et multis aliis locis predictis. Nam ibi dicit quod triplex matter is the First est substancia, una que 2m se non est hoc aliquid, ut Substance; but he speaks materia, alia species vel forma secundum quam materia Thiis primary substance is thereſore matter, quà capable of receiving perfection from form; but God alone is the First substance. 25. Sicut videtur vro Hic obicitur MS. 1. In Prag. Univ. M. S. VIII. G. 6. f. 84° there is an article that begins thus: sequitur alia posicio Reverendi Magistri Johannis de Hussynetz: Utrum materia... &c. The first page is similar to our MS. but it afterwards varies widely and the desinit is quite different. It was therefore useless to collate it; but I have noticed it, as throwing a doubt upon the genuineness of this composition.
DE MATERIA. 5a This question Utrum materia, nunc sub una forma substanciali et 135a supposes the existence of nunc sub alia existens, sit informis? primary Questio unum supponit et aliud querit. Supponit quod matter, which is also a materia prima nunc sub una forma substanciali et nunc 5 primary sub alia existat; et tunc querit utrum sit informis, etc. substance. It can never be Suppositum sit: materia prima est subiectum primum a predicate. ex quo aliquid fit, cum insit per se et non secundum accidens. Patet supposicio primo physicorum. Ex quo sequitur quod materia prima est substancia 10 prima. Patet, quia est subiectum primum, ut dicit supposicio. Igitur correlarium verum. 2° sequitur quod materia prima est solum subiectum et non potest esse formaliter predicatum, cum de necessitate semper subiciatur vel in subiectis procedatur 15 in infinitum. 3° sequitur quod prima substancia est materia prima perfectibilis a superstante. Patet exponendo per idem: subsistencia est materia prima perfectibilis a superstante, et nulla est prior nec aliqua; igitur corrollarium verum. 20 Correlarium. Non sequitur: Materia prima est prima substancia perfectibilis a superstante in ordine essendi rerum; igitur est prima substancia; cum deus sit prior substancia secundum verissimum ordinem rerum essendi. Aristotle seems Hic obicitur dictum Aristotelis in principio de anima 25 to say that et multis aliis locis predictis. Nam ibi dicit quod triplex matter is the First est substancia, una que 2m se non est hoc aliquid, ut Substance; but he speaks materia, alia species vel forma secundum quam materia Thiis primary substance is thereſore matter, quà capable of receiving perfection from form; but God alone is the First substance. 25. Sicut videtur vro Hic obicitur MS. 1. In Prag. Univ. M. S. VIII. G. 6. f. 84° there is an article that begins thus: sequitur alia posicio Reverendi Magistri Johannis de Hussynetz: Utrum materia... &c. The first page is similar to our MS. but it afterwards varies widely and the desinit is quite different. It was therefore useless to collate it; but I have noticed it, as throwing a doubt upon the genuineness of this composition.
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DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 171 1353 est hoc aliquid in actu; 3° coniunctum ex hiis. Innuitur quod materia prima est prima subsistencia, precedens alias. Solucio. Definicio Aristotelis est de substancia depen- 5 dente a prima causa. Est tamen sciendum quod magis conveniens vocabulum materie prime est subsistencia quam substancia. Unde greci vocant materiam primam Various terms used by the ypostasim ab yppos, quod est sub, et stasis, stacio, Greeks and the Romans to quasi substacio, eo quod substat omnibus formis eum designate matter, Form 10 sit primum subiectum, ut dicit supposicio. Greci ergo and compound. vocant materiam ypostasym et formam usiam. Conso- nancius ergo latini vocant materiam, subsistenciam; quia subsistit formis ut fundamentum. Hinc Commen- tator vocat materiam primam fundamentum nature. 15 Similiter philosophus 10 metaphysice. Formam vero vocant superstanciam, eo quod stat supra materiam. Et hoc intendo de forma, que est altera pars compositi fundata in materia. Compositum vero, vel forma abso- luta, ut intelligencia, vocant substancia, quia actu 20 existens compositum (vel intelligencia) preter primam potest suscipere accidencia quibus substet. Unde compo- situm proprie debet dici subsuperstancia; quia substans 2m unam partem (scilicet materiam) et superstans 2m aliam (puta formam), et totum in se extans ut com- 25 pletum et finis utriusque. I Supposicio secunda. Forma est res per quam aliquid est formaliter quid, vel alicuius modi, et est duplex; forma substancialis et forma accidentalis. Forma substancialis est forma qua substancia est substancialiter id quod est. 30 Ex isto sequitur quod omne designatum per abstractum terminum alicuius substancie est forma substancialis: ut humanitas, aqueitas, igneitas, et lapideitas; et sic de aliis. Patet, cum quolibet illorum dat esse quid, cuius est forma. Homo enim est quid completum per humani- 35 tatem, cum homo essencialiter ab humanitate sit homo; ignis ab igneitate ignis; et sic de aliis formis sub- stancialibus. Unde ex isto potest inferri quod omne superius est forma sui inferioris. Et non sequitur exinde quod sit pars eius superaddita, cum nec animalitas The form is that by which anything is that which it is, or as it is. Humanity is that by which a man is a man; so humanity 1s the form of man; and so too of all other like abstract terms. of it as dependent upon the First cause. 8. ylpos MS. 26. At the top of f. 135b, is a long, very illegible, and irre- levant note about peccatum contra naturam.
DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 171 1353 est hoc aliquid in actu; 3° coniunctum ex hiis. Innuitur quod materia prima est prima subsistencia, precedens alias. Solucio. Definicio Aristotelis est de substancia depen- 5 dente a prima causa. Est tamen sciendum quod magis conveniens vocabulum materie prime est subsistencia quam substancia. Unde greci vocant materiam primam Various terms used by the ypostasim ab yppos, quod est sub, et stasis, stacio, Greeks and the Romans to quasi substacio, eo quod substat omnibus formis eum designate matter, Form 10 sit primum subiectum, ut dicit supposicio. Greci ergo and compound. vocant materiam ypostasym et formam usiam. Conso- nancius ergo latini vocant materiam, subsistenciam; quia subsistit formis ut fundamentum. Hinc Commen- tator vocat materiam primam fundamentum nature. 15 Similiter philosophus 10 metaphysice. Formam vero vocant superstanciam, eo quod stat supra materiam. Et hoc intendo de forma, que est altera pars compositi fundata in materia. Compositum vero, vel forma abso- luta, ut intelligencia, vocant substancia, quia actu 20 existens compositum (vel intelligencia) preter primam potest suscipere accidencia quibus substet. Unde compo- situm proprie debet dici subsuperstancia; quia substans 2m unam partem (scilicet materiam) et superstans 2m aliam (puta formam), et totum in se extans ut com- 25 pletum et finis utriusque. I Supposicio secunda. Forma est res per quam aliquid est formaliter quid, vel alicuius modi, et est duplex; forma substancialis et forma accidentalis. Forma substancialis est forma qua substancia est substancialiter id quod est. 30 Ex isto sequitur quod omne designatum per abstractum terminum alicuius substancie est forma substancialis: ut humanitas, aqueitas, igneitas, et lapideitas; et sic de aliis. Patet, cum quolibet illorum dat esse quid, cuius est forma. Homo enim est quid completum per humani- 35 tatem, cum homo essencialiter ab humanitate sit homo; ignis ab igneitate ignis; et sic de aliis formis sub- stancialibus. Unde ex isto potest inferri quod omne superius est forma sui inferioris. Et non sequitur exinde quod sit pars eius superaddita, cum nec animalitas The form is that by which anything is that which it is, or as it is. Humanity is that by which a man is a man; so humanity 1s the form of man; and so too of all other like abstract terms. of it as dependent upon the First cause. 8. ylpos MS. 26. At the top of f. 135b, is a long, very illegible, and irre- levant note about peccatum contra naturam.
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172 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. The accidental form is that which makes anything as it 1s. To exist is to be, but not vice versâ. Everything but God is in its natural causes, before it exists; and that being is more perfect than its existence. If anything is in its causes, then it is really, since that form of being is superior to its own existence. Whatever was, or will be, or is possible, is. tanquam pars superadditur humanitati, nec alia forma superior ad inferiorem. Forma accidentalis est forma qua aliquid est alicuius- modi. Unde ly “alicuiusmodi" est signans omnem in- herenciam accidentalem, sive qualitatis, sive quantitatis. Si ergo sua natura extra esse ydeale, sive intelligibile in mente divina, et extra esse actuale in causis secundis, tunc existit. Corollarium primum. Omne existere est esse: et non econverso. Patet ex notabili. Corollarium 2m. Quelibet res citra deum prius natura- liter habet esse in causis secundis quam in existencia propria et natura grossa. Et prius natura dicitur in esse intelligibili preeminencie quam esse in causis secundis. Patet ex notabili. Corollarium 3m. Quelibet res citra deum magis et nobilius habet se in causis secundis quam in existencia propria et natura. Quelibet res citra deum habet se in existencia proprie nature pro esse in causis secundis; et esse in causis secundis habet pro esse intelligibili prime 20 cause; sicud patet ex notabili et corollario 2°. Sed "Propter quod unumquodque tale, et ipsum magis;" igitur corollarium verum. Corollarium quartum. Sicud sequitur: Illa res est in propria existencia, ergo illa res est: sic a forciori 25 sequitur: Illa res est in causis; ergo, illa res est. Patet; quia in causis secundis est esse nobilius quam esse in propria existencia et natura; et esse in prima causa est nobilius quam esse in 2is causis vel propria existencia et natura; ut patet ex corollario 3°. Ergo esse virtuale 30 et esse intelligibile nondum [sunt] nunc; et per con- sequens corollarium est verum. Corollarium 5tum. Omne quod fuit et quod erit est esse; et omne quod potest esse est. Patet, quia quod- libet tale est in suis causis virtualiter, et in prima 35 causa, 2m esse intelligibile: ergo, corollarium verum. Consequencia tenet ex Corollario 4°. 10 15 10. exnoli MS. 14. p'mecie MS. 19. pee MS. 20. pee MS. 31. sunt deest MS. 37. q pro sequencia MS. 22. Propter. An old axiom, translated word for word from the Greek. 'The cause of any suchness possesses that suchness in a higher degree.'
172 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. The accidental form is that which makes anything as it 1s. To exist is to be, but not vice versâ. Everything but God is in its natural causes, before it exists; and that being is more perfect than its existence. If anything is in its causes, then it is really, since that form of being is superior to its own existence. Whatever was, or will be, or is possible, is. tanquam pars superadditur humanitati, nec alia forma superior ad inferiorem. Forma accidentalis est forma qua aliquid est alicuius- modi. Unde ly “alicuiusmodi" est signans omnem in- herenciam accidentalem, sive qualitatis, sive quantitatis. Si ergo sua natura extra esse ydeale, sive intelligibile in mente divina, et extra esse actuale in causis secundis, tunc existit. Corollarium primum. Omne existere est esse: et non econverso. Patet ex notabili. Corollarium 2m. Quelibet res citra deum prius natura- liter habet esse in causis secundis quam in existencia propria et natura grossa. Et prius natura dicitur in esse intelligibili preeminencie quam esse in causis secundis. Patet ex notabili. Corollarium 3m. Quelibet res citra deum magis et nobilius habet se in causis secundis quam in existencia propria et natura. Quelibet res citra deum habet se in existencia proprie nature pro esse in causis secundis; et esse in causis secundis habet pro esse intelligibili prime 20 cause; sicud patet ex notabili et corollario 2°. Sed "Propter quod unumquodque tale, et ipsum magis;" igitur corollarium verum. Corollarium quartum. Sicud sequitur: Illa res est in propria existencia, ergo illa res est: sic a forciori 25 sequitur: Illa res est in causis; ergo, illa res est. Patet; quia in causis secundis est esse nobilius quam esse in propria existencia et natura; et esse in prima causa est nobilius quam esse in 2is causis vel propria existencia et natura; ut patet ex corollario 3°. Ergo esse virtuale 30 et esse intelligibile nondum [sunt] nunc; et per con- sequens corollarium est verum. Corollarium 5tum. Omne quod fuit et quod erit est esse; et omne quod potest esse est. Patet, quia quod- libet tale est in suis causis virtualiter, et in prima 35 causa, 2m esse intelligibile: ergo, corollarium verum. Consequencia tenet ex Corollario 4°. 10 15 10. exnoli MS. 14. p'mecie MS. 19. pee MS. 20. pee MS. 31. sunt deest MS. 37. q pro sequencia MS. 22. Propter. An old axiom, translated word for word from the Greek. 'The cause of any suchness possesses that suchness in a higher degree.'
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DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 173 Quantum ad primum articulum, Utrum universalia solum nude pure habeant esse ydeale in esse mente divina, sit prima conclusio quo ad suppositum: Idee ponende sunt in mente divina. Probatur. Deus rite et racionabiliter producit omnia. Consequens conclusio: racione vel racionibus producit omnia que producit. Consequencia tenet, quia impossibile est quid quantum racionabiliter producere sine racione, sicut esse album 136° sine albedine, et currentem sine cursu, et fortem] sine 10 fortitudine; et sic de aliis. Et antecedens est notum de se. Tunc ex consequente sic arguitur: deus racione vel racionibus producit omnia que producit; et, quia non eadem racione producit hominem quam asinum, et asinum quam equum (et sic de aliis): ergo est alia racio 15 qua producit hominem et alia racio qua producit asinum, et alia racio qua producit equum; et sic de aliis. Consequencia est nota; et antecedens propria parte est consequens prioris consequencie. Sed pro secunda parte sic probatur: quia, si omnia eadem racione pro- 20 duceret, hominem qua asinum, et asinum qua equum (et sic de aliis), sequitur quod ab eodem agente 2m idem simpliciter et pro eodem producerentur homo et asinus; et sic in toto homo esset asinus, et econtra. Immo, quodlibet esset quodlibet: quod est absurdum. 25 Conclusio: Est danda alia racio qua producit hominem, et alia racio qua producit equum; et sic de aliis. Et tales raciones sunt ydee secundum quas deus est pro- ductivus ad extra. Nec videtur aput quem sint iste raciones eterne, nisi aput deum, cum sacrilegum [esset 30 sic deum intueri extra se exemplar sui producti; ergo conclusio vera. Corollarium primum. Cuiuslibet rei citra primum, deum, prius habuit esse intelligibile; ideoque ab eterno, antequam habuit esse in propria existencia, eo quod 35 quelibet res citra deum prius fuit productibilis quam producta. Et clare esse intelligibile est ydea; ergo corollarium verum. Corollarium 2m. Omnis creatura 2m esse intelligibile vel ydeale est deus. Probatur sic: Omne eternaliter We must admit ideas in the Divine mind, or patterns by which He has produced all things, since He acts according to a plan, and no one can specifically fashion different things atter the same model. These patterns must be in God. They are the same as the Intelligible Being of all that is. Every creature is God as to its intelligible 7. q pro consequencia MS. 29. esset deest MS. 33. ideo quia MS. 1. Utrum. This paragraph seems to have nothing to do with the question announced; it is either interpolated, or the tractate grievously mutilated.
DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 173 Quantum ad primum articulum, Utrum universalia solum nude pure habeant esse ydeale in esse mente divina, sit prima conclusio quo ad suppositum: Idee ponende sunt in mente divina. Probatur. Deus rite et racionabiliter producit omnia. Consequens conclusio: racione vel racionibus producit omnia que producit. Consequencia tenet, quia impossibile est quid quantum racionabiliter producere sine racione, sicut esse album 136° sine albedine, et currentem sine cursu, et fortem] sine 10 fortitudine; et sic de aliis. Et antecedens est notum de se. Tunc ex consequente sic arguitur: deus racione vel racionibus producit omnia que producit; et, quia non eadem racione producit hominem quam asinum, et asinum quam equum (et sic de aliis): ergo est alia racio 15 qua producit hominem et alia racio qua producit asinum, et alia racio qua producit equum; et sic de aliis. Consequencia est nota; et antecedens propria parte est consequens prioris consequencie. Sed pro secunda parte sic probatur: quia, si omnia eadem racione pro- 20 duceret, hominem qua asinum, et asinum qua equum (et sic de aliis), sequitur quod ab eodem agente 2m idem simpliciter et pro eodem producerentur homo et asinus; et sic in toto homo esset asinus, et econtra. Immo, quodlibet esset quodlibet: quod est absurdum. 25 Conclusio: Est danda alia racio qua producit hominem, et alia racio qua producit equum; et sic de aliis. Et tales raciones sunt ydee secundum quas deus est pro- ductivus ad extra. Nec videtur aput quem sint iste raciones eterne, nisi aput deum, cum sacrilegum [esset 30 sic deum intueri extra se exemplar sui producti; ergo conclusio vera. Corollarium primum. Cuiuslibet rei citra primum, deum, prius habuit esse intelligibile; ideoque ab eterno, antequam habuit esse in propria existencia, eo quod 35 quelibet res citra deum prius fuit productibilis quam producta. Et clare esse intelligibile est ydea; ergo corollarium verum. Corollarium 2m. Omnis creatura 2m esse intelligibile vel ydeale est deus. Probatur sic: Omne eternaliter We must admit ideas in the Divine mind, or patterns by which He has produced all things, since He acts according to a plan, and no one can specifically fashion different things atter the same model. These patterns must be in God. They are the same as the Intelligible Being of all that is. Every creature is God as to its intelligible 7. q pro consequencia MS. 29. esset deest MS. 33. ideo quia MS. 1. Utrum. This paragraph seems to have nothing to do with the question announced; it is either interpolated, or the tractate grievously mutilated.
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174 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. posse aliquid est deus; sed omnis creatura est eternaliter aliquid posse esse, ergo omnis creatura est deus. Con- sequencia tenet in Barbara. Maior probatur, quia Omne eternaliter posse aliquid esse est potencia eterna; sed I add as to omnis talis est deus; ergo etc. Minor probatur, quia, its intelligible entity", though quocunque enti dato, ipsum est posse aliquid esse, et the restriction non inceptive, cum nichil huiusmodi potest incipere is not necessary, posse aliquid esse; ergo eternaliter. Et per consequens merely to p minor est vera. Et nominanter addidi in corellario avoid scandalizing “2m esse intelligibile vel ydeale"; nam, licet a philo- 10 the weak, who might say: So, sophis et sapientibus in lumine naturali elevatis con- this master ceditur simpliciter, et concedi posset, quod omnis crea- says that every creature, even tura est, propter limitacionem predicati quod limitat an ass, is God." subiectum ad esse intelligibile vel ydeale iuxta con- sequentem regulam (Talia sunt subiecta qualia per- 15 mittuntur ab eorum predicatis), attamen negarem occa- sionem errandi inperitis in ista materia, racione infirmi- tatis et inpericie materie concipientis, et precipue male interpretantibus, qui susurrant in angulis: "Iste magister concedit publice in scolis quod omnis creatura est deus, 20 et asinus est deus"; verba capientes, et non sensum. Ideo addidi in corollario 2m esse intelligibile, non de necessitate sed ad explanandum sensum michi satis. Nam non sapientis sed insipientis, non philosophi sed stultilophi, non quod katholici sed heretici esset con-25 cedere quod ille asinus grossus 2m suum esse grossum esset (vel alia vilissima creatura esset) deus. Corollarium 3m. Quodlibet ens sive creatura habuit esse ab eterno; patet, quia 2m esse intelligibile vel ydeale, ut patet ex prioribus; ergo corollarium verum, 30 etc. Corollarium 4m. Quelibet creatura 2m esse intelligibile 136" est exemplar sui ipsius 2m existenciam creature. Patet; quia quelibet creatura in sui existencia est exemplata ad exemplar sui esse, quod habet in mente divina; 35 ergo corellarium verum. 5tum corelarium. Mundus architypus est incomparabi- liter melior isto mundo sensibili. Et patenter patet; quia mundus architypus est multitudo omnium producti- bilitatum extrapositorum factorum, que est temporaliter 40 et contingenter: ergo corellarium verum. Consequencia Every being is, in its ideal essence, its own prototype. The architypal world is infinitely superior to the real, since the Eternal is above the Temporal. I should be a fool and a heretic to say that the physical entity of an ass was God. Every being has eternal entity. entity, since that is an eternal possibility. 28. qp es 13 MS.
174 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. posse aliquid est deus; sed omnis creatura est eternaliter aliquid posse esse, ergo omnis creatura est deus. Con- sequencia tenet in Barbara. Maior probatur, quia Omne eternaliter posse aliquid esse est potencia eterna; sed I add as to omnis talis est deus; ergo etc. Minor probatur, quia, its intelligible entity", though quocunque enti dato, ipsum est posse aliquid esse, et the restriction non inceptive, cum nichil huiusmodi potest incipere is not necessary, posse aliquid esse; ergo eternaliter. Et per consequens merely to p minor est vera. Et nominanter addidi in corellario avoid scandalizing “2m esse intelligibile vel ydeale"; nam, licet a philo- 10 the weak, who might say: So, sophis et sapientibus in lumine naturali elevatis con- this master ceditur simpliciter, et concedi posset, quod omnis crea- says that every creature, even tura est, propter limitacionem predicati quod limitat an ass, is God." subiectum ad esse intelligibile vel ydeale iuxta con- sequentem regulam (Talia sunt subiecta qualia per- 15 mittuntur ab eorum predicatis), attamen negarem occa- sionem errandi inperitis in ista materia, racione infirmi- tatis et inpericie materie concipientis, et precipue male interpretantibus, qui susurrant in angulis: "Iste magister concedit publice in scolis quod omnis creatura est deus, 20 et asinus est deus"; verba capientes, et non sensum. Ideo addidi in corollario 2m esse intelligibile, non de necessitate sed ad explanandum sensum michi satis. Nam non sapientis sed insipientis, non philosophi sed stultilophi, non quod katholici sed heretici esset con-25 cedere quod ille asinus grossus 2m suum esse grossum esset (vel alia vilissima creatura esset) deus. Corollarium 3m. Quodlibet ens sive creatura habuit esse ab eterno; patet, quia 2m esse intelligibile vel ydeale, ut patet ex prioribus; ergo corollarium verum, 30 etc. Corollarium 4m. Quelibet creatura 2m esse intelligibile 136" est exemplar sui ipsius 2m existenciam creature. Patet; quia quelibet creatura in sui existencia est exemplata ad exemplar sui esse, quod habet in mente divina; 35 ergo corellarium verum. 5tum corelarium. Mundus architypus est incomparabi- liter melior isto mundo sensibili. Et patenter patet; quia mundus architypus est multitudo omnium producti- bilitatum extrapositorum factorum, que est temporaliter 40 et contingenter: ergo corellarium verum. Consequencia Every being is, in its ideal essence, its own prototype. The architypal world is infinitely superior to the real, since the Eternal is above the Temporal. I should be a fool and a heretic to say that the physical entity of an ass was God. Every being has eternal entity. entity, since that is an eternal possibility. 28. qp es 13 MS.
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DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 175 tenet, cum quodlibet necessarium et eternum sit in- comparabiliter nobilius temporali et contingente. Sextum corelarium: Negans pertinaciter ideas, sive mundum architypum, graviter derogat deo. Patet, quia abstrahens 5 pertinaciter deo dominium istius mundi sensibilis et patentis, per quem regnat temporaliter et contingenter, graviter derogat deo: ergo multo a forciori abstrahens pertinaciter deo dominium mundi architipi, qui est incomparabiliter nobilior, per quem regnat necessario 1o et eternaliter, gravius derogat deo. Ergo corelarium verum. Et ideo beatus Thomas, questione prima, abnegat beatum Augustinum in libro de trinitate, dicentem: ** Qui negat ydeas infidelis est". 3a conclusio est: Universalia ydealia in mente divina 15 sunt ponenda. Probatur sic: Deus dat universaliter omnibus entibus esse, ut notum est; ergo est dare modum quo dat universaliter omnibus entibus esse. Talis modus non est singularis, quia alias per modum singularem daret universaliter esse: quod est oppositum 20 in adiecto. Ergo oportet quod talis modus sit universa- lissimus, 2m quod dat omnibus universaliter esse; et talis modus est ydea communissima; ergo conclusio vera. Item, dat deus universaliter omnibus substanciis esse, et minus universaliter quam omnibus entibus esse. 25 Ergo est dare modus quo dat minus universaliter omnibus substanciis esse. Antecedens pro prima parte notum est; sed pro 2a parte patet sic, quia communius est dare omnibus entibus esse quam omnibus substanciis esse, ut notum est; ergo antecedens verum. Tunc ultra, 3o ex consequente: talis modus non est singularis, quia est oppositum in adiecto quod per modum singularem daret universaliter esse. Ergo oportet quod talis modus sit minus communis priore; et talis modus est ydea; ergo conclusio vera. Et sic communiter, per arborem 35 Porfyrii descendendo usque devenietur ad entitatem singu- larem. Nam est talis ordo universi; igitur conclusio vera. Corelarium primum: Sicud est dare res minus con- venientes et magis convenientes in ordine universi, sic It is a grave offence against God to deny this architypal world, if the denial be pertinacious; St. Augustine calls it infidelity. We must admit ideal Universals in God, since he gives entity in a universal way, and less universally to some than to others. Now these various ways are the Divine Ideas. Thus some Ideas are more, others less general. 2. Secundum MS. 23. substanciis — substanciis in marg. MS. 39. ques zmag? quens MS. 11. Abnegal is quite plain in the MS. But St. Thomas, as a rule, abstains from contradicting St. Augustine. The reference is too vague to be found in St. Thomas' writings.
DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 175 tenet, cum quodlibet necessarium et eternum sit in- comparabiliter nobilius temporali et contingente. Sextum corelarium: Negans pertinaciter ideas, sive mundum architypum, graviter derogat deo. Patet, quia abstrahens 5 pertinaciter deo dominium istius mundi sensibilis et patentis, per quem regnat temporaliter et contingenter, graviter derogat deo: ergo multo a forciori abstrahens pertinaciter deo dominium mundi architipi, qui est incomparabiliter nobilior, per quem regnat necessario 1o et eternaliter, gravius derogat deo. Ergo corelarium verum. Et ideo beatus Thomas, questione prima, abnegat beatum Augustinum in libro de trinitate, dicentem: ** Qui negat ydeas infidelis est". 3a conclusio est: Universalia ydealia in mente divina 15 sunt ponenda. Probatur sic: Deus dat universaliter omnibus entibus esse, ut notum est; ergo est dare modum quo dat universaliter omnibus entibus esse. Talis modus non est singularis, quia alias per modum singularem daret universaliter esse: quod est oppositum 20 in adiecto. Ergo oportet quod talis modus sit universa- lissimus, 2m quod dat omnibus universaliter esse; et talis modus est ydea communissima; ergo conclusio vera. Item, dat deus universaliter omnibus substanciis esse, et minus universaliter quam omnibus entibus esse. 25 Ergo est dare modus quo dat minus universaliter omnibus substanciis esse. Antecedens pro prima parte notum est; sed pro 2a parte patet sic, quia communius est dare omnibus entibus esse quam omnibus substanciis esse, ut notum est; ergo antecedens verum. Tunc ultra, 3o ex consequente: talis modus non est singularis, quia est oppositum in adiecto quod per modum singularem daret universaliter esse. Ergo oportet quod talis modus sit minus communis priore; et talis modus est ydea; ergo conclusio vera. Et sic communiter, per arborem 35 Porfyrii descendendo usque devenietur ad entitatem singu- larem. Nam est talis ordo universi; igitur conclusio vera. Corelarium primum: Sicud est dare res minus con- venientes et magis convenientes in ordine universi, sic It is a grave offence against God to deny this architypal world, if the denial be pertinacious; St. Augustine calls it infidelity. We must admit ideal Universals in God, since he gives entity in a universal way, and less universally to some than to others. Now these various ways are the Divine Ideas. Thus some Ideas are more, others less general. 2. Secundum MS. 23. substanciis — substanciis in marg. MS. 39. ques zmag? quens MS. 11. Abnegal is quite plain in the MS. But St. Thomas, as a rule, abstains from contradicting St. Augustine. The reference is too vague to be found in St. Thomas' writings.
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176 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. proporcionabiliter est dare ydeas minus communes et magis communes in mente divina; sicud patet ex con- clusione et eius probacione, etc. There is an Corelarium 2m. Est dare ydeatum communissimum, Idea of greatest sicut est entitas analoga. Patet sic: quia, si est ideam5 generality and there is also dare communissimam ex conclusione, ergo, et ydeatum its object, which is communissimum proporcionabiliter; et per consequens Transcendental Being, the best corelarium est verum. of all possible Corelarium 3m. Entitas anologa est primum causatum creatures. For we can a deo factibile, summe possibiliter bonum infra deum. 10 conceive Pro prima parte patet sic, quia entitas anologa est nothing, however primum ydeatum ex prioribus: ergo et primum cau- perfect i that is not a being. satum. Consequencia tenet ab eodem ad idem, vel a convertibili ad convertibile. Sed pro secunda parte pro- batur. Bonum est quod ens infra deum est, et non 15 potest esse melius bonum infra deum quam quod ens infra deum est; ergo summe possibiliter bonum est quod ens infra deum est. Antecedens pro prima parte notum est, sed pro secunda parte sic probatur; quia, si oppositum potest esse melius bonum infra deum 20 quam quod ens infra deum est, sit illud a; tunc argu- mentatur sic: a est] et non est deus, ergo est cau- 137 satum a deo; et ultra: ergo est ens infra deum; et illud est melius quam ens infra deum; ergo ens infra deum est melius quam ens infra deum, quod est oppo- 25 situm in adiecto; et per consequens totum corellarium est verum. There are Corelarium quartum. Est dare species proximas, et ultimate species and last effects, causata proxima, inter quas species vel causata non so that no possunt alie species vel alia causata mediare, cum nulla 30 others come after them. species nec aliquod causatum potest perfici essencialiter; ergo, corelarium verum. Et antecedens patet speculanti conclusionem, cum sua probacione. 5tum corelarium: quod argumentum est verum; quid autem sit de quesito in se pertinebit in 3° articulo, etc. 35 Quantum ad 2m articulum, noto priorem divisionem, continuando de universali quod 2m universale est in re; et tale ymaginatur esse triplex 2m triplicem opinionem. Nam quidam opinabantur universale reale realiter essencialiter distinctum a singularibus cum universale 40 communicacione, participacione, et predicabilitate priori- The general opinion gives us 3 sorts of universals, (1) universals essentially distinct from their singulars by communication, 5. si crased? MS. 29. vel que MS. 34. artich MS. 35. ptebt MS. 41. 3 pro et MS.
