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Název:
Johannis Wyclif Miscellanea philosophica. vol. I. De actibus anime Replicacio de universalibus. De materia et forma. Now first ed. from the ms C.C.C. 103, Cambridge, and the Stockholm ms. (A.D. 1398)
Autor:
Dziewicki, Michael Henry
Rok vydání:
1902
Místo vydání:
London
Počet stran celkem:
334
Počet stran předmluvy plus obsahu:
LXXXII+252
Obsah:
- I: Titul
- IV: Obsah
- V: Předmluva
- 1: Edice
- 243: Index
upravit
Strana I
JOHANNIS WYCLIF MISCELLANEA PHILOSOPHICA. VOL. I. CONTAINING DE ACTIBUS ANIME REPLICACIO DE UNIVERSALIBUS DE MATERIA ET FORMA. NOW FIRST EDITED FROM THE MS. C. C. C. 103, CAMBRIDGE, AND THE STOCKHOLM MS. (A. D. 1398.) BY MICHAEL HENRY DZIEWICKI WITH AN ESSAY ON WYCLIF'S PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM BY THE SAME. LONDON. PUBLISHED FOR THE WYCLIF SOCIETY BY TRŮBNER & Co PATERNOSTER HOUSE, CHARING CROSS ROAD. 1902.
JOHANNIS WYCLIF MISCELLANEA PHILOSOPHICA. VOL. I. CONTAINING DE ACTIBUS ANIME REPLICACIO DE UNIVERSALIBUS DE MATERIA ET FORMA. NOW FIRST EDITED FROM THE MS. C. C. C. 103, CAMBRIDGE, AND THE STOCKHOLM MS. (A. D. 1398.) BY MICHAEL HENRY DZIEWICKI WITH AN ESSAY ON WYCLIF'S PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM BY THE SAME. LONDON. PUBLISHED FOR THE WYCLIF SOCIETY BY TRŮBNER & Co PATERNOSTER HOUSE, CHARING CROSS ROAD. 1902.
Strana II
Strana III
Printed in Austria.
Printed in Austria.
Strana IV
Contents. (1). An Essay on Wyclif's Philosophical System . . . p. XXIX. (2). Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p. De Actibus Anime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p. XXIX. Replicacio De Universalibus . . . . . . . . . . . p. XLVI. . . . . . . . . . . De Materia et Forma . . p. LXVIII. V.
Contents. (1). An Essay on Wyclif's Philosophical System . . . p. XXIX. (2). Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p. De Actibus Anime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p. XXIX. Replicacio De Universalibus . . . . . . . . . . . p. XLVI. . . . . . . . . . . De Materia et Forma . . p. LXVIII. V.
Strana V
An Essay on Wyclif's Philosophical System. After the publication, by the Wyclif Society, of De Compositione Hominis, of De Ente Praedicamentali, and of the three volumes of Logica, lately issued, enough is now known of this philosopher's general system and trend of thought to render a synopsis of his philosophy quite possible. This synopsis appears to be particularly in its place at the beginning of the works now to be published, in which he develops his principles more elaborately and in greater detail. Nor can we doubt that the synthesis of what has already appeared will be of use for what is to come — for the two volumes of Miscellanea, and for those, much more numerous, of Wyclif's great work, De Ente. The words of Isaiah in the Revised Version: 'How art thou fallen from heaven, O day-star, son of the morning !' can alone adequately render the extremes of Wyclif's fate: world-wide celebrity in his own times, complete oblivion in ours. The man who devoted his life to stemming the then all but irresistible tide of Nominalistic philosophy ; whose subtle genius drew to him at Oxford a numerous and enthusiastic band of followers, who in the first years of his Mastership at Balliol Hall elaborated a system of philosophy perhaps more daring than that of any Englishman before him, certainly as comprehensive and as surely following from his first principles as any, whether before him or after ; who, driven step by step towards the natural conclusions of his system, was the first to rise up against Rome, and to inaugurate the movement which culminated in Huss, and ended with Ziska: — that man is now so utterly forgotten; what he may or may not have thought is so ab- solutely indifferent even to cultured minds in the present day, that his Latin works, now being published by the Wyclif Society for upwards of fifteen years, are almost unread in his own native country.
An Essay on Wyclif's Philosophical System. After the publication, by the Wyclif Society, of De Compositione Hominis, of De Ente Praedicamentali, and of the three volumes of Logica, lately issued, enough is now known of this philosopher's general system and trend of thought to render a synopsis of his philosophy quite possible. This synopsis appears to be particularly in its place at the beginning of the works now to be published, in which he develops his principles more elaborately and in greater detail. Nor can we doubt that the synthesis of what has already appeared will be of use for what is to come — for the two volumes of Miscellanea, and for those, much more numerous, of Wyclif's great work, De Ente. The words of Isaiah in the Revised Version: 'How art thou fallen from heaven, O day-star, son of the morning !' can alone adequately render the extremes of Wyclif's fate: world-wide celebrity in his own times, complete oblivion in ours. The man who devoted his life to stemming the then all but irresistible tide of Nominalistic philosophy ; whose subtle genius drew to him at Oxford a numerous and enthusiastic band of followers, who in the first years of his Mastership at Balliol Hall elaborated a system of philosophy perhaps more daring than that of any Englishman before him, certainly as comprehensive and as surely following from his first principles as any, whether before him or after ; who, driven step by step towards the natural conclusions of his system, was the first to rise up against Rome, and to inaugurate the movement which culminated in Huss, and ended with Ziska: — that man is now so utterly forgotten; what he may or may not have thought is so ab- solutely indifferent even to cultured minds in the present day, that his Latin works, now being published by the Wyclif Society for upwards of fifteen years, are almost unread in his own native country.
Strana VI
VI AN ESSAY ON WYCLIF'S PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. So great a fall from such a height does not in the least imply that Wyclif, whether in the past or now, has met with more or with less attention than he deserved. He was a man of his time, great in his generation : but changing times have not only taken away all savour of actuality from the work he did and the problems which he tried to solve; they have rendered him unintelligible both to the general public and to those who are not ignorant of philosophy. Out of a thousand men trained in modern Metaphysical lore, scarcely one would be able to read and understand the five volumes of Wyclif's philosophical works that have lately seen the light; and not many would care to peruse the Introductions and side-notes in which the editors have striven to set forth Wyclif's meaning. Not only the problems which interested his contemporaries are dead, but the methods and the very terminology by which he attempted their solution are dead likewise. And to all such as are not philosophers, these volumes are no better than waste paper. On looking through them — if respect for the name of the great forgotten one kept back some very natural expression of contempt — they surely would experience something of what the Arab may feel, when he pitches his goat-skin tent on the ruins of some vast city : "I wonder how anyone could under- take such gigantic and such useless work!" Assuming that the reader who opens this volume is likely to ex- perience some such feeling, and yet is willing to be interested in Wyclif's philosophy, if possible, my task is a very simple, though, it must be con- fessed, a very arduous one. I intend to state, as plainly as I can, and putting aside all technicalities that are not indispensable, the main features of Wyclif's system, as I have understood it. I shall strive to take his own point of view ; and though I need hardly say that it is not mine, will do my utmost to place it in the best and most convincing light, so that the reader may at least vaguely understand how it was that he possessed such influence over his contemporaries; and also how his mind, working from point to point, from first principles to ultimate in- ferences, brought him finally into conflict — unwilling conflict, as I believe — with more than one dogma of the Church. Here, and with the purpose stated, I hold a brief for Wyclif. What was that Nominalism in which our philosopher (as he tells us himself) was bred, from which he broke away early in his career, and which he afterward fought with such energy during the whole of
VI AN ESSAY ON WYCLIF'S PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. So great a fall from such a height does not in the least imply that Wyclif, whether in the past or now, has met with more or with less attention than he deserved. He was a man of his time, great in his generation : but changing times have not only taken away all savour of actuality from the work he did and the problems which he tried to solve; they have rendered him unintelligible both to the general public and to those who are not ignorant of philosophy. Out of a thousand men trained in modern Metaphysical lore, scarcely one would be able to read and understand the five volumes of Wyclif's philosophical works that have lately seen the light; and not many would care to peruse the Introductions and side-notes in which the editors have striven to set forth Wyclif's meaning. Not only the problems which interested his contemporaries are dead, but the methods and the very terminology by which he attempted their solution are dead likewise. And to all such as are not philosophers, these volumes are no better than waste paper. On looking through them — if respect for the name of the great forgotten one kept back some very natural expression of contempt — they surely would experience something of what the Arab may feel, when he pitches his goat-skin tent on the ruins of some vast city : "I wonder how anyone could under- take such gigantic and such useless work!" Assuming that the reader who opens this volume is likely to ex- perience some such feeling, and yet is willing to be interested in Wyclif's philosophy, if possible, my task is a very simple, though, it must be con- fessed, a very arduous one. I intend to state, as plainly as I can, and putting aside all technicalities that are not indispensable, the main features of Wyclif's system, as I have understood it. I shall strive to take his own point of view ; and though I need hardly say that it is not mine, will do my utmost to place it in the best and most convincing light, so that the reader may at least vaguely understand how it was that he possessed such influence over his contemporaries; and also how his mind, working from point to point, from first principles to ultimate in- ferences, brought him finally into conflict — unwilling conflict, as I believe — with more than one dogma of the Church. Here, and with the purpose stated, I hold a brief for Wyclif. What was that Nominalism in which our philosopher (as he tells us himself) was bred, from which he broke away early in his career, and which he afterward fought with such energy during the whole of
Strana VII
AN ESSAY ON WYCLIF'S PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. VII his life? To answer this, we must first state the problem, so famous of old (though it now sounds like a puzzle in Grammar or Dialectics) which Nominalists, Conceptualists, and the various schools of Realists set them- selves to solve. There is no doubt that the same names are not always used in the same sense. Mr. Rochester was a bear; there are many bears in the Zoological Gardens ; others in the Stock Exchange ; there is a Great and a Little Bear in the sky. We may call a nine-thonged whip, or a mouse-eating animal, or a spiteful woman by the name of Cat. Either a playing-card or the ruler of a nation may be a Queen. These terms are equivocal. But there are cases when the same word, applied to different objects, means the same. Smith is a man ; Brown is a man likewise. But the word 'man' meaning the same in both cases, here comes the question: The same what? To this we have three principal replies. Nominalists say, The same word'; Conceptualists, 'The same concept, or idea'; Realists, The same thing'. In the theory of extreme Nominalists (of whom the famous Ockam was the acknowledged exponent) no general term has any meaning whatever, unless applied to its singulars, and so long as it is thus applied. It is by itself a mere empty sound, — a flatus vocis, as he chooses to call it. We find that two or more singulars resemble each other, and we take a general term to classify them according to that resemblance. Thus used, it has meaning ; not otherwise. There is nothing in the world save singulars : when taken apart from its singulars, a general term therefore signifies nothing. Smith is a man ; in so far as man' signifies Smith (consequently a concrete being, quite diverse from man' taken to mean Brown) it has signification. In so far as it is taken for something that is the same in both Smith and Brown, it has none. We docket singulars with general terms, just as a shop-keeper will docket various articles with a card, bearing: Price 3/4d. Take the ticket off the article, and Price 3/4 has no longer any distinct meaning. Such is the theory. It has nothing save its boldness to recommend it, and is palpably absurd. If it were true, what would become of the self-evident distinction, glanced at in the last paragraph but one, between equivocal and univocal terms? It would exist no more. There is a resemblance, far-fetched indeed and fictitious, between the Zoological Garden bears, those in human society, and those in the sky; between
AN ESSAY ON WYCLIF'S PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. VII his life? To answer this, we must first state the problem, so famous of old (though it now sounds like a puzzle in Grammar or Dialectics) which Nominalists, Conceptualists, and the various schools of Realists set them- selves to solve. There is no doubt that the same names are not always used in the same sense. Mr. Rochester was a bear; there are many bears in the Zoological Gardens ; others in the Stock Exchange ; there is a Great and a Little Bear in the sky. We may call a nine-thonged whip, or a mouse-eating animal, or a spiteful woman by the name of Cat. Either a playing-card or the ruler of a nation may be a Queen. These terms are equivocal. But there are cases when the same word, applied to different objects, means the same. Smith is a man ; Brown is a man likewise. But the word 'man' meaning the same in both cases, here comes the question: The same what? To this we have three principal replies. Nominalists say, The same word'; Conceptualists, 'The same concept, or idea'; Realists, The same thing'. In the theory of extreme Nominalists (of whom the famous Ockam was the acknowledged exponent) no general term has any meaning whatever, unless applied to its singulars, and so long as it is thus applied. It is by itself a mere empty sound, — a flatus vocis, as he chooses to call it. We find that two or more singulars resemble each other, and we take a general term to classify them according to that resemblance. Thus used, it has meaning ; not otherwise. There is nothing in the world save singulars : when taken apart from its singulars, a general term therefore signifies nothing. Smith is a man ; in so far as man' signifies Smith (consequently a concrete being, quite diverse from man' taken to mean Brown) it has signification. In so far as it is taken for something that is the same in both Smith and Brown, it has none. We docket singulars with general terms, just as a shop-keeper will docket various articles with a card, bearing: Price 3/4d. Take the ticket off the article, and Price 3/4 has no longer any distinct meaning. Such is the theory. It has nothing save its boldness to recommend it, and is palpably absurd. If it were true, what would become of the self-evident distinction, glanced at in the last paragraph but one, between equivocal and univocal terms? It would exist no more. There is a resemblance, far-fetched indeed and fictitious, between the Zoological Garden bears, those in human society, and those in the sky; between
Strana VIII
VIII ON ESSAY ON WYCLIF'S PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. the woman cat, the Felis domesticus, and the nine-tailed whip. But a consistent Nominalist would be forced to say that we docket these with names for the convenience of classification, and that equivocal terms are just as general as terms which are univocal, since the word alone is in both cases common to all the singulars! Now this distinction is the basis of all reasoning ; all men agree that no inference with equivocal terms has the least value. Why is the Stock Exchange like the sky ? Because there are bears in both', may be meant for a joke, never for an argument. Nominalists of course shift their ground at once, and say that they intend to exclude fictitious resemblances; those alone which are natural can be admitted. Then what are and where are these resemblances? Not in the mind alone ; therefore either in the things themselves, or between them. And as they are forced to admit that the word means these resemblances, they are no longer pure Nominalists ; for the likeness between Smith and Brown is the same as that between Brown and Smith. This brings us to Conceptualism, which is the same error in a less virulent but more insidious form. "Something in my idea of one man", the Conceptualist would say, “is indeed identical with something in my idea of another ; and therefore humanity is something more than a word; it is a thought. But there is nothing in the man Smith, nothing in the man Brown, which is really and truly identical in both. When we speak of their common humanity, we are speaking of an abstraction that cannot exist otherwise than mentally, not of the actual essence of the men themselves." In this doctrine, of course, a queen in a card- pack, on a chess board, in a bee-hive, or issuing a proclamation, is a word standing for four distinct ideas ; and there is no doubt that Con- ceptualism gets over the former difficulty. But there are plenty of others, which neither Conceptualists nor Nominalists can avoid. A chemist has three glass jars of hydrogen; that is, he applies one and the same idea, "hydrogen", to the contents of each jar. And his reason for doing so, the Conceptualist readily admits, is the likeness which he perceives between them. But where is that likeness ? In his mind only? It must be so, according to the system ; for if the likeness exists in the specimens of hydrogen — in jars No I, No 2 and No 3 — it is identical with itself everywhere, it is a universal likeness, really existing in the things: which would contradict the Con-
VIII ON ESSAY ON WYCLIF'S PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. the woman cat, the Felis domesticus, and the nine-tailed whip. But a consistent Nominalist would be forced to say that we docket these with names for the convenience of classification, and that equivocal terms are just as general as terms which are univocal, since the word alone is in both cases common to all the singulars! Now this distinction is the basis of all reasoning ; all men agree that no inference with equivocal terms has the least value. Why is the Stock Exchange like the sky ? Because there are bears in both', may be meant for a joke, never for an argument. Nominalists of course shift their ground at once, and say that they intend to exclude fictitious resemblances; those alone which are natural can be admitted. Then what are and where are these resemblances? Not in the mind alone ; therefore either in the things themselves, or between them. And as they are forced to admit that the word means these resemblances, they are no longer pure Nominalists ; for the likeness between Smith and Brown is the same as that between Brown and Smith. This brings us to Conceptualism, which is the same error in a less virulent but more insidious form. "Something in my idea of one man", the Conceptualist would say, “is indeed identical with something in my idea of another ; and therefore humanity is something more than a word; it is a thought. But there is nothing in the man Smith, nothing in the man Brown, which is really and truly identical in both. When we speak of their common humanity, we are speaking of an abstraction that cannot exist otherwise than mentally, not of the actual essence of the men themselves." In this doctrine, of course, a queen in a card- pack, on a chess board, in a bee-hive, or issuing a proclamation, is a word standing for four distinct ideas ; and there is no doubt that Con- ceptualism gets over the former difficulty. But there are plenty of others, which neither Conceptualists nor Nominalists can avoid. A chemist has three glass jars of hydrogen; that is, he applies one and the same idea, "hydrogen", to the contents of each jar. And his reason for doing so, the Conceptualist readily admits, is the likeness which he perceives between them. But where is that likeness ? In his mind only? It must be so, according to the system ; for if the likeness exists in the specimens of hydrogen — in jars No I, No 2 and No 3 — it is identical with itself everywhere, it is a universal likeness, really existing in the things: which would contradict the Con-
Strana IX
AN ESSAY ON WYCLIF'S PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. IX ceptualistic theory. The likeness is then only in the chemist's mind. What we think of as hydrogen in one jar may in reality have nothing similar in nature to what we think of as hydrogen in another. We put them together, we class them under one general idea; but all our reasonings must necessarily relate, not to them, but to the idea! Between things and our ideas of things, there is an abyss. Science may tell us something about the latter ; about the former, nothing. Experiments may, for example, show us that what is in jar No I is combustible in exactly the same way and under the same conditions as what is in jar No 2, This is therefore a property identical in each case. Yes ! but the identity goes no farther than our minds : they are in fact two different combusti- bilities, and we can affirm nothing about them, everything about our ideas of them. Let Chemistry, Natural Science, Mathematics, all go to ruin: for most certainly, when we say, These gases are hydrogen," or, These animals are elephants', or, These figures are rectangles', we do not mean only : 'My idea of gas in this and this case corresponds to my idea of hydrogen'; nor, The concept of certain animals, A, B, C... is included in that of elephants'; nor, These singulars, which I classify as figures, may also be classified as rectangles'. No: we mean more; we say not only that the thoughts, but also the things, have in them- selves a correspondence with each other. But, perish Chemistry, Mathe- matics, and every science, and let Conceptualism prevail ! — Can absurdity go farther? Possibly; at least it may become more striking. You deny that, when a general term is used, anything general is meant beyond the word itself, or at best, beyond an abstract idea. Very well. Here is a man who promises to pay five pounds. He is out of cash just now, so he cannot be thinking of any particular coin or banknote in his possession. What then does he promise? Something identical with, and equivalent to, any existing sum of five pounds. Is what he promises, only a word? Is it an abstraction? Then what is his promise worth in either case? Business men are not likely to think highly of such a theory. And if you say that he promises to pay certain singulars, without specifying which, I reply that A singular, Some singulars, All singulars, are general terms, and fall under the same class as the five pounds', and present the same difficulty. 'A singular', not applied in thought to this or that singular, in your theory either means nothing, or nothing real.
AN ESSAY ON WYCLIF'S PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. IX ceptualistic theory. The likeness is then only in the chemist's mind. What we think of as hydrogen in one jar may in reality have nothing similar in nature to what we think of as hydrogen in another. We put them together, we class them under one general idea; but all our reasonings must necessarily relate, not to them, but to the idea! Between things and our ideas of things, there is an abyss. Science may tell us something about the latter ; about the former, nothing. Experiments may, for example, show us that what is in jar No I is combustible in exactly the same way and under the same conditions as what is in jar No 2, This is therefore a property identical in each case. Yes ! but the identity goes no farther than our minds : they are in fact two different combusti- bilities, and we can affirm nothing about them, everything about our ideas of them. Let Chemistry, Natural Science, Mathematics, all go to ruin: for most certainly, when we say, These gases are hydrogen," or, These animals are elephants', or, These figures are rectangles', we do not mean only : 'My idea of gas in this and this case corresponds to my idea of hydrogen'; nor, The concept of certain animals, A, B, C... is included in that of elephants'; nor, These singulars, which I classify as figures, may also be classified as rectangles'. No: we mean more; we say not only that the thoughts, but also the things, have in them- selves a correspondence with each other. But, perish Chemistry, Mathe- matics, and every science, and let Conceptualism prevail ! — Can absurdity go farther? Possibly; at least it may become more striking. You deny that, when a general term is used, anything general is meant beyond the word itself, or at best, beyond an abstract idea. Very well. Here is a man who promises to pay five pounds. He is out of cash just now, so he cannot be thinking of any particular coin or banknote in his possession. What then does he promise? Something identical with, and equivalent to, any existing sum of five pounds. Is what he promises, only a word? Is it an abstraction? Then what is his promise worth in either case? Business men are not likely to think highly of such a theory. And if you say that he promises to pay certain singulars, without specifying which, I reply that A singular, Some singulars, All singulars, are general terms, and fall under the same class as the five pounds', and present the same difficulty. 'A singular', not applied in thought to this or that singular, in your theory either means nothing, or nothing real.
Strana X
X AN ESSAY ON WYCLIF'S PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. We might easily show how such doctrines work in the fields of Law and Ethics. Obligation, punishment, goodness, virtue, and so forth, become at most the merest fabric of our brains. The Artful Dodger is not sent to prison for having picked a pocket. No, indeed : in so far as this is an abstract statement, in so far it is false. He cannot be sent to an abstraction for having picked — an abstraction! He is sent, say, to the Old Bailey for picking the right coat-tail pocket of Mr. So-and-so, on such a date. Still less can we say that picking pockets is an offence punishable by imprisonment, unless we mean this to refer to and symbolize a number of cases like the preceding case: otherwise it is a mere ideal proposition, good for nothing. Now, as a summary, merely symbolizing cases that have occurred in the past, it has no value whatever as concerns the present or the future: and the whole binding power of Law is thus swept away ! The same is true as regards morality. I ought to do this remains indeed, if we mean thereby an individual feeling of obligation on some special occasion; but try to lay down rules of conduct — even to Nelson's famous signal: 'England expects every man to do his duty' — and they vanish into thin air. If duty could be done, an abstraction would be really existing in the act by which it is done. And yet English sailors did their duty at Trafalgar — let Conceptualists explain the fact how they may. If I have exposed these absurdities at such length, it is because the reader must see all Wyclif’s reasons for choosing the contrary alternative. Perhaps I shall therefore be excused if, at the close of this long investigation, I look for a moment at the humorous side of these theories. You are very sharpset, and enter a restaurant in a hurry. A waiter of the Nominalist persuasion (Heaven save the mark!) comes at your call. “I want a grilled steak, you say". “Beg pardon, sir, you don't; there is no such thing in the world. What you want is the — 'I am thinking particular grilled steak of which you are thinking". of none in particular," you protest; "any steak will do for me". “Excuse me, sir," he replies; "any steak will not do ; any steak is only a word" You leave the place, blessing the man, and go to another restaurant, where another waiter (a Conceptualist this time) politely assures you that what you want, not being something concrete and determined, is merely your general idea of a steak, which he regrets that he cannot supply, there being only singular steaks in the house. "Then give me a
X AN ESSAY ON WYCLIF'S PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. We might easily show how such doctrines work in the fields of Law and Ethics. Obligation, punishment, goodness, virtue, and so forth, become at most the merest fabric of our brains. The Artful Dodger is not sent to prison for having picked a pocket. No, indeed : in so far as this is an abstract statement, in so far it is false. He cannot be sent to an abstraction for having picked — an abstraction! He is sent, say, to the Old Bailey for picking the right coat-tail pocket of Mr. So-and-so, on such a date. Still less can we say that picking pockets is an offence punishable by imprisonment, unless we mean this to refer to and symbolize a number of cases like the preceding case: otherwise it is a mere ideal proposition, good for nothing. Now, as a summary, merely symbolizing cases that have occurred in the past, it has no value whatever as concerns the present or the future: and the whole binding power of Law is thus swept away ! The same is true as regards morality. I ought to do this remains indeed, if we mean thereby an individual feeling of obligation on some special occasion; but try to lay down rules of conduct — even to Nelson's famous signal: 'England expects every man to do his duty' — and they vanish into thin air. If duty could be done, an abstraction would be really existing in the act by which it is done. And yet English sailors did their duty at Trafalgar — let Conceptualists explain the fact how they may. If I have exposed these absurdities at such length, it is because the reader must see all Wyclif’s reasons for choosing the contrary alternative. Perhaps I shall therefore be excused if, at the close of this long investigation, I look for a moment at the humorous side of these theories. You are very sharpset, and enter a restaurant in a hurry. A waiter of the Nominalist persuasion (Heaven save the mark!) comes at your call. “I want a grilled steak, you say". “Beg pardon, sir, you don't; there is no such thing in the world. What you want is the — 'I am thinking particular grilled steak of which you are thinking". of none in particular," you protest; "any steak will do for me". “Excuse me, sir," he replies; "any steak will not do ; any steak is only a word" You leave the place, blessing the man, and go to another restaurant, where another waiter (a Conceptualist this time) politely assures you that what you want, not being something concrete and determined, is merely your general idea of a steak, which he regrets that he cannot supply, there being only singular steaks in the house. "Then give me a
Strana XI
AN ESSAY ON WYCLIF'S PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. XI singular one," you angrily reply, “and have done with it". A singular, sir?" he says; 'there can be none except in your mind, sir. We have only this one, that one, and this other" (pointing to each). 'This one then," you say. "Very well, sir ; now you can be served. But so long as your craving was for a mere empty abstraction, the thing was impossible". — Let us trust that assault and battery would not ensue; but how far you would be excusable if it did, I leave my readers to judge. If then both Nominalists and Conceptualists strike at the roots of science, law, morality, logical reasoning, and that plain common sense against which no man can go without making a fool of himself, there can be no doubt that any general term — man, for instance — means something more than the letters of the word, something more than the abstract idea of humanity that we conceive to be identical in both. The similarity between them that we perceive exists in them beforehand, or we never could perceive it. And it is identical in both. As the distance from York to London is absolutely the same as that from London to York, so the similarity between A and B is the similarity between B and A; and, as we have shown, it is no mere idea, but really existing in A and in B. This, when extended to all men, past, present, or future, is the Universal Man (or the real fact of their being men) identical with each individual taken as a man, and differing from them only in that they are the Many in One, whereas Humanity is the One in Many — one really existing, though universal, substance. To say therefore that there are only singulars in the world is a falsehood, leading to the absurdities enumerated in the foregoing paragraphs. But we can and we must go further. Men as well as brutes are animated beings, and — by the same reasoning — there exists a universal Animation, common to brutes as to men. Animated beings and plants have in common the yet more universal Life, absolutely the same Thing in a mushroom and in a man. We must go further still, urged onward by irresistible logic. Everything we can conceive — both God and His creatures — is a being: and thus Being is really identical in all: a transcendent link, binding the whole universe together, and giving it unity and harmony. Such is the basis of Wyclif's system ; such is what he shares with other Realists. We must now see wherein he differs from them. The
AN ESSAY ON WYCLIF'S PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. XI singular one," you angrily reply, “and have done with it". A singular, sir?" he says; 'there can be none except in your mind, sir. We have only this one, that one, and this other" (pointing to each). 'This one then," you say. "Very well, sir ; now you can be served. But so long as your craving was for a mere empty abstraction, the thing was impossible". — Let us trust that assault and battery would not ensue; but how far you would be excusable if it did, I leave my readers to judge. If then both Nominalists and Conceptualists strike at the roots of science, law, morality, logical reasoning, and that plain common sense against which no man can go without making a fool of himself, there can be no doubt that any general term — man, for instance — means something more than the letters of the word, something more than the abstract idea of humanity that we conceive to be identical in both. The similarity between them that we perceive exists in them beforehand, or we never could perceive it. And it is identical in both. As the distance from York to London is absolutely the same as that from London to York, so the similarity between A and B is the similarity between B and A; and, as we have shown, it is no mere idea, but really existing in A and in B. This, when extended to all men, past, present, or future, is the Universal Man (or the real fact of their being men) identical with each individual taken as a man, and differing from them only in that they are the Many in One, whereas Humanity is the One in Many — one really existing, though universal, substance. To say therefore that there are only singulars in the world is a falsehood, leading to the absurdities enumerated in the foregoing paragraphs. But we can and we must go further. Men as well as brutes are animated beings, and — by the same reasoning — there exists a universal Animation, common to brutes as to men. Animated beings and plants have in common the yet more universal Life, absolutely the same Thing in a mushroom and in a man. We must go further still, urged onward by irresistible logic. Everything we can conceive — both God and His creatures — is a being: and thus Being is really identical in all: a transcendent link, binding the whole universe together, and giving it unity and harmony. Such is the basis of Wyclif's system ; such is what he shares with other Realists. We must now see wherein he differs from them. The
Strana XII
XII AN ESSAY ON WYCLIF'S PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. early followers of that line of thought fell into a trap which he avoids with consummate skill. If,' argued their adversaries, Humanity be identical with Smith, and that same Humanity be identical with Brown — then Smith and Brown are identical! Two things, the same as a third, cannot but be the same as each other'. This was granted by certain Realists of old times, who averred that the distinction between two men was only apparent, they being essentially identical. More closely pressed, they were forced to admit that all animals, all living things, and finally all beings, were one and the same. Thus they not only fell into Pantheism — which in our days of free thought has not all the practical con- sequences which it had then — but they confused all things together, thus annihilating science and law no less completely than did those that held the contrary view. Wyclif was not to be caught in this way. He laughs to scorn the argument brought forward. It is, he says, not a syllogism, but a monstrous paralogism. What do you mean by Humanity is identical with Brown?" Humanity in itself is identical with nothing but itself. Humanity, as in Brown, is identical with that gentleman. Granted. Humanity, as in Smith, is identical with Smith. Very well. But here you have two different ideas, instead of one 'middle term'. You point first to Humanity in one man, then to Humanity in another : this change in your point of view is quite sufficient to ruin the argument. I am poor from a millionaire's point of view ; I am rich, from a pauper's: therefore I am both rich and poor! Anything could be proved, if we were allowed to pro- ceed thus. We must never forget that, though each singular is its Universal to some extent, and so is that which every other is, still each is different from every other. To strengthen this position, Wyclif lays great stress on the mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation, which serve to illustrate his doctrine. What the Father is, is the Son, is the Holy Spirit. Yet the Father is not the Son, nor is the Spirit the Father. Christ is God and man at once ; but His Deity is not His human nature. Such illustrations must, in those days of faith, have rendered him incalculable service. But, setting them aside, let us choose a few instances in the purely natural field. The Union Jack is something that is at once red, white, and blue: but the red is not the white, nor is the blue the red. The same man may be a mathematician and a drunkard: but his being
XII AN ESSAY ON WYCLIF'S PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. early followers of that line of thought fell into a trap which he avoids with consummate skill. If,' argued their adversaries, Humanity be identical with Smith, and that same Humanity be identical with Brown — then Smith and Brown are identical! Two things, the same as a third, cannot but be the same as each other'. This was granted by certain Realists of old times, who averred that the distinction between two men was only apparent, they being essentially identical. More closely pressed, they were forced to admit that all animals, all living things, and finally all beings, were one and the same. Thus they not only fell into Pantheism — which in our days of free thought has not all the practical con- sequences which it had then — but they confused all things together, thus annihilating science and law no less completely than did those that held the contrary view. Wyclif was not to be caught in this way. He laughs to scorn the argument brought forward. It is, he says, not a syllogism, but a monstrous paralogism. What do you mean by Humanity is identical with Brown?" Humanity in itself is identical with nothing but itself. Humanity, as in Brown, is identical with that gentleman. Granted. Humanity, as in Smith, is identical with Smith. Very well. But here you have two different ideas, instead of one 'middle term'. You point first to Humanity in one man, then to Humanity in another : this change in your point of view is quite sufficient to ruin the argument. I am poor from a millionaire's point of view ; I am rich, from a pauper's: therefore I am both rich and poor! Anything could be proved, if we were allowed to pro- ceed thus. We must never forget that, though each singular is its Universal to some extent, and so is that which every other is, still each is different from every other. To strengthen this position, Wyclif lays great stress on the mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation, which serve to illustrate his doctrine. What the Father is, is the Son, is the Holy Spirit. Yet the Father is not the Son, nor is the Spirit the Father. Christ is God and man at once ; but His Deity is not His human nature. Such illustrations must, in those days of faith, have rendered him incalculable service. But, setting them aside, let us choose a few instances in the purely natural field. The Union Jack is something that is at once red, white, and blue: but the red is not the white, nor is the blue the red. The same man may be a mathematician and a drunkard: but his being
Strana XIII
AN ESSAY ON WYCLIF'S PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. XIII the one is certainly not his being the other. You take a cup of tea, and experience a taste at once bitter and sweet; it is one sensation, and yet you distinguish the bitterness from the sweetness. Briefly, in nature we are continually meeting with instances of two things that are identical with a third, and yet differ from one another. Even the mathe- matical concept of the whole and its parts would be impossible, if we denied this. The whole is identical with all its parts, and to some extent, with every one of them: each part is distinct from every other, and no part is anything that the whole is not. Thus, though humanity is every individual man, one individual is not the other. Animation is common to brutes and men; nevertheless, no brute is a man. No confusion results from the admission that the same universal Life vivifies both animals and plants. That which is God is a creature, since Being is the same in both; yet no creature, as a creature, is God. Let us now, after this first glimpse at Wyclif's system, go back five hundred years and look into our young philosopher's mind, as after some sharp struggle with his life-long antagonists, the Franciscan Nominalists, he walks out into the country round Oxford to soothe his tired brain with quiet musings. The mystery of the Holy Trinity, of which his doctrine multiplies vestiges throughout creation, is everywhere and always present to him. Neither contounding' the individuals, nor dividing' their essences, his glance at once takes in the outward diversity of things, and the unity which underlies it. The sky is azure, the Isis which reflects it is azure, the forget-me-nots upon its banks are azure; and yet they are not three azures, but one azure. The plough-boy whom he sees afar has bodily existence, the oxen moving under the goad have the same corporeity, the glittering ploughshare is corporeal too : each is other, but their corporeity is One. The light which falls on the landscape is an entity, the landscape lit thereby is also an entity; so is the movement of the rolling water, and so likewise is the water that rolls: vast as the distance between them is, both phenomena and substances share one Universal in common. And this Entity is the same with that of the Most High. The truth of their present mobile existence was as real in God before the world began, as it is now ; the fact that at this point of time they exist, never was, never will be false ; He gave it being by willing that some day — this day ! — they should be.
AN ESSAY ON WYCLIF'S PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. XIII the one is certainly not his being the other. You take a cup of tea, and experience a taste at once bitter and sweet; it is one sensation, and yet you distinguish the bitterness from the sweetness. Briefly, in nature we are continually meeting with instances of two things that are identical with a third, and yet differ from one another. Even the mathe- matical concept of the whole and its parts would be impossible, if we denied this. The whole is identical with all its parts, and to some extent, with every one of them: each part is distinct from every other, and no part is anything that the whole is not. Thus, though humanity is every individual man, one individual is not the other. Animation is common to brutes and men; nevertheless, no brute is a man. No confusion results from the admission that the same universal Life vivifies both animals and plants. That which is God is a creature, since Being is the same in both; yet no creature, as a creature, is God. Let us now, after this first glimpse at Wyclif's system, go back five hundred years and look into our young philosopher's mind, as after some sharp struggle with his life-long antagonists, the Franciscan Nominalists, he walks out into the country round Oxford to soothe his tired brain with quiet musings. The mystery of the Holy Trinity, of which his doctrine multiplies vestiges throughout creation, is everywhere and always present to him. Neither contounding' the individuals, nor dividing' their essences, his glance at once takes in the outward diversity of things, and the unity which underlies it. The sky is azure, the Isis which reflects it is azure, the forget-me-nots upon its banks are azure; and yet they are not three azures, but one azure. The plough-boy whom he sees afar has bodily existence, the oxen moving under the goad have the same corporeity, the glittering ploughshare is corporeal too : each is other, but their corporeity is One. The light which falls on the landscape is an entity, the landscape lit thereby is also an entity; so is the movement of the rolling water, and so likewise is the water that rolls: vast as the distance between them is, both phenomena and substances share one Universal in common. And this Entity is the same with that of the Most High. The truth of their present mobile existence was as real in God before the world began, as it is now ; the fact that at this point of time they exist, never was, never will be false ; He gave it being by willing that some day — this day ! — they should be.
Strana XIV
XIV And the truth, known everlastingly by God, and the truth, known by Wyclif now, and that which exists in the things themselves, are one and the same : That They Are! All things, from first to last, are foreknown by God as existing ; were they not thus foreknown, they would neither take place, nor could they be possible. — The sun sets, and the crimson clouds are fair to see; but Wyclif's mind still contemplates the eternal existence of their beauty in God, when, a few minutes later, darkness comes over the land, and he must needs return to his cell to ponder, his heart full of these things. This, however, is a mere sketch of Wyclif's system, as it was then budding in his mind : we must now see how he afterwards developed and elaborated it in his Logica, giving us a complete and most original Cosmological theory. It is, however, necessary to the right understanding of what will follow, that we should note several corollaries and minor issues that proceed by logical sequence from his fundamental principles, once laid down. Nominalists readily admitted that, whilst the number of existing singulars must be finite (for an innumerable number is absurd) that of things merely possible, which from their point of view were only fictions without reality, might be infinitely, or — if you prefer — indefinitely great. So might also possible space be indefinite in size, and for ever divisible into indefinitely smaller and smaller parts. So likewise of time. But for Wyclif, whatever is possible is really possible, and therefore real; and for him too an innumerable number was an absurdity. Realities, countless to our minds, may and do exist; but nothing is infinite to God — not even Himself. The number of these realities is therefore fixed and definite. A being that God might but never will create is a contra- diction in terms ; since its cause — God's will — is wanting, it would be something without a cause, no less impossible than coal-black whiteness. The total multitude of possible beings is all those which God eternally sees as existing at some period of time: and no others. This is the maximum number, and the minimum at the same time. Space, to us unlimited, is limited in God's sight; there is also a limit to its possible divisions, and the smallest possible part of space — the mathe- matical point — is an existing reality. Again, since space is real, there can be no vacuum where it exists; but on the other hand, it is absolutely unthinkable save as the whereabouts of a body; real, but depending AN ESSAY ON WYCLIF'S PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM.
XIV And the truth, known everlastingly by God, and the truth, known by Wyclif now, and that which exists in the things themselves, are one and the same : That They Are! All things, from first to last, are foreknown by God as existing ; were they not thus foreknown, they would neither take place, nor could they be possible. — The sun sets, and the crimson clouds are fair to see; but Wyclif's mind still contemplates the eternal existence of their beauty in God, when, a few minutes later, darkness comes over the land, and he must needs return to his cell to ponder, his heart full of these things. This, however, is a mere sketch of Wyclif's system, as it was then budding in his mind : we must now see how he afterwards developed and elaborated it in his Logica, giving us a complete and most original Cosmological theory. It is, however, necessary to the right understanding of what will follow, that we should note several corollaries and minor issues that proceed by logical sequence from his fundamental principles, once laid down. Nominalists readily admitted that, whilst the number of existing singulars must be finite (for an innumerable number is absurd) that of things merely possible, which from their point of view were only fictions without reality, might be infinitely, or — if you prefer — indefinitely great. So might also possible space be indefinite in size, and for ever divisible into indefinitely smaller and smaller parts. So likewise of time. But for Wyclif, whatever is possible is really possible, and therefore real; and for him too an innumerable number was an absurdity. Realities, countless to our minds, may and do exist; but nothing is infinite to God — not even Himself. The number of these realities is therefore fixed and definite. A being that God might but never will create is a contra- diction in terms ; since its cause — God's will — is wanting, it would be something without a cause, no less impossible than coal-black whiteness. The total multitude of possible beings is all those which God eternally sees as existing at some period of time: and no others. This is the maximum number, and the minimum at the same time. Space, to us unlimited, is limited in God's sight; there is also a limit to its possible divisions, and the smallest possible part of space — the mathe- matical point — is an existing reality. Again, since space is real, there can be no vacuum where it exists; but on the other hand, it is absolutely unthinkable save as the whereabouts of a body; real, but depending AN ESSAY ON WYCLIF'S PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM.
Strana XV
AN ESSAY ON WYCLIF'S PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. XV for its reality upon the actual presence within it of something that is not itself. It cannot be thought as non-existent; nor can it be thought as existent, unless filled at every point of its (to us) boundless extent by some corporeal substance. The world takes up all space, even to its unimaginable, yet existing limits ; and within space, there is not one of its points unoccupied by a corresponding point of bodily substance: so that a vacuum, whether of real substance or of real extension, is as absolutely impossible as a vacuum of time. Time, a mode of being which implies changeable duration, also depends on the existence of the world, and is inconceivable apart from it. And as the ultimate parts of space are real indivisible points, so the ultimate elements of time are real in- divisible instants. The illustrious Pole of whom Germans — as if they had not enough great men of their own — would fain make a German, and whose name has been given to our present system of astronomy, was born 89 years after Wyclif's death. Our author, not being in such matters in advance of his time, takes the assertion that the whole universe revolves on its axis once every twenty-four hours as an established fact: and on this fact he proceeds to build a series of strange, though strictly logical inferences. Space, being the 'whereabouts of the world', is necessarily motionless ; whereas the world is everywhere in motion, save along the line of the poles. It follows that both space and the world have the shape of an immense sphere, perfectly smooth, with no conceivable Beyond. For if the sphere were not a perfectly smooth and regular surface — still more, if the world had the shape of a cube or a prism — the diurnal revolution would bring the surface of the world out of space sometimes (which is impossible) and sometimes there would be empty space out of the world (which is no less absurd). The argument would, it is true, proceed just as well or a cylinder or a cone revolving on its axis ; but the fact is, the idea of the universe as a sphere was then so deeply rooted in every philosophical mind that the possibility of these alternatives did not occur to Wyclif. He goes on to prove that the universe can be neither larger nor smaller than it is. If larger, and space did not expand, a portion of it would be beyond space; if smaller, and space did not shrink, there would be a vacuum: and as we cannot think away even the smallest part of space (just as we can add nothing in thought to its vastness), a simultaneous swelling or shrinkage both of
AN ESSAY ON WYCLIF'S PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. XV for its reality upon the actual presence within it of something that is not itself. It cannot be thought as non-existent; nor can it be thought as existent, unless filled at every point of its (to us) boundless extent by some corporeal substance. The world takes up all space, even to its unimaginable, yet existing limits ; and within space, there is not one of its points unoccupied by a corresponding point of bodily substance: so that a vacuum, whether of real substance or of real extension, is as absolutely impossible as a vacuum of time. Time, a mode of being which implies changeable duration, also depends on the existence of the world, and is inconceivable apart from it. And as the ultimate parts of space are real indivisible points, so the ultimate elements of time are real in- divisible instants. The illustrious Pole of whom Germans — as if they had not enough great men of their own — would fain make a German, and whose name has been given to our present system of astronomy, was born 89 years after Wyclif's death. Our author, not being in such matters in advance of his time, takes the assertion that the whole universe revolves on its axis once every twenty-four hours as an established fact: and on this fact he proceeds to build a series of strange, though strictly logical inferences. Space, being the 'whereabouts of the world', is necessarily motionless ; whereas the world is everywhere in motion, save along the line of the poles. It follows that both space and the world have the shape of an immense sphere, perfectly smooth, with no conceivable Beyond. For if the sphere were not a perfectly smooth and regular surface — still more, if the world had the shape of a cube or a prism — the diurnal revolution would bring the surface of the world out of space sometimes (which is impossible) and sometimes there would be empty space out of the world (which is no less absurd). The argument would, it is true, proceed just as well or a cylinder or a cone revolving on its axis ; but the fact is, the idea of the universe as a sphere was then so deeply rooted in every philosophical mind that the possibility of these alternatives did not occur to Wyclif. He goes on to prove that the universe can be neither larger nor smaller than it is. If larger, and space did not expand, a portion of it would be beyond space; if smaller, and space did not shrink, there would be a vacuum: and as we cannot think away even the smallest part of space (just as we can add nothing in thought to its vastness), a simultaneous swelling or shrinkage both of
Strana XVI
XVI AN ESSAY ON WYCLIF'S PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. the world and of space is out of the question. In this immobile spherical space, real yet of subtle essence, made up of an immense multitude of points, each touching the other, our material universe which consists of punctal atoms in number equal to the points of space, and each fitting exactly into the point which is its site at any time, revolves in the number of instants, known to God alone, that make up the twenty�four hours. And as points are the first elements of space, atoms, of matter, and instants, of time, so the instantaneous passage of a material atom from one point to the next, is the first element of movement. But how can we picture to ourselves indivisible points which, though touching one another, do not coïncide? When an atom passes from one site to the next, there is no distance between: how can that be called a passage? The same difficulty recurs as to time. We cannot imagine two indivisible instants without any interval between them. These objections, which our author states and solves at great length, together with many others that I must needs set aside, had no doubt far more weight in his time than they ought to have in ours. A generation that seriously discusses a Fourth Dimension, or the possible curvature of a straight line, should be far more willing than Wyclif's Oxford contemporaries, whose mathematical education was on strictly Euclidian lines, to listen favourably to his great plea: What we cannot realize in imagination is not necessarily untrue'. Mathematics are based on our impressions and imaginings, both sense-born. When we reason about essences that transcend imagination, this science naturally fails to bear us out, and our conclusions may seem to contradict it, though they do not. — Compare this with the argument of such as maintain that a Fourth Dimension is possible. We exist in three dimensions only, and so neither sense nor imagination can realize a fourth: but that does not mean that a Fourth Dimension is absurd'. If this reasoning be tolerable, why should we think worse of the other ? Our author, moreover, is not content with solving objections: he brings direct demonstrations to prove his theory. Though modal and dependent upon substance, every volume in space is real, as has been shown; so all that really belongs to it is real too. A surface, whether interior or exterior, is therefore real ; so is a line; so is a point. A line is a universal, of which its points are the singulars. Take away all its singulars from a universal; what remains? Nothing. Then how, if I suppose
XVI AN ESSAY ON WYCLIF'S PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. the world and of space is out of the question. In this immobile spherical space, real yet of subtle essence, made up of an immense multitude of points, each touching the other, our material universe which consists of punctal atoms in number equal to the points of space, and each fitting exactly into the point which is its site at any time, revolves in the number of instants, known to God alone, that make up the twenty�four hours. And as points are the first elements of space, atoms, of matter, and instants, of time, so the instantaneous passage of a material atom from one point to the next, is the first element of movement. But how can we picture to ourselves indivisible points which, though touching one another, do not coïncide? When an atom passes from one site to the next, there is no distance between: how can that be called a passage? The same difficulty recurs as to time. We cannot imagine two indivisible instants without any interval between them. These objections, which our author states and solves at great length, together with many others that I must needs set aside, had no doubt far more weight in his time than they ought to have in ours. A generation that seriously discusses a Fourth Dimension, or the possible curvature of a straight line, should be far more willing than Wyclif's Oxford contemporaries, whose mathematical education was on strictly Euclidian lines, to listen favourably to his great plea: What we cannot realize in imagination is not necessarily untrue'. Mathematics are based on our impressions and imaginings, both sense-born. When we reason about essences that transcend imagination, this science naturally fails to bear us out, and our conclusions may seem to contradict it, though they do not. — Compare this with the argument of such as maintain that a Fourth Dimension is possible. We exist in three dimensions only, and so neither sense nor imagination can realize a fourth: but that does not mean that a Fourth Dimension is absurd'. If this reasoning be tolerable, why should we think worse of the other ? Our author, moreover, is not content with solving objections: he brings direct demonstrations to prove his theory. Though modal and dependent upon substance, every volume in space is real, as has been shown; so all that really belongs to it is real too. A surface, whether interior or exterior, is therefore real ; so is a line; so is a point. A line is a universal, of which its points are the singulars. Take away all its singulars from a universal; what remains? Nothing. Then how, if I suppose
Strana XVII
AN ESSAY ON WYCLIF'S PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. XVII all its points taken away from a line, can I maintain that the line is entire ? for it is nothing more than all its points, just as the whole is all its parts. They are thus parts of the line, each touching every other, yet no two in the same place. This is not only not absurd, but necessary; each point stands for a certain fixed position in space: mutual contact cannot destroy their one essential property. By a like reasoning we prove that a surface consists of lines, and that a volume is made up of surfaces. A line, a surface, or a volume that is by but one point less than another, is smaller than that other. Again, suppose that two bodies touch : where they touch, do their points coincide? If they did, they could not belong to different bodies. Two points never can become one, however near: at the limit, therefore, they are also distinct. The surfaces of air and water touch. A stone falls into the water. Will it not first reach the bottommost surface of the air, and the topmost surface of the water afterwards? Each surface, being respectively of air and of water, cannot be the same, unless air be water. These proofs do not satisfy Wyclif's antagonists. In their opinion, a point, a line, or a surface, is but an abstraction (if it be even that); space itself is only a fiction, if taken apart from singulars occupying space. And at any rate a point is not a part of it; according to Geometry, both points, lines and surfaces may and do coïncide. But how can they have the face to invoke the authority of Geometry, when their whole system means the utter destruction of that science? Since a line is an abstraction, how can one be twice as great as another? You can bisect a line; can you cut an abstraction in two? According to us, one line is twice as long as another when the multitude of its points is twice as great. That number, though no man — possibly no creature — is able to count it, exists, and is known to God. Such is our idea, clear and intelligible ; but what of theirs ? If there be no such thing as a line, how can there be, between two lines, either equality or inequality? You cannot compare two nothingnesses together. If we seem to contradict Geometry, we only seem to do so ; whereas your contradiction is open and flagrant. The composition of time, which we say consists of succesive in- divisible instants, is yet more evidently demonstrable, if such a thing can be. Wyclif's opponents say that the end of one state and the B
AN ESSAY ON WYCLIF'S PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. XVII all its points taken away from a line, can I maintain that the line is entire ? for it is nothing more than all its points, just as the whole is all its parts. They are thus parts of the line, each touching every other, yet no two in the same place. This is not only not absurd, but necessary; each point stands for a certain fixed position in space: mutual contact cannot destroy their one essential property. By a like reasoning we prove that a surface consists of lines, and that a volume is made up of surfaces. A line, a surface, or a volume that is by but one point less than another, is smaller than that other. Again, suppose that two bodies touch : where they touch, do their points coincide? If they did, they could not belong to different bodies. Two points never can become one, however near: at the limit, therefore, they are also distinct. The surfaces of air and water touch. A stone falls into the water. Will it not first reach the bottommost surface of the air, and the topmost surface of the water afterwards? Each surface, being respectively of air and of water, cannot be the same, unless air be water. These proofs do not satisfy Wyclif's antagonists. In their opinion, a point, a line, or a surface, is but an abstraction (if it be even that); space itself is only a fiction, if taken apart from singulars occupying space. And at any rate a point is not a part of it; according to Geometry, both points, lines and surfaces may and do coïncide. But how can they have the face to invoke the authority of Geometry, when their whole system means the utter destruction of that science? Since a line is an abstraction, how can one be twice as great as another? You can bisect a line; can you cut an abstraction in two? According to us, one line is twice as long as another when the multitude of its points is twice as great. That number, though no man — possibly no creature — is able to count it, exists, and is known to God. Such is our idea, clear and intelligible ; but what of theirs ? If there be no such thing as a line, how can there be, between two lines, either equality or inequality? You cannot compare two nothingnesses together. If we seem to contradict Geometry, we only seem to do so ; whereas your contradiction is open and flagrant. The composition of time, which we say consists of succesive in- divisible instants, is yet more evidently demonstrable, if such a thing can be. Wyclif's opponents say that the end of one state and the B
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XVIII AN ESSAY ON WYCLIF'S PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. beginning of another occur at the same instant exactly, whenever change takes place. Supposing then in a moving body two degrees of speed, A and B, that succeed each other : A is a speed of 60 miles an hour only, B a speed of more than 60 miles — then the last instant at which A is truly predicated of that mobile is the first at which it is not thus truly predicated. A locomotive at the same instant goes only so fast and yet it goes faster! Surely no contradiction could be more palpable. Another example is probably yet more striking. Hardly any change can be conceived greater than that which takes place at what is called the instant' of death. Now, this so-called instant is in reality two: the last of Life, the first of Non-Life. Until and at that last moment of life, it is true that the man, though dying, is living ; at that moment it is yet false to say that he is dead. But, He is dead', becomes true immediately afterwards. The former instant is not the latter, though there is no possible interval between them. And as it is evident that in every change — though not so apparently — there is the same succession of distinct, yet immediate, instants, and as we know that the duration of everything real is a reality, it follows that those indivisible elements of duration are also real. How then, in this theory, are we to conceive movement as taking place? As the infinitesimal instantaneous passage uf one punctal atom from the site which it occupies to the next, its former site never remaining empty, but being at once and of necessity filled by the next punctal atom. What is called a slow continuous motion is continuous to the senses only; it consists of a multitude of instantaneous but infinitely short leaps, with intervals of more or fewer instants of rest between them. But no atom can move instantaneously through more than one point, since the instant corresponds to the point. The swiftest possible continuous movement is at the rate of one point per instant, when the mobile rests nowhere on its way : and this, Wyclif thinks — following his belief in the diurnal revolution of the universe — is the motion of the celestial Equator, outside of which there is no space. The slowest continuous motion possible is that of the series of four points which touch the line of the poles. These change places only once every six hours, each occupying exactly the same site at the end of the twenty-four. It is possible that some may say: "All these notions are mere fantastic dreams, unworthy of the serious attention of anyone who thinks'.
XVIII AN ESSAY ON WYCLIF'S PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. beginning of another occur at the same instant exactly, whenever change takes place. Supposing then in a moving body two degrees of speed, A and B, that succeed each other : A is a speed of 60 miles an hour only, B a speed of more than 60 miles — then the last instant at which A is truly predicated of that mobile is the first at which it is not thus truly predicated. A locomotive at the same instant goes only so fast and yet it goes faster! Surely no contradiction could be more palpable. Another example is probably yet more striking. Hardly any change can be conceived greater than that which takes place at what is called the instant' of death. Now, this so-called instant is in reality two: the last of Life, the first of Non-Life. Until and at that last moment of life, it is true that the man, though dying, is living ; at that moment it is yet false to say that he is dead. But, He is dead', becomes true immediately afterwards. The former instant is not the latter, though there is no possible interval between them. And as it is evident that in every change — though not so apparently — there is the same succession of distinct, yet immediate, instants, and as we know that the duration of everything real is a reality, it follows that those indivisible elements of duration are also real. How then, in this theory, are we to conceive movement as taking place? As the infinitesimal instantaneous passage uf one punctal atom from the site which it occupies to the next, its former site never remaining empty, but being at once and of necessity filled by the next punctal atom. What is called a slow continuous motion is continuous to the senses only; it consists of a multitude of instantaneous but infinitely short leaps, with intervals of more or fewer instants of rest between them. But no atom can move instantaneously through more than one point, since the instant corresponds to the point. The swiftest possible continuous movement is at the rate of one point per instant, when the mobile rests nowhere on its way : and this, Wyclif thinks — following his belief in the diurnal revolution of the universe — is the motion of the celestial Equator, outside of which there is no space. The slowest continuous motion possible is that of the series of four points which touch the line of the poles. These change places only once every six hours, each occupying exactly the same site at the end of the twenty-four. It is possible that some may say: "All these notions are mere fantastic dreams, unworthy of the serious attention of anyone who thinks'.
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AN ESSAY ON WYCLIF'S PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. XIX They are indeed, if we admit that Truth is nothing but the fashion of the hour — or the age ; if the thinker be of those who take their thoughts ready-made from the hands of some great writer of their time, and who, sublimely trustful, see no difference between what is now acceptable to the many and what will averlastingly remain, — between Modernity and Infallibility. Such a man may well laugh at Wyclif's thoughts and doctrines, link by link and systematically evolved — though he is utterly unable to point out where the error lies. Yet even for him this synopsis, imperfect though it is, may have some sort of historical interest. But, unwilling as I am to disturb such self-complacency, I must enter a mild protest against the word Dream. If it means anything, it means a series of confused imaginations, incoherent one with the other, and devoid of any basis in reason. Surely what has been written shows that there is method in Wyclif's dreaming, that his strange theory of the universe is the mere development of a fundamental theorem, which itself seems indubitably to result from his triumphant attack upon the Nominalistic position. Where is the flaw in Wyclif's logic? You will hardly find it in the secondary deductions, welded together with no less strength than care. If it lies in the method by which he establishes the existence of Universals, then point it out. If you are unable to do this, yet cannot admit that it is true, because its developments go counter to Modern Thought', — then talk no longer of dreams, but confess that the Englishman who five hundred years ago raised this edifice was a mighty thinker ; nay, perhaps — if I may say so without giving offence — even more intelligent than yourself, O man of the Twentieth Century ! From the present view of Wyclif's great system I have (to my great regret) omitted many a side-issue full of profound truth and quaint originality, many a foreshadowing of the most recent theories of physical and chemical science, — Wyclif's admission of atoms, for instance — many a logical disquisition that would set him far above the best dialecticians of the present day. But I was compelled to consider whether these would interest. The subject-matter bristles with such abstruse difficulties in most cases, and our author's language is so crabbed and technical all through, that I could not expect even the most indulgent readers to follow me. The connection, however, between Wyclif's philosophical system and those theological doctrines for which B *
AN ESSAY ON WYCLIF'S PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. XIX They are indeed, if we admit that Truth is nothing but the fashion of the hour — or the age ; if the thinker be of those who take their thoughts ready-made from the hands of some great writer of their time, and who, sublimely trustful, see no difference between what is now acceptable to the many and what will averlastingly remain, — between Modernity and Infallibility. Such a man may well laugh at Wyclif's thoughts and doctrines, link by link and systematically evolved — though he is utterly unable to point out where the error lies. Yet even for him this synopsis, imperfect though it is, may have some sort of historical interest. But, unwilling as I am to disturb such self-complacency, I must enter a mild protest against the word Dream. If it means anything, it means a series of confused imaginations, incoherent one with the other, and devoid of any basis in reason. Surely what has been written shows that there is method in Wyclif's dreaming, that his strange theory of the universe is the mere development of a fundamental theorem, which itself seems indubitably to result from his triumphant attack upon the Nominalistic position. Where is the flaw in Wyclif's logic? You will hardly find it in the secondary deductions, welded together with no less strength than care. If it lies in the method by which he establishes the existence of Universals, then point it out. If you are unable to do this, yet cannot admit that it is true, because its developments go counter to Modern Thought', — then talk no longer of dreams, but confess that the Englishman who five hundred years ago raised this edifice was a mighty thinker ; nay, perhaps — if I may say so without giving offence — even more intelligent than yourself, O man of the Twentieth Century ! From the present view of Wyclif's great system I have (to my great regret) omitted many a side-issue full of profound truth and quaint originality, many a foreshadowing of the most recent theories of physical and chemical science, — Wyclif's admission of atoms, for instance — many a logical disquisition that would set him far above the best dialecticians of the present day. But I was compelled to consider whether these would interest. The subject-matter bristles with such abstruse difficulties in most cases, and our author's language is so crabbed and technical all through, that I could not expect even the most indulgent readers to follow me. The connection, however, between Wyclif's philosophical system and those theological doctrines for which B *
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XX AN ESSAY ON WYCLIF'S PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. he was condemned by the Church, is another thing altogether ; and I may here endeavour to point out a link or two. No more : for on one hand, some of his peculiar views (those, for example, that concern Church discipline) may not have been the direct outcome of his philo- sophy; and on the other, so many have been condemned — 24 as erroneous by Convocation, in 1382; 365 as heretical or at least false by the Council of Constance — that we must pick and choose. I take therefore those that I think are the most important : Wyclif's doctrine of necessity, and his opinion regarding the Eucharist. In two very different senses, a thing may be called necessary. A cube, in every imaginable case, has necessarily eight interior angles; the square of five, under any circumstances, and whatever suppositions we may make, must be neither greater nor less than 25. But it is just as necessary that, when I have waked my friend in the morning, he does not sleep any longer; or that, if you fire off a properly loaded gun, the shot will leave the barrel. However, in the two last cases we have introduced a hypothesis, without which the necessity would not exist; if I wake my friend, be does not sleep; if I fire a loaded gun, it goes off. There is no apparent necessity either for my waking the man or firing the gun. In the first two cases, on the contrary, we find necessity stripped of any hypothesis whatsoever. We have therefore two different kinds: one hypothetical, the other absolute, according to the doctrine usually accepted in the School. All truths that deal only with facts that take place in time, belong to the former sort ; those based upon generalities which do not imply actual existence, and also such as refer to the existence of God, the absolutely Necessary Being, belong to the latter. Now Wyclif's adversaries accused him from the first of confounding these two distinct species of necessity. According to him, if he were consistent, everything in the world, human actions included, must be reduced to the class of things absolutely necessary. At the outset of his career, our philosopher denied this accusation, and drew a sharp line of demarcation between the two categories: he was no doubt doing his best to keep within the limits of orthodoxy. Later, he admitted that all things must inevitably occur in their time, arguing however that this did not imply the truth of the accusation. At last, forced by consistency and his enemies' unanswerable arguments, he granted simply that all
XX AN ESSAY ON WYCLIF'S PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. he was condemned by the Church, is another thing altogether ; and I may here endeavour to point out a link or two. No more : for on one hand, some of his peculiar views (those, for example, that concern Church discipline) may not have been the direct outcome of his philo- sophy; and on the other, so many have been condemned — 24 as erroneous by Convocation, in 1382; 365 as heretical or at least false by the Council of Constance — that we must pick and choose. I take therefore those that I think are the most important : Wyclif's doctrine of necessity, and his opinion regarding the Eucharist. In two very different senses, a thing may be called necessary. A cube, in every imaginable case, has necessarily eight interior angles; the square of five, under any circumstances, and whatever suppositions we may make, must be neither greater nor less than 25. But it is just as necessary that, when I have waked my friend in the morning, he does not sleep any longer; or that, if you fire off a properly loaded gun, the shot will leave the barrel. However, in the two last cases we have introduced a hypothesis, without which the necessity would not exist; if I wake my friend, be does not sleep; if I fire a loaded gun, it goes off. There is no apparent necessity either for my waking the man or firing the gun. In the first two cases, on the contrary, we find necessity stripped of any hypothesis whatsoever. We have therefore two different kinds: one hypothetical, the other absolute, according to the doctrine usually accepted in the School. All truths that deal only with facts that take place in time, belong to the former sort ; those based upon generalities which do not imply actual existence, and also such as refer to the existence of God, the absolutely Necessary Being, belong to the latter. Now Wyclif's adversaries accused him from the first of confounding these two distinct species of necessity. According to him, if he were consistent, everything in the world, human actions included, must be reduced to the class of things absolutely necessary. At the outset of his career, our philosopher denied this accusation, and drew a sharp line of demarcation between the two categories: he was no doubt doing his best to keep within the limits of orthodoxy. Later, he admitted that all things must inevitably occur in their time, arguing however that this did not imply the truth of the accusation. At last, forced by consistency and his enemies' unanswerable arguments, he granted simply that all
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AN ESSAY ON WYCLIF'S PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. XXI was necessary, without specifying any distinction; though to the end he upheld — whether nominally or with sincere intention, it is hard to say — the dogma of free-will, and our duty to act according to the law of God. It is easy to see how his theory leads to this consequence, however slow and unwilling he was to go on so perilous a path. As we have already noticed, nothing is possible — in Wyclif's sense of the word — except that which is, at some period of time. actually to occur, and is therefore from all eternity foreknown by God as a future truth. All other so-called possibilities are in reality impossible, since it is God's everlasting will that they shall never be. In this view, since it was eternally true that I shall at this instant be sitting here, writing this article, and since the contrary of this is not thinkable, how can my sitting here be aught but an absolute necessity? Wyclif at first tried to answer the difficulty by taking the usual distinction. Granted that I am sitting, it is impossible that I do not sit. This would clearly reduce the necessity to the kind termed hypothetical; but in his case it was not applicable. Other philosophers might have said without inconsistency: v To be possible does not mean definite existence or occurrence, but merely the denial of a contradiction in terms. Of such denials the endless multitude is known to God, not as separate entities, but simply as whatever will, may, or might be. It is not true as a fact that I am standing, since I am seated; but it is true that I might be standing just as well.' This of course was an explanation that Wyclif could not give without self-stultification. He accordingly at a later period modified his answer. If, he said, 'God has willed anything to take place, it must take place of necessity. But, since God's will, though eternal, is free and untrammelled, the necessity fails to be absolute. He might, had He chosen, willed otherwise'. Here his opponents had him on the hip. That which God might have willed, but did not — is it something possible or is it an impossibility? If it is possible, your whole system crumbles to pieces; if not, you arrive at the absurdity of saying that He might have willed an impossible thing'. To this there was, there could be, no satisfactory answer. Wyclif in his last years stood, through his conception of possibility, committed to a doctrine of necessity as hard and fast as that to which in our days Determinists stand committed through their conception of Law and Causation.
AN ESSAY ON WYCLIF'S PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. XXI was necessary, without specifying any distinction; though to the end he upheld — whether nominally or with sincere intention, it is hard to say — the dogma of free-will, and our duty to act according to the law of God. It is easy to see how his theory leads to this consequence, however slow and unwilling he was to go on so perilous a path. As we have already noticed, nothing is possible — in Wyclif's sense of the word — except that which is, at some period of time. actually to occur, and is therefore from all eternity foreknown by God as a future truth. All other so-called possibilities are in reality impossible, since it is God's everlasting will that they shall never be. In this view, since it was eternally true that I shall at this instant be sitting here, writing this article, and since the contrary of this is not thinkable, how can my sitting here be aught but an absolute necessity? Wyclif at first tried to answer the difficulty by taking the usual distinction. Granted that I am sitting, it is impossible that I do not sit. This would clearly reduce the necessity to the kind termed hypothetical; but in his case it was not applicable. Other philosophers might have said without inconsistency: v To be possible does not mean definite existence or occurrence, but merely the denial of a contradiction in terms. Of such denials the endless multitude is known to God, not as separate entities, but simply as whatever will, may, or might be. It is not true as a fact that I am standing, since I am seated; but it is true that I might be standing just as well.' This of course was an explanation that Wyclif could not give without self-stultification. He accordingly at a later period modified his answer. If, he said, 'God has willed anything to take place, it must take place of necessity. But, since God's will, though eternal, is free and untrammelled, the necessity fails to be absolute. He might, had He chosen, willed otherwise'. Here his opponents had him on the hip. That which God might have willed, but did not — is it something possible or is it an impossibility? If it is possible, your whole system crumbles to pieces; if not, you arrive at the absurdity of saying that He might have willed an impossible thing'. To this there was, there could be, no satisfactory answer. Wyclif in his last years stood, through his conception of possibility, committed to a doctrine of necessity as hard and fast as that to which in our days Determinists stand committed through their conception of Law and Causation.
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XXII AN ESSAY ON WYCLIF'S PHILOSOPHICAL. SYSTEM. His way of admitting Free-Will is also very similar to the sense in which Determinists admit Choice. It is an established fact, they say, that human beings are able to choose between two or more alternatives. That cannot by any means be denied. But as there must be a reason why, or a cause, for everything that goes on in the world, our choice, which we think is determined by and depends on ourselves, is in reality determined by and depends on causes other than ourselves. Without them, it could never be made ; with them, it must — and in the direction towards which those causes point. Substitute the will of God — the ultimate Reason Why of everything in Wyclif's theory — for Cause ; substitute Free-Will for Choice; and you have his position, which is very like theirs. '"We have Free-Will, and it is God's eternal deter- mination that at such and such a time we shall choose freely between two alternatives, though one of them is impossible, since He has willed that it shall never be chosen". How anyone can reconcile Choice with Determinism, or Necessity with Free-Will, would puzzle me to say, nor does it require to be said. Let it suffice to have pointed out that our author is here in no worse plight than a certain flourishing school of modern thinkers. In Wyclif's doctrine of the Eucharist, there are likewise several stages, brought about by the same process. Before the publication of his philosophical works, his belief, even in the latest stage, seemed to be hopelessly inconsistent, nay, self-contradictory; and readers will think it no easy task to clear him of this charge. Whilst maintaining that the substance of bread remains after consecration, he admits Christ's Real presence, which he, in the same breath almost, affirms to be 'figurative or sacramental'; and he applies the name of Transubstantiation to the change which occurs. A figurative presence which is real! a transub- stantiation that takes place, though the substance is not changed! What can this mean? Did so keen a logician really contradict himself, or did he belie his own principles on account of bodily fear?. How shall we find the concord of this discord ?' The generally received doctrine was that at the words of con- secration the substance of bread at once ceased to exist, the sensible appearance alone remaining ; whilst wherever the bread had been, and its appearance continued to be, Christ's Body was present, not extended, but entire in each smallest portion of what formerly was bread.
XXII AN ESSAY ON WYCLIF'S PHILOSOPHICAL. SYSTEM. His way of admitting Free-Will is also very similar to the sense in which Determinists admit Choice. It is an established fact, they say, that human beings are able to choose between two or more alternatives. That cannot by any means be denied. But as there must be a reason why, or a cause, for everything that goes on in the world, our choice, which we think is determined by and depends on ourselves, is in reality determined by and depends on causes other than ourselves. Without them, it could never be made ; with them, it must — and in the direction towards which those causes point. Substitute the will of God — the ultimate Reason Why of everything in Wyclif's theory — for Cause ; substitute Free-Will for Choice; and you have his position, which is very like theirs. '"We have Free-Will, and it is God's eternal deter- mination that at such and such a time we shall choose freely between two alternatives, though one of them is impossible, since He has willed that it shall never be chosen". How anyone can reconcile Choice with Determinism, or Necessity with Free-Will, would puzzle me to say, nor does it require to be said. Let it suffice to have pointed out that our author is here in no worse plight than a certain flourishing school of modern thinkers. In Wyclif's doctrine of the Eucharist, there are likewise several stages, brought about by the same process. Before the publication of his philosophical works, his belief, even in the latest stage, seemed to be hopelessly inconsistent, nay, self-contradictory; and readers will think it no easy task to clear him of this charge. Whilst maintaining that the substance of bread remains after consecration, he admits Christ's Real presence, which he, in the same breath almost, affirms to be 'figurative or sacramental'; and he applies the name of Transubstantiation to the change which occurs. A figurative presence which is real! a transub- stantiation that takes place, though the substance is not changed! What can this mean? Did so keen a logician really contradict himself, or did he belie his own principles on account of bodily fear?. How shall we find the concord of this discord ?' The generally received doctrine was that at the words of con- secration the substance of bread at once ceased to exist, the sensible appearance alone remaining ; whilst wherever the bread had been, and its appearance continued to be, Christ's Body was present, not extended, but entire in each smallest portion of what formerly was bread.
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AN ESSAY ON WYCLIF'S PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. XXIII Now the Real Presence, in Wyclif's system, made no difficulty whatever. Christ's Words, 'This is my body', spoken by the everlasting Truth, made that Presence true for all consecrated hosts, thenceforth to the end of time. Nothing is true but what really exists at some Now; Christ's Presence was therefore real, and coincides with the consecration of each Host. But, according to the system that we have expounded, a material body cannot exist without occupying certain fixed points of space, and thus being extended. It is only as a Universal Reality that anything can be one in many ; and it is only as figured by the bread that Christ's Body can be present entire in every part. This, this, this .... particle of bread is really the figure of Christ's Body', exactly corresponds to: A, B, C .... is a man.' Thus the bread passes from being a purely material substance to being a singular of the Universal Figure of Christ', which has real entity ; and it is in this sense that Wyclif admits both the Real Presence and Transubstantiation. But, does the bread cease to exist? That were a sheer impossi- bility. We have already seen that space, created together with the world, is necessary at every point of its extent. Should a single atom, at the instant when another moves out of its site into the next, fail to replace the vacated site, the site — as it must be the sile of something — would exist no longer ; which is absurd. How much more absurd is then the hypothesis that the multitudinous atoms which make up the smallest morsel of bread, can be annihilated! This is the true reason why Wyclif so strenuously denies that accidents can be separated from their substances : if they did, they would be sustained either by an impossible vacuum, or by another substance having accidents of its own. Thus the bread remains ; but we may no longer look upon it as bread, since Christ has told us what it is now. To the eye of faith, its material being is as nothing compared with the supernatural entity which has been added thereto, and which is in all truth worthy of our adoration. A bit of glass, plunged in the sun's rays, appears to our eye as a bit of light, not of glass : and such should be the attitude of our mind towards the Holy Eucharist. Such a doctrine, notwithstanding Wyclif's masterly defence in Convocation, could not fail to be condemned as an error, unless his ecclesiastical judges had been Realists, and moreover, Realists in his sense of the word. Whether they fully understood him or not, may be
AN ESSAY ON WYCLIF'S PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. XXIII Now the Real Presence, in Wyclif's system, made no difficulty whatever. Christ's Words, 'This is my body', spoken by the everlasting Truth, made that Presence true for all consecrated hosts, thenceforth to the end of time. Nothing is true but what really exists at some Now; Christ's Presence was therefore real, and coincides with the consecration of each Host. But, according to the system that we have expounded, a material body cannot exist without occupying certain fixed points of space, and thus being extended. It is only as a Universal Reality that anything can be one in many ; and it is only as figured by the bread that Christ's Body can be present entire in every part. This, this, this .... particle of bread is really the figure of Christ's Body', exactly corresponds to: A, B, C .... is a man.' Thus the bread passes from being a purely material substance to being a singular of the Universal Figure of Christ', which has real entity ; and it is in this sense that Wyclif admits both the Real Presence and Transubstantiation. But, does the bread cease to exist? That were a sheer impossi- bility. We have already seen that space, created together with the world, is necessary at every point of its extent. Should a single atom, at the instant when another moves out of its site into the next, fail to replace the vacated site, the site — as it must be the sile of something — would exist no longer ; which is absurd. How much more absurd is then the hypothesis that the multitudinous atoms which make up the smallest morsel of bread, can be annihilated! This is the true reason why Wyclif so strenuously denies that accidents can be separated from their substances : if they did, they would be sustained either by an impossible vacuum, or by another substance having accidents of its own. Thus the bread remains ; but we may no longer look upon it as bread, since Christ has told us what it is now. To the eye of faith, its material being is as nothing compared with the supernatural entity which has been added thereto, and which is in all truth worthy of our adoration. A bit of glass, plunged in the sun's rays, appears to our eye as a bit of light, not of glass : and such should be the attitude of our mind towards the Holy Eucharist. Such a doctrine, notwithstanding Wyclif's masterly defence in Convocation, could not fail to be condemned as an error, unless his ecclesiastical judges had been Realists, and moreover, Realists in his sense of the word. Whether they fully understood him or not, may be
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XXIV AN ESSAY ON WYCLIF'S PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. doubted ; at all events they understood that the substance of the bread remained, and was the figure of Christ's body. Into the justice of the sentence I need not enter, being only anxious to show that our philosopher was neither inconsistent nor a coward; that his assertions harmonize from his own point of view with one another, and were merely the frank statement of his matured thought. But Wyclif did not at the outset see the necessary consequences to which his system led. At first he saw nothing to hinder him from maintaining the general opinion of the School, as above set forth. Later, when he still admitted the possibility of annihilation, he held that the subtle reality of space existed where that which previously was bread had ceased to be; a corpus mathematicum, miraculously sustaining the accidents of shape, colour, resistance, etc. In the course of discussion, it dawned upon him that space, to be consistent with his own view, could no more exist independently of the matter which occupies it than the shape of a waxen ball can remain when the ball is destroyed. Whilst yet uncertain, and inclined to think that the subject of the remaining accidents was mere entity, or an essence concerning the nature of which he is not curious to enquire', he entered the third stage, as shown in a most instructive passage of De Benedicta Incar- natione. And at last, deciding that matter cannot be annihilated, he came to the irrevocable conclusion that what we see, is bread; what we adore, is Christ's Sacramental Body'. I shall possibly be expected to draw a parallel here between Wyclif and Luther. But there is no parallel to draw. Luther may from other points of view have been far superior to Wyclif; as a philosopher, he is nowhere beside him. What attempts at metaphysical reasoning are to be found in his works clearly proceed from the necessity to buttress up some newly built theological doctrine. Wyclif's theology is the reverse; it is mostly the mere outcome of his metaphysical creed. Wyclif was above all a logician; few great men have been so illogical as Luther. And whereas Wyclif approached the door of exit from the Church with slow reluctant steps, urged onwards by necessity gradually made clear to him, Luther, exasperated by opposition as much as by abuses, went over the threshold in a few great strides. One was a philosopher ; the other was not. Having stated at the outset that I personally do not agree with the theories expounded in this article, I may be blamed for not giving
XXIV AN ESSAY ON WYCLIF'S PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. doubted ; at all events they understood that the substance of the bread remained, and was the figure of Christ's body. Into the justice of the sentence I need not enter, being only anxious to show that our philosopher was neither inconsistent nor a coward; that his assertions harmonize from his own point of view with one another, and were merely the frank statement of his matured thought. But Wyclif did not at the outset see the necessary consequences to which his system led. At first he saw nothing to hinder him from maintaining the general opinion of the School, as above set forth. Later, when he still admitted the possibility of annihilation, he held that the subtle reality of space existed where that which previously was bread had ceased to be; a corpus mathematicum, miraculously sustaining the accidents of shape, colour, resistance, etc. In the course of discussion, it dawned upon him that space, to be consistent with his own view, could no more exist independently of the matter which occupies it than the shape of a waxen ball can remain when the ball is destroyed. Whilst yet uncertain, and inclined to think that the subject of the remaining accidents was mere entity, or an essence concerning the nature of which he is not curious to enquire', he entered the third stage, as shown in a most instructive passage of De Benedicta Incar- natione. And at last, deciding that matter cannot be annihilated, he came to the irrevocable conclusion that what we see, is bread; what we adore, is Christ's Sacramental Body'. I shall possibly be expected to draw a parallel here between Wyclif and Luther. But there is no parallel to draw. Luther may from other points of view have been far superior to Wyclif; as a philosopher, he is nowhere beside him. What attempts at metaphysical reasoning are to be found in his works clearly proceed from the necessity to buttress up some newly built theological doctrine. Wyclif's theology is the reverse; it is mostly the mere outcome of his metaphysical creed. Wyclif was above all a logician; few great men have been so illogical as Luther. And whereas Wyclif approached the door of exit from the Church with slow reluctant steps, urged onwards by necessity gradually made clear to him, Luther, exasperated by opposition as much as by abuses, went over the threshold in a few great strides. One was a philosopher ; the other was not. Having stated at the outset that I personally do not agree with the theories expounded in this article, I may be blamed for not giving
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AN ESSAY ON WYCLIF'S PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. XXV utterance to any criticisms on the subject. Yet I do not see that any criticisms of mine are worth having. Wyclif's system, and not what I think of it, may possibly interest the public. It is here set forth ; let those who care, judge for themselves. I have not taken the part of a judge, but of an advocate; and of an advocate only in the hope to render comprehensible the fierce enthusiasm — fierce at times even to the shedding of blood — that so novel and yet so plausible a view of the universe excited in his days. And, to speak quite frankly, I have yet another reason. It is true that both Nominalism and Realism have long been dead, so far as concerns the formal matter of their disputes. The issues raised by them, however, are not dead, and remain to divide — perhaps for ever — most if not all philosophers into two classes ; and it is with the class to which Wyclif belongs that I am in greater sympathy. Are things as we know them to be? That which is in our minds — does it exist in itself as it is in our minds? Answer yes, and you have not only Wyclif's Realism, but Berkeley's denial of matter, German Transcendentalism, and the various shades of thought of modern I- dealists: all belong to the same class. To be, is to be perceived ; matter exists as and when we know it ; outside of the knower, it is a nonentity'. — 'The Non-Ego is posited by the Ego, and is identical therewith'. — 'We have cognizance of an external world only as a modification of ourselves; and if it is as we know it, it is nothing but this modification'. To the propounded question, Wyclif's adversaries answered, No. But the same answer is implied in Locke's philosophy, in the Materialism of some XVIIIth century thinkers, and in the Empiricism and Positivism of our own times. Whilst attempting to fix the limits of the human understanding, Locke was forced to admit that certain ideas, if not all, were mere empty abstractions to which nothing corresponded in the real world; and that, reasoning by their means, however correctly, we were still liable to error, because things may exist otherwise than they are in our minds. Again, to assert that all is matter, notwithstanding our consciousness of the abyss between matter and mind — what is this but to say that what we know, how indubitably soever, may never- theless be false? Things are not as we know them to be. And the statement (which would destroy Metaphysics if Metaphysics could be
AN ESSAY ON WYCLIF'S PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. XXV utterance to any criticisms on the subject. Yet I do not see that any criticisms of mine are worth having. Wyclif's system, and not what I think of it, may possibly interest the public. It is here set forth ; let those who care, judge for themselves. I have not taken the part of a judge, but of an advocate; and of an advocate only in the hope to render comprehensible the fierce enthusiasm — fierce at times even to the shedding of blood — that so novel and yet so plausible a view of the universe excited in his days. And, to speak quite frankly, I have yet another reason. It is true that both Nominalism and Realism have long been dead, so far as concerns the formal matter of their disputes. The issues raised by them, however, are not dead, and remain to divide — perhaps for ever — most if not all philosophers into two classes ; and it is with the class to which Wyclif belongs that I am in greater sympathy. Are things as we know them to be? That which is in our minds — does it exist in itself as it is in our minds? Answer yes, and you have not only Wyclif's Realism, but Berkeley's denial of matter, German Transcendentalism, and the various shades of thought of modern I- dealists: all belong to the same class. To be, is to be perceived ; matter exists as and when we know it ; outside of the knower, it is a nonentity'. — 'The Non-Ego is posited by the Ego, and is identical therewith'. — 'We have cognizance of an external world only as a modification of ourselves; and if it is as we know it, it is nothing but this modification'. To the propounded question, Wyclif's adversaries answered, No. But the same answer is implied in Locke's philosophy, in the Materialism of some XVIIIth century thinkers, and in the Empiricism and Positivism of our own times. Whilst attempting to fix the limits of the human understanding, Locke was forced to admit that certain ideas, if not all, were mere empty abstractions to which nothing corresponded in the real world; and that, reasoning by their means, however correctly, we were still liable to error, because things may exist otherwise than they are in our minds. Again, to assert that all is matter, notwithstanding our consciousness of the abyss between matter and mind — what is this but to say that what we know, how indubitably soever, may never- theless be false? Things are not as we know them to be. And the statement (which would destroy Metaphysics if Metaphysics could be
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XXVI AN ESSAY ON WYCLIF'S PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. destroyed) that at the bottom of all our enquiries into first principles we find self-contradiction on every side, and that accordingly, though we cannot really tell what Time and Space are, we should confine our investigations to what is in Time and Space: — this well-known, this world-renowned theory, is based on an implicit denial that things are as we know them. All knowledge dissolves into self-contradiction; things alone do not contradict themselves. Is there then no answer to the question, save plain Yes or No ? no middle way between the absolute affirmative of the one class, and the uncompromising negative of the other? There is ; but in that very answer we see the reason why it fails to satisfy. Do things exist as they are known to us? AS is a very short word, but it has two meanings nevertheless. Let us look closer. Are things seen in a looking-glass as they are in reality? Yes and no. There is a certain resemblance, more or less perfect, if that be meant; but the difference is always that between the image and the original. In like manner, — so far as any comparison can be drawn, — the human intellect is the mirror of Nature. Our thoughts are indeed in a way the images of things ; but we can no more conclude that things have the same nature as our thoughts than we can infer that a nosegay out of a looking-glass is of quicksilver amalgam, because its image within the looking-glass is not a thing distinct from the silvering. Thus, things do really exist as they are known to us: that is, they giving rise to our thoughts and ideas, we have the right to reason from the latter to the former. There must be some resemblance, however vague, between representation and that which is represented. If it were totally unlike in representation, it would not be represented at all. — But, if AS is made to mean a complete identity of nature between what we know and our knowledge, then it may be boldly denied that things are as we know them. What we know of a grain of sand is not identical with what it is in itself; for what we know of it extends only to a few points of view, and there will ever remain infinite possibilities of more knowledge. All the sophisms in the world will never overthrow this simple yet clear distinction. Now it is precisely because this answer, given by many great philosophers, is so very cautious and moderate, that we feel disappointed. It is the old tale of Scylla and Charybdis over again, the breakers that
XXVI AN ESSAY ON WYCLIF'S PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. destroyed) that at the bottom of all our enquiries into first principles we find self-contradiction on every side, and that accordingly, though we cannot really tell what Time and Space are, we should confine our investigations to what is in Time and Space: — this well-known, this world-renowned theory, is based on an implicit denial that things are as we know them. All knowledge dissolves into self-contradiction; things alone do not contradict themselves. Is there then no answer to the question, save plain Yes or No ? no middle way between the absolute affirmative of the one class, and the uncompromising negative of the other? There is ; but in that very answer we see the reason why it fails to satisfy. Do things exist as they are known to us? AS is a very short word, but it has two meanings nevertheless. Let us look closer. Are things seen in a looking-glass as they are in reality? Yes and no. There is a certain resemblance, more or less perfect, if that be meant; but the difference is always that between the image and the original. In like manner, — so far as any comparison can be drawn, — the human intellect is the mirror of Nature. Our thoughts are indeed in a way the images of things ; but we can no more conclude that things have the same nature as our thoughts than we can infer that a nosegay out of a looking-glass is of quicksilver amalgam, because its image within the looking-glass is not a thing distinct from the silvering. Thus, things do really exist as they are known to us: that is, they giving rise to our thoughts and ideas, we have the right to reason from the latter to the former. There must be some resemblance, however vague, between representation and that which is represented. If it were totally unlike in representation, it would not be represented at all. — But, if AS is made to mean a complete identity of nature between what we know and our knowledge, then it may be boldly denied that things are as we know them. What we know of a grain of sand is not identical with what it is in itself; for what we know of it extends only to a few points of view, and there will ever remain infinite possibilities of more knowledge. All the sophisms in the world will never overthrow this simple yet clear distinction. Now it is precisely because this answer, given by many great philosophers, is so very cautious and moderate, that we feel disappointed. It is the old tale of Scylla and Charybdis over again, the breakers that
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AN ESSAY ON WYCLIF'S PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. XXVII wreck thought, the whirlpools which engulf it: but we philosophical mariners will not be advised, and every one steers for the rocks to keep clear of the whirlpool, or for the whirlpool to avoid the rocks. Or, to revert to our former illustration, suppose a set of looking-glasses endowed with human faculties, longing to get at the things they represent. One of them might cry: 'There is no room save the room which I mirror within me ; for the reflection is the room, and the reflection is identical with me". And another : "Reflection proceeds from outside, its cause cannot be within me : and therefore it were impossible to judge whether what I mirror has any likeness at all with the room, unless I could get out of myself'. The former would end by denying a separate existence to the room, the latter by refusing to believe anything at all about it. In like manner do these two contrary trends of thought proceed, some philosophers going farther, others not so far, but always in two contrary directions, and both fiercely intolerant of so tame a middle course as that which has been sketched above. Wyclif belonged to the former, and these at least maintain the character and the value of human knowledge; their excesses and errors at least do not attack the foundations of thought. But the others, whatever their ingenuity and acumen in minor matters may be, strike by the very force of their first principle at the roots of the human understanding and of all truth, and their genius does but stultify itself. Against this tendency, very powerful in his time, Wyclif's system was a reaction; as such, it was certainly justified; and if, like all reactions, it went too far, it has at least a claim to be judged with leniency.
AN ESSAY ON WYCLIF'S PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. XXVII wreck thought, the whirlpools which engulf it: but we philosophical mariners will not be advised, and every one steers for the rocks to keep clear of the whirlpool, or for the whirlpool to avoid the rocks. Or, to revert to our former illustration, suppose a set of looking-glasses endowed with human faculties, longing to get at the things they represent. One of them might cry: 'There is no room save the room which I mirror within me ; for the reflection is the room, and the reflection is identical with me". And another : "Reflection proceeds from outside, its cause cannot be within me : and therefore it were impossible to judge whether what I mirror has any likeness at all with the room, unless I could get out of myself'. The former would end by denying a separate existence to the room, the latter by refusing to believe anything at all about it. In like manner do these two contrary trends of thought proceed, some philosophers going farther, others not so far, but always in two contrary directions, and both fiercely intolerant of so tame a middle course as that which has been sketched above. Wyclif belonged to the former, and these at least maintain the character and the value of human knowledge; their excesses and errors at least do not attack the foundations of thought. But the others, whatever their ingenuity and acumen in minor matters may be, strike by the very force of their first principle at the roots of the human understanding and of all truth, and their genius does but stultify itself. Against this tendency, very powerful in his time, Wyclif's system was a reaction; as such, it was certainly justified; and if, like all reactions, it went too far, it has at least a claim to be judged with leniency.
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INTRODUCTION. As Wyclif's philosophical works, though extremely voluminous, con- sist for the most part of treatises which he himself intended for his great work, the Sunma De Ente, it was thought right by the Committee of the Wyclif Society (with whom I entirely agree) that Logica should be published first, and then, either in one volume or in two, all the other treatises which do not belong to De Ente. I here lay before the public the three treatises that I have been able to get ready for press in these last years. As each is widely different from the others in almost every respect, it seems better to deal with them separately. I. De Actibus Anime. (1). The Manuscript. When engaged with Logica, I had thought that the edition of a work from only one manuscript, if it were still more difficult to under- stand than the one I had to work upon then, must be an impossible task. As it appears, I was wrong, since De Actibus Anime is now in print ; but though I have managed to get through it, I scarce know how. My chief difficulty was that I had not copied the MS. myself ; that had been done by the late Mr. Austin, several of whose incorrect readings (due not to his lack of palaeographical knowledge, but to the difficulties of Scholastic terminology) I was enabled to set right by a happy guess or by a close inspection of such abbreviations as he had given with the copy. Still I was afraid lest some important mistakes nught have escaped me ; and it thus became necessary to review the original text It being impossible for me to do this, Mr. Matthew most kindly journeyed to Cambridge several times, and at a very great cost of time and pains, went through all the proofs. To express my full acknowledgment of this labour of his — and also of his scholarly help, bestowed throughout the
INTRODUCTION. As Wyclif's philosophical works, though extremely voluminous, con- sist for the most part of treatises which he himself intended for his great work, the Sunma De Ente, it was thought right by the Committee of the Wyclif Society (with whom I entirely agree) that Logica should be published first, and then, either in one volume or in two, all the other treatises which do not belong to De Ente. I here lay before the public the three treatises that I have been able to get ready for press in these last years. As each is widely different from the others in almost every respect, it seems better to deal with them separately. I. De Actibus Anime. (1). The Manuscript. When engaged with Logica, I had thought that the edition of a work from only one manuscript, if it were still more difficult to under- stand than the one I had to work upon then, must be an impossible task. As it appears, I was wrong, since De Actibus Anime is now in print ; but though I have managed to get through it, I scarce know how. My chief difficulty was that I had not copied the MS. myself ; that had been done by the late Mr. Austin, several of whose incorrect readings (due not to his lack of palaeographical knowledge, but to the difficulties of Scholastic terminology) I was enabled to set right by a happy guess or by a close inspection of such abbreviations as he had given with the copy. Still I was afraid lest some important mistakes nught have escaped me ; and it thus became necessary to review the original text It being impossible for me to do this, Mr. Matthew most kindly journeyed to Cambridge several times, and at a very great cost of time and pains, went through all the proofs. To express my full acknowledgment of this labour of his — and also of his scholarly help, bestowed throughout the
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XXX INTRODUCTION. whole work — would require language that might appear far too emphatic and glowing, and perhaps out of keeping with so dry a subject as the present. And though his collation has not resulted in the discovery of any considerable mistakes, yet I think that the gratitude of the whole Wyclif Society, as well as my own, are none the less due to him ; for he has established the late Mr. Austin's trustworthiness as a copier ; and this was a point of great importance. If we remember that Mr. Austin copied out the whole of De Ente (no less than twelve long tractates), it is a relief to know that his copy of De Anima, a much more difficult work, is yet quite sufficiently intelligible to be edited. To Dr. Furnivall, who authorized the unusual course of having the whole tractate set up in proof at once, so that the collation could be done in a few journeys to Cambridge, my best thanks are also due. He was moreover so kind as to make an extract from the Cambridge Catalogue of Manuscripts, and to send me a description of the MS. C. C. C. 103; both of which I subjoin. ce 'Catalogus Librorum Manuscriptorum quos Collegio Corporis Christi et B. Mariae Virginis in Academia Cantabrigiensi legavit Reverendissimus in Christo Pater Mattheus Parker, archiepiscopus Cantabrigiensis. Edidit Jacobus Nasmith A. M., S. A. S., etc. Cantabr. 1777. “P. 75, MS. CIII. ce Codex membranaceus in folio, seculo xv scriptus in quo continentur, * 1. Ernaldi (Carnotensis) abbatis de operibus sex dierum, p. 1. ce 2. Tractatus brevis de materia sive substantia sacrificii corporis et sanguinis Domini contra errores hereticorum, p. 38. 3. Sermo in illud primi capitis ad Romanos, Invisibilia Dei a creatura mundi per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur', p. 39. 4. De Dominica in passione Domini, p. 45. 5. Judicium Melancthonis de Wiclevo, p. 45. * “ 6. Wiclevus de actibus animae, p. 47. “ 7. Robertus de Kilwardely archiepiscopus Cantuariensis super tertium sententiarum, questio de passione Christi, p. 88. ce 8. Questio disputata a fratre Bonaventura super mendicitate, et objectiones Mag. Guillelmi de Sancto Victore, quâ [continentur] ejusdem fratris solutiones, et solutiones Mag. Gulielmi ad ejusdem fratris objectiones; unde ubi invenies in margine Mag. Guliel. scias hoc a Mag. Guillelmo dictum esse, cetera sunt dicta fratris; hanc questionem nullus habet Parisiis praeter unum vel duos, circa hujus acquisitionem multum laboravi, p. 95.
XXX INTRODUCTION. whole work — would require language that might appear far too emphatic and glowing, and perhaps out of keeping with so dry a subject as the present. And though his collation has not resulted in the discovery of any considerable mistakes, yet I think that the gratitude of the whole Wyclif Society, as well as my own, are none the less due to him ; for he has established the late Mr. Austin's trustworthiness as a copier ; and this was a point of great importance. If we remember that Mr. Austin copied out the whole of De Ente (no less than twelve long tractates), it is a relief to know that his copy of De Anima, a much more difficult work, is yet quite sufficiently intelligible to be edited. To Dr. Furnivall, who authorized the unusual course of having the whole tractate set up in proof at once, so that the collation could be done in a few journeys to Cambridge, my best thanks are also due. He was moreover so kind as to make an extract from the Cambridge Catalogue of Manuscripts, and to send me a description of the MS. C. C. C. 103; both of which I subjoin. ce 'Catalogus Librorum Manuscriptorum quos Collegio Corporis Christi et B. Mariae Virginis in Academia Cantabrigiensi legavit Reverendissimus in Christo Pater Mattheus Parker, archiepiscopus Cantabrigiensis. Edidit Jacobus Nasmith A. M., S. A. S., etc. Cantabr. 1777. “P. 75, MS. CIII. ce Codex membranaceus in folio, seculo xv scriptus in quo continentur, * 1. Ernaldi (Carnotensis) abbatis de operibus sex dierum, p. 1. ce 2. Tractatus brevis de materia sive substantia sacrificii corporis et sanguinis Domini contra errores hereticorum, p. 38. 3. Sermo in illud primi capitis ad Romanos, Invisibilia Dei a creatura mundi per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur', p. 39. 4. De Dominica in passione Domini, p. 45. 5. Judicium Melancthonis de Wiclevo, p. 45. * “ 6. Wiclevus de actibus animae, p. 47. “ 7. Robertus de Kilwardely archiepiscopus Cantuariensis super tertium sententiarum, questio de passione Christi, p. 88. ce 8. Questio disputata a fratre Bonaventura super mendicitate, et objectiones Mag. Guillelmi de Sancto Victore, quâ [continentur] ejusdem fratris solutiones, et solutiones Mag. Gulielmi ad ejusdem fratris objectiones; unde ubi invenies in margine Mag. Guliel. scias hoc a Mag. Guillelmo dictum esse, cetera sunt dicta fratris; hanc questionem nullus habet Parisiis praeter unum vel duos, circa hujus acquisitionem multum laboravi, p. 95.
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INTRODUCTION. XXXI 9. Epistola ut videlur fratrum minorum ad papam, quod injuste ab universitate Parisiensi expulsi sunt, data Parisiis 9 Oct. 1255, p. 107. c Desideratur pricipium et magna pars hujus epistolae. 10. Epistola Innocentii IV ad religiosos cujuscumque professionis et ordinis, ne infringant jura clericorum parochialium, data Neapoli IV Kal. Dec. anno pontificatus II°, p. 107. 11. Epistola universitatis Parisiensis contra fratres predicatores, data die Mercurii prox. post festum purificationis, 1253, p. 109. 12. Compositio inter fratres predicantes et universitatem Pari- siensem facta, 1. Martii, 1255, p. 122. * 13. Appellatio Walteri de Walpole et multorum aliorum ordinis fratrum predicatorum ad sedem apostolicam de quibusdam abusionibus et enormitatibus (quorum schedula annexa est huic appellationi) per Gerengarium ordinis magistrum perpetratis et toleratis, p. 113. 14. Excerpta ex Joanne de Bathone in prologo sententiarum de ordine Carmeli, p. 117. 15. Tractatus Ricardi Fitzrauf Archiepiscopi Armachani de pau- perie Salvatoris contra fratres mendicantes, lib. VII, p. 119. 16. Tractatus Ushredi monachi Dunelmensis de substantialibus regulae monachalis, p. 291. 17. Idem de perfectione vivendi in religione, p. 310. 18. Quaedam capitula de summa [theologiae] fratris Alvari de ordine minorum, p. 331. 19. Quaedam capitula Vincentii in speculo historiali, p. 416. *" 20. Determinatio Wiclevi contra Kyllingham Carmelitam, p. 419. * 21. Alia determinatio contra eumdem, p. ult. e* Desideratur magna pars hujus determinationis. "6 The Corpus MS." says Dr. Furnivall, "is a vellum folio ot 427 leaves in double columns containing Latin treatises in different hands, but all, I suppose, from early in the 15th century. Every page has 2 columns, 10 inches high, and nearly 3 inches broad. The writing is full of contractions. The leaves are 121/2 inches high and 9 broad. From leaf 119 to leaf 262. most of the chapter headings begin with a pennon like J (Johannes) from 2 to 31/2 inches long, blue, with a central red line in a narrow white space, tho' some J's are blue only or red only, occasionally relieved with white. The end of the MS. has gone, as Nasmith says.
INTRODUCTION. XXXI 9. Epistola ut videlur fratrum minorum ad papam, quod injuste ab universitate Parisiensi expulsi sunt, data Parisiis 9 Oct. 1255, p. 107. c Desideratur pricipium et magna pars hujus epistolae. 10. Epistola Innocentii IV ad religiosos cujuscumque professionis et ordinis, ne infringant jura clericorum parochialium, data Neapoli IV Kal. Dec. anno pontificatus II°, p. 107. 11. Epistola universitatis Parisiensis contra fratres predicatores, data die Mercurii prox. post festum purificationis, 1253, p. 109. 12. Compositio inter fratres predicantes et universitatem Pari- siensem facta, 1. Martii, 1255, p. 122. * 13. Appellatio Walteri de Walpole et multorum aliorum ordinis fratrum predicatorum ad sedem apostolicam de quibusdam abusionibus et enormitatibus (quorum schedula annexa est huic appellationi) per Gerengarium ordinis magistrum perpetratis et toleratis, p. 113. 14. Excerpta ex Joanne de Bathone in prologo sententiarum de ordine Carmeli, p. 117. 15. Tractatus Ricardi Fitzrauf Archiepiscopi Armachani de pau- perie Salvatoris contra fratres mendicantes, lib. VII, p. 119. 16. Tractatus Ushredi monachi Dunelmensis de substantialibus regulae monachalis, p. 291. 17. Idem de perfectione vivendi in religione, p. 310. 18. Quaedam capitula de summa [theologiae] fratris Alvari de ordine minorum, p. 331. 19. Quaedam capitula Vincentii in speculo historiali, p. 416. *" 20. Determinatio Wiclevi contra Kyllingham Carmelitam, p. 419. * 21. Alia determinatio contra eumdem, p. ult. e* Desideratur magna pars hujus determinationis. "6 The Corpus MS." says Dr. Furnivall, "is a vellum folio ot 427 leaves in double columns containing Latin treatises in different hands, but all, I suppose, from early in the 15th century. Every page has 2 columns, 10 inches high, and nearly 3 inches broad. The writing is full of contractions. The leaves are 121/2 inches high and 9 broad. From leaf 119 to leaf 262. most of the chapter headings begin with a pennon like J (Johannes) from 2 to 31/2 inches long, blue, with a central red line in a narrow white space, tho' some J's are blue only or red only, occasionally relieved with white. The end of the MS. has gone, as Nasmith says.