176 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. proporcionabiliter est dare ydeas minus communes et magis communes in mente divina; sicud patet ex con- clusione et eius probacione, etc. There is an Corelarium 2m. Est dare ydeatum communissimum, Idea of greatest sicut est entitas analoga. Patet sic: quia, si est ideam5 generality and there is also dare communissimam ex conclusione, ergo, et ydeatum its object, which is communissimum proporcionabiliter; et per consequens Transcendental Being, the best corelarium est verum. of all possible Corelarium 3m. Entitas anologa est primum causatum creatures. For we can a deo factibile, summe possibiliter bonum infra deum. 10 conceive Pro prima parte patet sic, quia entitas anologa est nothing, however primum ydeatum ex prioribus: ergo et primum cau- perfect i that is not a being. satum. Consequencia tenet ab eodem ad idem, vel a convertibili ad convertibile. Sed pro secunda parte pro- batur. Bonum est quod ens infra deum est, et non 15 potest esse melius bonum infra deum quam quod ens infra deum est; ergo summe possibiliter bonum est quod ens infra deum est. Antecedens pro prima parte notum est, sed pro secunda parte sic probatur; quia, si oppositum potest esse melius bonum infra deum 20 quam quod ens infra deum est, sit illud a; tunc argu- mentatur sic: a est] et non est deus, ergo est cau- 137 satum a deo; et ultra: ergo est ens infra deum; et illud est melius quam ens infra deum; ergo ens infra deum est melius quam ens infra deum, quod est oppo- 25 situm in adiecto; et per consequens totum corellarium est verum. There are Corelarium quartum. Est dare species proximas, et ultimate species and last effects, causata proxima, inter quas species vel causata non so that no possunt alie species vel alia causata mediare, cum nulla 30 others come after them. species nec aliquod causatum potest perfici essencialiter; ergo, corelarium verum. Et antecedens patet speculanti conclusionem, cum sua probacione. 5tum corelarium: quod argumentum est verum; quid autem sit de quesito in se pertinebit in 3° articulo, etc. 35 Quantum ad 2m articulum, noto priorem divisionem, continuando de universali quod 2m universale est in re; et tale ymaginatur esse triplex 2m triplicem opinionem. Nam quidam opinabantur universale reale realiter essencialiter distinctum a singularibus cum universale 40 communicacione, participacione, et predicabilitate priori- The general opinion gives us 3 sorts of universals, (1) universals essentially distinct from their singulars by communication, 5. si crased? MS. 29. vel que MS. 34. artich MS. 35. ptebt MS. 41. 3 pro et MS.
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DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 177 tate nature insensibilitate, et multis differenciis disting- wantur ex opposito a singulari. Et illius opposicionis videtur esse Burley, et per philosophum ascribitur Platoni in multis locis. 2" universale in re est quelibet res simplex universa- liter apprehensa per intellectum creatum, et tale uni- versale in racione substracti vel signati est res realis et in racione signati formalis est ens racionis solum; quia, ut sic, est forma communis substracta per intel- 10 lectum creatum a circumstanciis et condicionibus indi- viduantibus. Et talem formam in re non dicunt esse, quia dicunt quod omnis res est simplex, modo eo ipso quo talis forma esset res realis, ipsa esset singularis etc. Et sic esset circumscripta et cum hoc abstracta a But this is not said to be real, 15 circumstanciis individuantibus; et sic non esset circum- or in the things scripta: quod implicat. Ergo illam formam dicunt solum themselves, esse per intellectum. Unde, sicut opus dicitur humanum, for if real, then singular ; it vel res divisa vel intellecta denominacione extrinseca, singular, no longer abstract. sic res singularis dicitur universalis denominacione ex- 20 trinseca solum quando apprehenditur universaliter. Et de tali opinione sunt Egidius, sanctus Thomas et Commen- tator, dum modo intellectus est qui agit universalitatem in rebus. Et similiter Aristoteles, dicens, "Universale est dum intelligitur, particulare vero dum sentitur". Et 25 conformiter ymaginatur de materia prima et tempore; de quibus narrare, causa brevitatis, obmitto. 3m universale in re est forma vel natura communis, multis suppositis communicata; et talis opinio est media inter predictas, quia concedit cum secunda opinione 3o quod universale est singulare, et econtra, et concedit cum prima opinione quod universale differt a singularibus formaliter. Et de illa via fundant se super racionibus vivacibus et super auctoribus multorum philosophorum et doctorum. Nam pro illa via est Boecius in libro 35 divisionum, ubi ponit differenciam inter divisionem qua totum integrale dividitur in suas partes integrales, et (3) Another opinion admits with (2) that the Universals are identical with their singulars, aud with (1) that they differ from them. his opinion is sustained by weighty arguments and great authority. Egidius. St. Thomas, Averrhoës and Aristotle think thus. (2) Anything thought of universally becomes universal in the mind by abstraction. participation, and predication. 7. ft MS. 8. fod MS. 20. apprehendit MS. 21. fint MS. 33. vinatibo MS. 34. in 1 MS. 3. Burley. Walter Burleigh. Sce W.'s Miscellanca Philosophica, Introduction, p. IVI. 7. Substracta. This reminds us of the vulgar mistake, substraction, which has perhaps had its origin in Mediaeval Latin. Cf. the French word, soustraction. 16. Im- plical. Contradiccionem understood. De Universalibus. 12
DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 177 tate nature insensibilitate, et multis differenciis disting- wantur ex opposito a singulari. Et illius opposicionis videtur esse Burley, et per philosophum ascribitur Platoni in multis locis. 2" universale in re est quelibet res simplex universa- liter apprehensa per intellectum creatum, et tale uni- versale in racione substracti vel signati est res realis et in racione signati formalis est ens racionis solum; quia, ut sic, est forma communis substracta per intel- 10 lectum creatum a circumstanciis et condicionibus indi- viduantibus. Et talem formam in re non dicunt esse, quia dicunt quod omnis res est simplex, modo eo ipso quo talis forma esset res realis, ipsa esset singularis etc. Et sic esset circumscripta et cum hoc abstracta a But this is not said to be real, 15 circumstanciis individuantibus; et sic non esset circum- or in the things scripta: quod implicat. Ergo illam formam dicunt solum themselves, esse per intellectum. Unde, sicut opus dicitur humanum, for if real, then singular ; it vel res divisa vel intellecta denominacione extrinseca, singular, no longer abstract. sic res singularis dicitur universalis denominacione ex- 20 trinseca solum quando apprehenditur universaliter. Et de tali opinione sunt Egidius, sanctus Thomas et Commen- tator, dum modo intellectus est qui agit universalitatem in rebus. Et similiter Aristoteles, dicens, "Universale est dum intelligitur, particulare vero dum sentitur". Et 25 conformiter ymaginatur de materia prima et tempore; de quibus narrare, causa brevitatis, obmitto. 3m universale in re est forma vel natura communis, multis suppositis communicata; et talis opinio est media inter predictas, quia concedit cum secunda opinione 3o quod universale est singulare, et econtra, et concedit cum prima opinione quod universale differt a singularibus formaliter. Et de illa via fundant se super racionibus vivacibus et super auctoribus multorum philosophorum et doctorum. Nam pro illa via est Boecius in libro 35 divisionum, ubi ponit differenciam inter divisionem qua totum integrale dividitur in suas partes integrales, et (3) Another opinion admits with (2) that the Universals are identical with their singulars, aud with (1) that they differ from them. his opinion is sustained by weighty arguments and great authority. Egidius. St. Thomas, Averrhoës and Aristotle think thus. (2) Anything thought of universally becomes universal in the mind by abstraction. participation, and predication. 7. ft MS. 8. fod MS. 20. apprehendit MS. 21. fint MS. 33. vinatibo MS. 34. in 1 MS. 3. Burley. Walter Burleigh. Sce W.'s Miscellanca Philosophica, Introduction, p. IVI. 7. Substracta. This reminds us of the vulgar mistake, substraction, which has perhaps had its origin in Mediaeval Latin. Cf. the French word, soustraction. 16. Im- plical. Contradiccionem understood. De Universalibus. 12
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178 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. divisionem qua totum universale dividitur in suas partes subiectivas essenciales, quia totum integrale, licet sit omnes partes sue collective, tamen est aliqua sui pars divisim. Sed totum universale est quelibet sui pars divisim, et omnes simul collectim. Pro illa eciam sentencia est5 commentator, 5t° methaphysice 9t° 3°; et dicens "Uni- versale predicatum de partibus facit ea esse unum"; et expressius in decimo methaphysice, ubi exponit hunc textum philosophi, dicentis: “Genus quod est idem per substanciam omnia diversa", sic scribit describendo genus: "Genus est illud quod est predicabile de diversis 2m quod est unumquodque eorum." Pro illa eciam sentencia sunt multi sancti doctores quos nominare et eorum dicta pro istius sentencie confirmacione, causa brevitatis, obmitto, etc. Corelarium. Omne individuum capit partem univer- salis quod est sua essencia a qua originatur. Et ideo pertinenter dixit Porphyrius: 'Participacione (seu partis capcione) plures homines sunt unus homo." Corellarium 2m. Omnis creatura est ens [2m] participa- 20 cionem, quia quelibet creatura habet finitam entitatem quam participat ab alio. Nam solus deus non sic par- ticipat, cum sit omnia in omnibus. Ergo, etc. 3m. Est universale post rem, sicud sunt conceptus The Universal which is communes, vel termini communiter significantes; et 25 posterior to its singulars is talia sunt universalia in signis, que sunt equivoce uni- universal only versalia. Sic homo depictus est homo, quia est signum as to the symbols used representativum hominis; vel urina dicitur sana equivoce. to express it. This Universal, quia est representativum sanitatis; sic hoc signum “homo' being only vel “animal" (et sic de aliis) dicitur universale, quia est 30 the sign of what is really representativum universalis rei. Et tale universale Lin- universal, barely deserves coniensis dicit esse impertinens, quia non est pertinens that name. dictum quod terminus ex eo quod significet universaliter est universale; quia in selda videmus quod circulus representat vinum, et tamen non est vinum. Et dicitur 35 universale post rem, quia consequitur universale reale sicud signum suum signatum. Corelarium. Habita noticia universalium in re, faciliter If we know the real Universals, habetur noticia universalium post rem; et non e con- we easily know their signs, but verso. Patet, quia, habita noticia signatorum, habetur 40 not vice versa. Every individual shares in the Universal which is its essence. Every creature is a being by this participation. 10 15 137b 2. esse pro essenciales MS. 20. 2m deest MS. 31. sel MS. 34. Selda, a shop. (Du Cange.)
178 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. divisionem qua totum universale dividitur in suas partes subiectivas essenciales, quia totum integrale, licet sit omnes partes sue collective, tamen est aliqua sui pars divisim. Sed totum universale est quelibet sui pars divisim, et omnes simul collectim. Pro illa eciam sentencia est5 commentator, 5t° methaphysice 9t° 3°; et dicens "Uni- versale predicatum de partibus facit ea esse unum"; et expressius in decimo methaphysice, ubi exponit hunc textum philosophi, dicentis: “Genus quod est idem per substanciam omnia diversa", sic scribit describendo genus: "Genus est illud quod est predicabile de diversis 2m quod est unumquodque eorum." Pro illa eciam sentencia sunt multi sancti doctores quos nominare et eorum dicta pro istius sentencie confirmacione, causa brevitatis, obmitto, etc. Corelarium. Omne individuum capit partem univer- salis quod est sua essencia a qua originatur. Et ideo pertinenter dixit Porphyrius: 'Participacione (seu partis capcione) plures homines sunt unus homo." Corellarium 2m. Omnis creatura est ens [2m] participa- 20 cionem, quia quelibet creatura habet finitam entitatem quam participat ab alio. Nam solus deus non sic par- ticipat, cum sit omnia in omnibus. Ergo, etc. 3m. Est universale post rem, sicud sunt conceptus The Universal which is communes, vel termini communiter significantes; et 25 posterior to its singulars is talia sunt universalia in signis, que sunt equivoce uni- universal only versalia. Sic homo depictus est homo, quia est signum as to the symbols used representativum hominis; vel urina dicitur sana equivoce. to express it. This Universal, quia est representativum sanitatis; sic hoc signum “homo' being only vel “animal" (et sic de aliis) dicitur universale, quia est 30 the sign of what is really representativum universalis rei. Et tale universale Lin- universal, barely deserves coniensis dicit esse impertinens, quia non est pertinens that name. dictum quod terminus ex eo quod significet universaliter est universale; quia in selda videmus quod circulus representat vinum, et tamen non est vinum. Et dicitur 35 universale post rem, quia consequitur universale reale sicud signum suum signatum. Corelarium. Habita noticia universalium in re, faciliter If we know the real Universals, habetur noticia universalium post rem; et non e con- we easily know their signs, but verso. Patet, quia, habita noticia signatorum, habetur 40 not vice versa. Every individual shares in the Universal which is its essence. Every creature is a being by this participation. 10 15 137b 2. esse pro essenciales MS. 20. 2m deest MS. 31. sel MS. 34. Selda, a shop. (Du Cange.)