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XXXII INTRODUCTION. (2). Authenticity of the Treatise. In Shirley's catalogue the only reasons given to prove that the work is Wyclif's are (1) the author's name in the MS. and (2) the title given by Bale, but with another incipit. The second is plainly inadequate, and so is the first, as we shall see when we come to examine the authorship of Replicatio de Universalibus. But there is far stronger internal evidence in favour of its authenticity. Setting apart the fact that Scripture is much less quoted here than in most of the other philosophical treatises (which may easily be explained by supposing it written at an early date) the style is Wyclif's, and the ideas are his as well; less marked perhaps, but plain to anybody who has made a study of his style and system. The writer shows, besides, the same intimate acquaintance with Gilbert de la Porée (pp. 2, 39), Alhacen (p. 12). Vitellio (p. 13, 46), Bradwardine (p. 37) and others, as Wyclif does in Logica and elsewhere. What is more, he speaks of himself as intending to expound his doctrine concerning truth and falsehood in a certain first book De Insolubilibus'. Now this is precisely the title given by Shirley to one of the lost works of Wyclif whose first words have not been preserved; though (p. 28, note) I venture to suppose that it is one of the tractates in Logica. It is difficult, in presence of all these indications, to imagine that a contemporary to Wyclif existed, equal to him in talent, similar as to mental acquirements and erudition, identical in doctrines, and yet so completely unknown that his very name has not survived, and his De Insolubilibus has been ascribed to the other. Yet that we must assume, if we deny the authenticity of De Actibus Anime. (3). Date of the Work. Assuming the authenticity of De Actibus, we are at once able, not indeed to give any precise date to this work, but to place it before Logica to which I have (Int. to vol. I, p. VII) tried to ascribe the date of 1361 circiter. He combats most strongly the doctrine of absolute accidents (cap. IV), and yet he nowhere openly denies or seems to doubt the possibility of annihilation, as he does in Logica. Besides, as I point out in a note (p. 28), it is very likely that the De Insolubilibus he proposes to publish is a tractate of Logica itself. In Logica, besides, he goes very completely into the theory of vision, as it was then
XXXII INTRODUCTION. (2). Authenticity of the Treatise. In Shirley's catalogue the only reasons given to prove that the work is Wyclif's are (1) the author's name in the MS. and (2) the title given by Bale, but with another incipit. The second is plainly inadequate, and so is the first, as we shall see when we come to examine the authorship of Replicatio de Universalibus. But there is far stronger internal evidence in favour of its authenticity. Setting apart the fact that Scripture is much less quoted here than in most of the other philosophical treatises (which may easily be explained by supposing it written at an early date) the style is Wyclif's, and the ideas are his as well; less marked perhaps, but plain to anybody who has made a study of his style and system. The writer shows, besides, the same intimate acquaintance with Gilbert de la Porée (pp. 2, 39), Alhacen (p. 12). Vitellio (p. 13, 46), Bradwardine (p. 37) and others, as Wyclif does in Logica and elsewhere. What is more, he speaks of himself as intending to expound his doctrine concerning truth and falsehood in a certain first book De Insolubilibus'. Now this is precisely the title given by Shirley to one of the lost works of Wyclif whose first words have not been preserved; though (p. 28, note) I venture to suppose that it is one of the tractates in Logica. It is difficult, in presence of all these indications, to imagine that a contemporary to Wyclif existed, equal to him in talent, similar as to mental acquirements and erudition, identical in doctrines, and yet so completely unknown that his very name has not survived, and his De Insolubilibus has been ascribed to the other. Yet that we must assume, if we deny the authenticity of De Actibus Anime. (3). Date of the Work. Assuming the authenticity of De Actibus, we are at once able, not indeed to give any precise date to this work, but to place it before Logica to which I have (Int. to vol. I, p. VII) tried to ascribe the date of 1361 circiter. He combats most strongly the doctrine of absolute accidents (cap. IV), and yet he nowhere openly denies or seems to doubt the possibility of annihilation, as he does in Logica. Besides, as I point out in a note (p. 28), it is very likely that the De Insolubilibus he proposes to publish is a tractate of Logica itself. In Logica, besides, he goes very completely into the theory of vision, as it was then
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INTRODUCTION. XXXIII generally accepted; if that work had been previous to this, we can hardly, with the knowledge of Wyclif's readiness to refer the reader to other tractates which had already appeared, suppose that from pp. 12 to 18, in which he treats of vision — even in one place (p. 15, l. 25) using the very same expression which recurs in Logica — he purposely refrained from referring to this important work, if it was already in existence. Lastly, compare his words (p. 106) “Falsum est quod ego vixi 40 annis" — which he gives as an instance, but an instance that would have no meaning unless it were a fact, — with another example (Log. I, p. 169), * 'Deus ... potest... facere quod ego non sum nec fui futurus quadra- genarius in hoc instanti;" and you will see that the antecedence here is only ambiguous in so far as sum may be considered to relate to futurus, not to quadragenarius. And here again, the example that supposes the infinite power of God to be requisite for Wyclif not to be 40 years old at the instant he was writing, would have no meaning if the fact were not true. We may therefore safely assign to this work a date anterior to 1361 but not much if at all, anterior to Wyclif's Mastership at Balliol College. Not much ; the thought is too matured for a raw student, who began (as he tells us somewhere) by being as strong a Nominalist as any. Whether at all, depends on another question. Wyclif's views, as expounded here, are daring enough ; but were they so daring as to have stood in the way of his getting the Mastership at Balliol, had they been published before? And to this question I have of course no answer. Nominalists in authority must have been annoyed by his arguments, but the talent he displayed may have pleased them. We can guess now what he was aiming at all the time, and know the last consequences to which his first principles would lead him ; but his adversaries could not: and though we may suppose that the publication of the book before Wyclif's Mastership would have injured his prospects, we cannot be sure. Nor perhaps could Wyclif; and if not, who can tell whether his caution was equal to his daring ? (4). Analysis of the Contents. The title of the work prepares us to expect a tractate on Psy- chology. But, though there undoubtedly is a great deal of psychological argument, we should certainly be disappointed in our expectations: the
INTRODUCTION. XXXIII generally accepted; if that work had been previous to this, we can hardly, with the knowledge of Wyclif's readiness to refer the reader to other tractates which had already appeared, suppose that from pp. 12 to 18, in which he treats of vision — even in one place (p. 15, l. 25) using the very same expression which recurs in Logica — he purposely refrained from referring to this important work, if it was already in existence. Lastly, compare his words (p. 106) “Falsum est quod ego vixi 40 annis" — which he gives as an instance, but an instance that would have no meaning unless it were a fact, — with another example (Log. I, p. 169), * 'Deus ... potest... facere quod ego non sum nec fui futurus quadra- genarius in hoc instanti;" and you will see that the antecedence here is only ambiguous in so far as sum may be considered to relate to futurus, not to quadragenarius. And here again, the example that supposes the infinite power of God to be requisite for Wyclif not to be 40 years old at the instant he was writing, would have no meaning if the fact were not true. We may therefore safely assign to this work a date anterior to 1361 but not much if at all, anterior to Wyclif's Mastership at Balliol College. Not much ; the thought is too matured for a raw student, who began (as he tells us somewhere) by being as strong a Nominalist as any. Whether at all, depends on another question. Wyclif's views, as expounded here, are daring enough ; but were they so daring as to have stood in the way of his getting the Mastership at Balliol, had they been published before? And to this question I have of course no answer. Nominalists in authority must have been annoyed by his arguments, but the talent he displayed may have pleased them. We can guess now what he was aiming at all the time, and know the last consequences to which his first principles would lead him ; but his adversaries could not: and though we may suppose that the publication of the book before Wyclif's Mastership would have injured his prospects, we cannot be sure. Nor perhaps could Wyclif; and if not, who can tell whether his caution was equal to his daring ? (4). Analysis of the Contents. The title of the work prepares us to expect a tractate on Psy- chology. But, though there undoubtedly is a great deal of psychological argument, we should certainly be disappointed in our expectations: the
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XXXIV INTRODUCTION. work is purely metaphysical in its aim and in most of the questions dealt with. It is in two parts ; the first (pp. 1— 58) has three chapters, one of which (pp. 1—34) attacks the theory that mental acts are things distinct from the mind; the second (pp. 34—38) is a summary of the arguments in favour of the position that such acts are qualities (which, it would appear, some philosophers understood as being separable entities); and the third (pp. 38—58) is consecrated to the refutation of these arguments. The second part (pp. 59—128) is in four chapters, the first of which (pp. 59—87) deals with the question whether the mental act of affirmation, if relating to the past, must be either necessarily true or necessarily false. The second attacks the position that no mental act save an affirmation which implies self-contradiction can imply absolute impossibility (pp. 87—105). The third (pp. 105— 116) establishes Wyclif's theory : that God's existence is the necessary truth on which both possibility and impossibility depend. And the fourth (pp. 116—128) reverting to the theory of mental acts considered as qualities, argues that even if they were, no quality can be an absolute accident, separable from its substance. First Part, Ch. I. After enumerating various mental kinds of acts — sensations, thought, volition and emotion — Wyclif at once states his view: these acts cannot be thought as entities distinct from the mind. This discussion, of which the language is quite foreign to that of modern metaphysicians, reveals nevertheless a great deal of profound and earnest thought upon a subject closely resembling one that has much interest for philosophers in our days; and many of the arguments, if stripped of their old-world form and dressed up in the terminology of XXieth century science, would look strikingly new, and give him that used them great claims to deep and original thought; and I say this the more openly because I am perfectly aware that no one is at all likely to grub in this mine of riches or to appropriate to him- self what Wyclif might justly claim as his own. We well know that many metaphysicians deny the existence of a Subject. For them there are only feelings, thoughts, volitions, &c.; the Subject is a mere hypostatized abstraction'. If so, they are exactly in the same position, or at least assailable by the same kind of objections, as those who in our philo- sopher's time gave to mental acts an entity capable of existing by itself. If there be no underlying real Subject on which the entity of
XXXIV INTRODUCTION. work is purely metaphysical in its aim and in most of the questions dealt with. It is in two parts ; the first (pp. 1— 58) has three chapters, one of which (pp. 1—34) attacks the theory that mental acts are things distinct from the mind; the second (pp. 34—38) is a summary of the arguments in favour of the position that such acts are qualities (which, it would appear, some philosophers understood as being separable entities); and the third (pp. 38—58) is consecrated to the refutation of these arguments. The second part (pp. 59—128) is in four chapters, the first of which (pp. 59—87) deals with the question whether the mental act of affirmation, if relating to the past, must be either necessarily true or necessarily false. The second attacks the position that no mental act save an affirmation which implies self-contradiction can imply absolute impossibility (pp. 87—105). The third (pp. 105— 116) establishes Wyclif's theory : that God's existence is the necessary truth on which both possibility and impossibility depend. And the fourth (pp. 116—128) reverting to the theory of mental acts considered as qualities, argues that even if they were, no quality can be an absolute accident, separable from its substance. First Part, Ch. I. After enumerating various mental kinds of acts — sensations, thought, volition and emotion — Wyclif at once states his view: these acts cannot be thought as entities distinct from the mind. This discussion, of which the language is quite foreign to that of modern metaphysicians, reveals nevertheless a great deal of profound and earnest thought upon a subject closely resembling one that has much interest for philosophers in our days; and many of the arguments, if stripped of their old-world form and dressed up in the terminology of XXieth century science, would look strikingly new, and give him that used them great claims to deep and original thought; and I say this the more openly because I am perfectly aware that no one is at all likely to grub in this mine of riches or to appropriate to him- self what Wyclif might justly claim as his own. We well know that many metaphysicians deny the existence of a Subject. For them there are only feelings, thoughts, volitions, &c.; the Subject is a mere hypostatized abstraction'. If so, they are exactly in the same position, or at least assailable by the same kind of objections, as those who in our philo- sopher's time gave to mental acts an entity capable of existing by itself. If there be no underlying real Subject on which the entity of
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INTRODUCTION. XXXV each mental act depends, then each of these acts is independent, and can be conceived as self-existing. What these philosophers take away from the Subject, they must give to the acts ; it is impossible to conceive a a feeling neither independent and self-existing, nor dependent on another being distinct from it — a feeling which neither feels itself, nor is felt by a something which is not that feeling. On the other hand, Wyclif tells us (p. 2) that there was another school which asserted that the feelings, thoughts, &c. were identical with Mind ; and this would correspond closely enough to the position of those who contend that Mind is the sum or series of experiences of any individual, and that the individual is not different from his experiences: which in its result amounts to the same doctrine as the one just stated. He himself, though he does not state it clearly at first, is of opinion that the mind is to its mental acts as the active thing is to its action, or as a mobile to its motion (see pp. 38—41): the second different, but inseparable from the first, and absolutely unthink- able without it. And thus the question is now as actual as it ever was ; and all the advances of science, how great soever they may have been, have done nothing to solve the problem — as indeed they could do nothing, because they belong to another sphere. This question, if it can be solved, must be solved only by Metaphysical arguments. It is worth seeing what Wyclif has contributed to a discussion so important and of such actual interest. Those who admit that thought is an action of the thinking mind, yet try to conceive it as separable therefrom and possibly existing apart, fall into self-contradiction. Admitting for the present that a quality can exist without its subject, how can quality be at the same time activity p. 2) ? We classify sensations according to their objects, which if present produce the corresponding acts : between the mind and the object no intervening quality is needed (p. 3). If the will to move, for instance, were an absolute quality, existing throughout the body, the same move- ment would be produced in every part of it : which is absurd. And difference in the organs cannot make the difference in the movements, since they all obey the will ; and this obedience, if will were such a quality as conceived, would make a man able to do anything he chose to will (p. — 35). Then, as to the acts of the mind ; they are true, false, particular, universal, etc.; but an absolute entity is a thing, and a thing must be true, must be concrete. If you have to posit an act distinct from the mind, to enable it to think of its object, why not posit another C*
INTRODUCTION. XXXV each mental act depends, then each of these acts is independent, and can be conceived as self-existing. What these philosophers take away from the Subject, they must give to the acts ; it is impossible to conceive a a feeling neither independent and self-existing, nor dependent on another being distinct from it — a feeling which neither feels itself, nor is felt by a something which is not that feeling. On the other hand, Wyclif tells us (p. 2) that there was another school which asserted that the feelings, thoughts, &c. were identical with Mind ; and this would correspond closely enough to the position of those who contend that Mind is the sum or series of experiences of any individual, and that the individual is not different from his experiences: which in its result amounts to the same doctrine as the one just stated. He himself, though he does not state it clearly at first, is of opinion that the mind is to its mental acts as the active thing is to its action, or as a mobile to its motion (see pp. 38—41): the second different, but inseparable from the first, and absolutely unthink- able without it. And thus the question is now as actual as it ever was ; and all the advances of science, how great soever they may have been, have done nothing to solve the problem — as indeed they could do nothing, because they belong to another sphere. This question, if it can be solved, must be solved only by Metaphysical arguments. It is worth seeing what Wyclif has contributed to a discussion so important and of such actual interest. Those who admit that thought is an action of the thinking mind, yet try to conceive it as separable therefrom and possibly existing apart, fall into self-contradiction. Admitting for the present that a quality can exist without its subject, how can quality be at the same time activity p. 2) ? We classify sensations according to their objects, which if present produce the corresponding acts : between the mind and the object no intervening quality is needed (p. 3). If the will to move, for instance, were an absolute quality, existing throughout the body, the same move- ment would be produced in every part of it : which is absurd. And difference in the organs cannot make the difference in the movements, since they all obey the will ; and this obedience, if will were such a quality as conceived, would make a man able to do anything he chose to will (p. — 35). Then, as to the acts of the mind ; they are true, false, particular, universal, etc.; but an absolute entity is a thing, and a thing must be true, must be concrete. If you have to posit an act distinct from the mind, to enable it to think of its object, why not posit another C*
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XXXVI INTRODUCTION. by which this act also is enabled to reach it? and another again without end? or none at all? Besides, the doctrine implies that the soul creates and annihilates its own act when, after eliciting it, it passes to another. For the act is an absolute entity which does not pre�exist in matter, and is nowhere when not actually in the mind. No form but the human soul has the absolute entity of a separable thing, since no other can be conceived as existing unless actually determining a subject, and separation would be tantamount to annihilation (p. 5—8). It is said that these acts naturally depend on their subject, but that God might, by a miracle, render them independent. But that would make all dependency of effect upon cause a mere accident; for, independently of any cause but the First, any effect might take place; and this is unphilosophical in the highest degree. Better say that when these acts are produced they are created, and annihilated when they cease: though this would make substances of them (p. 8). If any act is capable of self-existence, how can it be successive in its essence? Yet many mental acts are admittedly such; sensations, for example, imaginations, and many others (pр. 9, 10). Can it be said, to explain the difficulty, that one act suffices for the perception of successive things? or that a fresh complex act is elicited at every instant of perception? or that there are simultaneously two distinct acts, one successive, and the other not? — Students of that portion of Philosophy which lies on the border between Psychology and Metaphysics, will here recognize the interesting question, How can we apprehend succession, if there be nothing permanent in our acts? T. H. Green, for instance — I quote the words of the President of the Aristotelian Society (address, 6th Nov. 1899) — "continually reiterates the statement that the apprehension of succession cannot be itself succession; that in order to be aware of B as succeding A, we must have both A and B before consciousness at once". Wyclif, it is true, brings this question forward only by way of argument against his opponents ; but the very same difficulty stands in the way of those who admit no subject, or a subject which is nothing but a series of succes- sive acts. One act, if it be a thing, cannot be successive; and if not succes- sive, cannot represent succession. It would represent what is past or future as present, i. e. otherwise than it is, and falsely. And if we can
XXXVI INTRODUCTION. by which this act also is enabled to reach it? and another again without end? or none at all? Besides, the doctrine implies that the soul creates and annihilates its own act when, after eliciting it, it passes to another. For the act is an absolute entity which does not pre�exist in matter, and is nowhere when not actually in the mind. No form but the human soul has the absolute entity of a separable thing, since no other can be conceived as existing unless actually determining a subject, and separation would be tantamount to annihilation (p. 5—8). It is said that these acts naturally depend on their subject, but that God might, by a miracle, render them independent. But that would make all dependency of effect upon cause a mere accident; for, independently of any cause but the First, any effect might take place; and this is unphilosophical in the highest degree. Better say that when these acts are produced they are created, and annihilated when they cease: though this would make substances of them (p. 8). If any act is capable of self-existence, how can it be successive in its essence? Yet many mental acts are admittedly such; sensations, for example, imaginations, and many others (pр. 9, 10). Can it be said, to explain the difficulty, that one act suffices for the perception of successive things? or that a fresh complex act is elicited at every instant of perception? or that there are simultaneously two distinct acts, one successive, and the other not? — Students of that portion of Philosophy which lies on the border between Psychology and Metaphysics, will here recognize the interesting question, How can we apprehend succession, if there be nothing permanent in our acts? T. H. Green, for instance — I quote the words of the President of the Aristotelian Society (address, 6th Nov. 1899) — "continually reiterates the statement that the apprehension of succession cannot be itself succession; that in order to be aware of B as succeding A, we must have both A and B before consciousness at once". Wyclif, it is true, brings this question forward only by way of argument against his opponents ; but the very same difficulty stands in the way of those who admit no subject, or a subject which is nothing but a series of succes- sive acts. One act, if it be a thing, cannot be successive; and if not succes- sive, cannot represent succession. It would represent what is past or future as present, i. e. otherwise than it is, and falsely. And if we can
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INTRODUCTION. XXXVII apprehend one instant of what is not present, why not the whole of the Past and the Future? To each successive impression an act must corre- spond ; and thus, in the shortest possible space of time, we should have an infinite multitude of acts. This brings us to the second answer, which is worth no more than the first. There can be no act without a certain duration, and these would have none at all. On the other hand, we should have to conceive the absurdity of an infinite number of entities, perfections, — call them what you will, — welling up (from non- existence, or from the unknown, in the theory of those who deny a Subject; from the Soul, in the opinion of Wyclif's opponents) even in the shortest possible space of time. This is contrary to experience besides; our mental acts of sensation have some degree of permanence, for when we whirl a brand, we see a circle. To suppose two simul- taneous acts, one successive and the other permanent, apprehending the first, does not solve the difficulty: for an instantaneous act cannot feel the successive as successive, and a permanent act, being of another nature, could not apprehend it at all (pp. 10—14). Most of these arguments make against such theories as, at the present day, fearing to hypostatize an abstract Subject, set up the sensation itself and hypo- statize it. Perhaps I may in this connection be allowed to quote from a paper I wrote for the Aristotelian Society (Extension as defined from the slandpoint of experience, read the 28th May, 1900). "Holding, as I do, most strongly to the principle that abstractions are not to be hypo- statized', I say that each of these facts [of experience], as such, is absolutely concrete, or (to use a dialectical term) singular. So much so, that if we do not admit the existence of a concrete — not an abstract — subject with which they form a whole, they must be dealt with as separate individuals. But I as strongly object to the hypostatizing of an abstract fact as to the hypostatizing of an abstract subject. There is no such thing in reality as a conscious state; there are only this, that, and the other conscious states, each wholly identical with itself, and not identical with anything else ..... But they are not unconnected. Now, if I abstract from this connection, if I disregard the fact that these impressions are part of a lolum of experience, I only view them from one standpoint; and if I then persist in calling them individuals, I hypostatize pure abstractions of my mind. They are no longer individuals, so long as I abstract from anything that they really are". This is the very thing
INTRODUCTION. XXXVII apprehend one instant of what is not present, why not the whole of the Past and the Future? To each successive impression an act must corre- spond ; and thus, in the shortest possible space of time, we should have an infinite multitude of acts. This brings us to the second answer, which is worth no more than the first. There can be no act without a certain duration, and these would have none at all. On the other hand, we should have to conceive the absurdity of an infinite number of entities, perfections, — call them what you will, — welling up (from non- existence, or from the unknown, in the theory of those who deny a Subject; from the Soul, in the opinion of Wyclif's opponents) even in the shortest possible space of time. This is contrary to experience besides; our mental acts of sensation have some degree of permanence, for when we whirl a brand, we see a circle. To suppose two simul- taneous acts, one successive and the other permanent, apprehending the first, does not solve the difficulty: for an instantaneous act cannot feel the successive as successive, and a permanent act, being of another nature, could not apprehend it at all (pp. 10—14). Most of these arguments make against such theories as, at the present day, fearing to hypostatize an abstract Subject, set up the sensation itself and hypo- statize it. Perhaps I may in this connection be allowed to quote from a paper I wrote for the Aristotelian Society (Extension as defined from the slandpoint of experience, read the 28th May, 1900). "Holding, as I do, most strongly to the principle that abstractions are not to be hypo- statized', I say that each of these facts [of experience], as such, is absolutely concrete, or (to use a dialectical term) singular. So much so, that if we do not admit the existence of a concrete — not an abstract — subject with which they form a whole, they must be dealt with as separate individuals. But I as strongly object to the hypostatizing of an abstract fact as to the hypostatizing of an abstract subject. There is no such thing in reality as a conscious state; there are only this, that, and the other conscious states, each wholly identical with itself, and not identical with anything else ..... But they are not unconnected. Now, if I abstract from this connection, if I disregard the fact that these impressions are part of a lolum of experience, I only view them from one standpoint; and if I then persist in calling them individuals, I hypostatize pure abstractions of my mind. They are no longer individuals, so long as I abstract from anything that they really are". This is the very thing
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XXXVIII INTRODUCTION. which Wyclif so strongly inveighed against in the doctrine of mental acts, considered to be absolute entities, distinct from the mind. Wyclif goes on to prove the absurdity of the hypothesis of mental acts existing independently. Sight, for instance, depends upon its object; and this dependence renders it necessary that it should exist in a subject. We have one same sight of different objects; and this could not be, given the aforesaid dependence, were there not something underlying sight. We also see two things as different, though in the same place, as a glass and that which we see through it, but more or less distinctly; this again is inexplicable, if the sight of each is a separate thing. And to maintain such a theory we must posit utter Materialism, each act occupying a different part of space, — even the acts of reason and of will (pp. 14—16). But as a fact, we have an inextended element, even in the acts of external sense, of presentation; much more so in the others. Even intensive parts of sensation would be impossible in the opponents' theory ; for, waiving other objections, to each point of space seen would correspond a certain intensity of sensation; and these being infinite, the total intensity would be so likewise! But an act, because it is elicited in matter, need not therefore be material. The colours as seen, — i. e. the act of sight, — do not exist in the external thing (pp. 16—18) ; and this false idea, which Locke was later to ascribe to Scholasticism, is here set aside by Wyclif in a few words, as a theory that no one believed, — the absurdum to which he strove to reduce his adversaries. Yet there are many who are still convineed at the present day that Locke was the first man who overthrew the doctrine that colours exist in the things, not in the eye! If he was, he was also the first reasonable philosopher that ever lived, and all those before him were fools. There is no doubt whatever that our act of sensation is what we can know best, it being our direct experience. If it were a separate entity, it would be, not only most knowable, but most known : and this is certainly false, or the devil — and this no theologian can admit — would know our thoughts better than any material substance, which exists by itself. The whole theory depends upon the doctrine of accidents in the Eucharist; if material accidents can be absolute, so can mental acts. But what exists by itself can act by itself; and it is certain that our mental acts have influence upon the course of things, which influence ought to remain, if they were cut off from their subjects (p. 18—20).
XXXVIII INTRODUCTION. which Wyclif so strongly inveighed against in the doctrine of mental acts, considered to be absolute entities, distinct from the mind. Wyclif goes on to prove the absurdity of the hypothesis of mental acts existing independently. Sight, for instance, depends upon its object; and this dependence renders it necessary that it should exist in a subject. We have one same sight of different objects; and this could not be, given the aforesaid dependence, were there not something underlying sight. We also see two things as different, though in the same place, as a glass and that which we see through it, but more or less distinctly; this again is inexplicable, if the sight of each is a separate thing. And to maintain such a theory we must posit utter Materialism, each act occupying a different part of space, — even the acts of reason and of will (pp. 14—16). But as a fact, we have an inextended element, even in the acts of external sense, of presentation; much more so in the others. Even intensive parts of sensation would be impossible in the opponents' theory ; for, waiving other objections, to each point of space seen would correspond a certain intensity of sensation; and these being infinite, the total intensity would be so likewise! But an act, because it is elicited in matter, need not therefore be material. The colours as seen, — i. e. the act of sight, — do not exist in the external thing (pp. 16—18) ; and this false idea, which Locke was later to ascribe to Scholasticism, is here set aside by Wyclif in a few words, as a theory that no one believed, — the absurdum to which he strove to reduce his adversaries. Yet there are many who are still convineed at the present day that Locke was the first man who overthrew the doctrine that colours exist in the things, not in the eye! If he was, he was also the first reasonable philosopher that ever lived, and all those before him were fools. There is no doubt whatever that our act of sensation is what we can know best, it being our direct experience. If it were a separate entity, it would be, not only most knowable, but most known : and this is certainly false, or the devil — and this no theologian can admit — would know our thoughts better than any material substance, which exists by itself. The whole theory depends upon the doctrine of accidents in the Eucharist; if material accidents can be absolute, so can mental acts. But what exists by itself can act by itself; and it is certain that our mental acts have influence upon the course of things, which influence ought to remain, if they were cut off from their subjects (p. 18—20).
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INTRODUCTION. XXXIX Note here with what care Wyclif, though he points out that the whole theory springs from the question of the Eucharist (ex quibus tota illa opinio habet ortum, p. 16), avoids any such digression as he is liable to in other tractates, concerning the Eucharist itself: this reticence is of importance in seeking the date of the work. Starting from the Scholastic axiom: Omne ens est bonum, or Ens el bonum convertuntur, Wyclif tries to prove that, as some mental acts are essentially evil, they cannot be entities. Pain is nothing in itself but the perception of disagreement, which is nothing positive; and lying is essentially evil (pp. 20, 21). The adversaries reply that such acts are not naturally, but only morally bad: and if a given act did not belong to a subject, its wickedness would disappear. But if they, belonging to a subject, render that subject evil, it must needs be because their nature is bad. A point that Wyclif does not develop here, is that qualities which affect the will are essentially either moral or immoral, and the distinction between moral and natural badness does not hold in their case. Now the adversaries held that the same act, elicited by one man, may be moral, and immoral if elicited by another, so that this is a mere accident. But, says Wyclif, what about an act of hatred of God? Can God Himself attach merit to that? And besides, the supposition of an act elicited by no one (not belonging to any subject), of a pain that is actual yet suffered by nobody, of something which exists as a pure potentiality and like a habit — as v. g. a man may actually be a drunkard, though not actually drunk — and yet is an act, are so many absurdities. A mental act signifies something elicited by a subject, or we should have an endless series of entities by which the act is pro- duced, one producing the other, and none of them really active. And lastly, the supposition of an act that may be inactive, or only potentially active, is utterly confusing ; such an act might possibly exist before the man who elicits it is born (pp. 21 —27). The following arguments may be more summarily indicated, as presenting less actual interest in our time; and I shall throughout attempt to keep to this rule, as the side-notes are sufficiently explicit to help any one interested in old-world modes of thought. Self-existence is contradicted by the essential attributes, at least of some mental acts. Some may be contingently false or contingently true; but if false or true by themselves, they would be so necessarily.
INTRODUCTION. XXXIX Note here with what care Wyclif, though he points out that the whole theory springs from the question of the Eucharist (ex quibus tota illa opinio habet ortum, p. 16), avoids any such digression as he is liable to in other tractates, concerning the Eucharist itself: this reticence is of importance in seeking the date of the work. Starting from the Scholastic axiom: Omne ens est bonum, or Ens el bonum convertuntur, Wyclif tries to prove that, as some mental acts are essentially evil, they cannot be entities. Pain is nothing in itself but the perception of disagreement, which is nothing positive; and lying is essentially evil (pp. 20, 21). The adversaries reply that such acts are not naturally, but only morally bad: and if a given act did not belong to a subject, its wickedness would disappear. But if they, belonging to a subject, render that subject evil, it must needs be because their nature is bad. A point that Wyclif does not develop here, is that qualities which affect the will are essentially either moral or immoral, and the distinction between moral and natural badness does not hold in their case. Now the adversaries held that the same act, elicited by one man, may be moral, and immoral if elicited by another, so that this is a mere accident. But, says Wyclif, what about an act of hatred of God? Can God Himself attach merit to that? And besides, the supposition of an act elicited by no one (not belonging to any subject), of a pain that is actual yet suffered by nobody, of something which exists as a pure potentiality and like a habit — as v. g. a man may actually be a drunkard, though not actually drunk — and yet is an act, are so many absurdities. A mental act signifies something elicited by a subject, or we should have an endless series of entities by which the act is pro- duced, one producing the other, and none of them really active. And lastly, the supposition of an act that may be inactive, or only potentially active, is utterly confusing ; such an act might possibly exist before the man who elicits it is born (pp. 21 —27). The following arguments may be more summarily indicated, as presenting less actual interest in our time; and I shall throughout attempt to keep to this rule, as the side-notes are sufficiently explicit to help any one interested in old-world modes of thought. Self-existence is contradicted by the essential attributes, at least of some mental acts. Some may be contingently false or contingently true; but if false or true by themselves, they would be so necessarily.
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XL INTRODUCTION. Reflection is impossible, for we cannot conceive the act knowing itself; and if we know a self-existent act, distinct from ourselves, it is only by means of a third act, which itself would have to be known by a fourth, and so on for ever. — Let me note by the way that those who have denied the existence of a Subject in modern times have been also driven to deny that we reflect upon ourselves ; we only, in their theory, seem to do so. — Do these acts depend upon us, or do they not? If our awareness of them has nothing to do with their existence, what sort of beings are they? (pp. 27—33). — Wyclif winds up with some diffi- culties about pain, considered as a mental act or feeling, and bearing on the punishments of Hell and Purgatory, which he contends would in this theory become equal. Ch. 2 need not be noticed, as it is but a short summary of the objections which he solves in the next chapter. Ch. 3. Wyclif, in his answers, begins by assuming several different senses in which the word action is used, and several different species of action. In the widest or transcendental sense it may mean the very essence of a being, when the latter (God) has no accidents: but in all other senses it is something accidental to the being which acts (pp. 38—42). The opponents say: Actions make men good or bad ; and what makes men good or bad must be a quality. The answer is that, not the actions themselves, but their goodness or wickedness, produce this result. The adversaries point out that whatever changes the state of the soul must be a quality, making it qualis; and mental acts belong to this category. But it is replied that this is true, if by quality we understand the soul as thus or thus changed ; false, if we would make of it a subtle entity that can exist independently of the soul (pp. 42—45). Here Wyclif indulges in a short digression concerning grace, where I would note, in connection with the date of the work, a striking combination of prudence and boldness; prudence, in his confirming himself to deny the self-existence of grace; boldness in censuring only in the mildest terms those who in the face of the whole Thomist School, assert that grace is not a real entity. I believe this is now an open question among Scholastic theologians ; but had Wyclif gone farther than he did, he would have set many an Oxford divine most bitterly against him (pp. 45—47). — "If", say the adversaries, “a mental act is not move- ment, it must be a quality; and it cannot possibly be a movement'.
XL INTRODUCTION. Reflection is impossible, for we cannot conceive the act knowing itself; and if we know a self-existent act, distinct from ourselves, it is only by means of a third act, which itself would have to be known by a fourth, and so on for ever. — Let me note by the way that those who have denied the existence of a Subject in modern times have been also driven to deny that we reflect upon ourselves ; we only, in their theory, seem to do so. — Do these acts depend upon us, or do they not? If our awareness of them has nothing to do with their existence, what sort of beings are they? (pp. 27—33). — Wyclif winds up with some diffi- culties about pain, considered as a mental act or feeling, and bearing on the punishments of Hell and Purgatory, which he contends would in this theory become equal. Ch. 2 need not be noticed, as it is but a short summary of the objections which he solves in the next chapter. Ch. 3. Wyclif, in his answers, begins by assuming several different senses in which the word action is used, and several different species of action. In the widest or transcendental sense it may mean the very essence of a being, when the latter (God) has no accidents: but in all other senses it is something accidental to the being which acts (pp. 38—42). The opponents say: Actions make men good or bad ; and what makes men good or bad must be a quality. The answer is that, not the actions themselves, but their goodness or wickedness, produce this result. The adversaries point out that whatever changes the state of the soul must be a quality, making it qualis; and mental acts belong to this category. But it is replied that this is true, if by quality we understand the soul as thus or thus changed ; false, if we would make of it a subtle entity that can exist independently of the soul (pp. 42—45). Here Wyclif indulges in a short digression concerning grace, where I would note, in connection with the date of the work, a striking combination of prudence and boldness; prudence, in his confirming himself to deny the self-existence of grace; boldness in censuring only in the mildest terms those who in the face of the whole Thomist School, assert that grace is not a real entity. I believe this is now an open question among Scholastic theologians ; but had Wyclif gone farther than he did, he would have set many an Oxford divine most bitterly against him (pp. 45—47). — "If", say the adversaries, “a mental act is not move- ment, it must be a quality; and it cannot possibly be a movement'.
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INTRODUCTION. XLI Here Wyclif answers that, without being a movement, it may be the cause of one; and in a more universal sense, it may be called a move- ment, as a tendency towards something or other (pp. 47—49). “How", it is urged, "could a man elicit the same act or commit the same sin twice, if that were not a quality, now present in the individual, now absent therefrom?" Here Wyclif simply denies that a man can commit the same sin twice ; its being committed at a different time makes it another sin (pp. 49—52). Lastly, it is objected that what is in, yet different from the soul, what determines a change therein by its advent, and may come and go without the destruction of the same, must be a quality. These arguments, Wyclif shows, prove only that there is a happening by which the soul is modified ; but not that the modification is something in itself (pp. 52—58). The question discussed in the first chapter of the Second Part is somewhat out of the lines of modern thought, and requires a short explanation. Not as to its connection with the former problems; every student of Wyclif knows that he allows himself a very wide range. Thus, when writing about mental acts, he conceived himself perfectly justified in positing theses as to their truth or falsehood. The explanation concerns the essential meaning of the discussion. A proposition is con- tingently true, if, while we admit its correspondence to facts, we are able to conceive at the same time that it might not correspond to them. It is necessarily true, if such non-correspondence is inconceivable. The question concerning propositions as to past facts thus becomes an in- quiry whether or not such propositions, if true, can be conceived as true contingently ; if false, as contingently false. If, for instance, it be true as a fact that Queen Victoria reigned over England, can we conceive her as possibly not having reigned? In the preceding essay on Wyclif's philosophy, I have shown that Wyclif understands by the Possible everything that has taken place, is now, or will take place at some fu- ture time; that and that only. All the rest is impossible, inconceivable, absurd. By that means he closes the door on many a Scholastic dis- cussion; and to ask what would have taken place if Adam had refused to eat the apple is to him the same as to ask about the mathematical consequences of the proposition 2 + 2 = 4 being false, or of a triangle having four sides. And so far as Adam is concerned, most people would hardly trouble to contradict him. But as his view extends to all things
INTRODUCTION. XLI Here Wyclif answers that, without being a movement, it may be the cause of one; and in a more universal sense, it may be called a move- ment, as a tendency towards something or other (pp. 47—49). “How", it is urged, "could a man elicit the same act or commit the same sin twice, if that were not a quality, now present in the individual, now absent therefrom?" Here Wyclif simply denies that a man can commit the same sin twice ; its being committed at a different time makes it another sin (pp. 49—52). Lastly, it is objected that what is in, yet different from the soul, what determines a change therein by its advent, and may come and go without the destruction of the same, must be a quality. These arguments, Wyclif shows, prove only that there is a happening by which the soul is modified ; but not that the modification is something in itself (pp. 52—58). The question discussed in the first chapter of the Second Part is somewhat out of the lines of modern thought, and requires a short explanation. Not as to its connection with the former problems; every student of Wyclif knows that he allows himself a very wide range. Thus, when writing about mental acts, he conceived himself perfectly justified in positing theses as to their truth or falsehood. The explanation concerns the essential meaning of the discussion. A proposition is con- tingently true, if, while we admit its correspondence to facts, we are able to conceive at the same time that it might not correspond to them. It is necessarily true, if such non-correspondence is inconceivable. The question concerning propositions as to past facts thus becomes an in- quiry whether or not such propositions, if true, can be conceived as true contingently ; if false, as contingently false. If, for instance, it be true as a fact that Queen Victoria reigned over England, can we conceive her as possibly not having reigned? In the preceding essay on Wyclif's philosophy, I have shown that Wyclif understands by the Possible everything that has taken place, is now, or will take place at some fu- ture time; that and that only. All the rest is impossible, inconceivable, absurd. By that means he closes the door on many a Scholastic dis- cussion; and to ask what would have taken place if Adam had refused to eat the apple is to him the same as to ask about the mathematical consequences of the proposition 2 + 2 = 4 being false, or of a triangle having four sides. And so far as Adam is concerned, most people would hardly trouble to contradict him. But as his view extends to all things
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XLII in the past, it becomes somewhat less easy to admit that if I say : 'Had I not given my last penny to a beggar just now, I should be able to ride home on this tramcar," I am pointing out the consequences of an absurd supposition. There is therefore, it seems, plenty of room for de- bate ; and here Wyclif is content to give his opponents the first innings. “What is contingent at any time cannot become necessary. It is not necessary that I exist now ; I can conceive my not existing ; there- fore I can conceive my not having existed yesterday'. What could make this necessary? what could change the nature of a contingent truth, and pass over the infinite distance which separates Contingency from necessity? The denial of such a truth in the past is false indeed, but not unthinkable, as it should be in Wyclif's theory. We can argue con- sistently from such a denial as a premise : it cannot therefore be absurd, for the Absurd is defined as that from which anything, true or false, may follow, if it be posited. As we say of things present that they are, so we say of things past that they are possible; and if what is may be otherwise so what has been may possibly have been otherwise. If God has infinite power over the present, he has no less over the past; if He can prevent things happening now, He can also make them not to have taken place. Even man can do that. If we say that we might have done otherwise than we have done, the word might signifies that our having done otherwise is actually (not was) a possibility. Besides, as a fact, our capacity for amendment and repentance exists; but we cannot do better than what we have done, nor can we sorrow for it, if it be ab- solutely necessary" (pp. 59—65). Wyclif (proceeding here according to the plan of St. Thomas in his Summa Theologica) next gives his own arguments on the contrary side, and winds up by refuting those of the adversary. Whatever is so true that it cannot cease to be true, is necessary ; and this is the case with things that have happened in the Past. God Himself cannot restore lost virginity. The Past is immutably what it is; and therefore its truth is necessary. If the same thing could happen again, the return of a dead man to life would be no miracle. Any singular proposition referring to a fact may be known as eternally and therefore necessarily true. Why should we take thought for the future, if we can make the past not to have been? Here the adversaries say that, speaking of possibility, they abstract from time ; a man who is blind might be not blind, and may INTRODUCTION.
XLII in the past, it becomes somewhat less easy to admit that if I say : 'Had I not given my last penny to a beggar just now, I should be able to ride home on this tramcar," I am pointing out the consequences of an absurd supposition. There is therefore, it seems, plenty of room for de- bate ; and here Wyclif is content to give his opponents the first innings. “What is contingent at any time cannot become necessary. It is not necessary that I exist now ; I can conceive my not existing ; there- fore I can conceive my not having existed yesterday'. What could make this necessary? what could change the nature of a contingent truth, and pass over the infinite distance which separates Contingency from necessity? The denial of such a truth in the past is false indeed, but not unthinkable, as it should be in Wyclif's theory. We can argue con- sistently from such a denial as a premise : it cannot therefore be absurd, for the Absurd is defined as that from which anything, true or false, may follow, if it be posited. As we say of things present that they are, so we say of things past that they are possible; and if what is may be otherwise so what has been may possibly have been otherwise. If God has infinite power over the present, he has no less over the past; if He can prevent things happening now, He can also make them not to have taken place. Even man can do that. If we say that we might have done otherwise than we have done, the word might signifies that our having done otherwise is actually (not was) a possibility. Besides, as a fact, our capacity for amendment and repentance exists; but we cannot do better than what we have done, nor can we sorrow for it, if it be ab- solutely necessary" (pp. 59—65). Wyclif (proceeding here according to the plan of St. Thomas in his Summa Theologica) next gives his own arguments on the contrary side, and winds up by refuting those of the adversary. Whatever is so true that it cannot cease to be true, is necessary ; and this is the case with things that have happened in the Past. God Himself cannot restore lost virginity. The Past is immutably what it is; and therefore its truth is necessary. If the same thing could happen again, the return of a dead man to life would be no miracle. Any singular proposition referring to a fact may be known as eternally and therefore necessarily true. Why should we take thought for the future, if we can make the past not to have been? Here the adversaries say that, speaking of possibility, they abstract from time ; a man who is blind might be not blind, and may INTRODUCTION.
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INTRODUCTION. XLIII see ; but even if cured, his having been blind' would still be true as a contingent fact. To this Wyclif demurs, and will not admit any possi- bility from which the time-element is eliminated. To say that I may not have existed is to say that my non-existence is thinkable; but to me it is not, and the contrary proposition is an absolutely necessary truth (pp.65—71). The arguments on the opposite side are now refuted, after several distinctions as to complete and incomplete necessity, the former either absolute (created or uncreated) or relative; and these distinctions show that in the whole question there is a great confusion of terms. The author understands by necessity something which is not in all cases op- posed to contingency. Yet he affirms that truths in the past are of such nature that their contradictories are inconceivable (pp. 71—74). The Necessary cannot become contingent, but the Contingent becomes ne- cessary by the fact that it has taken place: Now it cannot not have been. Whatever distance there may be between contingency and necessity, time and the concourse of God's action in the world can get over it. And each contingent truth has in it, as an essential factor, the possi- bility of becoming necessary. It does not follow, because God is free to give this necessity, that He is free to take it away ; and this is proved by many instances. That we can admit that a thing has not happened which has happened in reality proves only that we may be wrong, or that we wish to see the result of making such an admission; and not as all that it may possibly be either true or not true. Any truth that exists is eternal; it is neither annihilable, nor capable of being created anew. We say that a man who does not yet exist is able to spend money (in the future), but that a dead man cannot possibly spend money (in the past). Why? Because can indicates a potentiality which in the first case exists, but in the second exists no longer. As to God's power, we cannot make it extend, though infinite, to the realization of absurdities ; what is not do-able cannot be done, even by Him. This does not re- duce His power; for we do not deny that He can do whatever by any possibility can be done. The knowledge of the past enables us, not to change that past, but to change the future by means of the present. Can I not have done better than I did at such and such a time? No, I cannot now ; but I could then. The Past is unchangeable. Our con- trition is not properly for the Past, nor does it change the Past; it is for the present state produced in us by past acts ; it changes that, and
INTRODUCTION. XLIII see ; but even if cured, his having been blind' would still be true as a contingent fact. To this Wyclif demurs, and will not admit any possi- bility from which the time-element is eliminated. To say that I may not have existed is to say that my non-existence is thinkable; but to me it is not, and the contrary proposition is an absolutely necessary truth (pp.65—71). The arguments on the opposite side are now refuted, after several distinctions as to complete and incomplete necessity, the former either absolute (created or uncreated) or relative; and these distinctions show that in the whole question there is a great confusion of terms. The author understands by necessity something which is not in all cases op- posed to contingency. Yet he affirms that truths in the past are of such nature that their contradictories are inconceivable (pp. 71—74). The Necessary cannot become contingent, but the Contingent becomes ne- cessary by the fact that it has taken place: Now it cannot not have been. Whatever distance there may be between contingency and necessity, time and the concourse of God's action in the world can get over it. And each contingent truth has in it, as an essential factor, the possi- bility of becoming necessary. It does not follow, because God is free to give this necessity, that He is free to take it away ; and this is proved by many instances. That we can admit that a thing has not happened which has happened in reality proves only that we may be wrong, or that we wish to see the result of making such an admission; and not as all that it may possibly be either true or not true. Any truth that exists is eternal; it is neither annihilable, nor capable of being created anew. We say that a man who does not yet exist is able to spend money (in the future), but that a dead man cannot possibly spend money (in the past). Why? Because can indicates a potentiality which in the first case exists, but in the second exists no longer. As to God's power, we cannot make it extend, though infinite, to the realization of absurdities ; what is not do-able cannot be done, even by Him. This does not re- duce His power; for we do not deny that He can do whatever by any possibility can be done. The knowledge of the past enables us, not to change that past, but to change the future by means of the present. Can I not have done better than I did at such and such a time? No, I cannot now ; but I could then. The Past is unchangeable. Our con- trition is not properly for the Past, nor does it change the Past; it is for the present state produced in us by past acts ; it changes that, and
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XLIV that alone. A man who has sinned is not to blame because he is now able not to have sinned, but because, when he did, he had the power not to sin. At the beginning of the world the possibility of my being born then existed; as time went on, it became less; at the instant of my birth it was narrowed to that instant and no other (pp. 74—87). Chapters 2 and 3 (pp. 87—116) are perhaps the hardest to un- derstand in the whole treatise ; and it will suffice to give a short synopsis of Wyclif's theory and of those which he assailed. As a consequence of their denial of the necessity of propositions concerning the past, which has already been summarized, Nominalists were forced to take up the position that possibility or impossibility depended upon the axiom: no- thing can be and not be at the same time. Whatever did not contradict this (and things past, no longer existing, could not contradict it) was contingently true or false, but always possible; what contradicted it was impossible independently of any other truth. This therefore was the only criterion of the extent of God's power. Wyclif attacks this doctrine with great vehemence, attempting to show that, if things contingent in the present are contingent in the past, the proposition that Nothing in the world exists is admissible in that theory ; wherce he draws the most damaging and absurd inferences against his adversaries. A possibility independent of God is according to him the source of numberless errors which he points out in detail. He is convinced that the proposition, or rather the fact (though he seems not to distinguish between the two) that God exists, is the primordial truth on which the axiom of contra- diction depends. It is because God exists that Nothing can at the same time be and not be; and not vice versa. All possibility and impossibility therefore proceed from God's power. We cannot say that God's power does not extend to this because it is impossible; but, This is impos- sible, on account of God's power not extending to it. And, though such an assertion looks extravagant, if we remember what he means by pos- sible (that which at any time exists or will exist) it is in keeping with the rest of his doctrine. At the same time, whilst he was free not to admit a wider definition, his Nominalist adversaries had quite as much right to define the Possible as that of which the existence, no matter at what time, does not involve contradiction. In the last chapter, there is a return to the preceding question of quality'. But whereas Wyclif argned before that no mental act was a INTRODUCTION.
XLIV that alone. A man who has sinned is not to blame because he is now able not to have sinned, but because, when he did, he had the power not to sin. At the beginning of the world the possibility of my being born then existed; as time went on, it became less; at the instant of my birth it was narrowed to that instant and no other (pp. 74—87). Chapters 2 and 3 (pp. 87—116) are perhaps the hardest to un- derstand in the whole treatise ; and it will suffice to give a short synopsis of Wyclif's theory and of those which he assailed. As a consequence of their denial of the necessity of propositions concerning the past, which has already been summarized, Nominalists were forced to take up the position that possibility or impossibility depended upon the axiom: no- thing can be and not be at the same time. Whatever did not contradict this (and things past, no longer existing, could not contradict it) was contingently true or false, but always possible; what contradicted it was impossible independently of any other truth. This therefore was the only criterion of the extent of God's power. Wyclif attacks this doctrine with great vehemence, attempting to show that, if things contingent in the present are contingent in the past, the proposition that Nothing in the world exists is admissible in that theory ; wherce he draws the most damaging and absurd inferences against his adversaries. A possibility independent of God is according to him the source of numberless errors which he points out in detail. He is convinced that the proposition, or rather the fact (though he seems not to distinguish between the two) that God exists, is the primordial truth on which the axiom of contra- diction depends. It is because God exists that Nothing can at the same time be and not be; and not vice versa. All possibility and impossibility therefore proceed from God's power. We cannot say that God's power does not extend to this because it is impossible; but, This is impos- sible, on account of God's power not extending to it. And, though such an assertion looks extravagant, if we remember what he means by pos- sible (that which at any time exists or will exist) it is in keeping with the rest of his doctrine. At the same time, whilst he was free not to admit a wider definition, his Nominalist adversaries had quite as much right to define the Possible as that of which the existence, no matter at what time, does not involve contradiction. In the last chapter, there is a return to the preceding question of quality'. But whereas Wyclif argned before that no mental act was a INTRODUCTION.
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INTRODUCTION. XLV quality in the opponents' sense, he now argues that in that sense there is no such thing. It is, we must remember, an accident capable (at least by God's power) of existing separately from its substance. Wyclif very guardedly refrains from saying that quantity or the vis extensiva sub- stantia', cannot exist alone. This was generally admitted at the time by Schoolmen, though, as I have pointed out in De Apostasia, it forms no part of the doctrine of the Church of Rome. On the other hand, most Schoolmen admitted that material qualities, such as colour, taste, weight, &c. were absolutely dependent upon the quantity of a substance, and could not be conceived apart therefrom. It was thus a doctrine which, to say the least, was very far from being unassailable: but he attacks it with ar- guments that are, most of them at least, quite as adaptable to quantity; in fact, some of them were used by Descartes when he denied the theory of absolute accidents'. But it is certain that an open attack would have raised a storm which Wyclif probably did not at the time feel it his duty to meet; and thus (possibly, as I have already said, in view of the Mastership at Balliol College) he preferred to employ argu- ments which attacked quantity as an absolute accident without ever naming it. Some accidents — relations, for instance — are inconceivable as existing apart from substance. This essential distinction must be common to all. An accident existing separately would become a substance: which is impossible. If it could exist alone, and consequently act alone, it would be more perfect than material substances, which cannot act but by means of their qualities. Substance is defined as that which underlies accidents. Now, if a quality could act by itself, it could by itself be also acted upon and modified, receive movement, &c. — that is, underlie accidents, and thus become a substance. The whole world might be made up of absolute accidents, and the idea of substance thus becomes superfluous; we could not distinguish between things and appearances, and appear- ances would be to us as things. If this, for instance, were extended to mental acts, there might be a sensation of whiteness that could perceive a white colour, without any person to feel it (pp. 116—121). Here Wyclif examines the adversaries' reply. They naturally fall back upon a miracle, saying that an accident never has power to exist by itself; it would, in such a case, be upheld by Divine omnipotence. We infallibly know that substances underlie appearances, unless there be a miracle;
INTRODUCTION. XLV quality in the opponents' sense, he now argues that in that sense there is no such thing. It is, we must remember, an accident capable (at least by God's power) of existing separately from its substance. Wyclif very guardedly refrains from saying that quantity or the vis extensiva sub- stantia', cannot exist alone. This was generally admitted at the time by Schoolmen, though, as I have pointed out in De Apostasia, it forms no part of the doctrine of the Church of Rome. On the other hand, most Schoolmen admitted that material qualities, such as colour, taste, weight, &c. were absolutely dependent upon the quantity of a substance, and could not be conceived apart therefrom. It was thus a doctrine which, to say the least, was very far from being unassailable: but he attacks it with ar- guments that are, most of them at least, quite as adaptable to quantity; in fact, some of them were used by Descartes when he denied the theory of absolute accidents'. But it is certain that an open attack would have raised a storm which Wyclif probably did not at the time feel it his duty to meet; and thus (possibly, as I have already said, in view of the Mastership at Balliol College) he preferred to employ argu- ments which attacked quantity as an absolute accident without ever naming it. Some accidents — relations, for instance — are inconceivable as existing apart from substance. This essential distinction must be common to all. An accident existing separately would become a substance: which is impossible. If it could exist alone, and consequently act alone, it would be more perfect than material substances, which cannot act but by means of their qualities. Substance is defined as that which underlies accidents. Now, if a quality could act by itself, it could by itself be also acted upon and modified, receive movement, &c. — that is, underlie accidents, and thus become a substance. The whole world might be made up of absolute accidents, and the idea of substance thus becomes superfluous; we could not distinguish between things and appearances, and appear- ances would be to us as things. If this, for instance, were extended to mental acts, there might be a sensation of whiteness that could perceive a white colour, without any person to feel it (pp. 116—121). Here Wyclif examines the adversaries' reply. They naturally fall back upon a miracle, saying that an accident never has power to exist by itself; it would, in such a case, be upheld by Divine omnipotence. We infallibly know that substances underlie appearances, unless there be a miracle;
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XLVI and since it has pleased God to create a world of substances, a world of accidents would be less perfect. Our author's answer to these argu- ments is strikingly moderate. They have, he says, but little power to persuade ; the opinion is only based upon faith, and the hypothesis that God might supply the place of a substance: his own theory, he thinks, is more reasonable. He points out various flaws in the explanations, and the great confusion that would arise if they were admitted : we should grope in the dark, unable to distinguish between substance and acci- dent. Any entity that acts just like a substance, must really be one, for we have no means of knowing that it is not. And then, God's action would tend — infallibly tend — towards making us affirm that which is false. The answer about a world of accidents is, he says with a touch of malice, though it is mildly expressed, quedam theologizacio'. And he ends with the remarking that the last answer 'seems to him unsatisfactory (pр. 121— 127). It is, as I said, impossible to decide whether this treatise was written before or just after Wyclif became Master of Balliol Hall; but for those who know his usually vigourous style both of argument and of expression, the former alternative may seem not improbable. INTRODUCTION. II. Replicatio de Universalibus. (1). The Manuscript.1 When I was in London, between 1889 and 1890, editing various works of Wyclif, Dr. Furnivall sent me a copy of this Replicatio, with a somewhat lengthy Introduction in English, and a title�page stating that the work was edited by 'A. Herman Lundstrom, Theol. Kand. Pastor of Helga Trefaldighet Church, Upsala, Sweden;' but without either the variantes of the Prague University MS. III. G. 10, or any marginal notes; and the Introduction was chiefly a description of the famous Stockholm MS., written per manus Mag. Joh. Hus'. It became my duty to complete this work for publication by the Wyclif Society ; but when I examined it, I soon came to such very startling conclusions that I tried to com- 1 That is, the Stockholm MS. As III. G. 10 of Prague University is one of the sources for the text of De Materia et Forma, its description comes in the Introduction to that work,
XLVI and since it has pleased God to create a world of substances, a world of accidents would be less perfect. Our author's answer to these argu- ments is strikingly moderate. They have, he says, but little power to persuade ; the opinion is only based upon faith, and the hypothesis that God might supply the place of a substance: his own theory, he thinks, is more reasonable. He points out various flaws in the explanations, and the great confusion that would arise if they were admitted : we should grope in the dark, unable to distinguish between substance and acci- dent. Any entity that acts just like a substance, must really be one, for we have no means of knowing that it is not. And then, God's action would tend — infallibly tend — towards making us affirm that which is false. The answer about a world of accidents is, he says with a touch of malice, though it is mildly expressed, quedam theologizacio'. And he ends with the remarking that the last answer 'seems to him unsatisfactory (pр. 121— 127). It is, as I said, impossible to decide whether this treatise was written before or just after Wyclif became Master of Balliol Hall; but for those who know his usually vigourous style both of argument and of expression, the former alternative may seem not improbable. INTRODUCTION. II. Replicatio de Universalibus. (1). The Manuscript.1 When I was in London, between 1889 and 1890, editing various works of Wyclif, Dr. Furnivall sent me a copy of this Replicatio, with a somewhat lengthy Introduction in English, and a title�page stating that the work was edited by 'A. Herman Lundstrom, Theol. Kand. Pastor of Helga Trefaldighet Church, Upsala, Sweden;' but without either the variantes of the Prague University MS. III. G. 10, or any marginal notes; and the Introduction was chiefly a description of the famous Stockholm MS., written per manus Mag. Joh. Hus'. It became my duty to complete this work for publication by the Wyclif Society ; but when I examined it, I soon came to such very startling conclusions that I tried to com- 1 That is, the Stockholm MS. As III. G. 10 of Prague University is one of the sources for the text of De Materia et Forma, its description comes in the Introduction to that work,
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INTRODUCTION. XLVII municate with Pastor Lundstrom in order to induce him to change or at least shorten part of his Introduction. It was in vain; my letter was neither answered nor returned by post; or if it was, I never received it. In short, I do not even know whether the editor is still living or not. In these circumstances, I had no alternative but to print the whole of his Introduction as he wrote it ; this has of course been done with Dr. Furnivall's approval; and as this Introduction deals mainly if not ex- clusively with the Manuscript, its place is naturally here. What I shall have to add by way of supplement and (I regret to say) in one most important point, of contradiction, will come well enough under the head- ing of authenticity, date, and contents. Pastor Lundstrom's Introduction. Among the rich literary and bibliographical treasures in the pos- session of the royal Library at Stockholm, an autograph manuscript by John Huss de Hussinets, praereformer and martyr, takes a very impor- tant place. This precious Bohemian relic, now nearly 5001 years old, was part of the rich booty of war, which the Swedes, under General Königsmark, succeeded in making at the capture of Hradschin in Prague on July 26"h 1648, on which occasion the art and treasure-chamber of the royal palace, as well as its valuable library, fell into the hands of the invaders. 2 The manuscript very probably belonged to the so-called Rosenberg Library, a division of the Royal Bohemian Library, if the evidence on this point is correctly interpreted. It came — together with the rest of the booty which was sent home from Prague 3 — to Stockholm in the course of the year 1649, probably during the month of May.4 This old codex is in quarto size and bound in simple parchment. The lower cover has a flap which can be folded over and fastened with a string like a modern note-book. At the back of the volume are two iron studs in the form of small six-pointed stars ; and next the studs are the binding-threads, six at each end. 1 This was written before 1888. (M. H. D.) und die Vorgeschichte der Reformation, vol. II, p. 559. Roy. Libr. of Stockholm 7. Exhibition room catalogue. Romanum p. 141. 2 Lechler: Johann v. Wiclif 3 Vide Proceedings of 4 Vide Dudik: Iter
INTRODUCTION. XLVII municate with Pastor Lundstrom in order to induce him to change or at least shorten part of his Introduction. It was in vain; my letter was neither answered nor returned by post; or if it was, I never received it. In short, I do not even know whether the editor is still living or not. In these circumstances, I had no alternative but to print the whole of his Introduction as he wrote it ; this has of course been done with Dr. Furnivall's approval; and as this Introduction deals mainly if not ex- clusively with the Manuscript, its place is naturally here. What I shall have to add by way of supplement and (I regret to say) in one most important point, of contradiction, will come well enough under the head- ing of authenticity, date, and contents. Pastor Lundstrom's Introduction. Among the rich literary and bibliographical treasures in the pos- session of the royal Library at Stockholm, an autograph manuscript by John Huss de Hussinets, praereformer and martyr, takes a very impor- tant place. This precious Bohemian relic, now nearly 5001 years old, was part of the rich booty of war, which the Swedes, under General Königsmark, succeeded in making at the capture of Hradschin in Prague on July 26"h 1648, on which occasion the art and treasure-chamber of the royal palace, as well as its valuable library, fell into the hands of the invaders. 2 The manuscript very probably belonged to the so-called Rosenberg Library, a division of the Royal Bohemian Library, if the evidence on this point is correctly interpreted. It came — together with the rest of the booty which was sent home from Prague 3 — to Stockholm in the course of the year 1649, probably during the month of May.4 This old codex is in quarto size and bound in simple parchment. The lower cover has a flap which can be folded over and fastened with a string like a modern note-book. At the back of the volume are two iron studs in the form of small six-pointed stars ; and next the studs are the binding-threads, six at each end. 1 This was written before 1888. (M. H. D.) und die Vorgeschichte der Reformation, vol. II, p. 559. Roy. Libr. of Stockholm 7. Exhibition room catalogue. Romanum p. 141. 2 Lechler: Johann v. Wiclif 3 Vide Proceedings of 4 Vide Dudik: Iter
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XLVIII INTRODUCTION. The writing is inscribed upon good firm paper of a somewhat yellowish tinge. The pagination has been done with red ink, and is evidently of the same date as the manuscript itself. The margins are not particularly wide, measuring as a rule about half an inch.1 The volume contains five treatises, principally of a philosophical and scho- lastic nature.2 The title, which is to be found at the end, is as follows: — Wiklefi tractatus methapysici per manus Mag Joh. Hus de an. 1398.3 It is very remarkable that an old note on the upper cover appa- rently assigns the authorship of three of the five treatises to Huss. On this cover we find first in more modern characters No. 9 (referring to the 1734 catalogue); and then immediately below, the following words are to be distinguished on the authority of Dudik (Forschungen in Schweden). "Magistri Johannis Hus onus tractatus de ydeis secundus re- plicacio universalis tercius eius de veris universalibus." That this old an- notation (see pp. LIII, LIV) is not accurate seems probable, for several reasons which I will subsequently adduce. 1 I may here record some other minor points of interest which I observed during my study of the MS. I found that the volume, as far as leaf 20, had been perforated by some sharp three-edged instrument, which, as far as I can judge, may well have been a swordpoint. The upper cover is pierced as well, but in the first leaves, which are evidently a later insertion and one of which is glued to the cover, this little triangular hole is of course wanting. Can it have been some Swedish soldier who, intoxicated with victory at the capture of Hradschin, thus wished to set with the point of his sword a conqueror's mark which should commemorate for ever the acquisition of this precious document by his countrymen? There are also one or two other small peculiarities to be noticed. On leaf 108 a coarse, but characteristic face has been drawn with black ink in a large red initial. Again, at two or three places a rather large hand pointing has been drawn, e. g. leaf 25b, bya large red 2 I say “principally", for purely theological subjects are initial, and leaf 78. also treated of. For instance, at the end of the first treatise, sin against the Holy Ghost is discussed, and among other things the writer points out the absurdity of maintaining before a man's death, and without a special manifestation, that he has been guilty of sin against the Holy Ghost, and on the strength of this assumption 3 Dr. B. Dudik depriving him of the resource and consolation of prayer. wrongly states in his “Forschungen in Schweden für Mährens Geschichte", p. 185 that the MS. dates from the year 1389. Possibly this is a misprint, but it occurs both in the index and text.
XLVIII INTRODUCTION. The writing is inscribed upon good firm paper of a somewhat yellowish tinge. The pagination has been done with red ink, and is evidently of the same date as the manuscript itself. The margins are not particularly wide, measuring as a rule about half an inch.1 The volume contains five treatises, principally of a philosophical and scho- lastic nature.2 The title, which is to be found at the end, is as follows: — Wiklefi tractatus methapysici per manus Mag Joh. Hus de an. 1398.3 It is very remarkable that an old note on the upper cover appa- rently assigns the authorship of three of the five treatises to Huss. On this cover we find first in more modern characters No. 9 (referring to the 1734 catalogue); and then immediately below, the following words are to be distinguished on the authority of Dudik (Forschungen in Schweden). "Magistri Johannis Hus onus tractatus de ydeis secundus re- plicacio universalis tercius eius de veris universalibus." That this old an- notation (see pp. LIII, LIV) is not accurate seems probable, for several reasons which I will subsequently adduce. 1 I may here record some other minor points of interest which I observed during my study of the MS. I found that the volume, as far as leaf 20, had been perforated by some sharp three-edged instrument, which, as far as I can judge, may well have been a swordpoint. The upper cover is pierced as well, but in the first leaves, which are evidently a later insertion and one of which is glued to the cover, this little triangular hole is of course wanting. Can it have been some Swedish soldier who, intoxicated with victory at the capture of Hradschin, thus wished to set with the point of his sword a conqueror's mark which should commemorate for ever the acquisition of this precious document by his countrymen? There are also one or two other small peculiarities to be noticed. On leaf 108 a coarse, but characteristic face has been drawn with black ink in a large red initial. Again, at two or three places a rather large hand pointing has been drawn, e. g. leaf 25b, bya large red 2 I say “principally", for purely theological subjects are initial, and leaf 78. also treated of. For instance, at the end of the first treatise, sin against the Holy Ghost is discussed, and among other things the writer points out the absurdity of maintaining before a man's death, and without a special manifestation, that he has been guilty of sin against the Holy Ghost, and on the strength of this assumption 3 Dr. B. Dudik depriving him of the resource and consolation of prayer. wrongly states in his “Forschungen in Schweden für Mährens Geschichte", p. 185 that the MS. dates from the year 1389. Possibly this is a misprint, but it occurs both in the index and text.
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INTRODUCTION. XLIX The first of these treatises occupies the first thirty-three leaves, and has the following title: "Tractatus de indiuiduacione 1 temporis et instantis quam composuit2 subtilis vir Magister Joh. Wycleph." The first page specifies the contents of the twelve chapters into which the essay is divided, and the treatise itself begins as follows:3 c Intrando de tempore sunt aliqua ex dictis strictius capienda primum quod tempus sit de genere accepturum] sicutI (so Dudik, Stephens gives sicud', as the text really has it, d being regularly used throughout the Manuscript instead of t in such cases) enim philosophi supponunt tanquam notorium motum esse cum desinit illis probacio apriori] vel notoriori qua concludent motum esse sic convenienter accipit totum genus ho- minum exmotus cuiuscunque noticia tempus esse! cum tam homines quam bruta] ex in nata solercia noscunt tempus] ut patet ex tam famosa con- ſessione wlgarium quam eciam "etc. and ends on leaf 33 with — quod nemini est desperandum de quocunque graui (not graue as Stephens and Dudik have it) peccato cum quilibet (not quibus' as Stephens reads. Dudik has here omitted from cum — to "patet 3°") eciam dampnatus potest saluari ] et ex 2d° latere timendum continuare peccatum cum ad tantum (probably so; see Chassant. Stephens reads adtamen) potest continuari (quod fiat iremissibile) ed patet 3° quod stultum est sine speciali revelacione iudicare de aliquo ante mortem, quod peccat in spiritum sanctum, subtrahendo ab eo oracionis suffragia. Explicit tractatus de individuacione temporis et instantis quem composuit subtilis vir Magister Joh. Wycleph (from “Explicit" onwards the writing is in red ink). The second treatise extends from leaf 34 to leaf 52. It is divided into five sections and entitled "Tractatus de ydeis". It begins — "Intrando (and written above tractando) de ydeis primo oportet querere si sint. Supponendo quam naturale sit tale, quod ydea sequitur rationem exteriorem eternam aput deum 2m quam deus est productus rei ad extra. Videtur ergo quod talia (Stephens wrongly 2 Dudik here tries to correct Stephens and proposes 1 Vide Appendix. apposuit'. For my part I support Stephens. In the Stockholm Codex we have in this passage the sign which is used for co or con throughout, viz. 9 which Dudik 3 In order that the reader may be able to criticise has wrongly read for ap. my amplifications of the abbreviations which occur in the MS., I have here under- lined the letters which are wanting in the original. D
INTRODUCTION. XLIX The first of these treatises occupies the first thirty-three leaves, and has the following title: "Tractatus de indiuiduacione 1 temporis et instantis quam composuit2 subtilis vir Magister Joh. Wycleph." The first page specifies the contents of the twelve chapters into which the essay is divided, and the treatise itself begins as follows:3 c Intrando de tempore sunt aliqua ex dictis strictius capienda primum quod tempus sit de genere accepturum] sicutI (so Dudik, Stephens gives sicud', as the text really has it, d being regularly used throughout the Manuscript instead of t in such cases) enim philosophi supponunt tanquam notorium motum esse cum desinit illis probacio apriori] vel notoriori qua concludent motum esse sic convenienter accipit totum genus ho- minum exmotus cuiuscunque noticia tempus esse! cum tam homines quam bruta] ex in nata solercia noscunt tempus] ut patet ex tam famosa con- ſessione wlgarium quam eciam "etc. and ends on leaf 33 with — quod nemini est desperandum de quocunque graui (not graue as Stephens and Dudik have it) peccato cum quilibet (not quibus' as Stephens reads. Dudik has here omitted from cum — to "patet 3°") eciam dampnatus potest saluari ] et ex 2d° latere timendum continuare peccatum cum ad tantum (probably so; see Chassant. Stephens reads adtamen) potest continuari (quod fiat iremissibile) ed patet 3° quod stultum est sine speciali revelacione iudicare de aliquo ante mortem, quod peccat in spiritum sanctum, subtrahendo ab eo oracionis suffragia. Explicit tractatus de individuacione temporis et instantis quem composuit subtilis vir Magister Joh. Wycleph (from “Explicit" onwards the writing is in red ink). The second treatise extends from leaf 34 to leaf 52. It is divided into five sections and entitled "Tractatus de ydeis". It begins — "Intrando (and written above tractando) de ydeis primo oportet querere si sint. Supponendo quam naturale sit tale, quod ydea sequitur rationem exteriorem eternam aput deum 2m quam deus est productus rei ad extra. Videtur ergo quod talia (Stephens wrongly 2 Dudik here tries to correct Stephens and proposes 1 Vide Appendix. apposuit'. For my part I support Stephens. In the Stockholm Codex we have in this passage the sign which is used for co or con throughout, viz. 9 which Dudik 3 In order that the reader may be able to criticise has wrongly read for ap. my amplifications of the abbreviations which occur in the MS., I have here under- lined the letters which are wanting in the original. D
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L INTRODUCTION. reads an h in the word “Thalia". He has probably been misled by the peculiar form of the letter “ in the manuscript) sint ponenda quia ipse deus intelligit omne intelligibile &c.] and ends: Alij autem tanto am- pliant ydeas ] quod uocant omne quod est exemplar deo deo aliud cog- noscendum esse ydeam indeo (ydeam cognicionis realiter cogniti] nec est magna vis in tali variacione signorum] dum tamen sane concipitur. Ego autem elegi mihi magis probabile quod omnis creatura et solum creatura habet ydeam propriam in deo. Explicit tractatus de ydeis, ergo laus domino. The third treatise is divided into nine sections (not into eight as Stephens has it) and is entitled: — "Tractatus de materia et forma Ma- gistri Joh. Wycleph." (Not as Dudik writes “Johannis Vicleph".) It occupies twenty-three leaves, i. e. from leaf 53 to leaf 76, and begins thus: — "Cum materia et forma sint universalia (Stephen wrongly has volumina) mundi principalia restat de eis primo tam propter (here occurs a rather illegible word dotted underneath. It seems to be 'n' acionem', and is possibly connected with the following word, and for that reason dotted) ordinacionem quam genera conueniencium disserendum et cum materia non sit anobis cognoscibilis nisi per analogiam ad formam p° philosophorum consencio s° ordo naturalis postulat primo de forma post de materia pertractare. Primo igi- tur supponere &c. and concludes: — et in otroque primorum graduum nullum ens dicit presens vel aliquam essentiam preter deum. Explicit tractatus de materia et forma magistri Joh. Vycleph (Joh. Vycleph is not in red ink as Dudik states, but here follow some Bohemian [Czech] words which are in red. See Appendix). The fourth treatise is short, covering only nine leaves from leaf 77 to leaf 86, and is possibly only a recapitulary abstract of the long treatise which follows and ends the series. The fourth is styled. "Replicacio de universalibus" and begins with these words: — "Presentem agrediendo 1 replicacionis materiam in 3' partes distingo eam secundum tria puncta eiusdem replicationis fundamentalia quorum prima pars etc. and ends" quin lycet rex diuiditur in regem viuum et regem mortuum et depictum, et tamen nec rex viuus (viuus is underlined and above is written “mortuus" by the same hand as the manuscript itself) nec depictus est rex. Explicit replicacio de vniversalibus, 1 Dudik reads wrongly agrediando'.
L INTRODUCTION. reads an h in the word “Thalia". He has probably been misled by the peculiar form of the letter “ in the manuscript) sint ponenda quia ipse deus intelligit omne intelligibile &c.] and ends: Alij autem tanto am- pliant ydeas ] quod uocant omne quod est exemplar deo deo aliud cog- noscendum esse ydeam indeo (ydeam cognicionis realiter cogniti] nec est magna vis in tali variacione signorum] dum tamen sane concipitur. Ego autem elegi mihi magis probabile quod omnis creatura et solum creatura habet ydeam propriam in deo. Explicit tractatus de ydeis, ergo laus domino. The third treatise is divided into nine sections (not into eight as Stephens has it) and is entitled: — "Tractatus de materia et forma Ma- gistri Joh. Wycleph." (Not as Dudik writes “Johannis Vicleph".) It occupies twenty-three leaves, i. e. from leaf 53 to leaf 76, and begins thus: — "Cum materia et forma sint universalia (Stephen wrongly has volumina) mundi principalia restat de eis primo tam propter (here occurs a rather illegible word dotted underneath. It seems to be 'n' acionem', and is possibly connected with the following word, and for that reason dotted) ordinacionem quam genera conueniencium disserendum et cum materia non sit anobis cognoscibilis nisi per analogiam ad formam p° philosophorum consencio s° ordo naturalis postulat primo de forma post de materia pertractare. Primo igi- tur supponere &c. and concludes: — et in otroque primorum graduum nullum ens dicit presens vel aliquam essentiam preter deum. Explicit tractatus de materia et forma magistri Joh. Vycleph (Joh. Vycleph is not in red ink as Dudik states, but here follow some Bohemian [Czech] words which are in red. See Appendix). The fourth treatise is short, covering only nine leaves from leaf 77 to leaf 86, and is possibly only a recapitulary abstract of the long treatise which follows and ends the series. The fourth is styled. "Replicacio de universalibus" and begins with these words: — "Presentem agrediendo 1 replicacionis materiam in 3' partes distingo eam secundum tria puncta eiusdem replicationis fundamentalia quorum prima pars etc. and ends" quin lycet rex diuiditur in regem viuum et regem mortuum et depictum, et tamen nec rex viuus (viuus is underlined and above is written “mortuus" by the same hand as the manuscript itself) nec depictus est rex. Explicit replicacio de vniversalibus, 1 Dudik reads wrongly agrediando'.
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INTRODUCTION. LI quam si quis bene perpexerit, uidebit multo meliores raciones pro eisdem quam contra eadem, prime enim ducere procedunt alie vero cum" .... (here two or three words are erased). The fifth and last treatise occupies no less than forty-seven leaves i. e. from leaf 87 to leaf 134 and is divided into fifteen chapters.... It is entitled : *e Tractatus de veris vniversalibus Magistri venerabilis Johannis Wycleph.' The two first pages contain a summary of the contents, beginning thus: — "Libellus de vniversalibus continet 15 capitula primum premittit primo trimembrem distinccionem de vniversalibus &c". The treatise itself commences (leaf 88. a) "Capitulum primum. In purgando errores de vniversalibus & circa (not cet. as Stephens has it) vniversalia sunt 3a introductoria premovenda & primo quod &... and concludes (leaf 34 b): Sed nimis longum esset ista pertinenter pertractare/ alijs itaque difficultatibus huius materie/ & aliarum hic tactarum expectan- tibus alibi suum locum/ Pono finem huic superficiali tractatui de vniver- salibus/ ad alios tractatus derebus prime intencionis/ ad quarum noticiam sentencia ista apperit agressurus. Explicit 1 tractatus de veris vniver- salibus Magistri venerabilis Johannis Wycleph Sacre theologie veri et magni professoris Anno domini M° CCC° L xxxx viijj in die Sancti Yeronimi 2 Slawy3 per manus Hus de Hussynetz 4 amen tak boh day : (the four last czech words in red. (See Appendix). I ought here to observe that it is in Wyclif's very treatise "de universalibus" that Höfler5 and Loserth 6 discovered a passage which was formerly considered to have a particularly important bearing upon our knowledge of the personality of Huss. The words referred to are: ..“Ego autem statui michi ipsi pro regula, quod quociescunque videro racionem 1 Dudik here (Vide Forsch. in S., leaf 202) wrongly gives 'explicat'. The word is certainly so written in the text that one one might be tempted to follow Dudik's reading, or rather read 'expliat'. But this may be a misprint, as on leaf 198 he has it correctly. The word has in our MS. something like this appearance 'expliat', but 2 Not Jeronymi, as Dudik has on Ieaf 202, though he writes it a = ci, not a. 4 Not Hussynec as Dudik, 3 Not Slavi as Dudik. correctly on leaf 198. 5 Höfler: Anna v. Luxemburg in den Denkschriften der Wiener Akademie reads. 6 The MS. followed by Loserth is in the University Library of Prague : 20, 150. Cod. Un. Prag. VIII, leaf 6, 8a. Do
INTRODUCTION. LI quam si quis bene perpexerit, uidebit multo meliores raciones pro eisdem quam contra eadem, prime enim ducere procedunt alie vero cum" .... (here two or three words are erased). The fifth and last treatise occupies no less than forty-seven leaves i. e. from leaf 87 to leaf 134 and is divided into fifteen chapters.... It is entitled : *e Tractatus de veris vniversalibus Magistri venerabilis Johannis Wycleph.' The two first pages contain a summary of the contents, beginning thus: — "Libellus de vniversalibus continet 15 capitula primum premittit primo trimembrem distinccionem de vniversalibus &c". The treatise itself commences (leaf 88. a) "Capitulum primum. In purgando errores de vniversalibus & circa (not cet. as Stephens has it) vniversalia sunt 3a introductoria premovenda & primo quod &... and concludes (leaf 34 b): Sed nimis longum esset ista pertinenter pertractare/ alijs itaque difficultatibus huius materie/ & aliarum hic tactarum expectan- tibus alibi suum locum/ Pono finem huic superficiali tractatui de vniver- salibus/ ad alios tractatus derebus prime intencionis/ ad quarum noticiam sentencia ista apperit agressurus. Explicit 1 tractatus de veris vniver- salibus Magistri venerabilis Johannis Wycleph Sacre theologie veri et magni professoris Anno domini M° CCC° L xxxx viijj in die Sancti Yeronimi 2 Slawy3 per manus Hus de Hussynetz 4 amen tak boh day : (the four last czech words in red. (See Appendix). I ought here to observe that it is in Wyclif's very treatise "de universalibus" that Höfler5 and Loserth 6 discovered a passage which was formerly considered to have a particularly important bearing upon our knowledge of the personality of Huss. The words referred to are: ..“Ego autem statui michi ipsi pro regula, quod quociescunque videro racionem 1 Dudik here (Vide Forsch. in S., leaf 202) wrongly gives 'explicat'. The word is certainly so written in the text that one one might be tempted to follow Dudik's reading, or rather read 'expliat'. But this may be a misprint, as on leaf 198 he has it correctly. The word has in our MS. something like this appearance 'expliat', but 2 Not Jeronymi, as Dudik has on Ieaf 202, though he writes it a = ci, not a. 4 Not Hussynec as Dudik, 3 Not Slavi as Dudik. correctly on leaf 198. 5 Höfler: Anna v. Luxemburg in den Denkschriften der Wiener Akademie reads. 6 The MS. followed by Loserth is in the University Library of Prague : 20, 150. Cod. Un. Prag. VIII, leaf 6, 8a. Do
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LII INTRODUCTION. (vel scripturam)1 prevalidam declino ab opinione priori non obstante fama vel assercione virorum quos sequerer, considerans quod ex infirmitate nature longe plus habeo ignorancie quam certitudinis — quod si ex ignorancia vel quacunque alia causa (Hus: vel lapsu lingue) in isto defecero... revoco et retracto submittens me humiliter. In Huss' treatise "De trinitate" we find the same thought expressed in almost the same words. According to Dudik, this manuscript shows an excessive number of abbreviations, is somewhat indistinctly and hastily written, and is conse- quently especially difficult to decipher ; and the experience I have gained from the study of its numerous obscurities leads me fully to endorse Dudik's opinion. I will now record some observations on the subject of the writing itself, as it appears in the different treatises. In the first there are 37 or 38 lines to the page. The last page has however only six lines, and of these two are in red: "Explicit tractatus etc. The initial letters of the chapters are red; as are also several marginal notes referring to the contents. Commas, stops and dividing marks occur in the text, but the words are nevertheless occasionally run together. There are besides numerous corrections and emendations in faint writing. These alterations seem as a rule to have been made by a contemporary, but strange, hand, a few passages only showing signs of correction by a somewhat later writer. Lastly I may mention that here and there spaces are left for omitted words. In the second treatise also corrections and omissions are to be found e. g. leaves 31 and 40. — On leaf 54 appears a phrase added by a later hand to fill up an original omission: — "a condendis nouis generibus creature". The state of the third treatise is very much the same. For omis- sions I may refer to leaves 60, 71, 75, 76, (the same pages are mentioned by Dudik). In the fourth occur only two corrections and no omissions. In this treatise, the only one in which are no Bohemian words, there is also nothing in red ink, except the numbers of the pages and the first initial letter. 1 “Vel scripturam" is wanting in the Cod. Un. Prag, but is cited on the authority of Höfler.
LII INTRODUCTION. (vel scripturam)1 prevalidam declino ab opinione priori non obstante fama vel assercione virorum quos sequerer, considerans quod ex infirmitate nature longe plus habeo ignorancie quam certitudinis — quod si ex ignorancia vel quacunque alia causa (Hus: vel lapsu lingue) in isto defecero... revoco et retracto submittens me humiliter. In Huss' treatise "De trinitate" we find the same thought expressed in almost the same words. According to Dudik, this manuscript shows an excessive number of abbreviations, is somewhat indistinctly and hastily written, and is conse- quently especially difficult to decipher ; and the experience I have gained from the study of its numerous obscurities leads me fully to endorse Dudik's opinion. I will now record some observations on the subject of the writing itself, as it appears in the different treatises. In the first there are 37 or 38 lines to the page. The last page has however only six lines, and of these two are in red: "Explicit tractatus etc. The initial letters of the chapters are red; as are also several marginal notes referring to the contents. Commas, stops and dividing marks occur in the text, but the words are nevertheless occasionally run together. There are besides numerous corrections and emendations in faint writing. These alterations seem as a rule to have been made by a contemporary, but strange, hand, a few passages only showing signs of correction by a somewhat later writer. Lastly I may mention that here and there spaces are left for omitted words. In the second treatise also corrections and omissions are to be found e. g. leaves 31 and 40. — On leaf 54 appears a phrase added by a later hand to fill up an original omission: — "a condendis nouis generibus creature". The state of the third treatise is very much the same. For omis- sions I may refer to leaves 60, 71, 75, 76, (the same pages are mentioned by Dudik). In the fourth occur only two corrections and no omissions. In this treatise, the only one in which are no Bohemian words, there is also nothing in red ink, except the numbers of the pages and the first initial letter. 1 “Vel scripturam" is wanting in the Cod. Un. Prag, but is cited on the authority of Höfler.
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INTRODUCTION. LIII With regard to the last and longest treatise I may say that the writing differs very considerably from that of its predecessors. In the first place it is much more compressed than the others, there being now (i. e. from leaf 87) from 45 to 47 lines to the page, whereas before we had ouly 37 or 38. And I must add my opinion to that of Dudik, that we should consider this fact as tending to show that this treatise is written in a different hand from that of the others. Here too we have written in red, not only the initials, but also the commas and capital letters in the text, and besides these some of the Bohemian words (for a list of which, see the appendix) and lastly the following sentence which precedes the 15'h chapter: "Ponam eum super tronum meum". In great abundance too are the corrections, emendations of a later date and omissions, for examples of which Dudik refers to leaves 96, 109, 111, 119, 120, 126, 130, 132, 133. This treatise is followed by an index, occupying two pages of three columns each and about half a column on a third page (leap 135 b), and finally come eleven leaves blank and unnumbered. We now reach the question of the authorship of these treatises. There can scarcely be any real doubt, except as to Nos. II, IV and V, "De Ydeis", “Replicacio de universalibus" and "De veris universalibus". It will be remembered that an old note, according to the interpretation of Dudik, assigns the authorship of these to Huss. That Wyclif, as the manuscript itself states — was the author of Nos. I and III, must be considered established beyond all doubt. But that Wyclif — and not Huss, as this old note is supposed to assert, — was also the author of No. V, is evident from the concluding words of the Manuscript which I have already quoted: “Explicit tractatus de veris universalibus Magistri venera- bilis Johannis Wycleph, Sacre theologie veri et magni professoris,.... per manus Huss de Hussinetz. Dudik advances the very arbitrary, but at the same time ingenious hypothesis that this old annotation on the cover is really intended to mean that Huss was the author of only Nos. II and IV. The word tercius' in that case would be an error of the pen, and the treatises ascribed to Huss would be "Tractatus de Ydeis and Replicacio univer- salis eius de veris universalibus". But with respect to this I must observe that it may be considered quite an open question whether Dudik has correctly interpreted this old note. The words are now to a great extent
INTRODUCTION. LIII With regard to the last and longest treatise I may say that the writing differs very considerably from that of its predecessors. In the first place it is much more compressed than the others, there being now (i. e. from leaf 87) from 45 to 47 lines to the page, whereas before we had ouly 37 or 38. And I must add my opinion to that of Dudik, that we should consider this fact as tending to show that this treatise is written in a different hand from that of the others. Here too we have written in red, not only the initials, but also the commas and capital letters in the text, and besides these some of the Bohemian words (for a list of which, see the appendix) and lastly the following sentence which precedes the 15'h chapter: "Ponam eum super tronum meum". In great abundance too are the corrections, emendations of a later date and omissions, for examples of which Dudik refers to leaves 96, 109, 111, 119, 120, 126, 130, 132, 133. This treatise is followed by an index, occupying two pages of three columns each and about half a column on a third page (leap 135 b), and finally come eleven leaves blank and unnumbered. We now reach the question of the authorship of these treatises. There can scarcely be any real doubt, except as to Nos. II, IV and V, "De Ydeis", “Replicacio de universalibus" and "De veris universalibus". It will be remembered that an old note, according to the interpretation of Dudik, assigns the authorship of these to Huss. That Wyclif, as the manuscript itself states — was the author of Nos. I and III, must be considered established beyond all doubt. But that Wyclif — and not Huss, as this old note is supposed to assert, — was also the author of No. V, is evident from the concluding words of the Manuscript which I have already quoted: “Explicit tractatus de veris universalibus Magistri venera- bilis Johannis Wycleph, Sacre theologie veri et magni professoris,.... per manus Huss de Hussinetz. Dudik advances the very arbitrary, but at the same time ingenious hypothesis that this old annotation on the cover is really intended to mean that Huss was the author of only Nos. II and IV. The word tercius' in that case would be an error of the pen, and the treatises ascribed to Huss would be "Tractatus de Ydeis and Replicacio univer- salis eius de veris universalibus". But with respect to this I must observe that it may be considered quite an open question whether Dudik has correctly interpreted this old note. The words are now to a great extent
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LIV INTRODUCTION. obliterated. The first: Magistri Johannis Huss unus tractatus de ydeis' can still be seen fairly distinctly, but the following “secundus" (according to Dudik and Stephens) happens to come just on a fold of the parchment; and was, to me at least, quite indecipherable even with the aid of a powerful lens. After this word, which we may — on the joint authority of Dudik and Stephens — take to be "secundus", follow two more, which are still fairly legible “replicacio universalis". The third line begins with a word which seems to me just as likely to be 'eius' as tercius, though perhaps I should adopt the latter for preference. Then comes something illegible which falls just on the above-mentioned fold. That one of these words is 'de' may possibly be admitted, at least by any one who has been led to expect to see that word there. The upper part of one letter is quite plain and may well belong to a 'd'. The last word is still legible. But it is clear that Dudik's statement that both 'tercius' and 'eius' are to be found here cannot be correct (Stephens reads only 'eius'). For some trace, even if it were illegible, would certainly exist, if a second word had been written there; but no such trace is to be seen. After replicacio universalis' these is not a sign of any other word but 'tercius' (or eius), and after it we have directly “de veris universalibus". In these circumstances it will be safest not to let this old and very obscure anno- tation have any preponderating influence on the question of the authorship of any of these treatises. With regard to the second treatise, Dudik disputes, and I think with reason, the claim of Huss to its authorship. He summons to the support of his view, neither the circumstance that this work of Huss has been hitherto unknown, nor the fact that Lewis in his 'History of the life and opinions of John de Wycliffe" (Oxford 1836) refers to this treatise as one of Wyclif's most important works, but bases his contention on the ground that the omission of words and phrases in this as well as the other three treatises which are with all reason ascribed to Wyclif, implies the unfamiliarity of the writer with the original. This evidence he thus brings forward: „Wenn man bedenkt, dass der Autor, wenn er sein Concept mundirt, kaum nothig hat, Worte, die er nicht lesen kann, aus- zulassen — denn wer soll ihm hierüber Auskunft ertheilen? Man aber in dem, dem Huss zugeschriebenen Tractate „De Ydeis" solche ausgelassene Stellen, ja eine sogar mit einer späteren Schrift eingesetzte antrifft; dann
LIV INTRODUCTION. obliterated. The first: Magistri Johannis Huss unus tractatus de ydeis' can still be seen fairly distinctly, but the following “secundus" (according to Dudik and Stephens) happens to come just on a fold of the parchment; and was, to me at least, quite indecipherable even with the aid of a powerful lens. After this word, which we may — on the joint authority of Dudik and Stephens — take to be "secundus", follow two more, which are still fairly legible “replicacio universalis". The third line begins with a word which seems to me just as likely to be 'eius' as tercius, though perhaps I should adopt the latter for preference. Then comes something illegible which falls just on the above-mentioned fold. That one of these words is 'de' may possibly be admitted, at least by any one who has been led to expect to see that word there. The upper part of one letter is quite plain and may well belong to a 'd'. The last word is still legible. But it is clear that Dudik's statement that both 'tercius' and 'eius' are to be found here cannot be correct (Stephens reads only 'eius'). For some trace, even if it were illegible, would certainly exist, if a second word had been written there; but no such trace is to be seen. After replicacio universalis' these is not a sign of any other word but 'tercius' (or eius), and after it we have directly “de veris universalibus". In these circumstances it will be safest not to let this old and very obscure anno- tation have any preponderating influence on the question of the authorship of any of these treatises. With regard to the second treatise, Dudik disputes, and I think with reason, the claim of Huss to its authorship. He summons to the support of his view, neither the circumstance that this work of Huss has been hitherto unknown, nor the fact that Lewis in his 'History of the life and opinions of John de Wycliffe" (Oxford 1836) refers to this treatise as one of Wyclif's most important works, but bases his contention on the ground that the omission of words and phrases in this as well as the other three treatises which are with all reason ascribed to Wyclif, implies the unfamiliarity of the writer with the original. This evidence he thus brings forward: „Wenn man bedenkt, dass der Autor, wenn er sein Concept mundirt, kaum nothig hat, Worte, die er nicht lesen kann, aus- zulassen — denn wer soll ihm hierüber Auskunft ertheilen? Man aber in dem, dem Huss zugeschriebenen Tractate „De Ydeis" solche ausgelassene Stellen, ja eine sogar mit einer späteren Schrift eingesetzte antrifft; dann
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INTRODUCTION. LV wird der Schluss: dass Huss kaum der Verfasser dieser Abhandlung sei, ein verzeihlicher." To this there are some points of evidence to be added, which though they provide no infallible testimony, nevertheless tend strongly in favour of Wyclif's authorship of this particular treatise, evidence too which clearly cannot have been known to Dudik, Stephens and Pečirka, because it is only the research of recent years which has brought it to light. I mean first of all the relations which existed in a general way between Huss and Wyclif. There is no doubt that these latest investigations have gone to show (I refer especially to Loserth's work "Huss and Wiclif" which marks an era in our knowledge), how intimate this association was, how Huss even in his maturest manhood never broke his close and pupil-like connexion with his English master. And as it has been made clear that in the work of his riper years he almost mechanically adopted, nay to a great degree simply reproduced in writing, the spoken utterances of Wyclif, are we not justified in supposing that in his youth Huss held a position of even less independence with respect to his admired teacher, and especially in regard to speculative work which called for a greater experience of life and maturity than he himself possessed? Another circumstance which tends in the same direction is that in the List which Loserth gives of Wyclif's writings that were burnt twelve years later (in 1410) by the order of Archbishop Zbinco on account of their reputed heretical tendencies, four out of the five treatises of the Stockholm Manuscript occurs. The only one which is not among them is the "Replicacio de universalibus", the very treatise in fact which Dudik maintains was undoubtedly written by Huss, though for my part I am for certain reasons inclined to doubt even this. The fact that Archbishop Zbinco caused to be burned one or more copies of treatises by Wyclif bearing the same name is of course no real proof that he is the author of the Stockholm treatise 'de Ydeis'. This can evidently only be decided by an accurate comparison between the original of the copy or copies which were consigned to the flames, and that which we have at Stockholm. But the fact above referred to goes at least to support the plausibility of the supposition that Huss did not write No. 2 'de Ydeis'.1 In Prokop v. Pilsen's speech in defence of 1 Loserth's list of the burnt writings also makes it probable that Wyclif was the author of "De veris universalibus".
INTRODUCTION. LV wird der Schluss: dass Huss kaum der Verfasser dieser Abhandlung sei, ein verzeihlicher." To this there are some points of evidence to be added, which though they provide no infallible testimony, nevertheless tend strongly in favour of Wyclif's authorship of this particular treatise, evidence too which clearly cannot have been known to Dudik, Stephens and Pečirka, because it is only the research of recent years which has brought it to light. I mean first of all the relations which existed in a general way between Huss and Wyclif. There is no doubt that these latest investigations have gone to show (I refer especially to Loserth's work "Huss and Wiclif" which marks an era in our knowledge), how intimate this association was, how Huss even in his maturest manhood never broke his close and pupil-like connexion with his English master. And as it has been made clear that in the work of his riper years he almost mechanically adopted, nay to a great degree simply reproduced in writing, the spoken utterances of Wyclif, are we not justified in supposing that in his youth Huss held a position of even less independence with respect to his admired teacher, and especially in regard to speculative work which called for a greater experience of life and maturity than he himself possessed? Another circumstance which tends in the same direction is that in the List which Loserth gives of Wyclif's writings that were burnt twelve years later (in 1410) by the order of Archbishop Zbinco on account of their reputed heretical tendencies, four out of the five treatises of the Stockholm Manuscript occurs. The only one which is not among them is the "Replicacio de universalibus", the very treatise in fact which Dudik maintains was undoubtedly written by Huss, though for my part I am for certain reasons inclined to doubt even this. The fact that Archbishop Zbinco caused to be burned one or more copies of treatises by Wyclif bearing the same name is of course no real proof that he is the author of the Stockholm treatise 'de Ydeis'. This can evidently only be decided by an accurate comparison between the original of the copy or copies which were consigned to the flames, and that which we have at Stockholm. But the fact above referred to goes at least to support the plausibility of the supposition that Huss did not write No. 2 'de Ydeis'.1 In Prokop v. Pilsen's speech in defence of 1 Loserth's list of the burnt writings also makes it probable that Wyclif was the author of "De veris universalibus".
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LVI INTRODUCTION. this burnt treatise, it is expressly mentioned that it consisted of five chapters, which also agrees with that which forms part of the Stockholm Manuscript (see Loserth, "Huss and Wiclif", p. 282). Recent investigations in England have shown that these writings which have hitherto been looked upon as mutually independent, viz. De tempore' (= de indiv. temp.), and De Ydeis',1 only form a part of Wyclif's great treatise De Ente'. De tempore' is in fact § 6 of Work I, and De Ydeis' § 5 of Work II of De Ente'. (This I owe to Dr. Furnivall and the Report of the Executive Committee.) We now come to the question of the authorship of No. IV, "Repli- cacio de universalibus", which is also supposed by Dudik to be the work of Huss. I must begin by observing that I consider Dudik's suppo- sition altogether doubtful. Both Shirley, in his 'Catalogue of the original works of John Wiclif" and, following him, Lechler in his great work ce Johann v. Wiclif und die Vorgeschichte der Reformation" and Vattier in “John Wyclyff, sa vie, ses oeuvres, sa doctrine", mention a treatise with this very title. Repl. de univ.' as one of Wyclif's original works (No. 9 of the philosophical writings in Shirley, No. 6 in Lechler and Vattier). It is in the MS. No. 10 in the University Library at Prag, but as 2 I have had no opportunity of comparing it with that at Stockholm, I cannot of course at present offer a decisive opinion on the subject. But so much at least must be plain, that it is by no means certain that Huss was the author. Dudik advances in support of his view the occur- rence here and there in this treatise of the expressions "Magister meus reverendus" and "Magister meus". But these expressions might very well have been Wyclif's own, and might refer to some of those men whom he valued as his Masters, as for instance, the Parisian teacher Henrik Gothals of Ghent † 1293 (Henrikus de Gandavo, Doctor solemnis), Johann v. Jaudun († c. 1329), Walter Burleigh († 1337), who may all be considered as Wyclif's fore- runners in the exposition of a Platonising Augustinian Realism, and to all of whom, at various places in his writings, he appeals. Perhaps too the expressions in question might refer to William Occam, whom Wyclif 2 Shirley I know 1 As least as far as the English MS. is concerned. only at second hand, as his excellent catalogue has not been accessible to me.
LVI INTRODUCTION. this burnt treatise, it is expressly mentioned that it consisted of five chapters, which also agrees with that which forms part of the Stockholm Manuscript (see Loserth, "Huss and Wiclif", p. 282). Recent investigations in England have shown that these writings which have hitherto been looked upon as mutually independent, viz. De tempore' (= de indiv. temp.), and De Ydeis',1 only form a part of Wyclif's great treatise De Ente'. De tempore' is in fact § 6 of Work I, and De Ydeis' § 5 of Work II of De Ente'. (This I owe to Dr. Furnivall and the Report of the Executive Committee.) We now come to the question of the authorship of No. IV, "Repli- cacio de universalibus", which is also supposed by Dudik to be the work of Huss. I must begin by observing that I consider Dudik's suppo- sition altogether doubtful. Both Shirley, in his 'Catalogue of the original works of John Wiclif" and, following him, Lechler in his great work ce Johann v. Wiclif und die Vorgeschichte der Reformation" and Vattier in “John Wyclyff, sa vie, ses oeuvres, sa doctrine", mention a treatise with this very title. Repl. de univ.' as one of Wyclif's original works (No. 9 of the philosophical writings in Shirley, No. 6 in Lechler and Vattier). It is in the MS. No. 10 in the University Library at Prag, but as 2 I have had no opportunity of comparing it with that at Stockholm, I cannot of course at present offer a decisive opinion on the subject. But so much at least must be plain, that it is by no means certain that Huss was the author. Dudik advances in support of his view the occur- rence here and there in this treatise of the expressions "Magister meus reverendus" and "Magister meus". But these expressions might very well have been Wyclif's own, and might refer to some of those men whom he valued as his Masters, as for instance, the Parisian teacher Henrik Gothals of Ghent † 1293 (Henrikus de Gandavo, Doctor solemnis), Johann v. Jaudun († c. 1329), Walter Burleigh († 1337), who may all be considered as Wyclif's fore- runners in the exposition of a Platonising Augustinian Realism, and to all of whom, at various places in his writings, he appeals. Perhaps too the expressions in question might refer to William Occam, whom Wyclif 2 Shirley I know 1 As least as far as the English MS. is concerned. only at second hand, as his excellent catalogue has not been accessible to me.
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INTRODUCTION. LVII nevertheless generally mentions by a still more honorable title, 'Venerabilis Inceptor". Or it may even be that he refers directly to Augustine (cf. Lechler: Johann v. Wiclif und die Vorgeschichte der Reformation I, p. 461 ; II, p. 610). Dudik furthermore seeks support for the claim of Huss in the fact that we find no omissions in the Manuscript of this treatise, as we do for instance in No. I, as well as in the comparatively rare cor- rections which here occur. But when we consider how short this treatise is, covering as it does only nine leaves, this state of things seems by no means remarkable. For corrections do occur, and among the other treatises one could easily find a long series of pages entirely wanting in omissions. The course of my investigation has therefore led me to the con- clusion that the authorship of the four longer treatises contained in the Stockholm MS. may be attributed to Wyclif with an amount of probability which is all but equivalent to certainty, while with regard to the short summary, entitled "Replicacio de universalibus", it is quite credible that it is due to his hand as well. The words of the text "per manus Hus de Hussynetz" will then reſer merely to the actual writer. That Huss with his own hand wrote at least the greater part, if not the whole, of this Manuscript, seems highly probable. The Bohemian works and phrases which occur point to a writer to whom this language was familiar. 1 Furthermore, Dr. Dudik sent through Professor Dr. Kolenati two facsimile passages out of this Manuscript to Herr Hanka of Prague, where Huss' original writings are preserved. One of these passages happened to be a part of the first treatise in which the words “haha czechu" seems to have been written by a different hand from the Manuscript itself (Cap. 10, see Appendix). Mr. Hanka declared the whole Manuscript to be the work of Huss (of course with the exception of certain additions, corrections &c. which are undoubtedly of later date). A fresh comparison between facsimiles from other parts of this codex and the originals of Huss at Prague ought to finally settle this question. 1 According to Dudik, these occasional Behemian words were probably inserted only to fill up the lines (“eine damalige Modesache"), and are quite without bearing on the text. But an expression like that which we find on leaf 43 (see Appendix), as well as one on leaf 51, has at least some connexion with the text.
INTRODUCTION. LVII nevertheless generally mentions by a still more honorable title, 'Venerabilis Inceptor". Or it may even be that he refers directly to Augustine (cf. Lechler: Johann v. Wiclif und die Vorgeschichte der Reformation I, p. 461 ; II, p. 610). Dudik furthermore seeks support for the claim of Huss in the fact that we find no omissions in the Manuscript of this treatise, as we do for instance in No. I, as well as in the comparatively rare cor- rections which here occur. But when we consider how short this treatise is, covering as it does only nine leaves, this state of things seems by no means remarkable. For corrections do occur, and among the other treatises one could easily find a long series of pages entirely wanting in omissions. The course of my investigation has therefore led me to the con- clusion that the authorship of the four longer treatises contained in the Stockholm MS. may be attributed to Wyclif with an amount of probability which is all but equivalent to certainty, while with regard to the short summary, entitled "Replicacio de universalibus", it is quite credible that it is due to his hand as well. The words of the text "per manus Hus de Hussynetz" will then reſer merely to the actual writer. That Huss with his own hand wrote at least the greater part, if not the whole, of this Manuscript, seems highly probable. The Bohemian works and phrases which occur point to a writer to whom this language was familiar. 1 Furthermore, Dr. Dudik sent through Professor Dr. Kolenati two facsimile passages out of this Manuscript to Herr Hanka of Prague, where Huss' original writings are preserved. One of these passages happened to be a part of the first treatise in which the words “haha czechu" seems to have been written by a different hand from the Manuscript itself (Cap. 10, see Appendix). Mr. Hanka declared the whole Manuscript to be the work of Huss (of course with the exception of certain additions, corrections &c. which are undoubtedly of later date). A fresh comparison between facsimiles from other parts of this codex and the originals of Huss at Prague ought to finally settle this question. 1 According to Dudik, these occasional Behemian words were probably inserted only to fill up the lines (“eine damalige Modesache"), and are quite without bearing on the text. But an expression like that which we find on leaf 43 (see Appendix), as well as one on leaf 51, has at least some connexion with the text.
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LVIII INTRODUCTION. Stephens', assertion, adopted by Dudik, that the treatises bearing Wyclif's name, Nos. I, III and V, were unknown and unprinted, now only holds good in part. Dudik himself of course helped to make their existence known to the learned world. Nos. V and III, "De universalibus' and "De materia et forma" are in Shirley's list of Wyclif's original works, though he omits "De individuacione temporis et instantis". (Although Shirley's catalogue dates from 1865 and Dudik's "Forschungen &c." from 1851, the latter's work was not turned to account by the former.) Since Lechler's time they have been included in all works upon Wyclif which have any pretence to completeness. It will be remembered from what has been said above that three treatises bearing the same names as these three were among the works burned on July 16th, 1410. Very soon after this remarkable day, disputations were delivered at the University of Prague in defence of this very treatise "De universalibus" by Idislaw v. Zwinzeticz' and "De materia et forma" by Johann v. Giczin. But to a certain extent the dictum of Stephens and Dudik above mentioned still holds good. It is a most remarkable fact that not even at this day is there a single one of Wyclif's philosophical works in print. 1 And this circumstance is all the more notable, when one remembers what a reputation for acumen and dialectical ability he enjoyed among his contemporaries as well as with posterity,2 since we often find “Subtilis vir", “Subtilis magister" applied to the English reformer. Latterly, however, great interest has been awakened both in the man and his works. The real impulse seems to have been due to Pro- fessor Walter Waddington Shirley of Oxford, who died in 1866. Of his excellent "Catalogue" I have already spoken; and besides this he published another work of great importance for the subject, '“Fasciculi Zizaniorum". In 1880, Wyclif's works in English were given to the public, but these are inconsiderable both in value and extent, compared with his Latin writings. In March 1882 the Wyclif Society was founded in England for the purpose of editing and publishing Wyclif's still unprinted Latin works, 1 See Note 1, p. XLVII. 2 Posterity has, however, not estimated Wyclif's scientific ability and importance so highly as his contemporaries, or as he deserved (vide Lechler: J. v. Wiclif und die Vorgeschichte der Reformation I, 34 et seq.). The effect of his great importance as a reformer has in some degree been to oveshadow his repute as a philosopher.
LVIII INTRODUCTION. Stephens', assertion, adopted by Dudik, that the treatises bearing Wyclif's name, Nos. I, III and V, were unknown and unprinted, now only holds good in part. Dudik himself of course helped to make their existence known to the learned world. Nos. V and III, "De universalibus' and "De materia et forma" are in Shirley's list of Wyclif's original works, though he omits "De individuacione temporis et instantis". (Although Shirley's catalogue dates from 1865 and Dudik's "Forschungen &c." from 1851, the latter's work was not turned to account by the former.) Since Lechler's time they have been included in all works upon Wyclif which have any pretence to completeness. It will be remembered from what has been said above that three treatises bearing the same names as these three were among the works burned on July 16th, 1410. Very soon after this remarkable day, disputations were delivered at the University of Prague in defence of this very treatise "De universalibus" by Idislaw v. Zwinzeticz' and "De materia et forma" by Johann v. Giczin. But to a certain extent the dictum of Stephens and Dudik above mentioned still holds good. It is a most remarkable fact that not even at this day is there a single one of Wyclif's philosophical works in print. 1 And this circumstance is all the more notable, when one remembers what a reputation for acumen and dialectical ability he enjoyed among his contemporaries as well as with posterity,2 since we often find “Subtilis vir", “Subtilis magister" applied to the English reformer. Latterly, however, great interest has been awakened both in the man and his works. The real impulse seems to have been due to Pro- fessor Walter Waddington Shirley of Oxford, who died in 1866. Of his excellent "Catalogue" I have already spoken; and besides this he published another work of great importance for the subject, '“Fasciculi Zizaniorum". In 1880, Wyclif's works in English were given to the public, but these are inconsiderable both in value and extent, compared with his Latin writings. In March 1882 the Wyclif Society was founded in England for the purpose of editing and publishing Wyclif's still unprinted Latin works, 1 See Note 1, p. XLVII. 2 Posterity has, however, not estimated Wyclif's scientific ability and importance so highly as his contemporaries, or as he deserved (vide Lechler: J. v. Wiclif und die Vorgeschichte der Reformation I, 34 et seq.). The effect of his great importance as a reformer has in some degree been to oveshadow his repute as a philosopher.
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INTRODUCTION. LIX and generally dispelling the obscurity which has gathered for centuries round the memory of the great reformer. It may now be asked whether these Stockholm treatises are found in MS. elsewhere. I will state what I have been able to discover. In the Imperial Library at Vienna, MS. No. 4307 : 2 contains De universalibus; No. 4523:3, De universalibus, 4 (p. 115.) De ideis. No. 5204: 1, De universalibus. In Trinity College Library, Cambridge, are first 3° (Vattier) "Tractatus de tempore 10 pp. large folio, and secondly 5° (Vattier) containing" De universalibus, De tempore, De ydeis. — In the Library of Trinity College, Dublin are 25. Tractatus de tempore, 37 pp. and 28. De ente universali et attributis divinis. At Lincoln Cathedral are 1° De universalibus. A. G. 2°. De tempore, a part of 'De temporis quidditate (?= De individuacione temporis et instantis).' Furthermore, as I have already mentioned, there is a copy of Wyclif's treatise De univer- salibus' in the University Library at Prague (VIII. F. I.).1 The size and whole appearance of the Stockholm MS. are such as were usual with University pamphlets in the fourteenth century (see above, p. XLVII). The treatises are dated, as I have said, 1398. It was in that very year that J. Huss first officiated as a public teacher at the University of Prague. It is therefore by no means an unreasonable supposition that these philosophical treatises formed J. Huss' earliest lectures. Nor need we be astonished because Huss gave to his hearers Wyclif's philosophical essays, instead of some independent work of his own. For according to the statutes of the Philosophical Faculty at Prague, whereas a 'magister artium liberarum' had a right to deliver original lectures, a Baccalaureus' on the other hand was only permitted to discourse from the written work of an eminent Magister of Prague, Paris, or Oxford. It is certainly true that, even two years before his appearance as lecturer, Huss had been promoted to the standing of Mag. artium liberarum. But it is scarcely likely that he, a young man naturally endowed with greater acceptive than creative ability, would at his first appearance as an academic teacher have taken advantage of the privileges allowed him by the statutes of April 20, 1367 (vide Loserth p. 73.) Beginner as he was, he would have found great encouragement and support in the authority of so prominent a dialectician as the Oxford "Magister" J. Wyclif. In the very next year, 1 Vattier a. a. p. 190, 191; Loserth a. a. 225, 226.
INTRODUCTION. LIX and generally dispelling the obscurity which has gathered for centuries round the memory of the great reformer. It may now be asked whether these Stockholm treatises are found in MS. elsewhere. I will state what I have been able to discover. In the Imperial Library at Vienna, MS. No. 4307 : 2 contains De universalibus; No. 4523:3, De universalibus, 4 (p. 115.) De ideis. No. 5204: 1, De universalibus. In Trinity College Library, Cambridge, are first 3° (Vattier) "Tractatus de tempore 10 pp. large folio, and secondly 5° (Vattier) containing" De universalibus, De tempore, De ydeis. — In the Library of Trinity College, Dublin are 25. Tractatus de tempore, 37 pp. and 28. De ente universali et attributis divinis. At Lincoln Cathedral are 1° De universalibus. A. G. 2°. De tempore, a part of 'De temporis quidditate (?= De individuacione temporis et instantis).' Furthermore, as I have already mentioned, there is a copy of Wyclif's treatise De univer- salibus' in the University Library at Prague (VIII. F. I.).1 The size and whole appearance of the Stockholm MS. are such as were usual with University pamphlets in the fourteenth century (see above, p. XLVII). The treatises are dated, as I have said, 1398. It was in that very year that J. Huss first officiated as a public teacher at the University of Prague. It is therefore by no means an unreasonable supposition that these philosophical treatises formed J. Huss' earliest lectures. Nor need we be astonished because Huss gave to his hearers Wyclif's philosophical essays, instead of some independent work of his own. For according to the statutes of the Philosophical Faculty at Prague, whereas a 'magister artium liberarum' had a right to deliver original lectures, a Baccalaureus' on the other hand was only permitted to discourse from the written work of an eminent Magister of Prague, Paris, or Oxford. It is certainly true that, even two years before his appearance as lecturer, Huss had been promoted to the standing of Mag. artium liberarum. But it is scarcely likely that he, a young man naturally endowed with greater acceptive than creative ability, would at his first appearance as an academic teacher have taken advantage of the privileges allowed him by the statutes of April 20, 1367 (vide Loserth p. 73.) Beginner as he was, he would have found great encouragement and support in the authority of so prominent a dialectician as the Oxford "Magister" J. Wyclif. In the very next year, 1 Vattier a. a. p. 190, 191; Loserth a. a. 225, 226.
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LX INTRODUCTION. as well as subsequently, we find Huss also occupied in resistance to the attacks to which Wyclif's Realism was exposed from the prevaiing School of Nominalism. One of his contemporaries and declared opponents, Stephen von Dolein, also states in his "Epistola ad Hussitas', that at first among the teachers at Prague Huss was almost the only one who received Wyclif's writings with joy, read them and handed them over to others for study and their future guidance, though there are also some persons who entered their gentle protest against him, persons who now (Dolein wrote in 1417) rest in the Lord and others who are yet alive" (Loserth p. 96). And lastly, when we add to this the fact that the treatises, as I have shown, were undoubtedly written by the hand of Huss, we must allow it to be highly probable that they actually formed his first public lectures. Since then none of Wyclif's philosophical writings have been printed and published hitherto ; and since, furthermore, it is probable that these treatises are Huss' earliest lectures, the contents of the Stockholm MS. must be of no little interest both as a contribution to our knowledge of Huss and in connexion with the question of the general tendency of Wyclif's philosophy, about which extremely little is known. 1 And besides, these writings of 500 years ago help to throw some light on the general sub- ject of scientific University life at that date. Dr. Dudik too, thirly years ago, expressed a wish in this direction ; though hitherto no one has devoted himself to the task. I may perhaps quote the Bohemian scholar's own words: "Und somit bleibt kein anderer Wunsch, als dass diese Schriften in ihrem Inhalte gehörig gewürdigt werden möchten. Für Wyclif so gut wie für dessen Schüler, Huss, haben sie immer einen Werth und als Autograph sind sie eine kostbare Reliquie, wie für Böhmen, so für die ganze gelehrte Welt. Lastly, it may be asked how it is that no Swedish scholar has taken in hand and endeavoured to interpret this precious manuscript, which has now for so long, — in fact nearly 250 years, — been in the possession of Sweden, after having passed the first 250 years of its existence in the keeping of Bohemia. The reason of this no doubt is partly 1 Nor will it be disputed that these treatises of Wyclif's which contain, so to say, the propaedeutics of his theology, deserve to be published from this point of view also (vide Lechler a. a. 1, p. 24 et passim).
LX INTRODUCTION. as well as subsequently, we find Huss also occupied in resistance to the attacks to which Wyclif's Realism was exposed from the prevaiing School of Nominalism. One of his contemporaries and declared opponents, Stephen von Dolein, also states in his "Epistola ad Hussitas', that at first among the teachers at Prague Huss was almost the only one who received Wyclif's writings with joy, read them and handed them over to others for study and their future guidance, though there are also some persons who entered their gentle protest against him, persons who now (Dolein wrote in 1417) rest in the Lord and others who are yet alive" (Loserth p. 96). And lastly, when we add to this the fact that the treatises, as I have shown, were undoubtedly written by the hand of Huss, we must allow it to be highly probable that they actually formed his first public lectures. Since then none of Wyclif's philosophical writings have been printed and published hitherto ; and since, furthermore, it is probable that these treatises are Huss' earliest lectures, the contents of the Stockholm MS. must be of no little interest both as a contribution to our knowledge of Huss and in connexion with the question of the general tendency of Wyclif's philosophy, about which extremely little is known. 1 And besides, these writings of 500 years ago help to throw some light on the general sub- ject of scientific University life at that date. Dr. Dudik too, thirly years ago, expressed a wish in this direction ; though hitherto no one has devoted himself to the task. I may perhaps quote the Bohemian scholar's own words: "Und somit bleibt kein anderer Wunsch, als dass diese Schriften in ihrem Inhalte gehörig gewürdigt werden möchten. Für Wyclif so gut wie für dessen Schüler, Huss, haben sie immer einen Werth und als Autograph sind sie eine kostbare Reliquie, wie für Böhmen, so für die ganze gelehrte Welt. Lastly, it may be asked how it is that no Swedish scholar has taken in hand and endeavoured to interpret this precious manuscript, which has now for so long, — in fact nearly 250 years, — been in the possession of Sweden, after having passed the first 250 years of its existence in the keeping of Bohemia. The reason of this no doubt is partly 1 Nor will it be disputed that these treatises of Wyclif's which contain, so to say, the propaedeutics of his theology, deserve to be published from this point of view also (vide Lechler a. a. 1, p. 24 et passim).
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INTRODUCTION. LXI because the great expenditure of time consequent upon the difficulty of deciphering the MS., with its obscurities and numerous abbreviations, has frightened would-be investigators from attempting the task. The interest which I feel for the work has led me to make a genuine attempt to decipher that one of the five treatises of the MS. which has secmed to me most likely to repay me for my pains. I was influenced in my choice, partly because this particular treatise is a reputed original work by Huss, which gives it a special interest, and partly because of its shortness, and furthermore by the fact that the "replicacio de univer- salibus" is the only one of the five contained in the Stockholm MS. which seems to be unique. As far as I can learn, no other library in Europe possesses a copy of this treatise. May I conclude by hoping that my work will be looked upon as a small and humble contribution towards the realisation of the great and noble task which the Wyclif Society has undertaken? Upsala, October 1889. A. Hermann Lundström. Appendix. Bohemian words and sentences occuring in Wiclefi tractatus methaphysici per manus Mag. Joh. Hus de an. 1398 (Stockholm MS.). I. In the first treatise: "de indiuiduacione temporis et instantis' before Ch. 4 occur the following words : Consequens est dicere de indiuidua- cione temporis et instantis &c. and at the end of the line in red ink: * „2 Dobrzye bude daly 1 boh" i. e. "It must be good, if God so grant." Before Ch. 5 "Supposita igitur ipsa sentencia de indiuiduacione &c." and then in red (leaf 10) "haha nyemczy haha" i. e. "Haha, Germans, haha!" and then in black ink and by a different, though, on the authority of Dr. B. Dudik and Hr. Klemming, Head Librarian at Stockholm, who 1 Not “dali" as Dudík reads. 2 By the help of Professor Dr. Hjärne in Upsala, I am able to add translations of some of the Bohemian interpolations, but others remain still unintelligible.
INTRODUCTION. LXI because the great expenditure of time consequent upon the difficulty of deciphering the MS., with its obscurities and numerous abbreviations, has frightened would-be investigators from attempting the task. The interest which I feel for the work has led me to make a genuine attempt to decipher that one of the five treatises of the MS. which has secmed to me most likely to repay me for my pains. I was influenced in my choice, partly because this particular treatise is a reputed original work by Huss, which gives it a special interest, and partly because of its shortness, and furthermore by the fact that the "replicacio de univer- salibus" is the only one of the five contained in the Stockholm MS. which seems to be unique. As far as I can learn, no other library in Europe possesses a copy of this treatise. May I conclude by hoping that my work will be looked upon as a small and humble contribution towards the realisation of the great and noble task which the Wyclif Society has undertaken? Upsala, October 1889. A. Hermann Lundström. Appendix. Bohemian words and sentences occuring in Wiclefi tractatus methaphysici per manus Mag. Joh. Hus de an. 1398 (Stockholm MS.). I. In the first treatise: "de indiuiduacione temporis et instantis' before Ch. 4 occur the following words : Consequens est dicere de indiuidua- cione temporis et instantis &c. and at the end of the line in red ink: * „2 Dobrzye bude daly 1 boh" i. e. "It must be good, if God so grant." Before Ch. 5 "Supposita igitur ipsa sentencia de indiuiduacione &c." and then in red (leaf 10) "haha nyemczy haha" i. e. "Haha, Germans, haha!" and then in black ink and by a different, though, on the authority of Dr. B. Dudik and Hr. Klemming, Head Librarian at Stockholm, who 1 Not “dali" as Dudík reads. 2 By the help of Professor Dr. Hjärne in Upsala, I am able to add translations of some of the Bohemian interpolations, but others remain still unintelligible.
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LXII INTRODUCTION. went through the MS. together, a contemporary hand ; “haha czechu" i. e. * Haha, Bohemians !" Before Ch. 6 (leaf 13): "Post indiuiduacionem mundi &c." and in red "haha nymczy (sic) haha" i. e. “Haha, Germans! Haha! Before Ch. 9: "Sed quid dicam de indiuiduacione &c." and in red ink : haha nymczy haha ven ven" (not vey vey) i. e. “Haha, Germans ! haha! away, away !" Before Ch. 12 (leaf 31): "Explicit ergo loyca &c." and in red strach brachu" i. e. “Fear of the brother!" II. In the Second Treatise “de Ydeis" we find in the first paragraph (leaf 40) in red ink: “Strach protywnosty", i. e. “Fear of opponents !" In the second paragraph (leaf 43) in red ink: tulo dadye Aristotylessowy w roh" i. e. c This is one for Aristotle's horn". In the third (leaf 48) in red : „ pomniy" i. e. "Remember !" At the end of the fourth (leaf 51): ce Nechwatay non intelligentibus dawaty" i. e. 'Haste not to give this to those that do not understand." III. In the Third Treatise "de materia et forma" occur the following : At the end of the first section (leaf 55): prdnu 1 (sic!) druzy w roh". At the end of the second section (leaf 57) Buh wssudy" i. e. “God everywhere". At the end of the third (leaf 59): Au' roys osra haczye (sic)" At the end of the fourth (leaf 63) Buh day Wyclefowy2 nebeske kralewstwye" i. e. ce God give unto Wyclif the kingdom of heaven ! (leaf 66): “haha" ink: 1 Dr. Dudik supposes that as this expression is scarcely in harmony with Huss' character ; the word 'prdnu" may be written wrongly for 'padnu", through 2 Thus the MS. Dudik there is no doubt that the original has the first form. has wrongly Wyklefowy.
LXII INTRODUCTION. went through the MS. together, a contemporary hand ; “haha czechu" i. e. * Haha, Bohemians !" Before Ch. 6 (leaf 13): "Post indiuiduacionem mundi &c." and in red "haha nymczy (sic) haha" i. e. “Haha, Germans! Haha! Before Ch. 9: "Sed quid dicam de indiuiduacione &c." and in red ink : haha nymczy haha ven ven" (not vey vey) i. e. “Haha, Germans ! haha! away, away !" Before Ch. 12 (leaf 31): "Explicit ergo loyca &c." and in red strach brachu" i. e. “Fear of the brother!" II. In the Second Treatise “de Ydeis" we find in the first paragraph (leaf 40) in red ink: “Strach protywnosty", i. e. “Fear of opponents !" In the second paragraph (leaf 43) in red ink: tulo dadye Aristotylessowy w roh" i. e. c This is one for Aristotle's horn". In the third (leaf 48) in red : „ pomniy" i. e. "Remember !" At the end of the fourth (leaf 51): ce Nechwatay non intelligentibus dawaty" i. e. 'Haste not to give this to those that do not understand." III. In the Third Treatise "de materia et forma" occur the following : At the end of the first section (leaf 55): prdnu 1 (sic!) druzy w roh". At the end of the second section (leaf 57) Buh wssudy" i. e. “God everywhere". At the end of the third (leaf 59): Au' roys osra haczye (sic)" At the end of the fourth (leaf 63) Buh day Wyclefowy2 nebeske kralewstwye" i. e. ce God give unto Wyclif the kingdom of heaven ! (leaf 66): “haha" ink: 1 Dr. Dudik supposes that as this expression is scarcely in harmony with Huss' character ; the word 'prdnu" may be written wrongly for 'padnu", through 2 Thus the MS. Dudik there is no doubt that the original has the first form. has wrongly Wyklefowy.
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INTRODUCTION. LXIII At the end of the eighth (leaf 74): rosumyej". And after “Explicit..... Vycleph": "O Wycleff Wycleff negednomu ty hlawu zwycless" i. e. “O Wiclif, Wiclif upon many hast thou exercised wit!' IV. In the Fourth Treatise: "Replicacio de vniversalibus" are no Bohemian words. V. In the Fifth Treatise "de veris vniversalibus" occur the following: At the end of Ch. 3 (leaf 94) in red ink: cr Za zlaty stogy czos slyssal" i. e. "What thou hast heard may be priced in gold". Before Ch. 5 (leaf 95) in red : hurtyk". Before Ch. 8 (leaf 102): haha niemczy haha" i. e. 'Haha, Germans ! Haha !' Before Ch. 11 (leaf 116): znamenay czos slyssal" i. e. "Mark what thon hast heard !' Before Ch. 13 (leaf 124): * Myly Wycleph dayt boh nebeske kralewstwye" i. e. Dear Wyclif, may God give to thee the kingdom of heaven!" In Ch. 13 (leaf 126) in the fourth sentence "quando sit distinccio' after the word "arguenda" is written in red ink hrdyna" 1 i. e. "hero' but it has apparently no connexion with the text. Lastly at the end of this treatise and of the MS. (leaf 134) after the words “Explicit.. &c," is added in red ink: “ Amen tak boh day" i. e. ce Amen, may God so grant!" (2). Authenticity and date of the Work. As we see, Pastor Lundström comes to the conclusion, on one hand, that it is very doubtful whether Replicacio de Universalibus was written by Huss, and on the other that "it is quite credible" that Wyclif wrote it. I must for my own part and without the slightest doubt assert 1 Thus the MS. Dr. Dudik has wrongly “hrdina".