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DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 179 25 noticia signorum, et non e converso. Nam noticia signorum inpertinens est ad noticiam signatorum: ergo corelarium verum. Quoad illum articulum qui fuit: Utrum universalia 5 solum habeant esse intencionale et intellectuale per operacionem intellectus creati, sit conclusio prima. Conclusio prima. Nullum est universale reale distinctum a singularibus realiter essencialiter. Probatur: quia alias sequitur quod nullum tale in predicacione vdemptica 10 predicaretur de suis suppositis; et sic sequitur quod quodlibet superius esset inpertinens et alienum ad sua inferiora; cuius oppositum arguit philosophus. 7° Metha- physice; ergo conclusio vera. Confirmatur. Capta illa re communi que non est res singularis (per adversarium) 15 tunc arguitur sic: Illa res est indivisa a se et divisa a qualibet alia re singulari; ergo est res singularis. Con- sequencia tenet ex diffinicione rei singularis; et cum est separata a singularibus, ergo non est res singularis: quod est contradiccio. Et antecedens pro prima parte 20 clarum est, sed pro 2a parte probatur; quia, si non est divisa a qualibet alia re, tunc esset communicata aliis rebus singularibus, et sic non esset distincta realiter essencialiter a rebus singularibus; quod est contra ad- versarium; igitur conclusio vera. Corelarium primum. Quod opinio prima de universali in re que ascribitur Platoni est falsa, ideo in toto irracionalis, patet conclusione et eius comprobacione. Sed michi apparet quod mendaciter ascribitur Platoni; quia, cum Plato fuit divinissimus philosophorum, non est 30 conveniens quod dixisset unum dictum ita fatuum quod non solum apud sapientes, verum eciam aput modicum elevatos in lumine naturali est dignum risu. Sed ipse intellexit hoc de ydeys, de quibus dictum est in primo articulo. Ideo verisimile est quod Aristoteles propter 35 logicam propriam, in qua separatur a Platone, non capit sensum Platonis, sed equivocat solum in verbis, sicud eciam sepius fecit aliis philosophis antiquis. Have the Universals only ideal being, given them by the mind? 1) A Universal really and essentially distinct from its singulars cannot be admitted, for. being apart from all the others, it would be at the same time singular and not singular; if not apart, it could not be distinct. This false opinion is ascribed to Plato, but I rather believe Aristotle to have mistaken his meaning. 27. exclusione MS. 28. me Ms. 35. in qua fex a plone MS. 7. Nullum. This paragraph, together with the following, is interesting as showing the difference between Wyclif's and Plato's Universals. Plato assumed a Universe of really existing patterns of things, which were, as such, essentially distinct therefrom. 12*
DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 179 25 noticia signorum, et non e converso. Nam noticia signorum inpertinens est ad noticiam signatorum: ergo corelarium verum. Quoad illum articulum qui fuit: Utrum universalia 5 solum habeant esse intencionale et intellectuale per operacionem intellectus creati, sit conclusio prima. Conclusio prima. Nullum est universale reale distinctum a singularibus realiter essencialiter. Probatur: quia alias sequitur quod nullum tale in predicacione vdemptica 10 predicaretur de suis suppositis; et sic sequitur quod quodlibet superius esset inpertinens et alienum ad sua inferiora; cuius oppositum arguit philosophus. 7° Metha- physice; ergo conclusio vera. Confirmatur. Capta illa re communi que non est res singularis (per adversarium) 15 tunc arguitur sic: Illa res est indivisa a se et divisa a qualibet alia re singulari; ergo est res singularis. Con- sequencia tenet ex diffinicione rei singularis; et cum est separata a singularibus, ergo non est res singularis: quod est contradiccio. Et antecedens pro prima parte 20 clarum est, sed pro 2a parte probatur; quia, si non est divisa a qualibet alia re, tunc esset communicata aliis rebus singularibus, et sic non esset distincta realiter essencialiter a rebus singularibus; quod est contra ad- versarium; igitur conclusio vera. Corelarium primum. Quod opinio prima de universali in re que ascribitur Platoni est falsa, ideo in toto irracionalis, patet conclusione et eius comprobacione. Sed michi apparet quod mendaciter ascribitur Platoni; quia, cum Plato fuit divinissimus philosophorum, non est 30 conveniens quod dixisset unum dictum ita fatuum quod non solum apud sapientes, verum eciam aput modicum elevatos in lumine naturali est dignum risu. Sed ipse intellexit hoc de ydeys, de quibus dictum est in primo articulo. Ideo verisimile est quod Aristoteles propter 35 logicam propriam, in qua separatur a Platone, non capit sensum Platonis, sed equivocat solum in verbis, sicud eciam sepius fecit aliis philosophis antiquis. Have the Universals only ideal being, given them by the mind? 1) A Universal really and essentially distinct from its singulars cannot be admitted, for. being apart from all the others, it would be at the same time singular and not singular; if not apart, it could not be distinct. This false opinion is ascribed to Plato, but I rather believe Aristotle to have mistaken his meaning. 27. exclusione MS. 28. me Ms. 35. in qua fex a plone MS. 7. Nullum. This paragraph, together with the following, is interesting as showing the difference between Wyclif's and Plato's Universals. Plato assumed a Universe of really existing patterns of things, which were, as such, essentially distinct therefrom. 12*
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180 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. Conclusio' 2a. Universale in re non solum est forma communis per intellectum creatum universaliter appre- hensa. Probatur. Nam abstrahencium non est mendacium, 2° physicorum. Si ergo intelligens abstrahit talem formam, vel abstrahit vere [vel non]. Si non vere, tunc est ficticium, quia false abstrahere non est abstrahere. Si abstrahit vere; ergo huiusmodi forma abstractiva vere est et ultima ex consequente. Ergo realiter est. Et quia talis forma per adversarium est universale; ergo universale realiter est, et per consequens non solum per 10 intellectum causatum; est ergo construccio vera. Confirmatur sic. Subducta consideracione intellectus creati, universale habet esse quo (non solum per intel- lectum creatum) est; et per consequens conclusio vera. Antecedens sic: subducta omni consi ] deracione intel- lectus humani, adhuc commune est cuilibet homini esse hominem, et cuilibet igni esse ignem; ergo antecedens verum. Antecedens probatur sic: quia indubio quelibet illarum veritatum universalium prius naturaliter dependet ab intellectu divino intelligente et ordinante sic esse, 20 quam ad intellectu humano; quia deus agit hoc ab eterno et agit hoc, nec cessat hoc agere quando ita fit. Ergo etc. Et confirmatur, quia alias sequeretur quod tale universale multiplicaretur ad multiplicacionem actuum anime ceterorum perenniter, et inciperet esse 25 quociens libuerit: quod est inconveniens, eo quod tunc logica non esset sciencia, cum sit de singularibus et universalibus que non sunt mansiva sed continue in- cipiunt et desinunt esse; ergo conclusio vera. Corelarium: Quamvis multi vocibus negant universalia 30 Many deny the Universals realia, ponunt tamen ipsam 2m rem et intellectum. Patet, verbally but in reality admit cum summe communius sit omni rei esse ens, vel omni them. homini esse animal, quam sit commune quod com- muniter in Praga quolibet anno sit disputacio de quo- libet, vel quod communiter studentes post cenam vadunt 35 spaciatum. Unde ergo per vocem asserere talia esse, est ponere universalia realia et res communes, vel negando res communes est negare propriam vocem et assercionem. Corelarium 2m: quod 2us articulus, ut pro- ponitur, est falsus, etc. The Universal is not only the common form, apprehended by the mind; for if the abstractive process be right, (as it should be) it results in truth, and the Universal is what it is apprehended to be. The Universal, apart from the act of the human mind, has entity of its own. For man is man, fire is fire, whether thought of or not; their essences depend on the Divine Intellect. Otherwise they would be in continual fluctuation, and multiplication. 138* 40 5. vel non deest MS. 13. 9° MS. 25. per MS. 34. armo MS. 36. Cf. German spazieren, Polish spacerowac, to lake a walk.
180 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. Conclusio' 2a. Universale in re non solum est forma communis per intellectum creatum universaliter appre- hensa. Probatur. Nam abstrahencium non est mendacium, 2° physicorum. Si ergo intelligens abstrahit talem formam, vel abstrahit vere [vel non]. Si non vere, tunc est ficticium, quia false abstrahere non est abstrahere. Si abstrahit vere; ergo huiusmodi forma abstractiva vere est et ultima ex consequente. Ergo realiter est. Et quia talis forma per adversarium est universale; ergo universale realiter est, et per consequens non solum per 10 intellectum causatum; est ergo construccio vera. Confirmatur sic. Subducta consideracione intellectus creati, universale habet esse quo (non solum per intel- lectum creatum) est; et per consequens conclusio vera. Antecedens sic: subducta omni consi ] deracione intel- lectus humani, adhuc commune est cuilibet homini esse hominem, et cuilibet igni esse ignem; ergo antecedens verum. Antecedens probatur sic: quia indubio quelibet illarum veritatum universalium prius naturaliter dependet ab intellectu divino intelligente et ordinante sic esse, 20 quam ad intellectu humano; quia deus agit hoc ab eterno et agit hoc, nec cessat hoc agere quando ita fit. Ergo etc. Et confirmatur, quia alias sequeretur quod tale universale multiplicaretur ad multiplicacionem actuum anime ceterorum perenniter, et inciperet esse 25 quociens libuerit: quod est inconveniens, eo quod tunc logica non esset sciencia, cum sit de singularibus et universalibus que non sunt mansiva sed continue in- cipiunt et desinunt esse; ergo conclusio vera. Corelarium: Quamvis multi vocibus negant universalia 30 Many deny the Universals realia, ponunt tamen ipsam 2m rem et intellectum. Patet, verbally but in reality admit cum summe communius sit omni rei esse ens, vel omni them. homini esse animal, quam sit commune quod com- muniter in Praga quolibet anno sit disputacio de quo- libet, vel quod communiter studentes post cenam vadunt 35 spaciatum. Unde ergo per vocem asserere talia esse, est ponere universalia realia et res communes, vel negando res communes est negare propriam vocem et assercionem. Corelarium 2m: quod 2us articulus, ut pro- ponitur, est falsus, etc. The Universal is not only the common form, apprehended by the mind; for if the abstractive process be right, (as it should be) it results in truth, and the Universal is what it is apprehended to be. The Universal, apart from the act of the human mind, has entity of its own. For man is man, fire is fire, whether thought of or not; their essences depend on the Divine Intellect. Otherwise they would be in continual fluctuation, and multiplication. 138* 40 5. vel non deest MS. 13. 9° MS. 25. per MS. 34. armo MS. 36. Cf. German spazieren, Polish spacerowac, to lake a walk.
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DE UNIVERSALIBUS. Quantum ad 3"" articulum, qui fuit: Utrum univer- salia habeant esse reale et in propria forma, sit prima conclusio. Universalia realia sunt ponenda, quorum singulum 2?" essenciam est omnia sua supposita collectim 5et divisim ab eisdem, et a quolibet eorum differt forma- liter. Ista conclusio habet 35 partes; pro prima parte sic argumentatur multipliciter. Primo sic. Michi et non solum michi debetur esse animal, ut notum est, et non animal singulare, quia tale solum debetur uni quod non ro alteri. Ergo oportet quod sit animal commune, quod est omnia animalia singularia, et quodlibet eorum divisim; et tale est universale reale: ergo etc. Conclusio pro prima parte est vera. Confirmatur: Sor est similis Platoni in quantitate, et circumscriptis omnibus signis. 15 Vel singulari, vel communi. Non singulari; quia Sor humanitate sua singulari est sibi ita similis, ita quod non alteri, eo quod sua humanitate singulari sic Sor est homo, quod non alteri; nec humanitate singulari Platonis ex eadem racione, Ergo est ponenda communis 20 humanitas qua Sor est similis.Platoni: igitur, etc. Item, homo differt essencialiter ab asino et est danda con- veniencia essencialis qua homo essencialiter convenit cum homine, et talis conveniencia vel differencia non est in signo vel conceptu, quia conveniencia et diffe- s5rencia rerum essencialis fundatur essencialiter in rerum principiis, et non in signis; quia predicacio signorum vel eorum predicabilitas non est causa conveniencie et differencie rerum ad extra, sed e converso. Ergo oportet quod talis differencia et conveniencia sit realis. Et talis 3onon est singularis, quia, si ista differencia singularis vel conveniencia singularis non esset, adhuc esset verum quod homo differt essencialiter ab asino, et homo con- venit essencialiter cum homine. Ergo est ponenda differencia et conveniencia communis, et per consequens 181 We say that Real Universalis are identical with all their singulars together or apart, differing from each only bv a formal difference. When two men are like, in what are they like? In their individuality ? No, but in something else. which is identical with each. A man differs essentially from an ass, and agrees essentially with another man. This difference and agreement is neither in words nor in thought; therefore in fact. 35 conclusio vera, Pro 2? parte probatur quod alias, silf the Universal universale differt a suis suppositis, tunc in proposicione ydemptica aut non communicaretur suis suppositis (eo quod ut sic haberet se disparate ad sua supposita ut patet intuenti) et esset in toto alienum et inpertinens 4a Suis suppositis; ... .. et sic, cognoscendo suum superius, 6. pnoce MS. — 15. quod MS. 40. Suppositis. 1 think the missing member of the sentence ought to come here. were not the same us its singulars, it could not be predicated of them, or at least not properly.
DE UNIVERSALIBUS. Quantum ad 3"" articulum, qui fuit: Utrum univer- salia habeant esse reale et in propria forma, sit prima conclusio. Universalia realia sunt ponenda, quorum singulum 2?" essenciam est omnia sua supposita collectim 5et divisim ab eisdem, et a quolibet eorum differt forma- liter. Ista conclusio habet 35 partes; pro prima parte sic argumentatur multipliciter. Primo sic. Michi et non solum michi debetur esse animal, ut notum est, et non animal singulare, quia tale solum debetur uni quod non ro alteri. Ergo oportet quod sit animal commune, quod est omnia animalia singularia, et quodlibet eorum divisim; et tale est universale reale: ergo etc. Conclusio pro prima parte est vera. Confirmatur: Sor est similis Platoni in quantitate, et circumscriptis omnibus signis. 15 Vel singulari, vel communi. Non singulari; quia Sor humanitate sua singulari est sibi ita similis, ita quod non alteri, eo quod sua humanitate singulari sic Sor est homo, quod non alteri; nec humanitate singulari Platonis ex eadem racione, Ergo est ponenda communis 20 humanitas qua Sor est similis.Platoni: igitur, etc. Item, homo differt essencialiter ab asino et est danda con- veniencia essencialis qua homo essencialiter convenit cum homine, et talis conveniencia vel differencia non est in signo vel conceptu, quia conveniencia et diffe- s5rencia rerum essencialis fundatur essencialiter in rerum principiis, et non in signis; quia predicacio signorum vel eorum predicabilitas non est causa conveniencie et differencie rerum ad extra, sed e converso. Ergo oportet quod talis differencia et conveniencia sit realis. Et talis 3onon est singularis, quia, si ista differencia singularis vel conveniencia singularis non esset, adhuc esset verum quod homo differt essencialiter ab asino, et homo con- venit essencialiter cum homine. Ergo est ponenda differencia et conveniencia communis, et per consequens 181 We say that Real Universalis are identical with all their singulars together or apart, differing from each only bv a formal difference. When two men are like, in what are they like? In their individuality ? No, but in something else. which is identical with each. A man differs essentially from an ass, and agrees essentially with another man. This difference and agreement is neither in words nor in thought; therefore in fact. 35 conclusio vera, Pro 2? parte probatur quod alias, silf the Universal universale differt a suis suppositis, tunc in proposicione ydemptica aut non communicaretur suis suppositis (eo quod ut sic haberet se disparate ad sua supposita ut patet intuenti) et esset in toto alienum et inpertinens 4a Suis suppositis; ... .. et sic, cognoscendo suum superius, 6. pnoce MS. — 15. quod MS. 40. Suppositis. 1 think the missing member of the sentence ought to come here. were not the same us its singulars, it could not be predicated of them, or at least not properly.
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182 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. To the Universal belongs the property of being in many which the singular lacks ; therefore they differ formally Corollaries. Every universal is its singular. every individual is its species, &c., &c. non cognosceretur suum inferius confuse. Non enim foret pertinens cognoscere istum hominem, cognoscendo universaliter speciem hominis, nisi ipse homo foret species et illum hominem esse esset hominem esse; ergo conclusio pro secunda parte est vera. Sed pro 3a parte probatur sic: quia aliquid convenit formaliter universali quod non convenit singulari formaliter; et e converso: ergo differunt formaliter. Consequencia est nota, sed antecedens probatur sic: quia communicari pluribus convenit formaliter universali, et non convenit formaliter t0 singulari; alias coniuncta universalitati esset incommuni- cabilitas; quod claudit contradiccionem, etc. Ergo con- clusio tota vera. Corelarium primum. Quodlibet universale est singulare et e converso. Item, quodlibet individuum est species 15 et quodlibet species est individuum. Item, species specia- lissima est genus generalissimum, et e converso. Similiter, differencia est genus, et differencia est species. Patent omnia ista ex 2a parte conclusionis, quia in qualibet tali predicacione unum est reliquum secundum essenciam, 20 cum differunt formaliter, ut patet practicanti: ergo corelarium verum. Corelarium 2m. Iste locuciones sunt concedende: Qui- libet homo singularis est predicabile de multis, et tamen nullus homo singularis est predicabilis de multis. Item; 25 Genus animalis est incommunicabile multis, et tamen genus animalis communicatur multis. Item: Iste homo est homo universalis, et tamen iste homo non est uni- versalis. Similiter: Res universalis est res singularis, et tamen res universalis non est singularis. Patent omnia 30 ista ex secunda et 3a parte conclusionis, et noticia triplicis predicacionis. Corelarium 3m. Supposicio simplex et distinccio for- malis in rebus est ponenda; quibus cognitis bene non procedit aliquis paraloysmus contra veritatem univer- 35 salium et ydearum. Patet practicanti. Corelarium 4tum. X et responsale. Preter signa ad placitum instituta et conceptus humanos et species speciales et specificantes preter universalia ydeata, ponenda sunt universalia realia; patet ex dictis. 138- 40 21. pcticanti MS. 37. x z rnſale MS. 39. ydes MS.