INTRODUCTION. LXIII At the end of the eighth (leaf 74): rosumyej". And after “Explicit..... Vycleph": "O Wycleff Wycleff negednomu ty hlawu zwycless" i. e. “O Wiclif, Wiclif upon many hast thou exercised wit!' IV. In the Fourth Treatise: "Replicacio de vniversalibus" are no Bohemian words. V. In the Fifth Treatise "de veris vniversalibus" occur the following: At the end of Ch. 3 (leaf 94) in red ink: cr Za zlaty stogy czos slyssal" i. e. "What thou hast heard may be priced in gold". Before Ch. 5 (leaf 95) in red : hurtyk". Before Ch. 8 (leaf 102): haha niemczy haha" i. e. 'Haha, Germans ! Haha !' Before Ch. 11 (leaf 116): znamenay czos slyssal" i. e. "Mark what thon hast heard !' Before Ch. 13 (leaf 124): * Myly Wycleph dayt boh nebeske kralewstwye" i. e. Dear Wyclif, may God give to thee the kingdom of heaven!" In Ch. 13 (leaf 126) in the fourth sentence "quando sit distinccio' after the word "arguenda" is written in red ink hrdyna" 1 i. e. "hero' but it has apparently no connexion with the text. Lastly at the end of this treatise and of the MS. (leaf 134) after the words “Explicit.. &c," is added in red ink: “ Amen tak boh day" i. e. ce Amen, may God so grant!" (2). Authenticity and date of the Work. As we see, Pastor Lundström comes to the conclusion, on one hand, that it is very doubtful whether Replicacio de Universalibus was written by Huss, and on the other that "it is quite credible" that Wyclif wrote it. I must for my own part and without the slightest doubt assert 1 Thus the MS. Dr. Dudik has wrongly “hrdina".
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LXIV INTRODUCTION. the contrary to the latter conclusion: to me the supposition of Wyclif's authorship is absolutely incredible. The writer discusses at length external evidences of various kinds; but it is strange that neither Dudik nor himself should have taken the trouble to examine the internal evidence afforded by the work itself ; that so much should have been made of Magister meus Reverendus' — who, notwithstanding Lundström's doubts and suppositions, certainly was Wyclif — and so little of the thesis which the said Reverend Master' was evidently upholding. Nor can it be said that the treatise is incomprehensible on account of its Scholastic termino- logy. When we find the writer all along maintaining that there are no real Universals, while the Reverend Master' asserts them throughout the work — it requires but little acquaintance with Mediaeval philosophy to conclude that Wyclif was not its author ; unless indeed this was written at the very outset of his University studies. And even this possibility disappears for any one who has studied his system, which is essentially the same as that set forth in the arguments of the "Reverendus Magister." This, it is true, Lundström could not have done; but might he not have thought it incredible that Huss should have taken the trouble to copy a work of Wyclif, written before Wyclif was himself? I should have much preferred not to have been obliged to say this, for the editor's Introduction plainly shows much serious and pains-taking research; nnhappily there is, I believe, a tendency among certain scholars to overlook internal evidence and to overrate that which is external, especially in works of this kind. Here we have a case in which all disputes and conjectures might have been easily settled by the most superficial examination of the text itself. On p. 131, we see clearly that according to the Magister' with whom the writer is at variance all through, idem est veritas rei et entitas universaliter'. This might perhaps fail to be understood as an assertion of Realism. But what of the Master's conclusion (p. 133) Universale est, to which the writer opposes (p. 134) Nullum universale reale in essendo est, with clear arguments (pp. 134—138) to prove his point .... Quod non est universale in essendo reale ... probatur... Vel universale in essendo reale et suum singulare differunt, vel non ... Si esset universale in essendo reale... Dicit [Magister] quod universale est, et mea conclusio ponit oppositum ... And again (p. 144) Volui probare quod nullum universale in essendo est'. And on p. 148: Posuit magister istam con-
LXIV INTRODUCTION. the contrary to the latter conclusion: to me the supposition of Wyclif's authorship is absolutely incredible. The writer discusses at length external evidences of various kinds; but it is strange that neither Dudik nor himself should have taken the trouble to examine the internal evidence afforded by the work itself ; that so much should have been made of Magister meus Reverendus' — who, notwithstanding Lundström's doubts and suppositions, certainly was Wyclif — and so little of the thesis which the said Reverend Master' was evidently upholding. Nor can it be said that the treatise is incomprehensible on account of its Scholastic termino- logy. When we find the writer all along maintaining that there are no real Universals, while the Reverend Master' asserts them throughout the work — it requires but little acquaintance with Mediaeval philosophy to conclude that Wyclif was not its author ; unless indeed this was written at the very outset of his University studies. And even this possibility disappears for any one who has studied his system, which is essentially the same as that set forth in the arguments of the "Reverendus Magister." This, it is true, Lundström could not have done; but might he not have thought it incredible that Huss should have taken the trouble to copy a work of Wyclif, written before Wyclif was himself? I should have much preferred not to have been obliged to say this, for the editor's Introduction plainly shows much serious and pains-taking research; nnhappily there is, I believe, a tendency among certain scholars to overlook internal evidence and to overrate that which is external, especially in works of this kind. Here we have a case in which all disputes and conjectures might have been easily settled by the most superficial examination of the text itself. On p. 131, we see clearly that according to the Magister' with whom the writer is at variance all through, idem est veritas rei et entitas universaliter'. This might perhaps fail to be understood as an assertion of Realism. But what of the Master's conclusion (p. 133) Universale est, to which the writer opposes (p. 134) Nullum universale reale in essendo est, with clear arguments (pp. 134—138) to prove his point .... Quod non est universale in essendo reale ... probatur... Vel universale in essendo reale et suum singulare differunt, vel non ... Si esset universale in essendo reale... Dicit [Magister] quod universale est, et mea conclusio ponit oppositum ... And again (p. 144) Volui probare quod nullum universale in essendo est'. And on p. 148: Posuit magister istam con-
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INTRODUCTION LXV clusionem ... universale est singulare' (evidently meaning, 'is not a pure abstraction'). Once more we find (p. 149) the writer's assertion, and stated as his own : 'Nullum universale est'. And here I only give such expressions are as on the face of them quite umnistakable : but the whole work would to me at least have no meaning, if we supposed that the writer was Wyclif, defending the reality of Universals, since every one of his arguments is directed point-blank aganist them. But, this being so, what proofs are there that Wyclif was, as I have said, the Magister' referred to ? what likelihood have we that Huss was the author of the work ? and if not Huss, who may he have been ? To the first question I believe that everybody who knows Wyclif's line of thought, and studies the arguments given, will think that no proofs are required other than the tractate itself. Not to speak of De Universalibus, which has not yet appeared, but which I have had the advantage to see, we find the Magister's very arguments repeated and developed in Logica, vol II. His point that 'to be a man' (hominem esse) is the essence of man, and that this essence has a universal yet real existence, is to be read in Log. II. pp. 33 — 35, as well as in the Replicacio, pp. 133—134. The difficulties he grapples with about the Universal and its singular forming a number, are to be found both in Log. pp. 47—53 and in Rep. p. 136; the Phoenix' difficulty, which he tries to solve in one treatise, occurs in the other, and is answered in like manner. But really there is no need to go further ; if anyone who has read Ch. II of Logica, vol. II, reads the Replicatio without being convinced that the Magister in question was Wyclif himself (or at least some one holding the very same doctrines), I do not see by what means he can be convinced. If we suppose, however, that towards the end of the XIV. century there existed in Bohemia a Magister' whose views and ideas were identical with those of Wyclif, it is possible that Huss may, as a dialectical exercise, have taken up the cudgels against him, and argued the question from a Nominalistic point of view. It has often happened that men, wishing to see things more clearly, have tried to reason themselves out of opinions towards which they had a strong leaning. Still I do not think this at all probable. There are here and there certain traces of fierceness — almost of a dialectical scuffle — that would ill suit such an attitude, which would be but feigned antagonism after all. There is a quiet exultation over a temporary embarrassment of the Magister, denying 'quo E
INTRODUCTION LXV clusionem ... universale est singulare' (evidently meaning, 'is not a pure abstraction'). Once more we find (p. 149) the writer's assertion, and stated as his own : 'Nullum universale est'. And here I only give such expressions are as on the face of them quite umnistakable : but the whole work would to me at least have no meaning, if we supposed that the writer was Wyclif, defending the reality of Universals, since every one of his arguments is directed point-blank aganist them. But, this being so, what proofs are there that Wyclif was, as I have said, the Magister' referred to ? what likelihood have we that Huss was the author of the work ? and if not Huss, who may he have been ? To the first question I believe that everybody who knows Wyclif's line of thought, and studies the arguments given, will think that no proofs are required other than the tractate itself. Not to speak of De Universalibus, which has not yet appeared, but which I have had the advantage to see, we find the Magister's very arguments repeated and developed in Logica, vol II. His point that 'to be a man' (hominem esse) is the essence of man, and that this essence has a universal yet real existence, is to be read in Log. II. pp. 33 — 35, as well as in the Replicacio, pp. 133—134. The difficulties he grapples with about the Universal and its singular forming a number, are to be found both in Log. pp. 47—53 and in Rep. p. 136; the Phoenix' difficulty, which he tries to solve in one treatise, occurs in the other, and is answered in like manner. But really there is no need to go further ; if anyone who has read Ch. II of Logica, vol. II, reads the Replicatio without being convinced that the Magister in question was Wyclif himself (or at least some one holding the very same doctrines), I do not see by what means he can be convinced. If we suppose, however, that towards the end of the XIV. century there existed in Bohemia a Magister' whose views and ideas were identical with those of Wyclif, it is possible that Huss may, as a dialectical exercise, have taken up the cudgels against him, and argued the question from a Nominalistic point of view. It has often happened that men, wishing to see things more clearly, have tried to reason themselves out of opinions towards which they had a strong leaning. Still I do not think this at all probable. There are here and there certain traces of fierceness — almost of a dialectical scuffle — that would ill suit such an attitude, which would be but feigned antagonism after all. There is a quiet exultation over a temporary embarrassment of the Magister, denying 'quo E
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LXVI INTRODUCTION. ad presens' a consequence which he admitted to be formally right, that seems to me far different from the tone which Huss would have taken under similar circumstances. And it certainly seems to me that the writer is sincere in his attempts to make Wyclif contradict himself; nay, even in his belief that he has succeeded. Who he may have been, if not Huss, is a question of less importance: possibly some young Dominican or Franciscan friar who, being well skilled in the mental fencing that such a debate required, had challenged Wyclif to a public controversy, and afterwards wrote a short account of it. That the account was fair enough, and contained an impartial statement of both sides of the question, would be a sufficient reason for its being copied by Huss, to whom we may perhaps ascribe the closing words in which he shows that, in his opinion, Wyclif had the best of the argument, and his adversary was only able to proceed by 'extraneis cavillacionibus'. This view of the matter also clearly explains the reason why this treatise was not burnt by Archbishop Zbinca, as Lundström tells us — and also why it passed as a work of Wyclif ; which it indeed is in part, as much as the stenographie report of a debate between Gladstone and Beaconsfield may be counted among the works of either. A few words now as to the date. It is of course — since Wyclif is designated as Magister' — sufficiently fixed one way. But whether it be anterior to Logica and De Aclibus it is impossible to say with any certitude. If De Actibus was anterior to Wyclif's Mastership, the conclusion is obvious; but we have seen that this is not at all sure. The greater development of Wyclif's arguments and lines of reasoning in Logica might lead us to think the Replicalio was written before it; but as it is, in all probability, only a report and a summary of a debate that seems to have really taken place, the proof falls to the ground, or at any rate is merely negative. There is nothing whatever to show that the debate took place after Logica was finished; but even that hypothesis is not improbable. (3). Analysis of the Contents. Properly speaking, the analysis of what is in itself the dryest and most succinct analysis — the skeleton of an skeleton, if such an expression may be allowed — were a task beyond the power of man. To follow the discussion properly, the whole of the tractate, or at least the whole
LXVI INTRODUCTION. ad presens' a consequence which he admitted to be formally right, that seems to me far different from the tone which Huss would have taken under similar circumstances. And it certainly seems to me that the writer is sincere in his attempts to make Wyclif contradict himself; nay, even in his belief that he has succeeded. Who he may have been, if not Huss, is a question of less importance: possibly some young Dominican or Franciscan friar who, being well skilled in the mental fencing that such a debate required, had challenged Wyclif to a public controversy, and afterwards wrote a short account of it. That the account was fair enough, and contained an impartial statement of both sides of the question, would be a sufficient reason for its being copied by Huss, to whom we may perhaps ascribe the closing words in which he shows that, in his opinion, Wyclif had the best of the argument, and his adversary was only able to proceed by 'extraneis cavillacionibus'. This view of the matter also clearly explains the reason why this treatise was not burnt by Archbishop Zbinca, as Lundström tells us — and also why it passed as a work of Wyclif ; which it indeed is in part, as much as the stenographie report of a debate between Gladstone and Beaconsfield may be counted among the works of either. A few words now as to the date. It is of course — since Wyclif is designated as Magister' — sufficiently fixed one way. But whether it be anterior to Logica and De Aclibus it is impossible to say with any certitude. If De Actibus was anterior to Wyclif's Mastership, the conclusion is obvious; but we have seen that this is not at all sure. The greater development of Wyclif's arguments and lines of reasoning in Logica might lead us to think the Replicalio was written before it; but as it is, in all probability, only a report and a summary of a debate that seems to have really taken place, the proof falls to the ground, or at any rate is merely negative. There is nothing whatever to show that the debate took place after Logica was finished; but even that hypothesis is not improbable. (3). Analysis of the Contents. Properly speaking, the analysis of what is in itself the dryest and most succinct analysis — the skeleton of an skeleton, if such an expression may be allowed — were a task beyond the power of man. To follow the discussion properly, the whole of the tractate, or at least the whole
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INTRODUCTION. LXVII of the side-notes, should be read, with Wyclif's proofs in support of his thesis, and the adversary's denials and distinctions; with the adversary's proofs of his own counter-thesis, and the distinctions and denials given by Wyclif. But we may at least, in this debate, call the reader's attention to the weak point on each side, and to the argument best pressed home and least easily defended. In this duel of thoughts, if the report of the debate be fair, each of the combatants failed to parry a certain stroke ; and (I think) both from the same reason: each was wrong to some extent. On p. 138 we find the writer cornered by Wyclif's arguments, and actually making this astounding assertion: “A man cannot exist without any animated being existing; and yet it is not necessary for a man to be an animated being ; for we can conceive circumstances under which a man is not an animated being. And thus his being animated is not essential, although it is necessary, according to his nature, that he be an animated being ! When such an admission is made, he that makes it must be hard pressed indeed, and Wyclif certainly scores here. Yet it was due to no weakness on the part of the adversary ; the fault lay in the system. Nominalists contended that every universal term only signified a class of existing objects ; if they did not exist, the Universal term was void of signification as a fact. A man is an animated being ; but suppose only one man to exist, and all other animals to be destroyed, what becomes of the class? It would exist no longer, and the man would not be an animated being, since there would be no others with which he can form a class. It is necessary that man should be animated, and also a being, but not that he should be an animated being! At least it is thus, and only thus, that I can understand this answer, based upon a wrong and narrow conception of classes as composed of existing, not of possible members: a conception which most modern logicians repudiate. And with reason; for when we predicate animated of any being, we cannot help placing it in a possible class, whether there be other members or not. But, Wyclif maintaining that the class exists anteriorly to the existence of the animated individual, and his antagonist conceiving a class only as a multitude of similar individuals, the latter was obliged to deny what seems in reality undeniable. Wyclif is, on the other hand, very hard pressed hunself in another part of the debate. On pp. 143—145, we find him striving to answer this objection: If the Universal is really one with its singular, it cannot E-
INTRODUCTION. LXVII of the side-notes, should be read, with Wyclif's proofs in support of his thesis, and the adversary's denials and distinctions; with the adversary's proofs of his own counter-thesis, and the distinctions and denials given by Wyclif. But we may at least, in this debate, call the reader's attention to the weak point on each side, and to the argument best pressed home and least easily defended. In this duel of thoughts, if the report of the debate be fair, each of the combatants failed to parry a certain stroke ; and (I think) both from the same reason: each was wrong to some extent. On p. 138 we find the writer cornered by Wyclif's arguments, and actually making this astounding assertion: “A man cannot exist without any animated being existing; and yet it is not necessary for a man to be an animated being ; for we can conceive circumstances under which a man is not an animated being. And thus his being animated is not essential, although it is necessary, according to his nature, that he be an animated being ! When such an admission is made, he that makes it must be hard pressed indeed, and Wyclif certainly scores here. Yet it was due to no weakness on the part of the adversary ; the fault lay in the system. Nominalists contended that every universal term only signified a class of existing objects ; if they did not exist, the Universal term was void of signification as a fact. A man is an animated being ; but suppose only one man to exist, and all other animals to be destroyed, what becomes of the class? It would exist no longer, and the man would not be an animated being, since there would be no others with which he can form a class. It is necessary that man should be animated, and also a being, but not that he should be an animated being! At least it is thus, and only thus, that I can understand this answer, based upon a wrong and narrow conception of classes as composed of existing, not of possible members: a conception which most modern logicians repudiate. And with reason; for when we predicate animated of any being, we cannot help placing it in a possible class, whether there be other members or not. But, Wyclif maintaining that the class exists anteriorly to the existence of the animated individual, and his antagonist conceiving a class only as a multitude of similar individuals, the latter was obliged to deny what seems in reality undeniable. Wyclif is, on the other hand, very hard pressed hunself in another part of the debate. On pp. 143—145, we find him striving to answer this objection: If the Universal is really one with its singular, it cannot E-
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LXVIII INTRODUCTION. really include its singular, as it must by its universal nature. The underlying question is whether, if you allow that the Universal has a separate existence of its own, independent of any one of its singulars, you are able to count the Universal and its singular separately as two. Not only you are able, but you must; but if so, you have two singulars, one of which is not the other. And this must, in the system of Real Universals, be denied : the Universal and its singular are one. How then can one include the other? This is a palpable hit, and Wyclif does not affect to make light of it. He admits that the argument is well put and seemingly conclusive, but provisionally' (quo ad presens) denies the conclusion. And further, on p. 144, we see him in the meshes of a similar difficulty, first admitting the conclusion that the existence of one thing may be that of another', and then adding — as an after-thought, his opponent maliciously remarks — a distinction against which there is a strong and apparently unans- werable argument. Of course this is the crux of the matter. Give the Universal Humanity, Animation — what you will — only ideal existence, and the difficulty disappears. The problem is how to think them as real things, other than their singulars, yet identical with them ; and if other, then singulars or units which can be counted ; and yet universal. However great Wyclif's philosophical acumen may have been, it is no wonder if he floundered about a little just in this place. We may leave him so : this review of the two most interesting parts in the debate will, I think, suffice in lieu of the detailed contents of so short a treatise. III. De Materia et Forma. (1). The Manuscripts. Of this work there are no fewer than seven manuscripts extant. Shirley gives six of them in his catalogue; the seventh is the Stockholm MS., written by Huss in all probability, and for that reason taken as text. Of the others, I omitted collating Prag. Univ. 8. G. 23 and 5. H. 16, because, having looked over them, I thought their variants of little importance to the text, and in most cases concurring with those already noted, except where they gave blunders of their own. I need not say that this step was only taken with the full concurrence of Dr Furnivall. Lundström's Introduction gives a very complete description of the Stock-
LXVIII INTRODUCTION. really include its singular, as it must by its universal nature. The underlying question is whether, if you allow that the Universal has a separate existence of its own, independent of any one of its singulars, you are able to count the Universal and its singular separately as two. Not only you are able, but you must; but if so, you have two singulars, one of which is not the other. And this must, in the system of Real Universals, be denied : the Universal and its singular are one. How then can one include the other? This is a palpable hit, and Wyclif does not affect to make light of it. He admits that the argument is well put and seemingly conclusive, but provisionally' (quo ad presens) denies the conclusion. And further, on p. 144, we see him in the meshes of a similar difficulty, first admitting the conclusion that the existence of one thing may be that of another', and then adding — as an after-thought, his opponent maliciously remarks — a distinction against which there is a strong and apparently unans- werable argument. Of course this is the crux of the matter. Give the Universal Humanity, Animation — what you will — only ideal existence, and the difficulty disappears. The problem is how to think them as real things, other than their singulars, yet identical with them ; and if other, then singulars or units which can be counted ; and yet universal. However great Wyclif's philosophical acumen may have been, it is no wonder if he floundered about a little just in this place. We may leave him so : this review of the two most interesting parts in the debate will, I think, suffice in lieu of the detailed contents of so short a treatise. III. De Materia et Forma. (1). The Manuscripts. Of this work there are no fewer than seven manuscripts extant. Shirley gives six of them in his catalogue; the seventh is the Stockholm MS., written by Huss in all probability, and for that reason taken as text. Of the others, I omitted collating Prag. Univ. 8. G. 23 and 5. H. 16, because, having looked over them, I thought their variants of little importance to the text, and in most cases concurring with those already noted, except where they gave blunders of their own. I need not say that this step was only taken with the full concurrence of Dr Furnivall. Lundström's Introduction gives a very complete description of the Stock-
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INTRODUCTION. LXIX holm MS. The MSS. Prag. Univ. 8. F. 1. and 8. G. 6 have already been described in De Composicione Hominis. The MS. 4. H. 9. of Prague University is bound in wooden boards, with a strong leather back. Its size is abont six inches by ten. The pagination is rather faulty ; it extends from f. 1 to f. 262. The MS. is of paper, only the first and last outside leaves being of parchment, with half- effaced copies of Latin verses, some of which apparently relate to the irregular verbs. The words Pomoz myhy boze (Help me, O God) written in Bohemian over an erasure, sufficiently indicates the country of its origin. On the inside cover is an old index of contents ; a newer one has been inserted between the cover and the first (parchment) leaf. After the parchment there is one blank leaf that is not paginated. De Universalibus (i. e. the treatise which is part of De Ente) follows from f. 1 to f. 52 b. as in Shirley's catalogue, not to f. 56 b, as marked in the MS. table of contents. The writing is bold, legible, and probably belonging to the carlier years of the 15 th century ; and the corrections are both numerous and carefully made. There are two columns to every page. The chapters are indicated, not only by red initial letters, but by numbers as well. De Materia et Forma (beginning on f. 52 b, the number immediately following being f. 57 — an error of course — and ending f. 73 b a). De Com- posicione Hominis (ff. 73 b a to 93 a b) and De Tempore (ff. 94 a to 115 b) are also written in the same hand and bear a strong external resemblance to each other. Between the two latter tracts there are, besides the verso of f. 93 b, seven unpaginated leaves. On f. 93 b and the first of the following leaves we find several sentences, beginning with omnix fenix est, in another and a sprawling hand; these are probably students' notes. Again, after f. 113 b, come four unnumbered pages, covered with metaphysical figures and diagrams, probably in the same hand which made the students' notes. On f. 114 we have the treatise De Ydeis, written in the first hand, apparently ; but now there is only one column to each page ; and this is also the case with the tract by St. Thomas, De Encium Quiditate, which follows from f. 130 b to f. 137 a. F. 137 b and one unnumbered page (leaf ? that follows contain a prayer in German, probably in the second (the student's) hand, to the Blessed Sacrament. It begins: "Heiliger Gottes leichnam ich sag' dir Lob..." From f. 138 to f. 193 we have an anti- Wyclifſian work, Contra universalia realia; it begins with: "Probleuma
INTRODUCTION. LXIX holm MS. The MSS. Prag. Univ. 8. F. 1. and 8. G. 6 have already been described in De Composicione Hominis. The MS. 4. H. 9. of Prague University is bound in wooden boards, with a strong leather back. Its size is abont six inches by ten. The pagination is rather faulty ; it extends from f. 1 to f. 262. The MS. is of paper, only the first and last outside leaves being of parchment, with half- effaced copies of Latin verses, some of which apparently relate to the irregular verbs. The words Pomoz myhy boze (Help me, O God) written in Bohemian over an erasure, sufficiently indicates the country of its origin. On the inside cover is an old index of contents ; a newer one has been inserted between the cover and the first (parchment) leaf. After the parchment there is one blank leaf that is not paginated. De Universalibus (i. e. the treatise which is part of De Ente) follows from f. 1 to f. 52 b. as in Shirley's catalogue, not to f. 56 b, as marked in the MS. table of contents. The writing is bold, legible, and probably belonging to the carlier years of the 15 th century ; and the corrections are both numerous and carefully made. There are two columns to every page. The chapters are indicated, not only by red initial letters, but by numbers as well. De Materia et Forma (beginning on f. 52 b, the number immediately following being f. 57 — an error of course — and ending f. 73 b a). De Com- posicione Hominis (ff. 73 b a to 93 a b) and De Tempore (ff. 94 a to 115 b) are also written in the same hand and bear a strong external resemblance to each other. Between the two latter tracts there are, besides the verso of f. 93 b, seven unpaginated leaves. On f. 93 b and the first of the following leaves we find several sentences, beginning with omnix fenix est, in another and a sprawling hand; these are probably students' notes. Again, after f. 113 b, come four unnumbered pages, covered with metaphysical figures and diagrams, probably in the same hand which made the students' notes. On f. 114 we have the treatise De Ydeis, written in the first hand, apparently ; but now there is only one column to each page ; and this is also the case with the tract by St. Thomas, De Encium Quiditate, which follows from f. 130 b to f. 137 a. F. 137 b and one unnumbered page (leaf ? that follows contain a prayer in German, probably in the second (the student's) hand, to the Blessed Sacrament. It begins: "Heiliger Gottes leichnam ich sag' dir Lob..." From f. 138 to f. 193 we have an anti- Wyclifſian work, Contra universalia realia; it begins with: "Probleuma
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LXX INTRODUCTION. correspondens ..." and ends with “... miserere michi peccatori". It is carefully annotated and corrected, with an index of contents on the seven unnumbered leaves that follow. On f. 193 b. comes the treatise De Univer- salibus (no. 10 of Shirley's catalogue) which he ascribes to Wyclif, and which extends to f. 258 b. The verso of the same leaf and the four concluding folios contain short tracts, the author of which, though he is plainly not Wyclif himself, confesses that what he writes is taken from Wyclif. The last two leaves are blank. I had written a lengthy description of the Prag. Univ. MS. III. G. 10, at the time when I collated it; unfortunately that was ten years ago, and my notes are nowhere to be found. I therefore applied to the courtesy of the Head Librarian in Prague University for some description, no matter how short ; and he, with a courtesy for which I feel very grateful, at once sent me the following note in Latin, which I give in the original : III. G. 10. Codex chart. a. 1397 ff. 142 num. 21.5 15 cm. a duobus scribis dilucide exaratus sine rubricatione. Asseres corio rubro obducti. Umbilici et fibula desunt. f. 1—4 b. Quaestiones philosophicae variae. f. 5—30 b (anepigr.) Johannis Wiclif Tractatus de materia et forma. “Cum materia et forma sint universalia" X “aliquam essenciam preter deum". f. 31 a—69 b. Eiusdem tractatus de tempore. "Capitulum primum, X "subtrahendo ab eo orationis supponendo tempus esse declarat" suffragia." f. 70 a—104 b. Eiusdem tractatus de universalibus. 'Libellus de universalibus continet 15 cap." X “et sic loquitur 4° phisic. tractatu de tempore, quod idem est." f. 105 a—116 b. Eiusdem Replicatio de universalibus. "Presentem agrediendo replicationis materiam" X nec depictus est rex. Explicit replicatio de universalibus, quam si quis bene conspexerit, videbit multo meliores raciones pro eisdem quam contra eadem, prime enim directe procedunt, alie vero cum extraneis cavellacionibus.' f. 117 a—118 a. Quaestiones philosophicae. f. 119 a—137 b. Johannis Wiclif tractatus de ideis. Tractando de ydeis primo oportet querere" X "creatura habet ydeam propriam in deo. Explicit tractatus de ydeis ... a. d. 1397 finitus est liber iste in ferio III ante ascensionis ... g. b. q.
LXX INTRODUCTION. correspondens ..." and ends with “... miserere michi peccatori". It is carefully annotated and corrected, with an index of contents on the seven unnumbered leaves that follow. On f. 193 b. comes the treatise De Univer- salibus (no. 10 of Shirley's catalogue) which he ascribes to Wyclif, and which extends to f. 258 b. The verso of the same leaf and the four concluding folios contain short tracts, the author of which, though he is plainly not Wyclif himself, confesses that what he writes is taken from Wyclif. The last two leaves are blank. I had written a lengthy description of the Prag. Univ. MS. III. G. 10, at the time when I collated it; unfortunately that was ten years ago, and my notes are nowhere to be found. I therefore applied to the courtesy of the Head Librarian in Prague University for some description, no matter how short ; and he, with a courtesy for which I feel very grateful, at once sent me the following note in Latin, which I give in the original : III. G. 10. Codex chart. a. 1397 ff. 142 num. 21.5 15 cm. a duobus scribis dilucide exaratus sine rubricatione. Asseres corio rubro obducti. Umbilici et fibula desunt. f. 1—4 b. Quaestiones philosophicae variae. f. 5—30 b (anepigr.) Johannis Wiclif Tractatus de materia et forma. “Cum materia et forma sint universalia" X “aliquam essenciam preter deum". f. 31 a—69 b. Eiusdem tractatus de tempore. "Capitulum primum, X "subtrahendo ab eo orationis supponendo tempus esse declarat" suffragia." f. 70 a—104 b. Eiusdem tractatus de universalibus. 'Libellus de universalibus continet 15 cap." X “et sic loquitur 4° phisic. tractatu de tempore, quod idem est." f. 105 a—116 b. Eiusdem Replicatio de universalibus. "Presentem agrediendo replicationis materiam" X nec depictus est rex. Explicit replicatio de universalibus, quam si quis bene conspexerit, videbit multo meliores raciones pro eisdem quam contra eadem, prime enim directe procedunt, alie vero cum extraneis cavellacionibus.' f. 117 a—118 a. Quaestiones philosophicae. f. 119 a—137 b. Johannis Wiclif tractatus de ideis. Tractando de ydeis primo oportet querere" X "creatura habet ydeam propriam in deo. Explicit tractatus de ydeis ... a. d. 1397 finitus est liber iste in ferio III ante ascensionis ... g. b. q.
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INTRODUCTION. LXXI f. 138 a—142 b. Johannis Hus Quaestio "utrum materia nunc sub una forma substanciali et nunc sub alia existens sit informis." (sed finis discrepat a fine quaestionis eiusdem VIII. G. 6. f. 84). Sequuntur quaestiones aliae. Asseribus adligata sunt fragmenta membran. cuiusdam cod saec. XIII argum. philos. Vetus signat. bibl. S. J. Clement. Y II? n. 38. It will scarce be necessary to state in conclusion, that I have found the work of editing this treatise much facilitated by the number of MSS. and consequent corrective variants. As to their respective value, it would naturally be supposed that the Stockholm MS. generally, and it seems with sufficient reason, supposed to have been written by John Huss, is the best. Yet much of course depended upon the MSS. at his disposal; and if he was born in 1373 and the date of the MS. is really 1398, he must have been too young to venture to correct any but palpable errors in the text he copied. This will account, no doubt, for several mistakes which the other MSS. correct. E (Prag. Univ. IV. H. 9) seems to be a very good one, and gives many independent readings. Unfortunately it was collated after all the others, and usually only helps to bear out readings which are evidently better than the Stockholm MS. I was obliged to collate the latter part somewhat rapidly (See Note, p. 177). (2). Authenticity and Date of the Work. Shirley gives us, to prove the authenticity of the work, the testimony of Bishop Bale, and the author's name on MSS. 8. G. 23 and 5 H. 16; to which we must add his name at the ending of this tractate in the Stock- holm manuscript. And though Bale, by Shirley's own admission, is 'careless and uncritical', and the author's name on a manuscript does not prove much, still, taken together with other proofs, they seem here conclusive. Wyclif's style and manner of writing is as marked in this tractate as in any other of his best known works. His desire to base philosophy upon Scripture', clearly shown in his Logica, is here realized by a very great number of texts, almost as numerous indeed as those we find in the theo- logical works. The authors from whom Wyclif quotes by preference are the same in this treatise ; and Grosseteste, whom he constantly refers to— in fact, I believe, few long tractates are without some extract from this
INTRODUCTION. LXXI f. 138 a—142 b. Johannis Hus Quaestio "utrum materia nunc sub una forma substanciali et nunc sub alia existens sit informis." (sed finis discrepat a fine quaestionis eiusdem VIII. G. 6. f. 84). Sequuntur quaestiones aliae. Asseribus adligata sunt fragmenta membran. cuiusdam cod saec. XIII argum. philos. Vetus signat. bibl. S. J. Clement. Y II? n. 38. It will scarce be necessary to state in conclusion, that I have found the work of editing this treatise much facilitated by the number of MSS. and consequent corrective variants. As to their respective value, it would naturally be supposed that the Stockholm MS. generally, and it seems with sufficient reason, supposed to have been written by John Huss, is the best. Yet much of course depended upon the MSS. at his disposal; and if he was born in 1373 and the date of the MS. is really 1398, he must have been too young to venture to correct any but palpable errors in the text he copied. This will account, no doubt, for several mistakes which the other MSS. correct. E (Prag. Univ. IV. H. 9) seems to be a very good one, and gives many independent readings. Unfortunately it was collated after all the others, and usually only helps to bear out readings which are evidently better than the Stockholm MS. I was obliged to collate the latter part somewhat rapidly (See Note, p. 177). (2). Authenticity and Date of the Work. Shirley gives us, to prove the authenticity of the work, the testimony of Bishop Bale, and the author's name on MSS. 8. G. 23 and 5 H. 16; to which we must add his name at the ending of this tractate in the Stock- holm manuscript. And though Bale, by Shirley's own admission, is 'careless and uncritical', and the author's name on a manuscript does not prove much, still, taken together with other proofs, they seem here conclusive. Wyclif's style and manner of writing is as marked in this tractate as in any other of his best known works. His desire to base philosophy upon Scripture', clearly shown in his Logica, is here realized by a very great number of texts, almost as numerous indeed as those we find in the theo- logical works. The authors from whom Wyclif quotes by preference are the same in this treatise ; and Grosseteste, whom he constantly refers to— in fact, I believe, few long tractates are without some extract from this
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INTRODUCTION. LXXII author — is quoted at length in De Materia et Forma (p. 171). Besides, the works of Wyclif himself are quoted or mentioned, always, as usual with him, without saying whose works they are ; so much so, that in De Actibus Anime his allusion (p. 12) to libro tercio without any mention of the author would naturally lead us to suppose he is speaking of a work of his own. De Ydeis, De Trinitate, De Benedicta Incarnacione, De Tempore, and De Universalibus, are all spoken of as either already known or as about to appear: and this last is no doubt the strongest proof of authenticity that can be given. As to the date, we may fix it approximately by the tractates above mentioned. All save De Benedicta Incarnacione are referred to as already written; this one alone is to come. Now Mr Harris, in his Introduction to this work, gives an extremely ingenious argument to assign for its appearance one of the years between 1363 and 1367. De Materia et Forma came before it, and the whole Summa de Ente before that, since Wyclif refers to treatises in the Summa, and even to some of the treatises which stand last upon the Vienna list. De composicione Hominis, from its references (pp. 10, 14) to De Universalibus, must have been written after that treatise, and also, in all probability, after the Summa; and as it is the development and application of the doctrine contained in De Materia et Forma, it was most likely written after it. De Ente Predicamentali is certainly posterior to the Summa, from which it quotes, but I have found in it no quotation either from the present treatise or from De Composi- cione Hominis. If we admit Buddensieg's date of 1362 for that of Wyclif's denial of annihilation (towards which our author near the end of Logica is evidently strongly inclined) these works come in the following order, so far as I can judge. (1) The ten long tractates of the Summa de Ente. (2) De Ente Predicamentali. (3) De Materia et Forma. (4) De Composi- cione Hominis; and (5) De Benedicta Incarnacione; not to speak of the Questiones 13 which seem to have belonged to an earlier period. It seems impossible for a man to have written so much in less than five years ; therefore, if 1367 be really the latest date for De Incarnacione, I would also incline to think it not far from the earliest, and since De Composi- cione Hominis and De Materia et Forma are both short treatises, to suppose them written one year before; let us say, in 1366 or 1365. And even that would give us only four or five years for his immense work De Ente, together with the one that immediately followed it. This outpour
INTRODUCTION. LXXII author — is quoted at length in De Materia et Forma (p. 171). Besides, the works of Wyclif himself are quoted or mentioned, always, as usual with him, without saying whose works they are ; so much so, that in De Actibus Anime his allusion (p. 12) to libro tercio without any mention of the author would naturally lead us to suppose he is speaking of a work of his own. De Ydeis, De Trinitate, De Benedicta Incarnacione, De Tempore, and De Universalibus, are all spoken of as either already known or as about to appear: and this last is no doubt the strongest proof of authenticity that can be given. As to the date, we may fix it approximately by the tractates above mentioned. All save De Benedicta Incarnacione are referred to as already written; this one alone is to come. Now Mr Harris, in his Introduction to this work, gives an extremely ingenious argument to assign for its appearance one of the years between 1363 and 1367. De Materia et Forma came before it, and the whole Summa de Ente before that, since Wyclif refers to treatises in the Summa, and even to some of the treatises which stand last upon the Vienna list. De composicione Hominis, from its references (pp. 10, 14) to De Universalibus, must have been written after that treatise, and also, in all probability, after the Summa; and as it is the development and application of the doctrine contained in De Materia et Forma, it was most likely written after it. De Ente Predicamentali is certainly posterior to the Summa, from which it quotes, but I have found in it no quotation either from the present treatise or from De Composi- cione Hominis. If we admit Buddensieg's date of 1362 for that of Wyclif's denial of annihilation (towards which our author near the end of Logica is evidently strongly inclined) these works come in the following order, so far as I can judge. (1) The ten long tractates of the Summa de Ente. (2) De Ente Predicamentali. (3) De Materia et Forma. (4) De Composi- cione Hominis; and (5) De Benedicta Incarnacione; not to speak of the Questiones 13 which seem to have belonged to an earlier period. It seems impossible for a man to have written so much in less than five years ; therefore, if 1367 be really the latest date for De Incarnacione, I would also incline to think it not far from the earliest, and since De Composi- cione Hominis and De Materia et Forma are both short treatises, to suppose them written one year before; let us say, in 1366 or 1365. And even that would give us only four or five years for his immense work De Ente, together with the one that immediately followed it. This outpour
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INTRODUCTION. LXXIII is all the more astonishing when we think of the amount of mental work requisite for writing upon such abstruse subjects. (3). Contents of the Work. Before giving a detailed analysis of Wyclif's doctrine, it is well to point out what Scholastics meant by matter and by form, so as to see how much of novelty there was in his views. In general, and in the widest sense of all, form was that which made difference 1 between a thing existing in one way and existing in another ; whilst matter was that which made it identical with itself, though modified. Thus, a piece of wax is now spherical, now cylindrical: sphericity or cylindricity would be the form : the underlying wax, identical notwithstanding the change, would be the matter. So far as the changes which we observe only bear upon shape, colour, and the other qualities perceived by sense, the doctrine seems a mere statement of facts. But it was affirmed that changes are going forward in nature which imply the production of a totally new being, and the destruction of the former one, so that we can no longer properly say, This is the same substance', as we can in the case of wax. For when, for instance, wax is subjected to destructive distillation, and can no longer revert to its former appearance, the change is deeper and more substantial. That — whatever it may be — which underlies the present vapour, is not now capable of being a soft yellow mass. And yet, since wax changes into this vapour, there is something which all the time is the subject both of the wax and the vapour. These are two specifically different substances, with the same identical substratum; and as wax as a sphere or a cylinder is indifferent to either of these shapes, so the mysterious substratum is indifferent to being visible or invisible, a combustible solid or a highly inflammable gas. But the wax comes from the pollen of a plant, which in its turn has taken all that it is from the surrounding elements; and here again we have a further substantial change: from the inorganic elements to the living plant, from the living plant to a product which is organic but not organized; from I Not the difference ilself. Wyclif, as we shall see, takes form' to mean this difference, whether substantial or accidental ; and this of course, as a relation between two or more objects related, was necessarily a Universal.
INTRODUCTION. LXXIII is all the more astonishing when we think of the amount of mental work requisite for writing upon such abstruse subjects. (3). Contents of the Work. Before giving a detailed analysis of Wyclif's doctrine, it is well to point out what Scholastics meant by matter and by form, so as to see how much of novelty there was in his views. In general, and in the widest sense of all, form was that which made difference 1 between a thing existing in one way and existing in another ; whilst matter was that which made it identical with itself, though modified. Thus, a piece of wax is now spherical, now cylindrical: sphericity or cylindricity would be the form : the underlying wax, identical notwithstanding the change, would be the matter. So far as the changes which we observe only bear upon shape, colour, and the other qualities perceived by sense, the doctrine seems a mere statement of facts. But it was affirmed that changes are going forward in nature which imply the production of a totally new being, and the destruction of the former one, so that we can no longer properly say, This is the same substance', as we can in the case of wax. For when, for instance, wax is subjected to destructive distillation, and can no longer revert to its former appearance, the change is deeper and more substantial. That — whatever it may be — which underlies the present vapour, is not now capable of being a soft yellow mass. And yet, since wax changes into this vapour, there is something which all the time is the subject both of the wax and the vapour. These are two specifically different substances, with the same identical substratum; and as wax as a sphere or a cylinder is indifferent to either of these shapes, so the mysterious substratum is indifferent to being visible or invisible, a combustible solid or a highly inflammable gas. But the wax comes from the pollen of a plant, which in its turn has taken all that it is from the surrounding elements; and here again we have a further substantial change: from the inorganic elements to the living plant, from the living plant to a product which is organic but not organized; from I Not the difference ilself. Wyclif, as we shall see, takes form' to mean this difference, whether substantial or accidental ; and this of course, as a relation between two or more objects related, was necessarily a Universal.
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INTRODUCTION. LXXIV the wax to the vapour. And throughout all these changes of external qualities, something remains unchanged; and that something must therefore be itself absolutely indeterminate, but capable of receiving any determination. This was Primal Matter; and its determinations — such at least as made it pass from one class of substance to another — were called Substantial Forms. Every stone, every plant, every animal, every man, was merely primal matter plus a substantial form of its own. These were not merely two names for the same thing, or the same thing from two points of view. To be determined and to determine, to receive and to give, are not only different, but incompatible attributes. What gives waxness", though not really distinct from wax, must be distinct from that which, from not wax, becomes wax, or in other words receives 'waxness". Thus primal matter and substantial form are the two really different elements into which we must resolve everything that is subject to sub- stantial change. Matter can in no case subsist without form, since it has no quality but receptibility of form, and even that is a purely passive quality. All the lower forms of which the activity is such that it cannot take place without matter, cease to exist so soon as another form takes their place ; a form either actually informs matter or disappears altogether. When the daisy fades, when the butterfly or the nightingale dies, their forms — their souls, in Scholastic language — cease to be. In man alone, the form, which is the soul, “that by which the body is a living human body", has a distinct activity which does not depend upon matter; and therefore, when separated, though it is no longer actually a form, it need not cease to exist. Such is the ordinary doctrine of the School, in which we must notice the appeal to the fact of change for the positing of the two elements, and to the principle of contrariety to prove their distinction from each other. The thing is matter, partly ; it is partly form ; but also it is partly not one, and partly not the other, since each are different. Yet they are both identical in space ; where one is, there is the other : form pervades matter, matter upholds form. This doctrine is not so absurd as some may think. In the XVIIth century, Leibnitz had a return towards the end of his career to this old theory which he somewhere says “has a great deal of truth in it" ; and even in our days a great many Neo-Scholastic philosophers have elaborated a theory of Matter and Form, identical in its essentials with the ancient one, but strictly agreeing with the data of
INTRODUCTION. LXXIV the wax to the vapour. And throughout all these changes of external qualities, something remains unchanged; and that something must therefore be itself absolutely indeterminate, but capable of receiving any determination. This was Primal Matter; and its determinations — such at least as made it pass from one class of substance to another — were called Substantial Forms. Every stone, every plant, every animal, every man, was merely primal matter plus a substantial form of its own. These were not merely two names for the same thing, or the same thing from two points of view. To be determined and to determine, to receive and to give, are not only different, but incompatible attributes. What gives waxness", though not really distinct from wax, must be distinct from that which, from not wax, becomes wax, or in other words receives 'waxness". Thus primal matter and substantial form are the two really different elements into which we must resolve everything that is subject to sub- stantial change. Matter can in no case subsist without form, since it has no quality but receptibility of form, and even that is a purely passive quality. All the lower forms of which the activity is such that it cannot take place without matter, cease to exist so soon as another form takes their place ; a form either actually informs matter or disappears altogether. When the daisy fades, when the butterfly or the nightingale dies, their forms — their souls, in Scholastic language — cease to be. In man alone, the form, which is the soul, “that by which the body is a living human body", has a distinct activity which does not depend upon matter; and therefore, when separated, though it is no longer actually a form, it need not cease to exist. Such is the ordinary doctrine of the School, in which we must notice the appeal to the fact of change for the positing of the two elements, and to the principle of contrariety to prove their distinction from each other. The thing is matter, partly ; it is partly form ; but also it is partly not one, and partly not the other, since each are different. Yet they are both identical in space ; where one is, there is the other : form pervades matter, matter upholds form. This doctrine is not so absurd as some may think. In the XVIIth century, Leibnitz had a return towards the end of his career to this old theory which he somewhere says “has a great deal of truth in it" ; and even in our days a great many Neo-Scholastic philosophers have elaborated a theory of Matter and Form, identical in its essentials with the ancient one, but strictly agreeing with the data of
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INTRODUCTION. LXXV modern Physics and Chemistry. Some go so far as to assert that in Sir William Thompson's (Lord Kelvin's) theory of the vortex atom, we have the old doctrine: the vortex movement is form, the perfect fluid' is matter ; the two together make the atom. But we may now return to Wyclif, who uses the same terms, as we shall see, to designate totally different ideas. Ch. I. Form may be verbally defined as that through, or according to which any being is intrinsically this or thus ; if 'according to which', it is extrinsic form, or the pattern or exemplar of the thing made ; if 'through which', it is intrinsic; substantial if it makes the thing to be this thing, accidental if it makes it to be thus. Wyclif, before dealing with extrinsic or ideal forms, gives us a few preliminary remarks on the two other species. Substantial form makes its substance to be what it is, and accidental form is merely the mode of a substance, i. e. the substance itself existing (or acting) in this or that way. Every accident requires a subject, and it is only in a different sense — that of beauty, goodness and perfection — that Augustine calls God the Supreme and self-existent Mode (pp. 163—167). All accidents are forms of a substance; as to their degree of entity, disputes, mostly verbal, have arisen; some denying, some doubting whether they had any or not. This is hardly consistent with Scripture. Of the two extreme doctrines — one of which says that every thing must be self-existent, and so an accident is nothing ; and the other that God is the only substance, all creatures being accidents (the very essence of Spinoza's doctrine) — Wyclif declares that he admits neither, but states that the world, though it is an accident to God, is divided into accident and substance, accidents bearing the same relation to their sub- stances as created substances to God. As the latter cannot exist without the First Cause, so the former cannot possibly exist without subjects. He concludes the chapter by saying, in reference no doubt to former and wearisome controversies on this point: "I am not going to argue the matter again, unless arguments which I have not yet heard be brought forward" (pp. 167—170). Notice why he admits, in seemingly perilous agreement with the Pantheistic doctrine of Spinoza, that the world is an accident to God'. It is because the Universal Man, who comprises all possible men — that is, all men past, present and future — is to him a reality which depends upon God, and, so far as I can understand, is an eternal existence in God; and so of all other created things.
INTRODUCTION. LXXV modern Physics and Chemistry. Some go so far as to assert that in Sir William Thompson's (Lord Kelvin's) theory of the vortex atom, we have the old doctrine: the vortex movement is form, the perfect fluid' is matter ; the two together make the atom. But we may now return to Wyclif, who uses the same terms, as we shall see, to designate totally different ideas. Ch. I. Form may be verbally defined as that through, or according to which any being is intrinsically this or thus ; if 'according to which', it is extrinsic form, or the pattern or exemplar of the thing made ; if 'through which', it is intrinsic; substantial if it makes the thing to be this thing, accidental if it makes it to be thus. Wyclif, before dealing with extrinsic or ideal forms, gives us a few preliminary remarks on the two other species. Substantial form makes its substance to be what it is, and accidental form is merely the mode of a substance, i. e. the substance itself existing (or acting) in this or that way. Every accident requires a subject, and it is only in a different sense — that of beauty, goodness and perfection — that Augustine calls God the Supreme and self-existent Mode (pp. 163—167). All accidents are forms of a substance; as to their degree of entity, disputes, mostly verbal, have arisen; some denying, some doubting whether they had any or not. This is hardly consistent with Scripture. Of the two extreme doctrines — one of which says that every thing must be self-existent, and so an accident is nothing ; and the other that God is the only substance, all creatures being accidents (the very essence of Spinoza's doctrine) — Wyclif declares that he admits neither, but states that the world, though it is an accident to God, is divided into accident and substance, accidents bearing the same relation to their sub- stances as created substances to God. As the latter cannot exist without the First Cause, so the former cannot possibly exist without subjects. He concludes the chapter by saying, in reference no doubt to former and wearisome controversies on this point: "I am not going to argue the matter again, unless arguments which I have not yet heard be brought forward" (pp. 167—170). Notice why he admits, in seemingly perilous agreement with the Pantheistic doctrine of Spinoza, that the world is an accident to God'. It is because the Universal Man, who comprises all possible men — that is, all men past, present and future — is to him a reality which depends upon God, and, so far as I can understand, is an eternal existence in God; and so of all other created things.
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LXXVI INTRODUCTION. Ch. 2. Here Wyclit treats of Ideal forms, which are the patterns of all things, existing eternally in God. Neither here nor elsewhere have I been able to find ont whether the Universal Man — who according to him exists really and eternally in God, really and temporally in each of his singulars — is something distinct from the Divine Idea of man, or not. It may be that Wyclif considers the pattern to be something different from the reality created according to that pattern; but then he would have to admit an eternally created being. Or again, he may have thought that the Universal Man, quà existing in God's mind, is the pattern of the same, quà existing in singulars: but then there would be no real difference between the two. I must therefore confine myself to expounding his doctrine, as he sets it forth. There is in God an innumerable multitude of ideal forms, one with Him in essence, though we may think of them as distinct from Him ; and in this sense He is the Form of all beings. He is Himself the Form of the Three divine Persons, since Deity is common to all Three, and since the Three Persons are not distinct subjects, they are all Three one infinite Form. But sometimes the term is applied to the Person of the Word. Form emanates from matter, in created things, and the compound proceeds from both together; thus the Son emanates from the Father, and the Holy Ghost likewise proceeds from them. And this Supreme Form is the exemplar of all things. Conceive the world as a mere receptivity, a something that by itself would at once flow away into nonentity, and God present everywhere, giving to all things all their qualities of goodness, beauty and perfection (pp. 170—175). This comparison might easily be understood in a Pantheistic sense; those perfections we see in the world, are they not the very perfections of God? But Wyclif here, and indeed throughout his life, refuses to admit this conclusion, and we find him (p. 176) saying distinctly that God “forms outside of Himself and makes the beauty (formositatem) of every creature". We may think we see a necessary Pantheistic tendency in the whole of this doctrine; but Wyclif certainly did not see it ; and no doubt be understood his own system better than we. Ch. 3. Our author here begins to join issue with the School. A sub- stantial form is, according to him, a form in the widest and most abstract sense in which the term was used: that by which anything is what it is. What makes a fire to be a fire? Igneity. What makes a stone to be a
LXXVI INTRODUCTION. Ch. 2. Here Wyclit treats of Ideal forms, which are the patterns of all things, existing eternally in God. Neither here nor elsewhere have I been able to find ont whether the Universal Man — who according to him exists really and eternally in God, really and temporally in each of his singulars — is something distinct from the Divine Idea of man, or not. It may be that Wyclif considers the pattern to be something different from the reality created according to that pattern; but then he would have to admit an eternally created being. Or again, he may have thought that the Universal Man, quà existing in God's mind, is the pattern of the same, quà existing in singulars: but then there would be no real difference between the two. I must therefore confine myself to expounding his doctrine, as he sets it forth. There is in God an innumerable multitude of ideal forms, one with Him in essence, though we may think of them as distinct from Him ; and in this sense He is the Form of all beings. He is Himself the Form of the Three divine Persons, since Deity is common to all Three, and since the Three Persons are not distinct subjects, they are all Three one infinite Form. But sometimes the term is applied to the Person of the Word. Form emanates from matter, in created things, and the compound proceeds from both together; thus the Son emanates from the Father, and the Holy Ghost likewise proceeds from them. And this Supreme Form is the exemplar of all things. Conceive the world as a mere receptivity, a something that by itself would at once flow away into nonentity, and God present everywhere, giving to all things all their qualities of goodness, beauty and perfection (pp. 170—175). This comparison might easily be understood in a Pantheistic sense; those perfections we see in the world, are they not the very perfections of God? But Wyclif here, and indeed throughout his life, refuses to admit this conclusion, and we find him (p. 176) saying distinctly that God “forms outside of Himself and makes the beauty (formositatem) of every creature". We may think we see a necessary Pantheistic tendency in the whole of this doctrine; but Wyclif certainly did not see it ; and no doubt be understood his own system better than we. Ch. 3. Our author here begins to join issue with the School. A sub- stantial form is, according to him, a form in the widest and most abstract sense in which the term was used: that by which anything is what it is. What makes a fire to be a fire? Igneity. What makes a stone to be a
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INTRODUCTION. LXXVII stone? Petreity. What makes a man to be a man? Humanity. Therefore igneity, petreity, and humanity are substantial forms. This view, as we see, is not based upon the idea of substantial change, nor of a part of the substance remainng, while the other disappears. In a man there is nothing but humanity, in wax there is nothing but 'waxness'; these words denote the whole being in an abstract way, and that is all. Whereas the Scholastic doctrine as previously set forth, calls the soul the form of man, because it gives humanity to the body ; but it is not itself humanity, for when it is eparated from the body, the existence of the man that was ceases. Wyclif ridicules this idea of a compound of form and matter which is, he says, "like a tunic and its fur". Such a form is absolutely undemonstrable; but Wyclif's notion of form can be very readily de- monstrated (pp. 179—180). The rest of the chapter is a side-issue with Averrhoës, who is here accused of misunderstanding Aristotle. Ch. 4. Objections to the theory are now propounded in order, not only to answer them, but to develop the theory itself. It is said that, according to Wyclif's position, all essential differences would be destroyed. In his view matter is, in the case of fire, That which possesses igneity ; in the case of man, That Which possesses igneity ; and so forth ; the That Which (or subject, or matter, or, as he calls it a page or so further, essence) being identical in each case. To the modern mind, this subject is merely logical, and has no identity in these cases save that of the word; even the idea represented may be different. For Wyclif it was a reality. Therefore (the adversary argues) if your That Which now underlies igneity and now humanity, the same essence may be at one time fire, at another a man : which is the ruin of all specific differences. Wyclif replies that if That Which is to be called an essence, it is so in that sense in which essence abstracts from all differences and limitations, i. e. in a trans- cendental sense. Quality is everything that can be said of a subject; if so, the subject must be free from any qualities, and cannot properly be said to belong to a genus or a species (pp. 182—185). He admits that the same identical subject may be now fire, now water; but not at the same time. He contends that Aristotle's definition of matter applies exactly to his own transcendental Subject: nec quid, nec quale, nec quantum etc. It has no attribute but bare existence, is perpetual and cannot cease to be, save by annihilation, which is inconceivable (pp. 185—186). He gives the three examples which we often meet with in his works: the Divine
INTRODUCTION. LXXVII stone? Petreity. What makes a man to be a man? Humanity. Therefore igneity, petreity, and humanity are substantial forms. This view, as we see, is not based upon the idea of substantial change, nor of a part of the substance remainng, while the other disappears. In a man there is nothing but humanity, in wax there is nothing but 'waxness'; these words denote the whole being in an abstract way, and that is all. Whereas the Scholastic doctrine as previously set forth, calls the soul the form of man, because it gives humanity to the body ; but it is not itself humanity, for when it is eparated from the body, the existence of the man that was ceases. Wyclif ridicules this idea of a compound of form and matter which is, he says, "like a tunic and its fur". Such a form is absolutely undemonstrable; but Wyclif's notion of form can be very readily de- monstrated (pp. 179—180). The rest of the chapter is a side-issue with Averrhoës, who is here accused of misunderstanding Aristotle. Ch. 4. Objections to the theory are now propounded in order, not only to answer them, but to develop the theory itself. It is said that, according to Wyclif's position, all essential differences would be destroyed. In his view matter is, in the case of fire, That which possesses igneity ; in the case of man, That Which possesses igneity ; and so forth ; the That Which (or subject, or matter, or, as he calls it a page or so further, essence) being identical in each case. To the modern mind, this subject is merely logical, and has no identity in these cases save that of the word; even the idea represented may be different. For Wyclif it was a reality. Therefore (the adversary argues) if your That Which now underlies igneity and now humanity, the same essence may be at one time fire, at another a man : which is the ruin of all specific differences. Wyclif replies that if That Which is to be called an essence, it is so in that sense in which essence abstracts from all differences and limitations, i. e. in a trans- cendental sense. Quality is everything that can be said of a subject; if so, the subject must be free from any qualities, and cannot properly be said to belong to a genus or a species (pp. 182—185). He admits that the same identical subject may be now fire, now water; but not at the same time. He contends that Aristotle's definition of matter applies exactly to his own transcendental Subject: nec quid, nec quale, nec quantum etc. It has no attribute but bare existence, is perpetual and cannot cease to be, save by annihilation, which is inconceivable (pp. 185—186). He gives the three examples which we often meet with in his works: the Divine
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LXXVIII INTRODUCTION. Essence that is identical with the Father and the Son, who are themselves distinct Persons ; the Word that is God and Man at once, although Deity is not humanity; and Universal Humanity, which is identical with Peter and with Paul, though Peter and Paul are different individuals. Therefore, if I say : This same essence will be fire and will be water', it does not follow that fire will be water. Wyclif then goes on to examine various changes, a discussion into which we need not enter, since his system explains all of them except Transubstantiation, and he admits that there is here a question which he has not yet solved. Had he admitted that his Subject had a merely logical existence, there would have been no difficulty here at all. That which was bread is Christ's Body. That which, the subject of the change, remains of course, even in the orthodox explanation, but it is a mere word that stands, now for bread, now for Christ's Body. But Wyclif, in his Realism, was constrained to give the sentence the following signification: That identically same real thing which was bread is the Body of Christ. And the Church had decided that nothing remained of the bread save the outward appearances. Could these be taken as the underlying subject? Was the subject merely the same space, occupied by the appearances? and if so, could he grant that the space had a real existence of its own, without coming into conflict with the Church? No wonder that at this stage Wyclif avoided the discussion, and said: “Est longus sermo, et adhuc mihi inscrutabilis" (p. 186—189). The rest of the chapter (pp. 189—196) is devoted to a discussion of creation, in the course of which Wyclif says that the essence of things existed before the things themselves (an assertion that he will explain and justify further on); of the objection that, the receptivity of matter being a perfection, the subject cannot be conceived as formless, to which he replies that bare receptivity of anything cannot be a form, since a form must determine a subject to be this or that in particular; and of the vestiges of the Trinity in creation. We now see clearly that anything for which a concrete term is made to stand, v. g. man, horse, tree, is in Wyclif's theory, the complete substance. What answers to the corresponding abstract terms, humanity, 'equinity', arboreity', is the form. And that which is either a horse, or a man, or a tree, is the subject or matter, which may be identically the same in each successively, as it is the same in nature for all of them simultaneously. And if we are yet more curious to know what this matter may be, we shall find, on reverting to Logica, that it is
LXXVIII INTRODUCTION. Essence that is identical with the Father and the Son, who are themselves distinct Persons ; the Word that is God and Man at once, although Deity is not humanity; and Universal Humanity, which is identical with Peter and with Paul, though Peter and Paul are different individuals. Therefore, if I say : This same essence will be fire and will be water', it does not follow that fire will be water. Wyclif then goes on to examine various changes, a discussion into which we need not enter, since his system explains all of them except Transubstantiation, and he admits that there is here a question which he has not yet solved. Had he admitted that his Subject had a merely logical existence, there would have been no difficulty here at all. That which was bread is Christ's Body. That which, the subject of the change, remains of course, even in the orthodox explanation, but it is a mere word that stands, now for bread, now for Christ's Body. But Wyclif, in his Realism, was constrained to give the sentence the following signification: That identically same real thing which was bread is the Body of Christ. And the Church had decided that nothing remained of the bread save the outward appearances. Could these be taken as the underlying subject? Was the subject merely the same space, occupied by the appearances? and if so, could he grant that the space had a real existence of its own, without coming into conflict with the Church? No wonder that at this stage Wyclif avoided the discussion, and said: “Est longus sermo, et adhuc mihi inscrutabilis" (p. 186—189). The rest of the chapter (pp. 189—196) is devoted to a discussion of creation, in the course of which Wyclif says that the essence of things existed before the things themselves (an assertion that he will explain and justify further on); of the objection that, the receptivity of matter being a perfection, the subject cannot be conceived as formless, to which he replies that bare receptivity of anything cannot be a form, since a form must determine a subject to be this or that in particular; and of the vestiges of the Trinity in creation. We now see clearly that anything for which a concrete term is made to stand, v. g. man, horse, tree, is in Wyclif's theory, the complete substance. What answers to the corresponding abstract terms, humanity, 'equinity', arboreity', is the form. And that which is either a horse, or a man, or a tree, is the subject or matter, which may be identically the same in each successively, as it is the same in nature for all of them simultaneously. And if we are yet more curious to know what this matter may be, we shall find, on reverting to Logica, that it is
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INTRODUCTION. LXXIX nothing else but the atoms which fill the whole of space and cor- respond to each point of the same, and which at one time may form the body of a man, at another that of an ass, but never exist without any form. Ch. 5. But Wyclif's antagonists are not yet beaten. Are we, they say, to deny the value of the following syllogism : This is A; this same thing is B; therefore A is B? Wyclif asserts that a given man is that which possesses humanity ; that the same given man is identical with his humanity; yet he denies that matter is form, and that humanity is identical with that which possesses it. As to his examples, those of the Trinity and the Incarnation explain the unknown by what is more unknown yet ; and that of the humanity, common to its singulars Peter and Paul, merely begs the question, since most philosophers deny the reality of Universals. Besides, if matter and form are two distinct natures, how can they inter- penetrate each other so as to make up one compound (pp. 196—198) ? To this Wyclif replies by asserting that neither matter nor form nor compound is identical one with another, although they have one essence. He points out various senses of the words nature and simplicity, and then comes to the fundamental distinction which, in his theory, obtains between matter, form and compound. The former is the essence quà receptive of form; the latter is the same essence quá generable in matter. These, taken singly, are each the simple essence; when together, they are the compound. This therefore is identical with neither, but with both. It possesses the quality of being able to have a form, and also that of actually having it. We may call the abstract essence a 'nature', as we may call the compound or its components by the same name, but with different significations. And here we see where the syllogism given abore is faulty. A given man is identical with that which, etc. and he is also identical with his humanity ; but he is not identical from the same point of view (pp. 198—203). — After touching on the question whether there may be many sorts of primal matter, Wyclif clears himself of blame as concerns the instances he has given. In Aristotle's time everybody admitted that a universal term was common to all its singulars, and the denial of this in modern times has driven men to absurd assertions. As to the Holy Trinity, Wyclif only intended to prove that anyone who maintained the absurdity of the system would be also obliged to deny the Catholic faith ; and the example of Christ's double nature in one Person
INTRODUCTION. LXXIX nothing else but the atoms which fill the whole of space and cor- respond to each point of the same, and which at one time may form the body of a man, at another that of an ass, but never exist without any form. Ch. 5. But Wyclif's antagonists are not yet beaten. Are we, they say, to deny the value of the following syllogism : This is A; this same thing is B; therefore A is B? Wyclif asserts that a given man is that which possesses humanity ; that the same given man is identical with his humanity; yet he denies that matter is form, and that humanity is identical with that which possesses it. As to his examples, those of the Trinity and the Incarnation explain the unknown by what is more unknown yet ; and that of the humanity, common to its singulars Peter and Paul, merely begs the question, since most philosophers deny the reality of Universals. Besides, if matter and form are two distinct natures, how can they inter- penetrate each other so as to make up one compound (pp. 196—198) ? To this Wyclif replies by asserting that neither matter nor form nor compound is identical one with another, although they have one essence. He points out various senses of the words nature and simplicity, and then comes to the fundamental distinction which, in his theory, obtains between matter, form and compound. The former is the essence quà receptive of form; the latter is the same essence quá generable in matter. These, taken singly, are each the simple essence; when together, they are the compound. This therefore is identical with neither, but with both. It possesses the quality of being able to have a form, and also that of actually having it. We may call the abstract essence a 'nature', as we may call the compound or its components by the same name, but with different significations. And here we see where the syllogism given abore is faulty. A given man is identical with that which, etc. and he is also identical with his humanity ; but he is not identical from the same point of view (pp. 198—203). — After touching on the question whether there may be many sorts of primal matter, Wyclif clears himself of blame as concerns the instances he has given. In Aristotle's time everybody admitted that a universal term was common to all its singulars, and the denial of this in modern times has driven men to absurd assertions. As to the Holy Trinity, Wyclif only intended to prove that anyone who maintained the absurdity of the system would be also obliged to deny the Catholic faith ; and the example of Christ's double nature in one Person
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LXXX INTRODUCTION. was merely adduced as an illustration. That matter must be identical (pp. 203—206) with form because one interpenetrates the other, is an utterly worthless objection. Ch. 6. (pp. 266—216) Another argument is discussed here. How can this 'created essence' be formless and simple? It is prior to its form, as already stated; yet it cannot exist without it: a flagrant contradiction. It is identical with matter, form and compound, since it is what is common to all three ; but if so, it is threefold and not simple. We may give Wyclif's answer very briefly. There are various kinds of priority, amongst which priority in time and origin are most important. A sound is prior in its origin to the tune of which it forms a part, yet it is not prior to it in time. If primal matter is naturally prior to its form, yet cannot exist without one, when is it formless ? Never, in time ; but it is formless at what Wyclif calls the first instant of nature — a mode of being, not measured by time. What underlies anything must exist (at least in its nature) before that which it upholds. — As to simplicity, the argument equivocates with the various senses of this term. The same essence is matter, form and compound, i. e. it consists of these three, just as God consists of the Three Persons, without ceasing to be perfectly simple. The difference is in the point of view you take. The essence of man, of that which is man, and of humanity, is one and the same. Ch. 7. (pp. 216—225) consists mainly of the same objections as were given before, this time answered by an appeal to the Bible and Augustine, whose expressions coincide with the theory set forth. It is not of much interest, for the opponent's answer would be ready : neither the inspired authors nor the Father of the Church intended to write with Scholastic exactness. However, the argument, confirmed by a great number of quotations, seems to thow that Wyclif's theory agrees more closely with the letter of Holy Writ. Two points may be noted here. One that Wyclif approves of a theologian, who, to avoid sophistical affectation, would answer simply ves and no to the same question; of course in different senses. This, he says, is an affective mode of reasoning, but with cavillers only. The other is that our author finds himself contradicted by Aristotle. The latter says: “A statue is made of brass; brass is not made a statue." But Wyclif, quoting 'the water that was made wine', and Adam who was dust', and many other passages of a like nature, merely replies that he does not approve Aristotle's dictum.
LXXX INTRODUCTION. was merely adduced as an illustration. That matter must be identical (pp. 203—206) with form because one interpenetrates the other, is an utterly worthless objection. Ch. 6. (pp. 266—216) Another argument is discussed here. How can this 'created essence' be formless and simple? It is prior to its form, as already stated; yet it cannot exist without it: a flagrant contradiction. It is identical with matter, form and compound, since it is what is common to all three ; but if so, it is threefold and not simple. We may give Wyclif's answer very briefly. There are various kinds of priority, amongst which priority in time and origin are most important. A sound is prior in its origin to the tune of which it forms a part, yet it is not prior to it in time. If primal matter is naturally prior to its form, yet cannot exist without one, when is it formless ? Never, in time ; but it is formless at what Wyclif calls the first instant of nature — a mode of being, not measured by time. What underlies anything must exist (at least in its nature) before that which it upholds. — As to simplicity, the argument equivocates with the various senses of this term. The same essence is matter, form and compound, i. e. it consists of these three, just as God consists of the Three Persons, without ceasing to be perfectly simple. The difference is in the point of view you take. The essence of man, of that which is man, and of humanity, is one and the same. Ch. 7. (pp. 216—225) consists mainly of the same objections as were given before, this time answered by an appeal to the Bible and Augustine, whose expressions coincide with the theory set forth. It is not of much interest, for the opponent's answer would be ready : neither the inspired authors nor the Father of the Church intended to write with Scholastic exactness. However, the argument, confirmed by a great number of quotations, seems to thow that Wyclif's theory agrees more closely with the letter of Holy Writ. Two points may be noted here. One that Wyclif approves of a theologian, who, to avoid sophistical affectation, would answer simply ves and no to the same question; of course in different senses. This, he says, is an affective mode of reasoning, but with cavillers only. The other is that our author finds himself contradicted by Aristotle. The latter says: “A statue is made of brass; brass is not made a statue." But Wyclif, quoting 'the water that was made wine', and Adam who was dust', and many other passages of a like nature, merely replies that he does not approve Aristotle's dictum.
Strana LXXXI
INTRODUCTION. LXXXI Ch. 8. (pp. 225—234) Another series of objections is brought up and answered with great dialectical skill. But the most striking part of the chapter, at least in my eyes, is its conclusion. In the last five lines, Wyclif openly denies his doctrine of the Possibles; or at least it seems so. As I have pointed out in the essay at the beginning of this volume, nothing (according to him) was possible, except what actually exists or will exist at some time or other. It is at the bottom of his whole system, one of its foundation-stones, so to speak; and you have but to read in Logica, vol II. p. 86, lines 16—36, p. 87, lines 29—37, and p. 89, lines 1—9, to see what his opinion was upon this subject. Yet here he speaks of possible beings which never at any moment of time exist! I confess, when I saw these lines, I was sorely puzzled. Our philosopher's doctrine was not so venerable in my opinion that I should feel obliged, rather than to charge him with inconsistency, to declare the passage spurious, as controversialists are sometimes forced to do when much troubled by a text of the Bible; but nevertheless I was far from inclined to suppose Wyclif had contradicted himself. We must however choose between these two alternatives and a third, which I prefer. He may have used the word possibiles in the sense usually employed, either by oversight or in order to be more generally understood ; or in other words, he may have meaut by possibiles things which he himself considered as impossible. But even this explanation is open to grave doubts, if we admit the lines as they stand to have been written by Wyclif. Et posse existere, for instance, sounds very strangely when we compare it with the lines in Logica that I have quoted. Ch. 9. (pp. 235—242) It is lastly objected — and Wyclif very rightly keeps these most serious charges for the end — that the con- sequences of his theory lead to heresy. Every creature, having intelligible being that is real, would be coeternal with God. Nothing would come to an end, but all things would be perpetual. And this reality would mean the reality of actual, not of merely possible, existence : thus positing a world, created indeed, but eternally created, in contradiction to the faith of the Church, Wyclif's answer is perfectly orthodox ; he distinguishes between actual existence and mere intelligibility. That alone which is eternal of any creature is its exemplar, which lives eternally in God. And here Wyclif gives a lengthy exposition of the text of St. John, ch. I. Quod factum est in ipso vita erat (according to the ancient punctuation); and this ex- position is remarkably beautiful. Still, one cannot help thinking that the
INTRODUCTION. LXXXI Ch. 8. (pp. 225—234) Another series of objections is brought up and answered with great dialectical skill. But the most striking part of the chapter, at least in my eyes, is its conclusion. In the last five lines, Wyclif openly denies his doctrine of the Possibles; or at least it seems so. As I have pointed out in the essay at the beginning of this volume, nothing (according to him) was possible, except what actually exists or will exist at some time or other. It is at the bottom of his whole system, one of its foundation-stones, so to speak; and you have but to read in Logica, vol II. p. 86, lines 16—36, p. 87, lines 29—37, and p. 89, lines 1—9, to see what his opinion was upon this subject. Yet here he speaks of possible beings which never at any moment of time exist! I confess, when I saw these lines, I was sorely puzzled. Our philosopher's doctrine was not so venerable in my opinion that I should feel obliged, rather than to charge him with inconsistency, to declare the passage spurious, as controversialists are sometimes forced to do when much troubled by a text of the Bible; but nevertheless I was far from inclined to suppose Wyclif had contradicted himself. We must however choose between these two alternatives and a third, which I prefer. He may have used the word possibiles in the sense usually employed, either by oversight or in order to be more generally understood ; or in other words, he may have meaut by possibiles things which he himself considered as impossible. But even this explanation is open to grave doubts, if we admit the lines as they stand to have been written by Wyclif. Et posse existere, for instance, sounds very strangely when we compare it with the lines in Logica that I have quoted. Ch. 9. (pp. 235—242) It is lastly objected — and Wyclif very rightly keeps these most serious charges for the end — that the con- sequences of his theory lead to heresy. Every creature, having intelligible being that is real, would be coeternal with God. Nothing would come to an end, but all things would be perpetual. And this reality would mean the reality of actual, not of merely possible, existence : thus positing a world, created indeed, but eternally created, in contradiction to the faith of the Church, Wyclif's answer is perfectly orthodox ; he distinguishes between actual existence and mere intelligibility. That alone which is eternal of any creature is its exemplar, which lives eternally in God. And here Wyclif gives a lengthy exposition of the text of St. John, ch. I. Quod factum est in ipso vita erat (according to the ancient punctuation); and this ex- position is remarkably beautiful. Still, one cannot help thinking that the
Strana LXXXII
LXXXII INTRODUCTION. difficulty might be urged farther. For, unless our authvr is inconsistent here, 'mere intelligibility' of which he speaks is but an unintelligibility. And if the Universal Man is independent of each and all of his singulars. and is something really existing, is he not real from all eternity? Here, I think, Wyclif could but admit the conclusion, saying however (as I previously supposed) that in so far as this universal exists anteriorly to its singulars, it is the Ideal Man, not essentially other than God; and that the same, as existing in its singulars, is distinct from God. This would explain his remarkable statement on p. 239, that “he cannot go so for as to assert the identity of all things with God, since he would risk being misunderstood"; and when he denies (on the same page) that any creature exists eternally, he evidently means 'in so far as it is a creature, singular, and restricted to being at some moment of time'. In so far as it is identical with its Universal, which abstracts from all time, and has been from all eternity willed by God, it exists otherwise : and in so far it is not a creature. Our author, as we see, is able by this distinction to affirm in one sense that no creature is God, and in another to say — though he tells us he does not think himself justified in affirming this — that every being is God, "concedendo asinum et quodlibet nominabile esse Deum". Such is the treatise De materia et Forma, in which we plainly see the principles laid down in Logica now worked out to very startling conclusions. It was already easy to perceive in the former work how nearly Wyclif’s system approached to the Pantheism of the old Realists ; here the resemblance becomes much more striking. He never, it is true, declared himself a Pantheist openly ; and his boldness was such that, had he believed his system led to it, the declaration would no doubt have been made. But his subtility was as great as his boldness, and he probably found in his distinction grounds for holding back, which, inadequate though they might have seemed to other minds, were amply sufficient to his own. Others may have thought him a Pantheist ; he certainly held, from first to last, that he was not.
LXXXII INTRODUCTION. difficulty might be urged farther. For, unless our authvr is inconsistent here, 'mere intelligibility' of which he speaks is but an unintelligibility. And if the Universal Man is independent of each and all of his singulars. and is something really existing, is he not real from all eternity? Here, I think, Wyclif could but admit the conclusion, saying however (as I previously supposed) that in so far as this universal exists anteriorly to its singulars, it is the Ideal Man, not essentially other than God; and that the same, as existing in its singulars, is distinct from God. This would explain his remarkable statement on p. 239, that “he cannot go so for as to assert the identity of all things with God, since he would risk being misunderstood"; and when he denies (on the same page) that any creature exists eternally, he evidently means 'in so far as it is a creature, singular, and restricted to being at some moment of time'. In so far as it is identical with its Universal, which abstracts from all time, and has been from all eternity willed by God, it exists otherwise : and in so far it is not a creature. Our author, as we see, is able by this distinction to affirm in one sense that no creature is God, and in another to say — though he tells us he does not think himself justified in affirming this — that every being is God, "concedendo asinum et quodlibet nominabile esse Deum". Such is the treatise De materia et Forma, in which we plainly see the principles laid down in Logica now worked out to very startling conclusions. It was already easy to perceive in the former work how nearly Wyclif’s system approached to the Pantheism of the old Realists ; here the resemblance becomes much more striking. He never, it is true, declared himself a Pantheist openly ; and his boldness was such that, had he believed his system led to it, the declaration would no doubt have been made. But his subtility was as great as his boldness, and he probably found in his distinction grounds for holding back, which, inadequate though they might have seemed to other minds, were amply sufficient to his own. Others may have thought him a Pantheist ; he certainly held, from first to last, that he was not.
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F. 47* DE ACTIBUS ANIME. PRIMA PARS. CAPITULUM PRIMUM. Gracia dicendarum restat tractare de actibus, potenciis, intencionibus, et habitibus anime. Et primo de actibus, 5 cum sint nobis nociores, et media inducendi in noticias aliorum. Quod autem sunt actus anime, pauci vel nulli dissensiunt: nemo enim dubitat quin quandoque sen- ciat, intelligat, velit, vel nolit, et sic de ceteris actibus in particulari. Et inpossibile est hominem sic se habere, ro nisi fuerit unum ens denominans ipsum esse huiusmodi; igitur tale ens est ponendum. Et cum denominacio sit accidentalis, et per consequens formalis, sequitur quod sit quoddam ens a quo formaliter et inmediate homo est denominatus esse sic actuatus; et illi enti, quod- 15 cunque fuerit, impono nomen actus. Visio ergo, audicio, olfaccio, gustacio, et taccio, vocantur actus sensuum particularium; sed sensacio, ymaginacio, estimacio, fanta- internal feeling, siacio, et memoracio, vocantur actus continue sensuum necessariorum. Intelleccio, volucio, et nolucio, vocantur 20 actus potenciarum non organicarum. Intellectus et volun- tatis appetitus, vel desiderium appetibilis antequam habeatur, vocatur actus potencie appetitive vel concu- piscibilis; et sic de fuga, que est actus illis contrarius. Sed delectacio, dolor, vel tristacio, est in fine consequens Wyclif, taking as generally admitted the existence of certain mental acts, external sensation, volition and thought, together with the various 7. MS. descensiunt. 14. MS. uccut9. Title: J. Wicleff ... Anime in red ink; prima pars capi- tulum primum deest; larger initial G. There is no division of chapters in the Cambridge MS. C. C. C. 103, only large initial letters here and there, and towards the middle, Secunda Pars. De Actibus Anime.
F. 47* DE ACTIBUS ANIME. PRIMA PARS. CAPITULUM PRIMUM. Gracia dicendarum restat tractare de actibus, potenciis, intencionibus, et habitibus anime. Et primo de actibus, 5 cum sint nobis nociores, et media inducendi in noticias aliorum. Quod autem sunt actus anime, pauci vel nulli dissensiunt: nemo enim dubitat quin quandoque sen- ciat, intelligat, velit, vel nolit, et sic de ceteris actibus in particulari. Et inpossibile est hominem sic se habere, ro nisi fuerit unum ens denominans ipsum esse huiusmodi; igitur tale ens est ponendum. Et cum denominacio sit accidentalis, et per consequens formalis, sequitur quod sit quoddam ens a quo formaliter et inmediate homo est denominatus esse sic actuatus; et illi enti, quod- 15 cunque fuerit, impono nomen actus. Visio ergo, audicio, olfaccio, gustacio, et taccio, vocantur actus sensuum particularium; sed sensacio, ymaginacio, estimacio, fanta- internal feeling, siacio, et memoracio, vocantur actus continue sensuum necessariorum. Intelleccio, volucio, et nolucio, vocantur 20 actus potenciarum non organicarum. Intellectus et volun- tatis appetitus, vel desiderium appetibilis antequam habeatur, vocatur actus potencie appetitive vel concu- piscibilis; et sic de fuga, que est actus illis contrarius. Sed delectacio, dolor, vel tristacio, est in fine consequens Wyclif, taking as generally admitted the existence of certain mental acts, external sensation, volition and thought, together with the various 7. MS. descensiunt. 14. MS. uccut9. Title: J. Wicleff ... Anime in red ink; prima pars capi- tulum primum deest; larger initial G. There is no division of chapters in the Cambridge MS. C. C. C. 103, only large initial letters here and there, and towards the middle, Secunda Pars. De Actibus Anime.
Strana 2
2 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I. emotions and habitum convenientis vel disconvenientis. Et tales actus passions, consecuntur quascunque potencias anime, ut videtur; sed distinccius potenciam volutivam, que eciam non solum habet appetitum vel deappetitum, quod est volucio vel nolucio, sed habet actus sperandi vel desperandi, gau- dendi, tristandi; et sic de multis actibus compositis vel aggregatis. Et sic virtutem irascibilem consecuntur actus irascendi, dedignandi, et sic de multis aliis, de quibus per ordinem tractabitur. De istis ergo, quoad questionem “si est", non est dubitandum, set supposito quod sunt to que noto, tractandum est de suis quiditatibus. Three theories: In qua materia sunt tres opiniones; prima dicit quod (1) That they are absolutely omnis actus anime est qualitas, et res absoluta que distinct from potest per se existere, sicud corpus. Secunda dicit quod the mind ; (2) that they are omnis actus anime est ipsa anima; et tercia dicit quod 15 the mind ; (3) that they are omnis actus anime est accidens de genere accionis. accidents under Contra primam sic: omnis actus denominans forma- the category of Action. liter subiectum esse agens est accio. Sed omnis actus 11 Arguments anime qualis primarie denominat formaliter subiectum against the first theory. esse agens: ergo omnis talis est accio. Maior patet ex 20 I. If it were diffinicione quid nominis accionis, quam ponit auctor sex true, thought would not be an principiorum, dicens quod descriptive accio est forma, action of the thinking mind. secundum quam, in id quod subicitur, agere dicimur; ut declaratum est tercio libro. Et minor patet: nam quilibet actus anime denominat formaliter ipsam esse 25 agentem, eo quod anima, cum sit activa, habet pro eius propria operacione vel accione intelleccionem vel intellectivam que supponitur esse actus anime. Nec potest esse melior distinccio accidencium, quam capiendo ex autoritate vel supposicione suas descripciones quid nominis, 30 vel raciones generales, et videre utrum tales illis acci- dentibus conveniant. II. A quality, Secundo sic: Omnis qualitas denominat formaliter distinct from the mind, could subiectum suum esse quale, ut patet ex descripcione not at the same Aristotelis, capitulo de qualitate; sed nullus actus anime 35 time be its activity, since sic denominat; ergo nullus talis est qualitas. Minor these are sic: esse "quale" et esse "agens" sunt due denomina- F. 47" distinct categories. ciones generalissime diffinientes: igitur, cum nulla forma potest formaliter et inmediate denominare talibus duabus 40 proceeds to enquire what they are. 17. MS. 1° racio in marg. in red ink; ib. MS. omne. 19. p'nart pro primarie. 22. MS. deſc'pe. 23. MS. qbig pro subicitur. 24. MS. maior. 30. MS. autote. 33. MS. in marg. 2a racio in red ink. 22. Auctor sex principiorum. Gilbert de la Porrée.
2 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I. emotions and habitum convenientis vel disconvenientis. Et tales actus passions, consecuntur quascunque potencias anime, ut videtur; sed distinccius potenciam volutivam, que eciam non solum habet appetitum vel deappetitum, quod est volucio vel nolucio, sed habet actus sperandi vel desperandi, gau- dendi, tristandi; et sic de multis actibus compositis vel aggregatis. Et sic virtutem irascibilem consecuntur actus irascendi, dedignandi, et sic de multis aliis, de quibus per ordinem tractabitur. De istis ergo, quoad questionem “si est", non est dubitandum, set supposito quod sunt to que noto, tractandum est de suis quiditatibus. Three theories: In qua materia sunt tres opiniones; prima dicit quod (1) That they are absolutely omnis actus anime est qualitas, et res absoluta que distinct from potest per se existere, sicud corpus. Secunda dicit quod the mind ; (2) that they are omnis actus anime est ipsa anima; et tercia dicit quod 15 the mind ; (3) that they are omnis actus anime est accidens de genere accionis. accidents under Contra primam sic: omnis actus denominans forma- the category of Action. liter subiectum esse agens est accio. Sed omnis actus 11 Arguments anime qualis primarie denominat formaliter subiectum against the first theory. esse agens: ergo omnis talis est accio. Maior patet ex 20 I. If it were diffinicione quid nominis accionis, quam ponit auctor sex true, thought would not be an principiorum, dicens quod descriptive accio est forma, action of the thinking mind. secundum quam, in id quod subicitur, agere dicimur; ut declaratum est tercio libro. Et minor patet: nam quilibet actus anime denominat formaliter ipsam esse 25 agentem, eo quod anima, cum sit activa, habet pro eius propria operacione vel accione intelleccionem vel intellectivam que supponitur esse actus anime. Nec potest esse melior distinccio accidencium, quam capiendo ex autoritate vel supposicione suas descripciones quid nominis, 30 vel raciones generales, et videre utrum tales illis acci- dentibus conveniant. II. A quality, Secundo sic: Omnis qualitas denominat formaliter distinct from the mind, could subiectum suum esse quale, ut patet ex descripcione not at the same Aristotelis, capitulo de qualitate; sed nullus actus anime 35 time be its activity, since sic denominat; ergo nullus talis est qualitas. Minor these are sic: esse "quale" et esse "agens" sunt due denomina- F. 47" distinct categories. ciones generalissime diffinientes: igitur, cum nulla forma potest formaliter et inmediate denominare talibus duabus 40 proceeds to enquire what they are. 17. MS. 1° racio in marg. in red ink; ib. MS. omne. 19. p'nart pro primarie. 22. MS. deſc'pe. 23. MS. qbig pro subicitur. 24. MS. maior. 30. MS. autote. 33. MS. in marg. 2a racio in red ink. 22. Auctor sex principiorum. Gilbert de la Porrée.
Strana 3
CAP. I. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 3 denominacionibus, sequitur quod actus anime denominans immediate et formaliter animam esse agentem, non de- nominat immediate et formaliter ipsam esse qualem. Confirmatur per hoc quod actus sensitivi et intellectivi 5 terminantur ad obiecta (secundum omnes loquentes de actibus), nec possunt cognosci nisi cognoscendo obiecta a quibus specificantur. Sed certum est quod nulla res absoluta in me terminatur ad unum distans a me, nec specificatur a me; sicud nec dependet vel in esse vel in 10 cognosci ab uno coruptibili distante ab illo. Igitur etc. Sive enim actus sensitivi sint res absolute extense, sive multi- plicate, cum non protenduntur usque ad obiectum extrin- secum, patet quod nec terminantur nec finiuntur ad illud. Item, omnis potencia inanimati potest in eius opera- 15 cionem, habita sufficienti applicacione proporcionati obiecti sine alia re absoluta media (ut patuit de accione, et quelibet posicio modernis temporibus concedit); sed in quantum potencia est simplicior et perfeccior, potest in eius finem cum paucioribus mediis, ut patet secundo 20 De Celo: igitur multo magis virtus cognitiva potest in presencia proporcionati obiecti in eius operacionem, sine hoc quod producat rem absolutam mediam inter potenciam et habitum productum. Maior patet ex hoc, quod alterans sensibiliter aliud non alterat alteracione 25 que sit res absoluta, nec movens aliud localiter movet alia re absoluta media inter motorem et motum, ut patet et patebit. Et minor patet, non solum de intelli- genciis, de quibus ponit philosophus exemplum, sed de potenciis anime. Nam sensus communis sufficit com- 30 prehendere quodlibet sensibile cum paucioribus actibus quam sufficiunt sensus particulares; et sic de ymagina- tiva quoad sensum communem, et estimativa quoad ymaginativam; et intellectus hominis superaddit omnes illas vires. Intellectus angeli excedit intellectum hominis, 35 et intellectus dei omnes alias potencias. Non igitur est racio quare agens sensibiliter extrinsecum potest in suam operacionem sine produccione rei absolute, quin per idem potest et agens spirituale intrinsecum. Item, ponatur quod anima moveat voluntarie corpus IV. If a man's volition to move 40 Socratis localiter; tunc, secundum opinionem, ad omnem his body were III. No force in nature requires anything but the presence of its proper object to become active; the force of Mind. therefore, requires no quality to intervene between itself and its object. For the higher any power is, the fewer acts it requires to attain its object. Acts of sensation, v. g are classified according to their different objects, which make them known to us; an absolute quality could not thus depend on something else. 8. MS. alt“ pro absoluta. 12. MS. mlate pro multiplicate. 14. MS. in marg. 3a racio. 39. MS. in marg. 4° racio. 20. De Celo. By Aristotle.
CAP. I. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 3 denominacionibus, sequitur quod actus anime denominans immediate et formaliter animam esse agentem, non de- nominat immediate et formaliter ipsam esse qualem. Confirmatur per hoc quod actus sensitivi et intellectivi 5 terminantur ad obiecta (secundum omnes loquentes de actibus), nec possunt cognosci nisi cognoscendo obiecta a quibus specificantur. Sed certum est quod nulla res absoluta in me terminatur ad unum distans a me, nec specificatur a me; sicud nec dependet vel in esse vel in 10 cognosci ab uno coruptibili distante ab illo. Igitur etc. Sive enim actus sensitivi sint res absolute extense, sive multi- plicate, cum non protenduntur usque ad obiectum extrin- secum, patet quod nec terminantur nec finiuntur ad illud. Item, omnis potencia inanimati potest in eius opera- 15 cionem, habita sufficienti applicacione proporcionati obiecti sine alia re absoluta media (ut patuit de accione, et quelibet posicio modernis temporibus concedit); sed in quantum potencia est simplicior et perfeccior, potest in eius finem cum paucioribus mediis, ut patet secundo 20 De Celo: igitur multo magis virtus cognitiva potest in presencia proporcionati obiecti in eius operacionem, sine hoc quod producat rem absolutam mediam inter potenciam et habitum productum. Maior patet ex hoc, quod alterans sensibiliter aliud non alterat alteracione 25 que sit res absoluta, nec movens aliud localiter movet alia re absoluta media inter motorem et motum, ut patet et patebit. Et minor patet, non solum de intelli- genciis, de quibus ponit philosophus exemplum, sed de potenciis anime. Nam sensus communis sufficit com- 30 prehendere quodlibet sensibile cum paucioribus actibus quam sufficiunt sensus particulares; et sic de ymagina- tiva quoad sensum communem, et estimativa quoad ymaginativam; et intellectus hominis superaddit omnes illas vires. Intellectus angeli excedit intellectum hominis, 35 et intellectus dei omnes alias potencias. Non igitur est racio quare agens sensibiliter extrinsecum potest in suam operacionem sine produccione rei absolute, quin per idem potest et agens spirituale intrinsecum. Item, ponatur quod anima moveat voluntarie corpus IV. If a man's volition to move 40 Socratis localiter; tunc, secundum opinionem, ad omnem his body were III. No force in nature requires anything but the presence of its proper object to become active; the force of Mind. therefore, requires no quality to intervene between itself and its object. For the higher any power is, the fewer acts it requires to attain its object. Acts of sensation, v. g are classified according to their different objects, which make them known to us; an absolute quality could not thus depend on something else. 8. MS. alt“ pro absoluta. 12. MS. mlate pro multiplicate. 14. MS. in marg. 3a racio. 39. MS. in marg. 4° racio. 20. De Celo. By Aristotle.
Strana 4
JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I. one absolute punctum Socratis esset quedam qualitas absoluta pro- quality, existing ducta, que est volucio; et illa inmediate movet corpus, throughout the body, it would et ex consequenti se ipsam. Sed contra: illa volucio nec act everywhere potest poni extensa, nec uniformis, nec difformis, nec in the same way ; each part being equally multiplicata, et sic de aliis proprietatibus dandum rei 5 mobile, would absolute; igitur, etc. Si enim sit multiplicata, cum eius- move with equal swiftness; dem speciei sit virtus secundum locum motiva movens brutum (ut patet per Avicennam et racionem) sequeretur a pari illam esse multiplicatam; et per consequens appe- titus sensitivus illam producens esset multiplicatus. Et 10 cum eque mobilis sit quelibet pars corporea Socratis ut alia, sequitur quod talis res, naturaliter movens secundum eius ultimum, eque velociter moveret quam- libet partem ut aliam; quod est inpossibile de motu progressivo, cum alique partes quiescunt, et alie mo- 15 ventur uno motu, et alie alio; ut patet ex processu libri There would de progressu animalium. Oportet igitur ponere quot- therefore be as libet actus et partes quiescentes, et diversimode motas, many such qualitative acts sicud ponunt philosophi de motoribus orbium. Nam si as there are different unus actus sit res absoluta que possit per se et in 20 movements; mediate movere ita dispariter tot partes, multo magis F. 48 and if we suppose one anima; nam b volucio nunquam posset ita dispariter et fundamental quality ordinate movere unam partem corespondenter ad aliam directing all quiescentem, nisi esset res volutiva et deliberativa. Nam, these, it is unnecessary, corupta omni anima et potencia anime Socratis b, actu 25 since the soul can do this; manente conservato a deo, sufficeret cum dei conser- and vacione naturaliter in operacionem suam, ut modo. Sed unintelligible besides without quomodo hoc, nisi cognosceret et informaret? Si autem the soul. Suppose this est dare voluciones extensas infinitas, tunc volucio partis volitional quiescentis contrariaretur volucioni partis mote. Et sic 30 quality — the soul with its ad omnem punctum forent res eque fortes contrarie, faculties existing no contra se nitentes, et per consequens melius et facilius longer — to be moveretur corpus Socratis, producta volucione in corde, miraculously preserved: it vel mota parte, et non amplius, quam producta illa would continue to produce qualitate per totum. Confirmatur: b res naturaliter movet 35 movement as et manebit continue eque intensa, vel quantumlibet before ; which could not be, intendetur, ut pono; igitur, pari evidencia qua in prin- unless the quality knew cipio ita velociter movet, movebit et in fine, cum non of the various sit maior re a, nec virtus plus inclinans ad oppositum. motions ; it would no longer Et iuxta hoc continue produceret anima novas res ex-40 he a quality, but a subject, tensas, nunc ad pausandum partem, nunc ad movendum and identical with the soul. which is impossible, at least in the case of progressive movement. 5. MS. mlta pro multiplicata. 8. MS. amia. 13. MS. vote pro velociter. 18. et before partes erased in MS.
JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I. one absolute punctum Socratis esset quedam qualitas absoluta pro- quality, existing ducta, que est volucio; et illa inmediate movet corpus, throughout the body, it would et ex consequenti se ipsam. Sed contra: illa volucio nec act everywhere potest poni extensa, nec uniformis, nec difformis, nec in the same way ; each part being equally multiplicata, et sic de aliis proprietatibus dandum rei 5 mobile, would absolute; igitur, etc. Si enim sit multiplicata, cum eius- move with equal swiftness; dem speciei sit virtus secundum locum motiva movens brutum (ut patet per Avicennam et racionem) sequeretur a pari illam esse multiplicatam; et per consequens appe- titus sensitivus illam producens esset multiplicatus. Et 10 cum eque mobilis sit quelibet pars corporea Socratis ut alia, sequitur quod talis res, naturaliter movens secundum eius ultimum, eque velociter moveret quam- libet partem ut aliam; quod est inpossibile de motu progressivo, cum alique partes quiescunt, et alie mo- 15 ventur uno motu, et alie alio; ut patet ex processu libri There would de progressu animalium. Oportet igitur ponere quot- therefore be as libet actus et partes quiescentes, et diversimode motas, many such qualitative acts sicud ponunt philosophi de motoribus orbium. Nam si as there are different unus actus sit res absoluta que possit per se et in 20 movements; mediate movere ita dispariter tot partes, multo magis F. 48 and if we suppose one anima; nam b volucio nunquam posset ita dispariter et fundamental quality ordinate movere unam partem corespondenter ad aliam directing all quiescentem, nisi esset res volutiva et deliberativa. Nam, these, it is unnecessary, corupta omni anima et potencia anime Socratis b, actu 25 since the soul can do this; manente conservato a deo, sufficeret cum dei conser- and vacione naturaliter in operacionem suam, ut modo. Sed unintelligible besides without quomodo hoc, nisi cognosceret et informaret? Si autem the soul. Suppose this est dare voluciones extensas infinitas, tunc volucio partis volitional quiescentis contrariaretur volucioni partis mote. Et sic 30 quality — the soul with its ad omnem punctum forent res eque fortes contrarie, faculties existing no contra se nitentes, et per consequens melius et facilius longer — to be moveretur corpus Socratis, producta volucione in corde, miraculously preserved: it vel mota parte, et non amplius, quam producta illa would continue to produce qualitate per totum. Confirmatur: b res naturaliter movet 35 movement as et manebit continue eque intensa, vel quantumlibet before ; which could not be, intendetur, ut pono; igitur, pari evidencia qua in prin- unless the quality knew cipio ita velociter movet, movebit et in fine, cum non of the various sit maior re a, nec virtus plus inclinans ad oppositum. motions ; it would no longer Et iuxta hoc continue produceret anima novas res ex-40 he a quality, but a subject, tensas, nunc ad pausandum partem, nunc ad movendum and identical with the soul. which is impossible, at least in the case of progressive movement. 5. MS. mlta pro multiplicata. 8. MS. amia. 13. MS. vote pro velociter. 18. et before partes erased in MS.
Strana 5
CAP. I. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. secundum unum motum, et nunc secundum alium. Et cum hoc non posset facere nisi actu elicito, cognoscendo quomodo oportet partes huiusmodi se habere, sequitur quodlibet progrediens cognoscere motus et ordines par- 5 cium progrediendi: quod non solum contradicit ex- periencie, sed racioni. Nec valet dicere quod volucio movet secundum pro- It is of no use to reply that porciones et disposiciones organorum et virtutum que the difference in the organs debilitantur per continuacionem, quia eque bene pro- causes the difference in the 10 porcionatur pes quiescens sicud pes motus, et eque bene movements; for brachium motum ad anterius ut brachium motum ad they all have the same posterius. Sicud igitur gravitas et levitas, caliditas, et relation to cetera uniformia principia movendi movent subiecta volition, whether in uniformis capacitatis universaliter, sic esset de volucione, movement or at rest. If it were 15 si esset res absoluta, nec debilitas virtutis vel spiritus a quality, it would act like que imperantur ab actu volendi inpediunt: tum quia gravity and frequenter vigorantur per motum et manent eque forcia heat, which move moto homine ad sursum, sicut homine quiescente; tum uniformly. eciam quia omnia inferiora voluntate sunt resistiva sibi, 20 et eo velocius moverentur quo remitterentur in po- tenciis. Nec valet dicere quod anima regulat sicud virtus in semine regulatur ad diversas informaciones fetus fa- ciendas; tum quia ipsa non regulat, nisi per volucionem 25 quam producit. Que cum fuerit producta, ita naturaliter agit, sicud caliditas producta a calefaciente; tum eciam quia, si anima sufficiat regulare illam rem extensam immediate sine distincto actu, per idem sufficeret re- gulare virtutem secundum locum motivam, et alias vires 3o immediate sine re absoluta media producta. Nec est volucio tante efficacie ut secundum eius intencionem vel remissionem sufficiat velocius aut tardius movere corpus. Tunc enim sufficeret quilibet volare ut avis, et desistere a motu quando vellet, quia illa res absoluta habet in- 35 clinacionem naturalem ad sursum sicud virtus inducta a solido supposito, si ponitur sic, quod per se posita sufficeret elevare corpus et omnes vires quas iam movet F. 48' ad sursum. Et sic actus volendi intellective multipli- catus per totum celum esset res absoluta per se movens 40 celum; et per illum moveret intelligencia celum; igitur per accidens, sicud per accidens celum est quantum. If it be said that volitional movements are, like those of the seed in conception, regulated by the soul itself, this is worthless ; for the soul regulates them only through volition. Besides, the answer implies that the soul, by means of mere volition, could determine any effect whatever; if it chose to fly in the air, it could so so. And many other absurdities would follow. 9. MS. 9crae3. 14. MS. ummia; ib. MS. vto pro universaliter. 15. MS. ſpii.
CAP. I. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. secundum unum motum, et nunc secundum alium. Et cum hoc non posset facere nisi actu elicito, cognoscendo quomodo oportet partes huiusmodi se habere, sequitur quodlibet progrediens cognoscere motus et ordines par- 5 cium progrediendi: quod non solum contradicit ex- periencie, sed racioni. Nec valet dicere quod volucio movet secundum pro- It is of no use to reply that porciones et disposiciones organorum et virtutum que the difference in the organs debilitantur per continuacionem, quia eque bene pro- causes the difference in the 10 porcionatur pes quiescens sicud pes motus, et eque bene movements; for brachium motum ad anterius ut brachium motum ad they all have the same posterius. Sicud igitur gravitas et levitas, caliditas, et relation to cetera uniformia principia movendi movent subiecta volition, whether in uniformis capacitatis universaliter, sic esset de volucione, movement or at rest. If it were 15 si esset res absoluta, nec debilitas virtutis vel spiritus a quality, it would act like que imperantur ab actu volendi inpediunt: tum quia gravity and frequenter vigorantur per motum et manent eque forcia heat, which move moto homine ad sursum, sicut homine quiescente; tum uniformly. eciam quia omnia inferiora voluntate sunt resistiva sibi, 20 et eo velocius moverentur quo remitterentur in po- tenciis. Nec valet dicere quod anima regulat sicud virtus in semine regulatur ad diversas informaciones fetus fa- ciendas; tum quia ipsa non regulat, nisi per volucionem 25 quam producit. Que cum fuerit producta, ita naturaliter agit, sicud caliditas producta a calefaciente; tum eciam quia, si anima sufficiat regulare illam rem extensam immediate sine distincto actu, per idem sufficeret re- gulare virtutem secundum locum motivam, et alias vires 3o immediate sine re absoluta media producta. Nec est volucio tante efficacie ut secundum eius intencionem vel remissionem sufficiat velocius aut tardius movere corpus. Tunc enim sufficeret quilibet volare ut avis, et desistere a motu quando vellet, quia illa res absoluta habet in- 35 clinacionem naturalem ad sursum sicud virtus inducta a solido supposito, si ponitur sic, quod per se posita sufficeret elevare corpus et omnes vires quas iam movet F. 48' ad sursum. Et sic actus volendi intellective multipli- catus per totum celum esset res absoluta per se movens 40 celum; et per illum moveret intelligencia celum; igitur per accidens, sicud per accidens celum est quantum. If it be said that volitional movements are, like those of the seed in conception, regulated by the soul itself, this is worthless ; for the soul regulates them only through volition. Besides, the answer implies that the soul, by means of mere volition, could determine any effect whatever; if it chose to fly in the air, it could so so. And many other absurdities would follow. 9. MS. 9crae3. 14. MS. ummia; ib. MS. vto pro universaliter. 15. MS. ſpii.
Strana 6
6 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. ] Et per idem quelibet forma absoluta per accidens de- nominat, et deus (sicud et quelibet res naturaliter cau- sans), per accidens causat, quia per appetitum vel inclinacionem que mediat tanquam res absoluta. Et illa, si per se poneretur, esset vaga et nihil appetens, sicud dictum de virtute inducta in lapidem vel aliud violen- tatum. Cum enim omnis forma absoluta esset tante potens ipsa per se existente et conservata a deo, sicud ipsa conservata a suo subiecto, ut patet de sacramento altaris, sequitur quod volucio demonis movens grossum 10 cadaver sufficeret per se movere illud idem, et a pari volucio hominis. V. Acts of the Item, actus sunt veri, falsi, universales, particulares, mind are true, confusi, distincti, et possunt per se produci sine actu false, universal, particular &e. distincto; igitur non sunt res absolute potentes per se 15 They cannot, therefore, be existere. Consequencia probatur per hoc quod nulla res absolute absoluta est falsa vel universalis, nisi quia signatur false qualities, which, as such, vel universaliter. Cum igitur actus non signentur, eo are no more universal or quod distinguntur a speciebus, ut suppono pro nunc, false than light is, or colour. igitur non pocius sunt res absolute universales vel false 20 But thought is quam lux vel color. Intelleccio igitur est eo vera quo true or false as vere intelligitur, et eo falsa vel universalis quo false the subject thinks truly or vel universaliter intelligitur, sicud motus est velox, eo falsely; just as movement is quod mobile velociter movetur; et sic de aliis respec- quick or slow as the body tibus. Et quoad secundam partem antecedentis, non 25 moves quickly dicetur racio quare ad produccionem speciei vel alterius or slowly. If to elicit any rei absolute requiritur actus distinctus a producto, quin mental act, per idem ad cuiuscunque rei absolute requirentis pro- we had to posit another duccionem, requiritur actus distinctus. Et sequitur quod distinct from the mind, we in quacunque intelleccione anime sunt infiniti actus 30 should be forced antecedenter se producentes. Nec videtur racio quare to posit an infinite anima non moveret se per se et inmediate, cum sic multitude of acts, one per se primo agens, et per se primo recipiens illam produced by another, and qualitatem, quod est contra demonstracionem Aristoteles none directly 7° phisicorum; et sic crearet ac adnihilaret res ab-35 by the mind ; if any can be solutas, si sufficeret producere res absolutas taliter in elicited directly, seipsa. Nam significata a voluntate, que libere pro- why not all ? And if the first ducit b, actum volendi in seipsa, certum est quod non act thus directly elicited, is an producit illum de potencia materie potius quam pro- absolute quality, the soul ducendo angelum in seipso. Nec oportet quod b res 40 creates and absoluta informet a voluntatem, quia possibile est quod annihilates them ; for not 9. MS. sacrato altare. 28. MS. vqc pro requirentis. 13. MS. in marg. 5a racio. 17. MS. cigte.
6 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. ] Et per idem quelibet forma absoluta per accidens de- nominat, et deus (sicud et quelibet res naturaliter cau- sans), per accidens causat, quia per appetitum vel inclinacionem que mediat tanquam res absoluta. Et illa, si per se poneretur, esset vaga et nihil appetens, sicud dictum de virtute inducta in lapidem vel aliud violen- tatum. Cum enim omnis forma absoluta esset tante potens ipsa per se existente et conservata a deo, sicud ipsa conservata a suo subiecto, ut patet de sacramento altaris, sequitur quod volucio demonis movens grossum 10 cadaver sufficeret per se movere illud idem, et a pari volucio hominis. V. Acts of the Item, actus sunt veri, falsi, universales, particulares, mind are true, confusi, distincti, et possunt per se produci sine actu false, universal, particular &e. distincto; igitur non sunt res absolute potentes per se 15 They cannot, therefore, be existere. Consequencia probatur per hoc quod nulla res absolute absoluta est falsa vel universalis, nisi quia signatur false qualities, which, as such, vel universaliter. Cum igitur actus non signentur, eo are no more universal or quod distinguntur a speciebus, ut suppono pro nunc, false than light is, or colour. igitur non pocius sunt res absolute universales vel false 20 But thought is quam lux vel color. Intelleccio igitur est eo vera quo true or false as vere intelligitur, et eo falsa vel universalis quo false the subject thinks truly or vel universaliter intelligitur, sicud motus est velox, eo falsely; just as movement is quod mobile velociter movetur; et sic de aliis respec- quick or slow as the body tibus. Et quoad secundam partem antecedentis, non 25 moves quickly dicetur racio quare ad produccionem speciei vel alterius or slowly. If to elicit any rei absolute requiritur actus distinctus a producto, quin mental act, per idem ad cuiuscunque rei absolute requirentis pro- we had to posit another duccionem, requiritur actus distinctus. Et sequitur quod distinct from the mind, we in quacunque intelleccione anime sunt infiniti actus 30 should be forced antecedenter se producentes. Nec videtur racio quare to posit an infinite anima non moveret se per se et inmediate, cum sic multitude of acts, one per se primo agens, et per se primo recipiens illam produced by another, and qualitatem, quod est contra demonstracionem Aristoteles none directly 7° phisicorum; et sic crearet ac adnihilaret res ab-35 by the mind ; if any can be solutas, si sufficeret producere res absolutas taliter in elicited directly, seipsa. Nam significata a voluntate, que libere pro- why not all ? And if the first ducit b, actum volendi in seipsa, certum est quod non act thus directly elicited, is an producit illum de potencia materie potius quam pro- absolute quality, the soul ducendo angelum in seipso. Nec oportet quod b res 40 creates and absoluta informet a voluntatem, quia possibile est quod annihilates them ; for not 9. MS. sacrato altare. 28. MS. vqc pro requirentis. 13. MS. in marg. 5a racio. 17. MS. cigte.
Strana 7
CAP. I. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. deus suspendat actum informandi manente conser- being material, they are not vacione b ad a, eo quod prius quoad consequenciam est educed from matter. conservacio quam informacio. Igitur solum dependet nor are they necessarily tunc a suo efficiente, quod non coincidit cum materia dependent upon 5 secundum Philosophum, quia tunc foret idem in actu a subject, since they are et potencia respectu eiusdem. Igitur iuxta diffinicionem 'absolute accidents'. creacionis b crearetur; nec informacio impedit creaci- They proceed onem, sicud patet, posito quod Christus creavit in se from no subject, but solely from albedinem informantem, sicud creat animam. Nec re- an efficient cause: which 10 manencia materie post corupcionem b qualitatis impedit implies adnihilacionem; sicud patet, si deus primo faceret for- creation. The remanence mam substancialem vel accidentalem per se existere, et of matter is no argument postmodum adnihilaret illam, servata materia in qua against this, fuit. Si enim ad adnihilacionem forme requiritur ad- since God could create and 15 nihilacio cuiuscunque subiecti a quo poterit natura- annihilate a soul, the body F. 49° liter dependere, tunc nulla forma posset adnihilari, remaining as it nisi quodlibet materiale adnihilaretur, quod est impossi- was. If not, bile. Quandocunque igitur aliqua res absoluta secundum annihilation se et quamlibet partem corumpitur, tunc adnullatur vel were impossible, 20 adnihilatur. Ex quo racionaliter credi potest quod in- unless God annihilated the possibile est aliquam formam substancialem vel acciden- whole material talem esse rem absolutam distinctam a composito, et world. We may thence potentem per se existere, nisi forte fuerit anima in- infer, that with the exception of tellectiva. the human soul, Confirmatur tripliciter: primo per hoc quod si forma no form, accidental or elementi sit res absoluta composita ex partibus inten- substantial, has absolute entity. sivis, et potens ex dei potencia per se esse sine materia, If it had, we tunc possibile est deum successive secundum partes could conceive it as gradually servare illam in eodem situ cum illo, quod iam est sui ceasing to inform 30 materia, sine hoc quod partes deminute quoad inten- its matter, sionem informent. Faciat igitur deus hoc successive in while stilí coëxisting with hora, et corespondenter post deminucionem adnihilet it ; this would be tantamount illud quod ante fuit forma, et patet quod nulla est racio to a gradual quare sic adnihilaret formam, quin per idem, quando- annihilation quà form. 35 cunque corumperet illam in materia, secundum se totam adnihilaret illam. Similiter non maiorem dependenciam naturalem habet forma a sua materia quam ab efficiente causante ex- trinseco; sed deus, corumpendo effectum secundum se 40 totum, conservando illud efficiens extrinsecum quod For as the creation of matter with a form that depends upon it implies the creation of that 25 25. MS. .I. in marg. 30, 31. MS. informacionem pro intensionem. 33. MS. illud pro illud quod. 37. MS. 2 in marg. 38. MS. cato = causato.
CAP. I. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. deus suspendat actum informandi manente conser- being material, they are not vacione b ad a, eo quod prius quoad consequenciam est educed from matter. conservacio quam informacio. Igitur solum dependet nor are they necessarily tunc a suo efficiente, quod non coincidit cum materia dependent upon 5 secundum Philosophum, quia tunc foret idem in actu a subject, since they are et potencia respectu eiusdem. Igitur iuxta diffinicionem 'absolute accidents'. creacionis b crearetur; nec informacio impedit creaci- They proceed onem, sicud patet, posito quod Christus creavit in se from no subject, but solely from albedinem informantem, sicud creat animam. Nec re- an efficient cause: which 10 manencia materie post corupcionem b qualitatis impedit implies adnihilacionem; sicud patet, si deus primo faceret for- creation. The remanence mam substancialem vel accidentalem per se existere, et of matter is no argument postmodum adnihilaret illam, servata materia in qua against this, fuit. Si enim ad adnihilacionem forme requiritur ad- since God could create and 15 nihilacio cuiuscunque subiecti a quo poterit natura- annihilate a soul, the body F. 49° liter dependere, tunc nulla forma posset adnihilari, remaining as it nisi quodlibet materiale adnihilaretur, quod est impossi- was. If not, bile. Quandocunque igitur aliqua res absoluta secundum annihilation se et quamlibet partem corumpitur, tunc adnullatur vel were impossible, 20 adnihilatur. Ex quo racionaliter credi potest quod in- unless God annihilated the possibile est aliquam formam substancialem vel acciden- whole material talem esse rem absolutam distinctam a composito, et world. We may thence potentem per se existere, nisi forte fuerit anima in- infer, that with the exception of tellectiva. the human soul, Confirmatur tripliciter: primo per hoc quod si forma no form, accidental or elementi sit res absoluta composita ex partibus inten- substantial, has absolute entity. sivis, et potens ex dei potencia per se esse sine materia, If it had, we tunc possibile est deum successive secundum partes could conceive it as gradually servare illam in eodem situ cum illo, quod iam est sui ceasing to inform 30 materia, sine hoc quod partes deminute quoad inten- its matter, sionem informent. Faciat igitur deus hoc successive in while stilí coëxisting with hora, et corespondenter post deminucionem adnihilet it ; this would be tantamount illud quod ante fuit forma, et patet quod nulla est racio to a gradual quare sic adnihilaret formam, quin per idem, quando- annihilation quà form. 35 cunque corumperet illam in materia, secundum se totam adnihilaret illam. Similiter non maiorem dependenciam naturalem habet forma a sua materia quam ab efficiente causante ex- trinseco; sed deus, corumpendo effectum secundum se 40 totum, conservando illud efficiens extrinsecum quod For as the creation of matter with a form that depends upon it implies the creation of that 25 25. MS. .I. in marg. 30, 31. MS. informacionem pro intensionem. 33. MS. illud pro illud quod. 37. MS. 2 in marg. 38. MS. cato = causato.
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8 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I. form, so the conservavit ipsum naturaliter, non minus adnihilaret conservation of effectum. Igitur, per idem, non minus adnihilaret formam the form distinct and servando illud, quod fuit eius materia, totaliter distinctum. independent of its matter Sic enim, si deus simul crearet materiam cum forma would imply dependente ab illa materia, non minus crearet formam; the annihilation of igitur, per idem, non obstante dependencia, adnihilaretur the form. forma totaliter corupta, servata materia. Similiter nullius rei absolute totaliter distincte a re- A thing might remain as it liqua causata est dependencia ad eandem, et per con- was, even were its form sequens adnihilacio unius talis non impeditur esse ad- 10 annihilated ; nihilacio propter servacionem alterius. Maior patet; quia, for as matter and form are iuxta opinionem, quelibet forma substancialis vel acci- supposed to be two distinct dentalis potest esse sine substancia; igitur non magis things united without dependeret aliqua talis a subiecto quam econtra. De- dependency, pendencia enim includit per se causacionem. neither causes the other ; Nec valet dicere quod est naturalis dependencia si dependency implying non fuerit impedimentum supernaturale, quia summa causation. contingencia est quod unum causatur a relico causante The answer is that there is a secundo; ut si deus concurreret cum caliditate et faceret natural dependency, illam conservare ignem in esse. Subiectum enim potest 20 which can be manere idem in numero cum hoc, quod accidens sit removed by supernatural independens ab illo. Igitur, quod accidens dependet ab power. illo, hoc habet per accidens ab extrinseco et non per But this would take away all se, sicud totum dependet a parte et respectus a subiecto. necessity from every cause Nec habebit sic opinans evidenciam ad ponendum ali-25 except the First. quam qualitatem dependere a materia, sed magis philo- Heat, to produce fire, sophicum esset sibi dicere quod non, ut patet de qualitate. would require a separate Sicud igitur sequitur: materia secundum se totam pro- action of God. ducitur, sine materia contribuente; igitur creatur: ita, It would be more sequitur, hec forma sic producitur, igitur creatur; et si 30 philosophical simply to deny totaliter corumpitur, sic quod nihil sue essencie maneat, that any quality depends tunc adnihilatur. Unde libro contra Felicianum hereticum upon matter; autorem: Sola substancia est proprie creatura. Et con- and to say firmacio est de composicione actus, ex hoc quod actus that their production is quo cognoscitur corpus esse album est cognicio albi, 35 creation, and their et cognicio qua cognoscitur corpus simpliciter, est cognicio cessation, simpliciter: sit igitur a prima et b secunda. Tunc patet annihilation ; which assertion would make quod non sit possibile a esse rem absolutam compositam substances of etb simplicem, nisi a plures partes habuerit; vel b nullas them. There is likewise in this 15 8. MS. 3 in marg. 18. MS. in marg. Responsio. 19. MS. ac pro ut. MS. fietf. 29. MS. qbte pro contribuente? 32. MS. f, (erased) ho; ib. felinu. 33. MS. caum pro autorem. 36. MS. 9°a pro cognicio albi. 37. MS. o v o sit.
8 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I. form, so the conservavit ipsum naturaliter, non minus adnihilaret conservation of effectum. Igitur, per idem, non minus adnihilaret formam the form distinct and servando illud, quod fuit eius materia, totaliter distinctum. independent of its matter Sic enim, si deus simul crearet materiam cum forma would imply dependente ab illa materia, non minus crearet formam; the annihilation of igitur, per idem, non obstante dependencia, adnihilaretur the form. forma totaliter corupta, servata materia. Similiter nullius rei absolute totaliter distincte a re- A thing might remain as it liqua causata est dependencia ad eandem, et per con- was, even were its form sequens adnihilacio unius talis non impeditur esse ad- 10 annihilated ; nihilacio propter servacionem alterius. Maior patet; quia, for as matter and form are iuxta opinionem, quelibet forma substancialis vel acci- supposed to be two distinct dentalis potest esse sine substancia; igitur non magis things united without dependeret aliqua talis a subiecto quam econtra. De- dependency, pendencia enim includit per se causacionem. neither causes the other ; Nec valet dicere quod est naturalis dependencia si dependency implying non fuerit impedimentum supernaturale, quia summa causation. contingencia est quod unum causatur a relico causante The answer is that there is a secundo; ut si deus concurreret cum caliditate et faceret natural dependency, illam conservare ignem in esse. Subiectum enim potest 20 which can be manere idem in numero cum hoc, quod accidens sit removed by supernatural independens ab illo. Igitur, quod accidens dependet ab power. illo, hoc habet per accidens ab extrinseco et non per But this would take away all se, sicud totum dependet a parte et respectus a subiecto. necessity from every cause Nec habebit sic opinans evidenciam ad ponendum ali-25 except the First. quam qualitatem dependere a materia, sed magis philo- Heat, to produce fire, sophicum esset sibi dicere quod non, ut patet de qualitate. would require a separate Sicud igitur sequitur: materia secundum se totam pro- action of God. ducitur, sine materia contribuente; igitur creatur: ita, It would be more sequitur, hec forma sic producitur, igitur creatur; et si 30 philosophical simply to deny totaliter corumpitur, sic quod nihil sue essencie maneat, that any quality depends tunc adnihilatur. Unde libro contra Felicianum hereticum upon matter; autorem: Sola substancia est proprie creatura. Et con- and to say firmacio est de composicione actus, ex hoc quod actus that their production is quo cognoscitur corpus esse album est cognicio albi, 35 creation, and their et cognicio qua cognoscitur corpus simpliciter, est cognicio cessation, simpliciter: sit igitur a prima et b secunda. Tunc patet annihilation ; which assertion would make quod non sit possibile a esse rem absolutam compositam substances of etb simplicem, nisi a plures partes habuerit; vel b nullas them. There is likewise in this 15 8. MS. 3 in marg. 18. MS. in marg. Responsio. 19. MS. ac pro ut. MS. fietf. 29. MS. qbte pro contribuente? 32. MS. f, (erased) ho; ib. felinu. 33. MS. caum pro autorem. 36. MS. 9°a pro cognicio albi. 37. MS. o v o sit.
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CAP. I. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 9 F. 49° et a aliquas. I Quantum enim ad obiecta accidencium system no way to affirm that eque compositum est obiectum utriusque; et preter hoc one mental act is more complex de compositissimo obiecto potest haberi actus simpli- than another ; for the cissimus, et de obiecto simplicissimo actus compositissi- complexity of 5 mus. Imo, actus non capit esse ab obiecto; igitur nec their objects has nothing to do simplicitatem nec composicionem parcium: non igitur with it. And yet some acts plus componitur a quam b ex suis partibus quantitativis are certainly vel qualitativis. Nec valet dicere quod a aggregatur ex more, others less complex. multis actibus, quorum unus est b; quia stat actus And a complex 10 simplices esse sine hoc quod supperaddatur illis actus act is not a mere aggregate of componendi vel dividendi, et de actibus similibus sim- different acts, as it would be plicibus resultare actus contrarios et quantumlibet varios if each act had a distinct and complexos. Non igitur est actus complexus unum ethro- absolute entity. geneum habens partes diversarum naturarum. Si igitur 15 actus complexus esset una res absoluta indivisibilis, posset esse et cognosci sine partibus extremorum; quod est falsum. VI. It is Item, contradiccionem claudit quod aliqua res potens admitted that nothing capable per se existere sit essencialiter successiva, sicud patuit of self-existence 20 de motu et tempore, et illa posicio bene fatetur; sed is successive in multi sunt actus anime de se successive: igitur non its essence. Now many sunt res huiusmodi absolute. Assumptum patet, dis- mental acts are such; currendo per actus cuiuscunque potencie cognitive. Nam as, v. g. the external senses, tactus, percipiens subiectum continue, gustabit novum of which the 25 et novum gustabile descendens in gutture; olfactus eciam sensations are as successive as multiplicato continue novo odore percipiet novum et their changing objects; novum odorem. De auditu, quoad sonum, cum consistit in successione, patet idem; et de visione, quoad lumen continue novum. Et idem patet de oculis motis continue 3o percipiendo virtute visivam super partes uniformis con- tinui ad individuum illius uniformantem; vel aliter, in- tuendo per foramen vel eandem incidenciam idem visibile secundum diversas partes que obiciuntur visui. De omnibus sensacionibus interioribus patet idem, ut de 35 sensacione continua motus temporis, vel alterius suc- cessivi. Nam inpossibile est virtutem sensibilem vel in-and the internal teelings ; sensibilem cognoscere continue datum motum vel tempus, for our imaginations of nisi cognicio sit successiva, vel posset esse; quia esti- time and movement mando et ymaginando motum successivum ex mocione require 40 sensativa motus et immutacione sensus, patet quod succession. The same is omnes sensus interiores continue noviter immutabuntur, true of our other mental acts. 13, 14. MS. ethro" pro ethrogeneum. 18. MS. in marg. 6 racio. 31. MS. ate. 34. MS. abs.
CAP. I. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 9 F. 49° et a aliquas. I Quantum enim ad obiecta accidencium system no way to affirm that eque compositum est obiectum utriusque; et preter hoc one mental act is more complex de compositissimo obiecto potest haberi actus simpli- than another ; for the cissimus, et de obiecto simplicissimo actus compositissi- complexity of 5 mus. Imo, actus non capit esse ab obiecto; igitur nec their objects has nothing to do simplicitatem nec composicionem parcium: non igitur with it. And yet some acts plus componitur a quam b ex suis partibus quantitativis are certainly vel qualitativis. Nec valet dicere quod a aggregatur ex more, others less complex. multis actibus, quorum unus est b; quia stat actus And a complex 10 simplices esse sine hoc quod supperaddatur illis actus act is not a mere aggregate of componendi vel dividendi, et de actibus similibus sim- different acts, as it would be plicibus resultare actus contrarios et quantumlibet varios if each act had a distinct and complexos. Non igitur est actus complexus unum ethro- absolute entity. geneum habens partes diversarum naturarum. Si igitur 15 actus complexus esset una res absoluta indivisibilis, posset esse et cognosci sine partibus extremorum; quod est falsum. VI. It is Item, contradiccionem claudit quod aliqua res potens admitted that nothing capable per se existere sit essencialiter successiva, sicud patuit of self-existence 20 de motu et tempore, et illa posicio bene fatetur; sed is successive in multi sunt actus anime de se successive: igitur non its essence. Now many sunt res huiusmodi absolute. Assumptum patet, dis- mental acts are such; currendo per actus cuiuscunque potencie cognitive. Nam as, v. g. the external senses, tactus, percipiens subiectum continue, gustabit novum of which the 25 et novum gustabile descendens in gutture; olfactus eciam sensations are as successive as multiplicato continue novo odore percipiet novum et their changing objects; novum odorem. De auditu, quoad sonum, cum consistit in successione, patet idem; et de visione, quoad lumen continue novum. Et idem patet de oculis motis continue 3o percipiendo virtute visivam super partes uniformis con- tinui ad individuum illius uniformantem; vel aliter, in- tuendo per foramen vel eandem incidenciam idem visibile secundum diversas partes que obiciuntur visui. De omnibus sensacionibus interioribus patet idem, ut de 35 sensacione continua motus temporis, vel alterius suc- cessivi. Nam inpossibile est virtutem sensibilem vel in-and the internal teelings ; sensibilem cognoscere continue datum motum vel tempus, for our imaginations of nisi cognicio sit successiva, vel posset esse; quia esti- time and movement mando et ymaginando motum successivum ex mocione require 40 sensativa motus et immutacione sensus, patet quod succession. The same is omnes sensus interiores continue noviter immutabuntur, true of our other mental acts. 13, 14. MS. ethro" pro ethrogeneum. 18. MS. in marg. 6 racio. 31. MS. ate. 34. MS. abs.
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10 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I. sicud et intellectus, saltem de possibili. Et idem patet de discursu ymaginacionis reminiscentis estimative, fan- tastice, vel racionis discurrentis vel silogizantis, qui omnes actus possunt consistere in successione; et idem patet de actibus dolendi, tristandi, volendi, nolendi etc. Hic sunt tres responsiones. Prima dicit quod continue This difficulty is explained manebit idem actus quo successive sencientur diversa away by asserting that sensibilia; secunda dicit quod pro quolibet instanti erit one act suffices novus actus instantaneus compositus actuum successivo- for the perception of rum, vel nullus erit successivus; et tercia dicit quod pro 10 successive things ; or that quolibet instanti erit tam actus instantaneus quam suc- every instant a cessivus novus, et sic continue erunt duo actus quorum fresh complex act arises ; or neuter erit pars alterius, nec ambo erunt partes alicuius that there are two distinct tercii. acts, one successive, the Contra primam responsionem sic. other not. Universaliter actus variantur ad variacionem obiec- Refutation of the first answer. torum, sed continue erunt novi et novi motus per se Unless there were a continual sentiti; igitur continue novi et novi actus senciendi. change in the Aliter enim in qualibet sensacione motus esset inevitabi- acts, 20 corresponding liter error circa illud quod non posset esse. to that of the Similiter continue senciendo motum sensibilem erunt F. 50“ objects, we should perceive continue nove species acte et nove intenciones noviter the successive in a way signantes naturaliter novos motus; igitur novi actus. contrary to its Consequencia patet ex [hoc] quod nec species nec in- nature. Sensation of tenciones possunt causari sine novis actibus quibus elici- 25 movement implies antur, nec eadem species singularis naturaliter signare continuity of sic diversa. change in presentation Similiter, posito quod Socrates movetur successive, and representation; nunc ascendendo, nunc descendendo, nunc circulariter, consequently nunc recte, sicud patet esse possibile, cum hoc quod 30 continually changing continue varietur in coloribus et continue percipiatur mental acts. Given that the moveri, tunc non manebit precise idem actus nec pre- whole of that cise eadem intencio, quia motus disparium specierum which is perceived is in sencietur; diversis igitur sensacionibus et diversis simili- a state of continual tudinibus in specie sencientur, et per idem contingit 35 change, it is impossible that quantumlibet uniformem motum sentire continue novo the et novo actu. corresponding mental acts remain the same; 6. MS. nota tres responsiones in marg. 9. MS. 4. MS. actum. for then there 9р09 accu scceſſim. 15. MS. I in marg. 21. MS. 2 in marg: 24. hoc would no deest MS. 28. MS. 3 in marg. 32. MS. p'e. 37. MS. dictu. longer be cor- respondence; 24. Species, intenciones. Though these words do not, in and, however, Mediaeval Psychology, quite exactly correspond to the presen- uniform the change may be, tation and representation of modern thought, I have used the each part is latter terms, because the difference is here irrelevant. perceived by a fresh act. 15
10 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I. sicud et intellectus, saltem de possibili. Et idem patet de discursu ymaginacionis reminiscentis estimative, fan- tastice, vel racionis discurrentis vel silogizantis, qui omnes actus possunt consistere in successione; et idem patet de actibus dolendi, tristandi, volendi, nolendi etc. Hic sunt tres responsiones. Prima dicit quod continue This difficulty is explained manebit idem actus quo successive sencientur diversa away by asserting that sensibilia; secunda dicit quod pro quolibet instanti erit one act suffices novus actus instantaneus compositus actuum successivo- for the perception of rum, vel nullus erit successivus; et tercia dicit quod pro 10 successive things ; or that quolibet instanti erit tam actus instantaneus quam suc- every instant a cessivus novus, et sic continue erunt duo actus quorum fresh complex act arises ; or neuter erit pars alterius, nec ambo erunt partes alicuius that there are two distinct tercii. acts, one successive, the Contra primam responsionem sic. other not. Universaliter actus variantur ad variacionem obiec- Refutation of the first answer. torum, sed continue erunt novi et novi motus per se Unless there were a continual sentiti; igitur continue novi et novi actus senciendi. change in the Aliter enim in qualibet sensacione motus esset inevitabi- acts, 20 corresponding liter error circa illud quod non posset esse. to that of the Similiter continue senciendo motum sensibilem erunt F. 50“ objects, we should perceive continue nove species acte et nove intenciones noviter the successive in a way signantes naturaliter novos motus; igitur novi actus. contrary to its Consequencia patet ex [hoc] quod nec species nec in- nature. Sensation of tenciones possunt causari sine novis actibus quibus elici- 25 movement implies antur, nec eadem species singularis naturaliter signare continuity of sic diversa. change in presentation Similiter, posito quod Socrates movetur successive, and representation; nunc ascendendo, nunc descendendo, nunc circulariter, consequently nunc recte, sicud patet esse possibile, cum hoc quod 30 continually changing continue varietur in coloribus et continue percipiatur mental acts. Given that the moveri, tunc non manebit precise idem actus nec pre- whole of that cise eadem intencio, quia motus disparium specierum which is perceived is in sencietur; diversis igitur sensacionibus et diversis simili- a state of continual tudinibus in specie sencientur, et per idem contingit 35 change, it is impossible that quantumlibet uniformem motum sentire continue novo the et novo actu. corresponding mental acts remain the same; 6. MS. nota tres responsiones in marg. 9. MS. 4. MS. actum. for then there 9р09 accu scceſſim. 15. MS. I in marg. 21. MS. 2 in marg: 24. hoc would no deest MS. 28. MS. 3 in marg. 32. MS. p'e. 37. MS. dictu. longer be cor- respondence; 24. Species, intenciones. Though these words do not, in and, however, Mediaeval Psychology, quite exactly correspond to the presen- uniform the change may be, tation and representation of modern thought, I have used the each part is latter terms, because the difference is here irrelevant. perceived by a fresh act. 15
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CAP. I. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 1I Similiter, quandocunque evanescit sensibile et sensacio illius sensibilis, cum sensacio non sit nisi presencium; sicud dicunt autores ponentes in hoc diversitatem inter sensum communem et ymaginacionem. Et concordat ethimologia nominis qua dicitur presens quasi presensus. Sed in multis sensacionibus prenarratis erunt continue nova et nova sensibilia; igitur continue nove et nove sensaciones; vel aliter non esset possibile me videre aliquid nisi videtur illud, quod non posset esse; et per toidem viderem rem antequam esset. Sed quis est tam acute videns aut propheta, ut videat omnes coniuncciones, opposiciones, vel affectus celestium corporum futuros et preteritos? Nam non dicetur racio quare videt aliquam partem motus celi preteritam totaliter vel futuram, quin 15 per idem quamlibet sic videret. Similiter, supposito quod vidissem a motum per horam, et b motus sit futurus continuus cum a, unus homo minus dispositus quam ego sentiret b motum sub- stancia commune nova; nec sensacio preterita impedit 20 me elicere novos actus et novas species; igitur, cum ego sim eque bene applicatus ut ille, videtur quod ego eliciam novos actus et novas similitudines super priores. Minor patet ex hoc, quod simul possum habere actus et species similes de motibus similibus: igitur multo magis 25 de uno motu simili post relicum. Similiter, quam capax est medium specierum, tam capax est virtus cognitiva hominis; sed nullum medium est determinatum quoad multitudinem specierum: igitur nec virtus hominis sensitiva. Et cum nullo modo magis 3o est sensus receptivus quam elicitivus, sequitur quod pro quolibet instanti natus est elicere actum. Nec prior actus impedit, stante virtute, quia etsi continue fuisset homo intentus in aliquod sensibile et quantumlibet parva foret interrupcio (virtute salva et circumstanciis debitis) non 35 minus subito videret visibile; imo si, pro quolibet in- stanti, stantibus paribus, esset novum appositum, pro quolibet instanti videret illud, eo quod non est dare Now if, as happens, this present is continually differing, one single act would represent it as present when it is past or future, 1. e. otherwise than it is. And if we can perceive the smallest part of what is not present, why not the whole of the past and future ? We cannot receive more impressions than we feel ; to each of the continually changing impressions there must correspond an act, which would give us an infinite multitude of acts in any space of time, however short. Sensation is only of that which is present. 1. MS. 4 in marg. 2. MS. no pro nisi. 16. MS. 5 in marg. 18, 19. MS. mem sbe pro motum substancia. 21. MS. Ci pro sim. 26. MS. 6 in marg. 2). MS. noo pro nullo modo. 33. in deest MS. 18. Substancia commune nova. I can make nothing of this, which possibly might give the key to the whole passage.
CAP. I. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 1I Similiter, quandocunque evanescit sensibile et sensacio illius sensibilis, cum sensacio non sit nisi presencium; sicud dicunt autores ponentes in hoc diversitatem inter sensum communem et ymaginacionem. Et concordat ethimologia nominis qua dicitur presens quasi presensus. Sed in multis sensacionibus prenarratis erunt continue nova et nova sensibilia; igitur continue nove et nove sensaciones; vel aliter non esset possibile me videre aliquid nisi videtur illud, quod non posset esse; et per toidem viderem rem antequam esset. Sed quis est tam acute videns aut propheta, ut videat omnes coniuncciones, opposiciones, vel affectus celestium corporum futuros et preteritos? Nam non dicetur racio quare videt aliquam partem motus celi preteritam totaliter vel futuram, quin 15 per idem quamlibet sic videret. Similiter, supposito quod vidissem a motum per horam, et b motus sit futurus continuus cum a, unus homo minus dispositus quam ego sentiret b motum sub- stancia commune nova; nec sensacio preterita impedit 20 me elicere novos actus et novas species; igitur, cum ego sim eque bene applicatus ut ille, videtur quod ego eliciam novos actus et novas similitudines super priores. Minor patet ex hoc, quod simul possum habere actus et species similes de motibus similibus: igitur multo magis 25 de uno motu simili post relicum. Similiter, quam capax est medium specierum, tam capax est virtus cognitiva hominis; sed nullum medium est determinatum quoad multitudinem specierum: igitur nec virtus hominis sensitiva. Et cum nullo modo magis 3o est sensus receptivus quam elicitivus, sequitur quod pro quolibet instanti natus est elicere actum. Nec prior actus impedit, stante virtute, quia etsi continue fuisset homo intentus in aliquod sensibile et quantumlibet parva foret interrupcio (virtute salva et circumstanciis debitis) non 35 minus subito videret visibile; imo si, pro quolibet in- stanti, stantibus paribus, esset novum appositum, pro quolibet instanti videret illud, eo quod non est dare Now if, as happens, this present is continually differing, one single act would represent it as present when it is past or future, 1. e. otherwise than it is. And if we can perceive the smallest part of what is not present, why not the whole of the past and future ? We cannot receive more impressions than we feel ; to each of the continually changing impressions there must correspond an act, which would give us an infinite multitude of acts in any space of time, however short. Sensation is only of that which is present. 1. MS. 4 in marg. 2. MS. no pro nisi. 16. MS. 5 in marg. 18, 19. MS. mem sbe pro motum substancia. 21. MS. Ci pro sim. 26. MS. 6 in marg. 2). MS. noo pro nullo modo. 33. in deest MS. 18. Substancia commune nova. I can make nothing of this, which possibly might give the key to the whole passage.
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12 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I. maximam multitudinem actuum quos poterit virtus elicere, sed in quantolibet tempore potest infinitum multos elicere. Contra duas alias opiniones arguitur primo, quoad illud in quo conveniunt. Primo enim sequitur quod que-5 libet anima sit infinitum perfecta, quia infinitarum rerum non communicancium eque perfectarum est in quanto- libet tempore productiva, et omnium illarum simul con- servativa, igitur est infinitum perfectibilis per tales; et F. 50" cum iam habeat infinitas potencias activas et passivas 10 ad tales, sic quod iam non sit infinitum perfeccior quam tunc esset, sequitur quod quelibet sit infinitum perfecta. Similiter, dum virtus elicuerit actum, non est in eius Such acts, besides, potestate ipsum dimittere quandocunque vult, sed habet 15 must have a naturalem periodum. Igitur superfluit pro quolibet in- certain duration, and stanti elicere novum, vel si hoc fiat, infiniti non com- thus the explanation of municantes simul manebunt. Assumptum patet de actu lasting sensations by cogitandi, volendi, nolendi, et universaliter de quolibet actu instantaneous apprehendendi convenit: non corumpitur, nisi forte a 20 acts falls to the ground. contrario. Cum igitur anima infinitos actus potest simul habere, et sit eque conservativa sui per se effectus, sicud productiva, nec voluntarie corumpet tales actus sentiendi, quia non posset cogitare sic de illis, sequitur quod non continue subito corumpetur. Similiter experiencia concordat quod sensaciones ex- cellencium sensibilium manent in virtute in illorum ab- sencia; igitur omnium sensibilium sensaciones manent per aliquantum tempus. Antecedens patet de ticione ignito circumducto in tenebra, qui videtur delinquere 30 post se calentem circulum propter servaciones actuum; et sic patet de intuentibus solem vel nivem et diver- tentibus in loca tenebrosa, ut ponit Alacen et alii, re- citando multa talia experimenta. Omnis igitur actus sensitivus est essencialiter durativus. Similiter nullius successivi est dare primum instans vel ultimum, ut patet tercio libro; sed talium sensacionum Refutation of the other two answers. A fresh complex act of sensation arising at each instant, would suppose an infinite number of perfections welling from and upheld by the soul. It is a fact that sensation lasts, after the object is no longer presented; as in the case of a brand whirled round. 25 35 Each of such hypothetical acts, if instantancously 4. MS. I in marg. 7. MS. qpfca 24 pro eque perfectarum. 14. MS. 2 in marg. 26. MS. 3 in marg. 33. MS. alace. 36. MS. 4 in marg. 33. Alhacen, an Arabian optician of the 11th century. 37. Ut patet tercio libro. In Shirley's catalogue, there is, “On f. 84" we read: 'iuxta dicta tercio libro scibile mensurat scien- ciam de eodem.' What is this third book?" Here we find an
12 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I. maximam multitudinem actuum quos poterit virtus elicere, sed in quantolibet tempore potest infinitum multos elicere. Contra duas alias opiniones arguitur primo, quoad illud in quo conveniunt. Primo enim sequitur quod que-5 libet anima sit infinitum perfecta, quia infinitarum rerum non communicancium eque perfectarum est in quanto- libet tempore productiva, et omnium illarum simul con- servativa, igitur est infinitum perfectibilis per tales; et F. 50" cum iam habeat infinitas potencias activas et passivas 10 ad tales, sic quod iam non sit infinitum perfeccior quam tunc esset, sequitur quod quelibet sit infinitum perfecta. Similiter, dum virtus elicuerit actum, non est in eius Such acts, besides, potestate ipsum dimittere quandocunque vult, sed habet 15 must have a naturalem periodum. Igitur superfluit pro quolibet in- certain duration, and stanti elicere novum, vel si hoc fiat, infiniti non com- thus the explanation of municantes simul manebunt. Assumptum patet de actu lasting sensations by cogitandi, volendi, nolendi, et universaliter de quolibet actu instantaneous apprehendendi convenit: non corumpitur, nisi forte a 20 acts falls to the ground. contrario. Cum igitur anima infinitos actus potest simul habere, et sit eque conservativa sui per se effectus, sicud productiva, nec voluntarie corumpet tales actus sentiendi, quia non posset cogitare sic de illis, sequitur quod non continue subito corumpetur. Similiter experiencia concordat quod sensaciones ex- cellencium sensibilium manent in virtute in illorum ab- sencia; igitur omnium sensibilium sensaciones manent per aliquantum tempus. Antecedens patet de ticione ignito circumducto in tenebra, qui videtur delinquere 30 post se calentem circulum propter servaciones actuum; et sic patet de intuentibus solem vel nivem et diver- tentibus in loca tenebrosa, ut ponit Alacen et alii, re- citando multa talia experimenta. Omnis igitur actus sensitivus est essencialiter durativus. Similiter nullius successivi est dare primum instans vel ultimum, ut patet tercio libro; sed talium sensacionum Refutation of the other two answers. A fresh complex act of sensation arising at each instant, would suppose an infinite number of perfections welling from and upheld by the soul. It is a fact that sensation lasts, after the object is no longer presented; as in the case of a brand whirled round. 25 35 Each of such hypothetical acts, if instantancously 4. MS. I in marg. 7. MS. qpfca 24 pro eque perfectarum. 14. MS. 2 in marg. 26. MS. 3 in marg. 33. MS. alace. 36. MS. 4 in marg. 33. Alhacen, an Arabian optician of the 11th century. 37. Ut patet tercio libro. In Shirley's catalogue, there is, “On f. 84" we read: 'iuxta dicta tercio libro scibile mensurat scien- ciam de eodem.' What is this third book?" Here we find an
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CAP. I. DE ACTIBUS ANIME, est dare primum instans et ultimum: igitur non sunt successive. Confirmatur per hoc, quod in eadem specie specialissima non est dare duo, quorum unum sit suc- cessivum et aliud permanens, cum successivum et per- 5 manens sunt differencie generum, vel saltem plus quam differencie individuales. Non enim potest aliqua accio vel denominacio esse successiva, nisi fuerit successive unum ens in adquiri vel deperdi; set hic nec intendetur nec remittetur actus, ut pono, nec erit aliqua materia 1-0 cOntinua a qua caperet sensacio suam continuitatem; igitur etc, Et quod indivisibile sit pars quantitativa divi- sibilis creditur esse inpossibile. Ideo dicit 2? particula secunde opinionis quod non erit una sensacio composita ex illis instantaneis, nec erit 15alia successiva. Sed contra illud. est quod declaratum est alibi: motum successivum non posse sentiri per tempus, nisi sensacione successiva. Sicud igitur homo continue senciet, sic sensacione continua senciet, et non continua sensacione si non successiva; igitur, etc, Si 20enim omnis alius motus foret subductus preter sensa- cionem illam, ad hoc foret tempus continuum, et per consequens motus successivus continuus in senciendo. Contra terciam responsionem procedunt raciones facte contra actus successivos, Et patet quod est irracionalis, 25cum superfluit respectu eiusdem virtutis et eiusdem sen- sibilis ponere duos actus eque intelligibiles, eque distinctos 13. MS. 5 in marg. 23. MS. 6 im marg. 26. MS. ınle pro in- telligibiles. allusion to the third book already, and this allusion is several times repeated in the course of the work. A little further (p. 14) there is an allusion to the second book, concerning the optic axis and distinct vision. Now in Logica, Vol. Il, p. 181, we find this very statement, and at the end of the chapter: Notetur liber tercius Vitulonis (Vitellionis). I have not been able to see the work of the Polish optician, but am inclined to think that it was so well known in Oxford in those days that further reference to it was thought unnecessary. That several of the dicta quoted are rather metaphysical than optical does not militate against this possibility, for all natural philosophers were then meta- physicians. Wyclif cannot be alluding to his own Logica, for the statement mentioned occurs in his Z7ractatus Tercius. It is true that there he speaks of the third, not the second book of Vitellion, but this may be a mistake of the copyist, or the same details may be found in both books. Further (chap. III) we shall find the name of the celebrated optician joined to a reference to his book. I3 ermanent, is indivisible, is of another nature than what is successive and divisible, and cannot account for it. To make one whole of sensation out . of the instantaneous and the , successive impressions is . absurd; instantaneous acts cannot feel a successive continuum as successive. And to separate sensation into two distinct scrics of acts is beside the mark, for it does not explain the
CAP. I. DE ACTIBUS ANIME, est dare primum instans et ultimum: igitur non sunt successive. Confirmatur per hoc, quod in eadem specie specialissima non est dare duo, quorum unum sit suc- cessivum et aliud permanens, cum successivum et per- 5 manens sunt differencie generum, vel saltem plus quam differencie individuales. Non enim potest aliqua accio vel denominacio esse successiva, nisi fuerit successive unum ens in adquiri vel deperdi; set hic nec intendetur nec remittetur actus, ut pono, nec erit aliqua materia 1-0 cOntinua a qua caperet sensacio suam continuitatem; igitur etc, Et quod indivisibile sit pars quantitativa divi- sibilis creditur esse inpossibile. Ideo dicit 2? particula secunde opinionis quod non erit una sensacio composita ex illis instantaneis, nec erit 15alia successiva. Sed contra illud. est quod declaratum est alibi: motum successivum non posse sentiri per tempus, nisi sensacione successiva. Sicud igitur homo continue senciet, sic sensacione continua senciet, et non continua sensacione si non successiva; igitur, etc, Si 20enim omnis alius motus foret subductus preter sensa- cionem illam, ad hoc foret tempus continuum, et per consequens motus successivus continuus in senciendo. Contra terciam responsionem procedunt raciones facte contra actus successivos, Et patet quod est irracionalis, 25cum superfluit respectu eiusdem virtutis et eiusdem sen- sibilis ponere duos actus eque intelligibiles, eque distinctos 13. MS. 5 in marg. 23. MS. 6 im marg. 26. MS. ınle pro in- telligibiles. allusion to the third book already, and this allusion is several times repeated in the course of the work. A little further (p. 14) there is an allusion to the second book, concerning the optic axis and distinct vision. Now in Logica, Vol. Il, p. 181, we find this very statement, and at the end of the chapter: Notetur liber tercius Vitulonis (Vitellionis). I have not been able to see the work of the Polish optician, but am inclined to think that it was so well known in Oxford in those days that further reference to it was thought unnecessary. That several of the dicta quoted are rather metaphysical than optical does not militate against this possibility, for all natural philosophers were then meta- physicians. Wyclif cannot be alluding to his own Logica, for the statement mentioned occurs in his Z7ractatus Tercius. It is true that there he speaks of the third, not the second book of Vitellion, but this may be a mistake of the copyist, or the same details may be found in both books. Further (chap. III) we shall find the name of the celebrated optician joined to a reference to his book. I3 ermanent, is indivisible, is of another nature than what is successive and divisible, and cannot account for it. To make one whole of sensation out . of the instantaneous and the , successive impressions is . absurd; instantaneous acts cannot feel a successive continuum as successive. And to separate sensation into two distinct scrics of acts is beside the mark, for it does not explain the
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14 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I. per omnia, et eque sufficientes ad denominandum virtutem apprehendentem, quorum actuum neuter sit reducibilis ad alterum, nec ambo ad tercium. Nam eque perfecte per- ciperet homo pro hoc instanti illo actu instantaneo, sicud ambobus simul: immo non invenietur principium 5 individuans vel distinguens unum actum ab alio, po- tissime si actus successivus sit res absoluta habens pro hoc instanti unum indivisibile sui productum secundum se totum. Item, actus tales componentur ex suis partibus F. 51 VII. The hypothesis that quantitativis et qualitativis, quod non potest sustineri these acts are capable of cum hoc quod sint res absolute potentes per se existere; existing by igitur non sic est. Assumptum patet de actibus videndi, themselves is against their et per idem de aliis quibuscunque: nam, videndo com- consisting, as they do, of positum obiectum, alius actus corespondet uni parti vise 15 (1) quantitative et alius alteri, et ex illis componitur quantitative unus and (2) qualitative magnus actus: igitur etc. parts. Maior patet tripliciter: primo per hoc, quod videndo (1) Quantitative. One part of what we see is diversas partes eiusdem materialis alius actus est con- not the other. fusior, et alius distinccior, ut est propinquior puncto 20 We see more or less coniunccionis duorum axium piramidum radialium, ut distinctly ; the dictum est secundo libro. Igitur, cum nec idem potest same act cannot now perceive esse conservatus se ipso, nec idem actus terminari eque one object, now another, so it primo ad omnino disparata obiecta, sequitur quod alius cannot exist actus corespondet uni parti et alius alteri, et hinc dicitur 25 independently of its object. quod actus diversificantur penes obiecta. Si enim idem actus posset manere nunc unius subiecti et nunc alterius, non dependeret a subiecto nec a specie causante. Similiter, frequenter intuendo idem obiectum, alia The sight of one colour is est species visionis qua videtur una pars, et alia species 30 not the same act as the sight qua videtur alia; igitur partes videntur distinccius visi- of another, onibus in specie, et per idem cuiuscunque quod videtur though simultaneous quantum partes videntur distinctis visionibus, saltem in therewith. numero. Maior patet de re colorata visa secundum di- versas partes diversis coloribus in specie coloratas, vel 35 diversimode figuratas, ut est facies, vel aliter difformes vel diversificatas, in quibus omnibus sunt diverse visiones corespondentes diversis partibus, ut patet ex dictis alibi; igitur etc. unity of continuous sensation. 10. MS. 7 racio in marg. p 14, 15. MS. cotu pro compositum. 17. MS. I in marg. 23. MS. 9139 pro conservatus. 24. MS. oba = subiecta. 29. MS. 2 in marg. 22. Secundo libro. See note, p. 13.
14 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I. per omnia, et eque sufficientes ad denominandum virtutem apprehendentem, quorum actuum neuter sit reducibilis ad alterum, nec ambo ad tercium. Nam eque perfecte per- ciperet homo pro hoc instanti illo actu instantaneo, sicud ambobus simul: immo non invenietur principium 5 individuans vel distinguens unum actum ab alio, po- tissime si actus successivus sit res absoluta habens pro hoc instanti unum indivisibile sui productum secundum se totum. Item, actus tales componentur ex suis partibus F. 51 VII. The hypothesis that quantitativis et qualitativis, quod non potest sustineri these acts are capable of cum hoc quod sint res absolute potentes per se existere; existing by igitur non sic est. Assumptum patet de actibus videndi, themselves is against their et per idem de aliis quibuscunque: nam, videndo com- consisting, as they do, of positum obiectum, alius actus corespondet uni parti vise 15 (1) quantitative et alius alteri, et ex illis componitur quantitative unus and (2) qualitative magnus actus: igitur etc. parts. Maior patet tripliciter: primo per hoc, quod videndo (1) Quantitative. One part of what we see is diversas partes eiusdem materialis alius actus est con- not the other. fusior, et alius distinccior, ut est propinquior puncto 20 We see more or less coniunccionis duorum axium piramidum radialium, ut distinctly ; the dictum est secundo libro. Igitur, cum nec idem potest same act cannot now perceive esse conservatus se ipso, nec idem actus terminari eque one object, now another, so it primo ad omnino disparata obiecta, sequitur quod alius cannot exist actus corespondet uni parti et alius alteri, et hinc dicitur 25 independently of its object. quod actus diversificantur penes obiecta. Si enim idem actus posset manere nunc unius subiecti et nunc alterius, non dependeret a subiecto nec a specie causante. Similiter, frequenter intuendo idem obiectum, alia The sight of one colour is est species visionis qua videtur una pars, et alia species 30 not the same act as the sight qua videtur alia; igitur partes videntur distinccius visi- of another, onibus in specie, et per idem cuiuscunque quod videtur though simultaneous quantum partes videntur distinctis visionibus, saltem in therewith. numero. Maior patet de re colorata visa secundum di- versas partes diversis coloribus in specie coloratas, vel 35 diversimode figuratas, ut est facies, vel aliter difformes vel diversificatas, in quibus omnibus sunt diverse visiones corespondentes diversis partibus, ut patet ex dictis alibi; igitur etc. unity of continuous sensation. 10. MS. 7 racio in marg. p 14, 15. MS. cotu pro compositum. 17. MS. I in marg. 23. MS. 9139 pro conservatus. 24. MS. oba = subiecta. 29. MS. 2 in marg. 22. Secundo libro. See note, p. 13.
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CAP. I. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. Similiter, posito quod a et b essent discontinuata, visu percipiente discontinuacionem eorum, essent diverse visiones presumpte ad percepcionem discontinuacionis, ut patet de sensacione sensibilium communium: sed 5stat cum hoc quod illa continentur, stantibus visionibus et virtute percipiente continuacionem. Igitur stat de eodem continuo habere multas visiones distinctas se- cundum partes. Minor patet ex hoc, quod secundum opinionem, viso quantocunque albo, et ablatis succes- ro sive quotquot partibus visis, manebit continue eadem visio, et nulla corumpetur, quia nulla corumpetur nisi parti coresponderet specialis visio. Igitur multo magis propter motum vel continuacionem unius cum relico non oportet visionem corumpi, Et sequitur probandum. 15Quo habito, patet quod ex visionibus parcium com- ponitur una visio quantitative, Nam ille parciales visiones sunt cause totalis visionis, et non nisi intrinsece; quia aliter esset processus in infinitum in causis essencialiter ordinatis, quia essencialibus, quarum nulla sit pars 20 alterius: igitur relinquitur quod sunt partes totalis vi- sionis. Quod autem visio componitur ex suis partibus inten- sivis tripliciter suadetur. Primo per hoc quod videtur esse una res absoluta que potest intendi propter quam- 25libet octo circumstanciarum videndi; et impossibile est rem absolutam esse plus intensam sine eius condensacione vel reali adquisicione rei absolute, ut patuit de qualitate. Igitur oportet ad intensionem visionis generari novas res absolutas. 3o Similiter, videndo album per cristallum, vel quodlibet compositum per diaphanum, simul visum videntur con- 51* fuse duo disparata secundum eius pyramidem | radialem; igitur actus corespondens est compositus ex suis partibus intensivis. Consequencia patet per hoc quod ille visiones 35sunt partes tocius visionis et non quantitative; igitur intensive. Similiter, posito quod a album intendatur sic quod ad b albedinem continue visam adveniat per coextensionem 1. MS. 3 in marg. 22. MS. 1 in marg. — 26. MS. esse deest. 3o. MS. 2 in marg. — 37. MS. 3 in marg. 25. Circumstanciarum. See Logica, Vol. II, p. 176. 35. Non quantitative. Wyclif here supposes as an evident fact that the eye does not perceive directly the third dimension of space. 15 Our sight of two separate things is one sight, for were either of them separately to disappear, sight would stil remain ; much more is our sight of a continuum one sight, made up of partial acts of vision, which cause a quantitative whole. (2) Qualitative, or intensive parts. Sight depends upon eight varying . influences: if it were an entit capable of selt existence, each of these would produce new entities by the intension of sight which they effect. When we look at anythin through a glass we see it and the glass as diflerent, though | coinciding in space. These two objects imply intensive, not extended parts of vision. If a certain thing graduall becomes equally white with another, seen at the same time, the
CAP. I. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. Similiter, posito quod a et b essent discontinuata, visu percipiente discontinuacionem eorum, essent diverse visiones presumpte ad percepcionem discontinuacionis, ut patet de sensacione sensibilium communium: sed 5stat cum hoc quod illa continentur, stantibus visionibus et virtute percipiente continuacionem. Igitur stat de eodem continuo habere multas visiones distinctas se- cundum partes. Minor patet ex hoc, quod secundum opinionem, viso quantocunque albo, et ablatis succes- ro sive quotquot partibus visis, manebit continue eadem visio, et nulla corumpetur, quia nulla corumpetur nisi parti coresponderet specialis visio. Igitur multo magis propter motum vel continuacionem unius cum relico non oportet visionem corumpi, Et sequitur probandum. 15Quo habito, patet quod ex visionibus parcium com- ponitur una visio quantitative, Nam ille parciales visiones sunt cause totalis visionis, et non nisi intrinsece; quia aliter esset processus in infinitum in causis essencialiter ordinatis, quia essencialibus, quarum nulla sit pars 20 alterius: igitur relinquitur quod sunt partes totalis vi- sionis. Quod autem visio componitur ex suis partibus inten- sivis tripliciter suadetur. Primo per hoc quod videtur esse una res absoluta que potest intendi propter quam- 25libet octo circumstanciarum videndi; et impossibile est rem absolutam esse plus intensam sine eius condensacione vel reali adquisicione rei absolute, ut patuit de qualitate. Igitur oportet ad intensionem visionis generari novas res absolutas. 3o Similiter, videndo album per cristallum, vel quodlibet compositum per diaphanum, simul visum videntur con- 51* fuse duo disparata secundum eius pyramidem | radialem; igitur actus corespondens est compositus ex suis partibus intensivis. Consequencia patet per hoc quod ille visiones 35sunt partes tocius visionis et non quantitative; igitur intensive. Similiter, posito quod a album intendatur sic quod ad b albedinem continue visam adveniat per coextensionem 1. MS. 3 in marg. 22. MS. 1 in marg. — 26. MS. esse deest. 3o. MS. 2 in marg. — 37. MS. 3 in marg. 25. Circumstanciarum. See Logica, Vol. II, p. 176. 35. Non quantitative. Wyclif here supposes as an evident fact that the eye does not perceive directly the third dimension of space. 15 Our sight of two separate things is one sight, for were either of them separately to disappear, sight would stil remain ; much more is our sight of a continuum one sight, made up of partial acts of vision, which cause a quantitative whole. (2) Qualitative, or intensive parts. Sight depends upon eight varying . influences: if it were an entit capable of selt existence, each of these would produce new entities by the intension of sight which they effect. When we look at anythin through a glass we see it and the glass as diflerent, though | coinciding in space. These two objects imply intensive, not extended parts of vision. If a certain thing graduall becomes equally white with another, seen at the same time, the
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16 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I. c albedo simul visa: patet quod visio corespondens b et visio corespondens c distinguntur secundum distinccionem visorum, cum utraque posset manere sine altera, et per idem componunt intensive unam visionem. Nam si nulli parti corespondet propria visio, tunc, viso albo continue 5 intenso, pro quolibet instanti esset nova visio secundum se totam; et stat proxima racio. Ex istis credi potest quod non potest salvari actus esse res absolutas, nisi componantur tam ex suis quantitativis quam qualitativis; I et idem inveniet homo de actibus quarumcunque vir- tutum interiorum, ut de actu intellectus vel voluntatis, dum feruntur super aliquod divisibile secundum racionem divisibilis. But this is Quo patente, probatur quod repugnat ipsos actus esse impossible, for presentation res sic absolutas; primo per hoc quod nulla species et 15 itself is not per consequens nullus actus elicitus a specie est extensus, extended ; still less can the acts et per consequens non est res absoluta habens partes based upon it quantitativas: antecedens post modum probabitur. p be s0. Besides, if the Similiter, si haberet partes intensivas, subiectum act of sensation, eius corespondenter haberet partes intensivas denomi- 20 had intensive parts, then its natas ab illis partibus intensivis qualitatum; sed hoc subject (the soul) would non est verum de subiecto huiusmodi specierum: igi- correspondingly tur, etc. Prima consequencia videtur per hoc, quod si have intensive parts : which is sunt res absolute denominantes, quelibet illarum habet inadmissible. propriam denominacionem; et, cum infinitum remissa sit 25 aliqua, sequitur vel quod totum subiectum sit infinitum remissum vel infinitum remissa aliqua est pars; et cum non est dare percipientem partem nisi intensivam, se- quitur quod, quacunque forma existente re absoluta que possit per se existere et composita ex suis partibus 30 intensivis, oportet subiectum corespondenter componi. Less intensity Similiter, tunc pars remissior talis actus foret vel in one of these confusior vel distinccior. Si distinccior, inpossibile esset supposed intensive parts quicquam tali actu confuse concipere, nisi infinitum would imply either less or distincte conciperetur alia eius pars, cum tunc partes 35 more distinctness of qualitative communiter confusius apprehenduntur, sicud perception. patet de viso per vitreum cristallum vel aliud diaphanum. Not more : for the very Si confusior, tunc excellenti lumine radiante super po- distinctness of the perceptions of each part wouid interfere ; the better we see the glass, the less distinctly we 27. Aliqua est pars. The argument is intelligible, but the text see through it; and vice versa. seems to be corrupt here. corresponding sights, being distinct as to their objects, vet making one, imply qualitative difference in the acts. Thus every mental act, even thinking and willing, must consist of spatial and intensive parts, if it be a self- existing entity. 14. MS. 1 in marg. 19. MS. 2 in marg. 25. re ſa pro remissa and in the following lines. 28. MS. ptie pro percipientem. 32. MS. 3 in marg. 10
16 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I. c albedo simul visa: patet quod visio corespondens b et visio corespondens c distinguntur secundum distinccionem visorum, cum utraque posset manere sine altera, et per idem componunt intensive unam visionem. Nam si nulli parti corespondet propria visio, tunc, viso albo continue 5 intenso, pro quolibet instanti esset nova visio secundum se totam; et stat proxima racio. Ex istis credi potest quod non potest salvari actus esse res absolutas, nisi componantur tam ex suis quantitativis quam qualitativis; I et idem inveniet homo de actibus quarumcunque vir- tutum interiorum, ut de actu intellectus vel voluntatis, dum feruntur super aliquod divisibile secundum racionem divisibilis. But this is Quo patente, probatur quod repugnat ipsos actus esse impossible, for presentation res sic absolutas; primo per hoc quod nulla species et 15 itself is not per consequens nullus actus elicitus a specie est extensus, extended ; still less can the acts et per consequens non est res absoluta habens partes based upon it quantitativas: antecedens post modum probabitur. p be s0. Besides, if the Similiter, si haberet partes intensivas, subiectum act of sensation, eius corespondenter haberet partes intensivas denomi- 20 had intensive parts, then its natas ab illis partibus intensivis qualitatum; sed hoc subject (the soul) would non est verum de subiecto huiusmodi specierum: igi- correspondingly tur, etc. Prima consequencia videtur per hoc, quod si have intensive parts : which is sunt res absolute denominantes, quelibet illarum habet inadmissible. propriam denominacionem; et, cum infinitum remissa sit 25 aliqua, sequitur vel quod totum subiectum sit infinitum remissum vel infinitum remissa aliqua est pars; et cum non est dare percipientem partem nisi intensivam, se- quitur quod, quacunque forma existente re absoluta que possit per se existere et composita ex suis partibus 30 intensivis, oportet subiectum corespondenter componi. Less intensity Similiter, tunc pars remissior talis actus foret vel in one of these confusior vel distinccior. Si distinccior, inpossibile esset supposed intensive parts quicquam tali actu confuse concipere, nisi infinitum would imply either less or distincte conciperetur alia eius pars, cum tunc partes 35 more distinctness of qualitative communiter confusius apprehenduntur, sicud perception. patet de viso per vitreum cristallum vel aliud diaphanum. Not more : for the very Si confusior, tunc excellenti lumine radiante super po- distinctness of the perceptions of each part wouid interfere ; the better we see the glass, the less distinctly we 27. Aliqua est pars. The argument is intelligible, but the text see through it; and vice versa. seems to be corrupt here. corresponding sights, being distinct as to their objects, vet making one, imply qualitative difference in the acts. Thus every mental act, even thinking and willing, must consist of spatial and intensive parts, if it be a self- existing entity. 14. MS. 1 in marg. 19. MS. 2 in marg. 25. re ſa pro remissa and in the following lines. 28. MS. ptie pro percipientem. 32. MS. 3 in marg. 10
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CAP. I. litum splendidum vel excellenter coloratum, foret actus Not less; for then, by a videndi remissior, quia certum est secundum perspec- contrary conclusion, a tivos et experiencias quod lumen forte in talibus multa dazzling light visibilia occultat et visionem confundit. Et cum visio or colour would be more 5 est intensior, sicud patet ex eius forti impressione, et distinctly seen than a moderate de actibus apprehendendi universalia, est maior color; one ; which nam apprehendendo figuram in communi sub gradu ut contradicts experience. octo, patet quod percipiendo partes intensivas actus vel ad species vel ad individua illius generis secundum 10 equales et appropriatas proporciones, vel foret totus actus infinitum intensus, vel quelibet talis pars infinitum remissa. Nec valet dicere quod quelibet pars actus ex- tenditur, sicud ad omnem speciem vel individuum figure; tum quia tunc non distinguerentur penes obiecta, tum 15 quia tunc non confusius signarentur sub partibus par- cialibus actibus quam totalibus, cum infinitum confusius F. 52° signantur illa quam genus signatum] gradu ut octo. If the act of Similiter, si actus componitur sic intensive, quando- sight had cunque videretur unum album cum alio, ex visionibus intensive parts, 20 eorum fieret una intensior: quod est inpossibile, quia the total act would be tunc apprehenderet esse unum duplum intensive ad infinitely intense in the case of utrumlibet illorum, secundum intencionem actus, et sic seeing anything homogeneously infinitum intensa foret visio, videndo quodcunque uni- producing an impression. forme; cuius oppositum experimur, cum visiones simi- 25 lium se confundunt. Et prima consequencia videtur per hoc, quod ad omnem punctum cerebri ubi est visio unius visorum, est visio cuiuscunque: igitur, cum omne natum sit componi intensive ex talibus, sequitur quod unum componitur ex talibus. 30 Similiter, si visio sit res absolute extensa, tunc que- libet pars quantitativa primi sui subiecti informaretur parte sui, et vere denominaretur videns, et per con- DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 17 If vision is an extended thing, it is coëxtended with that which it sees ; the 18. MS. 4 in marg. 27. MS. omi pro omne. 30. MS. 5 in marg. 18. Similiter. The line of Wyclif's argument runs thus : The act of sight, as it is elicited in our brain, gives us awareness of the colour seen, independently of its size. Suppose this colour to be a white surface; each point that is white goes to make up the intensity of this awareness. Now if it were really composed of intensive parts, each point (of which there is an infinite multitude) contributing a certain intensity to the act, this act would be infinitely intense. To each point there would correspond a certain intensive part. — The adversaries would no doubt answer that the intensity contributed by each point of the sur- face is infinitely small.
CAP. I. litum splendidum vel excellenter coloratum, foret actus Not less; for then, by a videndi remissior, quia certum est secundum perspec- contrary conclusion, a tivos et experiencias quod lumen forte in talibus multa dazzling light visibilia occultat et visionem confundit. Et cum visio or colour would be more 5 est intensior, sicud patet ex eius forti impressione, et distinctly seen than a moderate de actibus apprehendendi universalia, est maior color; one ; which nam apprehendendo figuram in communi sub gradu ut contradicts experience. octo, patet quod percipiendo partes intensivas actus vel ad species vel ad individua illius generis secundum 10 equales et appropriatas proporciones, vel foret totus actus infinitum intensus, vel quelibet talis pars infinitum remissa. Nec valet dicere quod quelibet pars actus ex- tenditur, sicud ad omnem speciem vel individuum figure; tum quia tunc non distinguerentur penes obiecta, tum 15 quia tunc non confusius signarentur sub partibus par- cialibus actibus quam totalibus, cum infinitum confusius F. 52° signantur illa quam genus signatum] gradu ut octo. If the act of Similiter, si actus componitur sic intensive, quando- sight had cunque videretur unum album cum alio, ex visionibus intensive parts, 20 eorum fieret una intensior: quod est inpossibile, quia the total act would be tunc apprehenderet esse unum duplum intensive ad infinitely intense in the case of utrumlibet illorum, secundum intencionem actus, et sic seeing anything homogeneously infinitum intensa foret visio, videndo quodcunque uni- producing an impression. forme; cuius oppositum experimur, cum visiones simi- 25 lium se confundunt. Et prima consequencia videtur per hoc, quod ad omnem punctum cerebri ubi est visio unius visorum, est visio cuiuscunque: igitur, cum omne natum sit componi intensive ex talibus, sequitur quod unum componitur ex talibus. 30 Similiter, si visio sit res absolute extensa, tunc que- libet pars quantitativa primi sui subiecti informaretur parte sui, et vere denominaretur videns, et per con- DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 17 If vision is an extended thing, it is coëxtended with that which it sees ; the 18. MS. 4 in marg. 27. MS. omi pro omne. 30. MS. 5 in marg. 18. Similiter. The line of Wyclif's argument runs thus : The act of sight, as it is elicited in our brain, gives us awareness of the colour seen, independently of its size. Suppose this colour to be a white surface; each point that is white goes to make up the intensity of this awareness. Now if it were really composed of intensive parts, each point (of which there is an infinite multitude) contributing a certain intensity to the act, this act would be infinitely intense. To each point there would correspond a certain intensive part. — The adversaries would no doubt answer that the intensity contributed by each point of the sur- face is infinitely small.
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18 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I. thing seen is sequens vivens et cognoscens; quod nemo diceret. Quis identical with enim diceret quod speculum cristalinum est animatum, that which sees, we have to videt et cognoscit actu elicito differencias visibilium? Et admit that the act of vision consequencia patet ex hoc quod inpossibile est formam exists in the omogeneam absolutam extendi per subiectum, nisi que- colours themselves, and libet eius pars habeat disparem informacionem, et per that a mirror is capable of sight. consequens dispar subiectum primum ipsa informatum. Similiter, non sequitur: in isto corpore et per illud It does not follow, because corpus est actus elicitus, igitur illud corpus elicit illud an act is elicited in matter, that actum. Igitur non est medium ad probandum quod 10 it is elicited by spiritus corporeus, vel quelibet alia pars corporea, elicit that matter ; for spirits act in actum cognoscendi. Maior patet ex hoc quod intelligencia and through separata potest sentire vel percipere qualitatem medii corporal substances in medio et per medium, absque hoc quod communicet which do not share in their medio accionem suam. Nec est talis potencia extensa 15 acts. per corpus, ut probabitur postmodum: igitur etc. VIII. If the act Item, si actus esset res absoluta, potens per se existere, Of sensation tunc esset summe proportionatus ad gignendum noti- (being of all things the most ciam sui ipsius, et imprimendum eius speciem in vir- knowable and tute; quod probabitur multipliciter esse falsum. Et 20 the most capable of making itself consequencia probatur per hoc quod nihil est magis known) were cognitum quam actus, ut patet de doloribus, sensacionibus an entity by et universaliter omnibus intelleccionibus, in tantum quod itself, it would be necessarily nemo dubitat utrum dolet, delectatur, vigilat, dormit, the most known. sentit, intelligit, vult, amat, vel odit, etc Et quod natus 25 est gignere suam speciem videtur per hoc, quod est activus in sensum, et naturaliter inclinatur ad mani- festandum seipsum, et potest de illo haberi species in eius absencia, et per consequens in eius presencia, per quam ipse apprehendatur confuse; igitur composite. Arguitur sic: primo, videtur sequi quod demon potest longe melius cognoscere cogitacionem et intencionem hominis quam potest cognoscere aliquod materiale, quod est falsum. Et consequencia patet per hoc quod cogitacio est una res absoluta potens per se existere vel 35 in lapide aut quocunque alio corpore, ut dicit responsio, This is false: for it would follow thence that the devil knows our thoughts better than he knows material things. For if awareness, according to the hypothesis, 30 17. MS. 2. MS. ſpc cristalinus est animatus. 8. MS. 6 in marg. 8 racio in marg. 30. MS. 9te pro composite. 31. MS. I in marg. 7. The reasoning comes out more clearly in the case of touch. If touch is an extended act, the extended hardness or softuess which we touch exists in the object touched as in the hand which touches it, and the feeling itself exists in the hard or the soft thing.
18 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I. thing seen is sequens vivens et cognoscens; quod nemo diceret. Quis identical with enim diceret quod speculum cristalinum est animatum, that which sees, we have to videt et cognoscit actu elicito differencias visibilium? Et admit that the act of vision consequencia patet ex hoc quod inpossibile est formam exists in the omogeneam absolutam extendi per subiectum, nisi que- colours themselves, and libet eius pars habeat disparem informacionem, et per that a mirror is capable of sight. consequens dispar subiectum primum ipsa informatum. Similiter, non sequitur: in isto corpore et per illud It does not follow, because corpus est actus elicitus, igitur illud corpus elicit illud an act is elicited in matter, that actum. Igitur non est medium ad probandum quod 10 it is elicited by spiritus corporeus, vel quelibet alia pars corporea, elicit that matter ; for spirits act in actum cognoscendi. Maior patet ex hoc quod intelligencia and through separata potest sentire vel percipere qualitatem medii corporal substances in medio et per medium, absque hoc quod communicet which do not share in their medio accionem suam. Nec est talis potencia extensa 15 acts. per corpus, ut probabitur postmodum: igitur etc. VIII. If the act Item, si actus esset res absoluta, potens per se existere, Of sensation tunc esset summe proportionatus ad gignendum noti- (being of all things the most ciam sui ipsius, et imprimendum eius speciem in vir- knowable and tute; quod probabitur multipliciter esse falsum. Et 20 the most capable of making itself consequencia probatur per hoc quod nihil est magis known) were cognitum quam actus, ut patet de doloribus, sensacionibus an entity by et universaliter omnibus intelleccionibus, in tantum quod itself, it would be necessarily nemo dubitat utrum dolet, delectatur, vigilat, dormit, the most known. sentit, intelligit, vult, amat, vel odit, etc Et quod natus 25 est gignere suam speciem videtur per hoc, quod est activus in sensum, et naturaliter inclinatur ad mani- festandum seipsum, et potest de illo haberi species in eius absencia, et per consequens in eius presencia, per quam ipse apprehendatur confuse; igitur composite. Arguitur sic: primo, videtur sequi quod demon potest longe melius cognoscere cogitacionem et intencionem hominis quam potest cognoscere aliquod materiale, quod est falsum. Et consequencia patet per hoc quod cogitacio est una res absoluta potens per se existere vel 35 in lapide aut quocunque alio corpore, ut dicit responsio, This is false: for it would follow thence that the devil knows our thoughts better than he knows material things. For if awareness, according to the hypothesis, 30 17. MS. 2. MS. ſpc cristalinus est animatus. 8. MS. 6 in marg. 8 racio in marg. 30. MS. 9te pro composite. 31. MS. I in marg. 7. The reasoning comes out more clearly in the case of touch. If touch is an extended act, the extended hardness or softuess which we touch exists in the object touched as in the hand which touches it, and the feeling itself exists in the hard or the soft thing.
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CAP. I. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 19 et est magis proporcionata apprehencioni intelligencie quam aliquod tale materiale; nec aliunde inpedimentum; igitur, etc. Nec valet dicere quod actus apprehenditur, sed nes- 5 citur utrum informat, propter tria. Primo, quia eque probabili coniectura cognoscit diabolus formam infor- mare, cognoscendo illam esse, sicud cognoscit aliquod subiectum esse quale, vel informatum; secundo, per hoc quod informacio est res absoluta potens cognosci eque to bene a diabolo sicud ab homine. Tercio per hoc quod F. 52° diabolus potest videre quum | homo demeretur, et per consequens quum actus informat. Nec dicetur racio quare talis res non ageret, servata eius essencia, sicut faciunt accidencia eucaristie (ex quibus tota illa opinio 15 habet ortum) et per idem ageret in subiectum alienum; sed dicitur quod est dare qualitates que agunt in ex- trinsecum et non in subiectum proprium (ut qualitates de tercia specie) et alias que nec agunt in subiectum proprium nec alienum (ut qualitates de quarta specie); 20 et est dare alias que tam agunt in subiectum proprium quam alienum (ut qualitates de secunda). Igitur est dare qualitates que agunt in subiectum proprium, et non alienum (ut qualitates de prima), sicud infirmitas, dormicio, consuetudo, etc. Sed dico quod inpossibile est 25 rem aliquam formalem per se esse, et non posse per se agere; quia tunc vane haberet appetitum ad fines extrinsecos. Nec actus anime solum agit in subiectum proprium, sed in extrinsecum, ut corpus a quo distat et animam in qua ponitur non esse actus sensitivus. 30 Similiter, quam proporcionata est anima unius hominis ad apprehendendum talem rem per se existentem, est anima cuiuscunque et potencia intelligencie separate. Igitur, cum una natura intellectiva potest cognoscere talem rem, sequitur quod quelibet. Si dicitur quod nihil 35 preter deum potest cognoscere talem rem per se exi- stentem: contra, albedo et alie qualitates materiales exists in the stone that is felt, it can exist yet better in an angelic mind. We cannot say that the devil perceives that act, but is gnorant that it belongs to us. For (1) his knowledge in that respect is as great as for all other similar objects. (2) This 'belonging', according to the theory, is an absolute entity, cognoscible by itself. And (3) he knows when an act is a sin, and therefore, must know when it is imputable. Those driven by the theory of the Eucharistic accidents to admit sensation as an absolute entity, must admit that this, like those, can act by itself upon another subject. Four species of qualities. according to Aristotle's Categories. What is by itself must act by itself; and thus a mental act is a quality that influences not only the mind to which it belongs, but exterior bodies and minds also. It cannot be said that God alone can apprehend it, since the 20. et deest MS. 32 MS. intilue sept. 24. MS. dor pro dormicio. 3o. MS. 2 in marg. 36. MS. alias. 24. St. Thomas divides Aristotle's four classes of qualities, as follows : Quality being a modification of a substance, it either modifies (1) the nature of that substance, or (2) its power of action, or (3) its possibility of being acted upon, or (4) its quantity. (See Sum. Theol. 1° 2° qu. 49, art. 2. in corpore art.)
CAP. I. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 19 et est magis proporcionata apprehencioni intelligencie quam aliquod tale materiale; nec aliunde inpedimentum; igitur, etc. Nec valet dicere quod actus apprehenditur, sed nes- 5 citur utrum informat, propter tria. Primo, quia eque probabili coniectura cognoscit diabolus formam infor- mare, cognoscendo illam esse, sicud cognoscit aliquod subiectum esse quale, vel informatum; secundo, per hoc quod informacio est res absoluta potens cognosci eque to bene a diabolo sicud ab homine. Tercio per hoc quod F. 52° diabolus potest videre quum | homo demeretur, et per consequens quum actus informat. Nec dicetur racio quare talis res non ageret, servata eius essencia, sicut faciunt accidencia eucaristie (ex quibus tota illa opinio 15 habet ortum) et per idem ageret in subiectum alienum; sed dicitur quod est dare qualitates que agunt in ex- trinsecum et non in subiectum proprium (ut qualitates de tercia specie) et alias que nec agunt in subiectum proprium nec alienum (ut qualitates de quarta specie); 20 et est dare alias que tam agunt in subiectum proprium quam alienum (ut qualitates de secunda). Igitur est dare qualitates que agunt in subiectum proprium, et non alienum (ut qualitates de prima), sicud infirmitas, dormicio, consuetudo, etc. Sed dico quod inpossibile est 25 rem aliquam formalem per se esse, et non posse per se agere; quia tunc vane haberet appetitum ad fines extrinsecos. Nec actus anime solum agit in subiectum proprium, sed in extrinsecum, ut corpus a quo distat et animam in qua ponitur non esse actus sensitivus. 30 Similiter, quam proporcionata est anima unius hominis ad apprehendendum talem rem per se existentem, est anima cuiuscunque et potencia intelligencie separate. Igitur, cum una natura intellectiva potest cognoscere talem rem, sequitur quod quelibet. Si dicitur quod nihil 35 preter deum potest cognoscere talem rem per se exi- stentem: contra, albedo et alie qualitates materiales exists in the stone that is felt, it can exist yet better in an angelic mind. We cannot say that the devil perceives that act, but is gnorant that it belongs to us. For (1) his knowledge in that respect is as great as for all other similar objects. (2) This 'belonging', according to the theory, is an absolute entity, cognoscible by itself. And (3) he knows when an act is a sin, and therefore, must know when it is imputable. Those driven by the theory of the Eucharistic accidents to admit sensation as an absolute entity, must admit that this, like those, can act by itself upon another subject. Four species of qualities. according to Aristotle's Categories. What is by itself must act by itself; and thus a mental act is a quality that influences not only the mind to which it belongs, but exterior bodies and minds also. It cannot be said that God alone can apprehend it, since the 20. et deest MS. 32 MS. intilue sept. 24. MS. dor pro dormicio. 3o. MS. 2 in marg. 36. MS. alias. 24. St. Thomas divides Aristotle's four classes of qualities, as follows : Quality being a modification of a substance, it either modifies (1) the nature of that substance, or (2) its power of action, or (3) its possibility of being acted upon, or (4) its quantity. (See Sum. Theol. 1° 2° qu. 49, art. 2. in corpore art.)
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20 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I. accidents in the quas theologi ponunt posse per se existere, essent ita Eucharist are apprehended by manifestive suarum naturarum sicud ipsis informantibus. men, and the Igitur per idem illa res absoluta sic foret per se activa. case is similar. If a doctor Similiter, dolor infirmi esset immutativus sensus tactus touches a sick palpantis medici qui est eiusdem speciei cum dolore in? man, he af once p should be membro medici, ut suppono; et satis proporcionatus sensible of the pain felt by the igitur inmutaret solum tangentem. Quod est falsissimum: latter, since it is quia tunc medici non tangerent ita libenter pulsus fe- a thing by itself, better bricitancium. Et minor patet ex hoc quod omnis qua- cognizable from without than litas tangibilis melius tangitur dum distat a nervo 10 from within. tactus per medium carneum, quam si foret intrinsecus; But this is false ; and pain is not quia sensibile positum omnino intrinsecum non sentitur, by any means a positive ut patet de caliditate ethici, et quelibet in nervis quo- entity. rumlibet. Non igitur est dolor nervorum plus res posi- tiva quam fames vel inanicio quam stomacus sentit. 15 Similiter, omnis res absoluta est naturalis et bona, sicud quelibet eius naturalis proprietas; sed non sic est de dolore, fastidio et ceteris que propter peccata fuerunt inducta: igitur non sunt res huiusmodi absolute. Maior patet cuilibet philosopho. Quelibet enim talis res habet 20 appetitum naturalem conservandi seipsam et per con- sequens a natura habet talem appetitum propter aliquod bonum. Et minor patet, De infirmitatibus libro 2°. Nam omnes tales denominantes corumpentes naturam eveniunt in minori parte preter intentum nature; et informaciones 25 illarum sunt nocive, ut informaciones viciorum, ut post- modum probabitur: igitur etc. Similiter, si actus talis natus sit producere species in anima naturaliter, continue posito actu et posita capacitate anime sic produceret, et per consequens dolor continue 30 ageret novam speciem doloris, et quilibet sensus imme- diate ageret in se; quod est falsum, quia nulla quali- tas continue agit in subiectum in hoc quod informat ipsum, ut l patet per Aristotelem de possibili qualitate; F. 53. sed pocius quelibet forma naturalis absoluta potens per 35 se existere naturaliter informat et perficit suum sub- iectum, et non indifferenter inducitur a cultello scindente et quocunque indisponente suum subiectum. Again, all things are good; some mental acts, such as pain, &c. are not good ; therefore they are not things. Every thing tends to self- preservation; and this is good in nature; but pain has no such tendency, yet it is a mental act. Again, this would destroy the essential difference between a substantial form that acts by itself to inform its subject, and the accidental determination of quality. 2. MS. ifornb3. 4. MS. 3 in marg. 5. MS. quod pro qui. 7. MS. tangente 12. MS. sensum pro intrinsecum. 13. MS. qulib3. 15. MS. manict pro inanicio. 15. MS. 4 in marg. 28. MS. 5 in marg. 29. MS. 9° pro continue.
20 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I. accidents in the quas theologi ponunt posse per se existere, essent ita Eucharist are apprehended by manifestive suarum naturarum sicud ipsis informantibus. men, and the Igitur per idem illa res absoluta sic foret per se activa. case is similar. If a doctor Similiter, dolor infirmi esset immutativus sensus tactus touches a sick palpantis medici qui est eiusdem speciei cum dolore in? man, he af once p should be membro medici, ut suppono; et satis proporcionatus sensible of the pain felt by the igitur inmutaret solum tangentem. Quod est falsissimum: latter, since it is quia tunc medici non tangerent ita libenter pulsus fe- a thing by itself, better bricitancium. Et minor patet ex hoc quod omnis qua- cognizable from without than litas tangibilis melius tangitur dum distat a nervo 10 from within. tactus per medium carneum, quam si foret intrinsecus; But this is false ; and pain is not quia sensibile positum omnino intrinsecum non sentitur, by any means a positive ut patet de caliditate ethici, et quelibet in nervis quo- entity. rumlibet. Non igitur est dolor nervorum plus res posi- tiva quam fames vel inanicio quam stomacus sentit. 15 Similiter, omnis res absoluta est naturalis et bona, sicud quelibet eius naturalis proprietas; sed non sic est de dolore, fastidio et ceteris que propter peccata fuerunt inducta: igitur non sunt res huiusmodi absolute. Maior patet cuilibet philosopho. Quelibet enim talis res habet 20 appetitum naturalem conservandi seipsam et per con- sequens a natura habet talem appetitum propter aliquod bonum. Et minor patet, De infirmitatibus libro 2°. Nam omnes tales denominantes corumpentes naturam eveniunt in minori parte preter intentum nature; et informaciones 25 illarum sunt nocive, ut informaciones viciorum, ut post- modum probabitur: igitur etc. Similiter, si actus talis natus sit producere species in anima naturaliter, continue posito actu et posita capacitate anime sic produceret, et per consequens dolor continue 30 ageret novam speciem doloris, et quilibet sensus imme- diate ageret in se; quod est falsum, quia nulla quali- tas continue agit in subiectum in hoc quod informat ipsum, ut l patet per Aristotelem de possibili qualitate; F. 53. sed pocius quelibet forma naturalis absoluta potens per 35 se existere naturaliter informat et perficit suum sub- iectum, et non indifferenter inducitur a cultello scindente et quocunque indisponente suum subiectum. Again, all things are good; some mental acts, such as pain, &c. are not good ; therefore they are not things. Every thing tends to self- preservation; and this is good in nature; but pain has no such tendency, yet it is a mental act. Again, this would destroy the essential difference between a substantial form that acts by itself to inform its subject, and the accidental determination of quality. 2. MS. ifornb3. 4. MS. 3 in marg. 5. MS. quod pro qui. 7. MS. tangente 12. MS. sensum pro intrinsecum. 13. MS. qulib3. 15. MS. manict pro inanicio. 15. MS. 4 in marg. 28. MS. 5 in marg. 29. MS. 9° pro continue.
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CAP. I. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 21 Similiter, tale incisivum non agit in animam generando The same canse may produce dolorem, potissime cum tam prurigo quam delectacio pain or pleasure; it is, causatur per incisionem et anima post modum natur- therefore, the aliter dolebit. Igitur respondetur quod dolor, qui est perception of disagreement, 5 percepcio disconvenientis, causatur naturaliter ex pri- not of anything positive, which vacione alicuius positivi debiti mediate et non per se occurs when we feel pain. If it ex qualitatibus vel rebus positivis; quia tunc semper were otherwise, agerent manifestam dolorem, et eo forcius quo essent pain would be always in direct intenciores; cum tamen opposito modo sit: quia remissis proportion with the intensity of 1o qualitatibus corporis usque ad non gradum, ultra modum the quality intenderetur dolor et in eius deperdicione dilectaretur perceived. natura. Non igitur habet potenciam et inclinacionem na- turalem ad illam suscipiendum. IX. Certain Item, inpossibile est aliquam rem esse inseparabiliter mental acts, as 15 malam; set multi actus anime non sunt res huiusmodi lving, for instance, are absolute, et per idem nulli. Minor probatur de invidia, bad in their very nature ; mendacio, odio dei, et multis similibus, que Aristoteles but every dicit 2° ethicorum esse per se mala. absolute entity is naturally Hic est duplex responsio. Prima dicit quod omnis good. The adversaries 20 actus quoad essencialem substanciam est bonus, set est reply to this in actu quedam obliquitas vel deformitas; et illa est (1) that what is bad in those per se mala. Et sic deus wit omne actuale peccatum, acts is not their nature, but et facit omne tale, sed non deformitatem; et ponuntur their moral ad hoc multa exempla. Primo de eodem actu, qui in obliquity. The same act 25 prima medietate hore erit meritorius ex precepto, et in may be thus morally good secunda demeritorius ex precepto opposito. Secundo and bad during ponitur exemplum de actu adulterii, suspensionis, et two successive half hours. ceteris similibus corporalibus actibus, qui cum aliquibus Many bodily actions are circumstanciis sunt in aliquibus personis mali et illiciti right in certain 3o et in aliis personis sunt liciti, et inceptu meritorii. circumstances, and wrong in Tercio de actu voluntatis terminato ad diabolum, po- others. nendo quod sit deus per diaboli illusionem; talis enim To worship the devil, cultus potest ex ignorancia invincibili excusari. believing him to be God, is Secunda responsio dicit quod quilibet talis actus per excusable on account of the 35 accidens informat; et sic, ipso non informante, foret bonus; mistake. et modo per informanciam accidentalem est malus: et But the best known answer is that (2) the badness of an act is in its actually belonging to a subject; 1. MS. 6 in marg. 6. MS. med pro mediate. 8. MS. maia3 pro manifestam. 9. MS. tum pro tamen; ib. MS. ref pro remissis. 14. MS. 93 racio in marg. 23. MS. pot. 27. MS. suspentis. 28. MS. aliqu? 35. MS. ipsa. 15. Anime. I think a few words are wanting here, such as: sunt inseparabiliter mali, ergo.
CAP. I. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 21 Similiter, tale incisivum non agit in animam generando The same canse may produce dolorem, potissime cum tam prurigo quam delectacio pain or pleasure; it is, causatur per incisionem et anima post modum natur- therefore, the aliter dolebit. Igitur respondetur quod dolor, qui est perception of disagreement, 5 percepcio disconvenientis, causatur naturaliter ex pri- not of anything positive, which vacione alicuius positivi debiti mediate et non per se occurs when we feel pain. If it ex qualitatibus vel rebus positivis; quia tunc semper were otherwise, agerent manifestam dolorem, et eo forcius quo essent pain would be always in direct intenciores; cum tamen opposito modo sit: quia remissis proportion with the intensity of 1o qualitatibus corporis usque ad non gradum, ultra modum the quality intenderetur dolor et in eius deperdicione dilectaretur perceived. natura. Non igitur habet potenciam et inclinacionem na- turalem ad illam suscipiendum. IX. Certain Item, inpossibile est aliquam rem esse inseparabiliter mental acts, as 15 malam; set multi actus anime non sunt res huiusmodi lving, for instance, are absolute, et per idem nulli. Minor probatur de invidia, bad in their very nature ; mendacio, odio dei, et multis similibus, que Aristoteles but every dicit 2° ethicorum esse per se mala. absolute entity is naturally Hic est duplex responsio. Prima dicit quod omnis good. The adversaries 20 actus quoad essencialem substanciam est bonus, set est reply to this in actu quedam obliquitas vel deformitas; et illa est (1) that what is bad in those per se mala. Et sic deus wit omne actuale peccatum, acts is not their nature, but et facit omne tale, sed non deformitatem; et ponuntur their moral ad hoc multa exempla. Primo de eodem actu, qui in obliquity. The same act 25 prima medietate hore erit meritorius ex precepto, et in may be thus morally good secunda demeritorius ex precepto opposito. Secundo and bad during ponitur exemplum de actu adulterii, suspensionis, et two successive half hours. ceteris similibus corporalibus actibus, qui cum aliquibus Many bodily actions are circumstanciis sunt in aliquibus personis mali et illiciti right in certain 3o et in aliis personis sunt liciti, et inceptu meritorii. circumstances, and wrong in Tercio de actu voluntatis terminato ad diabolum, po- others. nendo quod sit deus per diaboli illusionem; talis enim To worship the devil, cultus potest ex ignorancia invincibili excusari. believing him to be God, is Secunda responsio dicit quod quilibet talis actus per excusable on account of the 35 accidens informat; et sic, ipso non informante, foret bonus; mistake. et modo per informanciam accidentalem est malus: et But the best known answer is that (2) the badness of an act is in its actually belonging to a subject; 1. MS. 6 in marg. 6. MS. med pro mediate. 8. MS. maia3 pro manifestam. 9. MS. tum pro tamen; ib. MS. ref pro remissis. 14. MS. 93 racio in marg. 23. MS. pot. 27. MS. suspentis. 28. MS. aliqu? 35. MS. ipsa. 15. Anime. I think a few words are wanting here, such as: sunt inseparabiliter mali, ergo.
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22 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I. abstracting illa est famosa responsio dicens actum per accidens from that, it is esse activum. good. Rejoinders. Contra primum arguitur: actus invidendi, actus men- (1) Certain acts are so cvil that tiendi, et odiendi deum sunt inseparabiliter mali; igitur they can by no non quilibet est per accidens malus. Pro antecedente sup- means be good ; and that good pono quod non obsit actum esse malum, et bonum fieri ex may come of illo, immo illum esse occasionem multorum bonorum. them docs not diminish their Sic enim ex maxima malicia vel privacione que fundatur essential malice. in substancia actus, frequenter occasionantur multa bona. The subject is Quo supposito, arguitur sic. Si aliquis talium actuum 10 determined by them according informat suum subiectum secundum naturalem infor- to their nature, macionem, tunc est malus; sed quilibet illorum sic per and cannot be otherwise se informat, igitur quilibet illorum est inseparabiliter determined by malus. Minor postmodum probabitur. Et maior patet them ; and as the subject is per hoc quod non posset esse quod homo diceret contra 15 necessarily determined by conscienciam, odiret deum, vel desideraret nihil esse, them in an evil vel odiret rem sine racione possibili, nisi hoc esset sense, their nature must be malum. Cum igitur ille sint proprie denominaciones evil. AS, v. g., an illorum actuum, sequitur quod illis denominantibus se- act of hatred of 20 cundum proprias denominaciones essent mali. God, or of speaking against Similiter, si unus contrariorum actuum voluntatis] est F. 535 the known truth ; however per se bonus, relicus est per se vel inseparabiliter malus. they may be clicited, these Sed est dare aliquos actus per se bonos, igitur est dare are cvil, actus illis contrarios inseparabiliter malos. Maior patet therefore, essentially s0. ex hoc quod, dato opposito, oportet dare de possibili 25 If of two quod uterque talium actuum contrariorum sit malus, contrary acts one is good by vel uterque bonus; et loquor de bonitate laudis meri- its very nature, the other is bad torie subiecto. Quo dato, duo contradictoria essent in the same simul vera, ut: “bonum est Socratem habere a actum, way, or two et bonum est ipsum non habere illum, sed actum oppo-30 contradictory propositions situm". Et minor patet de actu diligendi deum, de actu would at the volendi vitare malum culpe, et ceteris multis que deus same time be true. non posset facere malos; sic quod homo habendo illos Now some acts are such that demeretur in quantum haberet illos. Ideo dicunt theologi they cannot be quod est dare actus indifferentes, actus bonos de genere, morally evil. Theological et actus simpliciter bonos vel simpliciter malos, actus divisions of acts. neutros (ut elevacio fragminis, vel alia que non speci- ficantur plus ad bonum quam ad malum moris quoad 35 3. MS. I in marg. 16. MS. desi's. 21. MS. 2 in marg. 37. MS. * imio. 37. I can see no distinction between the 'actus indifferentes' and 'neutros'.
22 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I. abstracting illa est famosa responsio dicens actum per accidens from that, it is esse activum. good. Rejoinders. Contra primum arguitur: actus invidendi, actus men- (1) Certain acts are so cvil that tiendi, et odiendi deum sunt inseparabiliter mali; igitur they can by no non quilibet est per accidens malus. Pro antecedente sup- means be good ; and that good pono quod non obsit actum esse malum, et bonum fieri ex may come of illo, immo illum esse occasionem multorum bonorum. them docs not diminish their Sic enim ex maxima malicia vel privacione que fundatur essential malice. in substancia actus, frequenter occasionantur multa bona. The subject is Quo supposito, arguitur sic. Si aliquis talium actuum 10 determined by them according informat suum subiectum secundum naturalem infor- to their nature, macionem, tunc est malus; sed quilibet illorum sic per and cannot be otherwise se informat, igitur quilibet illorum est inseparabiliter determined by malus. Minor postmodum probabitur. Et maior patet them ; and as the subject is per hoc quod non posset esse quod homo diceret contra 15 necessarily determined by conscienciam, odiret deum, vel desideraret nihil esse, them in an evil vel odiret rem sine racione possibili, nisi hoc esset sense, their nature must be malum. Cum igitur ille sint proprie denominaciones evil. AS, v. g., an illorum actuum, sequitur quod illis denominantibus se- act of hatred of 20 cundum proprias denominaciones essent mali. God, or of speaking against Similiter, si unus contrariorum actuum voluntatis] est F. 535 the known truth ; however per se bonus, relicus est per se vel inseparabiliter malus. they may be clicited, these Sed est dare aliquos actus per se bonos, igitur est dare are cvil, actus illis contrarios inseparabiliter malos. Maior patet therefore, essentially s0. ex hoc quod, dato opposito, oportet dare de possibili 25 If of two quod uterque talium actuum contrariorum sit malus, contrary acts one is good by vel uterque bonus; et loquor de bonitate laudis meri- its very nature, the other is bad torie subiecto. Quo dato, duo contradictoria essent in the same simul vera, ut: “bonum est Socratem habere a actum, way, or two et bonum est ipsum non habere illum, sed actum oppo-30 contradictory propositions situm". Et minor patet de actu diligendi deum, de actu would at the volendi vitare malum culpe, et ceteris multis que deus same time be true. non posset facere malos; sic quod homo habendo illos Now some acts are such that demeretur in quantum haberet illos. Ideo dicunt theologi they cannot be quod est dare actus indifferentes, actus bonos de genere, morally evil. Theological et actus simpliciter bonos vel simpliciter malos, actus divisions of acts. neutros (ut elevacio fragminis, vel alia que non speci- ficantur plus ad bonum quam ad malum moris quoad 35 3. MS. I in marg. 16. MS. desi's. 21. MS. 2 in marg. 37. MS. * imio. 37. I can see no distinction between the 'actus indifferentes' and 'neutros'.
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CAP. I. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 23 suam speciem). Actus bonos de genere vocant qui ra- cione sui generis sonant in bonum, cum circumstancie privative vel intenciones male possunt facere quod non sint meritorii simpliciter, ut dare elemosynam, quod non 5 prodest privato gracia, vel intendenti vanam gloriam, quoad vitam eternam. Similiter, alii sunt actus principiati de lege nature, Certain acts are commanded by cum quibus deus non potest dispensare; ergo sic ar- the law of nature, with guitur: Si quilibet actus sit per accidens bonus, ordinet which God 10 deus quod homo demereatur in amando illum, in volendo Himself cannot dispense. But evitare malum moris in communi et in volendo facere if every such act were only ut diceret, et ordinet quod actus oppositi sint meritorii; accidentally good, God scilicet, odiendo deum scienter et contra conscienciam, might attach faciendo malum moris et faciendo oppositum illius quod merit to their contraries, so 15 diceret. Et patet quod in quantum aliquis cum ista lege that v. g. to hate God would odit deum, amat deum; quia facit deo beneplacitum please Him, conformando se voluntati divine. Et in quantum, cum and a man would be istis paribus, vult scienter facere malum, vult bene obliged to do so out of love facere; et sic ex illa maledicta lege esset deus inhono- for God. 20 randus et contrarius actus mutatus in eius oppositum, et omnis veritas reduplicativa, vel lex eterna destructa; quia homo plus amaret deum quam aliud citra deum, plus se quam proximum, et cuilibet esset suum tri- buendum; et sic de multis aliis que sunt per se racionalia. 25 Deus igitur non potest concedere talem legem. Cum Such a thing is absolutely igitur deus ordinat quamcunque formam absolutam que impossible, therefore these est naturaliter bona; et ordinat eius primum actum qui acts are evil in their own est informacio, cum illa sit naturalis et finis forme, nature, as sequitur quod si actus tales odiendi per se mali essent determinations of a subject, 3o forme absolute naturaliter bone, deus ordinaret quod and cannot be conceived as denominarent subiecta odire deum, et taliter velle: quod conformable to est impossibile. Ideo dicit secunda responsio quod tales God's will. actus per accidens informant, et addit quod actus odiendi potest esse actus amandi. Contra, sit a actus quo Socrates odit deum: et ponitur quod per totam illam horam non informet, et in fine 35 Answer to (2) which supposes that an act may 4. MS. sit meritorie. 7. MS. 3 in marg. 8. MS. quod pro ergo. 20. MS. 99 pro contrarius. 35. MS. 1 in marg. 5. Privato gracia. To a man out of God's grace. 21. Re- duplicativa. This may mean, the 'doubling' of the expressions, when we say: A man hates God out of love for Him, and if he loved God would not love Him. But I think it more probable that it is a mistake for redarguta, or something else.
CAP. I. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 23 suam speciem). Actus bonos de genere vocant qui ra- cione sui generis sonant in bonum, cum circumstancie privative vel intenciones male possunt facere quod non sint meritorii simpliciter, ut dare elemosynam, quod non 5 prodest privato gracia, vel intendenti vanam gloriam, quoad vitam eternam. Similiter, alii sunt actus principiati de lege nature, Certain acts are commanded by cum quibus deus non potest dispensare; ergo sic ar- the law of nature, with guitur: Si quilibet actus sit per accidens bonus, ordinet which God 10 deus quod homo demereatur in amando illum, in volendo Himself cannot dispense. But evitare malum moris in communi et in volendo facere if every such act were only ut diceret, et ordinet quod actus oppositi sint meritorii; accidentally good, God scilicet, odiendo deum scienter et contra conscienciam, might attach faciendo malum moris et faciendo oppositum illius quod merit to their contraries, so 15 diceret. Et patet quod in quantum aliquis cum ista lege that v. g. to hate God would odit deum, amat deum; quia facit deo beneplacitum please Him, conformando se voluntati divine. Et in quantum, cum and a man would be istis paribus, vult scienter facere malum, vult bene obliged to do so out of love facere; et sic ex illa maledicta lege esset deus inhono- for God. 20 randus et contrarius actus mutatus in eius oppositum, et omnis veritas reduplicativa, vel lex eterna destructa; quia homo plus amaret deum quam aliud citra deum, plus se quam proximum, et cuilibet esset suum tri- buendum; et sic de multis aliis que sunt per se racionalia. 25 Deus igitur non potest concedere talem legem. Cum Such a thing is absolutely igitur deus ordinat quamcunque formam absolutam que impossible, therefore these est naturaliter bona; et ordinat eius primum actum qui acts are evil in their own est informacio, cum illa sit naturalis et finis forme, nature, as sequitur quod si actus tales odiendi per se mali essent determinations of a subject, 3o forme absolute naturaliter bone, deus ordinaret quod and cannot be conceived as denominarent subiecta odire deum, et taliter velle: quod conformable to est impossibile. Ideo dicit secunda responsio quod tales God's will. actus per accidens informant, et addit quod actus odiendi potest esse actus amandi. Contra, sit a actus quo Socrates odit deum: et ponitur quod per totam illam horam non informet, et in fine 35 Answer to (2) which supposes that an act may 4. MS. sit meritorie. 7. MS. 3 in marg. 8. MS. quod pro ergo. 20. MS. 99 pro contrarius. 35. MS. 1 in marg. 5. Privato gracia. To a man out of God's grace. 21. Re- duplicativa. This may mean, the 'doubling' of the expressions, when we say: A man hates God out of love for Him, and if he loved God would not love Him. But I think it more probable that it is a mistake for redarguta, or something else.
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24 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I. exist without informet; tunc sic in fine incipiet esse quod hoc odit determining its subject. deum; igitur tunc novus actus vel nova informacio in- At the moment cipiet esse; et quicquid illud fuerit, illud ponendum est when it begins to determine, esse actus. Igitur, non solum antiquus actus noviter in- there is a transition from formabit, sed novus generabitur. Minor patet, ex hoc 5 non-activity to quod illa informacio denominabit subiectum formaliter transition is the et inmediate agens ; igitur, iuxta descripcionem accionis, act itself, and illa informacio erit accio; et cum due superfluunt, se- the hypothesis of its quitur quod antiqua non denominabit. Si enim actus pre-existence without posset per se manere, tunc ex dubio deus creavit omnes 10 determining is dolores et penas in principio, mundi, et inprimet illos superfluous. Besides, it secundum quod tanta demerebuntur; et sic non maiorem would have been possible penam vel dolorem habebit dampnatus in inferno quam for God to create various habebit quilibet peccator in hoc mundo vel purgatorio pains at the de possibili quo eadem pena successive puniet eos. Et 15 beginning of the world ; and hic considera quod locucio de magnitudinibus penarum thus sinners in videtur supponere illas esse successivas. Non enim dicitur Hell would not suffer greater, quod una pars orbis est maior equali parte mei, quia 1. e. more lasting diuturnior, sicud cum dicitur de pena. Nec videtur quod punishments homo eliceret actum dolendi propter unam rem ab-20 than men on carth ; for they solutam inproporcionatam sensitivi, quia per idem veniente might continue to exist tali pena. Si enim scirem quod talis pena esset ad eternally, ostium et ingrederetur me formido, perpetuo ego tantum though no longer dolerem et timerem novo actu quantum dolerent pro determining intoxicacione serpentis. their subjects. Similiter, potissimum medium probandi actus distingui est verificacio successiva contradictorium. Igitur, cum in fine hore erit verum quod Socrates odit, postquam S per ante fuit falsum, sequitur quod est dare actum odiendi non tunc generatum, propter quem sic incipiet 30 esse. Quidlibet enim aliud ab actu est inpertinens, eo quod ponendo novam informacionem diceretur commune tempus quod est unus actus in primis elicitus, qui successive et vicissim informabit sine generacione alicuius novi actus posterioris. Similiter, in hoc differt actus ab habitu quod actus manet solum dum agens agit, sed habitus manebit post, inclinando ad actum. Igitur, si actus potest sic latere dum non actualiter consideratur, et postmodum inclinare Again, if it is false that a man hates until a certain moment after which this is true (although the act pre-existed) we have an act at once new and not produced. F. 54* 25 35 The theory would also destroy the distinction between an act and a habit, both being able 21. MS. ſſ,di 14. MS. prcco pro peccator. 19. MS. tu = tamen? 23. MS. hostium; ib. MS. me formido me. or ſſ,vi. 22. MS. sciret. 24. MS. dolorem et timorem. 26. MS. 2 in marg; ib. MS. potemu. 36. MS. 3 in marg. 37. MS. imtid pro inclinando.
24 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I. exist without informet; tunc sic in fine incipiet esse quod hoc odit determining its subject. deum; igitur tunc novus actus vel nova informacio in- At the moment cipiet esse; et quicquid illud fuerit, illud ponendum est when it begins to determine, esse actus. Igitur, non solum antiquus actus noviter in- there is a transition from formabit, sed novus generabitur. Minor patet, ex hoc 5 non-activity to quod illa informacio denominabit subiectum formaliter transition is the et inmediate agens ; igitur, iuxta descripcionem accionis, act itself, and illa informacio erit accio; et cum due superfluunt, se- the hypothesis of its quitur quod antiqua non denominabit. Si enim actus pre-existence without posset per se manere, tunc ex dubio deus creavit omnes 10 determining is dolores et penas in principio, mundi, et inprimet illos superfluous. Besides, it secundum quod tanta demerebuntur; et sic non maiorem would have been possible penam vel dolorem habebit dampnatus in inferno quam for God to create various habebit quilibet peccator in hoc mundo vel purgatorio pains at the de possibili quo eadem pena successive puniet eos. Et 15 beginning of the world ; and hic considera quod locucio de magnitudinibus penarum thus sinners in videtur supponere illas esse successivas. Non enim dicitur Hell would not suffer greater, quod una pars orbis est maior equali parte mei, quia 1. e. more lasting diuturnior, sicud cum dicitur de pena. Nec videtur quod punishments homo eliceret actum dolendi propter unam rem ab-20 than men on carth ; for they solutam inproporcionatam sensitivi, quia per idem veniente might continue to exist tali pena. Si enim scirem quod talis pena esset ad eternally, ostium et ingrederetur me formido, perpetuo ego tantum though no longer dolerem et timerem novo actu quantum dolerent pro determining intoxicacione serpentis. their subjects. Similiter, potissimum medium probandi actus distingui est verificacio successiva contradictorium. Igitur, cum in fine hore erit verum quod Socrates odit, postquam S per ante fuit falsum, sequitur quod est dare actum odiendi non tunc generatum, propter quem sic incipiet 30 esse. Quidlibet enim aliud ab actu est inpertinens, eo quod ponendo novam informacionem diceretur commune tempus quod est unus actus in primis elicitus, qui successive et vicissim informabit sine generacione alicuius novi actus posterioris. Similiter, in hoc differt actus ab habitu quod actus manet solum dum agens agit, sed habitus manebit post, inclinando ad actum. Igitur, si actus potest sic latere dum non actualiter consideratur, et postmodum inclinare Again, if it is false that a man hates until a certain moment after which this is true (although the act pre-existed) we have an act at once new and not produced. F. 54* 25 35 The theory would also destroy the distinction between an act and a habit, both being able 21. MS. ſſ,di 14. MS. prcco pro peccator. 19. MS. tu = tamen? 23. MS. hostium; ib. MS. me formido me. or ſſ,vi. 22. MS. sciret. 24. MS. dolorem et timorem. 26. MS. 2 in marg; ib. MS. potemu. 36. MS. 3 in marg. 37. MS. imtid pro inclinando.
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CAP I. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. ad considerandum, videtur guod habeat racionem habitus. Non enim est dare in anima (2° cthicorum) nisi actus, habitus, potencias, et species actus. lgitur, si non erit actus, erit habitus, species, vel potencia. 53 Similiter, in prima apprehensione et obieccione rei generatur naturaliter talis actus; sed in qualibet po- steriori obieccione eque proporcionata non erit inpedi- mentum ex parte anime ad producendum novum actum; igitur confuse produceretur novus actus. Minor patet ex 10 hoc quod infiniti actus similimi possent simul esse, et agencia sunt pure naturalia subiecta accidencium talium. Et sic infiniti actus forent simul thesaurizati in anima superflue; nam compaciunturse, et antiquus non corum- peretur propter adventum novi. 15 Similiter, quam naturale est alicui accidenti informare, tam naturale est sibi inexistere, et e contra; set deus potest tollere informacionem accidentis, igitur et in- herenciam. Et cum, tollendo inherenciam, dat unum novum modum essendi, sequitur quod a pari potest 20dare novum modum informandi; et sic posset facere 25 to exist potentially without an actual determination of their subject. Our mind, eacli „time it was impressed by the same object of thought, might elicit unnecessary acts ad infinitum, and all similar; for the first, self- existent, might still coéxist with the others. Accidents determine tlic substance to which they belong; both determination and belonging are cqually essential. If the former were not quemlibet actum anime informare lapidem, vel quam:- so, then neither libet substanciam. Sic enim potest facere intellectum informare quamlibet materiam, alia accidencia absoluta informare quamlibet substanciam, et uniresibi quamlibet 25naturam. Et sic non solum quodlibet corpus esset quod- libet intellectivum, sed accidencia. Similiter, est dare aliqua accidentia que per se in- formant in quolibet genere accidentis: igitur, cum predicti F. 54* actus sint virtute accidencia, | cum illis sequitur quod 3oilli per se informant, et per consequens non possunt latere non informantes. Antecedens fuit declaratum [De] qualitate et quantitate, 2? libro. Ec de aliis respectibus est nocius. Nam, ponendo actum anime rem absolutam que possit per se existere non informando, oportet dare 35 informacionem, que sit accidens distinctum, a quo for- maliter et immediate subiectum denominatur agens. Et illa (iuxta diffinicionem quid nominis) erit accio; et cum 3. MS. erit non. 4. MS. pe? pro potencia. — 5. MS. 4 in marg. u. MS. cute acer. 15. MS. 5 in marg. 25. MS. esset non solum. 27. MS. 6 in marg. 3. MS. Dc deest. 32. MS. 2° ho smear ed with red. 35. Accidens a quo formaliter et immediate subiectum de- nominatur agens, is thc accepted nominal definition of action. the latter; and an act of thought might conceivably belong to a stone. If it were possible that an act could exist without determining any subject, it would no onper answer to the definition of action ; it would require another accident, determining 1t to determine, aud would no longer render the subject active by its immediate influx.
CAP I. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. ad considerandum, videtur guod habeat racionem habitus. Non enim est dare in anima (2° cthicorum) nisi actus, habitus, potencias, et species actus. lgitur, si non erit actus, erit habitus, species, vel potencia. 53 Similiter, in prima apprehensione et obieccione rei generatur naturaliter talis actus; sed in qualibet po- steriori obieccione eque proporcionata non erit inpedi- mentum ex parte anime ad producendum novum actum; igitur confuse produceretur novus actus. Minor patet ex 10 hoc quod infiniti actus similimi possent simul esse, et agencia sunt pure naturalia subiecta accidencium talium. Et sic infiniti actus forent simul thesaurizati in anima superflue; nam compaciunturse, et antiquus non corum- peretur propter adventum novi. 15 Similiter, quam naturale est alicui accidenti informare, tam naturale est sibi inexistere, et e contra; set deus potest tollere informacionem accidentis, igitur et in- herenciam. Et cum, tollendo inherenciam, dat unum novum modum essendi, sequitur quod a pari potest 20dare novum modum informandi; et sic posset facere 25 to exist potentially without an actual determination of their subject. Our mind, eacli „time it was impressed by the same object of thought, might elicit unnecessary acts ad infinitum, and all similar; for the first, self- existent, might still coéxist with the others. Accidents determine tlic substance to which they belong; both determination and belonging are cqually essential. If the former were not quemlibet actum anime informare lapidem, vel quam:- so, then neither libet substanciam. Sic enim potest facere intellectum informare quamlibet materiam, alia accidencia absoluta informare quamlibet substanciam, et uniresibi quamlibet 25naturam. Et sic non solum quodlibet corpus esset quod- libet intellectivum, sed accidencia. Similiter, est dare aliqua accidentia que per se in- formant in quolibet genere accidentis: igitur, cum predicti F. 54* actus sint virtute accidencia, | cum illis sequitur quod 3oilli per se informant, et per consequens non possunt latere non informantes. Antecedens fuit declaratum [De] qualitate et quantitate, 2? libro. Ec de aliis respectibus est nocius. Nam, ponendo actum anime rem absolutam que possit per se existere non informando, oportet dare 35 informacionem, que sit accidens distinctum, a quo for- maliter et immediate subiectum denominatur agens. Et illa (iuxta diffinicionem quid nominis) erit accio; et cum 3. MS. erit non. 4. MS. pe? pro potencia. — 5. MS. 4 in marg. u. MS. cute acer. 15. MS. 5 in marg. 25. MS. esset non solum. 27. MS. 6 in marg. 3. MS. Dc deest. 32. MS. 2° ho smear ed with red. 35. Accidens a quo formaliter et immediate subiectum de- nominatur agens, is thc accepted nominal definition of action. the latter; and an act of thought might conceivably belong to a stone. If it were possible that an act could exist without determining any subject, it would no onper answer to the definition of action ; it would require another accident, determining 1t to determine, aud would no longer render the subject active by its immediate influx.
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26 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I. accio illa absoluta sit virtute accio, cum ista sequitur quod sicud illa non potest esse non informans, sic nec illa, et per consequens talis absoluta qualitas non est ponenda tanquam actus formaliter denominans subiectum agere: sed, si denominat, hoc est efficienter per accidens? et remote, et sic non virtute cum agencia immediate denominante. Our adversaries Quoad aliud membrum, quod idem actus potest nunc say that the same act may terminari ad unum obiectum, et nunc ad aliud, nunc successively esse volucio, nunc intelleccio, nolucio, etc., videtur quod 10 have objects of various species. sit contradiccio; quia ponendo actus distingui, patet If so, it would quod isti actus sunt diversarum specierum. Igitur unus be a substance. actus non potest sic alterari ab una denominacione in aliam; sic enim actui competeret racio substancie, quia potest per se existere et transmutari. Will following Similiter, per hoc medium potissume est deducibile won't would imply, as in actus generari vel circa idem obiectum, vel circa novum, substances, quod nunc est verificacio unius contradictoriorum de appre- production and destruction; for hensione illius subiecti, postquam per ante oppositum we have here, fuit verum. Igitur, cum non stat absolute velle aliquod 20 as there, two contradictories obiectum, postquam illud fuit simpliciter nolitum ab that are successively eodem sine tali verificacione contradictoriorum, sequitur true and false, quod tam erit generacio, quam corupcio actus. Aliter false and true. enim actus volendi et actus nolendi, respectu eiusdem obiecti et eiusdem virtutis, non essent contrarii. This theory Similiter, nulla natura agit superflue, sed meliori would totally modo quo cum paribus potest. Cum igitur (per opinionem) change the nature of a natura potest generare in principio unum actum qui mental act. It might exist denominaret animam volentem, nolentem, aut appre- antecedently to hendentem quodcunque obiectum, sequitur quod, pro- 30 the man who elicits it, and ducendo novos actus, superflue ageret. Non igitur producet the same act would be now novos actus, sed idem manebit, nunc in habitu, nunc potential, now actual ; there in actu, nunc terminatus ad unum obiectum, nunc ad would be no aliud, nunc secundum unam racionem, nunc secundum reason for supposing that aliam; et sic actus esset habitus qualiscunque, et per 35 15 25 1. MS. vce = univoce? 8. MS. 1 in marg. 14. MS. in pro enim. 26. MS. 3 in marg. 16. MS. 2 in marg. 14. Substancia. According to Scholastics, substance is that which underlies successive changes, and remains the same throughout. If the same act could be now thought, now will, it would be the underlying subject of both thought and will, just as a piece of iron, sometimes cold, and sometimes hot, is the subject of heat and cold.
26 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I. accio illa absoluta sit virtute accio, cum ista sequitur quod sicud illa non potest esse non informans, sic nec illa, et per consequens talis absoluta qualitas non est ponenda tanquam actus formaliter denominans subiectum agere: sed, si denominat, hoc est efficienter per accidens? et remote, et sic non virtute cum agencia immediate denominante. Our adversaries Quoad aliud membrum, quod idem actus potest nunc say that the same act may terminari ad unum obiectum, et nunc ad aliud, nunc successively esse volucio, nunc intelleccio, nolucio, etc., videtur quod 10 have objects of various species. sit contradiccio; quia ponendo actus distingui, patet If so, it would quod isti actus sunt diversarum specierum. Igitur unus be a substance. actus non potest sic alterari ab una denominacione in aliam; sic enim actui competeret racio substancie, quia potest per se existere et transmutari. Will following Similiter, per hoc medium potissume est deducibile won't would imply, as in actus generari vel circa idem obiectum, vel circa novum, substances, quod nunc est verificacio unius contradictoriorum de appre- production and destruction; for hensione illius subiecti, postquam per ante oppositum we have here, fuit verum. Igitur, cum non stat absolute velle aliquod 20 as there, two contradictories obiectum, postquam illud fuit simpliciter nolitum ab that are successively eodem sine tali verificacione contradictoriorum, sequitur true and false, quod tam erit generacio, quam corupcio actus. Aliter false and true. enim actus volendi et actus nolendi, respectu eiusdem obiecti et eiusdem virtutis, non essent contrarii. This theory Similiter, nulla natura agit superflue, sed meliori would totally modo quo cum paribus potest. Cum igitur (per opinionem) change the nature of a natura potest generare in principio unum actum qui mental act. It might exist denominaret animam volentem, nolentem, aut appre- antecedently to hendentem quodcunque obiectum, sequitur quod, pro- 30 the man who elicits it, and ducendo novos actus, superflue ageret. Non igitur producet the same act would be now novos actus, sed idem manebit, nunc in habitu, nunc potential, now actual ; there in actu, nunc terminatus ad unum obiectum, nunc ad would be no aliud, nunc secundum unam racionem, nunc secundum reason for supposing that aliam; et sic actus esset habitus qualiscunque, et per 35 15 25 1. MS. vce = univoce? 8. MS. 1 in marg. 14. MS. in pro enim. 26. MS. 3 in marg. 16. MS. 2 in marg. 14. Substancia. According to Scholastics, substance is that which underlies successive changes, and remains the same throughout. If the same act could be now thought, now will, it would be the underlying subject of both thought and will, just as a piece of iron, sometimes cold, and sometimes hot, is the subject of heat and cold.
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СAP. 1. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 27 consequens omnia locuta de actibus, quod specificantur et individuantur ab obiectis et potenciis, quod eliciuntur actus meritorii, et quod novus actus generat habitum, iuvat, vel impeditur ad resistendum passionibus (et sic 5 de ceteris), essent falsa. Item, actus anime habent denominaciones, quas claudit contradiccionem aliquam rem absolutam habere; igitur non sunt res absolute. Antecedens probatur quintupliciter. Primo sic, posito quod christus elicuit actum asserendi, to quod antechristus erit, absolute sine aliqua connotacione: patet quod si ille actus fuit res absoluta, et realiter in- formavit, quod necessarium est ipsam fuisse et inform- avisse, et tunc patet quod necessarium est sic fore, esse, vel fuisse, vel aliter christum fuisse deceptum, ut superius 15 deductum est. Cum igitur inpossibile est ipsum fuisse deceptum, vel omne tale assertum necessario evenire, relinquitur oppositum antecedentis, scilicet quod actus christi non fuit una talis res absoluta informans eius animam, sicud nec volucio divine essencie est res huius- 20 modi absoluta. Similiter, posito quod omnis homo intelligat se esse F. 53 non intelligentem, quod est satis possibile, cum in- possibile potest intelligi, pono quod quilibet talis actus intelligendi sit a Et patet quod a, cum sit intelleccio, 25 non denominat subiectum suum esse non-intelligens, sed intelligens. Si enim denominaret hominem esse non- intelligentem, cum omnis forma vere denominat, sequitur quod verum esset omnem hominem esse non-intelligentem, quod repugnat casui. Relinquitur igitur quod denominat 3o hominem intelligere se esse non intelligentem: quo dato, sequitur quod quilibet talis actus vel sit verus, vel in- possibilis. Consequens falsum, quia proposicio que subordinatur tali actui est contingens: et consequencia patet, quia, si actus corespondeat tali complexo, “ego 35 sum non intelligens", tunc claudit contradiccionem illum actum esse verum, et per consequens per se est in- X. Mental acts have attributes which contradict a self- subsistence. (1) Every assertion of Christ was certainly true, but some were true not necessarily, but contingently. Now if such assertions were entities in themselves, they would be either necessarily false or necessarily true. (2) If all men thought of themselves as non-thinking beings, this act would mean cither a necessary truth or a necessary falsehood; whereas it might be true, but only contingenily. many are elicited, since this one would suffice for all. 6. MS. 10° racio in marg. 7. MS. contradicciones. 1. MS. 1 in marg. 21. MS. 2 in marg. 22. MS. intiicce. 32. ppoi. 33. To understand the drift of this argument, we must revert to Wyclif's theory, by which he affirms that the same subject, that which is at one time a man, may at another not be a man. Therefore, that which we are might, under other circumstances, not be thinking. See Logica, Vol. II, p. 16.
СAP. 1. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 27 consequens omnia locuta de actibus, quod specificantur et individuantur ab obiectis et potenciis, quod eliciuntur actus meritorii, et quod novus actus generat habitum, iuvat, vel impeditur ad resistendum passionibus (et sic 5 de ceteris), essent falsa. Item, actus anime habent denominaciones, quas claudit contradiccionem aliquam rem absolutam habere; igitur non sunt res absolute. Antecedens probatur quintupliciter. Primo sic, posito quod christus elicuit actum asserendi, to quod antechristus erit, absolute sine aliqua connotacione: patet quod si ille actus fuit res absoluta, et realiter in- formavit, quod necessarium est ipsam fuisse et inform- avisse, et tunc patet quod necessarium est sic fore, esse, vel fuisse, vel aliter christum fuisse deceptum, ut superius 15 deductum est. Cum igitur inpossibile est ipsum fuisse deceptum, vel omne tale assertum necessario evenire, relinquitur oppositum antecedentis, scilicet quod actus christi non fuit una talis res absoluta informans eius animam, sicud nec volucio divine essencie est res huius- 20 modi absoluta. Similiter, posito quod omnis homo intelligat se esse F. 53 non intelligentem, quod est satis possibile, cum in- possibile potest intelligi, pono quod quilibet talis actus intelligendi sit a Et patet quod a, cum sit intelleccio, 25 non denominat subiectum suum esse non-intelligens, sed intelligens. Si enim denominaret hominem esse non- intelligentem, cum omnis forma vere denominat, sequitur quod verum esset omnem hominem esse non-intelligentem, quod repugnat casui. Relinquitur igitur quod denominat 3o hominem intelligere se esse non intelligentem: quo dato, sequitur quod quilibet talis actus vel sit verus, vel in- possibilis. Consequens falsum, quia proposicio que subordinatur tali actui est contingens: et consequencia patet, quia, si actus corespondeat tali complexo, “ego 35 sum non intelligens", tunc claudit contradiccionem illum actum esse verum, et per consequens per se est in- X. Mental acts have attributes which contradict a self- subsistence. (1) Every assertion of Christ was certainly true, but some were true not necessarily, but contingently. Now if such assertions were entities in themselves, they would be either necessarily false or necessarily true. (2) If all men thought of themselves as non-thinking beings, this act would mean cither a necessary truth or a necessary falsehood; whereas it might be true, but only contingenily. many are elicited, since this one would suffice for all. 6. MS. 10° racio in marg. 7. MS. contradicciones. 1. MS. 1 in marg. 21. MS. 2 in marg. 22. MS. intiicce. 32. ppoi. 33. To understand the drift of this argument, we must revert to Wyclif's theory, by which he affirms that the same subject, that which is at one time a man, may at another not be a man. Therefore, that which we are might, under other circumstances, not be thinking. See Logica, Vol. II, p. 16.