182 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. To the Universal belongs the property of being in many which the singular lacks ; therefore they differ formally Corollaries. Every universal is its singular. every individual is its species, &c., &c. non cognosceretur suum inferius confuse. Non enim foret pertinens cognoscere istum hominem, cognoscendo universaliter speciem hominis, nisi ipse homo foret species et illum hominem esse esset hominem esse; ergo conclusio pro secunda parte est vera. Sed pro 3a parte probatur sic: quia aliquid convenit formaliter universali quod non convenit singulari formaliter; et e converso: ergo differunt formaliter. Consequencia est nota, sed antecedens probatur sic: quia communicari pluribus convenit formaliter universali, et non convenit formaliter t0 singulari; alias coniuncta universalitati esset incommuni- cabilitas; quod claudit contradiccionem, etc. Ergo con- clusio tota vera. Corelarium primum. Quodlibet universale est singulare et e converso. Item, quodlibet individuum est species 15 et quodlibet species est individuum. Item, species specia- lissima est genus generalissimum, et e converso. Similiter, differencia est genus, et differencia est species. Patent omnia ista ex 2a parte conclusionis, quia in qualibet tali predicacione unum est reliquum secundum essenciam, 20 cum differunt formaliter, ut patet practicanti: ergo corelarium verum. Corelarium 2m. Iste locuciones sunt concedende: Qui- libet homo singularis est predicabile de multis, et tamen nullus homo singularis est predicabilis de multis. Item; 25 Genus animalis est incommunicabile multis, et tamen genus animalis communicatur multis. Item: Iste homo est homo universalis, et tamen iste homo non est uni- versalis. Similiter: Res universalis est res singularis, et tamen res universalis non est singularis. Patent omnia 30 ista ex secunda et 3a parte conclusionis, et noticia triplicis predicacionis. Corelarium 3m. Supposicio simplex et distinccio for- malis in rebus est ponenda; quibus cognitis bene non procedit aliquis paraloysmus contra veritatem univer- 35 salium et ydearum. Patet practicanti. Corelarium 4tum. X et responsale. Preter signa ad placitum instituta et conceptus humanos et species speciales et specificantes preter universalia ydeata, ponenda sunt universalia realia; patet ex dictis. 138- 40 21. pcticanti MS. 37. x z rnſale MS. 39. ydes MS.
Strana 183
DE UNIVERSALIBUS. - Corelarium 5'"", Primus articulus . , . . ut proponuntur .... Sunt falsi, cum sint ex conclusione licet .... alio -... Supposita sint vera. Patet etc. Conclusio 22, Quamvis species specialissima realis 2'" ;essenciam est omnia sua supposita, cuiuslibet tamen speciei specialissime actualis omnia supposita inter se essencialiter distingwuntur. Pro prima parte conclusio patet ex 2* parte precedentis conclusionis. Sed pro secunda parte probatur de suppositis speciei humane. 10, Et. conformiter argumentatur de suppositis cuiuslibet alterius speciei actualis. Et argumentatur sic: Aliquod intrinsece essencialiter convenit Sorti quod non convenit Platoni; ergo differunt essencialiter. Et sic argumentatur de aliis. Antecedens probatur; quia esse istum hominem (demonstrato Sorte) habet quod sit Sorti et non Platoni, nec alicui alteri; et non accidentaliter, ergo, essencia- liter. Antecedens pro prima parte notum est, cum Sor sit iste homo (demonstrato Sorte) ergo esse istum hominem (demonstrato Sor) convenit Sorti. Sed pro secunda parte 20 probatur sic; quia sic Sor numeraliter est homo, quod sic numeraliter Plato non est homo; alias Sor esset Plato; et e converso. Non est verum ergo esse istum hominem alteri ex eadem causa, Pro 3? parte antecedens sic probatur; quia alias esse istum hominem numeraliter (demonstrato Sorte) posset abesse Sorti, et sic staret Sortem esse et ipsum non esse istum hominem numera- liter (demonstrando Sor), et sic Sor simul esset et non esset: quod est contradiccio. Corelarium primum. Non sequitur: Sor et Plato differunt 3oindividualiter substancialiter; ergo differunt specifice. Patet ex conclusione, quia Sor et Plato differunt essen- cialiter substancialiter, numeraliter, et conveniunt in prima specie communi. Et conclusio? Argumentum non concludit quo argumentatur contra conclusionem quod species specialissima non est species specialissima. Corelarium 2". |mpossibile est esse duo individua eiusdem speciei specialissime que equaliter haberent eumdem gradum essencialem naturalem. Patet, quia Sor oy "m e + I. p pii ft th MS. 2. aho MS. 15. q* MS. — 30. Int MS. 33. go MS. — 3x. nalem MS. 1. Primus. | have placed gaps here, not for words that ] could not make out, but for supposed omissions. 183 Though each individual is its species, yct cach is essentially distinct from every other. For each individual has this, that he is not any other. and it is essential to him (or he would otherwise no longer be an individual). It does not follow, becausc therc is essential diticrence, that thev differ specifically. If two bcings were cxactly equal in al things, they would be one
DE UNIVERSALIBUS. - Corelarium 5'"", Primus articulus . , . . ut proponuntur .... Sunt falsi, cum sint ex conclusione licet .... alio -... Supposita sint vera. Patet etc. Conclusio 22, Quamvis species specialissima realis 2'" ;essenciam est omnia sua supposita, cuiuslibet tamen speciei specialissime actualis omnia supposita inter se essencialiter distingwuntur. Pro prima parte conclusio patet ex 2* parte precedentis conclusionis. Sed pro secunda parte probatur de suppositis speciei humane. 10, Et. conformiter argumentatur de suppositis cuiuslibet alterius speciei actualis. Et argumentatur sic: Aliquod intrinsece essencialiter convenit Sorti quod non convenit Platoni; ergo differunt essencialiter. Et sic argumentatur de aliis. Antecedens probatur; quia esse istum hominem (demonstrato Sorte) habet quod sit Sorti et non Platoni, nec alicui alteri; et non accidentaliter, ergo, essencia- liter. Antecedens pro prima parte notum est, cum Sor sit iste homo (demonstrato Sorte) ergo esse istum hominem (demonstrato Sor) convenit Sorti. Sed pro secunda parte 20 probatur sic; quia sic Sor numeraliter est homo, quod sic numeraliter Plato non est homo; alias Sor esset Plato; et e converso. Non est verum ergo esse istum hominem alteri ex eadem causa, Pro 3? parte antecedens sic probatur; quia alias esse istum hominem numeraliter (demonstrato Sorte) posset abesse Sorti, et sic staret Sortem esse et ipsum non esse istum hominem numera- liter (demonstrando Sor), et sic Sor simul esset et non esset: quod est contradiccio. Corelarium primum. Non sequitur: Sor et Plato differunt 3oindividualiter substancialiter; ergo differunt specifice. Patet ex conclusione, quia Sor et Plato differunt essen- cialiter substancialiter, numeraliter, et conveniunt in prima specie communi. Et conclusio? Argumentum non concludit quo argumentatur contra conclusionem quod species specialissima non est species specialissima. Corelarium 2". |mpossibile est esse duo individua eiusdem speciei specialissime que equaliter haberent eumdem gradum essencialem naturalem. Patet, quia Sor oy "m e + I. p pii ft th MS. 2. aho MS. 15. q* MS. — 30. Int MS. 33. go MS. — 3x. nalem MS. 1. Primus. | have placed gaps here, not for words that ] could not make out, but for supposed omissions. 183 Though each individual is its species, yct cach is essentially distinct from every other. For each individual has this, that he is not any other. and it is essential to him (or he would otherwise no longer be an individual). It does not follow, becausc therc is essential diticrence, that thev differ specifically. If two bcings were cxactly equal in al things, they would be one
Strana 184
184 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. and the same habet aliud esse numerale intelligibile quam Plato, sicud being. patuit ex conclusione et eius predicacione; alias Sor esset Plato, et e converso; quod est falsum. Et sic argumentatur de aliis. Igitur corelarium verum. Corelarium 3m. Inter individua eiusdem speciei, unum 5 est; perfeccius alio essencialiter; patet ex priori assumpto. 139" Et confirmatur hoc corelarium. Nam sicut genus est in suis speciebus, una est perfeccior alia essencialiter, sic stat quod unum individuum est perfeccius alio eiusdem speciei; quamvis tamen species equaliter est in omnibus 10 suis individuis, sicut genus in suis speciebus. Corelarium 4tum. Anima Cristi fuit perfeccior per- feccione nuda essencialiter numerali anima .. . . inde .... quod est contra articulum Parisiensis. Patet ex prioribus; Ergo etc. Corelarium 5tum. Condiciones individuantes non sunt principia essendi individuorum, sed solum cognoscendi. Alias individua eiusdem speciei solum differrent per condiciones individuantes, et sic solum accidentaliter; quod est contra conclusionem et eius probacionem. 20 Ergo corelarium verum. Corelarium 6lum. Opinio peripateticorum ponens res singulares solum differre numero, prout numerus est de genere quantitatis, est falsa; quia tunc solum differrent accidentaliter; quod est contra prius dicta. Sed pro hoc 25 non nego quin res singulares differunt numero, capiendo numerum transcendentaliter; scilicet, pro essencia nume- rali qua una res singularis discernitur ab alia re singulari; et ita differt, cum capitur numero, in de- scripcione speciei specialissime. Corelarium 7mum. Deus non est species specialissima; quod patet. Quia si esset species specialissima, tunc esset species specialissima actualis, cum actu habeat plura supposita; quia pater in divinis est deus, filius in divinis est deus, spiritus sanctus est deus; et quia 35 cuiuslibet speciei specialissime actualis supposita inter There are many essential differences amongst beings of the same species. The conditions of individuality are not conditions of being, but of knowinig. It is false to think, with the Peripateticians, that singulars may differ only numerically. God is not a species; for if He were, the Threc Persons would be essentially distinct: which is a heresy. 15 30 5. Int'didua MS. 6. asz° MS. 13. nualr (?) MS. 14. pſiene MS. 17. oendi MS. 29. dt MS. 35. ff. pro spiritus sanctus MS. 6. At bottom of f. 138b is a quotation from St. Augustine that seems to have no relation with the subject matter. 14. Pari- siensis. Possibly the Council of Paris, which in 1147 dealt with the doctrines of Gilbert de la Porée, who was finally condemned in 1148 by the Council of Reims.
184 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. and the same habet aliud esse numerale intelligibile quam Plato, sicud being. patuit ex conclusione et eius predicacione; alias Sor esset Plato, et e converso; quod est falsum. Et sic argumentatur de aliis. Igitur corelarium verum. Corelarium 3m. Inter individua eiusdem speciei, unum 5 est; perfeccius alio essencialiter; patet ex priori assumpto. 139" Et confirmatur hoc corelarium. Nam sicut genus est in suis speciebus, una est perfeccior alia essencialiter, sic stat quod unum individuum est perfeccius alio eiusdem speciei; quamvis tamen species equaliter est in omnibus 10 suis individuis, sicut genus in suis speciebus. Corelarium 4tum. Anima Cristi fuit perfeccior per- feccione nuda essencialiter numerali anima .. . . inde .... quod est contra articulum Parisiensis. Patet ex prioribus; Ergo etc. Corelarium 5tum. Condiciones individuantes non sunt principia essendi individuorum, sed solum cognoscendi. Alias individua eiusdem speciei solum differrent per condiciones individuantes, et sic solum accidentaliter; quod est contra conclusionem et eius probacionem. 20 Ergo corelarium verum. Corelarium 6lum. Opinio peripateticorum ponens res singulares solum differre numero, prout numerus est de genere quantitatis, est falsa; quia tunc solum differrent accidentaliter; quod est contra prius dicta. Sed pro hoc 25 non nego quin res singulares differunt numero, capiendo numerum transcendentaliter; scilicet, pro essencia nume- rali qua una res singularis discernitur ab alia re singulari; et ita differt, cum capitur numero, in de- scripcione speciei specialissime. Corelarium 7mum. Deus non est species specialissima; quod patet. Quia si esset species specialissima, tunc esset species specialissima actualis, cum actu habeat plura supposita; quia pater in divinis est deus, filius in divinis est deus, spiritus sanctus est deus; et quia 35 cuiuslibet speciei specialissime actualis supposita inter There are many essential differences amongst beings of the same species. The conditions of individuality are not conditions of being, but of knowinig. It is false to think, with the Peripateticians, that singulars may differ only numerically. God is not a species; for if He were, the Threc Persons would be essentially distinct: which is a heresy. 15 30 5. Int'didua MS. 6. asz° MS. 13. nualr (?) MS. 14. pſiene MS. 17. oendi MS. 29. dt MS. 35. ff. pro spiritus sanctus MS. 6. At bottom of f. 138b is a quotation from St. Augustine that seems to have no relation with the subject matter. 14. Pari- siensis. Possibly the Council of Paris, which in 1147 dealt with the doctrines of Gilbert de la Porée, who was finally condemned in 1148 by the Council of Reims.
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DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 185 se distingwuntur essencialiter, ex conclusione sequitur quod supposita in divinis, sive persone, distingwuntur essencialiter: quod est heresis; quia omnes persone sunt una essencialiter. Consequencia patet ex terminis. Et, 5 eciam si esset species, tunc entitas analoga equaliter conveniret rei create et increate; quod est impossibile, cum deus sit infinite perfeccionis essencialis, ultra quam- libet rem creatam; Ergo corelarium verum. Conclusio tercia et ultima: res universales incompara- 10 biliter sunt meliores et nobiliores rebus singularibus. Patet conclusio multipliciter; quia esse hominem includit in se istum hominem, et cum amplius se extendit, ergo totam bonitatem universale includit rei singularis, et amplius extenditur nobilitas et bonitas rei universalis: ergo conclusio vera. Et per rem singularem non solum For if All animals did intelligo rem numeralem, sicut rem minus communem, not exist, no quia res magis communis est semper nobilior minus particular animals and communi. Confirmatur. Privacio rei universalis est peior therefore no men would quam privacio rei singularis; ergo res universalis est exist; but if no 20 melior re singulari. Consequencia tenet; penes maliciam men existed, there might still privacionis mensuratur bonitas habitus, quia, sicut be animals; one would be a far malum est rem aliquam non esse, sic proporcionabiliter greater loss est bonum illam rem esse. Et antecedens probatur: non than the other. esse animal est peior privacio quam non esse hominem; et non esse hominem est peior privacio quam non esse istum hominem; et sic de aliis. Ergo antecedens pro- batur: per non esse animal plura bona tolluntur quam per non esse hominem, et per non esse hominem plura tolluntur quam [per] non esse istum hominem: ergo, etc. 30 Antecedens probatur; quia, si non esset animal, non esset homo nec asinus; et sic de aliis speciebus: sed, si non esset homo, staret quod esset animal: ergo, etc. Confirmatur ista conclusio: Omne illud quod est magis propinquius deo, hoc est perfeccius et nobilius; sed res magis universalis respectu rei minus universalis est huiusmodi; ergo etc. Maior patet, quia de quanto aliqua res propius accedit ad primum ens, de tanto esse est perfeccior; et quanto plus recedit a primo ente, de tanto plus diminuitur in perfeccione; eo quod deus in 40 ordine essenciali universi est in supremo gradu possi- bili, et quidquid citra deum est eo ordine perfeccius, Superiority of the Universals over their singulars. The more universal they are, the more perfect they must be. And the nearer anything approaches God, the more perfect it is; now as anything is moro Universal, it is nearer to God. 15 25 35 18. que MS. 29. per deest MS. 36. Minor (?) MS. De Universalibus. 13
DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 185 se distingwuntur essencialiter, ex conclusione sequitur quod supposita in divinis, sive persone, distingwuntur essencialiter: quod est heresis; quia omnes persone sunt una essencialiter. Consequencia patet ex terminis. Et, 5 eciam si esset species, tunc entitas analoga equaliter conveniret rei create et increate; quod est impossibile, cum deus sit infinite perfeccionis essencialis, ultra quam- libet rem creatam; Ergo corelarium verum. Conclusio tercia et ultima: res universales incompara- 10 biliter sunt meliores et nobiliores rebus singularibus. Patet conclusio multipliciter; quia esse hominem includit in se istum hominem, et cum amplius se extendit, ergo totam bonitatem universale includit rei singularis, et amplius extenditur nobilitas et bonitas rei universalis: ergo conclusio vera. Et per rem singularem non solum For if All animals did intelligo rem numeralem, sicut rem minus communem, not exist, no quia res magis communis est semper nobilior minus particular animals and communi. Confirmatur. Privacio rei universalis est peior therefore no men would quam privacio rei singularis; ergo res universalis est exist; but if no 20 melior re singulari. Consequencia tenet; penes maliciam men existed, there might still privacionis mensuratur bonitas habitus, quia, sicut be animals; one would be a far malum est rem aliquam non esse, sic proporcionabiliter greater loss est bonum illam rem esse. Et antecedens probatur: non than the other. esse animal est peior privacio quam non esse hominem; et non esse hominem est peior privacio quam non esse istum hominem; et sic de aliis. Ergo antecedens pro- batur: per non esse animal plura bona tolluntur quam per non esse hominem, et per non esse hominem plura tolluntur quam [per] non esse istum hominem: ergo, etc. 30 Antecedens probatur; quia, si non esset animal, non esset homo nec asinus; et sic de aliis speciebus: sed, si non esset homo, staret quod esset animal: ergo, etc. Confirmatur ista conclusio: Omne illud quod est magis propinquius deo, hoc est perfeccius et nobilius; sed res magis universalis respectu rei minus universalis est huiusmodi; ergo etc. Maior patet, quia de quanto aliqua res propius accedit ad primum ens, de tanto esse est perfeccior; et quanto plus recedit a primo ente, de tanto plus diminuitur in perfeccione; eo quod deus in 40 ordine essenciali universi est in supremo gradu possi- bili, et quidquid citra deum est eo ordine perfeccius, Superiority of the Universals over their singulars. The more universal they are, the more perfect they must be. And the nearer anything approaches God, the more perfect it is; now as anything is moro Universal, it is nearer to God. 15 25 35 18. que MS. 29. per deest MS. 36. Minor (?) MS. De Universalibus. 13
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186 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. ergo est deo propius: et per consequens maior vera. Sed minor probatur, quia in ordine universi genus realiter prius est quam species, et species quam indi- viduum; et generaliter magis universale minus univer- sali. Genus in ordine essenciali universi magis com-5 mune est, propinquius supremo gradu essendi quam minus commune, et per consequens est conclusio vera, etc. Corelarium primum. Quilibet conformando bonitatem 139" We should prefer the universal to the sue bonitati divine tenetur .... plus deo plus diligere 10 particular good, bona universalia bonis privatis. Patet, quia oppositum and universal to particular faciendo peccat. Nam 2m duos theologos omne peccatum things. consistit in voluntate preponente minus bonum magis For the Universal is bono; sed generaliter bona universalia sunt magis bona better as more rationally bonis privatis: ergo corelarium verum. desirable; ihe Corelarium 2m. Res universales plus diligi debent Particular, only as more useful; rebus singularibus. Patet ex conclusione et probacione and even that, eius, eo quod sunt magis bone; ergo etc. Patet eciam only as concerns sic corelarium. In rebus singularibus relucet bonum temporal uses. comodi nobilius quam affeccio honestatis. Nam univer-20 salia non cedunt in comodum, si singularia cedunt in comodum. Si unus est dominus nobis, famulus nobis, vel alicuius etc., de hoc habeo comodum et utilitatem; sed de hoc quod est homo nullum habeo comodum. Ergo racione honestatis plus debent diligi et preponi 25 in dileccione rebus singularibus: ergo corelarium verum. Sed quod dixi universalia non cedere in commodum, debet intelligi de comodo temporali. Nam noticia univer- salium est maxime utilis, quia via inductiva ad cognos- cendum benedictam trinitatem, et ad intelligendum 30 sacram scripturam. Pro prima parte patet, quia est aliqualis conveniencia licet non omnimodo speciei ad supposita, sicud nature divine ad personas. Et ob hoc dicit Anshelmus de incarnacione, in capitulo primo: ce 'Iste", inquit, "cuius ymago est ymaginibus corporalium 35 adeo involuta quod non intelligit quomodo plures 15 5. g' pro Genus MS. 10. After tenetur, an illegible word; no gap MS. 12. duos? = divinos? 15. privacio quite plain MS. 19. r'lucz MS.; ib. bou MS. 22. nis MS.; ib. nis MS. 23. Intelite; MS. 33. obe MS. 9. At the top of f. 139 there is a note on the racio semi- nalis, irrelevant to the subject-matter. 20. Honestatis. Bonum honestum' was the Good, as appealing to our reason.
186 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. ergo est deo propius: et per consequens maior vera. Sed minor probatur, quia in ordine universi genus realiter prius est quam species, et species quam indi- viduum; et generaliter magis universale minus univer- sali. Genus in ordine essenciali universi magis com-5 mune est, propinquius supremo gradu essendi quam minus commune, et per consequens est conclusio vera, etc. Corelarium primum. Quilibet conformando bonitatem 139" We should prefer the universal to the sue bonitati divine tenetur .... plus deo plus diligere 10 particular good, bona universalia bonis privatis. Patet, quia oppositum and universal to particular faciendo peccat. Nam 2m duos theologos omne peccatum things. consistit in voluntate preponente minus bonum magis For the Universal is bono; sed generaliter bona universalia sunt magis bona better as more rationally bonis privatis: ergo corelarium verum. desirable; ihe Corelarium 2m. Res universales plus diligi debent Particular, only as more useful; rebus singularibus. Patet ex conclusione et probacione and even that, eius, eo quod sunt magis bone; ergo etc. Patet eciam only as concerns sic corelarium. In rebus singularibus relucet bonum temporal uses. comodi nobilius quam affeccio honestatis. Nam univer-20 salia non cedunt in comodum, si singularia cedunt in comodum. Si unus est dominus nobis, famulus nobis, vel alicuius etc., de hoc habeo comodum et utilitatem; sed de hoc quod est homo nullum habeo comodum. Ergo racione honestatis plus debent diligi et preponi 25 in dileccione rebus singularibus: ergo corelarium verum. Sed quod dixi universalia non cedere in commodum, debet intelligi de comodo temporali. Nam noticia univer- salium est maxime utilis, quia via inductiva ad cognos- cendum benedictam trinitatem, et ad intelligendum 30 sacram scripturam. Pro prima parte patet, quia est aliqualis conveniencia licet non omnimodo speciei ad supposita, sicud nature divine ad personas. Et ob hoc dicit Anshelmus de incarnacione, in capitulo primo: ce 'Iste", inquit, "cuius ymago est ymaginibus corporalium 35 adeo involuta quod non intelligit quomodo plures 15 5. g' pro Genus MS. 10. After tenetur, an illegible word; no gap MS. 12. duos? = divinos? 15. privacio quite plain MS. 19. r'lucz MS.; ib. bou MS. 22. nis MS.; ib. nis MS. 23. Intelite; MS. 33. obe MS. 9. At the top of f. 139 there is a note on the racio semi- nalis, irrelevant to the subject-matter. 20. Honestatis. Bonum honestum' was the Good, as appealing to our reason.
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DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 187 homines in specie sunt unus homo, quomodo in illa sacratissima et altissima materia comprehendet quod plures persone quarum singula queque perfectus est deus, sunt una essencia?" Sed pro 2a parte patet. Nam quando ille eximius philosophus et propheta Moyses dixit Genesis primo: "Producat terra animam viventem in genere suo cuncta reptilia et bestias terre 2m species suas" non intellexit terminum vel conceptum humanum per genus et speciem, sed naturas universales communi- 10 catas multis suppositis. Et ita est de multis dictis sacre scripture que adiicere causa brevitatis obmitto. Corelarium ultimum et responsale: quod conclusio, ut proponitur, est vera ad rem in oppositum nature ante- cedens; et sic est finis etc. Quero an angeli habent cognicionem qua cognoscunt deum per species sibi naturaliter concreatas et in ipso deo vident illo modo omnia factibilia extra, cum illo modo in cognoscendo deum habent omnem ydearum cognicionem. Aliam habent hii cognicionem qua cognos- 20 cuntur res in proprio genere per species sibi naturaliter concreatas, qualem cognicionem homo forte in statu innocencie similiter habebat, ultra tamen predictas per sensus corporeos res per species naturales proprias cognoscendo. Sed cum peccavit, tantum sibi tercia 25 cognicio remansit post proprias connaturales et con- creatas. Ex parte autem anime necessarium est omnem intelligentem fantasmata aliena speculari: sed hoc dupli- citer. Quandoque enim intelligibile virtuti sensitive est mediate subordinatum; ut scilicet sit sensibili coniunctum; 30 dumque sensibile sensui obicitur ex tunc intelligibile. Per sensible cuius inmediate in actu reducatur, ut est in corporibus, lapide etc. qui non videtur oculo corporis sed intelligitur; quandoque mere intelligibile non per immediatam speciem intelligitur, sed per mediatam 35 similitudinem, ut cum intelliguntur abstracta a materia, que propriis speciebus sensibilibus similitudines intelligi- biles in mediatas generantibus omnino carent. 3m autem 15 Different states of cognition either of men or of angels. 12. vyſal = universale? Ms. 13. in oppm r ne ans MS. 19. h. pro hii MS. 20. pro MS. 23. reales? MS. 30. obiccit' MS. 37. gantibz MS. 15. Quero. After the ending of De Materia (if this be indeed that tractate) there follows a passage which may be by Wyclif, written in another hand, and excessively difficult to read. I have left a gap for one illegible word.
DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 187 homines in specie sunt unus homo, quomodo in illa sacratissima et altissima materia comprehendet quod plures persone quarum singula queque perfectus est deus, sunt una essencia?" Sed pro 2a parte patet. Nam quando ille eximius philosophus et propheta Moyses dixit Genesis primo: "Producat terra animam viventem in genere suo cuncta reptilia et bestias terre 2m species suas" non intellexit terminum vel conceptum humanum per genus et speciem, sed naturas universales communi- 10 catas multis suppositis. Et ita est de multis dictis sacre scripture que adiicere causa brevitatis obmitto. Corelarium ultimum et responsale: quod conclusio, ut proponitur, est vera ad rem in oppositum nature ante- cedens; et sic est finis etc. Quero an angeli habent cognicionem qua cognoscunt deum per species sibi naturaliter concreatas et in ipso deo vident illo modo omnia factibilia extra, cum illo modo in cognoscendo deum habent omnem ydearum cognicionem. Aliam habent hii cognicionem qua cognos- 20 cuntur res in proprio genere per species sibi naturaliter concreatas, qualem cognicionem homo forte in statu innocencie similiter habebat, ultra tamen predictas per sensus corporeos res per species naturales proprias cognoscendo. Sed cum peccavit, tantum sibi tercia 25 cognicio remansit post proprias connaturales et con- creatas. Ex parte autem anime necessarium est omnem intelligentem fantasmata aliena speculari: sed hoc dupli- citer. Quandoque enim intelligibile virtuti sensitive est mediate subordinatum; ut scilicet sit sensibili coniunctum; 30 dumque sensibile sensui obicitur ex tunc intelligibile. Per sensible cuius inmediate in actu reducatur, ut est in corporibus, lapide etc. qui non videtur oculo corporis sed intelligitur; quandoque mere intelligibile non per immediatam speciem intelligitur, sed per mediatam 35 similitudinem, ut cum intelliguntur abstracta a materia, que propriis speciebus sensibilibus similitudines intelligi- biles in mediatas generantibus omnino carent. 3m autem 15 Different states of cognition either of men or of angels. 12. vyſal = universale? Ms. 13. in oppm r ne ans MS. 19. h. pro hii MS. 20. pro MS. 23. reales? MS. 30. obiccit' MS. 37. gantibz MS. 15. Quero. After the ending of De Materia (if this be indeed that tractate) there follows a passage which may be by Wyclif, written in another hand, and excessively difficult to read. I have left a gap for one illegible word.
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188 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. genus cognicionis per essenciam divinam participacione solum habent angeli boni et ... .. Unde Angeli boni habent 3plex esse, scilicet, esse innocencie vel statum in illo instanti in quo liberum arbitrium habebant ad movendum se ad bonum vel malum. Prima cognicione! quid agere deberent moti sunt in 2° instanti per volendi actum ad debitam subieccionem voluntati divine, con- formiter gracia gratum facere adniti relinqueant status gracie. Post eodem 3° de consono moti sunt ad statum The bad Angels passed glorie et confirmacionis. Mali autem angeli solum habent 10 through two only, innocence duplicem statum: unum innocencie, secundo instanti 2m and sin. culpe in 2° instanti. 3us pene et obduracionis in 3° consequenter usque in perpetuum eis inponeretur. The good Angels passed through three stages of cognition, in the states of innocence, grace, and glory.
188 JOHANNIS WYCLIF. genus cognicionis per essenciam divinam participacione solum habent angeli boni et ... .. Unde Angeli boni habent 3plex esse, scilicet, esse innocencie vel statum in illo instanti in quo liberum arbitrium habebant ad movendum se ad bonum vel malum. Prima cognicione! quid agere deberent moti sunt in 2° instanti per volendi actum ad debitam subieccionem voluntati divine, con- formiter gracia gratum facere adniti relinqueant status gracie. Post eodem 3° de consono moti sunt ad statum The bad Angels passed glorie et confirmacionis. Mali autem angeli solum habent 10 through two only, innocence duplicem statum: unum innocencie, secundo instanti 2m and sin. culpe in 2° instanti. 3us pene et obduracionis in 3° consequenter usque in perpetuum eis inponeretur. The good Angels passed through three stages of cognition, in the states of innocence, grace, and glory.