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28 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I. possibilis, vel non potest esse verus. Si alteri propo- sicioni corespondeat, tunc est talis proposicio [affirmativa], cum tamen solum sit proposicio negativa, et solum actus negativus, ut suppono; et nullus actus negativus core- spondet proposicione affirmative. (3) Suppose Similiter, sit a actus intelligendi corespondens huic I say: I know oracioni mentali "ego intelligo hoc falsum", demon- this to be fulse— this meaning strando oracionem mentalem cuius a est actus. Casus the very thing that I am saying. patet tripliciter; primo, quia possum intelligere que non The supposition possunt esse: igitur. Etenim hoc non potest esse verum 10 is admissible, vel falsum; hoc potest intelligi. Secundo, ex hoc quod, for things which cannot be, may negando casum, habet negans unum sensum in anima, be known; the very denial of racione cuius ipse negat; et cum non bene negaret the supposition racione illius sensus, nisi intelligeret illum, sequitur implies that its meaning is quod sic potest intelligi. Similiter certissima racio cum known; and as a fact we can experiencia docet quod philosophus potest habere tales have each word species in anima, "ego intelligo hoc falsum", et cum of the proposition in hoc potest homo considerare penes se, utrum illa qua- our mind, discuss them, tuor [verba] sint proposicio falsa, et per consequens and conclude intelligere quod sunt proposicio falsa. Consequencia patet 20 whether they make up a false per hoc, quod multi putant tales casus esse possibiles, proposition or no. igitur possunt intelligere, sicud putant. Quo admisso, Now this act of patet quod a actus est verus, et falsus. Verus est, quia the mind, if it be an absolute est res absoluta que vere informat suum subiectum, et entity, is at once true and falsus ex hoc quod est sic verus; cum tunc est ita quod 25 false ; true because it truly ipse intelligit illud falsum. De hoc dicetur in 1° libro determines the de insolubilibus. mind as an existent, and false because of its truth, since the act is known to be false. 15 2. MS. affirmativa deest. 6. MS. hec pro huic; ib. 3 in marg. 8. MS. c9 pro cuius, and casus. 10. MS. possit? 19. MS. verba deest. 26. De insolubilibus. Shirley gives this title under the heading of lost works of which the first words are not preserved. It is. therefore, a hopeless task to identify this treatise with another that bears a different title. But as in Ch. VIII of the third tractate De Logica (Logica, Vol. II, pp. 194—227) we find this question dealt with at length and very completely, it is allowable to suppose that it is the missing work ; especially as several of those whose first words are given by Shirley are found in Logica, v. g. De propositionibus temporalibus: "Sequitur jam ultimo de..." (Logica, Vol. III, p. 133); De speciebus hypotheticis: "Sequitur de speciebus hypotheticarum" (Logica, Vol. II, p. 1); De motu locali: "Sequitur de localibus pertractandum" (Logica, Vol. III, p. 1); De comparativis: "Consequens est ad dicta super- addere" (Logica, Vol. II, p. 129); De velocitate motus localis: “Jam ultimo restat videre" (Logica, Vol. III, p. 85, words slightly changed); De copulativis: "Sequitur de copulativis pertractandum'
28 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I. possibilis, vel non potest esse verus. Si alteri propo- sicioni corespondeat, tunc est talis proposicio [affirmativa], cum tamen solum sit proposicio negativa, et solum actus negativus, ut suppono; et nullus actus negativus core- spondet proposicione affirmative. (3) Suppose Similiter, sit a actus intelligendi corespondens huic I say: I know oracioni mentali "ego intelligo hoc falsum", demon- this to be fulse— this meaning strando oracionem mentalem cuius a est actus. Casus the very thing that I am saying. patet tripliciter; primo, quia possum intelligere que non The supposition possunt esse: igitur. Etenim hoc non potest esse verum 10 is admissible, vel falsum; hoc potest intelligi. Secundo, ex hoc quod, for things which cannot be, may negando casum, habet negans unum sensum in anima, be known; the very denial of racione cuius ipse negat; et cum non bene negaret the supposition racione illius sensus, nisi intelligeret illum, sequitur implies that its meaning is quod sic potest intelligi. Similiter certissima racio cum known; and as a fact we can experiencia docet quod philosophus potest habere tales have each word species in anima, "ego intelligo hoc falsum", et cum of the proposition in hoc potest homo considerare penes se, utrum illa qua- our mind, discuss them, tuor [verba] sint proposicio falsa, et per consequens and conclude intelligere quod sunt proposicio falsa. Consequencia patet 20 whether they make up a false per hoc, quod multi putant tales casus esse possibiles, proposition or no. igitur possunt intelligere, sicud putant. Quo admisso, Now this act of patet quod a actus est verus, et falsus. Verus est, quia the mind, if it be an absolute est res absoluta que vere informat suum subiectum, et entity, is at once true and falsus ex hoc quod est sic verus; cum tunc est ita quod 25 false ; true because it truly ipse intelligit illud falsum. De hoc dicetur in 1° libro determines the de insolubilibus. mind as an existent, and false because of its truth, since the act is known to be false. 15 2. MS. affirmativa deest. 6. MS. hec pro huic; ib. 3 in marg. 8. MS. c9 pro cuius, and casus. 10. MS. possit? 19. MS. verba deest. 26. De insolubilibus. Shirley gives this title under the heading of lost works of which the first words are not preserved. It is. therefore, a hopeless task to identify this treatise with another that bears a different title. But as in Ch. VIII of the third tractate De Logica (Logica, Vol. II, pp. 194—227) we find this question dealt with at length and very completely, it is allowable to suppose that it is the missing work ; especially as several of those whose first words are given by Shirley are found in Logica, v. g. De propositionibus temporalibus: "Sequitur jam ultimo de..." (Logica, Vol. III, p. 133); De speciebus hypotheticis: "Sequitur de speciebus hypotheticarum" (Logica, Vol. II, p. 1); De motu locali: "Sequitur de localibus pertractandum" (Logica, Vol. III, p. 1); De comparativis: "Consequens est ad dicta super- addere" (Logica, Vol. II, p. 129); De velocitate motus localis: “Jam ultimo restat videre" (Logica, Vol. III, p. 85, words slightly changed); De copulativis: "Sequitur de copulativis pertractandum'
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CAP. I. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 29 F. 555 25 Similiter, iuxta illud sequitur quod inpossibile est hominem distincte cognoscere singulos eius actus, quod probatur esse falsum. Et consequencia probatur, quia si sit possibile, habeat Socrates a actum rectum, et b 5 actum reflexum, per quem intelligit a; tunc vel cognoscit Socrates b distincte vel non. Si non, habetur intentum; si sic, vel eodem b actu et per idem quolibet actu cognosceretur idem actus, quod est inpossibile; vel aliter actu distincto, et sic erit processus in infinitum, rovel ultimus actus manebit incognitus. Hic est duplex responsio. Prima dicit quod quilibet actus ostendit se sine actu alio distinctissime, et se- cunda dicit quod ultimus actus manet incognitus in We cannot quocunque habente multos actus. Contra primum sic. admit that each 15 Aliquis actus est cognoscibilis actu reflexo; igitur non act manifests itself with stat hominem distincte cognoscere aliquem actum, nisi absolute destinctness. actu super illum reflexo. Antecedens patet, et con- Were it so, sequenciam probo; quia in hoc differt noticia distincta every act would be distinct a noticia confusa, quod distincta est illa que directe reflection ; whenever I saw 20 terminatur ad obiectum distincte cognitum, sed confusa a man, I should est illa que secundarie respicit obiectum sic cognitum, distinctly — not confusedly — ut quando videro Socratem, illa noticia terminatur di- think of the recte et primo| ad Socratem; et si terminetur ad illum fact of my seeing him; actum, hoc est valde confuse. which is false. Many, both Similiter, multi habent quotlibet actus anime, et learned and dubitant utrum sint tales actus, vel non considerant ignorant, either doubt or do not quod sunt tales, sicud patet tam de laicis, quam de think of the clericis, et postmodum considerando de illis actibus mental acts which they nesciunt illos, eliciendo novos actus quos reflexos dici- elicit; another act, of which 3o mus. Igitur ad distinctam actuum noticiam requiritur those acts are the object, is habere actum vel actus reflexos terminatos principaliter requisite. ad illos. We surely can Similiter, non dubium quin stat componere quod say This is “hoc est album", non componendo vel actualiter cogi- white', without explicitly 35 tando quod sic componitur. Cum igitur non possit affirming that we see the actualiter et distincte cognosci quod actus est, nisi whiteness. componendo quod actus est, sequitur quod stat habere quamlibet accionem anime sine actu reflexo super illam; Besides, it would be impossible to reflect upon any mental act; for if the first act were known by a second, the second would require to be known by a third, and so on ; or we must posit an act that knows itself; which is impossible. Refutation of two answers. 11. MS. 22 responses in marg. marg. 26. MS. actus acci9. anime, a small gap. 14. MS. a in marg. 33. MS. c in marg. 25. MS. b in 38. MS. after (Logica, Vol. III, p. 23). Moreover, if dicetur is not a mistake, it would seem that the present tractate is anterior to the Logica.
CAP. I. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 29 F. 555 25 Similiter, iuxta illud sequitur quod inpossibile est hominem distincte cognoscere singulos eius actus, quod probatur esse falsum. Et consequencia probatur, quia si sit possibile, habeat Socrates a actum rectum, et b 5 actum reflexum, per quem intelligit a; tunc vel cognoscit Socrates b distincte vel non. Si non, habetur intentum; si sic, vel eodem b actu et per idem quolibet actu cognosceretur idem actus, quod est inpossibile; vel aliter actu distincto, et sic erit processus in infinitum, rovel ultimus actus manebit incognitus. Hic est duplex responsio. Prima dicit quod quilibet actus ostendit se sine actu alio distinctissime, et se- cunda dicit quod ultimus actus manet incognitus in We cannot quocunque habente multos actus. Contra primum sic. admit that each 15 Aliquis actus est cognoscibilis actu reflexo; igitur non act manifests itself with stat hominem distincte cognoscere aliquem actum, nisi absolute destinctness. actu super illum reflexo. Antecedens patet, et con- Were it so, sequenciam probo; quia in hoc differt noticia distincta every act would be distinct a noticia confusa, quod distincta est illa que directe reflection ; whenever I saw 20 terminatur ad obiectum distincte cognitum, sed confusa a man, I should est illa que secundarie respicit obiectum sic cognitum, distinctly — not confusedly — ut quando videro Socratem, illa noticia terminatur di- think of the recte et primo| ad Socratem; et si terminetur ad illum fact of my seeing him; actum, hoc est valde confuse. which is false. Many, both Similiter, multi habent quotlibet actus anime, et learned and dubitant utrum sint tales actus, vel non considerant ignorant, either doubt or do not quod sunt tales, sicud patet tam de laicis, quam de think of the clericis, et postmodum considerando de illis actibus mental acts which they nesciunt illos, eliciendo novos actus quos reflexos dici- elicit; another act, of which 3o mus. Igitur ad distinctam actuum noticiam requiritur those acts are the object, is habere actum vel actus reflexos terminatos principaliter requisite. ad illos. We surely can Similiter, non dubium quin stat componere quod say This is “hoc est album", non componendo vel actualiter cogi- white', without explicitly 35 tando quod sic componitur. Cum igitur non possit affirming that we see the actualiter et distincte cognosci quod actus est, nisi whiteness. componendo quod actus est, sequitur quod stat habere quamlibet accionem anime sine actu reflexo super illam; Besides, it would be impossible to reflect upon any mental act; for if the first act were known by a second, the second would require to be known by a third, and so on ; or we must posit an act that knows itself; which is impossible. Refutation of two answers. 11. MS. 22 responses in marg. marg. 26. MS. actus acci9. anime, a small gap. 14. MS. a in marg. 33. MS. c in marg. 25. MS. b in 38. MS. after (Logica, Vol. III, p. 23). Moreover, if dicetur is not a mistake, it would seem that the present tractate is anterior to the Logica.
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30 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I. et per consequens sine distincta noticia talis actus. As a fact, Illud confirmatur per experienciam qua cognoscimus reflection upon quod homines, dum advertunt ad actus suos, sive ex- any present act disturbs us trinsecos, sive intrinsecos perturbant seipsos in quidlibet in its performance. directe faciendo. Et quod actus reflexus distinguitur ab? The act of reflection differs actu recto patet, quia illi actus terminantur ad diversa from the direct obiecta. Unus est universalis, alius singulare, unus affir- act, in that its object is not mativus, alius negativus, unus malus, alius bonus, unus necessarily the prior, alius posterior, et sic de quotlibet differenciis; same, as to universality, sicud patet cogitando primo et volendo quod nemo sit, 10 positiveness, and moral et postmodum cogitando quod talis actus est malus. goodness. Aliter enim non distingueretur actus reflexus ab actu recto, nec diversificarentur ad diversitatem obiectorum. Similiter, cum omnis noticia actualis sit sciencia actualis, patet ex dictis quod stat habere actum rectum 15 sine eius noticia actualis, quia scire, eius sciencia actuali; ut solum componendo quod “hoc erit", non habeo actualem consideracionem de alico actu anime, cum nullum terminum intelligo qui signat mihi actum anime, quia “hoc" in illo casu dato oportet ponere 20 quemlibet terminum equivoce signare actum anime, et quicquid fuerit intellectum intelligere actum anime; quod est falsum, eo quod actus intelligendi sunt per se noti, et nemo noscit vel experitur quod sic intelligit, cum multi opinantur quod non sunt tales actus. Ideo dicit secunda responsio, quod ultimus actus Nor can we admit manet incognitus in quocunque. Contra, inter omnia a series of reflective acts que sunt in anima vel ab homine noscibilia, actus sunt of which the maxime noscibiles, ut patet tam experiencia quam aucto- last cannot be distinctly ritate; set stat hominem distincte cognoscere omnes eius 30 known as such. Why should it habitus, potencias, et cetera, tam sensibilia quam in- not be known, since a man's sensibilia; igitur magis vel a pari stat hominem distincte own acts are what he knows cognoscere omnes eius actus. best ? Similiter si actus non posset distincte cognosci, nisi None of our acts could be per actum reflexum super eum, sequitur quod sit pro-35 distinctly known, without cessus in infinitum in actibus; cuius tamen oppositum an absurd dicit philosophus 2° de anima, ponens quod eadem est infinite series of reflective virtus qua sencio, et qua sencio me sentire, ne sit pro- acts ; for the cessus in infinitum. Et consequencia patet ex hoc, quod last act is distinctly dato ultimo actu, cum ille sit distincte cognoscibilis, 40 knowable, and yet cannot be et non nisi per actum reflexum, ut dicitur, sequitur known without quod alterius sit procedere. supposing another. When I say : This will be I certainly mean actual knowledge of this ; but this cannot be taken as directly signiſying my mental act, since many doubt whether such acts exist at all. 25 14. MS. d in marg. 26. MS. a in marg. 35. MS. b in marg.
30 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I. et per consequens sine distincta noticia talis actus. As a fact, Illud confirmatur per experienciam qua cognoscimus reflection upon quod homines, dum advertunt ad actus suos, sive ex- any present act disturbs us trinsecos, sive intrinsecos perturbant seipsos in quidlibet in its performance. directe faciendo. Et quod actus reflexus distinguitur ab? The act of reflection differs actu recto patet, quia illi actus terminantur ad diversa from the direct obiecta. Unus est universalis, alius singulare, unus affir- act, in that its object is not mativus, alius negativus, unus malus, alius bonus, unus necessarily the prior, alius posterior, et sic de quotlibet differenciis; same, as to universality, sicud patet cogitando primo et volendo quod nemo sit, 10 positiveness, and moral et postmodum cogitando quod talis actus est malus. goodness. Aliter enim non distingueretur actus reflexus ab actu recto, nec diversificarentur ad diversitatem obiectorum. Similiter, cum omnis noticia actualis sit sciencia actualis, patet ex dictis quod stat habere actum rectum 15 sine eius noticia actualis, quia scire, eius sciencia actuali; ut solum componendo quod “hoc erit", non habeo actualem consideracionem de alico actu anime, cum nullum terminum intelligo qui signat mihi actum anime, quia “hoc" in illo casu dato oportet ponere 20 quemlibet terminum equivoce signare actum anime, et quicquid fuerit intellectum intelligere actum anime; quod est falsum, eo quod actus intelligendi sunt per se noti, et nemo noscit vel experitur quod sic intelligit, cum multi opinantur quod non sunt tales actus. Ideo dicit secunda responsio, quod ultimus actus Nor can we admit manet incognitus in quocunque. Contra, inter omnia a series of reflective acts que sunt in anima vel ab homine noscibilia, actus sunt of which the maxime noscibiles, ut patet tam experiencia quam aucto- last cannot be distinctly ritate; set stat hominem distincte cognoscere omnes eius 30 known as such. Why should it habitus, potencias, et cetera, tam sensibilia quam in- not be known, since a man's sensibilia; igitur magis vel a pari stat hominem distincte own acts are what he knows cognoscere omnes eius actus. best ? Similiter si actus non posset distincte cognosci, nisi None of our acts could be per actum reflexum super eum, sequitur quod sit pro-35 distinctly known, without cessus in infinitum in actibus; cuius tamen oppositum an absurd dicit philosophus 2° de anima, ponens quod eadem est infinite series of reflective virtus qua sencio, et qua sencio me sentire, ne sit pro- acts ; for the cessus in infinitum. Et consequencia patet ex hoc, quod last act is distinctly dato ultimo actu, cum ille sit distincte cognoscibilis, 40 knowable, and yet cannot be et non nisi per actum reflexum, ut dicitur, sequitur known without quod alterius sit procedere. supposing another. When I say : This will be I certainly mean actual knowledge of this ; but this cannot be taken as directly signiſying my mental act, since many doubt whether such acts exist at all. 25 14. MS. d in marg. 26. MS. a in marg. 35. MS. b in marg.
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CAP. I. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 31 Similiter, habeat Socrates a actum rectum, et b talem A man may have at the same time two F. 56a reflexum, I quilibet actus anime mee est sine alico alio distinct acts, actu, quia cognosco illam copulativam, “deus est, et one by which he knows, v. g. quilibet illorum actuum est"; et patet quod b actu God's existence, 5 cognoscit aliquid distincte, et non nisi actum, cum sit and another implying the actus reflexus super actum: igitur b actu cognoscit knowledge of his own mental actum; et cum b sit indifferens ad noticiam a vel b, acts : these are sequitur quod utrumque illorum distincte cognoscit per independent and distinct; b actum. Si autem dicatur quod utrumque illorum the second 10 confuse et non distincte cognoscitur per b, querendum knows the first, and contains quid distincte cognoscitur per b, et mutandus est casus the knowledge of itself; sic, quod Socrates non habeat aliquem actum complexum and its nisi talem. Iste actus est satis possibilis, nisi ex hoc possibility quod sequatur inconsequens, sicud in materia insolubi- cannot be denied, save in 15 lium; et aliter non esset causa negandi casum, eo quod the case of so- experiencia demonstrat illum esse possibilem. Patet eciam called insoluble propositions ; quod actus amandi, noscendi, odiendi, et cetera potest for there is nothing to ferri in duo obiecta distincte; igitur non obest distincte prevent two objects being cognoscere duos actus eodem actu. known by one 20 Similiter, quibuscunque rebus homo potest racionaliter act. These acts may velle carere; maior patet ex hoc, quod aliter esset po- be such that we should tencia naturalis hominis diminuta, cum non posset in reasonably wish quodcunque sibi utile ad quod haberet inclinacionem not to have them ; for they naturalem; et per consequens potencia vel nisus ad hoc may be very painful; yet this 25 esset frustra. Et minor sic probatur. Si actus anime sint wish would not res absolute distincte, patet quod continerent accidens be reasonable, for it could not aliquos actus valde cruciantes. Sicud enim quilibet possibly be experitur, terrena cogitacio deprimit sensum multa fulfilled. Our thoughts cogitantem, et frequenter quomodocunque curis are often very painful to us. 3o curiosi invite fiunt insompnes ex conviacionibus quas libenter vellent relinquere. Si igitur essent res absolute and if they are things distincte ab anima, possent racionaliter niti ad earum distinct from the mind, we destruccionem. Ponitur igitur quod Socrates habeat a might desire their actum sibi nocivum, et nitatur voluntarie ipsum de- destruction. 35 struere: consequencia de quanto plus nititur voluntarie 1. MS. c in marg. 3. MS. 9gdo. 13. MS. possibile cu ex hoc pro nisi. 20. MS. 5 in marg.; ib. MS. quo cunque. 26. MS. 9tirs. 29. MS. qcuqs. 30. MS. 9uiaba. 21. It is evident that the minor and the conclusion are wanting here. We may suppose them to run thus: Sed, si actus sint res, non possumus racionabiliter velle eis carere. Igitur non sunt res.
CAP. I. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 31 Similiter, habeat Socrates a actum rectum, et b talem A man may have at the same time two F. 56a reflexum, I quilibet actus anime mee est sine alico alio distinct acts, actu, quia cognosco illam copulativam, “deus est, et one by which he knows, v. g. quilibet illorum actuum est"; et patet quod b actu God's existence, 5 cognoscit aliquid distincte, et non nisi actum, cum sit and another implying the actus reflexus super actum: igitur b actu cognoscit knowledge of his own mental actum; et cum b sit indifferens ad noticiam a vel b, acts : these are sequitur quod utrumque illorum distincte cognoscit per independent and distinct; b actum. Si autem dicatur quod utrumque illorum the second 10 confuse et non distincte cognoscitur per b, querendum knows the first, and contains quid distincte cognoscitur per b, et mutandus est casus the knowledge of itself; sic, quod Socrates non habeat aliquem actum complexum and its nisi talem. Iste actus est satis possibilis, nisi ex hoc possibility quod sequatur inconsequens, sicud in materia insolubi- cannot be denied, save in 15 lium; et aliter non esset causa negandi casum, eo quod the case of so- experiencia demonstrat illum esse possibilem. Patet eciam called insoluble propositions ; quod actus amandi, noscendi, odiendi, et cetera potest for there is nothing to ferri in duo obiecta distincte; igitur non obest distincte prevent two objects being cognoscere duos actus eodem actu. known by one 20 Similiter, quibuscunque rebus homo potest racionaliter act. These acts may velle carere; maior patet ex hoc, quod aliter esset po- be such that we should tencia naturalis hominis diminuta, cum non posset in reasonably wish quodcunque sibi utile ad quod haberet inclinacionem not to have them ; for they naturalem; et per consequens potencia vel nisus ad hoc may be very painful; yet this 25 esset frustra. Et minor sic probatur. Si actus anime sint wish would not res absolute distincte, patet quod continerent accidens be reasonable, for it could not aliquos actus valde cruciantes. Sicud enim quilibet possibly be experitur, terrena cogitacio deprimit sensum multa fulfilled. Our thoughts cogitantem, et frequenter quomodocunque curis are often very painful to us. 3o curiosi invite fiunt insompnes ex conviacionibus quas libenter vellent relinquere. Si igitur essent res absolute and if they are things distincte ab anima, possent racionaliter niti ad earum distinct from the mind, we destruccionem. Ponitur igitur quod Socrates habeat a might desire their actum sibi nocivum, et nitatur voluntarie ipsum de- destruction. 35 struere: consequencia de quanto plus nititur voluntarie 1. MS. c in marg. 3. MS. 9gdo. 13. MS. possibile cu ex hoc pro nisi. 20. MS. 5 in marg.; ib. MS. quo cunque. 26. MS. 9tirs. 29. MS. qcuqs. 30. MS. 9uiaba. 21. It is evident that the minor and the conclusion are wanting here. We may suppose them to run thus: Sed, si actus sint res, non possumus racionabiliter velle eis carere. Igitur non sunt res.
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32 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I. ipsum a destruere, de tanto plus sic cogitat, habet a intensius. Igitur impossibile est voluntarie deserere a; At the same time they cannot et ex isto videtur quod anima sit necessitata per actus be destroyed ; our will is suos qui sunt incoruptibiles, cum per ipsam non possunt powerless corrumpi, sed pocius naturaliter conservantur, tanquam 5 against them ; our soul tends per subiectum suum naturale; nec ab actibus contrariis, naturally towards their quia de quanto contrariantur sunt simul se compacientes; preservation, contrary acts nec a conservante ablato, sicud est de lumine, quia are things and solum dependet ab anima et suis causis. Nec sunt de thereſore, may coëxist with se coruptibiles, ut motus et tempus, quia sunt res ab-10 them; nor are they destructible solute potentes per se existere et intendentes continue in themselves. ad suum esse; non igitur possunt corumpi. If it be said that Nec valet dicere quod propter diversitatem temporis a past act, existing no sit novus actus, et sic stat me velle actum meum esse longer, may be qui fuit nunc ad duos annos, sine hoc quod ille possit 15 desired, but cannot be, this esse; quia tunc continue foret novus actus secundum reply makes its entity depend se totum, propter novitatem temporis a quo dependeret. upon time; Nec esset possibile eundem actum esse primo elicitum each instant we should have an in a instanti, qui fuit primo elicitus in b instanti; et entirely new sic caperent actus individuacionem suam a tempore sicud 20 act ; thus contradicting motus, et non essent res absolute. the hypothesis of its Confirmatur ex hoc, quod si essent res absolute, non independent corrumperentur per solam omissionem apprehensionis, existence. But that ut est de actibus quos homo vult destruere; nec esset hypothesis would imply inpossibile deum tollere illa, invito homine ] qui habuit that our illos actus. Ymo deus posset [imponere] homini vel consciousness, of them has facere ipsum credere quod non haberet talem actum; nothing to do with their immo sic esset in casu aliquod verum, quod nemo posset existence; credere, ut neminem habere aliquem actum et aliquod verum, quod nemo posset actualiter scire: ut me solum 30 habere a actum incomplexum, vel nihil actualiter con- cipere: et per consequens articuli fidei non essent diffi- cillimi ad credendum, nec anima esset in potencia ad omnia cognoscibilia cognoscendum. Immo talis actus anime: “b actus desinit esse", signaret naturaliter b 35 F. 56b whatever was thought would exist as it was thought, and God could not interfere with it, 15. MS. ille pro esse. 26. MS. impo- 32. MS. po pro per consequens. 7. Compacientes. Wyclif always returns to this point; ab- solute entities do not require a subject, but are subjects. Black and white cannot coëxist in the same subject; but a black dog and a white dog may coëxist. In like manner, according to the theory, contrary acts, being things, do not destroy each other. 5. MS. corq pro corrumpi. nere deest; a word erased.
32 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I. ipsum a destruere, de tanto plus sic cogitat, habet a intensius. Igitur impossibile est voluntarie deserere a; At the same time they cannot et ex isto videtur quod anima sit necessitata per actus be destroyed ; our will is suos qui sunt incoruptibiles, cum per ipsam non possunt powerless corrumpi, sed pocius naturaliter conservantur, tanquam 5 against them ; our soul tends per subiectum suum naturale; nec ab actibus contrariis, naturally towards their quia de quanto contrariantur sunt simul se compacientes; preservation, contrary acts nec a conservante ablato, sicud est de lumine, quia are things and solum dependet ab anima et suis causis. Nec sunt de thereſore, may coëxist with se coruptibiles, ut motus et tempus, quia sunt res ab-10 them; nor are they destructible solute potentes per se existere et intendentes continue in themselves. ad suum esse; non igitur possunt corumpi. If it be said that Nec valet dicere quod propter diversitatem temporis a past act, existing no sit novus actus, et sic stat me velle actum meum esse longer, may be qui fuit nunc ad duos annos, sine hoc quod ille possit 15 desired, but cannot be, this esse; quia tunc continue foret novus actus secundum reply makes its entity depend se totum, propter novitatem temporis a quo dependeret. upon time; Nec esset possibile eundem actum esse primo elicitum each instant we should have an in a instanti, qui fuit primo elicitus in b instanti; et entirely new sic caperent actus individuacionem suam a tempore sicud 20 act ; thus contradicting motus, et non essent res absolute. the hypothesis of its Confirmatur ex hoc, quod si essent res absolute, non independent corrumperentur per solam omissionem apprehensionis, existence. But that ut est de actibus quos homo vult destruere; nec esset hypothesis would imply inpossibile deum tollere illa, invito homine ] qui habuit that our illos actus. Ymo deus posset [imponere] homini vel consciousness, of them has facere ipsum credere quod non haberet talem actum; nothing to do with their immo sic esset in casu aliquod verum, quod nemo posset existence; credere, ut neminem habere aliquem actum et aliquod verum, quod nemo posset actualiter scire: ut me solum 30 habere a actum incomplexum, vel nihil actualiter con- cipere: et per consequens articuli fidei non essent diffi- cillimi ad credendum, nec anima esset in potencia ad omnia cognoscibilia cognoscendum. Immo talis actus anime: “b actus desinit esse", signaret naturaliter b 35 F. 56b whatever was thought would exist as it was thought, and God could not interfere with it, 15. MS. ille pro esse. 26. MS. impo- 32. MS. po pro per consequens. 7. Compacientes. Wyclif always returns to this point; ab- solute entities do not require a subject, but are subjects. Black and white cannot coëxist in the same subject; but a black dog and a white dog may coëxist. In like manner, according to the theory, contrary acts, being things, do not destroy each other. 5. MS. corq pro corrumpi. nere deest; a word erased.
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CAP. I. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 33 actum desinere esse, et per consequens deus non posset ipsam servare per tempus, nisi falsificaret seipsum, nec talem actum corumpere. Iste actus est eternus, eo quod nulla res signat naturaliter primarie falsum. Immo, man would be almighty for 5 quoad actus malos homo videtur omnipotens in malis, evil, the evil deed existing cum eque bene sequitur 'deus vult se sic habere, igitur by man's will as sic se habet", tam bene sequitur, "ego volo peccare, necessarily as God by His igitur pecco"; immo, si volo cogitare, velle, intelligere, own; etc. quicquam, signandi tunc sic facio. Immo videtur, and the will to revive a past to quod si volo habere quantumlibet preteritum actum act would suffice to revive it, meum, habeo illum, eo quod actus non individuantur since it does not a tempore, cum tunc consisterent in successione, quia depend on time. lapso tempore individuante non essent. Item de actibus volendi, nolendi, et ceteris actibus XI. Pain, if an absolute entity, 15 virtutis non organice, probatur quod non sunt res ab- might be inflicted solute potentes per se existere. Et primo de pena displi- successively on many, the same cencie qualibet puniuntur dampnati. Ponitur igitur quod individual act a sit unus talis actus qui in principio mundi fuit creatus, applied to each, 80 that a soul et peto quod in prima parte proporcionali unius hore in purgatory would suffer the 20 puniet Socratem ad condignum propter peccatum veniale, same eternal in secunda Platonem, in tercia tercium, et sic in in- pain as one in finitum, ita quod aliquem puniet in vindictam, et aliam tanquam penitencia salutaris. Et ponendo quod per se- cundam horam puniat ad condignum peccatum in pur- 25 gatorio, et in principio tercie hore puniat animam in inferno, manente eternaliter pena intensa ut octo. Et patet quod Socrates punitur pena eterna, quia a pena, que est pena eterna. Semper enim erit pena eadem in numero, sicud idem homo, successive habens filios per 30 generacionem et corupcionem eorum, manebit continue idem pater. Ex quo videtur quod deus non iuste distribuit illis penas, cum eadem pena precise puniet quemlibet illorum, et ipsi dispariter demerentur. Non igitur equa- bitur illa pena cuilibet demerito alicuius illorum, cum 35 ipsa erunt quantumlibet materialia, et pena eadem nec maiorata nec minorata; erit enim semper eque magna But what is eternal cannot be temporal; and if not temporal, it is against God's justice to inflict eternal punishment undeservedly. hell. 9. MS. oigdl cc. 10. MS. habere actum. 14. MS. 11a racio in marg. 19. MS. 19 hoie pro unius hore. 22. MS. am pro alium. 26. MS. manes. 28. MS. eius pro eadem. 16. Primo. Wyclif does not give a 'secundo'; which renders it likely that one paragraph, if not more, is wanting in this MS.
CAP. I. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 33 actum desinere esse, et per consequens deus non posset ipsam servare per tempus, nisi falsificaret seipsum, nec talem actum corumpere. Iste actus est eternus, eo quod nulla res signat naturaliter primarie falsum. Immo, man would be almighty for 5 quoad actus malos homo videtur omnipotens in malis, evil, the evil deed existing cum eque bene sequitur 'deus vult se sic habere, igitur by man's will as sic se habet", tam bene sequitur, "ego volo peccare, necessarily as God by His igitur pecco"; immo, si volo cogitare, velle, intelligere, own; etc. quicquam, signandi tunc sic facio. Immo videtur, and the will to revive a past to quod si volo habere quantumlibet preteritum actum act would suffice to revive it, meum, habeo illum, eo quod actus non individuantur since it does not a tempore, cum tunc consisterent in successione, quia depend on time. lapso tempore individuante non essent. Item de actibus volendi, nolendi, et ceteris actibus XI. Pain, if an absolute entity, 15 virtutis non organice, probatur quod non sunt res ab- might be inflicted solute potentes per se existere. Et primo de pena displi- successively on many, the same cencie qualibet puniuntur dampnati. Ponitur igitur quod individual act a sit unus talis actus qui in principio mundi fuit creatus, applied to each, 80 that a soul et peto quod in prima parte proporcionali unius hore in purgatory would suffer the 20 puniet Socratem ad condignum propter peccatum veniale, same eternal in secunda Platonem, in tercia tercium, et sic in in- pain as one in finitum, ita quod aliquem puniet in vindictam, et aliam tanquam penitencia salutaris. Et ponendo quod per se- cundam horam puniat ad condignum peccatum in pur- 25 gatorio, et in principio tercie hore puniat animam in inferno, manente eternaliter pena intensa ut octo. Et patet quod Socrates punitur pena eterna, quia a pena, que est pena eterna. Semper enim erit pena eadem in numero, sicud idem homo, successive habens filios per 30 generacionem et corupcionem eorum, manebit continue idem pater. Ex quo videtur quod deus non iuste distribuit illis penas, cum eadem pena precise puniet quemlibet illorum, et ipsi dispariter demerentur. Non igitur equa- bitur illa pena cuilibet demerito alicuius illorum, cum 35 ipsa erunt quantumlibet materialia, et pena eadem nec maiorata nec minorata; erit enim semper eque magna But what is eternal cannot be temporal; and if not temporal, it is against God's justice to inflict eternal punishment undeservedly. hell. 9. MS. oigdl cc. 10. MS. habere actum. 14. MS. 11a racio in marg. 19. MS. 19 hoie pro unius hore. 22. MS. am pro alium. 26. MS. manes. 28. MS. eius pro eadem. 16. Primo. Wyclif does not give a 'secundo'; which renders it likely that one paragraph, if not more, is wanting in this MS.
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34 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. II. Refutation of the answer, viz. that the same punishment is not equally great in the subjects to which it is applied. Punishment, being an entity, must act in so far as it has entity, and it has entity only in so far as it punishes. It being the same entity in every case, its intensity and duration are the same. quoad duracionem, quia continue eadem eterna, et continue eque magna quoad intencionem, quia continue intensa ut octo. Sed hic dicitur quod a non est tanta pena Socrati quanta est dampnato. Contra, a est tanta pena Socrati quanta pena est alicui, cum solum sibi sit pena vel saltem alicui sui. Sed quantacunque pena a est, vel potest esse, tanta pena est alicui, cum pena dicitur comparative pena, de quanto punit: igitur a est tanta pena Socrati quanta pena potest esse. Minor patet ex 10 hoc quod a non potest esse longior vel intensior pena quam est, et ex consequenti sequitur, cum quante est pena alicui, tante punit ipsum, quod tante punitur ya Socrates, quante punietur 1 aliquis relicorum: quod F. 57 derogat dei iusticie. 15 CAPITULUM SECUNDUM. In oppositum; omne accidens denominans subiectum Arguments to prove that formaliter esse quale, est qualitas: sed actus anime sic mental acts are qualities. denominant: igitur sunt qualitates. Maior patet de veri- I. Men are called good or bad on tate sermonis, et minor probatur sic. Per actus meri-20 account of their torios et demeritorios homines denominantur boni vel mental acts, which make mali, et (ut videtur) non oportet ponere ex illis actibus them such generari aliquas alias qualitates que formaliter denomi- formally : and quality is nant; igitur etc. Non enim quilibet actus bonus de genere suchness. inducit habitum moralem, nec antecedit ad habitum 25 supernaturalem. Item, anima movetur in gaudendo vel tristando, cum II. From joy to sorrow there is ex hoc est ipsa substancia variabilis differenter a deo; cum a mental change, and this change igitur non sit motus perceptibilis quo moveretur nisi must come under the class alteracio, sequitur quod alteratur, et cum omnis alteracio 30 of alteration. Now alteration is a change of 4. MS. Responsio in marg. 3. MS. ut gto (gradato?) pro ut octo. 16. MS. Capitulum secundum deest; large initial I in red ink. 17. MŠ. 13 19, 20. MS. v' o' pro veritate sermonis. 27. MS. racio in marg. 2a racio in marg. 29. MS. mos pcio. 29. Motus. Movement is equivalent to real change in Scho- lastic terminology. Such changes are divided into local motion, alteration, increase, diminution, production, and destruction. And it is clear that the change from joy to sorrow is alteration.
34 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. II. Refutation of the answer, viz. that the same punishment is not equally great in the subjects to which it is applied. Punishment, being an entity, must act in so far as it has entity, and it has entity only in so far as it punishes. It being the same entity in every case, its intensity and duration are the same. quoad duracionem, quia continue eadem eterna, et continue eque magna quoad intencionem, quia continue intensa ut octo. Sed hic dicitur quod a non est tanta pena Socrati quanta est dampnato. Contra, a est tanta pena Socrati quanta pena est alicui, cum solum sibi sit pena vel saltem alicui sui. Sed quantacunque pena a est, vel potest esse, tanta pena est alicui, cum pena dicitur comparative pena, de quanto punit: igitur a est tanta pena Socrati quanta pena potest esse. Minor patet ex 10 hoc quod a non potest esse longior vel intensior pena quam est, et ex consequenti sequitur, cum quante est pena alicui, tante punit ipsum, quod tante punitur ya Socrates, quante punietur 1 aliquis relicorum: quod F. 57 derogat dei iusticie. 15 CAPITULUM SECUNDUM. In oppositum; omne accidens denominans subiectum Arguments to prove that formaliter esse quale, est qualitas: sed actus anime sic mental acts are qualities. denominant: igitur sunt qualitates. Maior patet de veri- I. Men are called good or bad on tate sermonis, et minor probatur sic. Per actus meri-20 account of their torios et demeritorios homines denominantur boni vel mental acts, which make mali, et (ut videtur) non oportet ponere ex illis actibus them such generari aliquas alias qualitates que formaliter denomi- formally : and quality is nant; igitur etc. Non enim quilibet actus bonus de genere suchness. inducit habitum moralem, nec antecedit ad habitum 25 supernaturalem. Item, anima movetur in gaudendo vel tristando, cum II. From joy to sorrow there is ex hoc est ipsa substancia variabilis differenter a deo; cum a mental change, and this change igitur non sit motus perceptibilis quo moveretur nisi must come under the class alteracio, sequitur quod alteratur, et cum omnis alteracio 30 of alteration. Now alteration is a change of 4. MS. Responsio in marg. 3. MS. ut gto (gradato?) pro ut octo. 16. MS. Capitulum secundum deest; large initial I in red ink. 17. MŠ. 13 19, 20. MS. v' o' pro veritate sermonis. 27. MS. racio in marg. 2a racio in marg. 29. MS. mos pcio. 29. Motus. Movement is equivalent to real change in Scho- lastic terminology. Such changes are divided into local motion, alteration, increase, diminution, production, and destruction. And it is clear that the change from joy to sorrow is alteration.
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CAP. II. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 35 sit circa qualitatem, sequitur quod gaudium vel tristicia sit qualitas, et cum sit actus anime, sequitur actus anime esse qualitates, et cum omnes sint eiusdem generis, sequitur quod omnis actus anime sit qualitas. Item, beatitudo vel felicitas est actus anime, quia felicitacio; et illa est qualitas, et non respectus. Igitur, per idem, omnis actus anime est qualitas. Minor patet tripliciter: primo, quia convenienter respondetur ad questionem querentem qualis est Petrus, quod est beatus: 10 igitur beatitudo est qualitas. Similiter, tunc non esset possibile deum creare beati- These acts change tudinem, vel beatificare hominem, cum quilibet homo successively; beatificat se producendo secundum eius beneplacitum and change implies actus beatificos. Similiter contingit actum esse successi- something lost, something 15 vum, subducto omni alio motu: igitur contingit esse acquired, and something that successivam adquisicionem parcium actus, quod non remains: that which remains esset nisi essent qualitates que essent materia talis must be a motus; igitur etc. Nam impossibile esset aliquid suc- quality. cessive alterari, moveri localiter, vel augmentari, sine 20 materia distincta a transmutacione successive adquisita: cum igitur accio non potest esse per se terminus accionis, requiritur actum esse qualitatem. Item, secundum autorem sex principiorum, omnis accio est in motu, et econtra; sed non sic de actibus 25 anime, cum sint permanentes, et immanentes; igitur non sunt acciones. Minor satis patet, cum posita a visione, subducto omni motu locali alteracionis vel augmentacionis alio a visione, patet quod in a visione permanente non est dare prius vel posterius quoad 3o successionem pocius quam in ligno vel lapide. Et hic videtur quod respectu cuiuscunque actus anime imma- nentis oportet dare accionem transeuntem qua pro- ducatur: nam a generabatur et fiebat de non esse ad esse, et non continue succesive, cum sit indivisibile per- 35 manens. Igitur est dare eius generacionem vel faccionem subitam precedentem actum illum; et cum quilibet posset esse permanens, sequitur quod respectu cuius- cunque est dare accionem precedentem. Et patet clare quod talis permanens non fundatur formaliter in motu. IV. Our menta acts are either merely actions or qualities; they are not mere actions, for all action consists in movement, and mental acts, permanent and immanent, do not imply movement. Each of such acts, however, is produced by some transient action which precedes it. quality; and since one sort of mental acts may be, they all must be classed thus. III. Happiness is a mental state and a quality; for 'happy answers the question, qualis? 5. MS. 3a racio in marg. 23. MS. 4a racio in marg. 23. Autorem. See pag. 2, note. 3 *
CAP. II. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 35 sit circa qualitatem, sequitur quod gaudium vel tristicia sit qualitas, et cum sit actus anime, sequitur actus anime esse qualitates, et cum omnes sint eiusdem generis, sequitur quod omnis actus anime sit qualitas. Item, beatitudo vel felicitas est actus anime, quia felicitacio; et illa est qualitas, et non respectus. Igitur, per idem, omnis actus anime est qualitas. Minor patet tripliciter: primo, quia convenienter respondetur ad questionem querentem qualis est Petrus, quod est beatus: 10 igitur beatitudo est qualitas. Similiter, tunc non esset possibile deum creare beati- These acts change tudinem, vel beatificare hominem, cum quilibet homo successively; beatificat se producendo secundum eius beneplacitum and change implies actus beatificos. Similiter contingit actum esse successi- something lost, something 15 vum, subducto omni alio motu: igitur contingit esse acquired, and something that successivam adquisicionem parcium actus, quod non remains: that which remains esset nisi essent qualitates que essent materia talis must be a motus; igitur etc. Nam impossibile esset aliquid suc- quality. cessive alterari, moveri localiter, vel augmentari, sine 20 materia distincta a transmutacione successive adquisita: cum igitur accio non potest esse per se terminus accionis, requiritur actum esse qualitatem. Item, secundum autorem sex principiorum, omnis accio est in motu, et econtra; sed non sic de actibus 25 anime, cum sint permanentes, et immanentes; igitur non sunt acciones. Minor satis patet, cum posita a visione, subducto omni motu locali alteracionis vel augmentacionis alio a visione, patet quod in a visione permanente non est dare prius vel posterius quoad 3o successionem pocius quam in ligno vel lapide. Et hic videtur quod respectu cuiuscunque actus anime imma- nentis oportet dare accionem transeuntem qua pro- ducatur: nam a generabatur et fiebat de non esse ad esse, et non continue succesive, cum sit indivisibile per- 35 manens. Igitur est dare eius generacionem vel faccionem subitam precedentem actum illum; et cum quilibet posset esse permanens, sequitur quod respectu cuius- cunque est dare accionem precedentem. Et patet clare quod talis permanens non fundatur formaliter in motu. IV. Our menta acts are either merely actions or qualities; they are not mere actions, for all action consists in movement, and mental acts, permanent and immanent, do not imply movement. Each of such acts, however, is produced by some transient action which precedes it. quality; and since one sort of mental acts may be, they all must be classed thus. III. Happiness is a mental state and a quality; for 'happy answers the question, qualis? 5. MS. 3a racio in marg. 23. MS. 4a racio in marg. 23. Autorem. See pag. 2, note. 3 *
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36 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. II. V. If a mental Item, si actus tales sunt de genere accionis, et non act were but the subject qua dicunt formaliter nisi subiectum intelligere, sequitur knowing, it quod idem actus possunt quotienslibet redire; consequens would follow impossibile, quia tunc posset quotiens voluerit recreare that the same act might, after coruptum. Et consequencia sic probatur. [Ponatur]5 ceasing, be again quod ego intelligam Socratem a actu intelligendi, et reproduced; which is ponatur quod post desinam intelligere Socratem et impossible. reintelligam eum b actu simillimo preter hoc quod F. 57' For if at two different times elicitur in alio tempore: et patet quod b non ponit nisi I have two me intelligere Socratem, et consequencia ad illud; nec 10 distinct, but exactly similar a ponit nisi me intelligere Socratem, et consequencia mental acts concerning the ad illud; igitur qualitercunque b ponit, a posuit, et same object, their contents econtra. Ex quo sine dubio sequitur quod a sit b, et a being identical, actus est coruptus: igitur intentum. Nec valet dicere they are the same; i. e. the quod actus individuantur a temporibus, quia sunt per- 15 first, having ceased, exists manentes, potentes indifferenter esse in quolibet tempore, no more. et indifferenter in quolibet generari. Item, omnis accio requirit subiectum in quod agatur, VI. Action requires a subject that is sed non sic omnis actus anime. Igitur non omnis talis acted upon. est accio. Maior patet per Aristotelem ponentem de- 20 definition. Now some scriptive accionem esse formam secundum quam in id mental acts do quod subiectatur agere dicimur: et post, in solvendo not require this. We can think dubium de re producta per accionem, dicit quod accio of what cannot possibly exist; non requirit quid agatur, sed in quod agatur. Minor such objects of patet de actu intelligendi, volendi, et ymaginandi, quibus 25 thought are not acted upon. intelligitur, et est volitum et ymaginatum, quod non potest esse; ubi patens est quod actus non terminantur ad obiecta intellecta, volita, vel ymaginata, tanquam terminancia illos actus, cum illa non possunt esse, et It were absurd per consequens non terminare. Nec deus suplet vicem 30 to say that God takes their place illorum, cum non possunt esse (ymmo per idem supleret as the thing thought of. vicem chimere in omni accione, quod fatuum est dicere). Nor do our Nec terminantur ad species quibus apprehenduntur, tum mental representations quia species sunt media apprehendendi, et non termini, form the object tum quia sic species paterentur mediantibus illis actibus, 35 of these actions, they are that by et essent principaliter intellecte, volite, vel ymaginate; which, not that which we quod est falsum, quia multi habent tales actus qui non cognize. putant quod sunt species in anima. VII. If we go Confirmatur per hoc, quod discurrendo per raciones through the arguments in prius factas, invenietur pro maiori parte quod eque 40 the preceding chapter, we find procedunt difficultates solvende ab illa via, sicud ab that they tell equally against this theory. 1. MS. 5a racio in marg. 5. MS. Ponatur deest. 7. MS. ponitur. 20. MS. autorem?
36 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. II. V. If a mental Item, si actus tales sunt de genere accionis, et non act were but the subject qua dicunt formaliter nisi subiectum intelligere, sequitur knowing, it quod idem actus possunt quotienslibet redire; consequens would follow impossibile, quia tunc posset quotiens voluerit recreare that the same act might, after coruptum. Et consequencia sic probatur. [Ponatur]5 ceasing, be again quod ego intelligam Socratem a actu intelligendi, et reproduced; which is ponatur quod post desinam intelligere Socratem et impossible. reintelligam eum b actu simillimo preter hoc quod F. 57' For if at two different times elicitur in alio tempore: et patet quod b non ponit nisi I have two me intelligere Socratem, et consequencia ad illud; nec 10 distinct, but exactly similar a ponit nisi me intelligere Socratem, et consequencia mental acts concerning the ad illud; igitur qualitercunque b ponit, a posuit, et same object, their contents econtra. Ex quo sine dubio sequitur quod a sit b, et a being identical, actus est coruptus: igitur intentum. Nec valet dicere they are the same; i. e. the quod actus individuantur a temporibus, quia sunt per- 15 first, having ceased, exists manentes, potentes indifferenter esse in quolibet tempore, no more. et indifferenter in quolibet generari. Item, omnis accio requirit subiectum in quod agatur, VI. Action requires a subject that is sed non sic omnis actus anime. Igitur non omnis talis acted upon. est accio. Maior patet per Aristotelem ponentem de- 20 definition. Now some scriptive accionem esse formam secundum quam in id mental acts do quod subiectatur agere dicimur: et post, in solvendo not require this. We can think dubium de re producta per accionem, dicit quod accio of what cannot possibly exist; non requirit quid agatur, sed in quod agatur. Minor such objects of patet de actu intelligendi, volendi, et ymaginandi, quibus 25 thought are not acted upon. intelligitur, et est volitum et ymaginatum, quod non potest esse; ubi patens est quod actus non terminantur ad obiecta intellecta, volita, vel ymaginata, tanquam terminancia illos actus, cum illa non possunt esse, et It were absurd per consequens non terminare. Nec deus suplet vicem 30 to say that God takes their place illorum, cum non possunt esse (ymmo per idem supleret as the thing thought of. vicem chimere in omni accione, quod fatuum est dicere). Nor do our Nec terminantur ad species quibus apprehenduntur, tum mental representations quia species sunt media apprehendendi, et non termini, form the object tum quia sic species paterentur mediantibus illis actibus, 35 of these actions, they are that by et essent principaliter intellecte, volite, vel ymaginate; which, not that which we quod est falsum, quia multi habent tales actus qui non cognize. putant quod sunt species in anima. VII. If we go Confirmatur per hoc, quod discurrendo per raciones through the arguments in prius factas, invenietur pro maiori parte quod eque 40 the preceding chapter, we find procedunt difficultates solvende ab illa via, sicud ab that they tell equally against this theory. 1. MS. 5a racio in marg. 5. MS. Ponatur deest. 7. MS. ponitur. 20. MS. autorem?
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CAP. II. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. opinione contra guam arguitur; ut patet primo de ex- planacione illius novi entis, vel alterius modi habendi quo voluntas se habet eliciendo primum actum, ubi non est qualitas, vel quantitas subito adquisita vel de- 5 perdita. Secunda difficultas est quomodo anima non potest agere, nisi producat accionem permanentem, et alia coruptive et transeunter agencia satis possunt. [sto enim videtur quod non oportet per locum a simili, quod 10si ignis potest in finem suum sine re absoluta producta, quod virtus cognosciva potest. Tercium dubium est de actu voluntatis vel appetitus quo localiter movetur animal. Videtur enim difficultas tacta eque movere contra illam viam, sicud contra 135 aliam. Quartum dubium est de adnihilacione actuum, de composicione illorum ex suis partibus succedentibus, et partibus quantitativis permanentibus. Quintum dubium est de significacionibus talium actuum 20 et noticiis, quomodo ita patenter noscuntur ab hominibus, et de modo generandi illorum. Sextum dubium est de per se malicia et bonitate actuum, et de modo denominandi illorum. Ponunt enim precipui philosophi quod omnis actus anime est per se 25 bonus, sicud et omne positivum; et solum privacio ut malicia est mala, sicud nititur doctor profundus capi- tulo 26!? probare libro primo per multas raciones et autoritates et 2? libro capitulis 189 et 9"? sequentibus. | F. 58° — Septimum dubium est de principiis individuandi actus, 3o utrum tempus et subiectum individuant omnes actus, vel solum illos qui sunt successivi et requirunt obiecta ad que terminentur, sic quod actus circa obiecta que non sunt de se individuantur. Octavum dubium de speciebus quomodo sunt capiende. 6. MS. a in marg. 8. MS. possunt quod. 10. MS. 5 /n marg. — 22. MS. MS. 9ba pro obiecta. — 34. MS. 1. MS. 1 in marg. 12. MS. 3in marg. 16. MS. 4 in marg. oin marg. | 29. M3. 7 in marg 32. 8 in marg. 26. Doctor Profundus. Bradwardine. 29. Septimum au- bium. In the following chapter, Wvclif refutes all the objections here set down, except (g) and (h). He reserves (g) for the second part of the work, where he deals with the relations between time and mental acts; but (h) is either treated at the very beginning of Chapt. Ill or nowhere. 37 a) How, v. does the will elicit its first act, if there is no antecedent quality that can be changed? b) How 1s it that the soul cannot act without destroying a former action, whilst material agencies can? c) Voluntary movement has the same difficulties in both systems. d) How can an act be annihilated or combined with another? e) The thcory comes in conflict with evident truths concerning these acts and their origin. J) Lt posits acts that are essentially bad; whereas it is generally admitted that all positive things are good in themselves. &) What has time to do with differentiating these acts? h) And how are the various kinds ot action to be classified ?
CAP. II. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. opinione contra guam arguitur; ut patet primo de ex- planacione illius novi entis, vel alterius modi habendi quo voluntas se habet eliciendo primum actum, ubi non est qualitas, vel quantitas subito adquisita vel de- 5 perdita. Secunda difficultas est quomodo anima non potest agere, nisi producat accionem permanentem, et alia coruptive et transeunter agencia satis possunt. [sto enim videtur quod non oportet per locum a simili, quod 10si ignis potest in finem suum sine re absoluta producta, quod virtus cognosciva potest. Tercium dubium est de actu voluntatis vel appetitus quo localiter movetur animal. Videtur enim difficultas tacta eque movere contra illam viam, sicud contra 135 aliam. Quartum dubium est de adnihilacione actuum, de composicione illorum ex suis partibus succedentibus, et partibus quantitativis permanentibus. Quintum dubium est de significacionibus talium actuum 20 et noticiis, quomodo ita patenter noscuntur ab hominibus, et de modo generandi illorum. Sextum dubium est de per se malicia et bonitate actuum, et de modo denominandi illorum. Ponunt enim precipui philosophi quod omnis actus anime est per se 25 bonus, sicud et omne positivum; et solum privacio ut malicia est mala, sicud nititur doctor profundus capi- tulo 26!? probare libro primo per multas raciones et autoritates et 2? libro capitulis 189 et 9"? sequentibus. | F. 58° — Septimum dubium est de principiis individuandi actus, 3o utrum tempus et subiectum individuant omnes actus, vel solum illos qui sunt successivi et requirunt obiecta ad que terminentur, sic quod actus circa obiecta que non sunt de se individuantur. Octavum dubium de speciebus quomodo sunt capiende. 6. MS. a in marg. 8. MS. possunt quod. 10. MS. 5 /n marg. — 22. MS. MS. 9ba pro obiecta. — 34. MS. 1. MS. 1 in marg. 12. MS. 3in marg. 16. MS. 4 in marg. oin marg. | 29. M3. 7 in marg 32. 8 in marg. 26. Doctor Profundus. Bradwardine. 29. Septimum au- bium. In the following chapter, Wvclif refutes all the objections here set down, except (g) and (h). He reserves (g) for the second part of the work, where he deals with the relations between time and mental acts; but (h) is either treated at the very beginning of Chapt. Ill or nowhere. 37 a) How, v. does the will elicit its first act, if there is no antecedent quality that can be changed? b) How 1s it that the soul cannot act without destroying a former action, whilst material agencies can? c) Voluntary movement has the same difficulties in both systems. d) How can an act be annihilated or combined with another? e) The thcory comes in conflict with evident truths concerning these acts and their origin. J) Lt posits acts that are essentially bad; whereas it is generally admitted that all positive things are good in themselves. &) What has time to do with differentiating these acts? h) And how are the various kinds ot action to be classified ?
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38 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. III. CAPITULUM TERCIUM. Wyclif answers Pro responsione ad istud dubium suppono divisionem the last difficulty first. accionis 3° libro declaratam. Alia enim est accio essen- a) There are cialis terminata ad intrinsecum, quia ad essenciam sic three sorts of action ; the first agentis. Quali actu quecunque essencia potens per se! by which any existere appetit se esse, et tali (actu) intelligit et appetit being tends to be, anima essencialiter se esse, et talis actus est agencia qua quecunque essencia est trina, ut declaratum est. Non enim est possibile aliquam substanciam esse, nisi appetat se esse; et ille appetitus non potest poni accidens, to cum a nullo possit talis separari, nec passio, quia nihil dicit extrinsecum. Et secundo, in qualibet essencia creata ex tali accione procedit accio secunda inseparabiliter inexistens circa aliquem finem extrinsecum, ut anima per se appetit 15 beatitudinem, et omnis essencia creata naturaliter et per se suum finem, non actu elicito accidentali, sed per se, sicud per se quelibet creatura appetit bonum, et quelibet res creata appetit esse divinum, ut dicitur primo ethicorum, et secundo de anima. Tercio modo 20 accipitur accio pro agencia, que est forma accidentalis qua agens formaliter et actualiter denominatur agens, et ex tali agencia procedit motus; cum, secundum autorem sex principiorum, omnis accio transiens est in motu, et ex istis principiantur asserciones et negaciones, 25 cum agens appetit habere quod non habet, et alico carere quod habet. Et patet quintuplex divisio entis quarto metaphisice textu, et commento secundo; nam basis tocius entitatis est substancia vel agencia essencialis, que est primum 30 genus accionis; et primum genus entis est substancia, ut patet ibidem. Et ex tali substanciali agencia procedit secunda agencia, que est passio vel proprietas substancie; et illam dicit textus esse secundum genus entis. Et tercio, ex istis procedit agencia accidentalis; et accidens vocat 35 textus tercium genus entis, et ex tali accidente procedit motus, quem textus vocat quartum genus. Quamvis enim The third is an accident, and is the formal source of change. There is thus a fivefold division of being, in terms of action. (1) Essential or substantial action. (2) Its essential tendency, or property. (3) The accident or action which that energy produces. another by which it tends towards its last end : these two are not accidental but essential. (4) The movement or 6. MS. 1. MS. Capitulum tercium deest; large initial P in red ink. ctu deest. 37. MS. quem textus vocat tercium 8. MS. 3'ua pro trina. genus entis et ex tali accidente procedit after motus and before quem.
38 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. III. CAPITULUM TERCIUM. Wyclif answers Pro responsione ad istud dubium suppono divisionem the last difficulty first. accionis 3° libro declaratam. Alia enim est accio essen- a) There are cialis terminata ad intrinsecum, quia ad essenciam sic three sorts of action ; the first agentis. Quali actu quecunque essencia potens per se! by which any existere appetit se esse, et tali (actu) intelligit et appetit being tends to be, anima essencialiter se esse, et talis actus est agencia qua quecunque essencia est trina, ut declaratum est. Non enim est possibile aliquam substanciam esse, nisi appetat se esse; et ille appetitus non potest poni accidens, to cum a nullo possit talis separari, nec passio, quia nihil dicit extrinsecum. Et secundo, in qualibet essencia creata ex tali accione procedit accio secunda inseparabiliter inexistens circa aliquem finem extrinsecum, ut anima per se appetit 15 beatitudinem, et omnis essencia creata naturaliter et per se suum finem, non actu elicito accidentali, sed per se, sicud per se quelibet creatura appetit bonum, et quelibet res creata appetit esse divinum, ut dicitur primo ethicorum, et secundo de anima. Tercio modo 20 accipitur accio pro agencia, que est forma accidentalis qua agens formaliter et actualiter denominatur agens, et ex tali agencia procedit motus; cum, secundum autorem sex principiorum, omnis accio transiens est in motu, et ex istis principiantur asserciones et negaciones, 25 cum agens appetit habere quod non habet, et alico carere quod habet. Et patet quintuplex divisio entis quarto metaphisice textu, et commento secundo; nam basis tocius entitatis est substancia vel agencia essencialis, que est primum 30 genus accionis; et primum genus entis est substancia, ut patet ibidem. Et ex tali substanciali agencia procedit secunda agencia, que est passio vel proprietas substancie; et illam dicit textus esse secundum genus entis. Et tercio, ex istis procedit agencia accidentalis; et accidens vocat 35 textus tercium genus entis, et ex tali accidente procedit motus, quem textus vocat quartum genus. Quamvis enim The third is an accident, and is the formal source of change. There is thus a fivefold division of being, in terms of action. (1) Essential or substantial action. (2) Its essential tendency, or property. (3) The accident or action which that energy produces. another by which it tends towards its last end : these two are not accidental but essential. (4) The movement or 6. MS. 1. MS. Capitulum tercium deest; large initial P in red ink. ctu deest. 37. MS. quem textus vocat tercium 8. MS. 3'ua pro trina. genus entis et ex tali accidente procedit after motus and before quem.
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F. 585 CAP. III. commentator dicat quod motus sit per se passio pre-change effected by action. dicamentum, et auctor sex principiorum quod sit qua- litas, (tamen ampliative videtur quod poneret per se predicamentum); sed Aristoteles vocat motum viam ad 5 alia accidencia, non ponendo undecimum predicamentum, sed motum quasi proprietatem passionis. Et cum, se- cundum commentatorem (tercio phisicorum), motus componatur ex multis affirmacionibus et negacionibus de preterito et futuro, quas commentator vocat encia 10 logica, alii encia complexa, alii encia racionis, et alii generaliter veritates, patet ordo quinque generum entis ex triplici divisione accionis. Sed ulterius est notandum, quod tercium membrum subdividitur, cum alia sit agencia accidentalis immanens, 15 et alia transiens. Inmanens vocatur [illa] que est agencia accidentalis, non requirens passum extrinsecum in quod agatur, ut sunt actus anime. Et ideo auctor dividit accionem in accionem corporis et accionem anime; sed agencia transiens vocatur illa que requirit passum di- stinctum ab agente, et concomitanter] ad agenciam paciens ab eodem. Et utrumlibet membrum subdividitur, cum alia sit agencia successiva immanens, alia autem creditur permanens; alia instantanea et alia temporalis, ut sensacio motus, visio albi quiescentis et apprehensio 25 luminis desinentis; et sic alia est agencia transiens successiva, ut alteracio vel mocio localis; agencia alia dicitur permanens, ut nisus gravis vel fortis contra (5) The logical entities, or truths, implied in movement. b) Energy may be transient, as that of material forces, which passing from one subject to another, requires an object distinct from the agent; or immanent, when it remains in the subject that is thus active; both are either successive or permanent, instantaneous or temporal. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 39 1. 2. MS. p'ditu. 3. MS. amue. 15. MS. illa deest. 1. Commentator. Averrhoës, the Arabian commentator of Aristotle. 7. Ex multis affirmacionibus. This is a good sample of the Scholastic point of view, so exasperating to modern minds, because it insists on expressing everything in terms of language. That movement is made up of affirmations and negations, seems ridiculous to us. Yet Averrhoës merely means that to the fact of something being in motion there correspond many affirmations and negations concerning it, which are successively true. If my finger, v. g. be drawn along a foot rule we have successively: It is true that my finger is on the first inch; it is not true that it is on the second, on the third, etc. — and: It is not true that it is on the first, the third, the fourth etc.; it is true that it is on the second. Motion, and in general change, implies that the same propositions are true after having been false, and false after having been true,
F. 585 CAP. III. commentator dicat quod motus sit per se passio pre-change effected by action. dicamentum, et auctor sex principiorum quod sit qua- litas, (tamen ampliative videtur quod poneret per se predicamentum); sed Aristoteles vocat motum viam ad 5 alia accidencia, non ponendo undecimum predicamentum, sed motum quasi proprietatem passionis. Et cum, se- cundum commentatorem (tercio phisicorum), motus componatur ex multis affirmacionibus et negacionibus de preterito et futuro, quas commentator vocat encia 10 logica, alii encia complexa, alii encia racionis, et alii generaliter veritates, patet ordo quinque generum entis ex triplici divisione accionis. Sed ulterius est notandum, quod tercium membrum subdividitur, cum alia sit agencia accidentalis immanens, 15 et alia transiens. Inmanens vocatur [illa] que est agencia accidentalis, non requirens passum extrinsecum in quod agatur, ut sunt actus anime. Et ideo auctor dividit accionem in accionem corporis et accionem anime; sed agencia transiens vocatur illa que requirit passum di- stinctum ab agente, et concomitanter] ad agenciam paciens ab eodem. Et utrumlibet membrum subdividitur, cum alia sit agencia successiva immanens, alia autem creditur permanens; alia instantanea et alia temporalis, ut sensacio motus, visio albi quiescentis et apprehensio 25 luminis desinentis; et sic alia est agencia transiens successiva, ut alteracio vel mocio localis; agencia alia dicitur permanens, ut nisus gravis vel fortis contra (5) The logical entities, or truths, implied in movement. b) Energy may be transient, as that of material forces, which passing from one subject to another, requires an object distinct from the agent; or immanent, when it remains in the subject that is thus active; both are either successive or permanent, instantaneous or temporal. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 39 1. 2. MS. p'ditu. 3. MS. amue. 15. MS. illa deest. 1. Commentator. Averrhoës, the Arabian commentator of Aristotle. 7. Ex multis affirmacionibus. This is a good sample of the Scholastic point of view, so exasperating to modern minds, because it insists on expressing everything in terms of language. That movement is made up of affirmations and negations, seems ridiculous to us. Yet Averrhoës merely means that to the fact of something being in motion there correspond many affirmations and negations concerning it, which are successively true. If my finger, v. g. be drawn along a foot rule we have successively: It is true that my finger is on the first inch; it is not true that it is on the second, on the third, etc. — and: It is not true that it is on the first, the third, the fourth etc.; it is true that it is on the second. Motion, and in general change, implies that the same propositions are true after having been false, and false after having been true,
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40 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. III. renitens quiescens, et alia subita, sicud illuminacio medii. Omnes enim iste acciones terminantur ad passa distincta ab agentibus, non racione subiecti quod agat spiritualiter in res agentes (sicud est in prima accione in qua agens patitur passione que est salus et perfeccio, ut loquuntur philosophi), set in racione realiter passi transmutacione pacientis a suo quodammodo contrario, specialiter dum passum resistit agenti. De actibus anime est divisio secundum divisionem Coming to mental acts, we potenciarum et obiectorum; ut alius est organicus (ut 10 find them divided into sensacio interior vel exterior), alius non organicus (ut such as require an organ to be actus intellectus et voluntatis); alius requirit obiectum elicited, and such as do not; ad quod terminatur ad esse, tale quod universaliter for essentials omnis sensacio, et noticia alia non requirit, ut ymagi- and non- essentials are nacio, intelleccio, appetitus et volucio. Nam in omni 15 also to be found genere accidencium est dare accidentale et essenciale, in accidents. ut genus, speciem, differenciam, proprium et accidens. Science, or Unde dupliciter potest accipi sciencia actualis, vel certain knowledge may noticia; vel pro actu adherendi, cum existencia illius be either the quod primo apprehenditur, sine formidine contraria illi 20 actual unhesitating adhesioni; et sic noticia potest esse non noticia, quia, assent to the pereunte cognito, perit noticia. Et isto modo accipit truth; or it is not the act, but philosophus scienciam, capitulo de qualitate, ponens illam a disposition esse in predicamento relacionis, cum sit corespondencia towards it. cogniti ad actum cognoscendi. Secunda tamen est sciencia: 25 hec est habitus de genere qualitatis. Secundo, principaliter notandum est quod hoc genus The name of action may in a wide sense be accio, sicud cetera genera generalissima, potest extendi given to the ad omnem agenciam supradictam, et sic quelibet essencia, substance itself, or its essential vel propria passio qua essencia per se tendit in suum 30 tendency; in a strict sense it is 9. MS. 3 in marg. 25. MS. crediti — credendi? 1. Illuminacio medii. Light was supposed to be an in- stantaneous movement. 4. Spiritualiter. See St. Thomas, Sum. Theol. 1“ pars, qu. 78, art. 3, for an elucidation of this term. He distinguishes between the changes produced by an exterior object. Some are in the sensory organ in the same manner as in the object, v. g. heat or cold (secundum esse naturale). But the heat as felt, is not in the object, but in the subject alone, and this change is "secundum esse spirituale"; others, as colours, for instance, impress our organs only "secundum esse spirituale"; for the colour of a red-hot poker does not pass into the eye as its heat passes into the hand. 16. Accidentale. Note the sharp distinction between accidents, meaning phenomena, and accidents, meaning non-essentials.
40 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. III. renitens quiescens, et alia subita, sicud illuminacio medii. Omnes enim iste acciones terminantur ad passa distincta ab agentibus, non racione subiecti quod agat spiritualiter in res agentes (sicud est in prima accione in qua agens patitur passione que est salus et perfeccio, ut loquuntur philosophi), set in racione realiter passi transmutacione pacientis a suo quodammodo contrario, specialiter dum passum resistit agenti. De actibus anime est divisio secundum divisionem Coming to mental acts, we potenciarum et obiectorum; ut alius est organicus (ut 10 find them divided into sensacio interior vel exterior), alius non organicus (ut such as require an organ to be actus intellectus et voluntatis); alius requirit obiectum elicited, and such as do not; ad quod terminatur ad esse, tale quod universaliter for essentials omnis sensacio, et noticia alia non requirit, ut ymagi- and non- essentials are nacio, intelleccio, appetitus et volucio. Nam in omni 15 also to be found genere accidencium est dare accidentale et essenciale, in accidents. ut genus, speciem, differenciam, proprium et accidens. Science, or Unde dupliciter potest accipi sciencia actualis, vel certain knowledge may noticia; vel pro actu adherendi, cum existencia illius be either the quod primo apprehenditur, sine formidine contraria illi 20 actual unhesitating adhesioni; et sic noticia potest esse non noticia, quia, assent to the pereunte cognito, perit noticia. Et isto modo accipit truth; or it is not the act, but philosophus scienciam, capitulo de qualitate, ponens illam a disposition esse in predicamento relacionis, cum sit corespondencia towards it. cogniti ad actum cognoscendi. Secunda tamen est sciencia: 25 hec est habitus de genere qualitatis. Secundo, principaliter notandum est quod hoc genus The name of action may in a wide sense be accio, sicud cetera genera generalissima, potest extendi given to the ad omnem agenciam supradictam, et sic quelibet essencia, substance itself, or its essential vel propria passio qua essencia per se tendit in suum 30 tendency; in a strict sense it is 9. MS. 3 in marg. 25. MS. crediti — credendi? 1. Illuminacio medii. Light was supposed to be an in- stantaneous movement. 4. Spiritualiter. See St. Thomas, Sum. Theol. 1“ pars, qu. 78, art. 3, for an elucidation of this term. He distinguishes between the changes produced by an exterior object. Some are in the sensory organ in the same manner as in the object, v. g. heat or cold (secundum esse naturale). But the heat as felt, is not in the object, but in the subject alone, and this change is "secundum esse spirituale"; others, as colours, for instance, impress our organs only "secundum esse spirituale"; for the colour of a red-hot poker does not pass into the eye as its heat passes into the hand. 16. Accidentale. Note the sharp distinction between accidents, meaning phenomena, and accidents, meaning non-essentials.
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F. 59" CAP. III. finem, potest devocari accio; secundo modo potest nomen accionis limitari ad agenciam accidentalem; et sic est predicamentum. Nec est inconveniens nomen talis pre- dicamenti esse ambiguum vel analogum, quia hoc pene 5 invenies de nomine cuiuscunque predicamenti: nam substancia quandoque communiter accipitur pro quo- cunque ente absoluto sufficiente per se existere (et sic est commune ad deum et creaturas), quandoque limitatur ad ens absolutum potens per se subsistere accidentibus to absolutis, et sic est genus commune ad substancias cor- poreas et incorporeas; et sic essencia divina non est in predicamento substancie nisi per reduccionem, quia principium substancie. Non enim est possibile deum secundum naturam divinam per se substare accidenti 15 absoluto, ut qualitati vel quantitati, quamvis infinitis actibus relativis per se subsint. Nam bonitas, iusticia, sciencia, et quicquid in eo non relative dicitur, sonans in qualitatem, est ipsa substancia vel essencia. Et eodem modo magnitudo sue potencie, immensitatis, vel quic- quid in quantitatem sonans, sive continuam sive dis- cretam, dummodo non relative dicitur ad extra, est ipsa essencia, sicud est eius eternitas; et ternarius personarum corespondenter. Igitur, sicud dicitur de nomine sub- stancie, dicendum est de nomine accionis. Quandoque 25 enim ampliatur ad signandum quamcunque formam qua quicquam est formaliter agens; et vere sic est commune ad deum et omnes substancias vel essencias absolutas, cum deus per propriam sapienciam vel agenciam (que est verbum sue locucionis) est intelligens et dicens res: 3o et sic est quelibet essencia modo essencialiter noscens seipsam. Et quandoque restringitur ad formam acci- dentalem qua quicquam dicitur formaliter agens; et sic est predicamentum, et anime acciones sunt per re- duccionem in illo predicamento, quia eius principia. 35 In omni enim genere est unum primum quod est medium et mensura omnium aliorum, ut dicitur 10° metaphisice. Tercio respondetur per ordinem ad argumenta, suppo- nendo quod omnis actus anime a qualitatibus (que sunt intenciones, potencie et habitus) est distinctus, cum sit 40 accidens de genere accionis. Ad primum dicitur quod (t) it is not the actions minor est falsa. Ad hoc enim quod ens denominet sub- themselves, but their goodness limited to accidental agency. This ambiguily does not matter for it is found in the other categories too. God in one sense is a substance in another He is not; He is, if substance means that which exists by itself. He is not, if it means that which underlies accidents ; for His attributes are His very being. Action also may have a wider or a stricter signification, meaning either the active substance, or that which springs from it. Answers to the other objections in Chap. II. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 41 1, 2. MS. accio nomen accionis. . 29. MS. dns pro dicens. 33. MS. a° = alie? 37. MS. 3a conclusio in marg.
F. 59" CAP. III. finem, potest devocari accio; secundo modo potest nomen accionis limitari ad agenciam accidentalem; et sic est predicamentum. Nec est inconveniens nomen talis pre- dicamenti esse ambiguum vel analogum, quia hoc pene 5 invenies de nomine cuiuscunque predicamenti: nam substancia quandoque communiter accipitur pro quo- cunque ente absoluto sufficiente per se existere (et sic est commune ad deum et creaturas), quandoque limitatur ad ens absolutum potens per se subsistere accidentibus to absolutis, et sic est genus commune ad substancias cor- poreas et incorporeas; et sic essencia divina non est in predicamento substancie nisi per reduccionem, quia principium substancie. Non enim est possibile deum secundum naturam divinam per se substare accidenti 15 absoluto, ut qualitati vel quantitati, quamvis infinitis actibus relativis per se subsint. Nam bonitas, iusticia, sciencia, et quicquid in eo non relative dicitur, sonans in qualitatem, est ipsa substancia vel essencia. Et eodem modo magnitudo sue potencie, immensitatis, vel quic- quid in quantitatem sonans, sive continuam sive dis- cretam, dummodo non relative dicitur ad extra, est ipsa essencia, sicud est eius eternitas; et ternarius personarum corespondenter. Igitur, sicud dicitur de nomine sub- stancie, dicendum est de nomine accionis. Quandoque 25 enim ampliatur ad signandum quamcunque formam qua quicquam est formaliter agens; et vere sic est commune ad deum et omnes substancias vel essencias absolutas, cum deus per propriam sapienciam vel agenciam (que est verbum sue locucionis) est intelligens et dicens res: 3o et sic est quelibet essencia modo essencialiter noscens seipsam. Et quandoque restringitur ad formam acci- dentalem qua quicquam dicitur formaliter agens; et sic est predicamentum, et anime acciones sunt per re- duccionem in illo predicamento, quia eius principia. 35 In omni enim genere est unum primum quod est medium et mensura omnium aliorum, ut dicitur 10° metaphisice. Tercio respondetur per ordinem ad argumenta, suppo- nendo quod omnis actus anime a qualitatibus (que sunt intenciones, potencie et habitus) est distinctus, cum sit 40 accidens de genere accionis. Ad primum dicitur quod (t) it is not the actions minor est falsa. Ad hoc enim quod ens denominet sub- themselves, but their goodness limited to accidental agency. This ambiguily does not matter for it is found in the other categories too. God in one sense is a substance in another He is not; He is, if substance means that which exists by itself. He is not, if it means that which underlies accidents ; for His attributes are His very being. Action also may have a wider or a stricter signification, meaning either the active substance, or that which springs from it. Answers to the other objections in Chap. II. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 41 1, 2. MS. accio nomen accionis. . 29. MS. dns pro dicens. 33. MS. a° = alie? 37. MS. 3a conclusio in marg.
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42 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. III. or badness, which makes men good or bad ; these are qualities indeed, but they are distinct from the actions, iectum inmediate et formaliter accidentaliter esse quale, oportet quod sit forma accidentalis, qua posita, subiectum est tale; sic quod non sit alia forma proprior, secundum quam subiectum sit tale. Unde actus meritorii et de- meritorii denominant homines efficienter esse bonos vel 5 malos, et bonitates vel malicie ex illis resultantes de- nominant homines inmediate et formaliter esse malos as is clear from vel bonos. Et quod bonitates et malicie resultantes ab the fact that the same actions illis actibus distinguantur ab illis actibus, satis patet are now good, ex hoc quod illi actus possunt manere, bonitate vel 10 now bad ; that the goodness or malicia deperdita, et bonitas aut malicia potest manere, badness illis actibus deperditis. Ac tercio stat illa adquiri sub- remains when the actions are iecto, quantumlibet inproporcionaliter (puta verius bonita- over ; and that there is no tem [aut] maliciam quam actum, vel econtra); et patet correspondence distinccio inter illa. Sed non ymaginor quod bonitas 15 between the acts and the states vel malicia, quam pono qualitatem, sit res absoluta que induced by them. potest per se existere; quia hoc non concipio de aliqua n These states or forma accidentali quo subiectum formaliter est bonum, qualities, however, are sic quod claudit contradiccionem aliquid esse actualiter merely the thing itself, quà good bonum sine tali bonitate sibi accidentali, quia tantum 20 or bad. ponitur per illam bonitatem quod per hoc concretum: istam rem esse sic actualiter bonam. (2) Action effects Ad secundum dicitur concedendo quod anima alteratur. a change in the Sed pro materia notandum quod tripliciter contingit mind that acts. But change may ens alterari. Primo modo largissime per qualiscunque 25 be understood either a) as the forme accidentalis absolute adquisicionem; et isto modo happening of dicit Porfirius quod Socrates est alter in theatro quam any new determination fuit in foro propter adquisicionem situs vel loci. Secundo in any subject; or b) as the modo, propter qualitatis adquisicionem, sive fuerit sen- acquisition of a new quality, sibilis sive insensibilis, sicud virtuosus alteratur et factus 30 properly so bonus moraliter. Et isto modo contingit animam alterari, called: and in this sense the et hominem (secundum animam), per adquisiciones dispo- mind is said to sicionum, habituum, specierum, vel potenciarum. Sed change; or c) as the tercio modo propriissime dicitur aliquid alterari, quod acquisition of some extended est per se ens adquirens vel deperdens successive quali- 35 quality, by the loss of its tatem sensibilem per contrarii adquisicionem vel de- contrary. perdicionem; et isto modo ad qualitates que sunt de This last is the change that tercia specie qualitatis] ponit philosophus alteracionem F. 59" Aristotle calls alteration. proprie dictam in 7° phisicorum. Cum enim totum genus motus proprie dicti sit per se sensibile (ut patet 40 secundo De Anima), patet quod alteracio, que est eius 8. MS. ab pro quod. 13. MS. ves. 14. MS. aut deest. 25. MS. 30. MS. v'cuſa. pro pro per.
42 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. III. or badness, which makes men good or bad ; these are qualities indeed, but they are distinct from the actions, iectum inmediate et formaliter accidentaliter esse quale, oportet quod sit forma accidentalis, qua posita, subiectum est tale; sic quod non sit alia forma proprior, secundum quam subiectum sit tale. Unde actus meritorii et de- meritorii denominant homines efficienter esse bonos vel 5 malos, et bonitates vel malicie ex illis resultantes de- nominant homines inmediate et formaliter esse malos as is clear from vel bonos. Et quod bonitates et malicie resultantes ab the fact that the same actions illis actibus distinguantur ab illis actibus, satis patet are now good, ex hoc quod illi actus possunt manere, bonitate vel 10 now bad ; that the goodness or malicia deperdita, et bonitas aut malicia potest manere, badness illis actibus deperditis. Ac tercio stat illa adquiri sub- remains when the actions are iecto, quantumlibet inproporcionaliter (puta verius bonita- over ; and that there is no tem [aut] maliciam quam actum, vel econtra); et patet correspondence distinccio inter illa. Sed non ymaginor quod bonitas 15 between the acts and the states vel malicia, quam pono qualitatem, sit res absoluta que induced by them. potest per se existere; quia hoc non concipio de aliqua n These states or forma accidentali quo subiectum formaliter est bonum, qualities, however, are sic quod claudit contradiccionem aliquid esse actualiter merely the thing itself, quà good bonum sine tali bonitate sibi accidentali, quia tantum 20 or bad. ponitur per illam bonitatem quod per hoc concretum: istam rem esse sic actualiter bonam. (2) Action effects Ad secundum dicitur concedendo quod anima alteratur. a change in the Sed pro materia notandum quod tripliciter contingit mind that acts. But change may ens alterari. Primo modo largissime per qualiscunque 25 be understood either a) as the forme accidentalis absolute adquisicionem; et isto modo happening of dicit Porfirius quod Socrates est alter in theatro quam any new determination fuit in foro propter adquisicionem situs vel loci. Secundo in any subject; or b) as the modo, propter qualitatis adquisicionem, sive fuerit sen- acquisition of a new quality, sibilis sive insensibilis, sicud virtuosus alteratur et factus 30 properly so bonus moraliter. Et isto modo contingit animam alterari, called: and in this sense the et hominem (secundum animam), per adquisiciones dispo- mind is said to sicionum, habituum, specierum, vel potenciarum. Sed change; or c) as the tercio modo propriissime dicitur aliquid alterari, quod acquisition of some extended est per se ens adquirens vel deperdens successive quali- 35 quality, by the loss of its tatem sensibilem per contrarii adquisicionem vel de- contrary. perdicionem; et isto modo ad qualitates que sunt de This last is the change that tercia specie qualitatis] ponit philosophus alteracionem F. 59" Aristotle calls alteration. proprie dictam in 7° phisicorum. Cum enim totum genus motus proprie dicti sit per se sensibile (ut patet 40 secundo De Anima), patet quod alteracio, que est eius 8. MS. ab pro quod. 13. MS. ves. 14. MS. aut deest. 25. MS. 30. MS. v'cuſa. pro pro per.
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CAP. III. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 43 univoca species, erit eciam sensibile, quod non esset nisi quantitas adquisita vel deperdita fuerit sensibilis; quia subducta omni qualitate sensibili ab homine moto localiter, augmentato, vel alterato, non plus perciperet 5 illum motum quam percipio motum venti. Dicitur igitur quod homo, gaudendo vel tristando, inevitabiliter re- linquit post gaudium vel tristiciam quamdam disposi- cionem et quamdam alteracionem specierum in memoria, racione quarum secundo modo loquendo satis alteratur. 10 Cum enim sit melior vel peior, vel aliquod ens memorans noviter vel saltem intensius quam prius, satis ostenditur quod sit variabilis et non semper conformiter se habens ab intrinseco, sieud deus. Ad tercium dicitur quod assumptum est falsum, vel (3) Certain changes imply 15 aliter est equivocacio. Pro quo memorandum quod, merely the pre- existence of a sicud habita proporcione qualitatum priorum in mixto subject properly (ut vitro vel quocunque alio) secunda qualitate, informacio disposed, not a pre-existing resultat consecutive, sicud passio consequitur suum sub- quality. Glass, by the very fact iectum ([ut] diafaneitas, fragilitas, vel quecunque alia of its 20 qualitas secunda): sic, habita plena noticia obiecti beati- ingredients being rightly fici secundum ultimum capacitatis virtutis, et plena blended, has transparency; adhesicione ac dilectacione in illo obiecto cum securitate and thus, the perpetuo sic manendi et summa subordinacione aliarum full knowledge of the object of virium et parcium corporis secundum ultimum sue ca- bliss necessarily results in the pacitatis, secundum disposiciones quas theologi vocant beatific vision, dotes; habitis, inquam, istis, inevitabiliter resultat beati- without the separate tudo, que est qualitas quedam denominans subiectum creation of any beatific quality. formaliter beatum; non aliquid quod deus potest auferre The proper dispositions of et ponere in alio subiecto vel multiplicare sine multi- the subject are 3o plicacione sui subiecti, sed unum quod tantum ponit called the parts of bliss, or quantum ponitur per hoc quod iste est beatus; et iste blisses. disposiciones prime naturaliter vocantur quandoque partes beatitudinis, quandoque materialiter beatitudines. Per illa patet ad primam instanciam quod, querendo qualis 35 est Petrus in patria, convenienter respondetur quod est beatus, cum beatitudo sit eius insuperabilis qualitas. Et Joy or sorrow after it has passed, leaves behind it a certain state or disposition of the mind ; but this change merely proves that the soul does not possess the immutability of God. 25 deest. 14. MS. ad 3m in marg. 15. MS. ate pro aliter. 19. MS. ut 13. Against those who set up each quality as a subtle ab- stract entity, distinct from that which has the quality, Wyclif points out that every creature must be changeable, and defines quality merely as “the being itself, qua thus changed".
CAP. III. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 43 univoca species, erit eciam sensibile, quod non esset nisi quantitas adquisita vel deperdita fuerit sensibilis; quia subducta omni qualitate sensibili ab homine moto localiter, augmentato, vel alterato, non plus perciperet 5 illum motum quam percipio motum venti. Dicitur igitur quod homo, gaudendo vel tristando, inevitabiliter re- linquit post gaudium vel tristiciam quamdam disposi- cionem et quamdam alteracionem specierum in memoria, racione quarum secundo modo loquendo satis alteratur. 10 Cum enim sit melior vel peior, vel aliquod ens memorans noviter vel saltem intensius quam prius, satis ostenditur quod sit variabilis et non semper conformiter se habens ab intrinseco, sieud deus. Ad tercium dicitur quod assumptum est falsum, vel (3) Certain changes imply 15 aliter est equivocacio. Pro quo memorandum quod, merely the pre- existence of a sicud habita proporcione qualitatum priorum in mixto subject properly (ut vitro vel quocunque alio) secunda qualitate, informacio disposed, not a pre-existing resultat consecutive, sicud passio consequitur suum sub- quality. Glass, by the very fact iectum ([ut] diafaneitas, fragilitas, vel quecunque alia of its 20 qualitas secunda): sic, habita plena noticia obiecti beati- ingredients being rightly fici secundum ultimum capacitatis virtutis, et plena blended, has transparency; adhesicione ac dilectacione in illo obiecto cum securitate and thus, the perpetuo sic manendi et summa subordinacione aliarum full knowledge of the object of virium et parcium corporis secundum ultimum sue ca- bliss necessarily results in the pacitatis, secundum disposiciones quas theologi vocant beatific vision, dotes; habitis, inquam, istis, inevitabiliter resultat beati- without the separate tudo, que est qualitas quedam denominans subiectum creation of any beatific quality. formaliter beatum; non aliquid quod deus potest auferre The proper dispositions of et ponere in alio subiecto vel multiplicare sine multi- the subject are 3o plicacione sui subiecti, sed unum quod tantum ponit called the parts of bliss, or quantum ponitur per hoc quod iste est beatus; et iste blisses. disposiciones prime naturaliter vocantur quandoque partes beatitudinis, quandoque materialiter beatitudines. Per illa patet ad primam instanciam quod, querendo qualis 35 est Petrus in patria, convenienter respondetur quod est beatus, cum beatitudo sit eius insuperabilis qualitas. Et Joy or sorrow after it has passed, leaves behind it a certain state or disposition of the mind ; but this change merely proves that the soul does not possess the immutability of God. 25 deest. 14. MS. ad 3m in marg. 15. MS. ate pro aliter. 19. MS. ut 13. Against those who set up each quality as a subtle ab- stract entity, distinct from that which has the quality, Wyclif points out that every creature must be changeable, and defines quality merely as “the being itself, qua thus changed".
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44 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. III. querendo qualiter agit beatus, dicetur quod comprehendit vel intuetur deum. Quoad secundum dicitur quod conclusio illata non sequitur, nam obiectum beatificum dat cuicunque crea- ture beate de sua gracia beatitudinem, et creatura disponit: et disposuit se ad hoc, eliciendo tales actus. Nullum tamen actum elicit, nisi ad quem deus principalius graciose concitat, cum contradiccionem claudit quod homo quicquam benefaciat sine gracia dei speciali. Si autem instetur quod homo concurrit efficienter ad 10 suam beatificacionem in eliciendo actum, sicud sacra- mentum facit dispositive graciam, ego non contradico isti sensui. Utrinque tamen esset inpossibile ut beati- tudo esset potens per se existere. Nam hoc non coëfficit Beatitude is said animam, quamvis disponat ad hoc. Et quoad verbum 15 to be created in creandi implicatum, dicitur quod dupliciter accipitur ad the soul, relatively to its propositum; uno modo pro produccione entis in subiecto being caused by God's direct quod quondam creavit; et illo modo creat deus tenebram, action, not in faciendo illam individuacionem cuius materiam quondam F. 60" the sense of a substance which creavit. Sed secundo modo dicitur creare aliquid, cum 20 in no wise exists before facit illud quod nulla pars eius vel subiectum eius pre- creation. fuit, sicud fecit in principio mundi de materia prima, et frequenter postmodum de animabus quas creavit. Sed pro primo modo creandi, notandum quod, si fuerit disposicio cuius produccionem deus non potest communi- 25 care creature, ut est infusio gracie vel glorie, vel dacio beatitudinis, tunc specialiter dicitur deus creare talem disposicionem: non sic quod deus potest talem dispo- sicionem primo per se creare, et postmodum infundere (ac si quis liquorem infunderet in receptaculum per 30 cannalem), sed dare talem graciam, gloriam, vel beati- tudinem creare, est primo obiective, et primo effective facere creaturam deo gratam, gloriosam, vel beatam. Illius enim grosse ymaginacionis fuit ille maledictus This gross manner of simoniacus de quo in actibus apostolorum capitulo octavo 35 considering grace and glory legitur, quod voluit emisse potestatem apostolorum, ac as something si vellet emisse loculum plenum gracia, et illam se- separable from its possessor, cundum parvas proporciones vendidisse ad usuram, sicud and therefore, to be bought ypotecarii vendunt sirupos vel electuaria. Sed audivit and re-sold, was Whether man's action is an auxiliary efficient cause of bliss, or no, bliss cannot exist by itself. In this first sense, God simply makes His creature blessed, and by the fact its beatitude springs into existence. It does not follow, because these dispositions proceed from free-will, that man beatifies himself, since grace is an indispensable aid. 10. MS. 9it pro concurrit. 2. MS. after deum, orare very indistinct. 13. MS. vel pro ut. 35. MS. actibus capitulo octavo apostolorum. 35. Actus Apostolorum, VIII, 18—21.
44 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. III. querendo qualiter agit beatus, dicetur quod comprehendit vel intuetur deum. Quoad secundum dicitur quod conclusio illata non sequitur, nam obiectum beatificum dat cuicunque crea- ture beate de sua gracia beatitudinem, et creatura disponit: et disposuit se ad hoc, eliciendo tales actus. Nullum tamen actum elicit, nisi ad quem deus principalius graciose concitat, cum contradiccionem claudit quod homo quicquam benefaciat sine gracia dei speciali. Si autem instetur quod homo concurrit efficienter ad 10 suam beatificacionem in eliciendo actum, sicud sacra- mentum facit dispositive graciam, ego non contradico isti sensui. Utrinque tamen esset inpossibile ut beati- tudo esset potens per se existere. Nam hoc non coëfficit Beatitude is said animam, quamvis disponat ad hoc. Et quoad verbum 15 to be created in creandi implicatum, dicitur quod dupliciter accipitur ad the soul, relatively to its propositum; uno modo pro produccione entis in subiecto being caused by God's direct quod quondam creavit; et illo modo creat deus tenebram, action, not in faciendo illam individuacionem cuius materiam quondam F. 60" the sense of a substance which creavit. Sed secundo modo dicitur creare aliquid, cum 20 in no wise exists before facit illud quod nulla pars eius vel subiectum eius pre- creation. fuit, sicud fecit in principio mundi de materia prima, et frequenter postmodum de animabus quas creavit. Sed pro primo modo creandi, notandum quod, si fuerit disposicio cuius produccionem deus non potest communi- 25 care creature, ut est infusio gracie vel glorie, vel dacio beatitudinis, tunc specialiter dicitur deus creare talem disposicionem: non sic quod deus potest talem dispo- sicionem primo per se creare, et postmodum infundere (ac si quis liquorem infunderet in receptaculum per 30 cannalem), sed dare talem graciam, gloriam, vel beati- tudinem creare, est primo obiective, et primo effective facere creaturam deo gratam, gloriosam, vel beatam. Illius enim grosse ymaginacionis fuit ille maledictus This gross manner of simoniacus de quo in actibus apostolorum capitulo octavo 35 considering grace and glory legitur, quod voluit emisse potestatem apostolorum, ac as something si vellet emisse loculum plenum gracia, et illam se- separable from its possessor, cundum parvas proporciones vendidisse ad usuram, sicud and therefore, to be bought ypotecarii vendunt sirupos vel electuaria. Sed audivit and re-sold, was Whether man's action is an auxiliary efficient cause of bliss, or no, bliss cannot exist by itself. In this first sense, God simply makes His creature blessed, and by the fact its beatitude springs into existence. It does not follow, because these dispositions proceed from free-will, that man beatifies himself, since grace is an indispensable aid. 10. MS. 9it pro concurrit. 2. MS. after deum, orare very indistinct. 13. MS. vel pro ut. 35. MS. actibus capitulo octavo apostolorum. 35. Actus Apostolorum, VIII, 18—21.
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15 F. 60" CAP. III. responsum a subtili piscatore quod non fuit sibi pars the root of the heresy of neque sors in sermone illo; quia erravit, estimans donum Simon Magus. Pelagius, dei peccunia possideri. Et post illum surrexit ille male- teaching that dictus hereticus pellagius, acutus in pravitate. Sed re- we can please God without 5 spondet in ymaginacione putans grosse quod gracia esset grace, also conceived it as una res quam deus posset servare per se et infundere, something not sicud homo insorbet olera, et ideo consequenter dixit identical with a man's being quod gracia beatitudinis datur de lege ad faciliendum pleasing to God, and hominem ad bene et meritorie operandum, sed non separable 10 requiritur. Et illius opinionis sunt multi moderni theologi. therefrom. Many modern Et sic erravit de quiditate originalis peccati, putans quod theologians fuisset quedem macula positiva in semine vel carne per labour under a similar error. aquam corpoream abluibilis; et sic credo multos errasse His doctrine as to original sin per defectum noticie quiditatum talium. is erroneous in Unde credo quod contradiccionem formalem claudit, like manner. Digression quod deus salvet aliquem hominem, vel cooperetur cum concerning the nature of grace : eo meritorie operante sine speciali gracia et caritate Wyclif asserts creata distincta a deo et qualibet alia substancia. Et that to think it a separable entity si queritur de quiditate talis gracie, dicitur quod est is flatly absurd. A quality, yes; 20 optima qualitas, non potens per se existere, sed per se self-existent, no. denominans formaliter hominem gratum deo. Nec darem It would be, if such, worth unam guttam illius gracie, si esset res que posset per more than infinite se existere, pro infinitate auri vel omnibus bonis possi- treasures, provided it bilibus citra deum; saltem si essem securus de eius could not be 25 perpetua inexistencia: quia plus valeret mihi quam in- lost. Let there be no finitorum angelorum asistencia sine tali. Non igitur quarrel whether it is or not dissencio quod vocetur res positiva vel pes tauri si something opporteat, cum hoc tamen quod intelligatur (sicud ego positive; no matter what intelligo), quod non possit per se existere, cum nihil it may be called, ponit nisi hominem esse gratum deo, et | illa que con- it cannot exist by itself. secuntur ad hoc. Expediens tamen fuit quod quidam Nevertheless, the position of dixerunt quod non sit res sed qualitas quidem, quod some who assert non est quid sed cui, et quidem quod est ens sed non that it is a mere belonging, a reale, cum sit relacio. In talibus enim, ubi homines relation, and unreal, has this 35 sunt profundati in nimis grossis concepcionibus, expedit good side, that revocare eos recordando modum loquendi ultra hoc quod it errs in the right direction ; opporteret, si haberent veros conceptus apostoli et anti- such an exaggeration is quorum doctorum, sicud in simili docet Aristoteles, 3° useful at times. ethicorum. Nec credo quod unquam apostolus vel anti- 40 quus sentenciavit quod gracia sit res que posset per se existere. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 45 17. MS. operato. 30. MS. possibilis? pro ponit 7. Insorbet. Cf. insorbet ut olera (De Apostasia p. 100, l. 25).
15 F. 60" CAP. III. responsum a subtili piscatore quod non fuit sibi pars the root of the heresy of neque sors in sermone illo; quia erravit, estimans donum Simon Magus. Pelagius, dei peccunia possideri. Et post illum surrexit ille male- teaching that dictus hereticus pellagius, acutus in pravitate. Sed re- we can please God without 5 spondet in ymaginacione putans grosse quod gracia esset grace, also conceived it as una res quam deus posset servare per se et infundere, something not sicud homo insorbet olera, et ideo consequenter dixit identical with a man's being quod gracia beatitudinis datur de lege ad faciliendum pleasing to God, and hominem ad bene et meritorie operandum, sed non separable 10 requiritur. Et illius opinionis sunt multi moderni theologi. therefrom. Many modern Et sic erravit de quiditate originalis peccati, putans quod theologians fuisset quedem macula positiva in semine vel carne per labour under a similar error. aquam corpoream abluibilis; et sic credo multos errasse His doctrine as to original sin per defectum noticie quiditatum talium. is erroneous in Unde credo quod contradiccionem formalem claudit, like manner. Digression quod deus salvet aliquem hominem, vel cooperetur cum concerning the nature of grace : eo meritorie operante sine speciali gracia et caritate Wyclif asserts creata distincta a deo et qualibet alia substancia. Et that to think it a separable entity si queritur de quiditate talis gracie, dicitur quod est is flatly absurd. A quality, yes; 20 optima qualitas, non potens per se existere, sed per se self-existent, no. denominans formaliter hominem gratum deo. Nec darem It would be, if such, worth unam guttam illius gracie, si esset res que posset per more than infinite se existere, pro infinitate auri vel omnibus bonis possi- treasures, provided it bilibus citra deum; saltem si essem securus de eius could not be 25 perpetua inexistencia: quia plus valeret mihi quam in- lost. Let there be no finitorum angelorum asistencia sine tali. Non igitur quarrel whether it is or not dissencio quod vocetur res positiva vel pes tauri si something opporteat, cum hoc tamen quod intelligatur (sicud ego positive; no matter what intelligo), quod non possit per se existere, cum nihil it may be called, ponit nisi hominem esse gratum deo, et | illa que con- it cannot exist by itself. secuntur ad hoc. Expediens tamen fuit quod quidam Nevertheless, the position of dixerunt quod non sit res sed qualitas quidem, quod some who assert non est quid sed cui, et quidem quod est ens sed non that it is a mere belonging, a reale, cum sit relacio. In talibus enim, ubi homines relation, and unreal, has this 35 sunt profundati in nimis grossis concepcionibus, expedit good side, that revocare eos recordando modum loquendi ultra hoc quod it errs in the right direction ; opporteret, si haberent veros conceptus apostoli et anti- such an exaggeration is quorum doctorum, sicud in simili docet Aristoteles, 3° useful at times. ethicorum. Nec credo quod unquam apostolus vel anti- 40 quus sentenciavit quod gracia sit res que posset per se existere. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 45 17. MS. operato. 30. MS. possibilis? pro ponit 7. Insorbet. Cf. insorbet ut olera (De Apostasia p. 100, l. 25).
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46 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. III. Redeundo igitur ad terciam confirmacionem, dicitur quod quandocunque in hac vita homo elicit actum anime concomitatur disposicio vel indisposicio quoad bonitatem moralem, quoad memoriter retinendum vel obliviscendum, vel tercio quoad debilitacionem organi quo actus elicitur; quia sicut allegatum est 3° li° (scilicet li° 3° questione 16a vitulonis) visio non fit sine dolore et passione oculi a substancia abiciente, et per idem nullus alius actus organicus fit sine congrua debilitacione organi; ideoque omnem talem actum quantumcunque dictum permanen- 10 tem, dum illa vita vivitur, concomitatur quidem motus But this fact racione qualitatis adquisite vel deperdite. Nec multum of an nocet noscentibus veritatem, quod beatitudo requirat accompanying relation does relacionem vel habitudinem respectivam ad deum. Nam, not affect our position. posita beatitudine subiectiva quam ipsi ponunt deum 15 Our adversaries themselves say posse ponere in lapide; ad hoc — nisi foret informacio that the presence of vel unio — nihil valeret. Immo, secundum conceptus beatitude would illorum, positis beatitudine subiectiva cum sua informa- not beatify unless it were cione et beatitudine obiectiva, nisi affuerit accepcio united to its subject; and beatitudinis obiective, totum non valet attomum; et 20 union is a certum est quod accepcio et unio ponunt respectus. relation. He who has the Ego autem dico quod, posita illa qualitate, est sic quali- quality of beatitude must ficatus ita securus de sua beatitudine, quam securus be inseparably sum quod nihil simul est et non est; nec stat deum united to it, cum illa qualitate superinducere penam vel privare ab 25 since it would not otherwise illa, quamvis posset si vellet. Et sic cognicio condicio- be what it is. nate veritatis incommutabilis est sufficiens carta securi- tatis beatitudinis. Scio enim, et multo magis quilibet beatus in patria, quod si habet summam perfeccionem corporis et anime, quod illa nunquam deficeret in 30 futurum. Et certe antecedens patet. Cognosceret per experienciam (vel, secundum illos, intuitum) illam beati- tudinem, et satis videret quod ipsa perpetuo informabit, cum veritates de preterito, de futuro, et alie quecunque sint intuibiles in verbo. Unde nota diligenter Augustinum, 35 libro de immortalitate anime, ubi diffuse declarat quod sensacio est actus senciendi, et omnis talis passio est pati sensus. Unde, in fine libri, sic scribit: Cum anima in quarto gradu conceperit quanta sit, quodam incredi- Augustine, affirming the perfection of this mental vision, confirms our view. He must know that he is perfectly happy, and if perfectly, then eternally. Return to the main question Every act is accompanied by a certain disposition of the subject as concerns the act. 7. MS. vitlo3. 11. MS. vuts pro vivitur. 30. MS. desineret? 7. Vitulonis. The words in parentheses seem to be a mar- ginal note, transferred to the text.
46 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. III. Redeundo igitur ad terciam confirmacionem, dicitur quod quandocunque in hac vita homo elicit actum anime concomitatur disposicio vel indisposicio quoad bonitatem moralem, quoad memoriter retinendum vel obliviscendum, vel tercio quoad debilitacionem organi quo actus elicitur; quia sicut allegatum est 3° li° (scilicet li° 3° questione 16a vitulonis) visio non fit sine dolore et passione oculi a substancia abiciente, et per idem nullus alius actus organicus fit sine congrua debilitacione organi; ideoque omnem talem actum quantumcunque dictum permanen- 10 tem, dum illa vita vivitur, concomitatur quidem motus But this fact racione qualitatis adquisite vel deperdite. Nec multum of an nocet noscentibus veritatem, quod beatitudo requirat accompanying relation does relacionem vel habitudinem respectivam ad deum. Nam, not affect our position. posita beatitudine subiectiva quam ipsi ponunt deum 15 Our adversaries themselves say posse ponere in lapide; ad hoc — nisi foret informacio that the presence of vel unio — nihil valeret. Immo, secundum conceptus beatitude would illorum, positis beatitudine subiectiva cum sua informa- not beatify unless it were cione et beatitudine obiectiva, nisi affuerit accepcio united to its subject; and beatitudinis obiective, totum non valet attomum; et 20 union is a certum est quod accepcio et unio ponunt respectus. relation. He who has the Ego autem dico quod, posita illa qualitate, est sic quali- quality of beatitude must ficatus ita securus de sua beatitudine, quam securus be inseparably sum quod nihil simul est et non est; nec stat deum united to it, cum illa qualitate superinducere penam vel privare ab 25 since it would not otherwise illa, quamvis posset si vellet. Et sic cognicio condicio- be what it is. nate veritatis incommutabilis est sufficiens carta securi- tatis beatitudinis. Scio enim, et multo magis quilibet beatus in patria, quod si habet summam perfeccionem corporis et anime, quod illa nunquam deficeret in 30 futurum. Et certe antecedens patet. Cognosceret per experienciam (vel, secundum illos, intuitum) illam beati- tudinem, et satis videret quod ipsa perpetuo informabit, cum veritates de preterito, de futuro, et alie quecunque sint intuibiles in verbo. Unde nota diligenter Augustinum, 35 libro de immortalitate anime, ubi diffuse declarat quod sensacio est actus senciendi, et omnis talis passio est pati sensus. Unde, in fine libri, sic scribit: Cum anima in quarto gradu conceperit quanta sit, quodam incredi- Augustine, affirming the perfection of this mental vision, confirms our view. He must know that he is perfectly happy, and if perfectly, then eternally. Return to the main question Every act is accompanied by a certain disposition of the subject as concerns the act. 7. MS. vitlo3. 11. MS. vuts pro vivitur. 30. MS. desineret? 7. Vitulonis. The words in parentheses seem to be a mar- ginal note, transferred to the text.
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CAP. III. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 47 bili fiducia pergit in contemplacionem veritatis; sed hec accio (id est, appeticio intelligendi ea que vere summe que sunt) summus aspectus est anime: quo perfecciorem, meliorem, recciorem non habet. (4) The Et per idem patet responsio ad quartum argumentum. argument, denying that F. 61° Nam omnis actus anime est in motu, ut in suo] signato mental acts vel effectu, sicud omnis motus est in accione ut in eius consist in movement, fails causa; nec est possibile subducere omnem motum alium here ; for causing a visione vie, quia omnem talem concomitatur alter; movement, they 1o etsi orbes oculorum, visibile, et medium quantumlibet are to it as the cause is to the quiescant. Unde conceditur quod (sive actus anime po- effect ; and nitur permanens, sive successivus) quod est dare gene-movement is in them as the racionem actus vel actus incepcionem que distinguitur effect is in the cause. ab actu, cum sit solum instantanea et actus temporaneus. What produces the movement 15 Sic enim est in motu successivo, quod continue erit is an action, and subita motus generacio distincta a motu eius [cuius] est yet is not the movement generacio. produced. Dubium tamen est utrum actus sensitivi hic in via Are all acts of sensation vel in patria, et pene vel dolores in inferno, consistant successive, all permanent, or 20 in successione vel aliter sint permanentes, ut oportet; some one and some the other ? vel tercio aliqui permanentes et alii successivi. Et videtur The point tripliciter quod aliqui sint permanentes; primo, quia argued at length. stat virtutem manere fixam et intuitum continue fixum sine mutacione speciei aut intencione vel remissione 25 actus, ubi non est diversitas signanda parcium actus; quia nec a subiecto nec ab obiecto. Secundo, quia actus: non est enim virtutem sic intueri illud obiectum et hoc manebit continue, sive varietur subiectum, sive non, saltem de possibili; igitur et actus manebit continue 3o idem. Tercio, quia actus in patria non generabunt qualitates vel corumpent; quia si generabunt continue sine corupcione, in infinitum intenderentur, et si corumperent, perirent visiones beatitudinum, cum con- tinue defluerent, sicud motus; nec debilitas corporis vel 35 potencie erit ibi, sicud nec fastidium vel alienacio ex- 16. MS. cuius deest. 18. MS. dubium in marg. 20. MS. vtos pro ut oportet. 23. MS. intintu. 27. MS. itur. 21. I have been utterly unable to make out this paragraph, and the following. Some parts cannot even be construed. But what points most clearly to a serious corruption of the text, or to a considerable gap, is the fact that the argument proposes to prove that some mental acts are permanent, and concludes that all are successive!
CAP. III. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 47 bili fiducia pergit in contemplacionem veritatis; sed hec accio (id est, appeticio intelligendi ea que vere summe que sunt) summus aspectus est anime: quo perfecciorem, meliorem, recciorem non habet. (4) The Et per idem patet responsio ad quartum argumentum. argument, denying that F. 61° Nam omnis actus anime est in motu, ut in suo] signato mental acts vel effectu, sicud omnis motus est in accione ut in eius consist in movement, fails causa; nec est possibile subducere omnem motum alium here ; for causing a visione vie, quia omnem talem concomitatur alter; movement, they 1o etsi orbes oculorum, visibile, et medium quantumlibet are to it as the cause is to the quiescant. Unde conceditur quod (sive actus anime po- effect ; and nitur permanens, sive successivus) quod est dare gene-movement is in them as the racionem actus vel actus incepcionem que distinguitur effect is in the cause. ab actu, cum sit solum instantanea et actus temporaneus. What produces the movement 15 Sic enim est in motu successivo, quod continue erit is an action, and subita motus generacio distincta a motu eius [cuius] est yet is not the movement generacio. produced. Dubium tamen est utrum actus sensitivi hic in via Are all acts of sensation vel in patria, et pene vel dolores in inferno, consistant successive, all permanent, or 20 in successione vel aliter sint permanentes, ut oportet; some one and some the other ? vel tercio aliqui permanentes et alii successivi. Et videtur The point tripliciter quod aliqui sint permanentes; primo, quia argued at length. stat virtutem manere fixam et intuitum continue fixum sine mutacione speciei aut intencione vel remissione 25 actus, ubi non est diversitas signanda parcium actus; quia nec a subiecto nec ab obiecto. Secundo, quia actus: non est enim virtutem sic intueri illud obiectum et hoc manebit continue, sive varietur subiectum, sive non, saltem de possibili; igitur et actus manebit continue 3o idem. Tercio, quia actus in patria non generabunt qualitates vel corumpent; quia si generabunt continue sine corupcione, in infinitum intenderentur, et si corumperent, perirent visiones beatitudinum, cum con- tinue defluerent, sicud motus; nec debilitas corporis vel 35 potencie erit ibi, sicud nec fastidium vel alienacio ex- 16. MS. cuius deest. 18. MS. dubium in marg. 20. MS. vtos pro ut oportet. 23. MS. intintu. 27. MS. itur. 21. I have been utterly unable to make out this paragraph, and the following. Some parts cannot even be construed. But what points most clearly to a serious corruption of the text, or to a considerable gap, is the fact that the argument proposes to prove that some mental acts are permanent, and concludes that all are successive!
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48 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. III. It is probable that some acts are permanent and some successive; but their duration does not affect their intensity. crescens. Ideo relinquitur quod ibi erunt actus sensuum, sine motu concomitante, et per consequens, cum actus sensitivi, ut prius declaratum est: igitur, iuxta argumen- tum proximum omnes sunt successivi, cum non stat successivum et permanens esse eiusdem speciei specia- lissime. Similiter, omnes tales actus temporanei in patria sunt longi et sic magis recte diuturnitatis: igitur sunt suc- cessivi. Consequencia videtur per hoc, quod non est racio significanda quare pena vel leticia permanens 10 foret longa pocius quam quecunque pars orbis vel lu- minis: cum tamen pene inferni dicuntur infinite, et in- finitum maiores pene vel leticie sempiterne quam pene temporales intenciores et maiores mole. Relinquitur igitur quod sint magne diuturnitate, sicud tempus et 15 motus, et per consequens successive. Similiter, subducto omni motu preter ymaginacionem et sensacionem dampnati sine variacione actus vel quali- tatis inducte foret tempus consequens ymaginacionem, sicud videtur commentator dicere in quarto phisicorum; 20 sed tunc non esset prius vel posterius, nisi quoad partes pene fuerit successio: igitur in qualibet tali pena est successio parcium, et per consequens in omni leticia accidentali. Assumptum videtur per hoc, quod aliter non essent pene dampnatorum infinite proporcionate de 25 meritis punitorum, cum non excedant penam horalem: quod est contra iustum distributorem penarum et pre- miorum; nec aliter generaretur fastidium ex diuturnitate pene, cum apparet homini longa pena; et cum non sic F. 61" esset casus apparicionis quoad ymaginativam non est 30 causa fingenda. Pro isto probabiliter dici potest quod alii actus sunt permanentes et alii successivi, tam in patria, quam in via. Et illi qui sunt permanentes, quamvis sint eiusdem speciei cum aliis successivis, non sunt magni propter 35 diuturnitatem. Credo tamen quod post diem iudicii, tam pena, quam leticia, erit magna et successiva; quia tunc erit tempus, quamvis non per motus illorum orbium, sed quadam laude successiva dei: de qua laude, utrum In Heaven the praise of God erit voce tali qualem musici ponunt causari in orbibus 40 will be successive; ex conneccione vel proporcione suarum parcium, vel whether 1. MS. seSII = succesivi? 3. MS. sesti.