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INDEX. Absolute accidents, admitted by Wyclif in De Universalibus, VI, VI[, XX, 77. Abstract and the Concrete, difference in sense between the, 161. Abstraction, Universals by, 177; these exist, but there are others too, which have entity of their own, apart from that of our thinking act, 180. Accidents have genera, but not properly, 71; yet their entity is real, 72; they are defined as what may be pre- sent or absent without entailing the destruction of the subject in either case, 75; some are inseparable in fact from their subjects, but all may be separated therefrom in thought, 76; which in the case of the other four Universals is impossible, 77. Albertus Magnus, 60, 70. Analogy, a, traceable between various sorts of composition, 60. Angels can be only one of each species, according to St. Thomas, and there- fore their Universals are not real, only conceptual, 128, 129. Anselm, St. scems to say that the Word assumed Universal Humanity, 49. “Archetypes, the doctrine of, was probably Wyclit's first step towards Realism, VIII. „lristotle does not contradict Real Uni- versals by his definition of a form, 29; but if he denies it elsewhere (in De Animá), he is not to be followed, 39; says that genus cannot be predicated of difference, 61; that a statue is not a stone, which does not really militate against Wyclif's contention that it is, 89; says that white signifies whiteness together with its subject, 162; admits only Universals by abstraction, 177. Argument that every more and less implies a most and a least, developed, XIII. De Universalibus. Arguments based on the doctrine of the Trinity, why Wyclif was prone to employ, XVI. Assumption, the, of an irrational creature by a Divine Person, possibility of, maintained by certain theologians, 14, 15. Attributes, the, of a given man are iden- tical with the man, but not with each other, 52. Augustine, St. strongly upholds the doctrine of Divine Ideas, VIII, 4, 5, II, 15, 22, 175. Averrhóes (Commentator), 163, 167, 177, 178. Badness, absolute, is an absurdity, 160. Beatitude, heavenly, cannot properly be a Universal, 45; is infinite, but not enjoyed infinitely, 95. Beauty, the infinite, of the Ideal World, 16. Beginning, absolute, is impossible in a positive being, 167. Being, Transcendent, is the first object of the thinking mind, 35, but is not a Universal in the same scnse as thc Predicables or the Exemplar Forms, ib., is the best of all created things, 165. Brunellus, 3 and note. Burleigh, Walter, 177 and note. Care should bc taken lest we scandalize the simple by crude expressions, 14, 18. Cause, the further any, reaches, the morc perfect it is, 96, a7. Chrysostom, St. John, 11. Cognition, different states of, in men, and in good and bad angels, 187, 188. Communication, Universals by, 176, 177. Composition is quantitative, qualitative, or merely formal, 59, it is formal 14
INDEX. Absolute accidents, admitted by Wyclif in De Universalibus, VI, VI[, XX, 77. Abstract and the Concrete, difference in sense between the, 161. Abstraction, Universals by, 177; these exist, but there are others too, which have entity of their own, apart from that of our thinking act, 180. Accidents have genera, but not properly, 71; yet their entity is real, 72; they are defined as what may be pre- sent or absent without entailing the destruction of the subject in either case, 75; some are inseparable in fact from their subjects, but all may be separated therefrom in thought, 76; which in the case of the other four Universals is impossible, 77. Albertus Magnus, 60, 70. Analogy, a, traceable between various sorts of composition, 60. Angels can be only one of each species, according to St. Thomas, and there- fore their Universals are not real, only conceptual, 128, 129. Anselm, St. scems to say that the Word assumed Universal Humanity, 49. “Archetypes, the doctrine of, was probably Wyclit's first step towards Realism, VIII. „lristotle does not contradict Real Uni- versals by his definition of a form, 29; but if he denies it elsewhere (in De Animá), he is not to be followed, 39; says that genus cannot be predicated of difference, 61; that a statue is not a stone, which does not really militate against Wyclif's contention that it is, 89; says that white signifies whiteness together with its subject, 162; admits only Universals by abstraction, 177. Argument that every more and less implies a most and a least, developed, XIII. De Universalibus. Arguments based on the doctrine of the Trinity, why Wyclif was prone to employ, XVI. Assumption, the, of an irrational creature by a Divine Person, possibility of, maintained by certain theologians, 14, 15. Attributes, the, of a given man are iden- tical with the man, but not with each other, 52. Augustine, St. strongly upholds the doctrine of Divine Ideas, VIII, 4, 5, II, 15, 22, 175. Averrhóes (Commentator), 163, 167, 177, 178. Badness, absolute, is an absurdity, 160. Beatitude, heavenly, cannot properly be a Universal, 45; is infinite, but not enjoyed infinitely, 95. Beauty, the infinite, of the Ideal World, 16. Beginning, absolute, is impossible in a positive being, 167. Being, Transcendent, is the first object of the thinking mind, 35, but is not a Universal in the same scnse as thc Predicables or the Exemplar Forms, ib., is the best of all created things, 165. Brunellus, 3 and note. Burleigh, Walter, 177 and note. Care should bc taken lest we scandalize the simple by crude expressions, 14, 18. Cause, the further any, reaches, the morc perfect it is, 96, a7. Chrysostom, St. John, 11. Cognition, different states of, in men, and in good and bad angels, 187, 188. Communication, Universals by, 176, 177. Composition is quantitative, qualitative, or merely formal, 59, it is formal 14
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190 INDEX. when the components differ neither | Elementary Lessons in Logic, by Jevons, really nor essentially, 60. Contingent, the, is necessary in a certain sense, 107. Conversion, the, of all propositions is neither possible nor necessary, I9. Copulative propositions can always be denied without denying either of their parts, 152, 153. Creature, every, is identical both with its own measure of being and with the Archetype whence that measure proceeds, 13; is partially, but not absolutely, identical with God, 105. De Apostasid, XXVIII. De Ente Predicamentali, VII, 158 note. Definition of a Universal as Wyclif gives it, XX, 44. Degrees, three, in difference, predication, and in the inherence of the Universal in its singulars, 118, 119. Deity is not excluded from Entity be- cause it includes non-Deity, 100. De Materid, its authenticity, VII. Designations, various, of Matter, Form, and Compound, used by Greek and Roman philosophers, 171. De Universalibus, its authenticity, VI, and date, VII. Difference, a, between things, may be greater, or less, or the least possible, 58; if specific, there must be two to divide a genus, 64, 65; objections, 65, 56, answered, 66—868. Difficulties in editing this volume, V. Discussion is useless with one who denies the objective existence of Universal Being, 33. Disjunctive existence, theory of, brought forward to answer objection, 108—111; is an existence indifferent to the sub- jects in which it occurs, predicated of any of them vaguely, but distinctly of none, III. Disjunctive propositions may be true whilst none of their parts are true, 116, 118; apparent contradiction of this statement explained, XXXIII. Division, the, of Universals into Genus, Species, Difference, Property, and Accident, 44, 45. Duns Scotus and his distinctio formalis a naturd rei, XXII, XXIII; 54—56. Egidius, 22, 65, 83, 177. quoted, XXV, XXXII, Entity is not a generic term; why, 61 and note. Entity, the mere, of an has its fixed limits, 166. Existence, all, implies Being, but not vice versd, 172. Existence in a cause is real existence, 172. Expositorial syllogism, the, 87—9r. Extension, thc mere, of a predicate does not make for its perfection, 96. positive being Fallacy, the, of passing from ideal to real existence, 15; of the expositorial syllogism as used to combat Real Universals, 87—91; of the argument that Entity, including not-God, must exclude God, 99; of Composition and Division, employed against the Uni- versals, 110. Falsehood signifies truth negatively, 159; is a belief that something that is, is not, ib. Figurative entity, first germs of the Doctrine of, afterwards developed, XXVIII. Figurative predications are true, but only with notional identity between subject and predicate, 81, 83. First Substance, the, dependent on the First cause, is matter according to Aristotle, 170, 171. Form, if substantial, is that by which anything is what it is, 171; if acci- dental, is that by which it is as it is, 172. Formal, as well as efficient, final and material causes, may be one in many, 29; to deny this were to limit God's power, 3o. Formalitates, the, of Duns Scotus, 54—56; explained, XXII, XXIII. Forms, not all, have corresponding Di- vine Ideas, 20—22. Fragmenta, the, not by Wyclif, are cert- ainly inspired by him, VII. Generation has two meanings, 165; is the passage from non-existence to existence, 167. Genesis quoted, 187. God is not a Universal, properly so called, XXI, 45; knows all things, but not by means of propositions as we
190 INDEX. when the components differ neither | Elementary Lessons in Logic, by Jevons, really nor essentially, 60. Contingent, the, is necessary in a certain sense, 107. Conversion, the, of all propositions is neither possible nor necessary, I9. Copulative propositions can always be denied without denying either of their parts, 152, 153. Creature, every, is identical both with its own measure of being and with the Archetype whence that measure proceeds, 13; is partially, but not absolutely, identical with God, 105. De Apostasid, XXVIII. De Ente Predicamentali, VII, 158 note. Definition of a Universal as Wyclif gives it, XX, 44. Degrees, three, in difference, predication, and in the inherence of the Universal in its singulars, 118, 119. Deity is not excluded from Entity be- cause it includes non-Deity, 100. De Materid, its authenticity, VII. Designations, various, of Matter, Form, and Compound, used by Greek and Roman philosophers, 171. De Universalibus, its authenticity, VI, and date, VII. Difference, a, between things, may be greater, or less, or the least possible, 58; if specific, there must be two to divide a genus, 64, 65; objections, 65, 56, answered, 66—868. Difficulties in editing this volume, V. Discussion is useless with one who denies the objective existence of Universal Being, 33. Disjunctive existence, theory of, brought forward to answer objection, 108—111; is an existence indifferent to the sub- jects in which it occurs, predicated of any of them vaguely, but distinctly of none, III. Disjunctive propositions may be true whilst none of their parts are true, 116, 118; apparent contradiction of this statement explained, XXXIII. Division, the, of Universals into Genus, Species, Difference, Property, and Accident, 44, 45. Duns Scotus and his distinctio formalis a naturd rei, XXII, XXIII; 54—56. Egidius, 22, 65, 83, 177. quoted, XXV, XXXII, Entity is not a generic term; why, 61 and note. Entity, the mere, of an has its fixed limits, 166. Existence, all, implies Being, but not vice versd, 172. Existence in a cause is real existence, 172. Expositorial syllogism, the, 87—9r. Extension, thc mere, of a predicate does not make for its perfection, 96. positive being Fallacy, the, of passing from ideal to real existence, 15; of the expositorial syllogism as used to combat Real Universals, 87—91; of the argument that Entity, including not-God, must exclude God, 99; of Composition and Division, employed against the Uni- versals, 110. Falsehood signifies truth negatively, 159; is a belief that something that is, is not, ib. Figurative entity, first germs of the Doctrine of, afterwards developed, XXVIII. Figurative predications are true, but only with notional identity between subject and predicate, 81, 83. First Substance, the, dependent on the First cause, is matter according to Aristotle, 170, 171. Form, if substantial, is that by which anything is what it is, 171; if acci- dental, is that by which it is as it is, 172. Formal, as well as efficient, final and material causes, may be one in many, 29; to deny this were to limit God's power, 3o. Formalitates, the, of Duns Scotus, 54—56; explained, XXII, XXIII. Forms, not all, have corresponding Di- vine Ideas, 20—22. Fragmenta, the, not by Wyclif, are cert- ainly inspired by him, VII. Generation has two meanings, 165; is the passage from non-existence to existence, 167. Genesis quoted, 187. God is not a Universal, properly so called, XXI, 45; knows all things, but not by means of propositions as we
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INDEX. de, 26, 27; can separate a substance from its accident and preserve both, 77, 78; is the same thing, but not the same as His creatures, 105. Grades of being, two, essential and accidental 166. Grammatical Universal, the, 41. Grosseteste (Lincolniensis) 42, 65. Hegel's doctrine, a point of, refuted in Notae et Questiones Variae, XXXIX, 161 and note. Heresy, it is a, to say that God and a stone are identical, but what is God is identical with what is a stone, 104. Hierarchy, the, of the Angels, 85, 86. Humanity, Christ's, is worth more than that of all other men together, 144. Humanity is in itself neither white nor warm, &c., 40; is a bond between men in which all should rejoice, 150, 151; must be universal, 157, is identical with man, 163. Huss, John, VII, 170 note. Ideal World, the, is not one of relations, but is absolute, 109, 20; it is infinitely superior to the real world, 174. Ideas, or archetypes of the universe, exist in God, 2, 173, 175; there are Ideas of singulars, of species, of genera, 2; these, being separately realizable, cannot be one and the same, 3; they are, according to St. Augustine, iden- tical with Plato's world of archetypes, 4; are forms appearing in the mirror of Deity, 5; must comprise all things possible, 6; are exemplars necessary for God's work of creation, 7, 8; are eternal, 8; and correspond to thc intrinsic possibility of things, 9; ans- wers to objections concerning them, 10—22. Ignorance of some, thc, respecting the nature of an expositorial syllogism, 89, 90. Image of the Trinity, an, is in all in- telligent creatures, 53; objections to this doctrine, 39; answers, 140 144. Immaturity, the, of Wyclif’s doctrine in De Universalibus contessed by him, 83. Inference, the, made from an affirmative with a negative predicate to a negative with an affirmative predicate is in- admissible if it contradicts faith, 102, 191 Inherence and predication, difference between, 81. Inherence of a property in its subject, objection concerning the, 122, 123; answered, 123—127. Instants are Universals, in what sense, 46 and note. Irrationality is as positive a specific difference in a brute as rationality is in a man, 70. Jerome, St. 12. Jevons’ Elementary Lessons in Logic quoted, XXV, XXXII. John the Baptist is figuratively Elias, 81, 82, 84; this, as an affirmation made by Christ, is an identity of pre- dication which does not belong to other figures, 82, 83. Knowledge of God, the, is the Ideal World, IX. Life eternal is not said in Wyclif's system to exist in a created being, but in its intelligible entity, which is one with God, 17, 174. Life in God, all things are, according to St. John's Gospel, 11, 96; this inter- pretation depends on St. Augustine's punctuation, but St, John Chrysostom reads the text differently, 11, 12; all things living thus in God's mind are one with God, but not formally God, having no essences of their own, 12, 13; the eternal sight of one only among these would secure perfect bliss, 13. Logica, Wyclifs, V, VII, XVII, XXXVII. Man, Universal, is prior to its singulars, not in time but in nature, 38, though perhaps God might by a miracle give it existence without any singulars, 41; would be, according to Wyclif's ad- versaries, one Being in many persons, 49, but is not so, becoming singular in each singular, 50; for persons do not differ but in their several human essences, 51. Manuscripts, the, of the present tractates, are extremely illegible and corrupt, V; described in Vol, ] of Miscellanea Philosophica, VI. 14*