48 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. III. It is probable that some acts are permanent and some successive; but their duration does not affect their intensity. crescens. Ideo relinquitur quod ibi erunt actus sensuum, sine motu concomitante, et per consequens, cum actus sensitivi, ut prius declaratum est: igitur, iuxta argumen- tum proximum omnes sunt successivi, cum non stat successivum et permanens esse eiusdem speciei specia- lissime. Similiter, omnes tales actus temporanei in patria sunt longi et sic magis recte diuturnitatis: igitur sunt suc- cessivi. Consequencia videtur per hoc, quod non est racio significanda quare pena vel leticia permanens 10 foret longa pocius quam quecunque pars orbis vel lu- minis: cum tamen pene inferni dicuntur infinite, et in- finitum maiores pene vel leticie sempiterne quam pene temporales intenciores et maiores mole. Relinquitur igitur quod sint magne diuturnitate, sicud tempus et 15 motus, et per consequens successive. Similiter, subducto omni motu preter ymaginacionem et sensacionem dampnati sine variacione actus vel quali- tatis inducte foret tempus consequens ymaginacionem, sicud videtur commentator dicere in quarto phisicorum; 20 sed tunc non esset prius vel posterius, nisi quoad partes pene fuerit successio: igitur in qualibet tali pena est successio parcium, et per consequens in omni leticia accidentali. Assumptum videtur per hoc, quod aliter non essent pene dampnatorum infinite proporcionate de 25 meritis punitorum, cum non excedant penam horalem: quod est contra iustum distributorem penarum et pre- miorum; nec aliter generaretur fastidium ex diuturnitate pene, cum apparet homini longa pena; et cum non sic F. 61" esset casus apparicionis quoad ymaginativam non est 30 causa fingenda. Pro isto probabiliter dici potest quod alii actus sunt permanentes et alii successivi, tam in patria, quam in via. Et illi qui sunt permanentes, quamvis sint eiusdem speciei cum aliis successivis, non sunt magni propter 35 diuturnitatem. Credo tamen quod post diem iudicii, tam pena, quam leticia, erit magna et successiva; quia tunc erit tempus, quamvis non per motus illorum orbium, sed quadam laude successiva dei: de qua laude, utrum In Heaven the praise of God erit voce tali qualem musici ponunt causari in orbibus 40 will be successive; ex conneccione vel proporcione suarum parcium, vel whether 1. MS. seSII = succesivi? 3. MS. sesti.
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CAP. III. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 49 quomodolibet aliter, est grandis sermo, et mihi am-proceeding from the music of biguus. Quomodocunque igitur loquamur de actibus the spheres, is a doubtful point. anime, semper habent motus sibi corespondentes, quam- vis Barlay [et] precipuis logicis videatur quod auctor 5 sit intelligendus de accionibus corporis quod omnes tales sunt in motu. Tripliciter enim accipitur motus in com- muni, sicud dictum est de alteracione. Quandoque enim accipitur proprie pro mutacione successiva vel subita, qua motum adquirit sibi, vel deperdit substanciam, to qualitatem, vel quantitatem, sicud in postpredicamentis motus species ponit philosophus esse sex. Secundo modo accipitur largius, includendo variacionem factam per creacionem vel adnihilacionem. Tercio, largissime sumi- tur, includendo essencialem limitacionem passivam a 15 causa superiori naturaliter cognita; sicud philosophi accipiunt, quando dicunt inclusas motrices orbium mo- veri a deo tanquam ab amato et desiderato, de quanto limitantur ab illo apprehendendo sub racione amati finis bene ordinantis, quod sic se habeant modo orbes aut in this last 20 quomodolibet aliter, laudando deum. Et certum est sense, the quod, sic loquendo, omnes beati perpetuo movebuntur. Blessed are everlastingly in Et patet quod, ut oportet, omnis accio est in motu. motion ; Hoc tamen credo, quod erit successio in celo post and thus action consists in iudicium, a qua causabitur tempus; quia non credo movement. 25 quod tempus mensurans gaudia beatorum erit passio penarum vel mocionum successivorum dampnatorum; set de [hoc] alias erit sermo. Et sic, ut prius dicitur, con- cedo quod sive loquamur de ente permanente, sive de ente successivo, dummodo sit permanens vel tempora- 3o neum, quod eius generacio posita distinguitur ab ipso. Ad quintum dicitur quod non est inconsequens eosdem actus in communi vel in specie redire quotienscunque. Sed duplex est hic dubitacio: prima de principiis in- or as the otherness consequent upon creation or annihilation, or as the tendency of any being towards its cause, by which it is limited ; Movement may be understood either as a change (successive or instantaneous), 5. MS. corres pro corporis. 27. MS. hoc deest. 4. MS. ct deest. 2. MS. ad 5m in marg. (5) Mental acts, specifically the same, may recur ; the question is, a) what differentiates one from another, and 4. Barlay. Perhaps the same as Walter Burley. 22. Wy- clif's distinction, by which he manages to admit that every act consists in movement, appears here to be over-subtle. The two latter species of movement are not real, for in neither case is there a real change. In Creation, for instance, Scholastics say that the change from nothingness to Being (the terminus a quo not existing in fact) is not a real change. It would follow that in such cases the acts would not be real: which it was certainly not Wyclif's intention to prove.
CAP. III. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 49 quomodolibet aliter, est grandis sermo, et mihi am-proceeding from the music of biguus. Quomodocunque igitur loquamur de actibus the spheres, is a doubtful point. anime, semper habent motus sibi corespondentes, quam- vis Barlay [et] precipuis logicis videatur quod auctor 5 sit intelligendus de accionibus corporis quod omnes tales sunt in motu. Tripliciter enim accipitur motus in com- muni, sicud dictum est de alteracione. Quandoque enim accipitur proprie pro mutacione successiva vel subita, qua motum adquirit sibi, vel deperdit substanciam, to qualitatem, vel quantitatem, sicud in postpredicamentis motus species ponit philosophus esse sex. Secundo modo accipitur largius, includendo variacionem factam per creacionem vel adnihilacionem. Tercio, largissime sumi- tur, includendo essencialem limitacionem passivam a 15 causa superiori naturaliter cognita; sicud philosophi accipiunt, quando dicunt inclusas motrices orbium mo- veri a deo tanquam ab amato et desiderato, de quanto limitantur ab illo apprehendendo sub racione amati finis bene ordinantis, quod sic se habeant modo orbes aut in this last 20 quomodolibet aliter, laudando deum. Et certum est sense, the quod, sic loquendo, omnes beati perpetuo movebuntur. Blessed are everlastingly in Et patet quod, ut oportet, omnis accio est in motu. motion ; Hoc tamen credo, quod erit successio in celo post and thus action consists in iudicium, a qua causabitur tempus; quia non credo movement. 25 quod tempus mensurans gaudia beatorum erit passio penarum vel mocionum successivorum dampnatorum; set de [hoc] alias erit sermo. Et sic, ut prius dicitur, con- cedo quod sive loquamur de ente permanente, sive de ente successivo, dummodo sit permanens vel tempora- 3o neum, quod eius generacio posita distinguitur ab ipso. Ad quintum dicitur quod non est inconsequens eosdem actus in communi vel in specie redire quotienscunque. Sed duplex est hic dubitacio: prima de principiis in- or as the otherness consequent upon creation or annihilation, or as the tendency of any being towards its cause, by which it is limited ; Movement may be understood either as a change (successive or instantaneous), 5. MS. corres pro corporis. 27. MS. hoc deest. 4. MS. ct deest. 2. MS. ad 5m in marg. (5) Mental acts, specifically the same, may recur ; the question is, a) what differentiates one from another, and 4. Barlay. Perhaps the same as Walter Burley. 22. Wy- clif's distinction, by which he manages to admit that every act consists in movement, appears here to be over-subtle. The two latter species of movement are not real, for in neither case is there a real change. In Creation, for instance, Scholastics say that the change from nothingness to Being (the terminus a quo not existing in fact) is not a real change. It would follow that in such cases the acts would not be real: which it was certainly not Wyclif's intention to prove.
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50 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. III. b) whether the dividuandi actus; secunda, si possunt idem actus, quan- same individual act can recur. tumlibet singulares, redire idem in numero. a) Acts are Quoad illum, dicitur quod omnes actus successivi differentiated by individuantur a suis propriis subiectis et temporibus the difference in their subjects, mensurantibus, ut patet quinto phisicorum, capitulo de 5 and in the times at which they unitate motus, ubi dicitur quod ad unitatem numeralem are elicied. motus requiritur unitas numeralis subiecti et spatii, et The same temporis. Unde, quamvis in eodem tempore idem esset movement, made here and multiplicatum hic et Rome, adhuc illo moto localiter in Rome, foret alius motus hic et alius ibi, situs autem non potest 10 would be differentiated by multiplicari. De actu autem summe instantaneo, patet the difference in space: time can quod individuatur ab instanti, ita quod non esset ille F. 62 be in many actus si in alio instanti esset elicitus de actu perma- places at once, but place nente. Dicitur quod non individuatur a tempore, quia, cannot. quocunque instanti temporis dato, ille actus potest 15 As to instantaneous manere sine illo; sed quilibet talis [in]dividuatur ex suo acts, they are differentiated, subiecto vel obiecto vel saltem equevalenter, et ex hoc not by time, but quod est vel fuit in tali instanti generatus. Unde, posito by the instant in which they quod idem subiectum eliceret duos actus de eodem occur, or begin to obiecto secundum eandem racionem, unum prius et 20 occur. alium posterius, et utrumque permanentem, adhuc differret unus a relico per hoc quod sunt actus qui in diversis instantibus inceperunt. Et ideo notabiliter loquuntur illi qui cum Porfirio dicunt quod principia vel condiciones individuantes, quas Avicenna vocat appen-25 dicias materie, sunt hic et nunc: id est, ubicacio et quandalitas. Tempus autem et situs per se mensurantur sine accidentibus illis inherentibus, a quibus indivi- duarentur, quia aliter esset processus in infinitum in principiis individuandi. Substancie autem quecunque com-30 posite ex materia et forma individuantur ex suis prin- cipiis, scilicet ex materia et forma, et specialiter si quelibet singularis materia sit illis accidentalis, tunc in- dividuantur a suis formis. Et materia cum forma indi- viduantur ex se, sic quod non sit ulterius principium 35 And God is individuandi preter suas partes vel deum. Ipse enim also that which individuates individuat omnem rem causatam, sicut et omnem bonum every being. In general, the principles of individuation are the here and the now, for acts. Substances consisting of matter and form are individuated by both, or by their forms alone. 9. MS. romc pro Rome. 16. MS. in deest. 25. MS. amma. 21. Permanentem. Wyclif is speaking of instantaneous acts. But Scholastics do not understand by instant only the instant of time, but also the duration of an unchanging act, which may be equivalent to a very long time God's eternity is called an instant, because He has no successive acts of thought,
50 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. III. b) whether the dividuandi actus; secunda, si possunt idem actus, quan- same individual act can recur. tumlibet singulares, redire idem in numero. a) Acts are Quoad illum, dicitur quod omnes actus successivi differentiated by individuantur a suis propriis subiectis et temporibus the difference in their subjects, mensurantibus, ut patet quinto phisicorum, capitulo de 5 and in the times at which they unitate motus, ubi dicitur quod ad unitatem numeralem are elicied. motus requiritur unitas numeralis subiecti et spatii, et The same temporis. Unde, quamvis in eodem tempore idem esset movement, made here and multiplicatum hic et Rome, adhuc illo moto localiter in Rome, foret alius motus hic et alius ibi, situs autem non potest 10 would be differentiated by multiplicari. De actu autem summe instantaneo, patet the difference in space: time can quod individuatur ab instanti, ita quod non esset ille F. 62 be in many actus si in alio instanti esset elicitus de actu perma- places at once, but place nente. Dicitur quod non individuatur a tempore, quia, cannot. quocunque instanti temporis dato, ille actus potest 15 As to instantaneous manere sine illo; sed quilibet talis [in]dividuatur ex suo acts, they are differentiated, subiecto vel obiecto vel saltem equevalenter, et ex hoc not by time, but quod est vel fuit in tali instanti generatus. Unde, posito by the instant in which they quod idem subiectum eliceret duos actus de eodem occur, or begin to obiecto secundum eandem racionem, unum prius et 20 occur. alium posterius, et utrumque permanentem, adhuc differret unus a relico per hoc quod sunt actus qui in diversis instantibus inceperunt. Et ideo notabiliter loquuntur illi qui cum Porfirio dicunt quod principia vel condiciones individuantes, quas Avicenna vocat appen-25 dicias materie, sunt hic et nunc: id est, ubicacio et quandalitas. Tempus autem et situs per se mensurantur sine accidentibus illis inherentibus, a quibus indivi- duarentur, quia aliter esset processus in infinitum in principiis individuandi. Substancie autem quecunque com-30 posite ex materia et forma individuantur ex suis prin- cipiis, scilicet ex materia et forma, et specialiter si quelibet singularis materia sit illis accidentalis, tunc in- dividuantur a suis formis. Et materia cum forma indi- viduantur ex se, sic quod non sit ulterius principium 35 And God is individuandi preter suas partes vel deum. Ipse enim also that which individuates individuat omnem rem causatam, sicut et omnem bonum every being. In general, the principles of individuation are the here and the now, for acts. Substances consisting of matter and form are individuated by both, or by their forms alone. 9. MS. romc pro Rome. 16. MS. in deest. 25. MS. amma. 21. Permanentem. Wyclif is speaking of instantaneous acts. But Scholastics do not understand by instant only the instant of time, but also the duration of an unchanging act, which may be equivalent to a very long time God's eternity is called an instant, because He has no successive acts of thought,
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CAP. III. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 51 actum anime terminat, quamvis non in racione subiecti primarii talis actus; cum sic terminare actum intelli- gendi sit esse illud quod principaliter apprehenditur illo actu, sicud sunt universalia respectu actuum communium, et singularia respectu actuum singularium. In hoc igitur substancie vel essencie, que conveniunt per se existere quoad suas individuaciones, differunt ab accidentibus, quod ipse non individuantur a tempore quoad fieri, nec quoad esse; sic quod, si eedem anime redirent in per- 10 magno anno Platonis quantitate 36 milia annorum, actuantes sive eandem materiam sive diversam, redirent idem homines numero, et corespondenter de quibus- cunque formis substancialibus redeuntibus. Utrum autem forma substancialis possit redire eadem 15 numero, est alterius negocii. Ex omnibus istis narratis patet quod omnis individuacio causatur a primo prin- cipio, quod non proprie est individuum, quia non est per se vel per accidens in aliqua specie. Et ex istis patet responsio ad secundam difficultatem 20 et formam compositi argumenti: quia a actus ponit me sic intelligere Socratem et illa que consecuntur ad hoc, inter que unum individuans illum actum est, quod ipse tunc incepit esse. Nec video quod esset possibile duos actus elici pro eodem instanti simillime primo de eodem 25 obiecto, et in eodem subiecto. Actus enim possunt habere partes et esse quantumlibet similes, dum unus terminatur ad unam partem primi obiecti, et alius ad aliam; sicud patet de actibus videndi et ymaginandi. Et ex istis videtur probabile quod nec actus peccatorum, nec illa 3o peccata que sunt privaciones redeunt in eodem numero, saltem nisi fuerint communia; de quibus concedit Lin- colniensis quod non solum unum genus peccati, sed qualecunque peccatum, potest redire idem quoad sub- F. 62' iectum et materiam, vel subiectum, sed non quoad 35 tempus individuans. Unde probabile videtur quod omne accidens per- manens vel successivum individuatur a quandalitate: ut quantitas qualitas, relacio etc., sic quod alia esset quan- titas vel qualitas, si produceretur in uno instanti quam 40 si produceretur in alio. Vel, secundum alios, antequam producatur est indifferens utrum in uno instanti vel Thus accidents differ from substances; for if souls could return to the same bodies, they would be the same in number, not- withstanding the lapse of time. The first principle of individuation, God, not coming under a species, is not properly an individual. b) It is impossible for the same act to recur, because we are conscious of each act as it happens at a given time; recurring, the time would be different, and the act too. It is probably time that gives individuality to any accident, though some think that an accident is in itself indifferent to time. 27. MS. primo.
CAP. III. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 51 actum anime terminat, quamvis non in racione subiecti primarii talis actus; cum sic terminare actum intelli- gendi sit esse illud quod principaliter apprehenditur illo actu, sicud sunt universalia respectu actuum communium, et singularia respectu actuum singularium. In hoc igitur substancie vel essencie, que conveniunt per se existere quoad suas individuaciones, differunt ab accidentibus, quod ipse non individuantur a tempore quoad fieri, nec quoad esse; sic quod, si eedem anime redirent in per- 10 magno anno Platonis quantitate 36 milia annorum, actuantes sive eandem materiam sive diversam, redirent idem homines numero, et corespondenter de quibus- cunque formis substancialibus redeuntibus. Utrum autem forma substancialis possit redire eadem 15 numero, est alterius negocii. Ex omnibus istis narratis patet quod omnis individuacio causatur a primo prin- cipio, quod non proprie est individuum, quia non est per se vel per accidens in aliqua specie. Et ex istis patet responsio ad secundam difficultatem 20 et formam compositi argumenti: quia a actus ponit me sic intelligere Socratem et illa que consecuntur ad hoc, inter que unum individuans illum actum est, quod ipse tunc incepit esse. Nec video quod esset possibile duos actus elici pro eodem instanti simillime primo de eodem 25 obiecto, et in eodem subiecto. Actus enim possunt habere partes et esse quantumlibet similes, dum unus terminatur ad unam partem primi obiecti, et alius ad aliam; sicud patet de actibus videndi et ymaginandi. Et ex istis videtur probabile quod nec actus peccatorum, nec illa 3o peccata que sunt privaciones redeunt in eodem numero, saltem nisi fuerint communia; de quibus concedit Lin- colniensis quod non solum unum genus peccati, sed qualecunque peccatum, potest redire idem quoad sub- F. 62' iectum et materiam, vel subiectum, sed non quoad 35 tempus individuans. Unde probabile videtur quod omne accidens per- manens vel successivum individuatur a quandalitate: ut quantitas qualitas, relacio etc., sic quod alia esset quan- titas vel qualitas, si produceretur in uno instanti quam 40 si produceretur in alio. Vel, secundum alios, antequam producatur est indifferens utrum in uno instanti vel Thus accidents differ from substances; for if souls could return to the same bodies, they would be the same in number, not- withstanding the lapse of time. The first principle of individuation, God, not coming under a species, is not properly an individual. b) It is impossible for the same act to recur, because we are conscious of each act as it happens at a given time; recurring, the time would be different, and the act too. It is probably time that gives individuality to any accident, though some think that an accident is in itself indifferent to time. 27. MS. primo.
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52 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. III. alio producatur, sed dum fuerit producta, tunc ideo est illa quantitas, quia est quantitas que tunc producebatur. Prior tamen responsio est mihi probabilior, quia aliter non esset alia illuminacio medii propter diversitatem temporis, nec alia quantitas vel qualitas, manente eodem 5 subiecto et conformitate gradus. Et sic dicitur de pec- The recurrence of the same sin catis redeuntibus quod qualelibet peccatum potest redire at different times means the idem quoad subiectum, quoad pretericionem actus, et recurrence of a new sin only quoad obligacionem ad penam propter omissionem different from penitencie; sed ex illa dimissione insurgit novum pec- 10 the former one by the violation catum omissionis; et sic incipit esse nova obligacio ad of a duty which penam novam et propter peccatum preteritum et propter is present. novam redicionem. (6) Every act is Ad sextum dicitur quod minor est falsa, cum omnis produced in actus anime producitur in ipsa anima, ut subiecto; sive 15 the soul, as in its subject. sit actus immanens. Et sic (secundum nolentes ampliare If we do not illum terminum terminare [ad] actus quibus apprehen- admit that mental acts are duntur vel appetuntur illa que non sunt) non termi- determined by objects which nantur ad illa, sed deus terminat illos actus in hoc do not exist, in quod facit illos esse finitos, sicud terminat quamlibet 20 the sense of apprehending creaturam quamvis equivoce a terminacione per ob- or tending towards them iectum. Alii autem dicunt (cum quibus non ego), quod we must say actus terminatur ad illud quod non est nec potest they are determined by esse. Actus igitur quibus apprehenduntur intenciones, God, or simply admit that what potencie, vel habitus, terminantur ad illos et non alii. 25 cannot exist may determine. Ad primam confirmacionem dicitur, ut patet 4° libro, (7) a) Each new quod inpossibile est animam elicere novum actum, nisi mental act implies a moveatur. Unde ad primum actum volendi inclinat change in the soul; but this naturaliter bonum volitum, quia primo omnium vult does not imply homo ens esse actu elicito; et sic aliter se habet nunc 30 that a new absolute entity quam ante. Sed non oportet quod nova res absoluta is evolved. sit generata, sicud patet 3° libro tractatu de motu: et solvitur prima difficultas. Ad secundam dicitur quod nullum agens potest actu b) There must be, before any act takes place, transeunte successivo quicquam producere, nisi habeat 35 a tendency 14. MS. ad 6m in marg. 17. MS. ad deest. 26. MS. I in marg. 34. MS. 2 in marg. 4. Illuminacio medii. If light were an instantaneous move- ment, the otherness of the illumination throughout the space between the sun and the earth could not be accounted for by time, supposing illumination to be in itself indifferent to the instant at which it took place. 15. Sive. The second sive failing, the text must be corrupt. But the sense reads well enough if we supply sive transiens.
52 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. III. alio producatur, sed dum fuerit producta, tunc ideo est illa quantitas, quia est quantitas que tunc producebatur. Prior tamen responsio est mihi probabilior, quia aliter non esset alia illuminacio medii propter diversitatem temporis, nec alia quantitas vel qualitas, manente eodem 5 subiecto et conformitate gradus. Et sic dicitur de pec- The recurrence of the same sin catis redeuntibus quod qualelibet peccatum potest redire at different times means the idem quoad subiectum, quoad pretericionem actus, et recurrence of a new sin only quoad obligacionem ad penam propter omissionem different from penitencie; sed ex illa dimissione insurgit novum pec- 10 the former one by the violation catum omissionis; et sic incipit esse nova obligacio ad of a duty which penam novam et propter peccatum preteritum et propter is present. novam redicionem. (6) Every act is Ad sextum dicitur quod minor est falsa, cum omnis produced in actus anime producitur in ipsa anima, ut subiecto; sive 15 the soul, as in its subject. sit actus immanens. Et sic (secundum nolentes ampliare If we do not illum terminum terminare [ad] actus quibus apprehen- admit that mental acts are duntur vel appetuntur illa que non sunt) non termi- determined by objects which nantur ad illa, sed deus terminat illos actus in hoc do not exist, in quod facit illos esse finitos, sicud terminat quamlibet 20 the sense of apprehending creaturam quamvis equivoce a terminacione per ob- or tending towards them iectum. Alii autem dicunt (cum quibus non ego), quod we must say actus terminatur ad illud quod non est nec potest they are determined by esse. Actus igitur quibus apprehenduntur intenciones, God, or simply admit that what potencie, vel habitus, terminantur ad illos et non alii. 25 cannot exist may determine. Ad primam confirmacionem dicitur, ut patet 4° libro, (7) a) Each new quod inpossibile est animam elicere novum actum, nisi mental act implies a moveatur. Unde ad primum actum volendi inclinat change in the soul; but this naturaliter bonum volitum, quia primo omnium vult does not imply homo ens esse actu elicito; et sic aliter se habet nunc 30 that a new absolute entity quam ante. Sed non oportet quod nova res absoluta is evolved. sit generata, sicud patet 3° libro tractatu de motu: et solvitur prima difficultas. Ad secundam dicitur quod nullum agens potest actu b) There must be, before any act takes place, transeunte successivo quicquam producere, nisi habeat 35 a tendency 14. MS. ad 6m in marg. 17. MS. ad deest. 26. MS. I in marg. 34. MS. 2 in marg. 4. Illuminacio medii. If light were an instantaneous move- ment, the otherness of the illumination throughout the space between the sun and the earth could not be accounted for by time, supposing illumination to be in itself indifferent to the instant at which it took place. 15. Sive. The second sive failing, the text must be corrupt. But the sense reads well enough if we supply sive transiens.
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CAP. III. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 53 F. 63* nisum, inclinacionem activam, vel quomodocunque aliter nominandum, precedentem naturaliter et causaliter tran- seuntem (sicud declaratum est libro 3°, de inclinacione ferri ad deorsum, que potest suspendi per alteracionem 5 adamantis, et potest manere sine hoc quod producat actum transeuntem apposito prohibente forciori). Quod autem anima non ita instanter producat actus successivos et transeuntes, sicud agencia minus nobilia, hoc est propter superioritatem sue nature in agendo. Si autem to non posset sine re potente per se existere noviter pro- ducta principiare motum (que res coefficeret motum) esset inperfeccionis in anima. c) When we Ad terciam dicitur quod magna diversitas est ponere speak of an act quod actus sit accidens respectivum, factivum et non as an accident we mean 15 activum, nec habens appetitum vel inclinacionem, nec merely that it is the subject potens esse vel facere sine subiecto, cum sit subiectum sic itself, quà agere; et ponere quod sit una res absoluta potens per active; and thus it has no power se existere, per se appetere, et per se agere, sicud in itself membrum hominis. Et ideo multa argumenta procedunt separately from the subject. 20 contra unum modum dicendi que non procedunt contra If we define it thus, arguments alium. Unde, quamvis vires vel potencie anime et actus that otherwise might have volendi vel appetendi sint causativi motuum et aliarum force, have operacionum sensibilium, habent tamen limitatos modos none. The powers of ex circumstanciis concurrentibus cum quibus possunt the soul may be said to cause 25 causare, et cum quibus non; et sic quoad genus velo- movement, but citatum diurnitatum et talium accidentalium quibus not independently causant. Et ideo dicunt naturales quod tales vires anime of dependent ab organis corporalibus, et hinc debilitantur, circumstances. Some even fortificantur, generantur et corumpuntur, secundum dispo- sepend upon the bodily 3o siciones in illis organis; non tamen sunt res absolute organs, and ard destroyed with potentes per se existere, quia sunt qualitates. Et sic them. dicitur quod saltans, cum devenerit ad extremum gradum A leaper, when at the highest altitudinis quem sufficit attingere uno saltu a solido point of his fulcimento, etsi vires, actus et organa sint equeposita, leap, can go no farther, not 35 deficit tamen virtus quam contraxit ex supposito: quia because strength, but (sicud alias probatum est) [est] dare in proiecto et reflexo because the supporting virtutem quandam successivam qua deffinite movetur ground, fails mobile secundum inclinacionem gravitatis. Sed falsum him; in like manner, our est concipere illam virtutem esse unum absolutum potens powers cannot act without 40 per se existere, quia vere illa virtus est mobile sufficere their subject. towards that act ; but that this tendency should require he existence of another being to produce its act, would put the soul on a level with matter. 13. MS. 3 in marg. 15. MS. accim. 36. MS. est deest. 38. MS. fovitu?
CAP. III. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 53 F. 63* nisum, inclinacionem activam, vel quomodocunque aliter nominandum, precedentem naturaliter et causaliter tran- seuntem (sicud declaratum est libro 3°, de inclinacione ferri ad deorsum, que potest suspendi per alteracionem 5 adamantis, et potest manere sine hoc quod producat actum transeuntem apposito prohibente forciori). Quod autem anima non ita instanter producat actus successivos et transeuntes, sicud agencia minus nobilia, hoc est propter superioritatem sue nature in agendo. Si autem to non posset sine re potente per se existere noviter pro- ducta principiare motum (que res coefficeret motum) esset inperfeccionis in anima. c) When we Ad terciam dicitur quod magna diversitas est ponere speak of an act quod actus sit accidens respectivum, factivum et non as an accident we mean 15 activum, nec habens appetitum vel inclinacionem, nec merely that it is the subject potens esse vel facere sine subiecto, cum sit subiectum sic itself, quà agere; et ponere quod sit una res absoluta potens per active; and thus it has no power se existere, per se appetere, et per se agere, sicud in itself membrum hominis. Et ideo multa argumenta procedunt separately from the subject. 20 contra unum modum dicendi que non procedunt contra If we define it thus, arguments alium. Unde, quamvis vires vel potencie anime et actus that otherwise might have volendi vel appetendi sint causativi motuum et aliarum force, have operacionum sensibilium, habent tamen limitatos modos none. The powers of ex circumstanciis concurrentibus cum quibus possunt the soul may be said to cause 25 causare, et cum quibus non; et sic quoad genus velo- movement, but citatum diurnitatum et talium accidentalium quibus not independently causant. Et ideo dicunt naturales quod tales vires anime of dependent ab organis corporalibus, et hinc debilitantur, circumstances. Some even fortificantur, generantur et corumpuntur, secundum dispo- sepend upon the bodily 3o siciones in illis organis; non tamen sunt res absolute organs, and ard destroyed with potentes per se existere, quia sunt qualitates. Et sic them. dicitur quod saltans, cum devenerit ad extremum gradum A leaper, when at the highest altitudinis quem sufficit attingere uno saltu a solido point of his fulcimento, etsi vires, actus et organa sint equeposita, leap, can go no farther, not 35 deficit tamen virtus quam contraxit ex supposito: quia because strength, but (sicud alias probatum est) [est] dare in proiecto et reflexo because the supporting virtutem quandam successivam qua deffinite movetur ground, fails mobile secundum inclinacionem gravitatis. Sed falsum him; in like manner, our est concipere illam virtutem esse unum absolutum potens powers cannot act without 40 per se existere, quia vere illa virtus est mobile sufficere their subject. towards that act ; but that this tendency should require he existence of another being to produce its act, would put the soul on a level with matter. 13. MS. 3 in marg. 15. MS. accim. 36. MS. est deest. 38. MS. fovitu?
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54. JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. III. ex pretericione proieccionis vel reflexionis in talem vel talem actum, Et patet quomodo proporcio quam motus consequitur continue variatur proporcionaliter ad varia- cionem motus. properly speak Ad quartum dubium dicitur quod nullus actus potest of an act being creari vel adnihilari, utendo proprie terminis. Non enim anmihilatea; potest deus quemquam actum destruere, nisi servando destroyed, its subiectum propinquum vel remotum. Et habent actus subject must partes successivas, sicud dictum est de motu; et corespon- remain. i Ithas successive denter. dicendum est ad argumenta hic afferenda in 10 parts, like materia de successione actuum, sicud dictum est in and the — materia de motu. Sed quoad partes quantitativas actuum against them guoad molem est difficultas magna. Aliqui enim habent are similar to magnitudinem quoad molem, ut tactus, si virtus tactiva those against . Le . : . = motion. Sit extensa; et aliqui habent magnitudinem obiectivam 15 Som tative’ et non subiectivam, ut visio et ceteri actus facti per arts, as touch ; y; * 1: . nan ANS Pond i vede Virtutes multiplicatas, cum quibus illi actus multipli quantity in cantur, et individuati ab obiectis a quibus individuantur their 0 subject et dependent. Partes enim talium actuum componunt as sight. unum actum magnum, non subiective, sed obiective. 20 ‚The ancients Et hinc credo antiquos posuisse virtutem egredi ab agı a . . . . the act of sight, OTgano cum actu suo et terminari ad obiectum; et sic issuing from iri . the organ, COBnOscere per contactum quemdam spiritualem; et ended inits animam, immo hominem, esse quodammodo cum amante: object . . . . . . - knowledge et iste sensus est satis bonus. De partibus intensivis 25 being a ; . : . . spiritual actuum dicendum est proporcionaliter sicud dictum est contact, and de partibus intensivis qualitatum. Hoc tamen notandum, love, a spiritual . t presence. quod infiniti actus concurrunt ad unum actum causandum, Intensive parts i : . A belong to acts, qui non sunt partes eius, sed essencie extrinsece, ut as intensity actus propriorum sensibilium concurrunt | ad causandum F. 63* elongs to quality. But manythings may contribute — 5. MS. 4 in marg. 8. MS. actum. 10. MS. hinc ‘inde si (end of line) enda. 24. Cum amante. Not cum amato, because it was believed that, whereas knowledge made the subject in a way other from itself (intellectus . .. natus fferi omnia) love drew the loved object somehow into the subject. 3o. Propriorum .. . com- munium et per accidens sensibilia. Propria sensibilia are those qualities which only one sense can directly perceive, as colour for sight, sound for hearing etc. Communia are those which several senses directly perceive; v. g. pleasure or pain. Per accidens are those which are perceived by several senses not directly, but by means of the proprium. Thus shape is discerned by the eye, because it discerns colours that happen to have this or that shape; and by the touch, which perceives warmth and hardness together with a certain shape.
54. JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. III. ex pretericione proieccionis vel reflexionis in talem vel talem actum, Et patet quomodo proporcio quam motus consequitur continue variatur proporcionaliter ad varia- cionem motus. properly speak Ad quartum dubium dicitur quod nullus actus potest of an act being creari vel adnihilari, utendo proprie terminis. Non enim anmihilatea; potest deus quemquam actum destruere, nisi servando destroyed, its subiectum propinquum vel remotum. Et habent actus subject must partes successivas, sicud dictum est de motu; et corespon- remain. i Ithas successive denter. dicendum est ad argumenta hic afferenda in 10 parts, like materia de successione actuum, sicud dictum est in and the — materia de motu. Sed quoad partes quantitativas actuum against them guoad molem est difficultas magna. Aliqui enim habent are similar to magnitudinem quoad molem, ut tactus, si virtus tactiva those against . Le . : . = motion. Sit extensa; et aliqui habent magnitudinem obiectivam 15 Som tative’ et non subiectivam, ut visio et ceteri actus facti per arts, as touch ; y; * 1: . nan ANS Pond i vede Virtutes multiplicatas, cum quibus illi actus multipli quantity in cantur, et individuati ab obiectis a quibus individuantur their 0 subject et dependent. Partes enim talium actuum componunt as sight. unum actum magnum, non subiective, sed obiective. 20 ‚The ancients Et hinc credo antiquos posuisse virtutem egredi ab agı a . . . . the act of sight, OTgano cum actu suo et terminari ad obiectum; et sic issuing from iri . the organ, COBnOscere per contactum quemdam spiritualem; et ended inits animam, immo hominem, esse quodammodo cum amante: object . . . . . . - knowledge et iste sensus est satis bonus. De partibus intensivis 25 being a ; . : . . spiritual actuum dicendum est proporcionaliter sicud dictum est contact, and de partibus intensivis qualitatum. Hoc tamen notandum, love, a spiritual . t presence. quod infiniti actus concurrunt ad unum actum causandum, Intensive parts i : . A belong to acts, qui non sunt partes eius, sed essencie extrinsece, ut as intensity actus propriorum sensibilium concurrunt | ad causandum F. 63* elongs to quality. But manythings may contribute — 5. MS. 4 in marg. 8. MS. actum. 10. MS. hinc ‘inde si (end of line) enda. 24. Cum amante. Not cum amato, because it was believed that, whereas knowledge made the subject in a way other from itself (intellectus . .. natus fferi omnia) love drew the loved object somehow into the subject. 3o. Propriorum .. . com- munium et per accidens sensibilia. Propria sensibilia are those qualities which only one sense can directly perceive, as colour for sight, sound for hearing etc. Communia are those which several senses directly perceive; v. g. pleasure or pain. Per accidens are those which are perceived by several senses not directly, but by means of the proprium. Thus shape is discerned by the eye, because it discerns colours that happen to have this or that shape; and by the touch, which perceives warmth and hardness together with a certain shape.
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CAP. III. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 55 actus sensibilium communium et per accidens sensibilium. to form an act Sed actus terminatus ad universale non habet singulares paris of that act actus sensibilium communium et per accidens sensibilium themselves; and the same act terminatos ad singularia illius universalis. Immo, idem may becontuscd 5actus vel est actus confusus cuiuslibet illorum singula- °F distinct, as rium et distinctus respectu universalis primo apprehensi. "niversalobject, Et sic idem actus respectu alicorum est distinctus, et singulars. respectu aliorum est confusus; et sic actus diversitate specificantur et sorciuntur alias condiciones ex obiectis 10ad que principaliter terminantur. Idem enim est in- telligere in universali illum et illum. Aliud tamen est distincte intelligere vel signare illum, et aliud sic in- telligere illum. Quandoque autem distinxi illas confusas e) Is alrcady significaciones a distincta; et sic de actibus. Et modo he preceding ı5apparet mihi quod non oportet Ad quintum, etc. remarks. Ad sextum dicitur quod multi actus sunt insepara- f) We say that biliter mali et tamen boni, cum claudit contradiccionem essentially bad. ens esse nisi fuerit bonum. Unde dupliciter dicitur ali- , 8$ acts; yet as entities, thcy quid esse bonum vel malum: scilicet, formaliter, ab are good. 20 intrinseco (vel per se) sicud est omnis creatura bona, ig es Eq et omne positivum non peccatum; vel aliter per accidens, formal goodness, occasionaliter, et ab extrinseco, sicud peccata que deus and extrinsic non permitteret esse, nisi proficerent uno modo vel alio, adna mial cum ens et bonum convertuntur. Unde videtur mihi badness. 25 quod doctor profundus minimam realitatem ponit in actibus. Bene tamen probat quod omnes actus alico Bradwardine modo sunt boni; non tamen probat quod omnes mali Proven wat actus per accidens sunt mali; sicud patet de actibus , every act is . . 0. . . . . . somehow good, voluntatis et aliquibus actibus extrinsecis, Infinitos enim but not that all . Lo b 3o actus, tam extrinsecos quam intrinsecos, deus non pos- accidentally set de potencia absoluta facere malos, et infinitos p dad. are contingit signare quod deus non posset facere forma- numberless acts liter bonos. Aliquos autem posset deus facere bonos et infinite power post malos et econtra; non tamen est possibile aliguem render good 35esse actum quin genus eius sit bonum. Et sic vult and others that Anselmus nullum actum esse per se malum in quantum render formally est illius generis, Unde malos actus et peccata dicunt "EUM sancti frequenter non esse, eciam nec habere causas genetically efficientes, sed defficientes; nec esse verum quod de- "Prod" 1 i 1 1 specifically it 40 ficiunt sed falsum, quamvis deficiant, Et per ista tolluntur mav not be so. Thus it is said that sins do not > . exist, and have 16. MS. 6 in marg. — 3i. MS. non malos. no ethcient, but rather deficient 25. See note, end of Chapt. IL causes.
CAP. III. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 55 actus sensibilium communium et per accidens sensibilium. to form an act Sed actus terminatus ad universale non habet singulares paris of that act actus sensibilium communium et per accidens sensibilium themselves; and the same act terminatos ad singularia illius universalis. Immo, idem may becontuscd 5actus vel est actus confusus cuiuslibet illorum singula- °F distinct, as rium et distinctus respectu universalis primo apprehensi. "niversalobject, Et sic idem actus respectu alicorum est distinctus, et singulars. respectu aliorum est confusus; et sic actus diversitate specificantur et sorciuntur alias condiciones ex obiectis 10ad que principaliter terminantur. Idem enim est in- telligere in universali illum et illum. Aliud tamen est distincte intelligere vel signare illum, et aliud sic in- telligere illum. Quandoque autem distinxi illas confusas e) Is alrcady significaciones a distincta; et sic de actibus. Et modo he preceding ı5apparet mihi quod non oportet Ad quintum, etc. remarks. Ad sextum dicitur quod multi actus sunt insepara- f) We say that biliter mali et tamen boni, cum claudit contradiccionem essentially bad. ens esse nisi fuerit bonum. Unde dupliciter dicitur ali- , 8$ acts; yet as entities, thcy quid esse bonum vel malum: scilicet, formaliter, ab are good. 20 intrinseco (vel per se) sicud est omnis creatura bona, ig es Eq et omne positivum non peccatum; vel aliter per accidens, formal goodness, occasionaliter, et ab extrinseco, sicud peccata que deus and extrinsic non permitteret esse, nisi proficerent uno modo vel alio, adna mial cum ens et bonum convertuntur. Unde videtur mihi badness. 25 quod doctor profundus minimam realitatem ponit in actibus. Bene tamen probat quod omnes actus alico Bradwardine modo sunt boni; non tamen probat quod omnes mali Proven wat actus per accidens sunt mali; sicud patet de actibus , every act is . . 0. . . . . . somehow good, voluntatis et aliquibus actibus extrinsecis, Infinitos enim but not that all . Lo b 3o actus, tam extrinsecos quam intrinsecos, deus non pos- accidentally set de potencia absoluta facere malos, et infinitos p dad. are contingit signare quod deus non posset facere forma- numberless acts liter bonos. Aliquos autem posset deus facere bonos et infinite power post malos et econtra; non tamen est possibile aliguem render good 35esse actum quin genus eius sit bonum. Et sic vult and others that Anselmus nullum actum esse per se malum in quantum render formally est illius generis, Unde malos actus et peccata dicunt "EUM sancti frequenter non esse, eciam nec habere causas genetically efficientes, sed defficientes; nec esse verum quod de- "Prod" 1 i 1 1 specifically it 40 ficiunt sed falsum, quamvis deficiant, Et per ista tolluntur mav not be so. Thus it is said that sins do not > . exist, and have 16. MS. 6 in marg. — 3i. MS. non malos. no ethcient, but rather deficient 25. See note, end of Chapt. IL causes.
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56 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. III. Bradwardine, multe autoritates. Nec probat doctor per locum ab has neither autoritate vel racione quod omnis actus sit per se bonus, reasons nor authority to ut videtur ipsum intendere, sicut patet discurrendo per prove that all acts are argumenta sua; nec probat quod deus facit omnem essentially talem actum, ut dictum est 3° libro capitulo sexto, et 5 good. dicetur super libro sentenciarum alibi, si deus dederit. Hatred of God Actus igitur invidendi, odiendi deum, mentiendi, vel is essentially bad, though the fraudandi, sunt inseparabiliter mali, si actus extrinseci outward act possunt vel esse boni, vel saltem habere consimiles cum may be indifferent aliis circumstanciis bonos. Sed pro intellectu Anselmi 10 For the right understanding de conceptu virginali 3° et de casu diaboli 19° et 20° of what Anselm et aliorum loquencium de actibus, ponendo quod sunt says, remember that he posits nature et per se boni, notandum est diligenter quod real Universals, which are good illi ponunt universalia ex parte rei, et omne ens posi- in themselves: thus hatred is tivum habens aliquod universale bonum ponunt per se 15 good, because bonum. Et sic odium in genere dicerent bonum, quia it universally includes hatred odium peccati est bonum. Non tamen excluditur quin of sin; yet hatred of God claudat] contradiccionem quod odium dei sit malum. F. 64* is not denied to Et sic dicunt deum facere talia mala in quantum per- be evil. Thus God may mittit, dum possit prohibere. Et quandoque negant 20 be said either to do evil, or not illud, intelligendo positive faccionem. Omne enim posi- to do it, as we tivum dicerent habere universalem essenciam bonam, consider permission or et sic esse per se bonum; et tamen infinita singularia active production of illius universalis dicerent inseparabiliter mala; ut velle evil. similari deo non est simpliciter malum, sed velle ut 25 Nothing taken indeterminately primus angelus voluit fuit inseparabiliter malum. Unde is simply wrong; to wish nullum positivum ponunt simpliciter iniustum, quia non to be like God in quantum tale est iniustum, sed privaciones (ut peccata is not evil, but to wish it as et malicie) sunt per se mala quia in quantum huius- Lucifer did, is modi. Et sic privaciones dicunt deum non facere; et 30 evil. What makes illa positiva de actibus dicunt deum facere. Quia igitur against perfection in sufficit ad per se et formaliter in existenciam alicuius any act is not of denominacionis, dato singulari quod eius genus sit per God's doing; what makes for se huiusmodi vel eius passio; ideo dicunt quod omnis it 1s. accio est per se bona, et per accidens est mala, quia 35 This leads these doctors to say per deformitatem sibi a posteriori inexistentem, que that everything evil is (cum sit prefixum non, sicud est totum genus malicie) accidentally so; nec est genus, actus, nec passio, vel proprietas, sed for the prefix that expresses accidens privativum alicui accidenti separabiliter et deprivation is posterior and alteri inseparabiliter inexistens. Et ideo consequitur quod 40 accidental to the nullum positivum est per se malum vel privativum de- genus. Evil may thus by determination inhere 37. MS. p' pro prefixum.
56 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. III. Bradwardine, multe autoritates. Nec probat doctor per locum ab has neither autoritate vel racione quod omnis actus sit per se bonus, reasons nor authority to ut videtur ipsum intendere, sicut patet discurrendo per prove that all acts are argumenta sua; nec probat quod deus facit omnem essentially talem actum, ut dictum est 3° libro capitulo sexto, et 5 good. dicetur super libro sentenciarum alibi, si deus dederit. Hatred of God Actus igitur invidendi, odiendi deum, mentiendi, vel is essentially bad, though the fraudandi, sunt inseparabiliter mali, si actus extrinseci outward act possunt vel esse boni, vel saltem habere consimiles cum may be indifferent aliis circumstanciis bonos. Sed pro intellectu Anselmi 10 For the right understanding de conceptu virginali 3° et de casu diaboli 19° et 20° of what Anselm et aliorum loquencium de actibus, ponendo quod sunt says, remember that he posits nature et per se boni, notandum est diligenter quod real Universals, which are good illi ponunt universalia ex parte rei, et omne ens posi- in themselves: thus hatred is tivum habens aliquod universale bonum ponunt per se 15 good, because bonum. Et sic odium in genere dicerent bonum, quia it universally includes hatred odium peccati est bonum. Non tamen excluditur quin of sin; yet hatred of God claudat] contradiccionem quod odium dei sit malum. F. 64* is not denied to Et sic dicunt deum facere talia mala in quantum per- be evil. Thus God may mittit, dum possit prohibere. Et quandoque negant 20 be said either to do evil, or not illud, intelligendo positive faccionem. Omne enim posi- to do it, as we tivum dicerent habere universalem essenciam bonam, consider permission or et sic esse per se bonum; et tamen infinita singularia active production of illius universalis dicerent inseparabiliter mala; ut velle evil. similari deo non est simpliciter malum, sed velle ut 25 Nothing taken indeterminately primus angelus voluit fuit inseparabiliter malum. Unde is simply wrong; to wish nullum positivum ponunt simpliciter iniustum, quia non to be like God in quantum tale est iniustum, sed privaciones (ut peccata is not evil, but to wish it as et malicie) sunt per se mala quia in quantum huius- Lucifer did, is modi. Et sic privaciones dicunt deum non facere; et 30 evil. What makes illa positiva de actibus dicunt deum facere. Quia igitur against perfection in sufficit ad per se et formaliter in existenciam alicuius any act is not of denominacionis, dato singulari quod eius genus sit per God's doing; what makes for se huiusmodi vel eius passio; ideo dicunt quod omnis it 1s. accio est per se bona, et per accidens est mala, quia 35 This leads these doctors to say per deformitatem sibi a posteriori inexistentem, que that everything evil is (cum sit prefixum non, sicud est totum genus malicie) accidentally so; nec est genus, actus, nec passio, vel proprietas, sed for the prefix that expresses accidens privativum alicui accidenti separabiliter et deprivation is posterior and alteri inseparabiliter inexistens. Et ideo consequitur quod 40 accidental to the nullum positivum est per se malum vel privativum de- genus. Evil may thus by determination inhere 37. MS. p' pro prefixum.
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CAP. III. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 57 nominative, quamvis inseparabiliter sit tale. Multe enim inseparably in a positive thing sunt predicaciones necessarie denominaciones insepara- which in itself and without the biliter inexistentes, que non proprie sunt per se nec per determination, accidens; vel, si dicantur per accidens, hoc intelligitur is good. Some 5 de accidenti inseparabili, sicud binarius est paucus, determinations may belong pedale, parvum, qualitas est remissa; et sic de ceteris, iuseparably to the individual, quorum aliqua sunt inseparabilia quoad individuum et not to the separabilia quoad speciem, alia autem sunt inseparabilia species, nor to the quoad speciem et separabilia quoad genus; et sic odium genus. 1o in communi consequitur malicia separabiliter quoad genus et inseparabiliter quoad species multas et quoad individua.
CAP. III. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 57 nominative, quamvis inseparabiliter sit tale. Multe enim inseparably in a positive thing sunt predicaciones necessarie denominaciones insepara- which in itself and without the biliter inexistentes, que non proprie sunt per se nec per determination, accidens; vel, si dicantur per accidens, hoc intelligitur is good. Some 5 de accidenti inseparabili, sicud binarius est paucus, determinations may belong pedale, parvum, qualitas est remissa; et sic de ceteris, iuseparably to the individual, quorum aliqua sunt inseparabilia quoad individuum et not to the separabilia quoad speciem, alia autem sunt inseparabilia species, nor to the quoad speciem et separabilia quoad genus; et sic odium genus. 1o in communi consequitur malicia separabiliter quoad genus et inseparabiliter quoad species multas et quoad individua.
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SECUNDA PARS. CAPITULUM PRIMUM. Sequitur secunda pars, cuius primam partem quoad veritatem de preterito tractabo isto capitulo. Ponit enim 5 quod summe contingens est me fuisse, et sic de omni veritate de preterito que aliquando potuit non fuisse. Cuius evidencie sunt tales: Inpossibile est quod quic- quam contingens vel possibile distinctum contra neces- sarium mutetur in necessarium, vel econtra. Sed hoc 10 sequeretur, si veritas de preterito posset esse necessaria postquam fuit contingens: igitur, sic non potest esse. Maior patet tripliciter. Primo ex testimonio Aristotelis (primo de celo, in fine) dicentis contra Platonem quod inpossibile est naturam coruptibilem mutari in neces- 15 sariam. Secundo, patet hoc ex racione que forte movebat Aristotelem. Nam in latitudine contingencium quoad diuturnitatem est processus in infinitum. Igitur, quo- F. 64 cunque contingenti signato, l ipsum infinitum distat a condicione necessitatis. Sic enim probant theologi quod 20 solum deus potest creare, quia inter esse et non esse simpliciter est distancia infinita que solum ab illo potest preteriri; igitur, per idem non iuxta communem cursum nature potest de contingenti facere necessarium. Tercio; sic: veritas contingens nec a se nec ab alio 25 potest mutari in necessitates: igitur non potest sic mutari. Prima pars patet per hoc quod si veritas per se solam se scit perficere, tunc eque primo habens illam I shall here deal with the truth of any act. in the past or of anything past in general. It is affirmed that my having existed, or any truth which at any time is contingent, is contingent still. I. What is contingent cannot become necessary, and my having existed was once contingent. The major has Aristotle in its favour, and also the infinite distance between necessity and contingency, which cannot be passed over. Besides a contingent truth can become necessary neither by itself, nor by the action of any other cause, 2. MS. Capitulum primum deest; large initial S in red ink. 4. The MS. has ponit. As we go on, we see that the view here expounded is against Wyclif. Adversarius, or some such word, should be supplied.
SECUNDA PARS. CAPITULUM PRIMUM. Sequitur secunda pars, cuius primam partem quoad veritatem de preterito tractabo isto capitulo. Ponit enim 5 quod summe contingens est me fuisse, et sic de omni veritate de preterito que aliquando potuit non fuisse. Cuius evidencie sunt tales: Inpossibile est quod quic- quam contingens vel possibile distinctum contra neces- sarium mutetur in necessarium, vel econtra. Sed hoc 10 sequeretur, si veritas de preterito posset esse necessaria postquam fuit contingens: igitur, sic non potest esse. Maior patet tripliciter. Primo ex testimonio Aristotelis (primo de celo, in fine) dicentis contra Platonem quod inpossibile est naturam coruptibilem mutari in neces- 15 sariam. Secundo, patet hoc ex racione que forte movebat Aristotelem. Nam in latitudine contingencium quoad diuturnitatem est processus in infinitum. Igitur, quo- F. 64 cunque contingenti signato, l ipsum infinitum distat a condicione necessitatis. Sic enim probant theologi quod 20 solum deus potest creare, quia inter esse et non esse simpliciter est distancia infinita que solum ab illo potest preteriri; igitur, per idem non iuxta communem cursum nature potest de contingenti facere necessarium. Tercio; sic: veritas contingens nec a se nec ab alio 25 potest mutari in necessitates: igitur non potest sic mutari. Prima pars patet per hoc quod si veritas per se solam se scit perficere, tunc eque primo habens illam I shall here deal with the truth of any act. in the past or of anything past in general. It is affirmed that my having existed, or any truth which at any time is contingent, is contingent still. I. What is contingent cannot become necessary, and my having existed was once contingent. The major has Aristotle in its favour, and also the infinite distance between necessity and contingency, which cannot be passed over. Besides a contingent truth can become necessary neither by itself, nor by the action of any other cause, 2. MS. Capitulum primum deest; large initial S in red ink. 4. The MS. has ponit. As we go on, we see that the view here expounded is against Wyclif. Adversarius, or some such word, should be supplied.
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60 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I. not by itselt; sufficienciam sicud esse, nunquam foret contingens vel no! . l I poll had would dependens, sed semper prima veritas. Nec ab alio potest, always be quia illud aliud, sicut potest perficere, sic potest alias necessary. Nor by another: destruere; et in isto sunt theologi intricati de confir- for td eive it" macione intellectivarum et hominum, qui possunt de- 5 necessity, it perdere quodcunque ens recipiunt a deo libere contra- destroy it. dictorie conservante, sicud libere dedit illis. Dicitur you say that forte quod non est dare veritatem contingentem mutatam there is no truth, in necessitatem : quia, quamvis contingens sit filium fuisse possibility of a tamen non est veritas sed possibile ante actum quod io duty what of fllius meus fuit, Sed contra: illud est hoc quod motum nl his thing. fuit per horam, et erit per aliam ex libertate voluntatis; shall be moved est verum fuisse et non necessarium; sed postquam for an hour? fuerit completus, necessarium erit ipsum fuisse. Igitur depending On eadem veritas contingens potest alterari in necessitatem; 15 some ones will; et idem invenies de omni veritate de preterito futura. ye ot the end. Nam si filium meum fore sit futurum, tunc eternaliter fuit becomes a — quod filius meus erit; et sic fuisse est veritas contingens necessary has . PT . been. And so ot eterna et filio meo producto incipit esse necessitas. all other such ftem, nihil est admittendum nisi possibile; sed ad- 20 ir. FE what is mittendum est sine alico inconveniente quod ego non necessary, its fui (et sic de similibus); igitur quodlibet tale est pos- adipis is, sibile; et per consequens, cum quilibet responsalis propositions as: obligatur ad negandum aliquid, sequitur quod non habet Caesar has not admittere impossibile. Et minor patet, cum cotidie bene 25 admitted very admittitur quod Aristoteles sit futurus, et quod Cesar ть 3. in non fuit etc. Et hoc haberet magnum colorem penes favour of those €OS qui dicunt tempus esse unum absolutum, quod deus who think time posset adnihilare et recreare quocies voluerit. Nam Gontity which | penes sic dicentes, sicud potest recreare tempus, sic 30 annihilate or omnem veritatem continue fuit in tempore, et per con- create anew. sequens primam futuricionem ante actum, et quam- cunque aliam negacionem quam fecit; cum omne gene- rabile sit coruptibile, eo quod inpossibite est (secundum Aristotelem, ubi supra) quicquam habere temporis inicium, 55 et esse eternaliter duraturum. We canot say: — Nec valet responsio que dicit quod talia inpossibilia What . . true, now. per accidens que aliquando fuerunt vera bene possunt happening to 11. MS. motum qui. 24. Obligatur. In the Scholastic dialectical exercise of Obli- gations. See Wyclif's Logica, vol. T, Introduction, XXVIII —XXX, and pp. 69—74.
60 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I. not by itselt; sufficienciam sicud esse, nunquam foret contingens vel no! . l I poll had would dependens, sed semper prima veritas. Nec ab alio potest, always be quia illud aliud, sicut potest perficere, sic potest alias necessary. Nor by another: destruere; et in isto sunt theologi intricati de confir- for td eive it" macione intellectivarum et hominum, qui possunt de- 5 necessity, it perdere quodcunque ens recipiunt a deo libere contra- destroy it. dictorie conservante, sicud libere dedit illis. Dicitur you say that forte quod non est dare veritatem contingentem mutatam there is no truth, in necessitatem : quia, quamvis contingens sit filium fuisse possibility of a tamen non est veritas sed possibile ante actum quod io duty what of fllius meus fuit, Sed contra: illud est hoc quod motum nl his thing. fuit per horam, et erit per aliam ex libertate voluntatis; shall be moved est verum fuisse et non necessarium; sed postquam for an hour? fuerit completus, necessarium erit ipsum fuisse. Igitur depending On eadem veritas contingens potest alterari in necessitatem; 15 some ones will; et idem invenies de omni veritate de preterito futura. ye ot the end. Nam si filium meum fore sit futurum, tunc eternaliter fuit becomes a — quod filius meus erit; et sic fuisse est veritas contingens necessary has . PT . been. And so ot eterna et filio meo producto incipit esse necessitas. all other such ftem, nihil est admittendum nisi possibile; sed ad- 20 ir. FE what is mittendum est sine alico inconveniente quod ego non necessary, its fui (et sic de similibus); igitur quodlibet tale est pos- adipis is, sibile; et per consequens, cum quilibet responsalis propositions as: obligatur ad negandum aliquid, sequitur quod non habet Caesar has not admittere impossibile. Et minor patet, cum cotidie bene 25 admitted very admittitur quod Aristoteles sit futurus, et quod Cesar ть 3. in non fuit etc. Et hoc haberet magnum colorem penes favour of those €OS qui dicunt tempus esse unum absolutum, quod deus who think time posset adnihilare et recreare quocies voluerit. Nam Gontity which | penes sic dicentes, sicud potest recreare tempus, sic 30 annihilate or omnem veritatem continue fuit in tempore, et per con- create anew. sequens primam futuricionem ante actum, et quam- cunque aliam negacionem quam fecit; cum omne gene- rabile sit coruptibile, eo quod inpossibite est (secundum Aristotelem, ubi supra) quicquam habere temporis inicium, 55 et esse eternaliter duraturum. We canot say: — Nec valet responsio que dicit quod talia inpossibilia What . . true, now. per accidens que aliquando fuerunt vera bene possunt happening to 11. MS. motum qui. 24. Obligatur. In the Scholastic dialectical exercise of Obli- gations. See Wyclif's Logica, vol. T, Introduction, XXVIII —XXX, and pp. 69—74.
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CAP. I. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 61 F. 65* admitti; immo prodest pro veritate discucienda talia admittere. Quia si iam sit inpossibile, cum non possit esse latitudo in inpossibili, sicud nec in negacione quoad non posse esse, sequitur quod ex tali sequitur quidlibet negandum a| respondente sicud ex per se inpossibili. Et per consequens tanta est causa negandi tale, cum fuerit impossibile, sicud aliquod inpossibile assignandum; et per idem tollitur responsio que dicit quod talia sunt admittenda, sicud et omnia inpossibilia, dummodo non to arguantur ad illa: et hoc gracia argumenti, quia aliter Nor can we say multa argumenta perirent. Unde communissime ad- that, though mittitur quod nos sumus ante obligacionem, vel tale impossible, they are admitted for tempus quod de facto est preteritum. Immo sic concedit arguments sake, v. g. that we are Aristoteles vacuum esse, et medium infinitum subtiliari now at some 15 et sic de multis. Nam secundum veritatem nihil est moment of past time, just as admittendum, quo admisso quod est quomodocunque Aristotle supposes the inconveniens proponendum [sequitur]; sed sic est de existence of a quolibet inpossibili, igitur etc. Maior patet per hoc quod, vacuum, &c. For we should iuxta principia obligacionis, omne repugnans posito non not admit anything out of 20 est concedendum, sed omne repugnans tali posito, cum which self- sit sequens, est concedendum; igitur nullum tale est contradiction might follow : admissibile. Et quod ex omni tali inpossibili sequitur and all that is quidlibet inferendum patet sic. Si inpossibile est te non impossible is in this category, fuisse, ita quod non possit sic esse, tunc non posset because we can draw any 25 sic esse nisi tu sederes, et per consequens sequitur: sic inference we like therefrom. est; tu sedes (et sic de quolibet inferendo). Prima con- For example: sequencia patet ex hoc, quod aliter oportet dare oppo- if your never having existed situm, videlicet, quod sic posset esse cum hoc quod is impossible, admitted, it non sederes: ex quo sequitur quod sic possit esse. Idem would follow 3o enim est, “Non potest sic esse nisi tu sedeas", et Si that v. g. you are sitting tu non sedes non sic est". Et certum est quod hoc now ; otherwise your never sequitur ex dato, cum nullum inpossibile potest stare having existed cum alio. Nec aliud vult logicus habere per consequen- would be possible. ciam logicam, nisi quod antecedens signatum non posset be impossible, may safely be admitted. For we have no power to admit in any way that which cannot be, and we ought both to deny these and all other propositions similar to them. 17. MS. sequitur deest. 25. MS. Si pro sequitur. 25. Sederes. This argument proceeds upon the generally re- ceived axiom that an impossible proposition is one from which, when admitted, any conclusion may be drawn. 33. Con- sequenciam logicam. Note that there are two sorts of conditional propositions, one inferring a real nexus between antecedent and consequent, as: If I am alive, my heart beats, and the other in- ferring only the truth of the consequent, as: If I am alive, I saw him. Wyclif is here speaking of the latter sort of conditionals.
CAP. I. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 61 F. 65* admitti; immo prodest pro veritate discucienda talia admittere. Quia si iam sit inpossibile, cum non possit esse latitudo in inpossibili, sicud nec in negacione quoad non posse esse, sequitur quod ex tali sequitur quidlibet negandum a| respondente sicud ex per se inpossibili. Et per consequens tanta est causa negandi tale, cum fuerit impossibile, sicud aliquod inpossibile assignandum; et per idem tollitur responsio que dicit quod talia sunt admittenda, sicud et omnia inpossibilia, dummodo non to arguantur ad illa: et hoc gracia argumenti, quia aliter Nor can we say multa argumenta perirent. Unde communissime ad- that, though mittitur quod nos sumus ante obligacionem, vel tale impossible, they are admitted for tempus quod de facto est preteritum. Immo sic concedit arguments sake, v. g. that we are Aristoteles vacuum esse, et medium infinitum subtiliari now at some 15 et sic de multis. Nam secundum veritatem nihil est moment of past time, just as admittendum, quo admisso quod est quomodocunque Aristotle supposes the inconveniens proponendum [sequitur]; sed sic est de existence of a quolibet inpossibili, igitur etc. Maior patet per hoc quod, vacuum, &c. For we should iuxta principia obligacionis, omne repugnans posito non not admit anything out of 20 est concedendum, sed omne repugnans tali posito, cum which self- sit sequens, est concedendum; igitur nullum tale est contradiction might follow : admissibile. Et quod ex omni tali inpossibili sequitur and all that is quidlibet inferendum patet sic. Si inpossibile est te non impossible is in this category, fuisse, ita quod non possit sic esse, tunc non posset because we can draw any 25 sic esse nisi tu sederes, et per consequens sequitur: sic inference we like therefrom. est; tu sedes (et sic de quolibet inferendo). Prima con- For example: sequencia patet ex hoc, quod aliter oportet dare oppo- if your never having existed situm, videlicet, quod sic posset esse cum hoc quod is impossible, admitted, it non sederes: ex quo sequitur quod sic possit esse. Idem would follow 3o enim est, “Non potest sic esse nisi tu sedeas", et Si that v. g. you are sitting tu non sedes non sic est". Et certum est quod hoc now ; otherwise your never sequitur ex dato, cum nullum inpossibile potest stare having existed cum alio. Nec aliud vult logicus habere per consequen- would be possible. ciam logicam, nisi quod antecedens signatum non posset be impossible, may safely be admitted. For we have no power to admit in any way that which cannot be, and we ought both to deny these and all other propositions similar to them. 17. MS. sequitur deest. 25. MS. Si pro sequitur. 25. Sederes. This argument proceeds upon the generally re- ceived axiom that an impossible proposition is one from which, when admitted, any conclusion may be drawn. 33. Con- sequenciam logicam. Note that there are two sorts of conditional propositions, one inferring a real nexus between antecedent and consequent, as: If I am alive, my heart beats, and the other in- ferring only the truth of the consequent, as: If I am alive, I saw him. Wyclif is here speaking of the latter sort of conditionals.
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62 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. 1. Logical esse sine consequente, ut dicetur de condicionibus, et con uence . . . . means merely eodem modo sequitur necessarium consequi ad quid- that if one |; : . ea; neri». thing is true, libet assignandum, ut: *Si deus est, tunc tu fuisti ; cum another is truc; non sit possibile deum esse, nisi tu fuisti; quia si est, th nythin : > ee : may be stated oportet te fuisse. Et hoc est quod antiquitus solet dici, 5 as antecedent to 1 1 1 ; ; a necessary quod sicud necessarium sequitur ad quodlibet, ita ex truth. * inpossibili sequitur quodlibet. Veritates enim necessarie And 1 nf anything ‘may sunt adeo cathenate quod, una destructa, nihil manet. be the consequent or Ét tantum odiunt inpossibilia, quod non possunt esse, o hat is alico permanente, Ex necessario enim procedit verum Impossibile; . - . Mp; = "m or, E we posit contingens: ideo, quocunque inpossibili signato, si illud a thing "hb: : . . impossible, we St, tunc nihil est. Nec videtur quod tales proposiciones may infer that non sunt admittende, quia aliquando fuerunt concedende; nothing exists. . . . . There is no ét nullum inconveniens potest deduci ex concessione need even to ; ienti : deny an illatum scienti consequenter respondere, sicud potest impossible deduci ex concessione huius, "deus non est^, roposition - . Provided we Item, quam commune est esse ad encia presencia, adhere to 1 1 i consistency in Preterita vel futura signanda, ita commune est posse ad our answers. qualecunque tempus presens, preteritum, vel futurum. III. As esse is : . . . said of things Sed esse est commune ad omnia talia; igitur et posse ad 20 in the present, : : - . so poss? js sai4 quecunque talia tempora signanda, ut pro illis amplicet. of things in the Antecedens patet; nam omne verbum, quantumcunque past or the . . . future; esse can presens non amplicativum fuerit, connotat omne tempus be extended to ; . . the past and 11 hoc quod connotat tempus presens in communi, the future, Jgitur multo magis hoc verbum amplicativum potest. Si 25 therefore, posse . . . . also. autem precise idem tempus connotent in preterito et And what Lovi i i ici i might not have PTesenti, videtur quod, sicud talis pretericio potuit non been may not esse, sic et potest. Three more Confirmatur tripliciter: primo per hoc quod deus | arguments in est potencie infinite, non maiorabilis nec minorabilis F. 65" favour of this view: (1) God’s quoad potenciam. Sed oppositum sequeretur, si potencia infinite power 1S sua non se extenderet ad preterita; igitur se extendit increased nor ad illa. Minor sic: omnia que deus in fine illius hore but if God were poterit, nunc potest, et infinita ultra: igitur potencior t ab 1o: . - t able 19 do est nunc quam erit in fine. Consequencia patet per 235 what He can do modum arguendi communitatem unius termini excedere at another, this would not be alium. Et antecedens patet per hoc quod infinita in- God can now Stancia, infinitos motus, et alia encia potest deus nunc happening of prohibere ne fuissent, quorum quodlibet in fine erit numberless neccssarium fuisse. Nec valet dicere quod non est signum 4o therefore; He potencie prohibere talia, quia ad prohibendum talia their happening requiritur magna potencia, et alii propter impotenciam when it has occurred. 5. MS. non oportet. denied that this o - v
62 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. 1. Logical esse sine consequente, ut dicetur de condicionibus, et con uence . . . . means merely eodem modo sequitur necessarium consequi ad quid- that if one |; : . ea; neri». thing is true, libet assignandum, ut: *Si deus est, tunc tu fuisti ; cum another is truc; non sit possibile deum esse, nisi tu fuisti; quia si est, th nythin : > ee : may be stated oportet te fuisse. Et hoc est quod antiquitus solet dici, 5 as antecedent to 1 1 1 ; ; a necessary quod sicud necessarium sequitur ad quodlibet, ita ex truth. * inpossibili sequitur quodlibet. Veritates enim necessarie And 1 nf anything ‘may sunt adeo cathenate quod, una destructa, nihil manet. be the consequent or Ét tantum odiunt inpossibilia, quod non possunt esse, o hat is alico permanente, Ex necessario enim procedit verum Impossibile; . - . Mp; = "m or, E we posit contingens: ideo, quocunque inpossibili signato, si illud a thing "hb: : . . impossible, we St, tunc nihil est. Nec videtur quod tales proposiciones may infer that non sunt admittende, quia aliquando fuerunt concedende; nothing exists. . . . . There is no ét nullum inconveniens potest deduci ex concessione need even to ; ienti : deny an illatum scienti consequenter respondere, sicud potest impossible deduci ex concessione huius, "deus non est^, roposition - . Provided we Item, quam commune est esse ad encia presencia, adhere to 1 1 i consistency in Preterita vel futura signanda, ita commune est posse ad our answers. qualecunque tempus presens, preteritum, vel futurum. III. As esse is : . . . said of things Sed esse est commune ad omnia talia; igitur et posse ad 20 in the present, : : - . so poss? js sai4 quecunque talia tempora signanda, ut pro illis amplicet. of things in the Antecedens patet; nam omne verbum, quantumcunque past or the . . . future; esse can presens non amplicativum fuerit, connotat omne tempus be extended to ; . . the past and 11 hoc quod connotat tempus presens in communi, the future, Jgitur multo magis hoc verbum amplicativum potest. Si 25 therefore, posse . . . . also. autem precise idem tempus connotent in preterito et And what Lovi i i ici i might not have PTesenti, videtur quod, sicud talis pretericio potuit non been may not esse, sic et potest. Three more Confirmatur tripliciter: primo per hoc quod deus | arguments in est potencie infinite, non maiorabilis nec minorabilis F. 65" favour of this view: (1) God’s quoad potenciam. Sed oppositum sequeretur, si potencia infinite power 1S sua non se extenderet ad preterita; igitur se extendit increased nor ad illa. Minor sic: omnia que deus in fine illius hore but if God were poterit, nunc potest, et infinita ultra: igitur potencior t ab 1o: . - t able 19 do est nunc quam erit in fine. Consequencia patet per 235 what He can do modum arguendi communitatem unius termini excedere at another, this would not be alium. Et antecedens patet per hoc quod infinita in- God can now Stancia, infinitos motus, et alia encia potest deus nunc happening of prohibere ne fuissent, quorum quodlibet in fine erit numberless neccssarium fuisse. Nec valet dicere quod non est signum 4o therefore; He potencie prohibere talia, quia ad prohibendum talia their happening requiritur magna potencia, et alii propter impotenciam when it has occurred. 5. MS. non oportet. denied that this o - v
Strana 63
CAP. I. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 63 non possunt prohibere talia. Quis enim, nisi deus, suffi- ceret prohibere pretericionem instancium futurorum, prohibendo motum celi? aut quomodo non esset magna vis virtutis moralis prohibentis adulterium, homicidium, 5 vel huiusmodi actum, qui antecedit causaliter ad veri- tatem de peccato necessariam? Nec valet dicere quod talia postquam fuerint non sunt factibilia et sic non est potencia vel impotencia facere talia, quia impossibile est quicquam esse semel factibile, vel generabile, nisi t0 continue sic fuerit. Quia aliter non converterentur ter- mini secundum figuram quam ponit philosophus, primo de celo in fine; nec esset aliter possibile, generabile, vel factibile esse, quia non antequam fuerit nec postquam fuerit erit factibile vel generabile, ut dicit responsio. 15 Nec valet dicere quod de potencia infinita potest in- finitum tolli, cum hoc quod maneat continue in- finita, non minorata, quia hoc non tollit deperdicionem potencie dei sine adventu nove equevalentis; potencior igitur esset si posset in preterita: et cum hoc non claudit 20 contradiccionem, sequitur quod non esset ita bonus potens etc. sicud aliquid potest intelligi esse. Similiter, nulla quantitas et per consequens nullum tempus est de genere activorum, et per consequens non fit per tempus quod hoc instans fuisse incipit esse ne- 25 cessarium, potissime cum tempus non sit nisi per accidens causa generacionis, et per se causa corupcionis: nec hoc instans esse quod est ita contingens sufficit causare dictam veritatem summam. Relinquitur igitur quod prima veritas causat illam, et cum libere contra- 3o dictorie hoc faciat, sequitur quod posset expectare causando illam veritatem remissius quam necessitat, non subito necessitando se ad sic faciendum, nisi forte universo deficeret perfeccio ex defectu talis necessitatis. Quod videtur, cum immediate post hoc mundus non 35 poterit carere illa veritate, nisi secundum se totum dissolveretur. Cum tamen pretericiones multorum actuum pocius inperficiunt mundum, illas igitur potest deus ammovere perficiendo mundum, cum omnis defectus sit aput ipsum originalis. Potencia enim hominis se ex- 40 tendit ad preterita, ut ego possum fuisse, et aliter fecisse F. 66° in ] multis quam ego feci; quia aliter non esset nunc mihi possibile quod fui, sed fuit possibile quod fui: It is no use saying that a thing is no longer do-able when it is done ; and that consequently it is necessary. For what is once do-able is always so ; if not, when will t be so? If not after it is done, not before for the same reason. Nor can we say that infinite power may decrease, and yet remain infinite ; for this would at any rate imply a change in the unchangeable God, less powerful now than before. 2) Time, having no activity of its own, is unable to change what is contingent into what is necessary; God alone can do that; and as He is free, He may leave it contingent or not as He chooses. God is able to destroy the Past utterly. For even man can change his own Past. It is possible that I might have done otherwise means present possibility; if not, we should have to say: lt was possible, not, It is. prevention is an act of power, nay, of infinite power. 20. MS. sequitur pro esset.
CAP. I. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 63 non possunt prohibere talia. Quis enim, nisi deus, suffi- ceret prohibere pretericionem instancium futurorum, prohibendo motum celi? aut quomodo non esset magna vis virtutis moralis prohibentis adulterium, homicidium, 5 vel huiusmodi actum, qui antecedit causaliter ad veri- tatem de peccato necessariam? Nec valet dicere quod talia postquam fuerint non sunt factibilia et sic non est potencia vel impotencia facere talia, quia impossibile est quicquam esse semel factibile, vel generabile, nisi t0 continue sic fuerit. Quia aliter non converterentur ter- mini secundum figuram quam ponit philosophus, primo de celo in fine; nec esset aliter possibile, generabile, vel factibile esse, quia non antequam fuerit nec postquam fuerit erit factibile vel generabile, ut dicit responsio. 15 Nec valet dicere quod de potencia infinita potest in- finitum tolli, cum hoc quod maneat continue in- finita, non minorata, quia hoc non tollit deperdicionem potencie dei sine adventu nove equevalentis; potencior igitur esset si posset in preterita: et cum hoc non claudit 20 contradiccionem, sequitur quod non esset ita bonus potens etc. sicud aliquid potest intelligi esse. Similiter, nulla quantitas et per consequens nullum tempus est de genere activorum, et per consequens non fit per tempus quod hoc instans fuisse incipit esse ne- 25 cessarium, potissime cum tempus non sit nisi per accidens causa generacionis, et per se causa corupcionis: nec hoc instans esse quod est ita contingens sufficit causare dictam veritatem summam. Relinquitur igitur quod prima veritas causat illam, et cum libere contra- 3o dictorie hoc faciat, sequitur quod posset expectare causando illam veritatem remissius quam necessitat, non subito necessitando se ad sic faciendum, nisi forte universo deficeret perfeccio ex defectu talis necessitatis. Quod videtur, cum immediate post hoc mundus non 35 poterit carere illa veritate, nisi secundum se totum dissolveretur. Cum tamen pretericiones multorum actuum pocius inperficiunt mundum, illas igitur potest deus ammovere perficiendo mundum, cum omnis defectus sit aput ipsum originalis. Potencia enim hominis se ex- 40 tendit ad preterita, ut ego possum fuisse, et aliter fecisse F. 66° in ] multis quam ego feci; quia aliter non esset nunc mihi possibile quod fui, sed fuit possibile quod fui: It is no use saying that a thing is no longer do-able when it is done ; and that consequently it is necessary. For what is once do-able is always so ; if not, when will t be so? If not after it is done, not before for the same reason. Nor can we say that infinite power may decrease, and yet remain infinite ; for this would at any rate imply a change in the unchangeable God, less powerful now than before. 2) Time, having no activity of its own, is unable to change what is contingent into what is necessary; God alone can do that; and as He is free, He may leave it contingent or not as He chooses. God is able to destroy the Past utterly. For even man can change his own Past. It is possible that I might have done otherwise means present possibility; if not, we should have to say: lt was possible, not, It is. prevention is an act of power, nay, of infinite power. 20. MS. sequitur pro esset.
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64 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I. quicquid enim est possibile, potest esse, et contra. Ideo non est possibile quod ego non fui, sed fuit possibile, sicud iam non potest esse, sed potuit esse. Si igitur potest esse quod fui, tunc alia potencia potest sic esse sicud dicit esse, et diu fuisse. Si igitur potencia hominis se extendit ad preterita transmutanda, multo magis potencia dei. Et negans hoc de potencia hominis habet dicere quod, quicquid homo fecit, non potest melius fecisse. Et si potuit illud melius fecisse, tunc sequitur quod homo multa potuit facere antequam fuit natus, quorum to nullum potuit facere postquam fuit natus; quia multas acciones individuatas a tempore ante instans nativitatis sue. (3) We ought Similiter, homo naturaliter et racionaliter debet dolere to sorrow for de actu preterito, sicud patet de naturaliter erubescen- certain past acts ; now, if tibus de turpibus preteritis, et rationaliter confitenti- the past were necessarily bus. Sed nemo debet dolere de alico quod non est fixed, it would in eius potestate; igitur talia preterita sunt in hominis not be in our power, and potestate. Minor patet ex hoc quod nemo est laudandus sorrow would be foolish. vel culpandus propter illa que non sunt in eius potestate, No one is blamable for ut dicitur 2° ethicorum, et patet de racione. Nam omnis 20 what he cannot talis dolor (si non superfluit et non debet fieri) proficit help. Our sorrow is de quanto est bonum utile, et per consequens ens pro either superfluous or quo dolet est in dolentis potestate. Isto enim modo useful; if the naturaliter dolent et deflent homines amicos mortuos, latter, it is because we can quia potest esse quod sint quorum non esse dolent; 25 thereby change et sic non faciunt bruta. Non igitur plus valeret vel our past. Otherwise, to esset racionale dolere de alico quod non posset esse, lament a friend's death quam dolere pro non esse chimere vel alterius im- is to lament possibilis. Quemcunque enim actum feci ego, non that an absurdity is not possum melius fecisse illum, nec est possibile quod cum 30 true ; and whatever melioribus circumstanciis fecissem illum. I have done, Et si dicatur quod potui fecisse oppositum vel melius, I could not have done et ideo sum culpandus, tunc essem culpandus propter better. There was, it is potenciam per mille annos completum antequam fui; true, the bare et hoc ita faciliter sicud nunc possum quicquam 35 possibility of my doing facere. Et sic parentes mei potuerunt ex sciencia better; but this was the same sua produxisse me meliorem in naturalibus, in optima thing as the constellacione que unquam fuit, et sic breviter qui- possibility of my existence quid vel qualitercunque aliquis homo potuit fecisse 1000 years ago, of my being quidlibet potuit fecisse. Et si dicatur quod sit culpandas 40 born under a better star, &c. vel laudandus propter illa que potuit fecisse quando Can a man do better than he has done in the Past: You musí deny that, if you say he cannot change his Past. 15 5. MS. ocue pro sicud. 34. MS. potenciam antequam fin.
64 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I. quicquid enim est possibile, potest esse, et contra. Ideo non est possibile quod ego non fui, sed fuit possibile, sicud iam non potest esse, sed potuit esse. Si igitur potest esse quod fui, tunc alia potencia potest sic esse sicud dicit esse, et diu fuisse. Si igitur potencia hominis se extendit ad preterita transmutanda, multo magis potencia dei. Et negans hoc de potencia hominis habet dicere quod, quicquid homo fecit, non potest melius fecisse. Et si potuit illud melius fecisse, tunc sequitur quod homo multa potuit facere antequam fuit natus, quorum to nullum potuit facere postquam fuit natus; quia multas acciones individuatas a tempore ante instans nativitatis sue. (3) We ought Similiter, homo naturaliter et racionaliter debet dolere to sorrow for de actu preterito, sicud patet de naturaliter erubescen- certain past acts ; now, if tibus de turpibus preteritis, et rationaliter confitenti- the past were necessarily bus. Sed nemo debet dolere de alico quod non est fixed, it would in eius potestate; igitur talia preterita sunt in hominis not be in our power, and potestate. Minor patet ex hoc quod nemo est laudandus sorrow would be foolish. vel culpandus propter illa que non sunt in eius potestate, No one is blamable for ut dicitur 2° ethicorum, et patet de racione. Nam omnis 20 what he cannot talis dolor (si non superfluit et non debet fieri) proficit help. Our sorrow is de quanto est bonum utile, et per consequens ens pro either superfluous or quo dolet est in dolentis potestate. Isto enim modo useful; if the naturaliter dolent et deflent homines amicos mortuos, latter, it is because we can quia potest esse quod sint quorum non esse dolent; 25 thereby change et sic non faciunt bruta. Non igitur plus valeret vel our past. Otherwise, to esset racionale dolere de alico quod non posset esse, lament a friend's death quam dolere pro non esse chimere vel alterius im- is to lament possibilis. Quemcunque enim actum feci ego, non that an absurdity is not possum melius fecisse illum, nec est possibile quod cum 30 true ; and whatever melioribus circumstanciis fecissem illum. I have done, Et si dicatur quod potui fecisse oppositum vel melius, I could not have done et ideo sum culpandus, tunc essem culpandus propter better. There was, it is potenciam per mille annos completum antequam fui; true, the bare et hoc ita faciliter sicud nunc possum quicquam 35 possibility of my doing facere. Et sic parentes mei potuerunt ex sciencia better; but this was the same sua produxisse me meliorem in naturalibus, in optima thing as the constellacione que unquam fuit, et sic breviter qui- possibility of my existence quid vel qualitercunque aliquis homo potuit fecisse 1000 years ago, of my being quidlibet potuit fecisse. Et si dicatur quod sit culpandas 40 born under a better star, &c. vel laudandus propter illa que potuit fecisse quando Can a man do better than he has done in the Past: You musí deny that, if you say he cannot change his Past. 15 5. MS. ocue pro sicud. 34. MS. potenciam antequam fin.
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DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 65 66» 35 CAP. I. non fuit, ad hoc sequitur idem: quia quilibet, antequam for which I am not responsible. fuit, potuit habuisse quantumlibet magnam potenciam Past possibilities are quando fuit, et potuit in illo tempore quantumlibet infinite, but no magna mirabilia. Si igitur homo esset laudandus propter one deserves praise or blame 5 posse preteritum, tunc quilibet esset eque laudandus, et for them. si propter facta preterita, cum illa non sunt] in po- testate eius nec possunt proficere, non esset equaliter laudandus sicud unus presentiter bene operans vel operaticus; nec inequaliter, cum meritum non sit pro- to porcionabile merito. Arguments to In oppositum istius arguitur sic. Qualitercunque de- the contrary. terminate est et non potest desinere esse, necessario 1) What is true in the past is so est, sed tales veritates de preterito sunt determinate et determinately, non possunt desinere esse; igitur sunt necessarie. Maior nor can it cease to be: this 15 patet ex hoc quod [proposicio] non caperet instantaneam implies necessity. veritatem que non potest desinere esse instantanee ne- Nothing can be cessaria nisi de veritatibus dependentibus a futuro ut true at any instant, if at that sint tales (Hoc fuit futurum): sed tales non sunt de- instant it is not necessary; terminate vere. Et confirmacio illius est dictum Agathonis unless it be a truth which 20 (6t° ethicorum) approbatum a philosopho, quod deus depends privatur illo, de genito facere non genitum. Et precipui indeterminately on the future. theologi in hoc consenciunt quod mulierem que est Lost virginity corupta deus non potest facere virginem, quia non cannot be restored, even potest facere virginem; quia non potest facere quin fuit by God's power, as theologians 25 corupta. say. Item, omnis faccio, quantumcunque large accepta, (2) What cannot change is requirit unum terminum positivum, set “te non fuisse," necessary; every change et universaliter quelibet talis veritas de preterito, non implies something potest habere talem terminum; igitur non est factibile. affirmative from 30 Maior patet ex 51° phisicorum. Omnis enim motus est this to that or not that, &c. de subiecto in subiectum, ut motus proprie dictus; vel But your not de subiecto in non subiectum, ut corupcio, vel de non having been implies neither subiecto in subiectum, ut generacio: quarta enim com- a change from you to not you paracio de non subiecto in non subiectum est im- with having been possibile. Et minor patet ex hoc, quod talis pretericio affirmative: nor negativa non potest habere affirmativam pretericionem from having been to not sive terminum positivum; quia, si talis affirmacio est having been, with you vel fuit, tunc nemo nec est, nec fuit, nec erit. Et que- affirmative. 1. MS. non deest. 11. MS. 12 racio in marg. 15. MS. proposicio deest. 18. MS. sunt pro sint. 24. Virginem. See St. Thomas. Sum. Theol., Prima pars, qu. XXV, art. 4. 5
DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 65 66» 35 CAP. I. non fuit, ad hoc sequitur idem: quia quilibet, antequam for which I am not responsible. fuit, potuit habuisse quantumlibet magnam potenciam Past possibilities are quando fuit, et potuit in illo tempore quantumlibet infinite, but no magna mirabilia. Si igitur homo esset laudandus propter one deserves praise or blame 5 posse preteritum, tunc quilibet esset eque laudandus, et for them. si propter facta preterita, cum illa non sunt] in po- testate eius nec possunt proficere, non esset equaliter laudandus sicud unus presentiter bene operans vel operaticus; nec inequaliter, cum meritum non sit pro- to porcionabile merito. Arguments to In oppositum istius arguitur sic. Qualitercunque de- the contrary. terminate est et non potest desinere esse, necessario 1) What is true in the past is so est, sed tales veritates de preterito sunt determinate et determinately, non possunt desinere esse; igitur sunt necessarie. Maior nor can it cease to be: this 15 patet ex hoc quod [proposicio] non caperet instantaneam implies necessity. veritatem que non potest desinere esse instantanee ne- Nothing can be cessaria nisi de veritatibus dependentibus a futuro ut true at any instant, if at that sint tales (Hoc fuit futurum): sed tales non sunt de- instant it is not necessary; terminate vere. Et confirmacio illius est dictum Agathonis unless it be a truth which 20 (6t° ethicorum) approbatum a philosopho, quod deus depends privatur illo, de genito facere non genitum. Et precipui indeterminately on the future. theologi in hoc consenciunt quod mulierem que est Lost virginity corupta deus non potest facere virginem, quia non cannot be restored, even potest facere virginem; quia non potest facere quin fuit by God's power, as theologians 25 corupta. say. Item, omnis faccio, quantumcunque large accepta, (2) What cannot change is requirit unum terminum positivum, set “te non fuisse," necessary; every change et universaliter quelibet talis veritas de preterito, non implies something potest habere talem terminum; igitur non est factibile. affirmative from 30 Maior patet ex 51° phisicorum. Omnis enim motus est this to that or not that, &c. de subiecto in subiectum, ut motus proprie dictus; vel But your not de subiecto in non subiectum, ut corupcio, vel de non having been implies neither subiecto in subiectum, ut generacio: quarta enim com- a change from you to not you paracio de non subiecto in non subiectum est im- with having been possibile. Et minor patet ex hoc, quod talis pretericio affirmative: nor negativa non potest habere affirmativam pretericionem from having been to not sive terminum positivum; quia, si talis affirmacio est having been, with you vel fuit, tunc nemo nec est, nec fuit, nec erit. Et que- affirmative. 1. MS. non deest. 11. MS. 12 racio in marg. 15. MS. proposicio deest. 18. MS. sunt pro sint. 24. Virginem. See St. Thomas. Sum. Theol., Prima pars, qu. XXV, art. 4. 5
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66 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I (3) If what is past may be changed, then anything can begin over again any number of times, and exist eternally; which is absurd. (4) Any doctor could bring a man. to life again, the blind could sec, wine might be made out of vinegar, and every miracle might be a usual occurrence, if what can once happen can always do so. libet alia affirmacio est impertinens, cum oportet omnem motum esse a contrario in contrarium. Illud posset explanari in facilioribus terminis, sed sic locutus sum pro cognoscendis terminis et conceptu Aristotelis. Item, per deducciones ad inconsequens, arguitur ad 5 idem. Nam iuxta illud sequitur quod omne coruptibile infinities potest incipere et desinere esse, et per infinitum magnum tempus durare. Quod sic probatur: quocunque homine existente signato, ipse potest naturaliter in quo- libet instanti futuro nasci, et per consequens infinities 10 potest nasci. Si enim in quotlibet instantibus potest nasci, sine hoc quod immediate post vel ante nascatur, sequitur quod quotienslibet potest nasci et per idem corumpi, et per idem per quantumlibet magnum tempus esse; tum quia per cuiuslibet temporis aliam partem 15 potest esse, tum quia aliter oportet ponere instans vel tempus succedere post quod non possit esse; quod re- pugnat racioni, cum secundum illam eque possibile est iam per naturam quodcunque coruptibile incipere esse, sicud fuit quando incipit, cum sequitur penes sic 20 opinantem: Sic potuit Socrates naturaliter se habuisse; igitur sic poterit in eternum. Item, iuxta illud sequitur, quod, quocunque mortuo assignato, quicunque medicus potest ipsum sanare, facere vivere, et sic de oculo ceco facere oculum clarissime 25 videntem, ] membra spermatica deperdita restaurare, de F. 67' aceto immediate facere vinum, et breviter de omni preterito facere quod ipsum non fuit; et sic de in- finitis que philosophus reputaret impossibilia, et nos christiani reputaremus miracula. Et consequencie patent 30 ex hoc quod quantumcunque infirmo vel mortuo assig- nato, quantumlibet simplex medicus potuit aliquando sanare; et si potuit, tunc (per opinionem) potest, quia ponit hoc verbum posse de presenti eque indifferenter predicari de preterito, sicud de presenti vel futuro; et 35 per consequens oculus coruptus, sicud totus infirmus, potest quantumlibet faciliter a quocunque totaliter de novo fieri. Et sic non solum de potencia non includente contradiccionem, sed de possibili quoad nos, potest facere hoc esse vinum (demonstrando acetum). Et sequitur 40 quod nihil potest deperdere potenciam naturalem se- 13. MS. q°d13. 23. MS. 4a in marg.
66 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I (3) If what is past may be changed, then anything can begin over again any number of times, and exist eternally; which is absurd. (4) Any doctor could bring a man. to life again, the blind could sec, wine might be made out of vinegar, and every miracle might be a usual occurrence, if what can once happen can always do so. libet alia affirmacio est impertinens, cum oportet omnem motum esse a contrario in contrarium. Illud posset explanari in facilioribus terminis, sed sic locutus sum pro cognoscendis terminis et conceptu Aristotelis. Item, per deducciones ad inconsequens, arguitur ad 5 idem. Nam iuxta illud sequitur quod omne coruptibile infinities potest incipere et desinere esse, et per infinitum magnum tempus durare. Quod sic probatur: quocunque homine existente signato, ipse potest naturaliter in quo- libet instanti futuro nasci, et per consequens infinities 10 potest nasci. Si enim in quotlibet instantibus potest nasci, sine hoc quod immediate post vel ante nascatur, sequitur quod quotienslibet potest nasci et per idem corumpi, et per idem per quantumlibet magnum tempus esse; tum quia per cuiuslibet temporis aliam partem 15 potest esse, tum quia aliter oportet ponere instans vel tempus succedere post quod non possit esse; quod re- pugnat racioni, cum secundum illam eque possibile est iam per naturam quodcunque coruptibile incipere esse, sicud fuit quando incipit, cum sequitur penes sic 20 opinantem: Sic potuit Socrates naturaliter se habuisse; igitur sic poterit in eternum. Item, iuxta illud sequitur, quod, quocunque mortuo assignato, quicunque medicus potest ipsum sanare, facere vivere, et sic de oculo ceco facere oculum clarissime 25 videntem, ] membra spermatica deperdita restaurare, de F. 67' aceto immediate facere vinum, et breviter de omni preterito facere quod ipsum non fuit; et sic de in- finitis que philosophus reputaret impossibilia, et nos christiani reputaremus miracula. Et consequencie patent 30 ex hoc quod quantumcunque infirmo vel mortuo assig- nato, quantumlibet simplex medicus potuit aliquando sanare; et si potuit, tunc (per opinionem) potest, quia ponit hoc verbum posse de presenti eque indifferenter predicari de preterito, sicud de presenti vel futuro; et 35 per consequens oculus coruptus, sicud totus infirmus, potest quantumlibet faciliter a quocunque totaliter de novo fieri. Et sic non solum de potencia non includente contradiccionem, sed de possibili quoad nos, potest facere hoc esse vinum (demonstrando acetum). Et sequitur 40 quod nihil potest deperdere potenciam naturalem se- 13. MS. q°d13. 23. MS. 4a in marg.
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CAP. F. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 67 nescere vel debilitari, nullus enim lapsus temporis, sicud nulla accio vel mora, potest quicquam reddere insanabile, irrecuperabile, et sic de ceteris similibus. Item, ponatur quod intelligencie habeant proposiciones (5) A singular proposition, 5 eternas de qualibuscunque veritatibus, et patet quod referring to one instant, is est dare genus veritatum vel talis proposicio, “Hoc known by instans est" non sufficit per tempus manere vera. Illa angels, or pure intelligences, as proposicio a effectu vera est [sed] non sufficit naturaliter eternally true. nisi per diem manere vera. Et sic de infinitis gradibus t0 proposicionum contingencium (natarum in maiori et in minori, contingencium ad utrumlibet), et necessariarum. Cum igitur quelibet talis de preterito, cuius veritas non dependet a futuro, sufficit eternaliter manere vera, nec est in potestate alicuius facere illam esse falsam, videtur 15 quod illa sit necessaria, et per consequens oppositum inpossibile. Confirmatur per hoc quod a proposicio vera de preterito, in infinitum excedit quamcunque propo- sicionem contingentem in firmitate veritatis. Sicud enim illa anima se habet ad esse que est incoruptibilis et 20 eterna, sic veritas de preterito. Cum igitur necesse sit illam esse, sequitur per idem quod necesse sit veritatem talem esse. Dicens enim quod est in potestate cuius- cunque facere veritatem talem non esse, habet dicere de quacunque anima vel homine, confirmato quod ipse 25 potest facere illud non esse. Item, iuxta istam viam, consiliandum est eque de preteritis sicud de futuris, quod est contra doctrinam Aristotelis (3° c° 7° ethicorum) et contra omnem pru- denciam. Quid, rogo, valeret consulere de hoc: "navale 3o bellum fuit," aut de aliis huiusmodi veritatibus pre- teritis? Et consequencia patet, eo quod quilibet homo qui tunc fuit, vel in futurum erit, potest eque precavere pericula in illo bello contingencia, sicud unquam potuit. Igitur causata est racio nunc consulendi de illo, sicud 35 fuit tunc; et sine dubio multi apponerent diligenciam ad salvandum Hectorem, et sanandum multos qui de facto sunt corupti, si crederent se posse faciliter in illud. Unde hic respondet posicio, dicens quod verbum posse 67" est eque indifferenter] amplicativum pro preterito sicud pro futuro, et ideo non refert dicere quod hoc potest, (6) If the doctrine of the contingency of the past were true, we should have to take thought about it as about the future ; for we should be able to avoid past accidents by making them not to have taken place! Thus its truth is infinitely greater than that of anything contingent, which either may or may not be. If so, and if nothing can nake it false, it is necessarily true. The answer is here that to be possible abstracts from time, whether past, present or future. „ 8. MS. sed deest. 15. MS. 4. MS. 5a in marg.; ib. MS. ponitur. 36. MS. ectorem. 26. MS. 6to in marg. quin quod. 5*
CAP. F. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 67 nescere vel debilitari, nullus enim lapsus temporis, sicud nulla accio vel mora, potest quicquam reddere insanabile, irrecuperabile, et sic de ceteris similibus. Item, ponatur quod intelligencie habeant proposiciones (5) A singular proposition, 5 eternas de qualibuscunque veritatibus, et patet quod referring to one instant, is est dare genus veritatum vel talis proposicio, “Hoc known by instans est" non sufficit per tempus manere vera. Illa angels, or pure intelligences, as proposicio a effectu vera est [sed] non sufficit naturaliter eternally true. nisi per diem manere vera. Et sic de infinitis gradibus t0 proposicionum contingencium (natarum in maiori et in minori, contingencium ad utrumlibet), et necessariarum. Cum igitur quelibet talis de preterito, cuius veritas non dependet a futuro, sufficit eternaliter manere vera, nec est in potestate alicuius facere illam esse falsam, videtur 15 quod illa sit necessaria, et per consequens oppositum inpossibile. Confirmatur per hoc quod a proposicio vera de preterito, in infinitum excedit quamcunque propo- sicionem contingentem in firmitate veritatis. Sicud enim illa anima se habet ad esse que est incoruptibilis et 20 eterna, sic veritas de preterito. Cum igitur necesse sit illam esse, sequitur per idem quod necesse sit veritatem talem esse. Dicens enim quod est in potestate cuius- cunque facere veritatem talem non esse, habet dicere de quacunque anima vel homine, confirmato quod ipse 25 potest facere illud non esse. Item, iuxta istam viam, consiliandum est eque de preteritis sicud de futuris, quod est contra doctrinam Aristotelis (3° c° 7° ethicorum) et contra omnem pru- denciam. Quid, rogo, valeret consulere de hoc: "navale 3o bellum fuit," aut de aliis huiusmodi veritatibus pre- teritis? Et consequencia patet, eo quod quilibet homo qui tunc fuit, vel in futurum erit, potest eque precavere pericula in illo bello contingencia, sicud unquam potuit. Igitur causata est racio nunc consulendi de illo, sicud 35 fuit tunc; et sine dubio multi apponerent diligenciam ad salvandum Hectorem, et sanandum multos qui de facto sunt corupti, si crederent se posse faciliter in illud. Unde hic respondet posicio, dicens quod verbum posse 67" est eque indifferenter] amplicativum pro preterito sicud pro futuro, et ideo non refert dicere quod hoc potest, (6) If the doctrine of the contingency of the past were true, we should have to take thought about it as about the future ; for we should be able to avoid past accidents by making them not to have taken place! Thus its truth is infinitely greater than that of anything contingent, which either may or may not be. If so, and if nothing can nake it false, it is necessarily true. The answer is here that to be possible abstracts from time, whether past, present or future. „ 8. MS. sed deest. 15. MS. 4. MS. 5a in marg.; ib. MS. ponitur. 36. MS. ectorem. 26. MS. 6to in marg. quin quod. 5*
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68 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I. The general et dicere quod hoc potuit, vel poterit sic se habere. Et conclusions are sunt omnes conclusiones predicte concedende. Verum- admitted to be true; tamen non est possibile mortuum vivere, aut hominem but though a redire post sui corupcionem, vel revocare verbum locu- dead man can live, he cannot tum, et sic de aliis in sensu composito locutis, set in live after he is dead; sensu diviso sunt proporciones tales simplices concedende a word may be esse possibiles. Et tunc negande sunt alie tanquam in- spoken or not spoken, but not compossibiles prioribus. Et ideo signanter dicit philo- recalled when once spoken. sophus, quod a privacione ad habitum inpossibilis est regressio, et impossible est aliquid redire post sui 10 Given that I can corupcionem. Et sic de ceteris. Posito igitur quod ego cure a certain sanem oculum Aristotelis, aut preservem virginitatem man's eye, it follows that he cuiusdam, negandum est quod Aristoteles sit coruptus, is neither dead vel oculus eius fuit cecus, aut data mulier fuit corupta. nor blind. Omnia enim illa repugnant posito, et sic non reputat 15 supradicta reducta inconveniencia. Sed contra illam posicionem videtur primo quod But this answer seems to wrest words from abutitur terminis. Si enim tunc esset posse de presenti, their natural de preterito, et futuro, ad quid ponitur hoc verbum sense. If to be possible posse habere differencias temporum, cum non differt 20 abstracted from time, what is hoc posse et hoc potuisse sic se habere? the meaning of Similiter videtur quod natura docet nos opposito the past and the future tense, so modo loqui. Nam naturalis prudencia docet quemlibet often employed ? It is against non consiliari de preteritis, sicud non timet periculum nature to take preteritum, sed futurum. Nec aliquis est ita fatuus quod 25 counsel how to do past things; innititur ad hoc, quod sanet Aristotelem vel unum tale no one is so preteritum. Si tamen posset ex propria potencia pre- foolish as to try. Let him that cavere talia, et bene sciret quod talia faciliter possent holds this view nocere, vel perficere, similiter ex sua inpericia vel in- cure his dead grandfather, dustria timeret naturaliter talia, et speraret bona, sicut 30 and I will believe his facit de futuris; quod est contra Aristotelem (6to phisi- theory. corum, capitulo 6t0). Sanet igitur sic opinians avum suum, vel faciat unum tale mirabile, et credam ei. Similiter, subducta omni tali obligacione, concedit quod potest in presenti instanti salvare Aristotelem. Illi 35 igitur non repugnat hoc putatum esse necessarium: Aristoteles fuit mortuus per duo milia annorum ante hoc instans. Sunt igitur ambo simul concedenda; primum, quia est quasi necessarium, ut opinio concedit; et se- cundum, quia est verum et creditum vulgariter esse 40 firmius verum quam primum. Ex quo sequitur quod Aristoteles semper potest esse, et infinicies potest mori, ac infinicies generari. Nam in quolibet instanti potest esse, sicud per omnem horam, diem, septumanam, It admitted, it would jumble up the present with the past to such an extent,
68 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I. The general et dicere quod hoc potuit, vel poterit sic se habere. Et conclusions are sunt omnes conclusiones predicte concedende. Verum- admitted to be true; tamen non est possibile mortuum vivere, aut hominem but though a redire post sui corupcionem, vel revocare verbum locu- dead man can live, he cannot tum, et sic de aliis in sensu composito locutis, set in live after he is dead; sensu diviso sunt proporciones tales simplices concedende a word may be esse possibiles. Et tunc negande sunt alie tanquam in- spoken or not spoken, but not compossibiles prioribus. Et ideo signanter dicit philo- recalled when once spoken. sophus, quod a privacione ad habitum inpossibilis est regressio, et impossible est aliquid redire post sui 10 Given that I can corupcionem. Et sic de ceteris. Posito igitur quod ego cure a certain sanem oculum Aristotelis, aut preservem virginitatem man's eye, it follows that he cuiusdam, negandum est quod Aristoteles sit coruptus, is neither dead vel oculus eius fuit cecus, aut data mulier fuit corupta. nor blind. Omnia enim illa repugnant posito, et sic non reputat 15 supradicta reducta inconveniencia. Sed contra illam posicionem videtur primo quod But this answer seems to wrest words from abutitur terminis. Si enim tunc esset posse de presenti, their natural de preterito, et futuro, ad quid ponitur hoc verbum sense. If to be possible posse habere differencias temporum, cum non differt 20 abstracted from time, what is hoc posse et hoc potuisse sic se habere? the meaning of Similiter videtur quod natura docet nos opposito the past and the future tense, so modo loqui. Nam naturalis prudencia docet quemlibet often employed ? It is against non consiliari de preteritis, sicud non timet periculum nature to take preteritum, sed futurum. Nec aliquis est ita fatuus quod 25 counsel how to do past things; innititur ad hoc, quod sanet Aristotelem vel unum tale no one is so preteritum. Si tamen posset ex propria potencia pre- foolish as to try. Let him that cavere talia, et bene sciret quod talia faciliter possent holds this view nocere, vel perficere, similiter ex sua inpericia vel in- cure his dead grandfather, dustria timeret naturaliter talia, et speraret bona, sicut 30 and I will believe his facit de futuris; quod est contra Aristotelem (6to phisi- theory. corum, capitulo 6t0). Sanet igitur sic opinians avum suum, vel faciat unum tale mirabile, et credam ei. Similiter, subducta omni tali obligacione, concedit quod potest in presenti instanti salvare Aristotelem. Illi 35 igitur non repugnat hoc putatum esse necessarium: Aristoteles fuit mortuus per duo milia annorum ante hoc instans. Sunt igitur ambo simul concedenda; primum, quia est quasi necessarium, ut opinio concedit; et se- cundum, quia est verum et creditum vulgariter esse 40 firmius verum quam primum. Ex quo sequitur quod Aristoteles semper potest esse, et infinicies potest mori, ac infinicies generari. Nam in quolibet instanti potest esse, sicud per omnem horam, diem, septumanam, It admitted, it would jumble up the present with the past to such an extent,
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CAP. I. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 69 annum, etc., et per idem in quibuscunque instantibus generari et mori; et specialiter iuxta opinionem que concedit quod quocies fuit Oxonie, tocies fuit homo. that one day Similiter iuxta illud sequitur quod unum tempus potest might be 5 identificari cuicunque alteri, et maiorari ac minorari in infinitely infinitum, quod est contradiccio. Et consequencia sic lengthened, and form part of probatur: b, dies lapsa, potest esse futura, quia potuit another, so that all times would esse futura, et per consequens in quocunque tempore be confused ; and with time, F. 68� indifferenter potest esse futura. In c igitur die futuro all things. 10 potest esse futura; et cum impossibile sit b esse cum c, nisi unum sit pars alterius, vel sit idem tempus, sequitur quod b potest esse c, et cum tempus sit maxima causa individuacionis, videtur multo magis quod omnia reliqua possunt idemtificari, et per idem sequitur quod hora 15 potest imaginari ad quantumlibet parvum tempus et quantumlibet diu durare. Similiter, signato motu eterno preterito, quelibet eius pars diurna potest cras esse; igitur et totus ille motus, et per consequens totum tempus eternum, et sic in 20 quolibet instanti futuro est possibile mundum incipere esse, sic quod non fuit. Antecedens patet, quia que- cunque eius pars potuit esse futura, igitur potest; et per consequens tempus quod fuit passio talis motus potest cras esse, et sic omnis dies qui fuit potest cras 25 esse. Et per antecedens ante omne tempus possumus esse, et sic mundus in quolibet instanti incipere esse. Dicitur forte quod datus motus et data generacio possunt esse futura, et sic cras, cum ille terminus cras sit communis; sed non possunt esse in alio tempore, 30 nisi in isto (demonstrando tempus in quo fuerunt) quia tempus est principium individuacionis huiusmodi motuum qui non possunt idemtificari. Et sic illud tempus potest cras esse, sed non in distincto tempore similiter adequato. Illud non tollit quin ante omne tempus possimus esse 35 quia ante omne instans et omnem horam: et per con- sequens ante instans generacionis mee qui fuit a, possum esse. Et per ulterius sequitur: ante a possum esse, et This cannot be evaded by saying that a movement, taken abstractly, may be in any future time, but individually only is one time; This would make it possible for the world to begin at each instant of time. since one and the same time may be as well in the future as in the past! for at any rate I might be in existence previously to any given instant, and therefore, 33. MS. adeto. 34. nd pro illud. 7. Potest ... quia potuit. I think that Wyclif, urging this difficulty, loses sight of his adversary's distinction between the abstract present potest and the potest restricted to a certain portion of time.
CAP. I. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 69 annum, etc., et per idem in quibuscunque instantibus generari et mori; et specialiter iuxta opinionem que concedit quod quocies fuit Oxonie, tocies fuit homo. that one day Similiter iuxta illud sequitur quod unum tempus potest might be 5 identificari cuicunque alteri, et maiorari ac minorari in infinitely infinitum, quod est contradiccio. Et consequencia sic lengthened, and form part of probatur: b, dies lapsa, potest esse futura, quia potuit another, so that all times would esse futura, et per consequens in quocunque tempore be confused ; and with time, F. 68� indifferenter potest esse futura. In c igitur die futuro all things. 10 potest esse futura; et cum impossibile sit b esse cum c, nisi unum sit pars alterius, vel sit idem tempus, sequitur quod b potest esse c, et cum tempus sit maxima causa individuacionis, videtur multo magis quod omnia reliqua possunt idemtificari, et per idem sequitur quod hora 15 potest imaginari ad quantumlibet parvum tempus et quantumlibet diu durare. Similiter, signato motu eterno preterito, quelibet eius pars diurna potest cras esse; igitur et totus ille motus, et per consequens totum tempus eternum, et sic in 20 quolibet instanti futuro est possibile mundum incipere esse, sic quod non fuit. Antecedens patet, quia que- cunque eius pars potuit esse futura, igitur potest; et per consequens tempus quod fuit passio talis motus potest cras esse, et sic omnis dies qui fuit potest cras 25 esse. Et per antecedens ante omne tempus possumus esse, et sic mundus in quolibet instanti incipere esse. Dicitur forte quod datus motus et data generacio possunt esse futura, et sic cras, cum ille terminus cras sit communis; sed non possunt esse in alio tempore, 30 nisi in isto (demonstrando tempus in quo fuerunt) quia tempus est principium individuacionis huiusmodi motuum qui non possunt idemtificari. Et sic illud tempus potest cras esse, sed non in distincto tempore similiter adequato. Illud non tollit quin ante omne tempus possimus esse 35 quia ante omne instans et omnem horam: et per con- sequens ante instans generacionis mee qui fuit a, possum esse. Et per ulterius sequitur: ante a possum esse, et This cannot be evaded by saying that a movement, taken abstractly, may be in any future time, but individually only is one time; This would make it possible for the world to begin at each instant of time. since one and the same time may be as well in the future as in the past! for at any rate I might be in existence previously to any given instant, and therefore, 33. MS. adeto. 34. nd pro illud. 7. Potest ... quia potuit. I think that Wyclif, urging this difficulty, loses sight of his adversary's distinction between the abstract present potest and the potest restricted to a certain portion of time.
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70 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I. previously to sic multas generaciones habere, et per consequens multo- the instant of ciens generari et corumpi. Ego enim essem idem in my conception together with quocunque instanti fuissem generatus; et cum in quolibet other absurdities. instanti possum esse generatus, infinitas generaciones possum naturaliter habere. Nec valet dicere quod, admisso quod totum illud tempus sit futurum, sequitur aliud tempus precessisse; quia cum mundus incepit esse, sicud potuit esse quod nullum tempus fuit sed quodlibet est futurum, sic ad huc potest esse. Et sic quilibet nostrum potest esse 10 primus homo sine patre, et per consequens possibile est neminem forisfecisse; debet igitur quilibet nostrum inhibere alteri ne sic primarie peccet, cum sit in po- testate sua sic peccare, et salvare totum genus hominis a tali peccato; quod tamen theologi dicunt soli deo 15 posse competere. Sicud igitur una pars unius anni non potest esse pars alterius anni, qui erit mille annis post illum, sic nullum tempus potuit precessisse illud tempus; nec aliquod potest esse tempus, nisi quod fuit vel erit, quia tempus est per se individuatum; et si veniret aliud 20 quam tempus signatum, illud interrumperet omne tempus et fieret totum novum tempus: quod non est bene ymaginabile. Nec valet dicere quod necesse est mundum fuisse eternum, aut quodlibet instans vel pars finita temporis 25 eterni potest fore, sed non totum illud tempus; quia iuxta opinionem possibile est nihil esse, et per con- sequens quilibet ] homo potest facere quod mundus non F. 68b sit eternus, cum potest esse primus homo incipiens esse cum mundo. Cum igitur non claudit contradiccionem 30 sic esse, possibile est iuxta principia opinionis sic esse, et ad hoc sunt raciones de infinito alibi fiende. Non igitur propter individuacionem potest quecunque pars temporis fore post hoc instans. Similiter hoc verbum posse, implicat vel signat unum 35 ens, cum sit verbum amplicativum, et illud non est nisi posse vel potencia: igitur ipsum signet potenciam; et If you reply that the future implies the past I say : If the world had a beginning, according to you this beginning is possible now: and each of us may be the first man. Nor can you take refuge in the eternity of the world, for by your showing, all things being. contingent, it is possible that nothing exists, and that the world is not eternal. To be able signifies to be something, actively or passively. 7. Precessisse. The future implying the past, another possible future would imply another possible past. I may be in existence before a certain possible instant of my conception, but not before another possible instant. The reply is clear enough ; Wyclif, in this paragraph, endeavours to show that, in his adversary's theory, it is inadmissible.