INDEX. de, 26, 27; can separate a substance from its accident and preserve both, 77, 78; is the same thing, but not the same as His creatures, 105. Grades of being, two, essential and accidental 166. Grammatical Universal, the, 41. Grosseteste (Lincolniensis) 42, 65. Hegel's doctrine, a point of, refuted in Notae et Questiones Variae, XXXIX, 161 and note. Heresy, it is a, to say that God and a stone are identical, but what is God is identical with what is a stone, 104. Hierarchy, the, of the Angels, 85, 86. Humanity, Christ's, is worth more than that of all other men together, 144. Humanity is in itself neither white nor warm, &c., 40; is a bond between men in which all should rejoice, 150, 151; must be universal, 157, is identical with man, 163. Huss, John, VII, 170 note. Ideal World, the, is not one of relations, but is absolute, 109, 20; it is infinitely superior to the real world, 174. Ideas, or archetypes of the universe, exist in God, 2, 173, 175; there are Ideas of singulars, of species, of genera, 2; these, being separately realizable, cannot be one and the same, 3; they are, according to St. Augustine, iden- tical with Plato's world of archetypes, 4; are forms appearing in the mirror of Deity, 5; must comprise all things possible, 6; are exemplars necessary for God's work of creation, 7, 8; are eternal, 8; and correspond to thc intrinsic possibility of things, 9; ans- wers to objections concerning them, 10—22. Ignorance of some, thc, respecting the nature of an expositorial syllogism, 89, 90. Image of the Trinity, an, is in all in- telligent creatures, 53; objections to this doctrine, 39; answers, 140 144. Immaturity, the, of Wyclif’s doctrine in De Universalibus contessed by him, 83. Inference, the, made from an affirmative with a negative predicate to a negative with an affirmative predicate is in- admissible if it contradicts faith, 102, 191 Inherence and predication, difference between, 81. Inherence of a property in its subject, objection concerning the, 122, 123; answered, 123—127. Instants are Universals, in what sense, 46 and note. Irrationality is as positive a specific difference in a brute as rationality is in a man, 70. Jerome, St. 12. Jevons’ Elementary Lessons in Logic quoted, XXV, XXXII. John the Baptist is figuratively Elias, 81, 82, 84; this, as an affirmation made by Christ, is an identity of pre- dication which does not belong to other figures, 82, 83. Knowledge of God, the, is the Ideal World, IX. Life eternal is not said in Wyclif's system to exist in a created being, but in its intelligible entity, which is one with God, 17, 174. Life in God, all things are, according to St. John's Gospel, 11, 96; this inter- pretation depends on St. Augustine's punctuation, but St, John Chrysostom reads the text differently, 11, 12; all things living thus in God's mind are one with God, but not formally God, having no essences of their own, 12, 13; the eternal sight of one only among these would secure perfect bliss, 13. Logica, Wyclifs, V, VII, XVII, XXXVII. Man, Universal, is prior to its singulars, not in time but in nature, 38, though perhaps God might by a miracle give it existence without any singulars, 41; would be, according to Wyclif's ad- versaries, one Being in many persons, 49, but is not so, becoming singular in each singular, 50; for persons do not differ but in their several human essences, 51. Manuscripts, the, of the present tractates, are extremely illegible and corrupt, V; described in Vol, ] of Miscellanea Philosophica, VI. 14*
Strana 192
192 Majority, the, ought .to be followed in the use of terms, but the wise mino- rity as to doctrine, 119. Matter and “particular” quasi-Universal terms (Some ...), comparison between, 112 and note; 113. Matter, whcther, is completely undeter- mined in itself, 170—173. Miscellanea Philosophica, Wyclif's, VI, XIV, XVII, 177 note. Misunderstanding, a possible, of Wyclif's meaning as to the truth of disjunctive propositions, set aside, XXXIII. Moderate Realists, supposed answers of, to Wyclif's arguments against them, XVII—XIX. Modes, three, of answering in the Exer- cise of Obligations, 152—157. Nature and Person, difference between, 48. Nature herself prompts us to admit Universals, 34. Notae et Questiones Variae, authenticity of, VII. Number is quantity, but with neither continuity nor position in space, 68. Numerical entity means an entity that can be numbered with others, not an entity that cannot be in many subjects, 104, 105. Obedience to the King is denied by whoso denies the Universals, 24. Objections to Wyclif's system of Real Universals, 43, 44; 91—94; refuted, 94—151. Obligations, extraordinary rules given to the defender in the exercise of, XXXVII, XXXVIII, 152—157. Order in the world, commencing with Transcendent Entity and ending with individuals, 168, 169. Orthodoxy of Wyclif, the, at the time he wrote De Universalibus, V. Pantheism, Wyclif's struggle to avoid, XVI. Paris, Council of, in 1147, 184, note. Peasants, though they know nothing of propositions, know universal truths, 30, 31. INDEX. Perfection and universality go together, 185. Perjury, a man who swears he is com- mitting, by this very oath, utters no proposition but unmeaning words, 155. Plato, a system of Universals essentially distinct from their singulars, perhaps falsely ascribed to, 179. Plato's Ideas, according to St. Augustine, are the archetypes of things, and exist in God, 4. Points are Universals, in what sense, 46 and note. Porée, Gilbert de la, 184, note. Porphyry, 69, 70, 75, 76, 163, 178. Possibility of the assumption of an irrational creature by a Divine Person, the, maintained by certain theologians, 14, 15. Possibility, Wyclif's peculiar theory of, not yet matured but in germ in the De Universalibus, IX. Predestination is denied by those who deny the Universals, 23, 24. Predicaments, the ten, 131; Wyclif's tenfold division of Being, 131, 132, which may or may not correspond with the Predicaments, 134, 135; attempt to prove that the ten Predi- caments adequately divide the whole of Being, 136. Predicate, one, may have greater ex- tension and yet not be more perfect than another, 97. Predication, three kinds of, 81; it may be neitner essential nor real, but true nevertheless, ib. Principles, the truth of, does not depend on their being known and formuleted, 32. ; Property, a, is so closely connected with the substance it belongs to that it has no genera or species other than 'that substance, 72, 73; yet it is truly a Universal, 73, and is the substance itself£, viewed from a certain stand- point, 74. We may even predicate creative power of God as His pro- perty, 79. . . Propositions, universal, must signify something and this something is real, or we destroy all science, 25. Prudence necessary in avoiding both to limit God's Omnipotence, and to ascribe to Him what is absurd, 78.
192 Majority, the, ought .to be followed in the use of terms, but the wise mino- rity as to doctrine, 119. Matter and “particular” quasi-Universal terms (Some ...), comparison between, 112 and note; 113. Matter, whcther, is completely undeter- mined in itself, 170—173. Miscellanea Philosophica, Wyclif's, VI, XIV, XVII, 177 note. Misunderstanding, a possible, of Wyclif's meaning as to the truth of disjunctive propositions, set aside, XXXIII. Moderate Realists, supposed answers of, to Wyclif's arguments against them, XVII—XIX. Modes, three, of answering in the Exer- cise of Obligations, 152—157. Nature and Person, difference between, 48. Nature herself prompts us to admit Universals, 34. Notae et Questiones Variae, authenticity of, VII. Number is quantity, but with neither continuity nor position in space, 68. Numerical entity means an entity that can be numbered with others, not an entity that cannot be in many subjects, 104, 105. Obedience to the King is denied by whoso denies the Universals, 24. Objections to Wyclif's system of Real Universals, 43, 44; 91—94; refuted, 94—151. Obligations, extraordinary rules given to the defender in the exercise of, XXXVII, XXXVIII, 152—157. Order in the world, commencing with Transcendent Entity and ending with individuals, 168, 169. Orthodoxy of Wyclif, the, at the time he wrote De Universalibus, V. Pantheism, Wyclif's struggle to avoid, XVI. Paris, Council of, in 1147, 184, note. Peasants, though they know nothing of propositions, know universal truths, 30, 31. INDEX. Perfection and universality go together, 185. Perjury, a man who swears he is com- mitting, by this very oath, utters no proposition but unmeaning words, 155. Plato, a system of Universals essentially distinct from their singulars, perhaps falsely ascribed to, 179. Plato's Ideas, according to St. Augustine, are the archetypes of things, and exist in God, 4. Points are Universals, in what sense, 46 and note. Porée, Gilbert de la, 184, note. Porphyry, 69, 70, 75, 76, 163, 178. Possibility of the assumption of an irrational creature by a Divine Person, the, maintained by certain theologians, 14, 15. Possibility, Wyclif's peculiar theory of, not yet matured but in germ in the De Universalibus, IX. Predestination is denied by those who deny the Universals, 23, 24. Predicaments, the ten, 131; Wyclif's tenfold division of Being, 131, 132, which may or may not correspond with the Predicaments, 134, 135; attempt to prove that the ten Predi- caments adequately divide the whole of Being, 136. Predicate, one, may have greater ex- tension and yet not be more perfect than another, 97. Predication, three kinds of, 81; it may be neitner essential nor real, but true nevertheless, ib. Principles, the truth of, does not depend on their being known and formuleted, 32. ; Property, a, is so closely connected with the substance it belongs to that it has no genera or species other than 'that substance, 72, 73; yet it is truly a Universal, 73, and is the substance itself£, viewed from a certain stand- point, 74. We may even predicate creative power of God as His pro- perty, 79. . . Propositions, universal, must signify something and this something is real, or we destroy all science, 25. Prudence necessary in avoiding both to limit God's Omnipotence, and to ascribe to Him what is absurd, 78.
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INDEX. Quality possessed, any, is as good to the possessor as its loss would be evil, 146. Quantity exists without a subject in the Eucharist, 41; divisions of, 64. Question, the, whether a man taken as being warm and taken as being white, may or may not be counted as two distinct things, 161. Quiddity, the, is the essence, or that which answers to the question, “Quid est hoc?”, 57. Rationality, singular and universal, diffi- culties as to, 47, 48; solution, 48; is not a more positive thing in man than irrationality is in a brute, 70 Raven, a, though always black, can be conceived as losing its blackness, 76. “Really” may be understood either as meaning “truly”, or as the mode in which two distinct individuals are distinct, 84. Realists, moderate, supposed answer of, to Wyclif's arguments against them, XVII—XIX. Reims, Council of, in 1148; 184 note. Relations have purely notional entity 20, 78. Repetitions of the same thing in different places, a proof of Wyclif's youth and inexperience when he wrote De Uni- versalibus, XXIV, Resurrection, the, is denied by the denia! of the Universals, 24. Scandal to the weak and perverse by strangely-sounding propositions ought to be avoided, 18. Senses, the, hamper sight, II9. Sex is a property of all animals, 73. Signification, the primary, of anything, what it is, 162, 163 Singular accidents have individual sub- jects, general accidents have not, 125. Singularity, universal, must be admitted; this is not absurd, but the idea of singularity is then no longer restricted to one being, 106, 107. Species, every, must exist in its singu- lars at some time or other, 62, 131, 137, 138; is a mere abstraction in accidents, not in substances, 126; no two species can be equally perfect, 169. our intellectual 193 Subject quo, the, and the subject quod, distinction between, 124, 125. Substance, is the second of created things, as Transcendental Entity is the first, 1 18; material and formal divisions of, 124. Supposition, distributive, determinate, and e, 119, 120. Syllogism, the ‘expositorial, 87—-91. Terms, universal, must stand for things, not merely for ideas. Thomas, St. seems to deny that any irrational creature can be assumed by a Divine Person, XII; admits only Universals by abstraction, 177. Time is a sort of continuous quantity that has no position in space, 68. Transcendentals, the (Entity, Truth, Goodness) are not Universals in a strict sense, XXI. Trinity, the. Holy, is three different realities (res) in One Being; the Ideas are likewise different realities in God's mind, IO, 11. Truth, "neither primary nor secondary, can have a corresponding falsehood, 158—161. Ultimate species, 176. Utility, the, of Universals in the world, 145—152; but this is not temporal utility, which only singulars possess, I . Universal, to say that the, is singular quà universal is absurd; to say it includes singulars is no objection to Realism, 101. Universality, three sorts of, metaphy- sical, logical, grammatical, 36—42; three opinions concerning, 176, 177. Universals, denied verbally by some, are admitted mentally by all, 1, 33; exist really in things, 23; proofs, 23—34; are better known than their singulars, 31; are divided into real, potential, and conceptual, 127; are more perfect than their singulars, 139; do all these do, but as efficient causes, not as direct agents, 147, 148; thus they are principles of action, 148, 149; resemble commonwealths, singulars being as the private members of the same, 151; and are identical with their singulars, differing from each other only by a formal difference, 181, 182.
INDEX. Quality possessed, any, is as good to the possessor as its loss would be evil, 146. Quantity exists without a subject in the Eucharist, 41; divisions of, 64. Question, the, whether a man taken as being warm and taken as being white, may or may not be counted as two distinct things, 161. Quiddity, the, is the essence, or that which answers to the question, “Quid est hoc?”, 57. Rationality, singular and universal, diffi- culties as to, 47, 48; solution, 48; is not a more positive thing in man than irrationality is in a brute, 70 Raven, a, though always black, can be conceived as losing its blackness, 76. “Really” may be understood either as meaning “truly”, or as the mode in which two distinct individuals are distinct, 84. Realists, moderate, supposed answer of, to Wyclif's arguments against them, XVII—XIX. Reims, Council of, in 1148; 184 note. Relations have purely notional entity 20, 78. Repetitions of the same thing in different places, a proof of Wyclif's youth and inexperience when he wrote De Uni- versalibus, XXIV, Resurrection, the, is denied by the denia! of the Universals, 24. Scandal to the weak and perverse by strangely-sounding propositions ought to be avoided, 18. Senses, the, hamper sight, II9. Sex is a property of all animals, 73. Signification, the primary, of anything, what it is, 162, 163 Singular accidents have individual sub- jects, general accidents have not, 125. Singularity, universal, must be admitted; this is not absurd, but the idea of singularity is then no longer restricted to one being, 106, 107. Species, every, must exist in its singu- lars at some time or other, 62, 131, 137, 138; is a mere abstraction in accidents, not in substances, 126; no two species can be equally perfect, 169. our intellectual 193 Subject quo, the, and the subject quod, distinction between, 124, 125. Substance, is the second of created things, as Transcendental Entity is the first, 1 18; material and formal divisions of, 124. Supposition, distributive, determinate, and e, 119, 120. Syllogism, the ‘expositorial, 87—-91. Terms, universal, must stand for things, not merely for ideas. Thomas, St. seems to deny that any irrational creature can be assumed by a Divine Person, XII; admits only Universals by abstraction, 177. Time is a sort of continuous quantity that has no position in space, 68. Transcendentals, the (Entity, Truth, Goodness) are not Universals in a strict sense, XXI. Trinity, the. Holy, is three different realities (res) in One Being; the Ideas are likewise different realities in God's mind, IO, 11. Truth, "neither primary nor secondary, can have a corresponding falsehood, 158—161. Ultimate species, 176. Utility, the, of Universals in the world, 145—152; but this is not temporal utility, which only singulars possess, I . Universal, to say that the, is singular quà universal is absurd; to say it includes singulars is no objection to Realism, 101. Universality, three sorts of, metaphy- sical, logical, grammatical, 36—42; three opinions concerning, 176, 177. Universals, denied verbally by some, are admitted mentally by all, 1, 33; exist really in things, 23; proofs, 23—34; are better known than their singulars, 31; are divided into real, potential, and conceptual, 127; are more perfect than their singulars, 139; do all these do, but as efficient causes, not as direct agents, 147, 148; thus they are principles of action, 148, 149; resemble commonwealths, singulars being as the private members of the same, 151; and are identical with their singulars, differing from each other only by a formal difference, 181, 182.
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194 INDEX. Vague Universal, between the Universal proper and the singular, called the Particular (All ... Some . . . This), 114, 115. Vestige of the Trinity in all things, 53. Whiteness is not white, though identical with a white thing ; therefore we ought not to say that a creature is its own Archetype in God, 18, 19; it is “the being white of a substance", but may miraculously exist by itself, 79. Words and propositions are necessary means of dealing with thigs, 101. Worst, the, of all possible things is impossible, 160. Wyclif appeals in De Universalibus to the authority of the Roman Church, X ; confesses his youth and inexperience, 137. Youth of Wyclif, the, when writing his De Universalibus, proved by the work itself, VI.
194 INDEX. Vague Universal, between the Universal proper and the singular, called the Particular (All ... Some . . . This), 114, 115. Vestige of the Trinity in all things, 53. Whiteness is not white, though identical with a white thing ; therefore we ought not to say that a creature is its own Archetype in God, 18, 19; it is “the being white of a substance", but may miraculously exist by itself, 79. Words and propositions are necessary means of dealing with thigs, 101. Worst, the, of all possible things is impossible, 160. Wyclif appeals in De Universalibus to the authority of the Roman Church, X ; confesses his youth and inexperience, 137. Youth of Wyclif, the, when writing his De Universalibus, proved by the work itself, VI.
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