70 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I. previously to sic multas generaciones habere, et per consequens multo- the instant of ciens generari et corumpi. Ego enim essem idem in my conception together with quocunque instanti fuissem generatus; et cum in quolibet other absurdities. instanti possum esse generatus, infinitas generaciones possum naturaliter habere. Nec valet dicere quod, admisso quod totum illud tempus sit futurum, sequitur aliud tempus precessisse; quia cum mundus incepit esse, sicud potuit esse quod nullum tempus fuit sed quodlibet est futurum, sic ad huc potest esse. Et sic quilibet nostrum potest esse 10 primus homo sine patre, et per consequens possibile est neminem forisfecisse; debet igitur quilibet nostrum inhibere alteri ne sic primarie peccet, cum sit in po- testate sua sic peccare, et salvare totum genus hominis a tali peccato; quod tamen theologi dicunt soli deo 15 posse competere. Sicud igitur una pars unius anni non potest esse pars alterius anni, qui erit mille annis post illum, sic nullum tempus potuit precessisse illud tempus; nec aliquod potest esse tempus, nisi quod fuit vel erit, quia tempus est per se individuatum; et si veniret aliud 20 quam tempus signatum, illud interrumperet omne tempus et fieret totum novum tempus: quod non est bene ymaginabile. Nec valet dicere quod necesse est mundum fuisse eternum, aut quodlibet instans vel pars finita temporis 25 eterni potest fore, sed non totum illud tempus; quia iuxta opinionem possibile est nihil esse, et per con- sequens quilibet ] homo potest facere quod mundus non F. 68b sit eternus, cum potest esse primus homo incipiens esse cum mundo. Cum igitur non claudit contradiccionem 30 sic esse, possibile est iuxta principia opinionis sic esse, et ad hoc sunt raciones de infinito alibi fiende. Non igitur propter individuacionem potest quecunque pars temporis fore post hoc instans. Similiter hoc verbum posse, implicat vel signat unum 35 ens, cum sit verbum amplicativum, et illud non est nisi posse vel potencia: igitur ipsum signet potenciam; et If you reply that the future implies the past I say : If the world had a beginning, according to you this beginning is possible now: and each of us may be the first man. Nor can you take refuge in the eternity of the world, for by your showing, all things being. contingent, it is possible that nothing exists, and that the world is not eternal. To be able signifies to be something, actively or passively. 7. Precessisse. The future implying the past, another possible future would imply another possible past. I may be in existence before a certain possible instant of my conception, but not before another possible instant. The reply is clear enough ; Wyclif, in this paragraph, endeavours to show that, in his adversary's theory, it is inadmissible.
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СAP. 1. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 71 cum omnis potencia ymaginabilis sit activa vel passiva, sequitur quod ipsum talem solum signet. Si igitur alia potencia potest esse, vel est illa potencia delibilis vel indelibilis. Si delibilis, tunc potest non esse, et per 5 consequens potest esse quod ipsa non posset esse, et sic alia agencia possunt difficultari quantum ad acciones quas possunt facere, sic quod una vice de difficiliori possunt facere quam alia; quod repugnat posicioni. Si autem potencia sit indelibilis, tunc non est nisi in deo ro vel materia prima; sed hoc non denominat hominem, quia sic quilibet posset in infinitum magnum effectum naturaliter, cum potencia ex qua sic potest non sit limitata. Nec denominatur res potencior propter poten- ciam passivam, quia tanto est substancia activa im- 15 pedicior quoad est passivior. Sicud igitur sum certus quod ego fui, in tantum quod non possum discredere illi, sic est necessitas limitans me ad illum modum sciendi ultra modum sciendi contingens futurum, quod propter naturam sui non possum nisi opinari. Et cum 20 sic loquntur autores de posse idem suppositus post declaracionem. Quo supposito, restat respondere per ordinem argu- mentis. Et primo premittenda est distinccio de necessi- tate; sicud enim verum ad veritatem, et ens ad entitatem, 25 sic necessarium ad necessitatem Omne igitur necessarium est necessitas, et econtra. Prima autem demonstracio necessarii est, quod quedam est necessitas simpliciter et quedam secundum quid, vel ex condicione. Vocatur autem simpliciter necessitas, veritas quam oportet esse; 3o et illa dividitur in absolutam et per accidens. Necessitas absoluta est quam oportet [et] semper opportuit esse, ut esse deum; et necessitas per accidens dicitur quam iam oportet, sed non semper oportuit esse; ut me fuisse. Et absoluta necessitas quidem est prima, ut “deum 35 esse" et quedam creata ut “mundum esse". Et causa- All power must be active or passive. I have no power either way to think of my not having been : this, therefore, is a necessity that goes beyond contingency, which is mere matter of opinion. I shall now answer the arguments first set forth, after giving various senses of the word necessity ; 1. Complete which is absolute or relative ; if absolute, uncreated or created; created necessity being affirmative, 2. MS. Aristoteles alia. 31. MS. et deest. 3, 4. debilis ... indebilis everywhere. 21. Declaracionem. This sentence is not to be construed. I suspect also that there is a gap somewhere in the paragraph, or that the text is corrupt; for the conclusion and the beginning do not seem to hold together. 35. Mundum esse. Wyclif here speaks of the ideal world which he calls a 'created truth'. See Logica, vol. III, pp. 224 to end, and Introduction, p. XXXV.
СAP. 1. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 71 cum omnis potencia ymaginabilis sit activa vel passiva, sequitur quod ipsum talem solum signet. Si igitur alia potencia potest esse, vel est illa potencia delibilis vel indelibilis. Si delibilis, tunc potest non esse, et per 5 consequens potest esse quod ipsa non posset esse, et sic alia agencia possunt difficultari quantum ad acciones quas possunt facere, sic quod una vice de difficiliori possunt facere quam alia; quod repugnat posicioni. Si autem potencia sit indelibilis, tunc non est nisi in deo ro vel materia prima; sed hoc non denominat hominem, quia sic quilibet posset in infinitum magnum effectum naturaliter, cum potencia ex qua sic potest non sit limitata. Nec denominatur res potencior propter poten- ciam passivam, quia tanto est substancia activa im- 15 pedicior quoad est passivior. Sicud igitur sum certus quod ego fui, in tantum quod non possum discredere illi, sic est necessitas limitans me ad illum modum sciendi ultra modum sciendi contingens futurum, quod propter naturam sui non possum nisi opinari. Et cum 20 sic loquntur autores de posse idem suppositus post declaracionem. Quo supposito, restat respondere per ordinem argu- mentis. Et primo premittenda est distinccio de necessi- tate; sicud enim verum ad veritatem, et ens ad entitatem, 25 sic necessarium ad necessitatem Omne igitur necessarium est necessitas, et econtra. Prima autem demonstracio necessarii est, quod quedam est necessitas simpliciter et quedam secundum quid, vel ex condicione. Vocatur autem simpliciter necessitas, veritas quam oportet esse; 3o et illa dividitur in absolutam et per accidens. Necessitas absoluta est quam oportet [et] semper opportuit esse, ut esse deum; et necessitas per accidens dicitur quam iam oportet, sed non semper oportuit esse; ut me fuisse. Et absoluta necessitas quidem est prima, ut “deum 35 esse" et quedam creata ut “mundum esse". Et causa- All power must be active or passive. I have no power either way to think of my not having been : this, therefore, is a necessity that goes beyond contingency, which is mere matter of opinion. I shall now answer the arguments first set forth, after giving various senses of the word necessity ; 1. Complete which is absolute or relative ; if absolute, uncreated or created; created necessity being affirmative, 2. MS. Aristoteles alia. 31. MS. et deest. 3, 4. debilis ... indebilis everywhere. 21. Declaracionem. This sentence is not to be construed. I suspect also that there is a gap somewhere in the paragraph, or that the text is corrupt; for the conclusion and the beginning do not seem to hold together. 35. Mundum esse. Wyclif here speaks of the ideal world which he calls a 'created truth'. See Logica, vol. III, pp. 224 to end, and Introduction, p. XXXV.
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72 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I. tarum quedam est affirmativa, ut “corpus esse", quedam negativa, ut “hominem non esse asinum", quedam con- ditionalis contingenter, ut “si tu es homo, tu es homo", quedam universalis, et quedam singularis. Si autem sit necessitas ex condicione vel secundum quid, tunc est 5 necessitas quam non oportet esse, sed oportet illam esse condicione supposita, ut in 2° phisicorum in fine, F. 69. vocat Aristoteles veritatem ex fine supposito necessariam which is either antecedent (said ut habere navem est necessarium ad navigandum, quia of a cause in regard to its habere navem est, et non possit navigari sine habitu 1o effect) or sequent (said navis. Et talis necessitas est duplex; quedam enim est of an effect in antecedens, et quedam consequens; et vocatur necessitas regard to its cause). antecedens causa aggregata vel consequens, qua posita, sequitur causatum, et illud causatum est necessitas con- sequens. Antecedent Et est triplex necessitas antecedens: quedam voluntaria, necessity is quedam naturalis, et quedam cogens. Voluntaria (ut either voluntary, voluntas dei), quantumcunque contingens, est necessitas which, though it necessitates antecedens respectu cuiuscunque effectus. Et illa non its effect, does tollit libertatem arbitrii, meritum, demeritum, contin-20 not destroy free will ; genciam vel fortunam, sicud declarant theologi [et] natural, which doctor profundus, 3° capitulo 1°, 2°, et infra. Necessitas produces its naturaliter antecedens est causa ex qua sequitur causatum effect without intending it; sine deliberacione ad causatum causandum (ut lux appli- cata ad diaphanum sine impedimento agit necessitate 25 naturali suum lumen); et sic de omnibus agentibus naturalibus. Necessitas cogens est causa violentans cau- or coactive, producing an satum ad effectum ex illa sequentem; ut malus habitus effect contrary to the nature of necessitat ad actus viciosos. Et isto modo loquitur the subject coërced. philosophus 5t° metaphisice 161°. Et iste due necessitates, There can be no merit, but quamvis compaciantur casum et fortunam ac contin- there may be genciam, non tamen compaciuntur suum proximum demerit, in acts produced by the effectum esse meritorium; sed demeritorium bene potest, last two causes ; dum propria culpa demerentis fuerit causa necessitatis a vice coërces man to elicit antecedentis. vicious acts; but he is to Et necessitas consequens vocatur quodcunque causatum blame for the growth of the [quod] sequitur ex tali necessitate. vice. Et ex isto elicio mihi tria; primo, quod impossibile Consequent corresponds to est aliquam veritatem esse, nisi fuerit necessitas simpli- antecedent necessity. citer vel secundum quid, aut antecedens aut consequens 40 Hence I infer: (1) that every truth must be 15 30 35 negative, or conditional; universal or singular. 2. Incomplete, 2, 3. MS. 9' pro conditionalis. 8. MS. necessitate. 13. MS. CX pro sequens. 21. MS. e heosl; ib. MS. et deest. 24. MS. Gij at pro sine. 37. MS. quod deest.
72 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I. tarum quedam est affirmativa, ut “corpus esse", quedam negativa, ut “hominem non esse asinum", quedam con- ditionalis contingenter, ut “si tu es homo, tu es homo", quedam universalis, et quedam singularis. Si autem sit necessitas ex condicione vel secundum quid, tunc est 5 necessitas quam non oportet esse, sed oportet illam esse condicione supposita, ut in 2° phisicorum in fine, F. 69. vocat Aristoteles veritatem ex fine supposito necessariam which is either antecedent (said ut habere navem est necessarium ad navigandum, quia of a cause in regard to its habere navem est, et non possit navigari sine habitu 1o effect) or sequent (said navis. Et talis necessitas est duplex; quedam enim est of an effect in antecedens, et quedam consequens; et vocatur necessitas regard to its cause). antecedens causa aggregata vel consequens, qua posita, sequitur causatum, et illud causatum est necessitas con- sequens. Antecedent Et est triplex necessitas antecedens: quedam voluntaria, necessity is quedam naturalis, et quedam cogens. Voluntaria (ut either voluntary, voluntas dei), quantumcunque contingens, est necessitas which, though it necessitates antecedens respectu cuiuscunque effectus. Et illa non its effect, does tollit libertatem arbitrii, meritum, demeritum, contin-20 not destroy free will ; genciam vel fortunam, sicud declarant theologi [et] natural, which doctor profundus, 3° capitulo 1°, 2°, et infra. Necessitas produces its naturaliter antecedens est causa ex qua sequitur causatum effect without intending it; sine deliberacione ad causatum causandum (ut lux appli- cata ad diaphanum sine impedimento agit necessitate 25 naturali suum lumen); et sic de omnibus agentibus naturalibus. Necessitas cogens est causa violentans cau- or coactive, producing an satum ad effectum ex illa sequentem; ut malus habitus effect contrary to the nature of necessitat ad actus viciosos. Et isto modo loquitur the subject coërced. philosophus 5t° metaphisice 161°. Et iste due necessitates, There can be no merit, but quamvis compaciantur casum et fortunam ac contin- there may be genciam, non tamen compaciuntur suum proximum demerit, in acts produced by the effectum esse meritorium; sed demeritorium bene potest, last two causes ; dum propria culpa demerentis fuerit causa necessitatis a vice coërces man to elicit antecedentis. vicious acts; but he is to Et necessitas consequens vocatur quodcunque causatum blame for the growth of the [quod] sequitur ex tali necessitate. vice. Et ex isto elicio mihi tria; primo, quod impossibile Consequent corresponds to est aliquam veritatem esse, nisi fuerit necessitas simpli- antecedent necessity. citer vel secundum quid, aut antecedens aut consequens 40 Hence I infer: (1) that every truth must be 15 30 35 negative, or conditional; universal or singular. 2. Incomplete, 2, 3. MS. 9' pro conditionalis. 8. MS. necessitate. 13. MS. CX pro sequens. 21. MS. e heosl; ib. MS. et deest. 24. MS. Gij at pro sine. 37. MS. quod deest.
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CAP. I. DE ACTIBUS ANIME 73 F. 693 necessary, respectu diversorum. Patet ex hoc quod prima veritas either with est necessitas simpliciter antecedens ad multas veritates complete or with incomplete simpliciter sequentes ex illa; ut, si deus est, nihil simul necessity. The truth of est et non est; et quecunque alia veritas causata est, God's existence 5 tam antecedens quam consequens simpliciter, vel se- is the first cause of all others, cundum quid respectu diversorum. Omnis enim talis and all others are caused in veritas est causa, qua posita, sequitur creatum. Et one sense, creatum sequens est causa posteriori, aliqua contingens causes in another; simpliciter, et alia necessaria. Non enim est dare ulti- so that there is no last effect, ro mum causatum, cum ipsum causaret infinitas relaciones as each cause ipso posteriores ex ipso sequentes. gives rise to infinite other Secundo, patet quod sophiste et maior pars hominum relations. loquens de necessario intendit famosius necessarium (2) Most people understand by simpliciter; quia aliter non distinguerent necessarium necessily that which is 15 contra contingens. Anologum igitur per se sumptum complete, for famosiori est sumendum; immo, secundum logicam they oppose it to contingency. Aristotelis non sequitur “hoc secundum quid est tale, I understand indeed igitur est tale"; et illud sequar ego in futurum, loquens something de necessario. analogous to it; but what is 20 Tercio patet quod magna causa controversie in ista necessary in a certain sense materia est equivocacio in terminis. Unde sophistis non need not be so in every sense. placet modus loquendi doctoris profundi de descripcione (3) The necessitatis antecedentis, consequentis, et aliis, con- controversy on this subject cernentibus istam materiam. Unde secundum ipsum, proceeds mainly 25 3° libro, capitulo 2°, necessitas naturaliter antecedens from a contusion of est causa activa, qua posita, cum omnibus suis disposi- terms. Sophists do not cionibus naturaliter previis quibus causat suum causatum, approve of Bradwardine's necessario et indefectibiliter sequitur illud causatum definition of causari. Non enim necessario sequitur me sic facere, antecedent and consequent 3o quamvis deus velit me sic facere, sed necessario, necessity. si Deus vult me sic facere, tunc sic facio: ut He says that natural non est necesse me sedere si (vel dum) sedeo, sed necessity is the necessary necesse est quod sedeo, si sedeo; ita quod necessitas following of an sit consequencie, et non consequentis. Unde aliquibus effect from its cause. 35 videretur quod necessitas antecedens et consequens est Though God may will anl quedam consequencia, que est habitudo sic esse ad sic act of mine, it does not follow esse, et non illa contingens veritas antecedens vel con- that I do it by sequens. Unde falsum est quod agens naturale, appli- necessity; but it necessarily catum ad passivum, necessario agit, vel incipit agere, follows that I do it. 40 sed necessario si applicatur ad passivum super quod Likewise we dominatur, agit vel incipit agere; et ignoranciam illius cannot say that a natural agent sophismatis vidi frequenter necessitare responsales. Nota S MS. priori. 32. MS. VI du??
CAP. I. DE ACTIBUS ANIME 73 F. 693 necessary, respectu diversorum. Patet ex hoc quod prima veritas either with est necessitas simpliciter antecedens ad multas veritates complete or with incomplete simpliciter sequentes ex illa; ut, si deus est, nihil simul necessity. The truth of est et non est; et quecunque alia veritas causata est, God's existence 5 tam antecedens quam consequens simpliciter, vel se- is the first cause of all others, cundum quid respectu diversorum. Omnis enim talis and all others are caused in veritas est causa, qua posita, sequitur creatum. Et one sense, creatum sequens est causa posteriori, aliqua contingens causes in another; simpliciter, et alia necessaria. Non enim est dare ulti- so that there is no last effect, ro mum causatum, cum ipsum causaret infinitas relaciones as each cause ipso posteriores ex ipso sequentes. gives rise to infinite other Secundo, patet quod sophiste et maior pars hominum relations. loquens de necessario intendit famosius necessarium (2) Most people understand by simpliciter; quia aliter non distinguerent necessarium necessily that which is 15 contra contingens. Anologum igitur per se sumptum complete, for famosiori est sumendum; immo, secundum logicam they oppose it to contingency. Aristotelis non sequitur “hoc secundum quid est tale, I understand indeed igitur est tale"; et illud sequar ego in futurum, loquens something de necessario. analogous to it; but what is 20 Tercio patet quod magna causa controversie in ista necessary in a certain sense materia est equivocacio in terminis. Unde sophistis non need not be so in every sense. placet modus loquendi doctoris profundi de descripcione (3) The necessitatis antecedentis, consequentis, et aliis, con- controversy on this subject cernentibus istam materiam. Unde secundum ipsum, proceeds mainly 25 3° libro, capitulo 2°, necessitas naturaliter antecedens from a contusion of est causa activa, qua posita, cum omnibus suis disposi- terms. Sophists do not cionibus naturaliter previis quibus causat suum causatum, approve of Bradwardine's necessario et indefectibiliter sequitur illud causatum definition of causari. Non enim necessario sequitur me sic facere, antecedent and consequent 3o quamvis deus velit me sic facere, sed necessario, necessity. si Deus vult me sic facere, tunc sic facio: ut He says that natural non est necesse me sedere si (vel dum) sedeo, sed necessity is the necessary necesse est quod sedeo, si sedeo; ita quod necessitas following of an sit consequencie, et non consequentis. Unde aliquibus effect from its cause. 35 videretur quod necessitas antecedens et consequens est Though God may will anl quedam consequencia, que est habitudo sic esse ad sic act of mine, it does not follow esse, et non illa contingens veritas antecedens vel con- that I do it by sequens. Unde falsum est quod agens naturale, appli- necessity; but it necessarily catum ad passivum, necessario agit, vel incipit agere, follows that I do it. 40 sed necessario si applicatur ad passivum super quod Likewise we dominatur, agit vel incipit agere; et ignoranciam illius cannot say that a natural agent sophismatis vidi frequenter necessitare responsales. Nota S MS. priori. 32. MS. VI du??
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74 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I. acts necessarily tamen quod tales termini, necessario, de necessitate etc., upon its object, possunt quandoque sumi cathegorice et denotare necessi- but that it is necessary, when tatem antecedentis ad consequens, vel econtra. Et, posita applied to its object, that it causa sufficienti respectu cuiusquam causati, de necessi- should act. tate, tali condicionali cuius antecedens ponitur, sequitur 5 These terms, however, are consequens. Et isto modo loquitur Anselmus in libro de often used differently. concordia et predestinacione, post principium et multis While wood is aliis locis, concedens quod lignum album necesse est necessarily white, but esse album, sed illud lignum non est necesse esse album. wood is not. Aristotle says Et eundem modum loquendi habet Aristoteles primo 1o that what is must be when it pery ermeneias in fine, dicens quod omne quod est, is ; which is quando est, necesse est esse, et omne quod non est, sometimes understood as quando non est, necesse est non esse: ubi volunt conditional quandoque necessitatem condicionalem intelligere, et necessity, sometimes as quandoque volunt contingens esse tali necessitate ex 15 contingency determined by antecedente: determinante vero, ut, si aliqua res est, antecedent tunc ex necessitate comitante sequitur ex determinata necessity; which is not so veritate quod illa est; et sic non est de fore rei. of things in the future. Quamvis igitur non placeat sic loqui, proficit tamen From this scire modum loquendi pro intellectu autorum; et ex 20 terminology no doubt springs isto, credo, inolevit distinccio de necessario quoad ad the distinction between the nunc, et necessario pro omni tempore. now and the ever necessary. Ulterius, nota de possibili quod aliquod est possibile Possible also simpliciter; quod potest esse sive per se sive a qua- may mean what lies in the power cunque causa prima vel secunda; et isto modo loquar 25 of any cause to ego de possibili. Sed aliud est possibile secundum quid, effectuate. But some things puta possibile cause create; sicud omnia que possunt are possible to certain causes, fieri a causa secunda sunt possibilia illis. Et illa que and not to non possunt fieri a causa secunda sed a prima, sicud others ; some, only to creacio et alia opera miraculosa, sunt impossibilia quoad 30 the First Cause. All these causam secundam, sed non sunt inpossibilia. Immo. meanings of terms must be omne nominandum est alicui cause secundum quid borne in impossibile; ut, quod mihi inpossibile (hoc est in quod mind, in view of what follows. ego non possum) est alteri possibile; et illas signifi- I say that all truths caciones oportet cum diligencia notare pro conceptu 35 concerning the dicendorum de generibus veritatum. past are necessary in the Istis premissis, patet quod tales veritates de preterito highest degree sunt simpliciter necessarie, et sua opposita sunt simpli- and their contradictories, citer impossibilia, hoc est, non] possunt esse, sicud ille F. 70. absolutely impossible. veritates non possunt non esse. 40 5. MS. eius. 11. Pery ermeneias. De interpretatione; the third in order of Aristotle's works. 28. Illis, i. e. causis secundis.
74 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I. acts necessarily tamen quod tales termini, necessario, de necessitate etc., upon its object, possunt quandoque sumi cathegorice et denotare necessi- but that it is necessary, when tatem antecedentis ad consequens, vel econtra. Et, posita applied to its object, that it causa sufficienti respectu cuiusquam causati, de necessi- should act. tate, tali condicionali cuius antecedens ponitur, sequitur 5 These terms, however, are consequens. Et isto modo loquitur Anselmus in libro de often used differently. concordia et predestinacione, post principium et multis While wood is aliis locis, concedens quod lignum album necesse est necessarily white, but esse album, sed illud lignum non est necesse esse album. wood is not. Aristotle says Et eundem modum loquendi habet Aristoteles primo 1o that what is must be when it pery ermeneias in fine, dicens quod omne quod est, is ; which is quando est, necesse est esse, et omne quod non est, sometimes understood as quando non est, necesse est non esse: ubi volunt conditional quandoque necessitatem condicionalem intelligere, et necessity, sometimes as quandoque volunt contingens esse tali necessitate ex 15 contingency determined by antecedente: determinante vero, ut, si aliqua res est, antecedent tunc ex necessitate comitante sequitur ex determinata necessity; which is not so veritate quod illa est; et sic non est de fore rei. of things in the future. Quamvis igitur non placeat sic loqui, proficit tamen From this scire modum loquendi pro intellectu autorum; et ex 20 terminology no doubt springs isto, credo, inolevit distinccio de necessario quoad ad the distinction between the nunc, et necessario pro omni tempore. now and the ever necessary. Ulterius, nota de possibili quod aliquod est possibile Possible also simpliciter; quod potest esse sive per se sive a qua- may mean what lies in the power cunque causa prima vel secunda; et isto modo loquar 25 of any cause to ego de possibili. Sed aliud est possibile secundum quid, effectuate. But some things puta possibile cause create; sicud omnia que possunt are possible to certain causes, fieri a causa secunda sunt possibilia illis. Et illa que and not to non possunt fieri a causa secunda sed a prima, sicud others ; some, only to creacio et alia opera miraculosa, sunt impossibilia quoad 30 the First Cause. All these causam secundam, sed non sunt inpossibilia. Immo. meanings of terms must be omne nominandum est alicui cause secundum quid borne in impossibile; ut, quod mihi inpossibile (hoc est in quod mind, in view of what follows. ego non possum) est alteri possibile; et illas signifi- I say that all truths caciones oportet cum diligencia notare pro conceptu 35 concerning the dicendorum de generibus veritatum. past are necessary in the Istis premissis, patet quod tales veritates de preterito highest degree sunt simpliciter necessarie, et sua opposita sunt simpli- and their contradictories, citer impossibilia, hoc est, non] possunt esse, sicud ille F. 70. absolutely impossible. veritates non possunt non esse. 40 5. MS. eius. 11. Pery ermeneias. De interpretatione; the third in order of Aristotle's works. 28. Illis, i. e. causis secundis.
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CAP. I. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 75 Et ad primum argumentum, dicitur quod assumptum Refutation of (1). What is est falsum. Nam contingens potest mutari in necessarium, contingent may become sed non est possibile econtra, quia natura semper pro- necessary, but not vice versá. ficit et non desinit quantum ad perpetua. Nec sequitur: From the "tanta est distancia a necessario ad contingens, sicud difference between the econtra, et stat de contingenti fieri necessarium, igitur contingent and the necessary stat de necessario fieri contingens"; quia per idem being the same, sequeretur de aceto immediate fieri vinum, sicud econtra, you either inter nothing, or et de sene iuvenem, sicud econtra, et sic de multis si- endless absurdities. to milibus que scimus esse impossibilia. Si aliter ponitur vis in hoc verbo moveri quod nullius speciei motus est quo veritas contingens mutetur in necessitatem cum non est dare locacionem subiecti vel adquisitum aut deperditum, dicitur quod ex contingenti 15 fit necessarium, non quidem ut ex nocte fit dies, sed idem quod iam est contingens erit alias necessarium; non per absolutum sibi adquiritum, sed per hoc quod oportet ipsum esse, postquam fuit possibile ipsum non esse. Et hoc sine dubio principaliter est a deo, qui 20 talem eternam legem instituit quod nullum quod est ab- solute preteritum potest non fuisse, sed quod verum contingens potest large alterari (hoc est fieri alterum) per adquisicionem denominacionis non qualitatis a de- nominacione qualitatis ad denominacionem necessarii. 25 Et patet quod responsio in fine data non proficit. Sed ad primam confirmacionem dicitur quod satis possibile est corpus coruptibile fieri corpus incoruptibile; nec procedit processus Aristotelis (primo, de celo) contra Platonem. Sed volens palliare processum potest dicere 30 quod procedit ex supposicione: supponens quod mundus sit compositus ex elementis contrariis composicione quali- tativa, racione cuius composicionis naturaliter corumpe- retur in fine sue periodis, sicud homo, vel aliud coruptibile; sed ex voluntate opificis qui ipsum fecit in 35 principio temporis est servatum a corupcione: et sic de se coruptibile, sed eternum ab alio. Hoc, inquam, non est philosophicum, cum potens mundum facere natura- liter incoruptibilem in prima eius factura, sic faceret racionaliter ne tediaretur in eius preservacione et si 40 dicas quod sic fecisset corpus humanum primo in- coruptibile et omne quod mutabit in necessarium propter The Contingent becomes necessary by acquiring necessity over and above the contingent truth which it possessed before ; the same truth which before might have been otherwise, now cannot be otherwise. God's eternal aw is that what is past cannot not have been ; whereas the contingent is subject to change. Aristotle's argument against Plato is worthless, unless we take it as a hypothetical one, and suppose that the sky is incorruptible, not by its, nature, but through God's will. But it is not philosophical; if the sky's nature could be incorruptible, why should not God have mude it so a' urst: What is the change that takes place? 13. MS. cum . . . . subiecti twice.
CAP. I. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 75 Et ad primum argumentum, dicitur quod assumptum Refutation of (1). What is est falsum. Nam contingens potest mutari in necessarium, contingent may become sed non est possibile econtra, quia natura semper pro- necessary, but not vice versá. ficit et non desinit quantum ad perpetua. Nec sequitur: From the "tanta est distancia a necessario ad contingens, sicud difference between the econtra, et stat de contingenti fieri necessarium, igitur contingent and the necessary stat de necessario fieri contingens"; quia per idem being the same, sequeretur de aceto immediate fieri vinum, sicud econtra, you either inter nothing, or et de sene iuvenem, sicud econtra, et sic de multis si- endless absurdities. to milibus que scimus esse impossibilia. Si aliter ponitur vis in hoc verbo moveri quod nullius speciei motus est quo veritas contingens mutetur in necessitatem cum non est dare locacionem subiecti vel adquisitum aut deperditum, dicitur quod ex contingenti 15 fit necessarium, non quidem ut ex nocte fit dies, sed idem quod iam est contingens erit alias necessarium; non per absolutum sibi adquiritum, sed per hoc quod oportet ipsum esse, postquam fuit possibile ipsum non esse. Et hoc sine dubio principaliter est a deo, qui 20 talem eternam legem instituit quod nullum quod est ab- solute preteritum potest non fuisse, sed quod verum contingens potest large alterari (hoc est fieri alterum) per adquisicionem denominacionis non qualitatis a de- nominacione qualitatis ad denominacionem necessarii. 25 Et patet quod responsio in fine data non proficit. Sed ad primam confirmacionem dicitur quod satis possibile est corpus coruptibile fieri corpus incoruptibile; nec procedit processus Aristotelis (primo, de celo) contra Platonem. Sed volens palliare processum potest dicere 30 quod procedit ex supposicione: supponens quod mundus sit compositus ex elementis contrariis composicione quali- tativa, racione cuius composicionis naturaliter corumpe- retur in fine sue periodis, sicud homo, vel aliud coruptibile; sed ex voluntate opificis qui ipsum fecit in 35 principio temporis est servatum a corupcione: et sic de se coruptibile, sed eternum ab alio. Hoc, inquam, non est philosophicum, cum potens mundum facere natura- liter incoruptibilem in prima eius factura, sic faceret racionaliter ne tediaretur in eius preservacione et si 40 dicas quod sic fecisset corpus humanum primo in- coruptibile et omne quod mutabit in necessarium propter The Contingent becomes necessary by acquiring necessity over and above the contingent truth which it possessed before ; the same truth which before might have been otherwise, now cannot be otherwise. God's eternal aw is that what is past cannot not have been ; whereas the contingent is subject to change. Aristotle's argument against Plato is worthless, unless we take it as a hypothetical one, and suppose that the sky is incorruptible, not by its, nature, but through God's will. But it is not philosophical; if the sky's nature could be incorruptible, why should not God have mude it so a' urst: What is the change that takes place? 13. MS. cum . . . . subiecti twice.
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76 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I. Adam was tedium evitandum, dicitur quod ipse non potest tediari; created immortal, and sed racioni convenit quod sic fecisset de mundo. Et the past, as we racioni repugnat quod sic fecisset de omnibus aliis say, becomes necessary. contingentibus, que faciet necessaria. Ymmo, hoc non But this is potuit absolute: contradiccionem enim claudit motum according to reason. contradictorie libere servatum, et secundum sui partem It is impossible that the futurum, necessario fuisse. Et sic requirit ordo naturalis movements of quod homo primo proficiat in uno statu merendi et the sky should be necessary; subiaceat necessitati moriendi, et aliis miseriis, et hinc and it was deveniat perpetuus secundum exigenciam meritorum. 10 fitting, according to Theologi tamen dicunt quod si primus homo non the state of nature, that man peccasset, tunc non subiecisset naturam humanam morti should die. If the first man vel talibus miseriis; sed post certam ] periodum pro-F. 70" had not sinned, ficiendi fuisset translata sine morte ad celum. Nec est very possibly we might have id incredibile, cum spiritus leves sufficiunt habilitare 15 been immortal. corpus quod nunc habemus, ut ex affeccionibus anime ipsa elevet nostrum feculentum et grave corpus ad nota- bilem altitudinem, via saltus. Quanto magis anima habens quasi incomparabiliter intenciores et puriores affecciones plus proporcionatas locacioni corporis in 20 celestibus, et spiritus plures puriores et obedienciores, cum corpore longe minus resistente, possit elevare corpus quantumlibet alte. Nec obest composicio ex contrariis perpetuitati, quia, secundum Lyncolniensem in libello, omnes planete et stelle componuntur ex contrariis ele-25 mentis, et tamen sunt incoruptibiles. De toto isto alibi. Ad secundam confirmacionem, dicitur quod contingens, The distance between the quantumlibet distans distancia latitudinis contingencie a Contingent and the necessary is necessitate, solum finite distat distancia possibilitatis vel not infinite, being equivalent difficultatis aut distancia temporis; et talem distanciam 30 to a certain, potest agens finitum transire cum coefficiencia potencie possibility and infinite, ut motus potest facere datum motum contin- to a difference of time ; which gentem necessario fuisse, cum contingente tempore, et in course of time and with illa veritate sine quo nec potest quicquam facere. God's concourse, may Sophista vero non contentatur de admissione talis 35 be got over. distancie, quia distancia ponit utrumque distans et per consequens necessitas in quam transmutabitur est cum contingencia, quia distancia ad aliam necessitatem est impertinens. Et sic negat sophista quod multum distat We cannot properly speak of a great distance 33, 34. MS. t9 et illam veritatem. 39. MS. sentencia (?) 34. Sine quo. Quo is perhaps not a mistake. It may be meant to stand for Deus.
76 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I. Adam was tedium evitandum, dicitur quod ipse non potest tediari; created immortal, and sed racioni convenit quod sic fecisset de mundo. Et the past, as we racioni repugnat quod sic fecisset de omnibus aliis say, becomes necessary. contingentibus, que faciet necessaria. Ymmo, hoc non But this is potuit absolute: contradiccionem enim claudit motum according to reason. contradictorie libere servatum, et secundum sui partem It is impossible that the futurum, necessario fuisse. Et sic requirit ordo naturalis movements of quod homo primo proficiat in uno statu merendi et the sky should be necessary; subiaceat necessitati moriendi, et aliis miseriis, et hinc and it was deveniat perpetuus secundum exigenciam meritorum. 10 fitting, according to Theologi tamen dicunt quod si primus homo non the state of nature, that man peccasset, tunc non subiecisset naturam humanam morti should die. If the first man vel talibus miseriis; sed post certam ] periodum pro-F. 70" had not sinned, ficiendi fuisset translata sine morte ad celum. Nec est very possibly we might have id incredibile, cum spiritus leves sufficiunt habilitare 15 been immortal. corpus quod nunc habemus, ut ex affeccionibus anime ipsa elevet nostrum feculentum et grave corpus ad nota- bilem altitudinem, via saltus. Quanto magis anima habens quasi incomparabiliter intenciores et puriores affecciones plus proporcionatas locacioni corporis in 20 celestibus, et spiritus plures puriores et obedienciores, cum corpore longe minus resistente, possit elevare corpus quantumlibet alte. Nec obest composicio ex contrariis perpetuitati, quia, secundum Lyncolniensem in libello, omnes planete et stelle componuntur ex contrariis ele-25 mentis, et tamen sunt incoruptibiles. De toto isto alibi. Ad secundam confirmacionem, dicitur quod contingens, The distance between the quantumlibet distans distancia latitudinis contingencie a Contingent and the necessary is necessitate, solum finite distat distancia possibilitatis vel not infinite, being equivalent difficultatis aut distancia temporis; et talem distanciam 30 to a certain, potest agens finitum transire cum coefficiencia potencie possibility and infinite, ut motus potest facere datum motum contin- to a difference of time ; which gentem necessario fuisse, cum contingente tempore, et in course of time and with illa veritate sine quo nec potest quicquam facere. God's concourse, may Sophista vero non contentatur de admissione talis 35 be got over. distancie, quia distancia ponit utrumque distans et per consequens necessitas in quam transmutabitur est cum contingencia, quia distancia ad aliam necessitatem est impertinens. Et sic negat sophista quod multum distat We cannot properly speak of a great distance 33, 34. MS. t9 et illam veritatem. 39. MS. sentencia (?) 34. Sine quo. Quo is perhaps not a mistake. It may be meant to stand for Deus.
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CAP. I. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. a fine anni, sed magnum tempus erit complete secundum se totum elapsum, antequam erit finis illius anni, et sic illa contingencia non distat a necessitate sua; 71 between now and the end of the ycar; yet sed Much time must elapse beforc magnum tempus erit; et certa difficultas 5et ad hocthe end arrives. 5 quod fiet necessaria. Et cum opporteat deum coefficere ad hoc, sicud ad omnem naturalem accionem, patet quod requiritur ad hoc potencia infinita. Sed illam alteracionem relinquo sophistis, contentus de sentencia; sed videtur mihi quod bonus logicus notaret distanciam An infinite power is of course required, since God acts in every change that occurs. The distance between the roinfinitam inter hoc contingens et ipsum necessarium: contingent and immo, ymaginato tempore infinito, quod necessario est, et ymaginato in alio extremo instanti, quod necessario vel inevitabiliter instans est, et ymaginata latitudine diuturnitatis contingencium vel coruptibilium temporum 15ab illa gradu usque ad necessitatem temporis eterni, non est illa distancia inter hoc contingens et illud ne- cessarium, Nec oportet aliquem gradum gradatum illius latitudinis adquiri ad hoc quod de contingenti fiat ne- cessarium. Ideo inter contingens in communi, 20 cessarium in communi, est tanta latitudo, et non inter quodcunque contingens et quodcunque necessarium. Sed utrum oportet fore maiorem determinacionem vel cer- titudinem antequam de tali contingenti fiat necessarium, dicetur tractatu proximo. Non igitur videtur mihi quod 25inter proprietatem contingentis ad utrumlibet et pro- prietatem necessarii sit talis magna distancia, nisi quoad duracionem temporis vel aliud fingendum quod aliqui F. 71* vocant vehemenciam | essendi. Nam inter posse non esse, et non posse non esse, non est distancia, cum non sit 3o medium inter contradictoria; et talem vehemenciam essendi potest causatum cum communi influencia subito causare, sine saltu; tales enim termini similitudinarii et analogici gravant responsales. Ideo aliqui negant modos loquendi, et alii admittunt. Falsum enim est 35 quod inter esse et mon esse est distancia infinita. Ad tercium dicitur quod talis veritas, quamvis sit per se necessitabilis, sicud per se homo est risibilis, non tamen per se quoad causam, sed ab aliis. Et multe veritates requirunt homines et talia coruptibilia, sic quod deus 40 non posset de potencia sua absoluta per se necessitare tales veritates sine iuvamine mobilium vel preterito vel 33. MS. rnfalcj. the Necessary should be noted, as not that between one moment and time, however, long, even eternal. et ne- There is a great difference between taking them in general, and comparing one thing contingent with another that is necessary. Between them (in the first sense) there is no such grcat distance, only that of timc, and so-called intensity of being. Where there is nothing intervening. there 1s really no distance ; but fo be able not to be, and not to be able not to be, are contradictions, and nothing intervenes. That a truth may become necessary depends upon its nature; the becoming so depends on something else.
CAP. I. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. a fine anni, sed magnum tempus erit complete secundum se totum elapsum, antequam erit finis illius anni, et sic illa contingencia non distat a necessitate sua; 71 between now and the end of the ycar; yet sed Much time must elapse beforc magnum tempus erit; et certa difficultas 5et ad hocthe end arrives. 5 quod fiet necessaria. Et cum opporteat deum coefficere ad hoc, sicud ad omnem naturalem accionem, patet quod requiritur ad hoc potencia infinita. Sed illam alteracionem relinquo sophistis, contentus de sentencia; sed videtur mihi quod bonus logicus notaret distanciam An infinite power is of course required, since God acts in every change that occurs. The distance between the roinfinitam inter hoc contingens et ipsum necessarium: contingent and immo, ymaginato tempore infinito, quod necessario est, et ymaginato in alio extremo instanti, quod necessario vel inevitabiliter instans est, et ymaginata latitudine diuturnitatis contingencium vel coruptibilium temporum 15ab illa gradu usque ad necessitatem temporis eterni, non est illa distancia inter hoc contingens et illud ne- cessarium, Nec oportet aliquem gradum gradatum illius latitudinis adquiri ad hoc quod de contingenti fiat ne- cessarium. Ideo inter contingens in communi, 20 cessarium in communi, est tanta latitudo, et non inter quodcunque contingens et quodcunque necessarium. Sed utrum oportet fore maiorem determinacionem vel cer- titudinem antequam de tali contingenti fiat necessarium, dicetur tractatu proximo. Non igitur videtur mihi quod 25inter proprietatem contingentis ad utrumlibet et pro- prietatem necessarii sit talis magna distancia, nisi quoad duracionem temporis vel aliud fingendum quod aliqui F. 71* vocant vehemenciam | essendi. Nam inter posse non esse, et non posse non esse, non est distancia, cum non sit 3o medium inter contradictoria; et talem vehemenciam essendi potest causatum cum communi influencia subito causare, sine saltu; tales enim termini similitudinarii et analogici gravant responsales. Ideo aliqui negant modos loquendi, et alii admittunt. Falsum enim est 35 quod inter esse et mon esse est distancia infinita. Ad tercium dicitur quod talis veritas, quamvis sit per se necessitabilis, sicud per se homo est risibilis, non tamen per se quoad causam, sed ab aliis. Et multe veritates requirunt homines et talia coruptibilia, sic quod deus 40 non posset de potencia sua absoluta per se necessitare tales veritates sine iuvamine mobilium vel preterito vel 33. MS. rnfalcj. the Necessary should be noted, as not that between one moment and time, however, long, even eternal. et ne- There is a great difference between taking them in general, and comparing one thing contingent with another that is necessary. Between them (in the first sense) there is no such grcat distance, only that of timc, and so-called intensity of being. Where there is nothing intervening. there 1s really no distance ; but fo be able not to be, and not to be able not to be, are contradictions, and nothing intervenes. That a truth may become necessary depends upon its nature; the becoming so depends on something else.
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78 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I. There are many existente; hoc est, sine hoc quod tale iuvit, iuvat, vel truths such that iuvabit ad talem veritatem. Nec sequitur: libere dat God cannot give them prima causa necessitatem isti veritati; igitur, potest necessity without the aid tollere necessitatem ab illa; quia summa libertas est of movement necessitas et libertas contradiccionis est infima. Nec se-5 or change. Who gives quitur, si deus confirmat hominem vel intelligenciam, necessity freely can freely take quod potest alias auferre ab illis confirmacionem, vel it away', is false. antecedens ad confirmacionem: quod ymaginor sic. Esto The highest liberty is quod unus dominus satis potens et non potens mentiri necessity ; the vel deficere, promisit unicuique de famulis suis quod qui- 10 lowest is the liberty of cunque perseveraverit debite in famulatu suo usque ad contradiction. If God can finem diei, quod hereditabit eum perpetua hereditate confirm a soul sufficienti pro se et suis, et quantum ad laborem di- in grace, it does not follow that urnum ministrabit sibi sufficienter de omnibus pro tunc He can withdraw His necessariis. Tunc planum est quod dominus in fine 15 gift. Suppose a diei, vel post, non poterit auferre ab alico perfecte master, famulancium usque ad finem hereditatem predictam, able to keep and unable to break quamvis gratis dedit et gratis servabit. Consimiliter his promise, makes one, credo esse philosophicum ponere quod deus sit unus under certain dominus non impossibilis, nec potens mentiri vel habere 20 conditions, to a servant; if the dominum vel superiorem, qui statuit et dixit diccione servant fulfils the conditions vel lege eterna quod quodcunque individuum hominis the master musl usque ad finem vite sue manserit debite iusticie famulans also fulfit his promise, given et sibi debite affectus perpetuabitur in gaudio, tam and kept freely. God is such a corpore quam anima; et cum illud venerit, non erit 25 master. We must not in dei potestate illud auferre. Non autem est ymagi- imagine grace to nandum quod deus dat unum frustum gracie quod be a thing that can be placed no potest auferre et ponere in lapide vel bruto. Sed certum matter where. est quod dat sibi magnam graciam in sic premiando (que vocatur gracia confirmacionis) quam non potest 30 auferre, sicud non potest habere tale non gratum sibi vel acceptum. Gracia enim, iuxta prius dicta, vel est creaturam esse gratam deo, vel deum habere creaturam sibi gratam; vel tercio communius potest quidlibet gratis datum dici gracia specialis. Igitur gracia est confirmacio; 35 et conformiter ymaginandum est de eadem lege eterna quod homo sit premiatus, non potest difformare volu- cionem suam ab illo quod deus voluerit ipsum velle. Principium enim eternum est quod voluntas creata non potest quicquam velle, nisi mota et determinata ad illud ] volendum. Sed tunc erit voluntas confirmata, exempta ab omni possibilitate impellentis ad contrarie volendum voluntati prime cause; ideo erit exempta ab omni possibilitate contrarie volendi voluntati divine. To be confirmed in grace is to have one's will cternally united to that of God, 40 so that the possibility of willing the contrary is taken away. F. 71
78 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I. There are many existente; hoc est, sine hoc quod tale iuvit, iuvat, vel truths such that iuvabit ad talem veritatem. Nec sequitur: libere dat God cannot give them prima causa necessitatem isti veritati; igitur, potest necessity without the aid tollere necessitatem ab illa; quia summa libertas est of movement necessitas et libertas contradiccionis est infima. Nec se-5 or change. Who gives quitur, si deus confirmat hominem vel intelligenciam, necessity freely can freely take quod potest alias auferre ab illis confirmacionem, vel it away', is false. antecedens ad confirmacionem: quod ymaginor sic. Esto The highest liberty is quod unus dominus satis potens et non potens mentiri necessity ; the vel deficere, promisit unicuique de famulis suis quod qui- 10 lowest is the liberty of cunque perseveraverit debite in famulatu suo usque ad contradiction. If God can finem diei, quod hereditabit eum perpetua hereditate confirm a soul sufficienti pro se et suis, et quantum ad laborem di- in grace, it does not follow that urnum ministrabit sibi sufficienter de omnibus pro tunc He can withdraw His necessariis. Tunc planum est quod dominus in fine 15 gift. Suppose a diei, vel post, non poterit auferre ab alico perfecte master, famulancium usque ad finem hereditatem predictam, able to keep and unable to break quamvis gratis dedit et gratis servabit. Consimiliter his promise, makes one, credo esse philosophicum ponere quod deus sit unus under certain dominus non impossibilis, nec potens mentiri vel habere 20 conditions, to a servant; if the dominum vel superiorem, qui statuit et dixit diccione servant fulfils the conditions vel lege eterna quod quodcunque individuum hominis the master musl usque ad finem vite sue manserit debite iusticie famulans also fulfit his promise, given et sibi debite affectus perpetuabitur in gaudio, tam and kept freely. God is such a corpore quam anima; et cum illud venerit, non erit 25 master. We must not in dei potestate illud auferre. Non autem est ymagi- imagine grace to nandum quod deus dat unum frustum gracie quod be a thing that can be placed no potest auferre et ponere in lapide vel bruto. Sed certum matter where. est quod dat sibi magnam graciam in sic premiando (que vocatur gracia confirmacionis) quam non potest 30 auferre, sicud non potest habere tale non gratum sibi vel acceptum. Gracia enim, iuxta prius dicta, vel est creaturam esse gratam deo, vel deum habere creaturam sibi gratam; vel tercio communius potest quidlibet gratis datum dici gracia specialis. Igitur gracia est confirmacio; 35 et conformiter ymaginandum est de eadem lege eterna quod homo sit premiatus, non potest difformare volu- cionem suam ab illo quod deus voluerit ipsum velle. Principium enim eternum est quod voluntas creata non potest quicquam velle, nisi mota et determinata ad illud ] volendum. Sed tunc erit voluntas confirmata, exempta ab omni possibilitate impellentis ad contrarie volendum voluntati prime cause; ideo erit exempta ab omni possibilitate contrarie volendi voluntati divine. To be confirmed in grace is to have one's will cternally united to that of God, 40 so that the possibility of willing the contrary is taken away. F. 71
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CAP. I. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 79 Omnes igitur tales confirmaciones vel necessitates in- cipientes esse dependent quodammodo a veritate de preterito, et illa a veritate simpliciter intellecta. Quantum ad alia concernencia in particulari istam materiam, re- 5 linquo ipsa theologis; vel forte mihi alibi pertractanda. Ad secundum argumentum dicitur quod impossibilia possunt admitti in tribus casibus. Primo, posito quod non sciatur illa esse impossibilia; ut viso animali a remotis, quod credam esse hominem, cum hoc quod 10 sit asinus, potest admitti illud esse hominem, vel quod- cunque de quo dubitatur utrum sit tale. Secundo, posito quod aliquod sit impossibile per accidens quod quondam fuit possibile (ut impossibilitates de preterito) potest admitti quod sint veritates, gracia argumenti. Et tercio 15 gracia cognoscendi formalem consecucionem vel aliam veritatem quamcunque, potest poni inpossibile et admitti: ut admittitur quod nihil sit, aut quod homo sit asinus; et sic de quantumlibet impossibili. Sed hoc credo: quod quocunque impossibili dato, sequitur quidlibet conclu- 20 dendum, sicud ex quocunque antecedente sequitur quod- cunque necessarium, ut deductum est. Et sic negatur assumptum argumenti. Et si queritur quomodo sit convenienter respondendum, admisso tali impossibili, dicitur quod diversimode se- 25 cundum tres gradus admissionis inpossibilis. Unde, ad- misso impossibili quod credebatur ex ignorancia sensus esse possibile, concedendum est illud et quodcunque se- quens scitum sequi; quod si per experimentalem sen- sacionem cognitum fuerit positum esse inpossibile, tunc 30 negandum est illud et quodcunque impossibile sequens. In omni enim tali casu, ubi error sensus potest facere assensum ad impossibile, subticenda est protestacio ne- gandi positum, si sit inpossibile et quodcunque im- possibile sequens; et sic revocanda est sustentacio 35 admissionis propter ignoranciam excusantem. Nec propter hoc est concedendum quod male respondebatur, quamvis Reſutation of (II). We can admit what is impossible in three cases: (1) when we are not sure; as when we say, This is a man, though it is in reality an ass. (2) We can admit, for argument's sake, that something which has happened in the past is not true, or vice versa. (3) We can admit any absurdity for the sake of knowing what will follow from the admission. If we have admitted an impossible thing by mistake — then we must hold to all the consequences, until made to see our error ; we must then deny it and all its consequences, on the understanding that we never meant to admit an absurdity, our ignorance being our excuse. Nor should we here admit that the answer was wrong. 32. MS. protestacione. 28. Experimentalem. It is possible that, at these 'Obligations'. tricks were played as in the old Greek schools of philosophy. A veiled figure is shown. "Do you know this person ?" "No". — The veil is withdrawn. — "She is your mother : you do not know your mother.'
CAP. I. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 79 Omnes igitur tales confirmaciones vel necessitates in- cipientes esse dependent quodammodo a veritate de preterito, et illa a veritate simpliciter intellecta. Quantum ad alia concernencia in particulari istam materiam, re- 5 linquo ipsa theologis; vel forte mihi alibi pertractanda. Ad secundum argumentum dicitur quod impossibilia possunt admitti in tribus casibus. Primo, posito quod non sciatur illa esse impossibilia; ut viso animali a remotis, quod credam esse hominem, cum hoc quod 10 sit asinus, potest admitti illud esse hominem, vel quod- cunque de quo dubitatur utrum sit tale. Secundo, posito quod aliquod sit impossibile per accidens quod quondam fuit possibile (ut impossibilitates de preterito) potest admitti quod sint veritates, gracia argumenti. Et tercio 15 gracia cognoscendi formalem consecucionem vel aliam veritatem quamcunque, potest poni inpossibile et admitti: ut admittitur quod nihil sit, aut quod homo sit asinus; et sic de quantumlibet impossibili. Sed hoc credo: quod quocunque impossibili dato, sequitur quidlibet conclu- 20 dendum, sicud ex quocunque antecedente sequitur quod- cunque necessarium, ut deductum est. Et sic negatur assumptum argumenti. Et si queritur quomodo sit convenienter respondendum, admisso tali impossibili, dicitur quod diversimode se- 25 cundum tres gradus admissionis inpossibilis. Unde, ad- misso impossibili quod credebatur ex ignorancia sensus esse possibile, concedendum est illud et quodcunque se- quens scitum sequi; quod si per experimentalem sen- sacionem cognitum fuerit positum esse inpossibile, tunc 30 negandum est illud et quodcunque impossibile sequens. In omni enim tali casu, ubi error sensus potest facere assensum ad impossibile, subticenda est protestacio ne- gandi positum, si sit inpossibile et quodcunque im- possibile sequens; et sic revocanda est sustentacio 35 admissionis propter ignoranciam excusantem. Nec propter hoc est concedendum quod male respondebatur, quamvis Reſutation of (II). We can admit what is impossible in three cases: (1) when we are not sure; as when we say, This is a man, though it is in reality an ass. (2) We can admit, for argument's sake, that something which has happened in the past is not true, or vice versa. (3) We can admit any absurdity for the sake of knowing what will follow from the admission. If we have admitted an impossible thing by mistake — then we must hold to all the consequences, until made to see our error ; we must then deny it and all its consequences, on the understanding that we never meant to admit an absurdity, our ignorance being our excuse. Nor should we here admit that the answer was wrong. 32. MS. protestacione. 28. Experimentalem. It is possible that, at these 'Obligations'. tricks were played as in the old Greek schools of philosophy. A veiled figure is shown. "Do you know this person ?" "No". — The veil is withdrawn. — "She is your mother : you do not know your mother.'
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80 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I. concedebatur impossibile. Non enim concedebatur, nisi sub tacita condicione quod sit possibile: quia dubitatur in principio utrum fuit possibile. Et in regulis obliga- cionum inseritur illa particula “scitum a respondente esse tale", ut nullum inpossibile scitum esse tale a? responsali est simpliciter admittendum; et sic de aliis If both the regulis. In secundo casu, ubi tam opponens quam questioner and respondens noscunt ponendum esse inpossibile, sed quod the respondent know that some quondam fuit possibile, sequela tali que pro omni thing once tempore fuit bona, tunc addendum est illud: 'Gracia 10 possible is no longer so, then talis finis", et negandum est illud continue infra talem it can be admitted clearly obligacionem esse inpossibile, et quodcunque antecedens stating “for the argument's ad illud; et sic multa que de facto sunt vera, et ne- sake , and other like cessaria per accidens; sed repugnancia sunt neganda. impossibilities Tercio casu, ubi] admittitur impossibile, gracia cogno- may be admitted in the same way scendi quod ex illo non formaliter seu causaliter When an impossibility is sequitur datum inconsequens, quod est illud et quod- introduced, in cunque sequitur; negandum est signatam veritatem order to find whether it is causaliter vel formaliter sequi. Ut, si homo velit probare connected with quod ex hoc quod aliquid est, deus est, et ponat mihi 20 another, we must deny that quod nihil sit; intendo probare quod ex hoc quod nihil it has any connection with est deus non est, tunc habeo concedere quod nihil est, the opposite et quod deus non est. Sed forte negabo quod ex hoc truth. But we should quod nihil est, deus non est, sed ex hoc quod deus non neither admit est nihil est. Est autem dare multas species obliga-25 all that follows from, nor deny cionum et multas species posicionum, ut patebit 6to libro. all that contradicts, Nec est omne sequens ex possibilitate concedendum, nec a possible statement. omne repugnans negandum. We deny that Ulterius negatur recreacionem talem veritatum aut truth can be created anew, or reditum temporis esse possibilem, immo conceditur quod 30 that past time can return; aliquid potest incipere et manere eternaliter, sicud de we admit that some things that anima, et de tempore. Et ad Aristotelem potest dici have begin, quod ipse nihil per se posset generari generacione remain eternally. physica, cum hoc quod maneat postmodum incoruptibile As to Aristotle's secundum proporcionem principiorum pro tempore sue 35 argument: It is true that if creacionis, ut omne generatum (quale solum est per se a man begets a son, the latter, generabile) poneret Aristoteles fieri ex sibi contrariis, made up of et sic semper habere contrarium a quo esset coruptibile. contrary elements, is Non tamen probat quin elementum generatum et mixtum liable to dissolution; The rules of the exercise provide for such a mistake. F. 723 18. MS. sequitur et. 33. MS. posse. 32. Wyclif here reverts to what Aristotle says: A changeable nature cannot become necessary.
80 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I. concedebatur impossibile. Non enim concedebatur, nisi sub tacita condicione quod sit possibile: quia dubitatur in principio utrum fuit possibile. Et in regulis obliga- cionum inseritur illa particula “scitum a respondente esse tale", ut nullum inpossibile scitum esse tale a? responsali est simpliciter admittendum; et sic de aliis If both the regulis. In secundo casu, ubi tam opponens quam questioner and respondens noscunt ponendum esse inpossibile, sed quod the respondent know that some quondam fuit possibile, sequela tali que pro omni thing once tempore fuit bona, tunc addendum est illud: 'Gracia 10 possible is no longer so, then talis finis", et negandum est illud continue infra talem it can be admitted clearly obligacionem esse inpossibile, et quodcunque antecedens stating “for the argument's ad illud; et sic multa que de facto sunt vera, et ne- sake , and other like cessaria per accidens; sed repugnancia sunt neganda. impossibilities Tercio casu, ubi] admittitur impossibile, gracia cogno- may be admitted in the same way scendi quod ex illo non formaliter seu causaliter When an impossibility is sequitur datum inconsequens, quod est illud et quod- introduced, in cunque sequitur; negandum est signatam veritatem order to find whether it is causaliter vel formaliter sequi. Ut, si homo velit probare connected with quod ex hoc quod aliquid est, deus est, et ponat mihi 20 another, we must deny that quod nihil sit; intendo probare quod ex hoc quod nihil it has any connection with est deus non est, tunc habeo concedere quod nihil est, the opposite et quod deus non est. Sed forte negabo quod ex hoc truth. But we should quod nihil est, deus non est, sed ex hoc quod deus non neither admit est nihil est. Est autem dare multas species obliga-25 all that follows from, nor deny cionum et multas species posicionum, ut patebit 6to libro. all that contradicts, Nec est omne sequens ex possibilitate concedendum, nec a possible statement. omne repugnans negandum. We deny that Ulterius negatur recreacionem talem veritatum aut truth can be created anew, or reditum temporis esse possibilem, immo conceditur quod 30 that past time can return; aliquid potest incipere et manere eternaliter, sicud de we admit that some things that anima, et de tempore. Et ad Aristotelem potest dici have begin, quod ipse nihil per se posset generari generacione remain eternally. physica, cum hoc quod maneat postmodum incoruptibile As to Aristotle's secundum proporcionem principiorum pro tempore sue 35 argument: It is true that if creacionis, ut omne generatum (quale solum est per se a man begets a son, the latter, generabile) poneret Aristoteles fieri ex sibi contrariis, made up of et sic semper habere contrarium a quo esset coruptibile. contrary elements, is Non tamen probat quin elementum generatum et mixtum liable to dissolution; The rules of the exercise provide for such a mistake. F. 723 18. MS. sequitur et. 33. MS. posse. 32. Wyclif here reverts to what Aristotle says: A changeable nature cannot become necessary.
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CAP. I. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 81 similiter posset eternaliter manere; nec vidi argumentum but this only proves that in textu Aristotelis, vel alibi, quin corpus quod iam dissolution is possible. est coruptibile potest alias disponi et proporcionari, tam Under certain circumstances quoad partes quoad situm et proporcionem extrinsecorum we can conceive (ut cessacionem motus primi) quod fiat corpus neutrum a body remaining for et incoruptibile, et sic exemptum a contrarietate et ever unchanged. transmutacione ad formam, sicud iam est de celo. Unde Remarks on Aristotle's creditur quod Aristoteles voluit quod mundus non sit theory of the incorruptibility una res naturaliter coruptibilis, ut homo, et preservari of the heavens. ro a deo, ne una pars celi agat in reliquam, ad quam accionem est utriusque appetitus naturalis. Hoc enim non est verum, cum celum sit exemptum a contrarietate, nec pars eius materialis, cum sit satiata forma, habet appetitum ad aliam, nec est physice alterabilis. Patet 15 igitur responsio ad secundum argumentum. Ad tercium dicitur quod conclusio est concedenda de significacione temporis, cum omne verbum secundarie connotat quodcunque tempus, et sicud esse non est commune ad illa preterita vel futura que non sunt, sic 20 posse non est commune ad potencias que fuerunt et erunt, si non sint. Ymmo, dicitur quod hoc verbum posse presentis temporis solum primarie connotat presens tempus, et potuit connotat solum primarie tempus pre- teritum; sed poterit connotat primarie solum tempus 25 futurum. Unde formaliter sequitur de veritate sermonis: Socrates potest esse, igitur est potencia a, qua potest esse in tempore quod est presens, quamvis deductive sequitur tanquam necessarium, si a potuit vel poterit. Sed hic queris quare hoc verbum ampliat pocius pro F. 723 30 futuris quam pro preteritis que eque non sunt, ut con- ceditur, ampliando posse, quod homo qui nunquam fuit vel erit potest annuatim expendere mille libras, et de Cesare negatur ipsum quicquam posse expendere. Dicitur, sicud prius, quod ampliando posse multa possunt sic se 35 habere potencia aliena, et iuxta tales potencias non dicuntur ipsa potenciora, cum non sunt vel non habent nisi potenciam passivam ad sic esse. Unde, quia aliena potencia habet sufficienciam reducendi talia futura ad actum; sed nulla potencia sufficit reducere determinate 40 preteritum: ideo quodam instinctu naturali inclinantur homines ad concedendum de futuro, quod ipsum potest Refutation of (III). We admit the analogy between esse and posse; but as esse does not belong to past or future things which are not, so posse cannot be predicated of past or future things either; all depends upon the tense which is employed. Why then can posse be used in the future, not in the past ? If it is possible for a man who does not yet exist to spend money (in the future) why is it not possible for a dead man to spend money (in the past)? Because a passive potentiality may become actuul by means of an active power; but no power can restore what is past. 22. MS. nota de posse in marg. 6
CAP. I. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 81 similiter posset eternaliter manere; nec vidi argumentum but this only proves that in textu Aristotelis, vel alibi, quin corpus quod iam dissolution is possible. est coruptibile potest alias disponi et proporcionari, tam Under certain circumstances quoad partes quoad situm et proporcionem extrinsecorum we can conceive (ut cessacionem motus primi) quod fiat corpus neutrum a body remaining for et incoruptibile, et sic exemptum a contrarietate et ever unchanged. transmutacione ad formam, sicud iam est de celo. Unde Remarks on Aristotle's creditur quod Aristoteles voluit quod mundus non sit theory of the incorruptibility una res naturaliter coruptibilis, ut homo, et preservari of the heavens. ro a deo, ne una pars celi agat in reliquam, ad quam accionem est utriusque appetitus naturalis. Hoc enim non est verum, cum celum sit exemptum a contrarietate, nec pars eius materialis, cum sit satiata forma, habet appetitum ad aliam, nec est physice alterabilis. Patet 15 igitur responsio ad secundum argumentum. Ad tercium dicitur quod conclusio est concedenda de significacione temporis, cum omne verbum secundarie connotat quodcunque tempus, et sicud esse non est commune ad illa preterita vel futura que non sunt, sic 20 posse non est commune ad potencias que fuerunt et erunt, si non sint. Ymmo, dicitur quod hoc verbum posse presentis temporis solum primarie connotat presens tempus, et potuit connotat solum primarie tempus pre- teritum; sed poterit connotat primarie solum tempus 25 futurum. Unde formaliter sequitur de veritate sermonis: Socrates potest esse, igitur est potencia a, qua potest esse in tempore quod est presens, quamvis deductive sequitur tanquam necessarium, si a potuit vel poterit. Sed hic queris quare hoc verbum ampliat pocius pro F. 723 30 futuris quam pro preteritis que eque non sunt, ut con- ceditur, ampliando posse, quod homo qui nunquam fuit vel erit potest annuatim expendere mille libras, et de Cesare negatur ipsum quicquam posse expendere. Dicitur, sicud prius, quod ampliando posse multa possunt sic se 35 habere potencia aliena, et iuxta tales potencias non dicuntur ipsa potenciora, cum non sunt vel non habent nisi potenciam passivam ad sic esse. Unde, quia aliena potencia habet sufficienciam reducendi talia futura ad actum; sed nulla potencia sufficit reducere determinate 40 preteritum: ideo quodam instinctu naturali inclinantur homines ad concedendum de futuro, quod ipsum potest Refutation of (III). We admit the analogy between esse and posse; but as esse does not belong to past or future things which are not, so posse cannot be predicated of past or future things either; all depends upon the tense which is employed. Why then can posse be used in the future, not in the past ? If it is possible for a man who does not yet exist to spend money (in the future) why is it not possible for a dead man to spend money (in the past)? Because a passive potentiality may become actuul by means of an active power; but no power can restore what is past. 22. MS. nota de posse in marg. 6
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82 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I. It is preferable, however, instead of saying This is possible to be (in the future), to say: It will be possible that this may take place. When we say is, there is always a tendency to contract its meaning to now. esse, et de preterito hoc negare; et sic concedimus quod Antechristus non solum poterit esse, sed quod potest esse. Verumtamen melius esset dicere quod poterit esse ita, quod connotetur potencia activa propria; et hoc 5 verbum poterit contrahat hoc infinitum esse ad signandum pro tempore futuro. Ita quod iste sit sensus: Erit in ipso potencia a qua est possibile quod sit. Non enim videtur quod hoc verbum potest contrahat sic hoc in- finitum esse, cum utrumque sit presentis temporis. 10 Videtur igitur quod sequitur: hoc potest esse; igitur hoc potest esse in instanti quod est presens. Immo, cum ista, Hoc instans est, videtur sequi quod potest esse in hoc instanti; quod scimus esse falsum, si scimus quod nec est nec fuit. Et credo quod plus consequens vim 15 vocis foret sic dicere, quam concedere ad talem sensum quod hoc potest esse, id est potencia a qua poterit in futurum fore. Illa tamen significacio est usitacior. As to God's Ad primam instanciam conceditur quod potencia dei power it extends se extendit ad preterita que sunt; sed de veritate sermonis 20 to all that is, but not to that nec se extendit ad preterita nec ad futura que non which is not. Not to be able sunt. Nec sequitur, etsi infinita non possit quorum to do what once was possible, quodlibet quondam potuit, quod propter hoc sit inpotens. does not argue Pro quo nota tria. Primo quod iste terminus impotens loss of power. Note: non convertitur cum isto termino infinito, non potens; 25 (1) That impotent is not sed est privativus, sicud iste terminus iniustus. Unde, the same as not sicud lapis non est iniustus, sic non est impotens ad potent, the former generandum. Talia igitur dicunt privacionem forme in signifies want of power which subiecto in quo nata est forma talis esse. ought to be Secundo, nota quod potencia est forma intrinseca 30 possessed. potenti, vel essencialis (ut in deo), vel actualis (ut in (2) That power does not depend homine); ita quod non dependet ab obiecto in quod upon the object it is applied to. potest, sed solum est potencia talis deperdibilis per (3) That God's power alteracionem vel debilitacionem potentis. extends to as many objects as Tercio nota quod potencia [dei] semper fertur in eque 35 His Thought multa, sicud et eius intelleccio, volucio etc.; ut quando and Will. When a thing's deus desinit posse causare futuricionem dati produci- futurition is no longer possible, bilis, ut desinit posse prohibere hoc fuisse, fore, vel God begins to esse, tunc incipit posse facere quod futuricio dati pro- make it impossible; so ducibilis non possit esse post] instans quod est presens; F. 73. there is no loss, vel saltem, si omnia que in fine poterit sic nunc potest Yet the other terminology is more used. 35. MS. dei deest.
82 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I. It is preferable, however, instead of saying This is possible to be (in the future), to say: It will be possible that this may take place. When we say is, there is always a tendency to contract its meaning to now. esse, et de preterito hoc negare; et sic concedimus quod Antechristus non solum poterit esse, sed quod potest esse. Verumtamen melius esset dicere quod poterit esse ita, quod connotetur potencia activa propria; et hoc 5 verbum poterit contrahat hoc infinitum esse ad signandum pro tempore futuro. Ita quod iste sit sensus: Erit in ipso potencia a qua est possibile quod sit. Non enim videtur quod hoc verbum potest contrahat sic hoc in- finitum esse, cum utrumque sit presentis temporis. 10 Videtur igitur quod sequitur: hoc potest esse; igitur hoc potest esse in instanti quod est presens. Immo, cum ista, Hoc instans est, videtur sequi quod potest esse in hoc instanti; quod scimus esse falsum, si scimus quod nec est nec fuit. Et credo quod plus consequens vim 15 vocis foret sic dicere, quam concedere ad talem sensum quod hoc potest esse, id est potencia a qua poterit in futurum fore. Illa tamen significacio est usitacior. As to God's Ad primam instanciam conceditur quod potencia dei power it extends se extendit ad preterita que sunt; sed de veritate sermonis 20 to all that is, but not to that nec se extendit ad preterita nec ad futura que non which is not. Not to be able sunt. Nec sequitur, etsi infinita non possit quorum to do what once was possible, quodlibet quondam potuit, quod propter hoc sit inpotens. does not argue Pro quo nota tria. Primo quod iste terminus impotens loss of power. Note: non convertitur cum isto termino infinito, non potens; 25 (1) That impotent is not sed est privativus, sicud iste terminus iniustus. Unde, the same as not sicud lapis non est iniustus, sic non est impotens ad potent, the former generandum. Talia igitur dicunt privacionem forme in signifies want of power which subiecto in quo nata est forma talis esse. ought to be Secundo, nota quod potencia est forma intrinseca 30 possessed. potenti, vel essencialis (ut in deo), vel actualis (ut in (2) That power does not depend homine); ita quod non dependet ab obiecto in quod upon the object it is applied to. potest, sed solum est potencia talis deperdibilis per (3) That God's power alteracionem vel debilitacionem potentis. extends to as many objects as Tercio nota quod potencia [dei] semper fertur in eque 35 His Thought multa, sicud et eius intelleccio, volucio etc.; ut quando and Will. When a thing's deus desinit posse causare futuricionem dati produci- futurition is no longer possible, bilis, ut desinit posse prohibere hoc fuisse, fore, vel God begins to esse, tunc incipit posse facere quod futuricio dati pro- make it impossible; so ducibilis non possit esse post] instans quod est presens; F. 73. there is no loss, vel saltem, si omnia que in fine poterit sic nunc potest Yet the other terminology is more used. 35. MS. dei deest.
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CAP. I. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 83 et infinita ultra, eadem potencia manebit continue, que as to the number of posset continue in omnia illa, si illa essent factibilia. objects. God's power Et ideo, sicud non sequitur: deus non potest facere extends to chimeram, igitur est inpotens ad faciendum chimeram, anything in so far as it is able 5 quia oportet capere in antecedente quod chimera sit to be made; but He is not, factibilis a deo. Ipse igitur continue conservat equas therefore, impotent veritates, cum secundum ultimum sue potencie conservat because He veritates. cannot make an absurdity to be. Sed queris cum istum motum fuisse fuit quondam Why then, if the preterition of 10 generabile, factibile, et causabile, quare non adhuc est a given huiusmodi? cum sit quod queritur quare non est ipse movement was once in His impotens ad faciendum hoc, cum hoc sit factibile ab power to cause, illo, et ipse non possit facere hoc ipsum? Igitur, posse should it not be now? facere hoc fuit potencia eius que desiit esse. The power to do this was Sed pro isto intellige quod tales termini, dicentes a His, and is not. verbis ampliativis denotantes aptitudinem, possunt tri- Here note that such terms as pliciter sumi: aliquando distrahunt tempus presens, ut caurable, generable, &c. idem sit hoc esse causabile et hoc posse causari; ali- mean either the mere quando striccius sumuntur quoad tempus, ut intelligatur possibility of 20 causabile esse illud quod habet potenciam ut causetur. v. g., causation, or the existence Et sic de causativo respectu activi. Et isto modo loquitur of a power by philosophus 3° phisicorum 11°: 'Cum domus fuit, non which it may be caused, amplius edificabilis est." Sed tercio, dicitur de omni or its own fitness to be tali quod (vel sibi simile in specie) habet aptitudinem caused. 25 esse huiusmodi. Et isto modo loquitur in primo de celo, volens ista converti: generabile, coruptibile, con- tingens, possibile, et opponi istis ingenerabile, incorupti- bile, eternum, necessarium. Et credo quod ista significacio fuit sumpta de conceptu rerum communium. Si enim 3o species hominis sit per se generabilis et coruptibilis in suis individuis, quare non individuum quod sortitur predicacionem speciei haberet conformem passionem? non quia ipsum potest generari, sed quia est cuiusdam nature communis que in aliquo eius individuo potest 35 generari et in alio corumpi. To say that God Potest igitur dici quod, ad inferendum impotenciam, is impotent, we oportet capere unum factibile quod in se est factibile must find something that a potente, sed quod deficit potencia illud faciendi: quod can be made, est impossibile de deo. Nec est inconsequens admittendo then prove 40 tales potencias respectivas, quod infinite desinant esse, that He cannot make it. sine hoc quod ipse fiat minus potens, aut impotens. That God's respective power, as to the making of this or that thing, should cease This points to the theory of real Universals; natures which, in their individuals, tend towards causation, &c. 15 31. MS. Indicm. 6*
CAP. I. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 83 et infinita ultra, eadem potencia manebit continue, que as to the number of posset continue in omnia illa, si illa essent factibilia. objects. God's power Et ideo, sicud non sequitur: deus non potest facere extends to chimeram, igitur est inpotens ad faciendum chimeram, anything in so far as it is able 5 quia oportet capere in antecedente quod chimera sit to be made; but He is not, factibilis a deo. Ipse igitur continue conservat equas therefore, impotent veritates, cum secundum ultimum sue potencie conservat because He veritates. cannot make an absurdity to be. Sed queris cum istum motum fuisse fuit quondam Why then, if the preterition of 10 generabile, factibile, et causabile, quare non adhuc est a given huiusmodi? cum sit quod queritur quare non est ipse movement was once in His impotens ad faciendum hoc, cum hoc sit factibile ab power to cause, illo, et ipse non possit facere hoc ipsum? Igitur, posse should it not be now? facere hoc fuit potencia eius que desiit esse. The power to do this was Sed pro isto intellige quod tales termini, dicentes a His, and is not. verbis ampliativis denotantes aptitudinem, possunt tri- Here note that such terms as pliciter sumi: aliquando distrahunt tempus presens, ut caurable, generable, &c. idem sit hoc esse causabile et hoc posse causari; ali- mean either the mere quando striccius sumuntur quoad tempus, ut intelligatur possibility of 20 causabile esse illud quod habet potenciam ut causetur. v. g., causation, or the existence Et sic de causativo respectu activi. Et isto modo loquitur of a power by philosophus 3° phisicorum 11°: 'Cum domus fuit, non which it may be caused, amplius edificabilis est." Sed tercio, dicitur de omni or its own fitness to be tali quod (vel sibi simile in specie) habet aptitudinem caused. 25 esse huiusmodi. Et isto modo loquitur in primo de celo, volens ista converti: generabile, coruptibile, con- tingens, possibile, et opponi istis ingenerabile, incorupti- bile, eternum, necessarium. Et credo quod ista significacio fuit sumpta de conceptu rerum communium. Si enim 3o species hominis sit per se generabilis et coruptibilis in suis individuis, quare non individuum quod sortitur predicacionem speciei haberet conformem passionem? non quia ipsum potest generari, sed quia est cuiusdam nature communis que in aliquo eius individuo potest 35 generari et in alio corumpi. To say that God Potest igitur dici quod, ad inferendum impotenciam, is impotent, we oportet capere unum factibile quod in se est factibile must find something that a potente, sed quod deficit potencia illud faciendi: quod can be made, est impossibile de deo. Nec est inconsequens admittendo then prove 40 tales potencias respectivas, quod infinite desinant esse, that He cannot make it. sine hoc quod ipse fiat minus potens, aut impotens. That God's respective power, as to the making of this or that thing, should cease This points to the theory of real Universals; natures which, in their individuals, tend towards causation, &c. 15 31. MS. Indicm. 6*
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84 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I. with the thing Nec sequitur: deus est non potens ad hoc, igitur est made, implies no diminution impotens ad hoc, vel impotens; et patet quid de tribus of His real responsionibus sit tenendum. Adverte tamen cum dili- power ; but at the same gencia, si deus continue incipiat posse que prius non time, other respective potuit in loco illorum que desinit posse et prius potuit, powers spring et ampliando hoc verbum posse ut prius dictum est, up; so that even in this sense,His non inveni equevalenciam, quia est potencia activa in Omnipotence deo, ex qua poterit in futurum fore qualitercunque erit remains untouched. vel poterit esse ex parte dei. I can do much Unde, quamvis possim multa mala facere que deus 10 evil that God cannot; but non potest, non tamen inveni que deus in futurum there is nothing poterit facere, et iam non potest. Unde deus potest He will be able to do in the facere quod futuricio dati instantis non possit esse post future, and b instans, quamvis illud ] b instans non sit prius. Verum- cannot do now. If we abstract tamen restringendo hoc verbum posse, conceditur quod from the time to which posse deus potest facere hoc instans esse sine hoc quod aliud extends, then instans precedat, et sic in principio non potuit. Et we must use other language facit multa esse necessaria que in principio non potuit facere tunc esse, et sic in quodcunque potest nunc, in illud vel eque difficile potuit tunc; et sic in quale-20 cunque vel quantumcunque potest nunc, in tale vel tantum potuit tunc. Redeu[n]do igitur ad significacionem secunde instancie, conceditur quod tempus et multa possunt facere ne- cessitates, dummodo non possunt agere; et sic creditur 25 concausare generacionem rei in hoc quod ex eius ad- ventu sit res que fuit preordinata in illo fieri. Non tamen inevitabiliter, sed postquam coruptibile fuerit, est decretum quod in fine sue periodi vel citra peribit; et sic currit debilitacio vel corupcio rei determinate cum 30 tempore. Deus igitur causat talem veritatem cum uno alio contingenter conferente, et libere hoc facit, quam- vis non possit sic exspectare et mitigare accionem, ut but God's power is as great at one time as at another. Time, though not actively, renders many things necessary, according to God's decree that certain things shall perish; and though God decrees thus F. 735 15 29. MS. piod9, and thus several times. 19. Et sic. I think that before these words there is a gap. Wyclif, after saying that “God now makes many things to be necessary, which He could not make to be so in the beginning", may have added ; "and in the beginning He made many things to be necessary which He cannot make now;" — concluding, as in the text, by a denial of any decrease of God's power. 24. Facere might be understood metaphysically; but Wyclif's Realism makes of time an existing entity. 31. Uno alio, i. e. tempore.
84 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I. with the thing Nec sequitur: deus est non potens ad hoc, igitur est made, implies no diminution impotens ad hoc, vel impotens; et patet quid de tribus of His real responsionibus sit tenendum. Adverte tamen cum dili- power ; but at the same gencia, si deus continue incipiat posse que prius non time, other respective potuit in loco illorum que desinit posse et prius potuit, powers spring et ampliando hoc verbum posse ut prius dictum est, up; so that even in this sense,His non inveni equevalenciam, quia est potencia activa in Omnipotence deo, ex qua poterit in futurum fore qualitercunque erit remains untouched. vel poterit esse ex parte dei. I can do much Unde, quamvis possim multa mala facere que deus 10 evil that God cannot; but non potest, non tamen inveni que deus in futurum there is nothing poterit facere, et iam non potest. Unde deus potest He will be able to do in the facere quod futuricio dati instantis non possit esse post future, and b instans, quamvis illud ] b instans non sit prius. Verum- cannot do now. If we abstract tamen restringendo hoc verbum posse, conceditur quod from the time to which posse deus potest facere hoc instans esse sine hoc quod aliud extends, then instans precedat, et sic in principio non potuit. Et we must use other language facit multa esse necessaria que in principio non potuit facere tunc esse, et sic in quodcunque potest nunc, in illud vel eque difficile potuit tunc; et sic in quale-20 cunque vel quantumcunque potest nunc, in tale vel tantum potuit tunc. Redeu[n]do igitur ad significacionem secunde instancie, conceditur quod tempus et multa possunt facere ne- cessitates, dummodo non possunt agere; et sic creditur 25 concausare generacionem rei in hoc quod ex eius ad- ventu sit res que fuit preordinata in illo fieri. Non tamen inevitabiliter, sed postquam coruptibile fuerit, est decretum quod in fine sue periodi vel citra peribit; et sic currit debilitacio vel corupcio rei determinate cum 30 tempore. Deus igitur causat talem veritatem cum uno alio contingenter conferente, et libere hoc facit, quam- vis non possit sic exspectare et mitigare accionem, ut but God's power is as great at one time as at another. Time, though not actively, renders many things necessary, according to God's decree that certain things shall perish; and though God decrees thus F. 735 15 29. MS. piod9, and thus several times. 19. Et sic. I think that before these words there is a gap. Wyclif, after saying that “God now makes many things to be necessary, which He could not make to be so in the beginning", may have added ; "and in the beginning He made many things to be necessary which He cannot make now;" — concluding, as in the text, by a denial of any decrease of God's power. 24. Facere might be understood metaphysically; but Wyclif's Realism makes of time an existing entity. 31. Uno alio, i. e. tempore.
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CAP. I. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 85 dicitur: quia hoc repugnat legibus eternis quas ipse instituit, quibus non potest contravenire propter eius bonitatem et potenciam. Et sic non debet dici defectus mundi quando caret tali veritate, quia loco illius habet 5 unam aliam, ut natus est habere adhuc talem veri- tatem. Conceditur tamen quod tales veritates proficiunt I admit the knowledge of mundo, sicud et earum cogniciones: quod patet ymagi- past events may be useful. nando casum quem Gallienus ponit quandoque ex corup- It were a great 10 cione memorie contigisse: viz. quod quilibet cives unius evil if a whole civitatis tantum perdiderunt de memoria, quod non town, still greater if all recoluerunt qui fuerunt patres vel parentes, et sic de England, were omnibus actibus vel policiis preteritis. Quantum igitur totally to forget the past. malum foret hoc si tota Anglia sic desiperet! Quamvis Some, however, would like to 15 multi ex defectibus preteritis appeterent quod sic esset. forget what has Et sic dico de omni veritate preterita, quod ipsa quo- gone wrong. Were there any dammodo proficit; quia aliter deus non sineret illam past truth that profited esse, nec ordinaret potenciam memorandi ad illam nothing, God cognoscendam. Aliqua igitur talis veritas sine qua would not allow it to subsist in 20 mundus non potest esse nocet isti; quam deus potest our memories. If one of these emendare, non tollendo illam veritatem, sed vel monendo necessary truths transgressorem ad satisfaciendum, vel puniendo pro be hurtful, God has power to delicto: et sic potencia dei se extendit ad preterita, cum make amends by warning or necessario conservat, et per consequens potest conservare punishing the 25 omnia illa. sinner ; and by keeping these Sed de homine, videtur mihi inproprius modus lo- truths in existence, He quendi quod ipse potest fuisse; admisso tamen modo exerts His power. loquendi ad illum sensum quod possibile est ipsum That I am able fuisse, et potencia infinita potest facere quod ipse fuit to have been is not well 30 (quia aliter negandum esset quemquam potuisse fecisse expressed, but, quidquam) et ultra concedo quod non possum melius taking it to mean that I may fecisse, vel me habuisse, quam me habui qualitercunque have been, and would have determinate; sed potui, antequam sic me habui. Et sic been if God had F. 74* willedit so, then conceditur quod antequam fuiI natus potui multa facere I say that I 35 continue que postquam fui natus non potui; immo hoc cannot non have done better est verum de deo. than I did ; but at the time Ad terciam instanciam dicitur quod minor est falsa I could ad communem intellectum. Debet enim homo dolere do better. de actu preterito, sed principaliter de veritate presenti. freely, yet He cannot but abide by His own eternal law. 33. MS. determinante me habui. 9. Gallienus may be the Roman physician Galen; the extract given looks like a bit of mental pathology.
CAP. I. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 85 dicitur: quia hoc repugnat legibus eternis quas ipse instituit, quibus non potest contravenire propter eius bonitatem et potenciam. Et sic non debet dici defectus mundi quando caret tali veritate, quia loco illius habet 5 unam aliam, ut natus est habere adhuc talem veri- tatem. Conceditur tamen quod tales veritates proficiunt I admit the knowledge of mundo, sicud et earum cogniciones: quod patet ymagi- past events may be useful. nando casum quem Gallienus ponit quandoque ex corup- It were a great 10 cione memorie contigisse: viz. quod quilibet cives unius evil if a whole civitatis tantum perdiderunt de memoria, quod non town, still greater if all recoluerunt qui fuerunt patres vel parentes, et sic de England, were omnibus actibus vel policiis preteritis. Quantum igitur totally to forget the past. malum foret hoc si tota Anglia sic desiperet! Quamvis Some, however, would like to 15 multi ex defectibus preteritis appeterent quod sic esset. forget what has Et sic dico de omni veritate preterita, quod ipsa quo- gone wrong. Were there any dammodo proficit; quia aliter deus non sineret illam past truth that profited esse, nec ordinaret potenciam memorandi ad illam nothing, God cognoscendam. Aliqua igitur talis veritas sine qua would not allow it to subsist in 20 mundus non potest esse nocet isti; quam deus potest our memories. If one of these emendare, non tollendo illam veritatem, sed vel monendo necessary truths transgressorem ad satisfaciendum, vel puniendo pro be hurtful, God has power to delicto: et sic potencia dei se extendit ad preterita, cum make amends by warning or necessario conservat, et per consequens potest conservare punishing the 25 omnia illa. sinner ; and by keeping these Sed de homine, videtur mihi inproprius modus lo- truths in existence, He quendi quod ipse potest fuisse; admisso tamen modo exerts His power. loquendi ad illum sensum quod possibile est ipsum That I am able fuisse, et potencia infinita potest facere quod ipse fuit to have been is not well 30 (quia aliter negandum esset quemquam potuisse fecisse expressed, but, quidquam) et ultra concedo quod non possum melius taking it to mean that I may fecisse, vel me habuisse, quam me habui qualitercunque have been, and would have determinate; sed potui, antequam sic me habui. Et sic been if God had F. 74* willedit so, then conceditur quod antequam fuiI natus potui multa facere I say that I 35 continue que postquam fui natus non potui; immo hoc cannot non have done better est verum de deo. than I did ; but at the time Ad terciam instanciam dicitur quod minor est falsa I could ad communem intellectum. Debet enim homo dolere do better. de actu preterito, sed principaliter de veritate presenti. freely, yet He cannot but abide by His own eternal law. 33. MS. determinante me habui. 9. Gallienus may be the Roman physician Galen; the extract given looks like a bit of mental pathology.
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86 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I. It is not true Pretericio enim actus mali, mortis, vel alicuius talis cuius that in esse perficeret hominem, imperficeret eum; et ideo prin- contrition our principal cipaliter dolet de eius imperfeccione vel malicia. Et sorrow is for our past sin; it quia veritas talis est (cum paribus) causa sue imper- is for the state that sin has feccionis, ideo dolet naturaliter de tali veritate que est 5 produced in us; quodammodo in eius potestate quoad excitandum ipsum this sorrow has the effect of ad dolorem, quo quodammodo perficitur; et, ut dicitur, making us better in hoc quod eandem potenciam habet homo nunc quam in the present. It is not now in habuit quando suffecit opposito modo se habuisse. Sed a man's power not to have ego credo quod non sit in hominis potestate non fecisse 1o sinned. But he is to talem actum quamvis quondam fuit, et ideo est cul- blame, because pandus. Culpacio enim debet subsequi delictum quod it was then in his power. presupponit, et sic debet presupponere fuisse potenciam Sorrow appeases Him evitandi. Sic igitur proficit dolor, de quanto pacat we have personam contra quam delictum fuit commissum, de 15 offended, warns us against quanto exemplificat ad retrahendum a talibus ex eius repeating our effence and has nocumento. Immo videtur experitis quod habet de se even a certain quandam dilectacionem annexam, sicud patet de affectis sweetness. ad fletum. Digression: not Immo, credo tam bruta quam homines dolere na-20 only men, but turaliter de hiis que non possunt redire, ut patet de brutes also, grieve for what canibus et avibus, que dolent de amissione sui similis: is past, and the argument to ideo non est argumentum probare resurreccionem ho- prove the minum pro naturali dolore mortis eorum: sic enim dolet resurrection hy our sorrow for homo pro morte canis vel equi. Illacio nocumenti, cum 25 the dead is faulty. paribus, est racio dolendi de preterito; qualis racio No one is to non reperitur in non esse chimere: hoc enim nemini blame for a possibility of nocet. acting, unless he has actually Ulterius, tenta responsione, dicitur quod nemo est misused that culpandus propter potenciam qua potuit sic vel sic 30 possibility, or not used it fecisse, nisi actualiter habuisset illam et abusus fuisset when he ought. Nor am I to illa, vel omittendo sine hoc quod satisfecit. Potencia blame for not enim qua potui sic vel sic me habuisse antequam fui always having done my very natus, non fuit potencia. Nec sum culpandus, quamvis best, unless non continue proficiam secundum ultimum potencie 35 everybody is mee et evitem omne malum quantum potencia mea slightly to blame in that respect. sufficeret ad ultimum; nisi forte nemo possit esse in- In conclusion, I admit that I culpabilis vel sine delicto levi digno venia. Sed illud might have been relinquo moralibus, concedens quod in quolibet instanti born at any instant in the preterito potui fuisse natus, et sic per infinita tempora 40 fuisse, in quorum nullo potui fuisse postquam fui natus; quamvis, antequam fui, potui fuisse generatus in quo- 41 and 42. MS. postquam — fuisse twice.
86 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I. It is not true Pretericio enim actus mali, mortis, vel alicuius talis cuius that in esse perficeret hominem, imperficeret eum; et ideo prin- contrition our principal cipaliter dolet de eius imperfeccione vel malicia. Et sorrow is for our past sin; it quia veritas talis est (cum paribus) causa sue imper- is for the state that sin has feccionis, ideo dolet naturaliter de tali veritate que est 5 produced in us; quodammodo in eius potestate quoad excitandum ipsum this sorrow has the effect of ad dolorem, quo quodammodo perficitur; et, ut dicitur, making us better in hoc quod eandem potenciam habet homo nunc quam in the present. It is not now in habuit quando suffecit opposito modo se habuisse. Sed a man's power not to have ego credo quod non sit in hominis potestate non fecisse 1o sinned. But he is to talem actum quamvis quondam fuit, et ideo est cul- blame, because pandus. Culpacio enim debet subsequi delictum quod it was then in his power. presupponit, et sic debet presupponere fuisse potenciam Sorrow appeases Him evitandi. Sic igitur proficit dolor, de quanto pacat we have personam contra quam delictum fuit commissum, de 15 offended, warns us against quanto exemplificat ad retrahendum a talibus ex eius repeating our effence and has nocumento. Immo videtur experitis quod habet de se even a certain quandam dilectacionem annexam, sicud patet de affectis sweetness. ad fletum. Digression: not Immo, credo tam bruta quam homines dolere na-20 only men, but turaliter de hiis que non possunt redire, ut patet de brutes also, grieve for what canibus et avibus, que dolent de amissione sui similis: is past, and the argument to ideo non est argumentum probare resurreccionem ho- prove the minum pro naturali dolore mortis eorum: sic enim dolet resurrection hy our sorrow for homo pro morte canis vel equi. Illacio nocumenti, cum 25 the dead is faulty. paribus, est racio dolendi de preterito; qualis racio No one is to non reperitur in non esse chimere: hoc enim nemini blame for a possibility of nocet. acting, unless he has actually Ulterius, tenta responsione, dicitur quod nemo est misused that culpandus propter potenciam qua potuit sic vel sic 30 possibility, or not used it fecisse, nisi actualiter habuisset illam et abusus fuisset when he ought. Nor am I to illa, vel omittendo sine hoc quod satisfecit. Potencia blame for not enim qua potui sic vel sic me habuisse antequam fui always having done my very natus, non fuit potencia. Nec sum culpandus, quamvis best, unless non continue proficiam secundum ultimum potencie 35 everybody is mee et evitem omne malum quantum potencia mea slightly to blame in that respect. sufficeret ad ultimum; nisi forte nemo possit esse in- In conclusion, I admit that I culpabilis vel sine delicto levi digno venia. Sed illud might have been relinquo moralibus, concedens quod in quolibet instanti born at any instant in the preterito potui fuisse natus, et sic per infinita tempora 40 fuisse, in quorum nullo potui fuisse postquam fui natus; quamvis, antequam fui, potui fuisse generatus in quo- 41 and 42. MS. postquam — fuisse twice.
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CAP. II. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 87 F. 74 libet tali; et sic continue desinam posse multa facere past, but as time drew on this que prius potero: immo antequam fui, pro quolibet 'might have instanti quod fuit, desii multa posse que ante illud in- been' was continually stans potui: et sic potencia qua, antequam fui, potui narrowed, until the moment of 5 sic fecisse, fuit eternaliter in deperdi. Sed de hoc my birth, which them became tractatu proximo. the only one possible. CAPITULUM SECUNDUM. Restat tangere secundam opinionem. quoad hoc. Ponit Arguments to nihil simpliciter inpossibile, nisi affirmativum includens prove that nothing is 10 contradiccionem. simply Nam omnis necessitas, ut est maioris et vehemencioris impossible, save an affirmation entitatis, est magis necessaria; sed affirmacio est maioris which includes a contradiction. et vehemencioris entitatis quam negacio; igitur affir- Any affirmacion has a greater macio est magis necessaria quam negacio. Maior patet degree of entity 15 ex hoc: quante necessarium est ens, tante est verum, than a negation, and is therefore, et per consequens necessarium. Maior igitur entitas est more necessary. maior necessitas. Et minor patet ex hoc quod negacio non habet esse nisi per affirmacionem. Item, omne causatum necessarium est minus neces- 20 sarium quam eius per se causa; sed omnis veritas negativa est causata: igitur, nulla est magis necessaria quam eius causa. Maior patet ex hoc quod quando- cunque, in essenciali ordine causandi, causa et causatum participant univoce aliquam denominacionem, et cau- 25 satum propter eius causam, causa plus participat eandem, ut patet primo posteriorum. Et minor patet ex hoc quod non est alia veritas incausata, nisi una, que causat omnem veritatem causatam; que non potest poni negacio. 30 Item, si nullum hominem esse asinum sit simpliciter necessarium, et causatum habet aliquam essencialem causam (ut docebitur postmodum). Nulla enim entitas causatur per accidens, sic quod possit facere se non causatum. Causa igitur essencialis dicte veritatis, cum Every negation owes its being to an affirmation which is denied : it is, therefore, less necessary (or less impossible). Take any negation; if it s necessary, it is founded on an affirmation, and derives its necessity therefrom. 5. MS. pe pro fuit. 7. MS. Capitulum etc. deest; large initial R in red ink. 24. MS. v'ce pro univoce. 24. To set this forth more clearly by an example: Genius can be predicated both of Homer and of the Iliad (participant... denominacionem); — but Homer is the cause of the lliad ; therefore, there is more genius in Homer. I have left the word univoce as it stands, though it ought (at least in the language of more modern Scholastics) to be analogice.
CAP. II. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 87 F. 74 libet tali; et sic continue desinam posse multa facere past, but as time drew on this que prius potero: immo antequam fui, pro quolibet 'might have instanti quod fuit, desii multa posse que ante illud in- been' was continually stans potui: et sic potencia qua, antequam fui, potui narrowed, until the moment of 5 sic fecisse, fuit eternaliter in deperdi. Sed de hoc my birth, which them became tractatu proximo. the only one possible. CAPITULUM SECUNDUM. Restat tangere secundam opinionem. quoad hoc. Ponit Arguments to nihil simpliciter inpossibile, nisi affirmativum includens prove that nothing is 10 contradiccionem. simply Nam omnis necessitas, ut est maioris et vehemencioris impossible, save an affirmation entitatis, est magis necessaria; sed affirmacio est maioris which includes a contradiction. et vehemencioris entitatis quam negacio; igitur affir- Any affirmacion has a greater macio est magis necessaria quam negacio. Maior patet degree of entity 15 ex hoc: quante necessarium est ens, tante est verum, than a negation, and is therefore, et per consequens necessarium. Maior igitur entitas est more necessary. maior necessitas. Et minor patet ex hoc quod negacio non habet esse nisi per affirmacionem. Item, omne causatum necessarium est minus neces- 20 sarium quam eius per se causa; sed omnis veritas negativa est causata: igitur, nulla est magis necessaria quam eius causa. Maior patet ex hoc quod quando- cunque, in essenciali ordine causandi, causa et causatum participant univoce aliquam denominacionem, et cau- 25 satum propter eius causam, causa plus participat eandem, ut patet primo posteriorum. Et minor patet ex hoc quod non est alia veritas incausata, nisi una, que causat omnem veritatem causatam; que non potest poni negacio. 30 Item, si nullum hominem esse asinum sit simpliciter necessarium, et causatum habet aliquam essencialem causam (ut docebitur postmodum). Nulla enim entitas causatur per accidens, sic quod possit facere se non causatum. Causa igitur essencialis dicte veritatis, cum Every negation owes its being to an affirmation which is denied : it is, therefore, less necessary (or less impossible). Take any negation; if it s necessary, it is founded on an affirmation, and derives its necessity therefrom. 5. MS. pe pro fuit. 7. MS. Capitulum etc. deest; large initial R in red ink. 24. MS. v'ce pro univoce. 24. To set this forth more clearly by an example: Genius can be predicated both of Homer and of the Iliad (participant... denominacionem); — but Homer is the cause of the lliad ; therefore, there is more genius in Homer. I have left the word univoce as it stands, though it ought (at least in the language of more modern Scholastics) to be analogice.
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JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. II. 88 But to be simply oportet ipsam esse affirmacionem, est necessaria sim- necessary is to be thus by itself, pliciter, eo quod, ipsa pereunte, perit simpliciter ne- not by anything cessarium. Si igitur claudit contradiccionem illam nega- else. cionem non esse, claudit contradiccionem eius causam non esse. Unde igitur habet ista negacio quod est 5 simpliciter necessaria, nisi a simpliciter necessario? Item, si omnis affirmacio potest non esse, et infinite If some negations are negaciones non possunt non esse, infinite negaciones necessary and no affirmations sunt natura priores affirmacionibus; et cum repugnat are so, it follows that the naturam posterius essencialiter causare prius in natura, 10 former are more sequitur quod nulle tales negaciones habent affirmaciones perfect in their per se causas. Prima consequencia patet ex hoc quod, nature than the affirmations on which they descriptive, “illud est prius natura a quo non conver- depend, and titur subsistendi consequencia". Firmius igitur esse habent consequently that they do not quam affirmaciones, cuius oppositum ponit philosophus 15 depend upon secundo pery armenias in fine, dicens quod prius et them. Aristotle points magis verum est bonum esse bonum quam bonum non out that to say ; What is good is esse malum. Et racio est, secundum eum, quia ideo good, is truer than to say : bonum est non malum, quia est bonum. What is good is Item, unumquodque se habet ad esse sicud ad cognosci 20 not evil. Being and (ex secundo methaphisice); sed affirmacio est cognosci- knowing correspond; an bilior quam negacio: igitur et magis et prius ens. Nulla affirmation is enim est racio quare cognoscibilius est hominem esse in more knowable than a negation; communi quam individuum esse, nisi quia prius natura- F. 75a therefore, it is more a being. liter est hominem esse quam individuum esse; et sic de 25 aliis. Et minor patet ex hoc quod nulla negacio cog- The proof is that negation is noscitur nisi per affirmacionem, sicud nec privacio; et known, but by affirmation, ideo docet Aristoteles (libro priorum et primo poste- riorum capitulo 7°), quod demonstracio affirmativa est prestancior quam negativa. Nulla énim est negacio, qua 30 posita, sequitur illam cognosci a quocunque, cum ex nulla negativa possibili sequitur nisi simpliciter necessa- rium. Sed ex affirmativa bene sequitur rem cognosci; That nothing igitur prestancior est affirmacio quam negacio. Nec valet can at once be obieccio qua obicitur nihil simul esse et non esse fore 35 and not be is not a primary primum notum; quia, ut declarabitur libro ultimo, hoc truth; it depends on an est notum per affirmacionem prius notam. affirmation. Item, quanto aliquid est magis ens, est magis bonum, Entity and goodness come et econtra. Sed nulla bonitas reperitur in negacione, to the same. Now a negation nisi per accidens; igitur nec entitas. Minor patet ex hoc 40 is not good by quod quanto ens est bonum, est ipsum appetibile; sed itself. and that an affirmative is clearer than a negative demonstration. 19. MS. non deest. 24. MS. illum (?) pro individuum.
JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. II. 88 But to be simply oportet ipsam esse affirmacionem, est necessaria sim- necessary is to be thus by itself, pliciter, eo quod, ipsa pereunte, perit simpliciter ne- not by anything cessarium. Si igitur claudit contradiccionem illam nega- else. cionem non esse, claudit contradiccionem eius causam non esse. Unde igitur habet ista negacio quod est 5 simpliciter necessaria, nisi a simpliciter necessario? Item, si omnis affirmacio potest non esse, et infinite If some negations are negaciones non possunt non esse, infinite negaciones necessary and no affirmations sunt natura priores affirmacionibus; et cum repugnat are so, it follows that the naturam posterius essencialiter causare prius in natura, 10 former are more sequitur quod nulle tales negaciones habent affirmaciones perfect in their per se causas. Prima consequencia patet ex hoc quod, nature than the affirmations on which they descriptive, “illud est prius natura a quo non conver- depend, and titur subsistendi consequencia". Firmius igitur esse habent consequently that they do not quam affirmaciones, cuius oppositum ponit philosophus 15 depend upon secundo pery armenias in fine, dicens quod prius et them. Aristotle points magis verum est bonum esse bonum quam bonum non out that to say ; What is good is esse malum. Et racio est, secundum eum, quia ideo good, is truer than to say : bonum est non malum, quia est bonum. What is good is Item, unumquodque se habet ad esse sicud ad cognosci 20 not evil. Being and (ex secundo methaphisice); sed affirmacio est cognosci- knowing correspond; an bilior quam negacio: igitur et magis et prius ens. Nulla affirmation is enim est racio quare cognoscibilius est hominem esse in more knowable than a negation; communi quam individuum esse, nisi quia prius natura- F. 75a therefore, it is more a being. liter est hominem esse quam individuum esse; et sic de 25 aliis. Et minor patet ex hoc quod nulla negacio cog- The proof is that negation is noscitur nisi per affirmacionem, sicud nec privacio; et known, but by affirmation, ideo docet Aristoteles (libro priorum et primo poste- riorum capitulo 7°), quod demonstracio affirmativa est prestancior quam negativa. Nulla énim est negacio, qua 30 posita, sequitur illam cognosci a quocunque, cum ex nulla negativa possibili sequitur nisi simpliciter necessa- rium. Sed ex affirmativa bene sequitur rem cognosci; That nothing igitur prestancior est affirmacio quam negacio. Nec valet can at once be obieccio qua obicitur nihil simul esse et non esse fore 35 and not be is not a primary primum notum; quia, ut declarabitur libro ultimo, hoc truth; it depends on an est notum per affirmacionem prius notam. affirmation. Item, quanto aliquid est magis ens, est magis bonum, Entity and goodness come et econtra. Sed nulla bonitas reperitur in negacione, to the same. Now a negation nisi per accidens; igitur nec entitas. Minor patet ex hoc 40 is not good by quod quanto ens est bonum, est ipsum appetibile; sed itself. and that an affirmative is clearer than a negative demonstration. 19. MS. non deest. 24. MS. illum (?) pro individuum.
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CAP. II. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 89 nihil potest appetere negacionem, nisi per accidens, sicud non potest proficere, nisi per accidens; princi- palius igitur appetit eius perfectum et esse quam aliquod non esse. Cui, rogo, esset bonum nihil esse? aut quo- 5 modo potest aliqua negacio movere ad ipsam appe- tendum? cum non cognoscitur non esse rei, nisi intuendo aliquod positivum, cui noscitur repugnare esse datum, aut per aliquam aliam privacionem que cognoscitur, vel per habitum, vel per actualem apprehensionem to positivi oppositi tali privacioni? Homo enim percipit tenebram percepcione medii alio sensu a visu, ut tactu; et percipit disposicionem oculi ad intuendum ex parte sui, partim ex sensu, et partim ex habitu, quiescente in anima. Si igitur negacio apponitur, hoc est virtute 15 et gracia alterius. Item, nulla veritas communis est prima veritas. Maior A general truth cannot be patet ex predictis, cum omnis veritas communis de- primitive, since it is composed pendet et causatur ab individuis, et per consequens non of multitudes of est prima causa non causata. Quamvis enim nulla anima singular truths. 20 sensitiva informat hoc cadaver, quia nulla anima in- format illud, tamen cum hoc nulla sensitiva informat Now every illud, quia nulla illarum informat illud. Et omnis anima negative sensitiva est aliqua illarum. Et sic in affirmativis; quia proposition, by denying the substancia animata sensibilis est, ideo animal est; et quia verb, denies it universally. 25 homo est, ideo animal est. Et minor patet ex hoc quod The singular omnis negacio negat verbum, et omne verbum est negative: This is not an animal, commune; unde idem est hoc non esse animal, et nullum amounts to: No animal esse hoc, et illud est commune ad infinita; et animal is this. hoc invenies in primo principio complexo. 30 Item, quam primo est aliqua res in ordine natu- God's being is the first truth rali, tam primo in eodem ordine est ipsam esse. Sed of all, deus est prima res in ordine naturali: igitur primo in ordine essendi est ipsum esse, et per consequens prius est ipsum esse quam talem veritatem nega- 35 tivam esse. Maior patet ex hoc quod idem est ens et entis esse, iuxta prius declarata. Et quod ipse non sit talis veritas negativa, patet ex hoc quod ipse est What we desire is not that which a thing is not, but that which it is, positively speaking; „ what is not can only be known by a positive act of perception of something else. We know darkness by groping; i. c. positively, by touch, not sight. for God and His being come to the same. And He certainly is not anything negative, 29. MS. 94°. 16. Veritas. We must here supply the minor: Every negative proposition contains a general term. 31. Ipsam esse, its being or the proposition stating that it is, which, in the Realistic theory, is the same thing.
CAP. II. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 89 nihil potest appetere negacionem, nisi per accidens, sicud non potest proficere, nisi per accidens; princi- palius igitur appetit eius perfectum et esse quam aliquod non esse. Cui, rogo, esset bonum nihil esse? aut quo- 5 modo potest aliqua negacio movere ad ipsam appe- tendum? cum non cognoscitur non esse rei, nisi intuendo aliquod positivum, cui noscitur repugnare esse datum, aut per aliquam aliam privacionem que cognoscitur, vel per habitum, vel per actualem apprehensionem to positivi oppositi tali privacioni? Homo enim percipit tenebram percepcione medii alio sensu a visu, ut tactu; et percipit disposicionem oculi ad intuendum ex parte sui, partim ex sensu, et partim ex habitu, quiescente in anima. Si igitur negacio apponitur, hoc est virtute 15 et gracia alterius. Item, nulla veritas communis est prima veritas. Maior A general truth cannot be patet ex predictis, cum omnis veritas communis de- primitive, since it is composed pendet et causatur ab individuis, et per consequens non of multitudes of est prima causa non causata. Quamvis enim nulla anima singular truths. 20 sensitiva informat hoc cadaver, quia nulla anima in- format illud, tamen cum hoc nulla sensitiva informat Now every illud, quia nulla illarum informat illud. Et omnis anima negative sensitiva est aliqua illarum. Et sic in affirmativis; quia proposition, by denying the substancia animata sensibilis est, ideo animal est; et quia verb, denies it universally. 25 homo est, ideo animal est. Et minor patet ex hoc quod The singular omnis negacio negat verbum, et omne verbum est negative: This is not an animal, commune; unde idem est hoc non esse animal, et nullum amounts to: No animal esse hoc, et illud est commune ad infinita; et animal is this. hoc invenies in primo principio complexo. 30 Item, quam primo est aliqua res in ordine natu- God's being is the first truth rali, tam primo in eodem ordine est ipsam esse. Sed of all, deus est prima res in ordine naturali: igitur primo in ordine essendi est ipsum esse, et per consequens prius est ipsum esse quam talem veritatem nega- 35 tivam esse. Maior patet ex hoc quod idem est ens et entis esse, iuxta prius declarata. Et quod ipse non sit talis veritas negativa, patet ex hoc quod ipse est What we desire is not that which a thing is not, but that which it is, positively speaking; „ what is not can only be known by a positive act of perception of something else. We know darkness by groping; i. c. positively, by touch, not sight. for God and His being come to the same. And He certainly is not anything negative, 29. MS. 94°. 16. Veritas. We must here supply the minor: Every negative proposition contains a general term. 31. Ipsam esse, its being or the proposition stating that it is, which, in the Realistic theory, is the same thing.
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90 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. II. unum optimum positivum ordinativum, intellectivum, volutivum, et sic de multis quorum quodlibet repugnat He who is the esse illius veritatis. Ipse enim est maxime per se ens, source of all gracia cuius omnia alia ordinantur; quod alienum est that is affirmed, and the ultimate a dicta negacione. Cum igitur per se completissime 5 goal of mind causat affirmaciones, non est pura negacio, et quietat and will. tam intellectivam quam] appetitivam per suum movere positivum, concausando in omni causacione: et illud est impossibile de alico communi vel negacione. Et cum ordinatur suppremum in ordine naturali (quod non 10 potest poni ab alio), sequitur quod ordinat se ipsum in illo gradu, et quecunque alia in suis gradubus ordi- nata. Et ex illo sequitur quod sapienter et voluntarie ordinat; que omnia nemo potest assentire competere negacioni, distinguendo contra affirmacionem. Unde in 15 tantum fuit illud notum philosophis, quod non vocant negacionem esse, sed non esse, sicud patet in libro pery The vagueness ermeneias, et libro phisicorum Aristotelis. Nec possunt of meaning of negaciones ponere in ordine vel predicamento cum negative terms bars them from affirmacionibus propter suas equivocaciones. Et ex istis 20 being classed with colligi potest a mihi probabili quod prima veritas est affirmations. prima necessitas, que est, deum esse, quam claudit The primordial truth is God's contradiccionem non esse, cum ab illa sit quelibet being, not to be denied without veritas alia assignanda. Et per consequens, nec negacio absurdity. nec pretericio nec futuricio nec posse esse, nec commune 25 Thence we have aliquod est prima veritas. Et hoc est quod philosophi it that God is a dicunt; primam causam esse actum purum, precedentem pure act, not a potentiality of potenciam in tantum quod ipsum posse presumit actum being ; for potentiality purum, qui est ipsum esse. Nam, si est ipsum posse does not exist esse, tunc est prima a qua potest esse, et per con-30 in itself. Thence sequens alicui actualiter existenti inexistit. Sed cui nisi Augustine and prime cause? Et ad illum sensum deducunt Augustinus Anselm infer God's existence (2° de libero arbitrio, capitulo 14°) Anselmus et alii from the very notion of truth theologi deum esse, ex necessaria dacione veritatis, et And Avicenna Avicenna cum Algazale vocant ipsum solum necesse 35 and Algazel infer His esse non difficile, cum non habeat prius nec in alico necessity from genere, vel specie: et sic de multis pulcris veritatibus. His supremacy. I have already Sed hic sunt multe responsiones; alia que negat tales answered in full those who deny negaciones, futuriciones, pretericiones, etc. posse esse; the possibility alia que dicit omnem talem negacionem esse quidlibet, 40 of negations, etc. By His own existence, He is first and supreme, and the cause of all order. A negation can be said not to be, but not to be. F. 755 39. Posse esse. No doubt these 3. Veritatis, i. e. negative. adversaries of Wyclif denied them as real things.
90 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. II. unum optimum positivum ordinativum, intellectivum, volutivum, et sic de multis quorum quodlibet repugnat He who is the esse illius veritatis. Ipse enim est maxime per se ens, source of all gracia cuius omnia alia ordinantur; quod alienum est that is affirmed, and the ultimate a dicta negacione. Cum igitur per se completissime 5 goal of mind causat affirmaciones, non est pura negacio, et quietat and will. tam intellectivam quam] appetitivam per suum movere positivum, concausando in omni causacione: et illud est impossibile de alico communi vel negacione. Et cum ordinatur suppremum in ordine naturali (quod non 10 potest poni ab alio), sequitur quod ordinat se ipsum in illo gradu, et quecunque alia in suis gradubus ordi- nata. Et ex illo sequitur quod sapienter et voluntarie ordinat; que omnia nemo potest assentire competere negacioni, distinguendo contra affirmacionem. Unde in 15 tantum fuit illud notum philosophis, quod non vocant negacionem esse, sed non esse, sicud patet in libro pery The vagueness ermeneias, et libro phisicorum Aristotelis. Nec possunt of meaning of negaciones ponere in ordine vel predicamento cum negative terms bars them from affirmacionibus propter suas equivocaciones. Et ex istis 20 being classed with colligi potest a mihi probabili quod prima veritas est affirmations. prima necessitas, que est, deum esse, quam claudit The primordial truth is God's contradiccionem non esse, cum ab illa sit quelibet being, not to be denied without veritas alia assignanda. Et per consequens, nec negacio absurdity. nec pretericio nec futuricio nec posse esse, nec commune 25 Thence we have aliquod est prima veritas. Et hoc est quod philosophi it that God is a dicunt; primam causam esse actum purum, precedentem pure act, not a potentiality of potenciam in tantum quod ipsum posse presumit actum being ; for potentiality purum, qui est ipsum esse. Nam, si est ipsum posse does not exist esse, tunc est prima a qua potest esse, et per con-30 in itself. Thence sequens alicui actualiter existenti inexistit. Sed cui nisi Augustine and prime cause? Et ad illum sensum deducunt Augustinus Anselm infer God's existence (2° de libero arbitrio, capitulo 14°) Anselmus et alii from the very notion of truth theologi deum esse, ex necessaria dacione veritatis, et And Avicenna Avicenna cum Algazale vocant ipsum solum necesse 35 and Algazel infer His esse non difficile, cum non habeat prius nec in alico necessity from genere, vel specie: et sic de multis pulcris veritatibus. His supremacy. I have already Sed hic sunt multe responsiones; alia que negat tales answered in full those who deny negaciones, futuriciones, pretericiones, etc. posse esse; the possibility alia que dicit omnem talem negacionem esse quidlibet, 40 of negations, etc. By His own existence, He is first and supreme, and the cause of all order. A negation can be said not to be, but not to be. F. 755 39. Posse esse. No doubt these 3. Veritatis, i. e. negative. adversaries of Wyclif denied them as real things.
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CAP. II. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 91 ut te non esse asinum est deus et omne quod est; sed de istis satis est dictum. Tercia responsio dicit tales Others either say that negaciones esse, sed nec causari nec causare. Quarta a) negatives exist, but are dicit quod non communicat cum affirmacionibus in not causes or 5 causando, sed eque primo causant in suo genere sicud effects. Or that b) they affirmaciones in suo; et sic de multis variacionibus have an influence in lateralibus. causation which Contra terciam responsionem sic: multe negaciones is independent of their inceperunt esse, et multe desinent esse; igitur fient corresponding affirmatives. 10 modis suis et per consequens causabuntur; et per idem Refutation of a) Negations begin una negacio facit; sicud non habere pulmonem facit non and cease to be respiracionem. true; becoming, they are caused. Similiter, omnis negacio est bona et ordinata ad Because one is aliquem finem, gracia cuius conservatur a prima causa: true, another is true; so one 15 igitur omnis talis est causata. Illud satis declaratum est causes the other. What is prius de negacionibus. maintained in being by God, Similiter, omnis demonstracio fit virtute prime ne- as negations are, gacionis, que est verum immediatum et causa conclu- must be caused. Every sionis (ex processu primi posteriorum); in tantum quod demonstration depends on the 20 ideo quelibet quantitas est maior quam aliqua sui pars, primordial quia aliter pars quantitativa esset non quantitativa pars; negation: nothing can at et ita idem simul esset et non esset ideo, propter hoc once be and not quod nihil simul est et non est; et quantitas est, est be; and it is caused thereby. omne tale maius quam aliqua eius pars quantitativa, How could any 25 ut declarabitur ultimo libro. Quomodo enim est possi- causal F. 76° bile negacionem esse, vel aliquam causalem de ne- proposition respecting a gacionem esse veram, nisi negacio possit causari? ad negation be true otherwise ? quid enim quereretur causa quare homo non loquitur, Why does this aut quare deus non dat homini graciam (et sic de aliis man not speak? Because 3o negacionibus) si non possint causari? Nam vere dice- follows, and gives retur cuilibet sic querenti quod non est causa quare the cause of omisi vel feci illud opus; et per consequens quelibet the man's not speaking. causalis per quam responderetur ad talem questionem esset impossibilis. Contra quartam responsionem: satis patet quod ne- gaciones causantur ex affirmacionibus, ut unus facit alium non agere, aut non taliter se habere, eo quod facit antecedens ad illud. Similiter, quelibet negacio concausat affirmacionem de inesse cum alia affirmacione: 40 igitur responsio falsa. Ex hoc enim quod deus sic se habet et nihil aliud a deo, solus deus sic se habet; et Refutation of b). It is certain that every negation depends upon an affirmation, which is, therefore, its cause; and every affirmation implies a 35 25. MS. rco pro quomodo. 39. MS. de méci: inessenciali?
CAP. II. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 91 ut te non esse asinum est deus et omne quod est; sed de istis satis est dictum. Tercia responsio dicit tales Others either say that negaciones esse, sed nec causari nec causare. Quarta a) negatives exist, but are dicit quod non communicat cum affirmacionibus in not causes or 5 causando, sed eque primo causant in suo genere sicud effects. Or that b) they affirmaciones in suo; et sic de multis variacionibus have an influence in lateralibus. causation which Contra terciam responsionem sic: multe negaciones is independent of their inceperunt esse, et multe desinent esse; igitur fient corresponding affirmatives. 10 modis suis et per consequens causabuntur; et per idem Refutation of a) Negations begin una negacio facit; sicud non habere pulmonem facit non and cease to be respiracionem. true; becoming, they are caused. Similiter, omnis negacio est bona et ordinata ad Because one is aliquem finem, gracia cuius conservatur a prima causa: true, another is true; so one 15 igitur omnis talis est causata. Illud satis declaratum est causes the other. What is prius de negacionibus. maintained in being by God, Similiter, omnis demonstracio fit virtute prime ne- as negations are, gacionis, que est verum immediatum et causa conclu- must be caused. Every sionis (ex processu primi posteriorum); in tantum quod demonstration depends on the 20 ideo quelibet quantitas est maior quam aliqua sui pars, primordial quia aliter pars quantitativa esset non quantitativa pars; negation: nothing can at et ita idem simul esset et non esset ideo, propter hoc once be and not quod nihil simul est et non est; et quantitas est, est be; and it is caused thereby. omne tale maius quam aliqua eius pars quantitativa, How could any 25 ut declarabitur ultimo libro. Quomodo enim est possi- causal F. 76° bile negacionem esse, vel aliquam causalem de ne- proposition respecting a gacionem esse veram, nisi negacio possit causari? ad negation be true otherwise ? quid enim quereretur causa quare homo non loquitur, Why does this aut quare deus non dat homini graciam (et sic de aliis man not speak? Because 3o negacionibus) si non possint causari? Nam vere dice- follows, and gives retur cuilibet sic querenti quod non est causa quare the cause of omisi vel feci illud opus; et per consequens quelibet the man's not speaking. causalis per quam responderetur ad talem questionem esset impossibilis. Contra quartam responsionem: satis patet quod ne- gaciones causantur ex affirmacionibus, ut unus facit alium non agere, aut non taliter se habere, eo quod facit antecedens ad illud. Similiter, quelibet negacio concausat affirmacionem de inesse cum alia affirmacione: 40 igitur responsio falsa. Ex hoc enim quod deus sic se habet et nihil aliud a deo, solus deus sic se habet; et Refutation of b). It is certain that every negation depends upon an affirmation, which is, therefore, its cause; and every affirmation implies a 35 25. MS. rco pro quomodo. 39. MS. de méci: inessenciali?
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92 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. II. corresponding sic de omni veritate affirmativa universali. Immo, virtute negation : there primi principii negativi, tenet quecunque conclusio is, therefore, no independence. affirmative demonstrata in aliqua sciencia doctrinali: ut To be equal, ideo triangulus habet tres angulos equales duobus rectis, and not to be unequal to two quia habet tres que non sunt inequales duobus rectis; 5 right angles, comes to the immo, quia aliter pars esset equalis toti, per deduc- same. cionem ad impossibile. If, as already Similiter, omnes negaciones sunt causate, iuxta de- shown, all ducta, igitur est dare ordinem et dependenciam tocius negations are caused, they generis negacionum ad genus affirmacionum; est igitur 1o cannot be ordo que sunt diversarum coordinacionum, et conveniunt independent, but there must primo in ente, ut patet de privacione et affirmacione be some order among them. ipsa priori [et] meliori; et sic de ceteris comparacionibus They agree with extra genus, qualis videtur esse inter possibile esse et affirmations in having entity, though less impossibile esse, ita quod prius sit possibile aliquid esse, 15 perfect, and quam impossibile esse quod chimera sit. Hoc enim ideo essentially dependent on est, quia repugnat enti vel possibili. Relacio igitur the former. impossibilis esse ad possibile fundatur principaliter in The impossible depends in like possibili, et non in negacione. Et per consequens in manner on the possible, substancia; eo quod omnis opposicio reducitur ad oppo-20 and so of sicionem habitus et privacionis in predicamento sub- privation and substance; stancie; ut patet 10m0 metaphisice 15°, et allegat doctor which opinion has authority profundus, primo libro, capitulo 13°. Habitus enim po- in its favour. tencie dei ad sic causandum est causa quare sic est impossibile; sicud ipse ibi allegat doctorem solennem et 25 doctorem subtilem tenere, cum, affirmacione existente causa affirmacionis, negacio est causa negacionis. Ulterius, quoad secundam partem, videtur quod sit Arguments against the falsa, per hoc quod idem simul esse et non esse est definition of the simply manifestissimum impossibile, et sic de qualibet copula-30 impossible. 1. The same tiva facta ex contradictoriis: et tamen nullum istorum thing is and is est proposicio affirmativa vel negativa, cum sit chate- not at the same time ; this is gorica: igitur responsio falsa. Et si dicatur quod que- neither an affirmative nor libet talis sit affirmativa, quia affirmat veritatem esse, a negative proposition, tunc superflue additur quod solum affirmativa includens 35 8o it is not an contradiccionem est impossibilis, quia omnis negativa affirmation containing a contradiction, as stated at first. 13. MS. et deest. 15. MS. after aliquid 4. MS. equales deest. esse esse. 32, 33. MS. chateca. 25. Doctorem solennem et doctorem subtilem. Doctor subtilis is of course Duns Scotus. St. Thomas is sometimes called Doctor solemnis, but Wyclif no doubt here alludes to Henricus de Gandavo, cited in De Ecclesia, p. 367. 32. Chategorica. Pro- bably a mistake for copulativa. A categorical proposition must be either affirmative or negative; but not a copulative one.
92 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. II. corresponding sic de omni veritate affirmativa universali. Immo, virtute negation : there primi principii negativi, tenet quecunque conclusio is, therefore, no independence. affirmative demonstrata in aliqua sciencia doctrinali: ut To be equal, ideo triangulus habet tres angulos equales duobus rectis, and not to be unequal to two quia habet tres que non sunt inequales duobus rectis; 5 right angles, comes to the immo, quia aliter pars esset equalis toti, per deduc- same. cionem ad impossibile. If, as already Similiter, omnes negaciones sunt causate, iuxta de- shown, all ducta, igitur est dare ordinem et dependenciam tocius negations are caused, they generis negacionum ad genus affirmacionum; est igitur 1o cannot be ordo que sunt diversarum coordinacionum, et conveniunt independent, but there must primo in ente, ut patet de privacione et affirmacione be some order among them. ipsa priori [et] meliori; et sic de ceteris comparacionibus They agree with extra genus, qualis videtur esse inter possibile esse et affirmations in having entity, though less impossibile esse, ita quod prius sit possibile aliquid esse, 15 perfect, and quam impossibile esse quod chimera sit. Hoc enim ideo essentially dependent on est, quia repugnat enti vel possibili. Relacio igitur the former. impossibilis esse ad possibile fundatur principaliter in The impossible depends in like possibili, et non in negacione. Et per consequens in manner on the possible, substancia; eo quod omnis opposicio reducitur ad oppo-20 and so of sicionem habitus et privacionis in predicamento sub- privation and substance; stancie; ut patet 10m0 metaphisice 15°, et allegat doctor which opinion has authority profundus, primo libro, capitulo 13°. Habitus enim po- in its favour. tencie dei ad sic causandum est causa quare sic est impossibile; sicud ipse ibi allegat doctorem solennem et 25 doctorem subtilem tenere, cum, affirmacione existente causa affirmacionis, negacio est causa negacionis. Ulterius, quoad secundam partem, videtur quod sit Arguments against the falsa, per hoc quod idem simul esse et non esse est definition of the simply manifestissimum impossibile, et sic de qualibet copula-30 impossible. 1. The same tiva facta ex contradictoriis: et tamen nullum istorum thing is and is est proposicio affirmativa vel negativa, cum sit chate- not at the same time ; this is gorica: igitur responsio falsa. Et si dicatur quod que- neither an affirmative nor libet talis sit affirmativa, quia affirmat veritatem esse, a negative proposition, tunc superflue additur quod solum affirmativa includens 35 8o it is not an contradiccionem est impossibilis, quia omnis negativa affirmation containing a contradiction, as stated at first. 13. MS. et deest. 15. MS. after aliquid 4. MS. equales deest. esse esse. 32, 33. MS. chateca. 25. Doctorem solennem et doctorem subtilem. Doctor subtilis is of course Duns Scotus. St. Thomas is sometimes called Doctor solemnis, but Wyclif no doubt here alludes to Henricus de Gandavo, cited in De Ecclesia, p. 367. 32. Chategorica. Pro- bably a mistake for copulativa. A categorical proposition must be either affirmative or negative; but not a copulative one.
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F. 760 35 CAP. II. est affirmativa affirmans negacionem principaliter signa- tam, et deum esse (cum omnibus aliis sequentibus); immo, quelibet universalis negativa, ut talis, nullus homo If you say it is affirmative, est asinus includeret contradiccionem. Contradiccio enim because it affirms its own 5 non est principaliter signatum per contradictoria, quia truth, then every illud non potest esse; nec est relacio inter esse et] non proposition is affirmative. esse sibi contradicens, quia impossibile est relacionem Besides, every negative esse inter aliqua que repugnant esse [simul]; est igitur proposition contains a contradiccio, vel significacio duorum quorum unum re- contradiction: to pugnat alteri, vel proposiciones contradictorie; et quo- No man is an ass; man modocunque dicatur, invenietur tales negaciones includere contradicts ass. contradiccionem. Item hec est impossibilis, si tu es homo, tu es asinus; We can find an impossible et hec non includit contradiccionem; igitur posicio falsa. proposition wilhout any 15 Maior sic probatur: omne possibile est admittibile, po- contradiction ; v. g. If you are sicione presignante illud omne concedendum; sed non a man, you are sic est de ista condicionali: igitur non est possibilis. an ass. It is admittedly Minor sic: posito tibi quod si tu es homo tu es asinus, impossible, by the rules of non repugnat ille quod tu potes esse homo: est igitur Obligation. 20 concedendum tanquam necessarium inpertinens; ex quo Yet there is no contradiction: sequitur quod tu potes esse asinus, et per idem quid- the possibility of being a man libet potest esse quidlibet. Sequitur enim: si tu es does not exclude homo, tu es asinus; sed tu potes esse homo, igitur potes the possibility of being an ass. esse asinus, per hoc medium: si antecedens est possibile, Now this 25 tunc consequens est possibile. Et quod concessibilis non proposition, repugnat formaliter alicui proposicioni demonstrabile being conditional, videtur: quia omnis concessibilis non ponit aliquid de- does not contain anything about monstrabile iuxta opinionem; in tantum quod talis bona actuality, only concessibilis si tu es, tu es, non ponit deum esse nec possibility; and therefore, there 3o ipsum non esse; igitur a pari concessibilis non valens is no contradiction. non ponit aliqualiter demonstrabile; cum tunc concessi- bilis opposita illud negaret. Si enim hec concessibilis affirmativa repugnaret formaliter huic, “ego sum", tunc poneret formaliter me non esse, quod nemo dicit. Item, impossibile est hominem non posse esse; et tamen talis proposicio non est affirmativa includens contra- diccionem; igitur posicio falsa. Assertum probatur tri- pliciter: primo per hoc quod quondam fuit possibile hominem posse esse, et iuxta opinionem nullum possi- 40 bile potest mutari in impossibile, vel econtra, sicud Again, according to the adversary, what is once possible cannot cease to be so: thus, that a given man cannot exist, is not possible. Yet it is a negative proposition. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 93 8. MS. repugnat; ib. simul deest. 19. MS. est pro esse. 26. MS. demoe several times, pro demonstrabile.
F. 760 35 CAP. II. est affirmativa affirmans negacionem principaliter signa- tam, et deum esse (cum omnibus aliis sequentibus); immo, quelibet universalis negativa, ut talis, nullus homo If you say it is affirmative, est asinus includeret contradiccionem. Contradiccio enim because it affirms its own 5 non est principaliter signatum per contradictoria, quia truth, then every illud non potest esse; nec est relacio inter esse et] non proposition is affirmative. esse sibi contradicens, quia impossibile est relacionem Besides, every negative esse inter aliqua que repugnant esse [simul]; est igitur proposition contains a contradiccio, vel significacio duorum quorum unum re- contradiction: to pugnat alteri, vel proposiciones contradictorie; et quo- No man is an ass; man modocunque dicatur, invenietur tales negaciones includere contradicts ass. contradiccionem. Item hec est impossibilis, si tu es homo, tu es asinus; We can find an impossible et hec non includit contradiccionem; igitur posicio falsa. proposition wilhout any 15 Maior sic probatur: omne possibile est admittibile, po- contradiction ; v. g. If you are sicione presignante illud omne concedendum; sed non a man, you are sic est de ista condicionali: igitur non est possibilis. an ass. It is admittedly Minor sic: posito tibi quod si tu es homo tu es asinus, impossible, by the rules of non repugnat ille quod tu potes esse homo: est igitur Obligation. 20 concedendum tanquam necessarium inpertinens; ex quo Yet there is no contradiction: sequitur quod tu potes esse asinus, et per idem quid- the possibility of being a man libet potest esse quidlibet. Sequitur enim: si tu es does not exclude homo, tu es asinus; sed tu potes esse homo, igitur potes the possibility of being an ass. esse asinus, per hoc medium: si antecedens est possibile, Now this 25 tunc consequens est possibile. Et quod concessibilis non proposition, repugnat formaliter alicui proposicioni demonstrabile being conditional, videtur: quia omnis concessibilis non ponit aliquid de- does not contain anything about monstrabile iuxta opinionem; in tantum quod talis bona actuality, only concessibilis si tu es, tu es, non ponit deum esse nec possibility; and therefore, there 3o ipsum non esse; igitur a pari concessibilis non valens is no contradiction. non ponit aliqualiter demonstrabile; cum tunc concessi- bilis opposita illud negaret. Si enim hec concessibilis affirmativa repugnaret formaliter huic, “ego sum", tunc poneret formaliter me non esse, quod nemo dicit. Item, impossibile est hominem non posse esse; et tamen talis proposicio non est affirmativa includens contra- diccionem; igitur posicio falsa. Assertum probatur tri- pliciter: primo per hoc quod quondam fuit possibile hominem posse esse, et iuxta opinionem nullum possi- 40 bile potest mutari in impossibile, vel econtra, sicud Again, according to the adversary, what is once possible cannot cease to be so: thus, that a given man cannot exist, is not possible. Yet it is a negative proposition. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 93 8. MS. repugnat; ib. simul deest. 19. MS. est pro esse. 26. MS. demoe several times, pro demonstrabile.
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94 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. II. nullum necessarium potest mutari in contingens aut impossibile, vel econtra. Igitur iam non est impossibile To say: A man hominem posse esse. Similiter, si homo non potest esse cannot exist, and God knows et deus sic intelligit, sequitur quod deus sic intelligendo it, would be intelligit impossibile; et per consequens, si proposicio 5 a negative proposition, sic primarie signaverit, illa foret impossibilis. Et cum denying God's quelibet proposicio sic primarie signans foret negativa, existence, sequitur quod negativa potest esse impossibilis. Nemo „ enim sani capitis dicit quod si data dies vel accio preterita, vacuum, corpus, infinitum, etc. non potest 10 esse, tunc deus non potest esse. Et admisso quod ali- And if we admit that quid potest esse, cum hoc quod unum quodcunque anything in the past is now preteritum non posset esse, sequitur directe oppositum impossible, we have to give up posicionis, viz. quod in casu possibili negativa pure est the theory ; simpliciter impossibilis; nec docebit posicio. Unde for- 15 or to say that the assertion of maliter sequitur: hoc tempus preteritum non potest esse, the Past as a igitur deus non potest esse; potissime cum multi opinantur non-entity implies the antecedens necessarium et consequens impossibile. Simi- denial of God's existence, liter idem est: hoc non posse esse (demonstrata chimera), et impossibile esse vel contradiccionem claudere quod hoc 20 sit. Sed non potest claudere contradiccionem quod hoc and that the negative which sit; igitur non potest esse, hoc non potest esse; et per denies the existence of an consequens non potest bene admitti quod hoc non potest absurdity, is inadmissible. esse, demonstrata chimera vel quocunque alio. Item, ponitur quod si tu es, tu non potes esse; et 25 From this theory it 37. arguitur sic: si tu es, tu non potes esse; sed contra- F. 77 follows, moreover, that diccionem claudit quod tu es, igitur contradiccionem existence, if claudit quod tu non potes esse: et per consequens posited, is denied ; necesse est te esse. Et ista est affirmativa demonstracio: igitur aliqua talis est necessaria, cuius oppositum ponitur 30 in opinione. Quod autem concessibilis sit admittenda ab ista via, patet ex hoc, quod possibile est nihil posse esse (ut dicit), et si nihil potest esse, tunc, si tu es, tu non potes esse; igitur possibile est quod si tu es, tu non potes esse. Consequencia patet ex hoc principio 35 necessario: si antecedens est possibile, consequens est possibile. Et ultra sequitur quod prima concessibilis est possibilis. Et minor silogismi ypothetici patet ex hoc quod contradiccionem claudit nihil posse esse, et tamen non, si tu es, tu non potes esse, quia ponantur simul de 40 possibili. Et patet quod concedendum est nihil posse and therefore, impossible. 10. MS. vam. 29. MS. democ.
94 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. II. nullum necessarium potest mutari in contingens aut impossibile, vel econtra. Igitur iam non est impossibile To say: A man hominem posse esse. Similiter, si homo non potest esse cannot exist, and God knows et deus sic intelligit, sequitur quod deus sic intelligendo it, would be intelligit impossibile; et per consequens, si proposicio 5 a negative proposition, sic primarie signaverit, illa foret impossibilis. Et cum denying God's quelibet proposicio sic primarie signans foret negativa, existence, sequitur quod negativa potest esse impossibilis. Nemo „ enim sani capitis dicit quod si data dies vel accio preterita, vacuum, corpus, infinitum, etc. non potest 10 esse, tunc deus non potest esse. Et admisso quod ali- And if we admit that quid potest esse, cum hoc quod unum quodcunque anything in the past is now preteritum non posset esse, sequitur directe oppositum impossible, we have to give up posicionis, viz. quod in casu possibili negativa pure est the theory ; simpliciter impossibilis; nec docebit posicio. Unde for- 15 or to say that the assertion of maliter sequitur: hoc tempus preteritum non potest esse, the Past as a igitur deus non potest esse; potissime cum multi opinantur non-entity implies the antecedens necessarium et consequens impossibile. Simi- denial of God's existence, liter idem est: hoc non posse esse (demonstrata chimera), et impossibile esse vel contradiccionem claudere quod hoc 20 sit. Sed non potest claudere contradiccionem quod hoc and that the negative which sit; igitur non potest esse, hoc non potest esse; et per denies the existence of an consequens non potest bene admitti quod hoc non potest absurdity, is inadmissible. esse, demonstrata chimera vel quocunque alio. Item, ponitur quod si tu es, tu non potes esse; et 25 From this theory it 37. arguitur sic: si tu es, tu non potes esse; sed contra- F. 77 follows, moreover, that diccionem claudit quod tu es, igitur contradiccionem existence, if claudit quod tu non potes esse: et per consequens posited, is denied ; necesse est te esse. Et ista est affirmativa demonstracio: igitur aliqua talis est necessaria, cuius oppositum ponitur 30 in opinione. Quod autem concessibilis sit admittenda ab ista via, patet ex hoc, quod possibile est nihil posse esse (ut dicit), et si nihil potest esse, tunc, si tu es, tu non potes esse; igitur possibile est quod si tu es, tu non potes esse. Consequencia patet ex hoc principio 35 necessario: si antecedens est possibile, consequens est possibile. Et ultra sequitur quod prima concessibilis est possibilis. Et minor silogismi ypothetici patet ex hoc quod contradiccionem claudit nihil posse esse, et tamen non, si tu es, tu non potes esse, quia ponantur simul de 40 possibili. Et patet quod concedendum est nihil posse and therefore, impossible. 10. MS. vam. 29. MS. democ.
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CAP. 11. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 95 esse, et cum hoc quod potest esse quod tu sis, cum hoc quod tu potes esse: quod est contradiccio manifesta. Et sic habet posicio ista admittere quantumcunque difformes concessibiles de possibili: nam, ut uniformiter 5 dicam, habet admittere quod contradiccionem claudit deum vel aliquid esse, sic quod, si deus vel aliquid est, tunc illud est et non est: quia, si nihil potest esse, tunc, si aliquid est, nihil est; quia, ut prius dictum est, non posset esse quod nihil potest esse cum oppo- 10 sito concessibilis, viz. quod posset adesse cum hoc quod non nihil sit. Sed antecedens est possibile; igitur con- sequens; et ita necessario est possibile quod si deus est, ipse est et non est; et sic quelibet affirmativa potest claudere contradiccionem. Nam necessario potest 15 esse quod nihil possit esse, et si potest esse quod nihil possit esse, tunc potest esse quod, si deus est, ipse et non est; igitur, necessario sic potest esse quod, si deus est, tunc simul est et non est. Assumptum primum patet ex hoc quod, si non necessario possibile est quod 20 nihil possit esse, ponitur igitur quod non sit possibile nihil posse esse; ex quo sequitur quod necesse est ali- quid posse esse et quod negativa mera sit impossibilis. Et minor, que est concessibilis sequens, patet ex dictis. Nam si nihil potest esse, tunc si deus est, ipse est et 25 non potest esse; et per consequens est et non est. Item, si possibile est nihil posse esse, tunc deus non To say that everything potest esse; consequens ad minorem est falsum; igitur might possibly not exist, is to antecedens. Prima consequencia probatur sic; si deus say that God is impossible, est, ipse non potest non esse, et si sic, non est possi- which is false. 3o bile nihil posse esse. Igitur a primo ex opposito; si est For either God possibile nihil posse esse, tunc deus non est. Prima is impossible, consequencia sic probatur. Si deus est, tunc est unum or He is necessary, tale quod non potest incipere vel desinere esse; et si being, by the very meaning sic, tunc est unum necesse esse non potens non esse. of His name, 35 Deus enim de virtute sermonis vel saltem virtute me- that which can neither begin morie quibus cognoscitur esse, est unum tale quo non nor cease to be. potest esse prius, melius, pocius, etc.: et per consequens, est unum independens quod non potest corumpi, vel fieri a se vel ab alio, ut methaphisici satis sciunt de- 40 ducere. Si igitur est unum tale quod non potest vel denying at once and affirming everything, even God's existence. not only in particular, but in general, 26. Si possibile est. The supposition that possibly nothing exists, so fiercely combated in the following pages, was really made in discussion, as we shall see a little further.
CAP. 11. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 95 esse, et cum hoc quod potest esse quod tu sis, cum hoc quod tu potes esse: quod est contradiccio manifesta. Et sic habet posicio ista admittere quantumcunque difformes concessibiles de possibili: nam, ut uniformiter 5 dicam, habet admittere quod contradiccionem claudit deum vel aliquid esse, sic quod, si deus vel aliquid est, tunc illud est et non est: quia, si nihil potest esse, tunc, si aliquid est, nihil est; quia, ut prius dictum est, non posset esse quod nihil potest esse cum oppo- 10 sito concessibilis, viz. quod posset adesse cum hoc quod non nihil sit. Sed antecedens est possibile; igitur con- sequens; et ita necessario est possibile quod si deus est, ipse est et non est; et sic quelibet affirmativa potest claudere contradiccionem. Nam necessario potest 15 esse quod nihil possit esse, et si potest esse quod nihil possit esse, tunc potest esse quod, si deus est, ipse et non est; igitur, necessario sic potest esse quod, si deus est, tunc simul est et non est. Assumptum primum patet ex hoc quod, si non necessario possibile est quod 20 nihil possit esse, ponitur igitur quod non sit possibile nihil posse esse; ex quo sequitur quod necesse est ali- quid posse esse et quod negativa mera sit impossibilis. Et minor, que est concessibilis sequens, patet ex dictis. Nam si nihil potest esse, tunc si deus est, ipse est et 25 non potest esse; et per consequens est et non est. Item, si possibile est nihil posse esse, tunc deus non To say that everything potest esse; consequens ad minorem est falsum; igitur might possibly not exist, is to antecedens. Prima consequencia probatur sic; si deus say that God is impossible, est, ipse non potest non esse, et si sic, non est possi- which is false. 3o bile nihil posse esse. Igitur a primo ex opposito; si est For either God possibile nihil posse esse, tunc deus non est. Prima is impossible, consequencia sic probatur. Si deus est, tunc est unum or He is necessary, tale quod non potest incipere vel desinere esse; et si being, by the very meaning sic, tunc est unum necesse esse non potens non esse. of His name, 35 Deus enim de virtute sermonis vel saltem virtute me- that which can neither begin morie quibus cognoscitur esse, est unum tale quo non nor cease to be. potest esse prius, melius, pocius, etc.: et per consequens, est unum independens quod non potest corumpi, vel fieri a se vel ab alio, ut methaphisici satis sciunt de- 40 ducere. Si igitur est unum tale quod non potest vel denying at once and affirming everything, even God's existence. not only in particular, but in general, 26. Si possibile est. The supposition that possibly nothing exists, so fiercely combated in the following pages, was really made in discussion, as we shall see a little further.
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96 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. II. potuit incipere vel desinere esse vel habere causam, tunc est necesse] esse non potens non esse. Confirmatur tripliciter, primo sic: si potest esse quod If we affirm the possibility of homo vel nihil potest esse, tunc aliqua potencia potest nothing existing, we sic esse, et per consequens potencia potest esse; et ultra 5 affirm this possibility as sequitur quod potens potest esse tali potencia. Et per existing, consequens illa proposicio, potest esse quod nihil potest which is a contradiction in esse, implicat contradiccionem. Implicat enim esse possi- terms. The power bile quod aliquid immediate per se corumpat vel generet which could make that there se, quia potencia faciens nihil posse esse extingueret 10 was nothing immediate seipsam. would annihilate itself. Similiter, si nihil potest esse, tunc possibile est quod Were there nothing, there nihil potest esse. Et per consequens ab aliqua potencia still would be potest esse quod nihil potest esse; et sic aliqua potencia something, i. e. that which potest esse. Declaratum enim est superius quod si nihil 15 makes that there is nothing. est, ita est quod nihil est; et per consequens, possibile And note that est nihil esse. Et hic considera quomodo summe ne- when the adversary says cessarium est quod possibile est nihil esse, quamvis sit that Il is possible that affirmativum ponens potenciam, et per consequens nothing exists, summe necessarium est potenciam esse, et ex hoc actum 20 he posits this priorem esse. Si enim non est possibile nihil esse, vel possibility as a necessary truth, posse esse, tunc necesse est aliquid esse vel posse for if not, the possibility of esse, et per consequens claudit contradiccionem nihil its contrary esse vel posse esse. Evidencius igitur sequitur: aliquid would be affirmed, and potest esse; igitur necessario aliquid potest esse, quam 25 thus destroy it. sequitur: nihil potest esse; igitur necessario nihil potest esse; ut patet 51° metaphisice de necessario, quod prin- cipalius dicitur de affirmacione. Similiter, absolute necessarium est hominem non esse asinum, te esse si tu es, et ita de infinitis veritati-30 bus que omnia sunt encia, iuxta declarata. Igitur, absolute necessarium est ens esse; igitur non est possi- bile nullum ens esse. Et patet ulterius, cum omnes tales negaciones sunt cause vel causate, sequitur quod absolute necessarium est ordinem causarum et prjmam 35 causam esse, et per consequens deum esse. Ex hoc enim Socrates non simul est et non est quod nihil simul est et non est; et sic de infinitis veritatibus eternis causatis ab ista negacione, que est primum principium et immediatum: negativa tamen, ut dicitur 40 primo posteriorum. Est igitur in ordine privativorum. Et ex ista consideracione de veritate probant Augustinus Anselmus et Lyncolniensis in suis scriptis de veritate necessaris deum esse. There are infinite truths, which are beings, in the sense given; they are necessary; therefore it is impossible that there is no being. One depends upon another, they have One First Cause, which is God, F. 77 7b according to the demonstrations given by Augustine, Anselm, and Grosseteste.
96 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. II. potuit incipere vel desinere esse vel habere causam, tunc est necesse] esse non potens non esse. Confirmatur tripliciter, primo sic: si potest esse quod If we affirm the possibility of homo vel nihil potest esse, tunc aliqua potencia potest nothing existing, we sic esse, et per consequens potencia potest esse; et ultra 5 affirm this possibility as sequitur quod potens potest esse tali potencia. Et per existing, consequens illa proposicio, potest esse quod nihil potest which is a contradiction in esse, implicat contradiccionem. Implicat enim esse possi- terms. The power bile quod aliquid immediate per se corumpat vel generet which could make that there se, quia potencia faciens nihil posse esse extingueret 10 was nothing immediate seipsam. would annihilate itself. Similiter, si nihil potest esse, tunc possibile est quod Were there nothing, there nihil potest esse. Et per consequens ab aliqua potencia still would be potest esse quod nihil potest esse; et sic aliqua potencia something, i. e. that which potest esse. Declaratum enim est superius quod si nihil 15 makes that there is nothing. est, ita est quod nihil est; et per consequens, possibile And note that est nihil esse. Et hic considera quomodo summe ne- when the adversary says cessarium est quod possibile est nihil esse, quamvis sit that Il is possible that affirmativum ponens potenciam, et per consequens nothing exists, summe necessarium est potenciam esse, et ex hoc actum 20 he posits this priorem esse. Si enim non est possibile nihil esse, vel possibility as a necessary truth, posse esse, tunc necesse est aliquid esse vel posse for if not, the possibility of esse, et per consequens claudit contradiccionem nihil its contrary esse vel posse esse. Evidencius igitur sequitur: aliquid would be affirmed, and potest esse; igitur necessario aliquid potest esse, quam 25 thus destroy it. sequitur: nihil potest esse; igitur necessario nihil potest esse; ut patet 51° metaphisice de necessario, quod prin- cipalius dicitur de affirmacione. Similiter, absolute necessarium est hominem non esse asinum, te esse si tu es, et ita de infinitis veritati-30 bus que omnia sunt encia, iuxta declarata. Igitur, absolute necessarium est ens esse; igitur non est possi- bile nullum ens esse. Et patet ulterius, cum omnes tales negaciones sunt cause vel causate, sequitur quod absolute necessarium est ordinem causarum et prjmam 35 causam esse, et per consequens deum esse. Ex hoc enim Socrates non simul est et non est quod nihil simul est et non est; et sic de infinitis veritatibus eternis causatis ab ista negacione, que est primum principium et immediatum: negativa tamen, ut dicitur 40 primo posteriorum. Est igitur in ordine privativorum. Et ex ista consideracione de veritate probant Augustinus Anselmus et Lyncolniensis in suis scriptis de veritate necessaris deum esse. There are infinite truths, which are beings, in the sense given; they are necessary; therefore it is impossible that there is no being. One depends upon another, they have One First Cause, which is God, F. 77 7b according to the demonstrations given by Augustine, Anselm, and Grosseteste.
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CAP. II. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. Item, omni termino potest intellectus assentire, cum anima sit in potencia informari quacunque veritate, per consequens habet aptitudinem naturalem ad cui- cunque tali assenciendum, sed nullus intellectus potest 5assentire huic: nihil est vel potest esse, Igitur non potest esse veritas. Maior patet ex hoc quod omnis veritas (et per consequens omne ens) est per se cognoscibile sicud per se homo est risibilis; et ad illum finem ordinatur ut cognoscatur omne utile ab ordinante illud fore ad 10 talem finem. Et minor patet ex dictis negacionibus que nec possunt ordinari nec cognosci, cuiquam proficere, vel conservari, Non, inquam, possunt ordinari ad aliquem finem ymaginandum, nec possunt cognosci cum, eo ipso quod sunt, perit omnis natura cognitiva; nec possunt 15 esse bona utilia, cum tollunt omnia quibus fierent utilia; F. 78* nec | possunt conservari, eo quod, ipsis positis, perit omnis ordo cognoscendi cum omnes veritates eque- parantur, ipsis positis; Et quod nullus intellectus potest assentire quod sic sit, patet multipliciter. Primo ex hoc 20quod primum cognitum est ens esse, Secundo ex hoc quod quelibet cognitiva potencia appetit et cognoscit se esse; et tanto distinccius et perfeccius quo est per- feccius cognitiva, Non igitur virtus cognoscens nihil simul esse et non esse assentiret cum hoc quod nihil 25sit, Tercio ex hoc quod primum apprehensum est posi- tivum per quod apprehenditur negacio; sic quod, si nulla res posset esse, non posset esse movens ad appre- hendendum negacionem talem. Sicud enim ymaginacio non potest assentire quod anima vel deus sit, propter 3oimproporcionem virtutis ad apprehensibile, sic nec in- tellectus potest assentire quod nihil sit, cum non potest assentire nisi per mocionem, vel saltem requisicionem obiecti. Negacio enim, negans omnem rem, non potest esse obiectum intellectus; et multo magis non potest esse 35 finis assensus ant volucionis. Confirmatur illud tripliciter, evigilando ingenium sic sopitum. Primo enim, iuxta priorem sentenciam, ponit posicio quod qualitercunque potest esse impossibile, 10. MS. melius. 34. Requisicionem may possibly mean the state of a mind seek- ing to get a clear notion of some object. 7 97 Our mind, though made to et assent to every truth, finds it impossible to admit that possibly there is nothing. his therefore is not true. Truth is made to be knowable and useful to man; such propositions are neither; with their admission there exists no one to know them, nor any one to whom they might be useful. Our first. knowledge is that Bere is something. We know that we exist, and cannot at the same time accept as a possibility that there is nothing. As our imagination cannot realize God or the soul’s existence, because that is out of proportion with its scope, so reason cannot conceive the possibility of nothing existing. From the admissions of the possibility of absolute
CAP. II. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. Item, omni termino potest intellectus assentire, cum anima sit in potencia informari quacunque veritate, per consequens habet aptitudinem naturalem ad cui- cunque tali assenciendum, sed nullus intellectus potest 5assentire huic: nihil est vel potest esse, Igitur non potest esse veritas. Maior patet ex hoc quod omnis veritas (et per consequens omne ens) est per se cognoscibile sicud per se homo est risibilis; et ad illum finem ordinatur ut cognoscatur omne utile ab ordinante illud fore ad 10 talem finem. Et minor patet ex dictis negacionibus que nec possunt ordinari nec cognosci, cuiquam proficere, vel conservari, Non, inquam, possunt ordinari ad aliquem finem ymaginandum, nec possunt cognosci cum, eo ipso quod sunt, perit omnis natura cognitiva; nec possunt 15 esse bona utilia, cum tollunt omnia quibus fierent utilia; F. 78* nec | possunt conservari, eo quod, ipsis positis, perit omnis ordo cognoscendi cum omnes veritates eque- parantur, ipsis positis; Et quod nullus intellectus potest assentire quod sic sit, patet multipliciter. Primo ex hoc 20quod primum cognitum est ens esse, Secundo ex hoc quod quelibet cognitiva potencia appetit et cognoscit se esse; et tanto distinccius et perfeccius quo est per- feccius cognitiva, Non igitur virtus cognoscens nihil simul esse et non esse assentiret cum hoc quod nihil 25sit, Tercio ex hoc quod primum apprehensum est posi- tivum per quod apprehenditur negacio; sic quod, si nulla res posset esse, non posset esse movens ad appre- hendendum negacionem talem. Sicud enim ymaginacio non potest assentire quod anima vel deus sit, propter 3oimproporcionem virtutis ad apprehensibile, sic nec in- tellectus potest assentire quod nihil sit, cum non potest assentire nisi per mocionem, vel saltem requisicionem obiecti. Negacio enim, negans omnem rem, non potest esse obiectum intellectus; et multo magis non potest esse 35 finis assensus ant volucionis. Confirmatur illud tripliciter, evigilando ingenium sic sopitum. Primo enim, iuxta priorem sentenciam, ponit posicio quod qualitercunque potest esse impossibile, 10. MS. melius. 34. Requisicionem may possibly mean the state of a mind seek- ing to get a clear notion of some object. 7 97 Our mind, though made to et assent to every truth, finds it impossible to admit that possibly there is nothing. his therefore is not true. Truth is made to be knowable and useful to man; such propositions are neither; with their admission there exists no one to know them, nor any one to whom they might be useful. Our first. knowledge is that Bere is something. We know that we exist, and cannot at the same time accept as a possibility that there is nothing. As our imagination cannot realize God or the soul’s existence, because that is out of proportion with its scope, so reason cannot conceive the possibility of nothing existing. From the admissions of the possibility of absolute
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98 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. II. The first object of thought is Being; and therefore everything possible is knowable. If absolute nothingness were possible, it would therefore be knowable as Being. nothingness, taliter non potest esse; et per opinionem potest [esse] necessarily quod inpossibile sit aliquid esse; igitur non potest ali- possible, we must infer that quid esse, immo necesse est nihil esse. Sed quis assentit nothing exists. huic sine omni obligacione quod nihil potest esse? Et tamen patet quod hoc habet querere, cum concedendum: est quod necessario potest esse quod nihil potest esse, et per consequens necessario possibile est nihil posse esse. Et per consequens necessario possibile est necessario nihil esse; et per consequens tale possibile non potest incipere vel desinere esse; necessario est: et per idem 10 omnis negativa esset necessaria et omnis affirmativa in- possibilis. Sed quis tantum decipitur? Similiter, iuxta prius dicta, cum ens in communi sit obiectum intellectus et cognicionis; sicud omne visibile potest videri, sic omne possibile potest ab intellectu 15 cognosci, vel aliter unum contraccius ente esset primum obiectum intellectus. Et cum tale non posset per se deducere in assensum sui, Nihil est, oportet quod per aliquid. Vel igitur per signum naturaliter signans, vel voluntarie, ut voces extra, si per significacionem prin-20 cipalem. [Et] cum omnis talis presupponit significacionem et apprehensionem naturalem, sequitur quod tale ob- iectum apprehensum moveret naturaliter ad assensum sui esse. Nec aliquid aliud est assignandum quod moveret ad assenciendum quod nibil est, quia semper 25 eius significacio naturalis moveret ad assenciendum ali- quid esse; igitur etc. Si enim sensibile faceret prin- cipaliter signati (et per consequens cum necessario sen- sibilis non possit agi in anima sine cooperacione virtutis agentis), sequitur quod presupponitur apprehensio virtutis 30 agentis respectu principaliter signantis, antequam prin- cipaliter signet. Nec est fingenda res naturaliter movens ad sic credendum. Similiter, facto per impossibile assensu quod nihil est; adhuc est pronitas ex evidenciis ad assenciendum 35 quod | aliquid vel aliqualiter potest esse. Et, intellectu F. 785 bene experrecto, est satis notum quod si nihil est, nihil If there is nothing, there never can be anything, and nothing is possible, which is absurd. 1. MS. esse deest. 12. MS. decipit. 21. MS. et deest. 22. Credendum. I have given the general sense of the para- graph as well as I could in the marginal notes; but the text is in places so corrupt that it cannot be construed.
98 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. II. The first object of thought is Being; and therefore everything possible is knowable. If absolute nothingness were possible, it would therefore be knowable as Being. nothingness, taliter non potest esse; et per opinionem potest [esse] necessarily quod inpossibile sit aliquid esse; igitur non potest ali- possible, we must infer that quid esse, immo necesse est nihil esse. Sed quis assentit nothing exists. huic sine omni obligacione quod nihil potest esse? Et tamen patet quod hoc habet querere, cum concedendum: est quod necessario potest esse quod nihil potest esse, et per consequens necessario possibile est nihil posse esse. Et per consequens necessario possibile est necessario nihil esse; et per consequens tale possibile non potest incipere vel desinere esse; necessario est: et per idem 10 omnis negativa esset necessaria et omnis affirmativa in- possibilis. Sed quis tantum decipitur? Similiter, iuxta prius dicta, cum ens in communi sit obiectum intellectus et cognicionis; sicud omne visibile potest videri, sic omne possibile potest ab intellectu 15 cognosci, vel aliter unum contraccius ente esset primum obiectum intellectus. Et cum tale non posset per se deducere in assensum sui, Nihil est, oportet quod per aliquid. Vel igitur per signum naturaliter signans, vel voluntarie, ut voces extra, si per significacionem prin-20 cipalem. [Et] cum omnis talis presupponit significacionem et apprehensionem naturalem, sequitur quod tale ob- iectum apprehensum moveret naturaliter ad assensum sui esse. Nec aliquid aliud est assignandum quod moveret ad assenciendum quod nibil est, quia semper 25 eius significacio naturalis moveret ad assenciendum ali- quid esse; igitur etc. Si enim sensibile faceret prin- cipaliter signati (et per consequens cum necessario sen- sibilis non possit agi in anima sine cooperacione virtutis agentis), sequitur quod presupponitur apprehensio virtutis 30 agentis respectu principaliter signantis, antequam prin- cipaliter signet. Nec est fingenda res naturaliter movens ad sic credendum. Similiter, facto per impossibile assensu quod nihil est; adhuc est pronitas ex evidenciis ad assenciendum 35 quod | aliquid vel aliqualiter potest esse. Et, intellectu F. 785 bene experrecto, est satis notum quod si nihil est, nihil If there is nothing, there never can be anything, and nothing is possible, which is absurd. 1. MS. esse deest. 12. MS. decipit. 21. MS. et deest. 22. Credendum. I have given the general sense of the para- graph as well as I could in the marginal notes; but the text is in places so corrupt that it cannot be construed.
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CAP. II. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 99 potest esse. Igitur cuicunque intellectui sic experiecto est satis notum quod non sit possibile nihil esse. Minor sic: si nihil est et adhuc aliquid potest esse, aliquid potest per se solum facere seipsum. Ponatur enim quod nihil sit, et quod in b instanti primo sit aliquid. Si igitur multa tunc erunt, vel erunt ordinata quod unum fiat ab alio (et sic eadem est primum) vel omnia erunt inpertinencia aliis, vel solum unum erit. Et quomodo- cunque sit, deducendum est ad hoc quod aliquid erit 10 primo per se. Quod pono fore a; et patet quod prius est a posse esse quam a esse, cum sit coruptibile contingens. Et per consequens potencia a, qua a potest esse, precedit a esse; et cum illa potencia sit posterius a essencia cui inest, sequitur quod a precedit 15 naturaliter seipsum. Et hic foret instancia Aristotelis (8° phisicorum, de incepcione mundi) insolubilis, quare in uno instanti inciperet a esse, et non in quocunque, cum non potest poni voluntas libera vel aliqua alia causa naturaliter antecedens. Et per idem corumpens 20 se immediate per se, continue corumperet se; et hic esset querendum de deo, posita incepcione omnium rerum in a instanti. Et sic de multis aliis. In tantum enim credidit unus subtilis logicus isti opinioni, quia dixit mihi quidlibet posse esse deum per 25 corupcionem cuiuscunque superioris; et sic credo po- neret deum negativum et unum inanimatum, dependens ab infinitis ipso prioribus, deum. Et revera magnus sopor est in animo sic dicentis! Ymaginatur enim quod 5 Nothing can be supposed making itself out of its own pure possibility, yet we should have to suppose at least one being making itself thus, having the power to be before it is the being to which the power belongs! Thus God might make Himself; and a logician actually told me that anything might become God, if all that were more perfect than itself were reduced to nothing ; 1. MS. expiecco. 5. MS. et pro sit before aliquid. 27. MS. ipsum. 2. Satis notum. Because, if nothing were possible, this affir- mation would destroy its own possibility. 16. Insolubilis. Aristotle's argument (so-called because it is hard so answer) in favour of the eternity of the world, when stripped of its ter- minology, runs thus, and resembles Wyclif's argument a good deal : If the world begun, it began at a certain instant of time. If this was the first instant, there was no now before it, and the world was eternal. If not the first instant, then time, which is but measured movement, existed before there was anything that could move. St. Thomas shows that Aristotle here begs 23. This subtilis the question (Sum. cont. Gent. 1. 11, c. 36.) logicus, whoever he may have been, had arrived in his own way at the conclusions of the German Transcendental philo- sophers — an impersonal God, always becoming. He must have been a sort of Hegel, born far before his time. 7*
CAP. II. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 99 potest esse. Igitur cuicunque intellectui sic experiecto est satis notum quod non sit possibile nihil esse. Minor sic: si nihil est et adhuc aliquid potest esse, aliquid potest per se solum facere seipsum. Ponatur enim quod nihil sit, et quod in b instanti primo sit aliquid. Si igitur multa tunc erunt, vel erunt ordinata quod unum fiat ab alio (et sic eadem est primum) vel omnia erunt inpertinencia aliis, vel solum unum erit. Et quomodo- cunque sit, deducendum est ad hoc quod aliquid erit 10 primo per se. Quod pono fore a; et patet quod prius est a posse esse quam a esse, cum sit coruptibile contingens. Et per consequens potencia a, qua a potest esse, precedit a esse; et cum illa potencia sit posterius a essencia cui inest, sequitur quod a precedit 15 naturaliter seipsum. Et hic foret instancia Aristotelis (8° phisicorum, de incepcione mundi) insolubilis, quare in uno instanti inciperet a esse, et non in quocunque, cum non potest poni voluntas libera vel aliqua alia causa naturaliter antecedens. Et per idem corumpens 20 se immediate per se, continue corumperet se; et hic esset querendum de deo, posita incepcione omnium rerum in a instanti. Et sic de multis aliis. In tantum enim credidit unus subtilis logicus isti opinioni, quia dixit mihi quidlibet posse esse deum per 25 corupcionem cuiuscunque superioris; et sic credo po- neret deum negativum et unum inanimatum, dependens ab infinitis ipso prioribus, deum. Et revera magnus sopor est in animo sic dicentis! Ymaginatur enim quod 5 Nothing can be supposed making itself out of its own pure possibility, yet we should have to suppose at least one being making itself thus, having the power to be before it is the being to which the power belongs! Thus God might make Himself; and a logician actually told me that anything might become God, if all that were more perfect than itself were reduced to nothing ; 1. MS. expiecco. 5. MS. et pro sit before aliquid. 27. MS. ipsum. 2. Satis notum. Because, if nothing were possible, this affir- mation would destroy its own possibility. 16. Insolubilis. Aristotle's argument (so-called because it is hard so answer) in favour of the eternity of the world, when stripped of its ter- minology, runs thus, and resembles Wyclif's argument a good deal : If the world begun, it began at a certain instant of time. If this was the first instant, there was no now before it, and the world was eternal. If not the first instant, then time, which is but measured movement, existed before there was anything that could move. St. Thomas shows that Aristotle here begs 23. This subtilis the question (Sum. cont. Gent. 1. 11, c. 36.) logicus, whoever he may have been, had arrived in his own way at the conclusions of the German Transcendental philo- sophers — an impersonal God, always becoming. He must have been a sort of Hegel, born far before his time. 7*
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100 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. II. he was surely omnia que iam sunt incipiant esse, et alias desinant dreaming, imagining that esse, sine causa faciente incepcionem vel desicionem: beginning or ac si homo ymaginaretur se successive converti in quid- ceasing to be takes place libet assignandum. Sed racio vigilans dicit istam ymagi- without a nacionem esse impossibilem, cum impossibile sit effectum 5 cause. Waking reason esse sine efficiente; et propter prius naturaliter, prius shows that this est potencia in efficiente, antequam efficiat. Quomodo, cannot be; the efficient cause must exist rogo, aliter cognosceret dictus philosophus aliquas esse before the causas, cum credat non opportere causam esse, etsi effect; and so must the power effectus sit ? aut quomodo cognoscet quod causatum 10 to produce. Such a view compositum dependet ex sua forma, si credat posse destroys every esse quod quidlibet sit independens ab altero? Cum notion of philosophy (the igitur sic opinans cognoscat quod, si a potest esse ne- science of causes), for it cessarium, impossibile, vel possibile, tunc est huius- destroys all modi, cognoscere potest cercius quod si aliquod causatum 15 dependence between cause est, causa finalis non causata est, ut docebitur alibi. and effect. Non enim est per se notum quod si sic potest esse sic est, demonstrando per ly “sic", quod inpossibile est ali- quid esse, quod necesse est nihil posse esse, vel quod possibile est a diem fore; et breviter, demonstrando 20 quamcunque veritatem de inpossibili, necessario, vel contingenti. Et, cum ista posicio concedit sensus, habet querere consequenter omnes dictas consequencias. De- monstretur igitur racio in aliis, discutiendo et assen- ciendo sequelis facilioribus. Scimus enim quod si potest 25 esse quod necessario deus est, vel quod deus est, tunc sic est; et sic de omni absolute necessario; ut, si potest esse quod impossibile est deum non esse, vel idem simul esse] et non esse, tunc sic est; et sic, si potest esse absolute necessarium quod nihil sit, sic est. Ex istis sum motus ad eliciendum contra illam viam quindecimam racionem. Nam, si possibile est quod nihil potest esse necessarium vel contingens (et loquor de necessario ut ista posicio loquitur: cuius oppositum claudit contradiccionem) demonstracio patet; quia contra-35 diccionem claudit aliqua aliter esse, nisi taliter non posset non esse. Vel taliter posset esse; cum sit de- The possibility of anything being necessary and its necessary affirmation, come to the same. If there is nothing necessary, either it is contradictory to suppose anything necessary, or it is not. F 79. 30 22. MS. s' pro sensus. 32. Quindecimam. If we count all the varions refutations from Contra terciam (p. 91), considering the three arguments of Confirmatur tripliciter (p. 96) as one, we shall find them to be fourteen. 35. I think there is a gap between contra- diccionem and demonstracio. The side-notes show how I try to fill it.
100 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. II. he was surely omnia que iam sunt incipiant esse, et alias desinant dreaming, imagining that esse, sine causa faciente incepcionem vel desicionem: beginning or ac si homo ymaginaretur se successive converti in quid- ceasing to be takes place libet assignandum. Sed racio vigilans dicit istam ymagi- without a nacionem esse impossibilem, cum impossibile sit effectum 5 cause. Waking reason esse sine efficiente; et propter prius naturaliter, prius shows that this est potencia in efficiente, antequam efficiat. Quomodo, cannot be; the efficient cause must exist rogo, aliter cognosceret dictus philosophus aliquas esse before the causas, cum credat non opportere causam esse, etsi effect; and so must the power effectus sit ? aut quomodo cognoscet quod causatum 10 to produce. Such a view compositum dependet ex sua forma, si credat posse destroys every esse quod quidlibet sit independens ab altero? Cum notion of philosophy (the igitur sic opinans cognoscat quod, si a potest esse ne- science of causes), for it cessarium, impossibile, vel possibile, tunc est huius- destroys all modi, cognoscere potest cercius quod si aliquod causatum 15 dependence between cause est, causa finalis non causata est, ut docebitur alibi. and effect. Non enim est per se notum quod si sic potest esse sic est, demonstrando per ly “sic", quod inpossibile est ali- quid esse, quod necesse est nihil posse esse, vel quod possibile est a diem fore; et breviter, demonstrando 20 quamcunque veritatem de inpossibili, necessario, vel contingenti. Et, cum ista posicio concedit sensus, habet querere consequenter omnes dictas consequencias. De- monstretur igitur racio in aliis, discutiendo et assen- ciendo sequelis facilioribus. Scimus enim quod si potest 25 esse quod necessario deus est, vel quod deus est, tunc sic est; et sic de omni absolute necessario; ut, si potest esse quod impossibile est deum non esse, vel idem simul esse] et non esse, tunc sic est; et sic, si potest esse absolute necessarium quod nihil sit, sic est. Ex istis sum motus ad eliciendum contra illam viam quindecimam racionem. Nam, si possibile est quod nihil potest esse necessarium vel contingens (et loquor de necessario ut ista posicio loquitur: cuius oppositum claudit contradiccionem) demonstracio patet; quia contra-35 diccionem claudit aliqua aliter esse, nisi taliter non posset non esse. Vel taliter posset esse; cum sit de- The possibility of anything being necessary and its necessary affirmation, come to the same. If there is nothing necessary, either it is contradictory to suppose anything necessary, or it is not. F 79. 30 22. MS. s' pro sensus. 32. Quindecimam. If we count all the varions refutations from Contra terciam (p. 91), considering the three arguments of Confirmatur tripliciter (p. 96) as one, we shall find them to be fourteen. 35. I think there is a gap between contra- diccionem and demonstracio. The side-notes show how I try to fill it.
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CAP. II. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 101 monstracio immediata per contradictoria, si primum Ifcontradictory, according to the membrum detur, tunc est necessarium iuxta exponentes; definition, the non-existence si secundum, tunc est verum contingens. Si igitur nihil of anything necessary is posse esse potest esse necessarium, tunc iam est neces- itself necessary sarium [secundum] frequenter dicta. Et si sit contingens, if not, then its non-existence tunc potest oppositum evenire, scilicet, quod aliquid is contingent. If contingent, potest esse; quod repugnat veritati primo date. Ideo pla- then something num est quod claudit contradiccionem quod sit verum may be necessary, and contingens (distinguendo contingens contra necessarium) (as above proved) is 1o quod nihil potest esse. Non igitur posset esse verum, necessary. nisi esset absolute necessarium quod nihil potest esse. Et Therefore contingency is hoc admisso, negandum est aliquid fuisse vel potuisse fu- out of the question, and isse. Sed ista responsio non evadit, quin sine obligacione you must quelibet affirmativa sit neganda tanquam inpossibilis; absolutely deny not only all 15 quia, subducta omni obligacione, concedit quod neces- possible past things, but all sario potest esse quod nihil potest esse: tunc iam est affirmative necessarium quod nihil potest esse, eo quod, si sic propositions. adhuc non sit, et sic potest esse, tunc ab aliqua po- tencia sic potest fieri. Omne enim quod non est alico 20 istorum quatuor modorum non est; vel sic quod fuit et desinit vel desiit esse, vel erit, et sic incipit vel in- cipiet esse, vel tercio, dum nec erit [nec fuit], sed est poten- cia a qua potest sic esse (ut est de effectu possibili que nunquam fuit vel erit) vel quarto, quia non potest esse. 25 Sic igitur b effectum fore potest continue fieri a po- tencia, quamvis non possit incipere esse. Et patet quod nullo istoruin modorum est verum quod possibile est quod nihil potest esse, nisi forte quarto modo; quia, iuxta opinionem, non est in potestate prime cause facere 3o ipsum non posse esse, cum etsi non esset, adhuc posset esse. Quidlibet igitur non posse esse est iuxta opinionem incausabile. Relinquitur igitur quod sic sit falsum quod nihil potest esse, [et] quod falsum non possit esse. 35 Similiter, cum deum esse sit contingens et per con- sequens est esse firmius a quo dependet, scilicet nihil simul esse, et non esse, quod est prius naturaliter quam deum esse, sequitur quod non sint gradus in contin- Everything either (1) was and is not, or (2) will be and is not; or (3) is possible; or (4) is impossible. The proposition that possibly nothing exists belongs to none of these categories but the last. This theory makes God's existence contingent, depending on the negative axiom of contradiction. 5 5. MS. secundum deest. 22. MS. nec fuit deest. 27. MS. pro 33. MS. et deest. non possibile. 22. Dum nec erit. "Whilst it is not in the future or in the past." Wyclif here includes all existents amongst things possible.
CAP. II. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 101 monstracio immediata per contradictoria, si primum Ifcontradictory, according to the membrum detur, tunc est necessarium iuxta exponentes; definition, the non-existence si secundum, tunc est verum contingens. Si igitur nihil of anything necessary is posse esse potest esse necessarium, tunc iam est neces- itself necessary sarium [secundum] frequenter dicta. Et si sit contingens, if not, then its non-existence tunc potest oppositum evenire, scilicet, quod aliquid is contingent. If contingent, potest esse; quod repugnat veritati primo date. Ideo pla- then something num est quod claudit contradiccionem quod sit verum may be necessary, and contingens (distinguendo contingens contra necessarium) (as above proved) is 1o quod nihil potest esse. Non igitur posset esse verum, necessary. nisi esset absolute necessarium quod nihil potest esse. Et Therefore contingency is hoc admisso, negandum est aliquid fuisse vel potuisse fu- out of the question, and isse. Sed ista responsio non evadit, quin sine obligacione you must quelibet affirmativa sit neganda tanquam inpossibilis; absolutely deny not only all 15 quia, subducta omni obligacione, concedit quod neces- possible past things, but all sario potest esse quod nihil potest esse: tunc iam est affirmative necessarium quod nihil potest esse, eo quod, si sic propositions. adhuc non sit, et sic potest esse, tunc ab aliqua po- tencia sic potest fieri. Omne enim quod non est alico 20 istorum quatuor modorum non est; vel sic quod fuit et desinit vel desiit esse, vel erit, et sic incipit vel in- cipiet esse, vel tercio, dum nec erit [nec fuit], sed est poten- cia a qua potest sic esse (ut est de effectu possibili que nunquam fuit vel erit) vel quarto, quia non potest esse. 25 Sic igitur b effectum fore potest continue fieri a po- tencia, quamvis non possit incipere esse. Et patet quod nullo istoruin modorum est verum quod possibile est quod nihil potest esse, nisi forte quarto modo; quia, iuxta opinionem, non est in potestate prime cause facere 3o ipsum non posse esse, cum etsi non esset, adhuc posset esse. Quidlibet igitur non posse esse est iuxta opinionem incausabile. Relinquitur igitur quod sic sit falsum quod nihil potest esse, [et] quod falsum non possit esse. 35 Similiter, cum deum esse sit contingens et per con- sequens est esse firmius a quo dependet, scilicet nihil simul esse, et non esse, quod est prius naturaliter quam deum esse, sequitur quod non sint gradus in contin- Everything either (1) was and is not, or (2) will be and is not; or (3) is possible; or (4) is impossible. The proposition that possibly nothing exists belongs to none of these categories but the last. This theory makes God's existence contingent, depending on the negative axiom of contradiction. 5 5. MS. secundum deest. 22. MS. nec fuit deest. 27. MS. pro 33. MS. et deest. non possibile. 22. Dum nec erit. "Whilst it is not in the future or in the past." Wyclif here includes all existents amongst things possible.
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102 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. II. gencia, scilicet contingencia contingenti in maiori parte, It follows then, contingenti ad utrumlibet, et contingenti in minori. Con- contrary to sequens contra Aristotelem et veritatem. Et consequencia Aristotle, that all contingent patet ex hoc quod summe contingens est deum esse, things are equally eo quod infinitum faciliter potest non esse. Et sic est 5 contingent. dare tempus eternum iuxta posicionem, quod non potest Time is eternal, and more desinere vel incipere esse: quod est maioris permanencie permanent than God. quam deus; cum ipsum vel motus celi non sit maioris permanencie quam celum vel mundus sibi subiectus, sequitur quod illud sit maioris permanencie quam 10 deus. An answer: Ideo dicit quodam modo quod deus et talia corpora God and all perpetua bene possunt non esse; sed tunc repugnat everlasting things may quod fuerunt vel erunt; sicud dicitur de tempore eterno possibly not be; quod potest non esse, sic nec incipere nec desinere 15 but if they were not they never esse. Ista autem responsio non intelligit significacionem could have been. But this is illius verbi posse. Ipsum] enim est verbum positivum F. 79" contrary to the meaning of signans principaliter potenciam a qua potest sic esse: posse, which signifies power ut, si non sit impossibile quod sic sit, tunc est potencia relatively to a a qua potest sic esse; ita quod iste negaciones, non 20 certain suchness. esse impossibile, ponunt affirmativam potenciam. If this suchness Similiter, si, deo non existente, nihil potest esse, is not impossible, there exists a tunc, deo non existente, forent omnes negaciones et power whereby omnes veritates necessarie, quod deus non potest facere it is actualizable. in vita sua, cum, eo ipso quod ipse est, ipse potest 25 If God did not ad utrumlibet in multas veritates contingentes; quia exist, all those truths which necessarium posicioni. Tamen non potest de dei omni- are now contingent, as potencia esse sine contingenti, iuxta illud commune depending upon sophisma, necessario aliquod ens est quod non necessario His will, would become est. Deus enim non posset facere quin ipse posset multa, 30 necessary. absoluta vel respectiva, causare, que non sunt. Posito But something necessarily must igitur toto genere negacionum, sine hoc quod aliquid be contingent, 1. c. not sit, patet quod est ordo et causacio in negacionibus necessary. Then there infinitis, quia, quocunque singulari positivo demonstrato, would only ex hoc illud non est, quia nihil est. Et omnes veritates 35 remain negations; but essent tunc necessarie. Sed, rogo, a quo caperent tantas even these primitates, nisi a prima causa negacionum, que in in- would be subordinate one finitum precedit deum in causando? Nec valet negare to another: This does not istum modum loquendi, quia non implicatur, nisi quod exist, because nihil potest esse, aut, sicud alia negacio, nata est prin-40 nothing exists. And the cipaliter signare qualiter communiter loquentes conce- necessity of all truths would 1. MS. scilicet contingencia scilicet. 34. MS. Determinato.
102 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. II. gencia, scilicet contingencia contingenti in maiori parte, It follows then, contingenti ad utrumlibet, et contingenti in minori. Con- contrary to sequens contra Aristotelem et veritatem. Et consequencia Aristotle, that all contingent patet ex hoc quod summe contingens est deum esse, things are equally eo quod infinitum faciliter potest non esse. Et sic est 5 contingent. dare tempus eternum iuxta posicionem, quod non potest Time is eternal, and more desinere vel incipere esse: quod est maioris permanencie permanent than God. quam deus; cum ipsum vel motus celi non sit maioris permanencie quam celum vel mundus sibi subiectus, sequitur quod illud sit maioris permanencie quam 10 deus. An answer: Ideo dicit quodam modo quod deus et talia corpora God and all perpetua bene possunt non esse; sed tunc repugnat everlasting things may quod fuerunt vel erunt; sicud dicitur de tempore eterno possibly not be; quod potest non esse, sic nec incipere nec desinere 15 but if they were not they never esse. Ista autem responsio non intelligit significacionem could have been. But this is illius verbi posse. Ipsum] enim est verbum positivum F. 79" contrary to the meaning of signans principaliter potenciam a qua potest sic esse: posse, which signifies power ut, si non sit impossibile quod sic sit, tunc est potencia relatively to a a qua potest sic esse; ita quod iste negaciones, non 20 certain suchness. esse impossibile, ponunt affirmativam potenciam. If this suchness Similiter, si, deo non existente, nihil potest esse, is not impossible, there exists a tunc, deo non existente, forent omnes negaciones et power whereby omnes veritates necessarie, quod deus non potest facere it is actualizable. in vita sua, cum, eo ipso quod ipse est, ipse potest 25 If God did not ad utrumlibet in multas veritates contingentes; quia exist, all those truths which necessarium posicioni. Tamen non potest de dei omni- are now contingent, as potencia esse sine contingenti, iuxta illud commune depending upon sophisma, necessario aliquod ens est quod non necessario His will, would become est. Deus enim non posset facere quin ipse posset multa, 30 necessary. absoluta vel respectiva, causare, que non sunt. Posito But something necessarily must igitur toto genere negacionum, sine hoc quod aliquid be contingent, 1. c. not sit, patet quod est ordo et causacio in negacionibus necessary. Then there infinitis, quia, quocunque singulari positivo demonstrato, would only ex hoc illud non est, quia nihil est. Et omnes veritates 35 remain negations; but essent tunc necessarie. Sed, rogo, a quo caperent tantas even these primitates, nisi a prima causa negacionum, que in in- would be subordinate one finitum precedit deum in causando? Nec valet negare to another: This does not istum modum loquendi, quia non implicatur, nisi quod exist, because nihil potest esse, aut, sicud alia negacio, nata est prin-40 nothing exists. And the cipaliter signare qualiter communiter loquentes conce- necessity of all truths would 1. MS. scilicet contingencia scilicet. 34. MS. Determinato.
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CAP. II. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 103 dunt esse. Si igitur possibile sit nihil posse esse, quia proceed from the first nihil potest esse, tunc ex negativa sequitur affirmativa. principle of contradiction. Et quecunque concessibilis post illud positum est con- cedenda, ut, si tu es homo tu es quidlibet, eo quod 5 repugnat summe necessitati quicquam posse esse, ut superius deductum est. Causa igitur quare ex hoc: nihil potest esse, non sequitur inconsequens, est quia hoc non potest esse: immo, negans ex ista proposicione proposita sequi inconsequens, non docebit quomodo ex hoc quod to aliquid est, sequitur impossibile. Immo, universaliter: si volo probare hominem esse asinum, vel quicquid aliud, assumo sic: si homo est, homo est asinus, sed homo est, igitur homo est asinus. Minorem daret quilibet mihi sine obligacione; vel si non, capio quamcunque 15 aliam affirmativam veram, et formetur racio. Et probo maiorem: quia si non aliqualiter potest esse, tunc si homo est homo, est asinus; sed antecedens est possibile, igitur consequens. Et certum est quod consequens non potest esse verum contingens sic significando; et hoc 20 est unum brogardicum ad probandum omne inpossibile. Potest igitur colligi ex dictis quod non sit possibile nihil posse esse. Item, quantum ad triplicem distinccionem de inpossi- bili, videtur quod repugnat posicioni; primo, quia nullum 25 est inpossibile vel necessarium, nisi simpliciter; et per consequens divisum non dicitur de quolibet dividencium. Secundo, quia omne impossibile vel necessarium quoad nos est necessarium vel inpossibile simpliciter. Ponit enim posicio exemplum de inpossibili quoad nos, de inpossibilitate capcionis avis evolantis, et de non dixisse verbum quod dictum est. Sed ista videntur mihi in- circumspecte dicta, eo quod infinitum agilis possum esse, infinitum magnus, infinitum diu durare, et per F. 8o° consequens quantum avem possum multis modisI quan- And not only would there be order amongst these negations, but they would be founded on or would elicit affirmations, so that anything impossible may be affirmatively proved to exist ; for if nothing is possible, then everything impossible must be admitted to exist. This position denies all distinction between impossibilitics; what is impossible is símply so. If you say "This or that is impossible quo ad nos „ admitting that there is no limit to our possible perfections, you destroy that impossibility. 30 26. MS. difu ... di decin. 20. Brogardicum. Brocardia, Brocardicorum opus; a collection of ecclesiastical canons by Burkhard, Bishop of Worms, called, by the Italians and French, Brocard. It means also an elementary principle or a short proverbial rule, in law, ethics, or meta- physics. See Webster's Dictionary. (ed. 1900). 23. Triplicem distinctionem. A proposition, according to the old Scholastie dis- tinction, might be either morally, or physically, or metaphysically necessary, or impossible.
CAP. II. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 103 dunt esse. Si igitur possibile sit nihil posse esse, quia proceed from the first nihil potest esse, tunc ex negativa sequitur affirmativa. principle of contradiction. Et quecunque concessibilis post illud positum est con- cedenda, ut, si tu es homo tu es quidlibet, eo quod 5 repugnat summe necessitati quicquam posse esse, ut superius deductum est. Causa igitur quare ex hoc: nihil potest esse, non sequitur inconsequens, est quia hoc non potest esse: immo, negans ex ista proposicione proposita sequi inconsequens, non docebit quomodo ex hoc quod to aliquid est, sequitur impossibile. Immo, universaliter: si volo probare hominem esse asinum, vel quicquid aliud, assumo sic: si homo est, homo est asinus, sed homo est, igitur homo est asinus. Minorem daret quilibet mihi sine obligacione; vel si non, capio quamcunque 15 aliam affirmativam veram, et formetur racio. Et probo maiorem: quia si non aliqualiter potest esse, tunc si homo est homo, est asinus; sed antecedens est possibile, igitur consequens. Et certum est quod consequens non potest esse verum contingens sic significando; et hoc 20 est unum brogardicum ad probandum omne inpossibile. Potest igitur colligi ex dictis quod non sit possibile nihil posse esse. Item, quantum ad triplicem distinccionem de inpossi- bili, videtur quod repugnat posicioni; primo, quia nullum 25 est inpossibile vel necessarium, nisi simpliciter; et per consequens divisum non dicitur de quolibet dividencium. Secundo, quia omne impossibile vel necessarium quoad nos est necessarium vel inpossibile simpliciter. Ponit enim posicio exemplum de inpossibili quoad nos, de inpossibilitate capcionis avis evolantis, et de non dixisse verbum quod dictum est. Sed ista videntur mihi in- circumspecte dicta, eo quod infinitum agilis possum esse, infinitum magnus, infinitum diu durare, et per F. 8o° consequens quantum avem possum multis modisI quan- And not only would there be order amongst these negations, but they would be founded on or would elicit affirmations, so that anything impossible may be affirmatively proved to exist ; for if nothing is possible, then everything impossible must be admitted to exist. This position denies all distinction between impossibilitics; what is impossible is símply so. If you say "This or that is impossible quo ad nos „ admitting that there is no limit to our possible perfections, you destroy that impossibility. 30 26. MS. difu ... di decin. 20. Brogardicum. Brocardia, Brocardicorum opus; a collection of ecclesiastical canons by Burkhard, Bishop of Worms, called, by the Italians and French, Brocard. It means also an elementary principle or a short proverbial rule, in law, ethics, or meta- physics. See Webster's Dictionary. (ed. 1900). 23. Triplicem distinctionem. A proposition, according to the old Scholastie dis- tinction, might be either morally, or physically, or metaphysically necessary, or impossible.
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104 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. II. The whole tumcunque faciliter capere; et sic, cum necessario potui question lies in non dixisse illud. this ; whether any Et redargucciones omnes dependent super isto quod determinations, non claudit contradiccionem me sic posse vel me habere, applied to a given subject, et quod plus est (cum probabile creditur quidlibet cau-5 do or do not contradict satum cuilibet posse idemtificari, et sic hominem posse themselves. If not, a man esse deum) probabile videtur quod quidlibet potest facere can be God, quicquid aliud potest facere. Si enim est dare limites and any being can do potencie et denominacionum hominis ultra quos non anything. potest, ut de quantitate, duracione, sciencia, etc., tunc 10 Given determinate claudit contradiccionem excedere tales limites; et multo limits to a man's size, magis claudit contradiccionem nihil esse. Et hic incidunt power, &c., the omnes difficultates de infinito mundo, de vacuo, de passing of those limits implies composicione continui ex indivisibilibus, de identificacione absurdity. Here come the rei cum alia, de multiplicacione rei, et sic de aliis, in 15 questions of an quibus sunt opiniones utrum claudunt contradiccionem infinite world, a vacuum, the vel non; quam materiam potes sparsim colligere in hac Continuous consisting of summa. points &c. Nothing is Quantum ad inpossibile apud naturam, patet quod impossible except what is contradiccionem claudit quicquam esse inpossibile; nisi 20 naturally so; fuerit inpossibile apud naturam, aut econtra; cum deus whatever is possible, is sit natura, et omne universale similiter. Qualitercunque either the First igitur potest esse, potest esse prima veritas vel a prima Truth or those truths that veritate, et per consequens qualitercunque potest esse, proceed therefrom ; potest esse a natura. Si igitur quicquam sit inpossibile 25 and its contrary apud naturam, tunc omni nature repugnat ipsum esse, jars with all nature ; if with et per consequens simpliciter non potest esse. Immo, the nature of one being, then ut plus dicam, repugnat quod alicui nature repugnet with all. Nature forms a qualitercunque esse, nisi cuilibet nature repugnet sic esse. confederacy; Si enim sit confederacio in policia humana, racione 30 what makes against one cuius repugnare uni foret repugnare tribus eorundem, necessary truth multo magis in policia naturali universitatis encium est makes against the existence of federacio magis firma. Nam destruere unum necessarium the whole est destruere totam universitatem encium iuxta declarata. world. Dissolution Nec corupcionem repugnat esse, cum sit naturalis, tam 35 exists, as a natural result of agenti quam passo. Immo, nihil potest esse simpliciter action and of passion; and violentum; igitur est cathenacio aurea, secundum poetice nothing absolutely loquentes, inter encia universi, cui repugnat esse ali- opposed to quod impossibile vel non bonum. nature can exist. 19. MS. Conclusio in marg.
104 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. II. The whole tumcunque faciliter capere; et sic, cum necessario potui question lies in non dixisse illud. this ; whether any Et redargucciones omnes dependent super isto quod determinations, non claudit contradiccionem me sic posse vel me habere, applied to a given subject, et quod plus est (cum probabile creditur quidlibet cau-5 do or do not contradict satum cuilibet posse idemtificari, et sic hominem posse themselves. If not, a man esse deum) probabile videtur quod quidlibet potest facere can be God, quicquid aliud potest facere. Si enim est dare limites and any being can do potencie et denominacionum hominis ultra quos non anything. potest, ut de quantitate, duracione, sciencia, etc., tunc 10 Given determinate claudit contradiccionem excedere tales limites; et multo limits to a man's size, magis claudit contradiccionem nihil esse. Et hic incidunt power, &c., the omnes difficultates de infinito mundo, de vacuo, de passing of those limits implies composicione continui ex indivisibilibus, de identificacione absurdity. Here come the rei cum alia, de multiplicacione rei, et sic de aliis, in 15 questions of an quibus sunt opiniones utrum claudunt contradiccionem infinite world, a vacuum, the vel non; quam materiam potes sparsim colligere in hac Continuous consisting of summa. points &c. Nothing is Quantum ad inpossibile apud naturam, patet quod impossible except what is contradiccionem claudit quicquam esse inpossibile; nisi 20 naturally so; fuerit inpossibile apud naturam, aut econtra; cum deus whatever is possible, is sit natura, et omne universale similiter. Qualitercunque either the First igitur potest esse, potest esse prima veritas vel a prima Truth or those truths that veritate, et per consequens qualitercunque potest esse, proceed therefrom ; potest esse a natura. Si igitur quicquam sit inpossibile 25 and its contrary apud naturam, tunc omni nature repugnat ipsum esse, jars with all nature ; if with et per consequens simpliciter non potest esse. Immo, the nature of one being, then ut plus dicam, repugnat quod alicui nature repugnet with all. Nature forms a qualitercunque esse, nisi cuilibet nature repugnet sic esse. confederacy; Si enim sit confederacio in policia humana, racione 30 what makes against one cuius repugnare uni foret repugnare tribus eorundem, necessary truth multo magis in policia naturali universitatis encium est makes against the existence of federacio magis firma. Nam destruere unum necessarium the whole est destruere totam universitatem encium iuxta declarata. world. Dissolution Nec corupcionem repugnat esse, cum sit naturalis, tam 35 exists, as a natural result of agenti quam passo. Immo, nihil potest esse simpliciter action and of passion; and violentum; igitur est cathenacio aurea, secundum poetice nothing absolutely loquentes, inter encia universi, cui repugnat esse ali- opposed to quod impossibile vel non bonum. nature can exist. 19. MS. Conclusio in marg.
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CAP. III. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 105 CAPITULUM TERCIUM. F. 80b In isto dubio videtur mihi, sicud prius, quod prima veritas (que est deum esse) necessario sit necessitas a qua est omnis alia veritas, et posse esse, vel non posse 5 esse; ita quod quicquid ipse potest vel causatum ab eo, illud est possibile et solum tale; et quicquid ipse non potest nec aliquod causatum ab eo, illud non potest esse vel illud esse est inpossibile. Et sic omnis necessitas, contingencia, vel inpossibilitas est ab illo. Et sic con- 10 cedo quod omne absolute necessarium claudit contra- diccionem non esse, et omne quod est inpossibile claudit contradiccionem esse; et voco contradiccionem in pro- posito [quod] impossibilitatem claudit, ita quod claudere contradiccionem est implicare quantum ad actum signi- 15 ficandi qualiter non potest esse; ut contradiccio est quod ego non fui, quia non potest esse quod ego non fui. Unde non sequitur: hoc est impossibile, contradiccio, vel repugnancia,] igitur hoc est; sed pocius sequitur oppositum. Quia antecedens principaliter ponit quod 20 hoc non potest esse. Et sic isti termini: falsitas, in- possibilitas, falsum, et inpossibile, et alii similes, possunt supponere personaliter negative, ut hominem esse asinum est falsum et inpossibile; hoc est: non est nec potest esse. Et tunc sunt proposiciones negative. Quandoque 25 autem supponunt simpliciter ac si essent termini se- cunde intencionis in proposicionibus affirmativis, ut: “deum non esse est inpossibile", est una impossibilitas; et “Cesarem non fuisse est inpossibile" est alia in- possibilitas. Et ut breviter dicam, omnis veritas de in- 3o possibili est inpossibilitas, et omnis veritas de falso est falsitas. Ut, si verum est te esse, tunc falsum est te non esse, et hoc est falsitas, id est, taliter est falsum. Et isto modo sunt doctores et logici intelligendi, quando dicunt quod, si veritas vel necessitas est, tunc 35 falsitas et inpossibilitas sunt, quia, posito uno oppo- sitorum, relicum est ponendum. Inpossibilitas igitur est privacio necessitatis quam oportet esse, posita necessi- tate; et sic intelligunt quando dicunt quod omnis falsitas, Wyclif's position: That God is is the necessary truth on which all possibility and impossibility depend. What God can do, and what He causes to be is possible, and that alone. The non- existence of what is absolutely necessary, and the existence of the absolutely impossible are self- contradictory terms. This is impossible, therefore, this is, cannot be said ; rather : this is not. Falsity and impossibility are predicated truly in a negative sense; This is false means This cannot be. But we may use them affirmatively, regarding them as acts of the mind: God's non-existence is an impossibility. What we say truly of the impossible is affirmed as an impossibility. Logicians must be understood thus, when they say that truth implies falsity &c., and therefore that falsity proceeds from God. 1. MS. Capitulum etc. deest; large initial I in red ink. 13. MS. quod deest. 28. MS. crefr pro Cesarem. 29—30. MS. Et... impossi- bilitas twice.
CAP. III. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 105 CAPITULUM TERCIUM. F. 80b In isto dubio videtur mihi, sicud prius, quod prima veritas (que est deum esse) necessario sit necessitas a qua est omnis alia veritas, et posse esse, vel non posse 5 esse; ita quod quicquid ipse potest vel causatum ab eo, illud est possibile et solum tale; et quicquid ipse non potest nec aliquod causatum ab eo, illud non potest esse vel illud esse est inpossibile. Et sic omnis necessitas, contingencia, vel inpossibilitas est ab illo. Et sic con- 10 cedo quod omne absolute necessarium claudit contra- diccionem non esse, et omne quod est inpossibile claudit contradiccionem esse; et voco contradiccionem in pro- posito [quod] impossibilitatem claudit, ita quod claudere contradiccionem est implicare quantum ad actum signi- 15 ficandi qualiter non potest esse; ut contradiccio est quod ego non fui, quia non potest esse quod ego non fui. Unde non sequitur: hoc est impossibile, contradiccio, vel repugnancia,] igitur hoc est; sed pocius sequitur oppositum. Quia antecedens principaliter ponit quod 20 hoc non potest esse. Et sic isti termini: falsitas, in- possibilitas, falsum, et inpossibile, et alii similes, possunt supponere personaliter negative, ut hominem esse asinum est falsum et inpossibile; hoc est: non est nec potest esse. Et tunc sunt proposiciones negative. Quandoque 25 autem supponunt simpliciter ac si essent termini se- cunde intencionis in proposicionibus affirmativis, ut: “deum non esse est inpossibile", est una impossibilitas; et “Cesarem non fuisse est inpossibile" est alia in- possibilitas. Et ut breviter dicam, omnis veritas de in- 3o possibili est inpossibilitas, et omnis veritas de falso est falsitas. Ut, si verum est te esse, tunc falsum est te non esse, et hoc est falsitas, id est, taliter est falsum. Et isto modo sunt doctores et logici intelligendi, quando dicunt quod, si veritas vel necessitas est, tunc 35 falsitas et inpossibilitas sunt, quia, posito uno oppo- sitorum, relicum est ponendum. Inpossibilitas igitur est privacio necessitatis quam oportet esse, posita necessi- tate; et sic intelligunt quando dicunt quod omnis falsitas, Wyclif's position: That God is is the necessary truth on which all possibility and impossibility depend. What God can do, and what He causes to be is possible, and that alone. The non- existence of what is absolutely necessary, and the existence of the absolutely impossible are self- contradictory terms. This is impossible, therefore, this is, cannot be said ; rather : this is not. Falsity and impossibility are predicated truly in a negative sense; This is false means This cannot be. But we may use them affirmatively, regarding them as acts of the mind: God's non-existence is an impossibility. What we say truly of the impossible is affirmed as an impossibility. Logicians must be understood thus, when they say that truth implies falsity &c., and therefore that falsity proceeds from God. 1. MS. Capitulum etc. deest; large initial I in red ink. 13. MS. quod deest. 28. MS. crefr pro Cesarem. 29—30. MS. Et... impossi- bilitas twice.
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106 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. III. possibilitas, vel inpossibilitas, est a deo. Quod si non placet sic loqui (cum tunc ad sensus equivocos con- cedendum esset quod veritas est falsitas, imposibilitas necessitas, et sic de aliis que videntur inpossibilia, cum tamen sensus sit necessarius) satis est quod cognoscatur terminos sic signare apud aliquos scribentes, et sic non contempnantur raciones et dicta eorum propter defectum noticie equivocacionis terminorum. Ipsi igitur concedunt quod multa sunt inpossibilia; ut, quod homo est asinus est inpossibile, et quod homo est asinus non est; sed 10 quod homo est asinus est inpossibile de necessitate; igitur ideo illud inpossibile (quod dependet causative a deo) illud necessario est. Unde mirabiliter par[a]logizantur quidam, probantes And it is an quod tale impossibile non ex se formaliter est inpossibile, 15 amazing fallacy to conclude quia non est. Concedens igitur quod veritas est falsitas, thence that non concedit oppositum de opposito, sic quod entitas nothing is impossible in sit non entitas; sed concedit quod veritas est [hoc itself; A falsity is a falsum esse; et sic necessitas conceditur esse inpossibi- truth means simply: It is a litas, hoc est, aliqualiter intelligitur non posse 20 truth that esse. Et patet ex hoc quod falsitas non mutabitur in this is false ; and so also of veritatem; ut iam falsum est quod ego vixi 40 annis; impossibility. Nor does a et illud falsum non erit verum, quia illud falsum iam falsity become non est. Conceditur igitur quod multa possunt esse truth ; but that which is now necessaria que iam non sunt necessaria, et sic de possibili 25 false, becoming true, ceases to et impossibili. be false. Sed contra istam posicionem instatur tripliciter. Primo Three Objections. sic: Unumquodque se habet ad esse sicud ad cognosci, I. To be means to be known. et econtra, ut patet ex 2° metaphisice, et sepius alle- God's existence gatur; sed magis notum est quod nihil simul est et 30 is not the first principle of non est quam quod deus est: igitur est magis et prius knowing; therefore, not ens. Confirmatur per hoc quod illa negacio est primum of being. The principium, virtute cuius tenent omnes demonstraciones axiom of contradiction is affirmative et negative. Si igitur illud haberet causam, the first posset demonstrari. Minor patet ex certissima experiencia, 35 principle of knowing, or it qua scimus neminem dissentire isti principio, nec aliquem would require to be indigere illud adiscere; sed multum necessarium est demonstrated, adiscere questionem, si est de deo. Igitur] non potest as God's existence esse medium concludendi nihil simul esse et non esse. requires it. This form of speech by which they grant (though in diverse senses) that truth is falsity, and that there are many impossibilities which are necessary and depend on God. must be borne in mind in studying these writers. F. 81* 18. MS. hoc deest. 22. If this example be taken as the statement of a fact, De Actibus Anima was written before Logica. See Logica III, 144, 1. 20, 21.
106 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. III. possibilitas, vel inpossibilitas, est a deo. Quod si non placet sic loqui (cum tunc ad sensus equivocos con- cedendum esset quod veritas est falsitas, imposibilitas necessitas, et sic de aliis que videntur inpossibilia, cum tamen sensus sit necessarius) satis est quod cognoscatur terminos sic signare apud aliquos scribentes, et sic non contempnantur raciones et dicta eorum propter defectum noticie equivocacionis terminorum. Ipsi igitur concedunt quod multa sunt inpossibilia; ut, quod homo est asinus est inpossibile, et quod homo est asinus non est; sed 10 quod homo est asinus est inpossibile de necessitate; igitur ideo illud inpossibile (quod dependet causative a deo) illud necessario est. Unde mirabiliter par[a]logizantur quidam, probantes And it is an quod tale impossibile non ex se formaliter est inpossibile, 15 amazing fallacy to conclude quia non est. Concedens igitur quod veritas est falsitas, thence that non concedit oppositum de opposito, sic quod entitas nothing is impossible in sit non entitas; sed concedit quod veritas est [hoc itself; A falsity is a falsum esse; et sic necessitas conceditur esse inpossibi- truth means simply: It is a litas, hoc est, aliqualiter intelligitur non posse 20 truth that esse. Et patet ex hoc quod falsitas non mutabitur in this is false ; and so also of veritatem; ut iam falsum est quod ego vixi 40 annis; impossibility. Nor does a et illud falsum non erit verum, quia illud falsum iam falsity become non est. Conceditur igitur quod multa possunt esse truth ; but that which is now necessaria que iam non sunt necessaria, et sic de possibili 25 false, becoming true, ceases to et impossibili. be false. Sed contra istam posicionem instatur tripliciter. Primo Three Objections. sic: Unumquodque se habet ad esse sicud ad cognosci, I. To be means to be known. et econtra, ut patet ex 2° metaphisice, et sepius alle- God's existence gatur; sed magis notum est quod nihil simul est et 30 is not the first principle of non est quam quod deus est: igitur est magis et prius knowing; therefore, not ens. Confirmatur per hoc quod illa negacio est primum of being. The principium, virtute cuius tenent omnes demonstraciones axiom of contradiction is affirmative et negative. Si igitur illud haberet causam, the first posset demonstrari. Minor patet ex certissima experiencia, 35 principle of knowing, or it qua scimus neminem dissentire isti principio, nec aliquem would require to be indigere illud adiscere; sed multum necessarium est demonstrated, adiscere questionem, si est de deo. Igitur] non potest as God's existence esse medium concludendi nihil simul esse et non esse. requires it. This form of speech by which they grant (though in diverse senses) that truth is falsity, and that there are many impossibilities which are necessary and depend on God. must be borne in mind in studying these writers. F. 81* 18. MS. hoc deest. 22. If this example be taken as the statement of a fact, De Actibus Anima was written before Logica. See Logica III, 144, 1. 20, 21.
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CAP. III. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 107 Item, si deus alia potest et alia non potest, tunc II. If there is anything that potencia sua est limitata, et non omnimode infinita, ut God cannot do, His power is dicunt theologi. Consequencia patet ex hoc quod essencia limited sua est actus qui est primus terminus sue potencie, by those things which are 5 iuxta dicta; et impossibilia terminant potenciam suam impossible to Him. ex alio latere, cum usque ad illa exclusive potest, et But if God can non ultra. Et quod consequens sit inpossibile, patet ex make all that hoc quod in omnia que possunt esse, potest; igitur in can possibly be, then nothing is omnia potest. Sic enim supponit terminus respectu illius impossible to Him. ro verbi “potest". Et confirmacio illius est quod non est And if there cognoscibile a posteriori que potest vel non potest; nec were anything, we could a priori, cum nihil sit prius impossibili necessario nisi neither know it deus; et per ipsum, cum non posset esse medium con- a priori nor a posteriori. cludendi, nihil demonstracione cognoscitur. 1. c. not at all. III. In so far as 15 ltem, quam manifestum vel primum est aliquod ne- anything is necessary, in so cessarium, tam inpossibile est eius oppositum; sed per far its opposite opinionem summe necessarium et manifestum est deum is unthinkable. If the existence vel aliquid esse; igitur summe manifeste inpossibile est of anything nihil esse. Assertum patet ex hoc quod habitus est were the most evident of 20 mensura privacionis, et opposita sunt alterutrum media truths, if would be impossible cognoscendi; unde formatur apud morales hoc prin- to think of absolute non- cipium, quod, quam bonum est aliquod, tam mala esset existence; eius privacio. Et potest utrumque deduci; nam quante necessarium est aliquid esse, tante impossibile est illud 25 non esse, eo quod idem est necessario hoc esse et im- possibile esse quod hoc non sit. Et quod consequens sit falsum patet ex hoc quod nemo scit formaliter deducere inconsequens vel contradiccionem ex hoc posito et admisso, Nihil est; immo, intellectus assentit illi, dissen- 3o ciendo contradiccioni. Et sic de veritatibus de preterito, quas inpossibile esset probare nisi per testes, ut legiste probant. Ad ista tria essent multa dicenda; sed transcurrendo pro presenti. 35 Dicitur ad primum quod primum est falsum, cum supreme nature sit maxime notum ipsam esse; et illa noticia est maxima et prima noticia. Et quantum ad noticiam nostram, dicetur octavo libro, ut superius pro- mittebatur, quod deum esse est primum notum a quo- 40 cunque cognoscente, non tamen est explicite cognoscibile, nisi a re racionali. Unde illa auctoritas secundi meta- phisice: “Sicud oculus vespertilionis ad radios solis, sic intellectus noster ad illa que sunt manifestissima in natura," non tollit quin certissimam cognicionem habe- Which is not true; it can be admitted as a truth and consistently defended. Nor can there be any proof of past truths, save the indirect one of testimony. I will refute these objections briefly, (I) The existence of a Supreme Nature is the most known of all truths, and the first known to all beings, but explicitly only to rational beings. The eyes of a bat cannot look at the sun, yet our knowledge of God, though
CAP. III. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 107 Item, si deus alia potest et alia non potest, tunc II. If there is anything that potencia sua est limitata, et non omnimode infinita, ut God cannot do, His power is dicunt theologi. Consequencia patet ex hoc quod essencia limited sua est actus qui est primus terminus sue potencie, by those things which are 5 iuxta dicta; et impossibilia terminant potenciam suam impossible to Him. ex alio latere, cum usque ad illa exclusive potest, et But if God can non ultra. Et quod consequens sit inpossibile, patet ex make all that hoc quod in omnia que possunt esse, potest; igitur in can possibly be, then nothing is omnia potest. Sic enim supponit terminus respectu illius impossible to Him. ro verbi “potest". Et confirmacio illius est quod non est And if there cognoscibile a posteriori que potest vel non potest; nec were anything, we could a priori, cum nihil sit prius impossibili necessario nisi neither know it deus; et per ipsum, cum non posset esse medium con- a priori nor a posteriori. cludendi, nihil demonstracione cognoscitur. 1. c. not at all. III. In so far as 15 ltem, quam manifestum vel primum est aliquod ne- anything is necessary, in so cessarium, tam inpossibile est eius oppositum; sed per far its opposite opinionem summe necessarium et manifestum est deum is unthinkable. If the existence vel aliquid esse; igitur summe manifeste inpossibile est of anything nihil esse. Assertum patet ex hoc quod habitus est were the most evident of 20 mensura privacionis, et opposita sunt alterutrum media truths, if would be impossible cognoscendi; unde formatur apud morales hoc prin- to think of absolute non- cipium, quod, quam bonum est aliquod, tam mala esset existence; eius privacio. Et potest utrumque deduci; nam quante necessarium est aliquid esse, tante impossibile est illud 25 non esse, eo quod idem est necessario hoc esse et im- possibile esse quod hoc non sit. Et quod consequens sit falsum patet ex hoc quod nemo scit formaliter deducere inconsequens vel contradiccionem ex hoc posito et admisso, Nihil est; immo, intellectus assentit illi, dissen- 3o ciendo contradiccioni. Et sic de veritatibus de preterito, quas inpossibile esset probare nisi per testes, ut legiste probant. Ad ista tria essent multa dicenda; sed transcurrendo pro presenti. 35 Dicitur ad primum quod primum est falsum, cum supreme nature sit maxime notum ipsam esse; et illa noticia est maxima et prima noticia. Et quantum ad noticiam nostram, dicetur octavo libro, ut superius pro- mittebatur, quod deum esse est primum notum a quo- 40 cunque cognoscente, non tamen est explicite cognoscibile, nisi a re racionali. Unde illa auctoritas secundi meta- phisice: “Sicud oculus vespertilionis ad radios solis, sic intellectus noster ad illa que sunt manifestissima in natura," non tollit quin certissimam cognicionem habe- Which is not true; it can be admitted as a truth and consistently defended. Nor can there be any proof of past truths, save the indirect one of testimony. I will refute these objections briefly, (I) The existence of a Supreme Nature is the most known of all truths, and the first known to all beings, but explicitly only to rational beings. The eyes of a bat cannot look at the sun, yet our knowledge of God, though
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108 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. III. certain, is amus de deo, sed confusam et abstractivam; et infinitas confused and proprietates eius ignoramus; immo sensualitas nihil abtract. Senses indeed distincte cognoscit de illo. Verumtamen, sicud omne can have no videns videt in virtute solis, et, secundum lyncolniensem, distinct perception of videt confuse solem, sic omne cognoscens cognoscit in Him. We see by virtute et in lumine prime cause, et confuse primam means of the causam. Nec hoc obiective, quia confusius cognoscitur sun, and thus in a way see lumen irradians super colorem quam color, quamvis the sun; so it is of our color virtute luminis cognoscatur. Sic igitur innata est knowledge of the First Cause nobis via, dum fantasmata dominantur, distinctius co-10 We see colour by light, but the gnoscere inferiora quam superiora, sicud bruta faciunt; latter less et tamen prius naturaliter, tam quoad consequenciam explicitly. quam causative cognoscimus priora; immo, primo Thus our nature, when omnium primam causam. Nos enim sumus in potencia imagination predominates, deponendi sensuale dominium fantasmatis super mentem, 15 knows inferior things more et sic] cognoscendi et quietandi in ipso principaliter. Et F. 81" clearly than ad [hoc] faciendum, est cognicio negacionum nobis things superior, yet the latter are ordinata, pro isto statu esse nobis certissima; sicud first known. But we have cognicio umbre et dimissi luminis est maxime propor- power to shake cionata debili visui convalescenti, qualis est intellectus 20 off the yoke of imagination, by noster pro statu opinandi. the knowledge Et sic, quantum ad primitatem principii, potest dici of negations, which gives us quod illud principium recitatum ab Aristotele, 4to metha- the greatest certitude. phisice, 9no est idem in re cum hoc: aliquid est. Idem Aristotle's enim videtur "idem simul inesse et non inesse eidem 25 principle of contradiction is secundum idem est impossibile" et necessarium est in reality the same as this: aliquid esse vel non esse"; et idem est necessario ali- Something quid esse vel non esse, et necessario aliquid esse; quia exists. For the veritas disiunctive, cuius altera pars est inpossibilis, et disjunctive: Necessarily reliqua necessaria, non superaddit veritatem partis ne-30 something cessarie, et idem est “necessario aliquid esse" et “ali- either does or does or does quid esse". Et ideo a primo veritas primi principii est not exist (which is affirmacio; et per consequens primum principium affir- admittedly equivalent to mativum signans primarie convertibiliter cum isto, ali- the other quid. Verumtamen illa veritas potest diversimode ostendi 35 axioms) implies that in either et signari secundum quarum unam ostensionem cogno- case something scetur esse necessarium et secundum aliam ignorabitur, is necessary. It is only the vel credetur posse non esse; ut idem est: necessario deum form that varies in these esse, et: esse impossibile deum non esse; sicud patet per different equipollenciam, et per deduccionem superius tactam, 40 axioms, more or less qua probatur esse summe inpossibile, et per consequens applicable to different cases. 14. MS. omnem. 15. MS. diuu. 17. MS. hoc deest.
108 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. III. certain, is amus de deo, sed confusam et abstractivam; et infinitas confused and proprietates eius ignoramus; immo sensualitas nihil abtract. Senses indeed distincte cognoscit de illo. Verumtamen, sicud omne can have no videns videt in virtute solis, et, secundum lyncolniensem, distinct perception of videt confuse solem, sic omne cognoscens cognoscit in Him. We see by virtute et in lumine prime cause, et confuse primam means of the causam. Nec hoc obiective, quia confusius cognoscitur sun, and thus in a way see lumen irradians super colorem quam color, quamvis the sun; so it is of our color virtute luminis cognoscatur. Sic igitur innata est knowledge of the First Cause nobis via, dum fantasmata dominantur, distinctius co-10 We see colour by light, but the gnoscere inferiora quam superiora, sicud bruta faciunt; latter less et tamen prius naturaliter, tam quoad consequenciam explicitly. quam causative cognoscimus priora; immo, primo Thus our nature, when omnium primam causam. Nos enim sumus in potencia imagination predominates, deponendi sensuale dominium fantasmatis super mentem, 15 knows inferior things more et sic] cognoscendi et quietandi in ipso principaliter. Et F. 81" clearly than ad [hoc] faciendum, est cognicio negacionum nobis things superior, yet the latter are ordinata, pro isto statu esse nobis certissima; sicud first known. But we have cognicio umbre et dimissi luminis est maxime propor- power to shake cionata debili visui convalescenti, qualis est intellectus 20 off the yoke of imagination, by noster pro statu opinandi. the knowledge Et sic, quantum ad primitatem principii, potest dici of negations, which gives us quod illud principium recitatum ab Aristotele, 4to metha- the greatest certitude. phisice, 9no est idem in re cum hoc: aliquid est. Idem Aristotle's enim videtur "idem simul inesse et non inesse eidem 25 principle of contradiction is secundum idem est impossibile" et necessarium est in reality the same as this: aliquid esse vel non esse"; et idem est necessario ali- Something quid esse vel non esse, et necessario aliquid esse; quia exists. For the veritas disiunctive, cuius altera pars est inpossibilis, et disjunctive: Necessarily reliqua necessaria, non superaddit veritatem partis ne-30 something cessarie, et idem est “necessario aliquid esse" et “ali- either does or does or does quid esse". Et ideo a primo veritas primi principii est not exist (which is affirmacio; et per consequens primum principium affir- admittedly equivalent to mativum signans primarie convertibiliter cum isto, ali- the other quid. Verumtamen illa veritas potest diversimode ostendi 35 axioms) implies that in either et signari secundum quarum unam ostensionem cogno- case something scetur esse necessarium et secundum aliam ignorabitur, is necessary. It is only the vel credetur posse non esse; ut idem est: necessario deum form that varies in these esse, et: esse impossibile deum non esse; sicud patet per different equipollenciam, et per deduccionem superius tactam, 40 axioms, more or less qua probatur esse summe inpossibile, et per consequens applicable to different cases. 14. MS. omnem. 15. MS. diuu. 17. MS. hoc deest.
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CAP. III. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 109 summe false, deum non esse. Et cum, quanto aliquod est magis falsum, est magis verum ipsum esse falsum, patet quod summe verum est, esse falsum quod deus non sit: quod totum sonat, iuxta raciones pueriles, esse 5 necessarium deum esse. Et sine dubio idem est aliquid esse et deum esse. Ideo a primo significatum primi principii est deum esse; sed tamen, cum primum principium non adequate, quamvis principaliter, signet deum esse, queratur de 10 veritate adequate signata, et supponitur quod sit com- munis ad omne esse creatum, cum deus non univoce est cum rebus causatis. Et tunc est difficultas, si illud potest demonstrari, sic arguendo: quandocunque causa completa et sufficiens ponitur respectu sui causabilis cau- 15 sandi, tunc illud causabile ponitur; sed deus est causa completissima respectu veritatis causabilis in communi; igitur ipse est. Hec enim racio videtur fieri ex prioribus nocioribus, et causis conclusionis; non oportet con- clusionem prius ignorari propter difficultatem demon- 20 stracionis, quam ponit Aristoteles, primo posteriorum, quia intellective demonstrat conclusionem quam eterna- liter sciverunt. Nec esset possibile esse demonstracionem per tempus. Sufficit igitur quod faciat scire, conser- vando scienciam; quod si conceditur, patet quod con- 25 clusio est magis sciencia quam antecedens vel medium, et prius antecedente, cum antecedens sit causatum con- and would tentum sub conclusione communiori. Ideo forte, cum perhaps not be ens sit primum causatum, non silogistice demonstrabile, strictly syllogistic, since sed sequens consequencia naturali tanquam posterius a nothing is 3o priori; quia non est possibile demonstrare, nisi ex philo-anterior to that which exists. sophantibus, ut sonant sex passiones demonstracionis posite ab Aristotele, primo posteriorum. Sed de hoc octavo libro. Ad secundum, dicitur quod potencia dei videtur mihi 35 esse summe et maxime et per se finita et limitata, F. 82“ quia alie potencie finiuntur per illam, et illa per se finit se, sicud patet per theologos concedentes ternarii However, though the first principle of contradiction signifies this truth in itself, it does not suffice by itself to show it. A difficulty ; can the existence of created truth be proved by God's existence, thus positing another truth anterior thereto ? II. God's power is indeed limited, but llmited by Himself alone, whereas all others are limited by His power. And hence God's existence is the most certain of all things, amounting to the affirmation that something exists. At any rate, such a demonstration would not belong to time but to eternity, 21. MS. untllue. 30, 31. MS. phib3. 13. The difficulty lies in this: that the proposition by which God is proved to cause all truth must be itself a truth caused by and dependent on God. I believe that some words are want- ing in the next sentence to complete the sense.
CAP. III. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 109 summe false, deum non esse. Et cum, quanto aliquod est magis falsum, est magis verum ipsum esse falsum, patet quod summe verum est, esse falsum quod deus non sit: quod totum sonat, iuxta raciones pueriles, esse 5 necessarium deum esse. Et sine dubio idem est aliquid esse et deum esse. Ideo a primo significatum primi principii est deum esse; sed tamen, cum primum principium non adequate, quamvis principaliter, signet deum esse, queratur de 10 veritate adequate signata, et supponitur quod sit com- munis ad omne esse creatum, cum deus non univoce est cum rebus causatis. Et tunc est difficultas, si illud potest demonstrari, sic arguendo: quandocunque causa completa et sufficiens ponitur respectu sui causabilis cau- 15 sandi, tunc illud causabile ponitur; sed deus est causa completissima respectu veritatis causabilis in communi; igitur ipse est. Hec enim racio videtur fieri ex prioribus nocioribus, et causis conclusionis; non oportet con- clusionem prius ignorari propter difficultatem demon- 20 stracionis, quam ponit Aristoteles, primo posteriorum, quia intellective demonstrat conclusionem quam eterna- liter sciverunt. Nec esset possibile esse demonstracionem per tempus. Sufficit igitur quod faciat scire, conser- vando scienciam; quod si conceditur, patet quod con- 25 clusio est magis sciencia quam antecedens vel medium, et prius antecedente, cum antecedens sit causatum con- and would tentum sub conclusione communiori. Ideo forte, cum perhaps not be ens sit primum causatum, non silogistice demonstrabile, strictly syllogistic, since sed sequens consequencia naturali tanquam posterius a nothing is 3o priori; quia non est possibile demonstrare, nisi ex philo-anterior to that which exists. sophantibus, ut sonant sex passiones demonstracionis posite ab Aristotele, primo posteriorum. Sed de hoc octavo libro. Ad secundum, dicitur quod potencia dei videtur mihi 35 esse summe et maxime et per se finita et limitata, F. 82“ quia alie potencie finiuntur per illam, et illa per se finit se, sicud patet per theologos concedentes ternarii However, though the first principle of contradiction signifies this truth in itself, it does not suffice by itself to show it. A difficulty ; can the existence of created truth be proved by God's existence, thus positing another truth anterior thereto ? II. God's power is indeed limited, but llmited by Himself alone, whereas all others are limited by His power. And hence God's existence is the most certain of all things, amounting to the affirmation that something exists. At any rate, such a demonstration would not belong to time but to eternity, 21. MS. untllue. 30, 31. MS. phib3. 13. The difficulty lies in this: that the proposition by which God is proved to cause all truth must be itself a truth caused by and dependent on God. I believe that some words are want- ing in the next sentence to complete the sense.
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110 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. III. suppositum esse finem binarii prioris suppositorum; immo finit se quantum ad posse, respectu intelligencia extrin- secorum in que potest et in que non potest. Ideo, sicud est per se, sic finit se per se. Sed inercia vel confinium distinguendi inter illa que potest et illa que non potest 5 videtur pro statu opinandi esse scolasticus locus exer- citandi in veritate vel demum infinite, quamvis sibi sit Some are manifestissimum quante potest. Aliqui enim ponunt quod unwilling to potest in contradiccionem, ne cogantur ponere ipsum admít any limitation of esse potencie limitate, et ex hoc quod plus potest quam 1o God's power; some contend quis potest intelligere vel sustinere. Cum igitur homo that He can do potest intelligere et sustinere ipsum posse in quidlibet more than we can conceive; citra contradiccionem, sequitur quod ipse potest in and as we conceive contradiccionem. Et illud forte movebat antiquos anything short of impossibility, (4t° metaphisice) concedentes de possibili idem simul 15 His power esse et non esse. Et tercio moventur ex hoc: deus potest extends farther. Others say that facere idem multiplicari simul in diversis sitibus sub con- if God can make trariis denominacionibus; et sic de aliis que nos pone- the same thing exist in remus inpossibilia. Igitur (per idem) potest facere idem different places with contrary simul in diversis instantibus habere contrarias denomi- 20 attributes He can also make naciones, et per consequens contradictorias. contrary Sed iste evidencie non movent me ad hoc credendum. attributes coexist in the Prima enim est soluta. Quantum ad secundum, patet same thing. But if we can quod falsum assumitur. Nos enim possumus intelligere as a fact ipsum et omnia possibilia; immo, ut sophiste credunt, 25 conceive a proposition nos possumus intelligere infinitum plus esse quam ipse concerning potest, sicud patet capiendo proposicionem talem “In- what God certainly cannot finitum plus quam deus potest est causatum a deo do, then there is no limit to our malo." Immo, cum nos intelligimus contradiccionem conceptions. quam nos ponimus ipsum posse, et ultra contradiccionem 30 We can conceive what non potest, sequitur quod nos intelligimus maximum a contradiction is ; if we magisterium in quod potest; et si nesciamus hoc susti- cannot, what do nere, nec possimus illi assentire, ad quid ponimus illud we mean by saying that esse necessarium? Scimus enim quod ex necessario non God's power extends to it? sequitur quicquam falsi, nec credimus aliquid sine evi-35 We have no dencia non habente evidenciam eque fortem sibi con- proof whatever to make us trariam. Sed non est ymaginabilis evidencia ad creden- believe that the dum idem simul esse et non esse; tum quia quacunque same thing is and is not. signata deduci potest, quod non est evidencia (cum non potest ducere in credulitatem); tum quia, si esset evi- 40 But the whole question seems to me a tangle of scholastic subtleties. 4. Sed inercia — Aliqui. This sentence appears to be mutilated.
110 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. III. suppositum esse finem binarii prioris suppositorum; immo finit se quantum ad posse, respectu intelligencia extrin- secorum in que potest et in que non potest. Ideo, sicud est per se, sic finit se per se. Sed inercia vel confinium distinguendi inter illa que potest et illa que non potest 5 videtur pro statu opinandi esse scolasticus locus exer- citandi in veritate vel demum infinite, quamvis sibi sit Some are manifestissimum quante potest. Aliqui enim ponunt quod unwilling to potest in contradiccionem, ne cogantur ponere ipsum admít any limitation of esse potencie limitate, et ex hoc quod plus potest quam 1o God's power; some contend quis potest intelligere vel sustinere. Cum igitur homo that He can do potest intelligere et sustinere ipsum posse in quidlibet more than we can conceive; citra contradiccionem, sequitur quod ipse potest in and as we conceive contradiccionem. Et illud forte movebat antiquos anything short of impossibility, (4t° metaphisice) concedentes de possibili idem simul 15 His power esse et non esse. Et tercio moventur ex hoc: deus potest extends farther. Others say that facere idem multiplicari simul in diversis sitibus sub con- if God can make trariis denominacionibus; et sic de aliis que nos pone- the same thing exist in remus inpossibilia. Igitur (per idem) potest facere idem different places with contrary simul in diversis instantibus habere contrarias denomi- 20 attributes He can also make naciones, et per consequens contradictorias. contrary Sed iste evidencie non movent me ad hoc credendum. attributes coexist in the Prima enim est soluta. Quantum ad secundum, patet same thing. But if we can quod falsum assumitur. Nos enim possumus intelligere as a fact ipsum et omnia possibilia; immo, ut sophiste credunt, 25 conceive a proposition nos possumus intelligere infinitum plus esse quam ipse concerning potest, sicud patet capiendo proposicionem talem “In- what God certainly cannot finitum plus quam deus potest est causatum a deo do, then there is no limit to our malo." Immo, cum nos intelligimus contradiccionem conceptions. quam nos ponimus ipsum posse, et ultra contradiccionem 30 We can conceive what non potest, sequitur quod nos intelligimus maximum a contradiction is ; if we magisterium in quod potest; et si nesciamus hoc susti- cannot, what do nere, nec possimus illi assentire, ad quid ponimus illud we mean by saying that esse necessarium? Scimus enim quod ex necessario non God's power extends to it? sequitur quicquam falsi, nec credimus aliquid sine evi-35 We have no dencia non habente evidenciam eque fortem sibi con- proof whatever to make us trariam. Sed non est ymaginabilis evidencia ad creden- believe that the dum idem simul esse et non esse; tum quia quacunque same thing is and is not. signata deduci potest, quod non est evidencia (cum non potest ducere in credulitatem); tum quia, si esset evi- 40 But the whole question seems to me a tangle of scholastic subtleties. 4. Sed inercia — Aliqui. This sentence appears to be mutilated.
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CAP. III. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 11I F. 82" dencia ad copulativam, tunc esset evidencia ad primam partem sicud et ad secundam. Et per consequens, cum omnis evidencia movens ad unum contradictorium cre- dendum, movet ad dissenciendum opposito scito esse 5 tali, sequitur quod tota evidencia movet ad discredendum copulative. Et [si] credatur dicta copulativa sine eviden- cia movente, tunc est per se evidens cuius oppositum tota natura humana experitur, cum unanimiter profitetur primum principium esse per se evidens. Ideo certissimum 10 est quod quantecunque potencie deus est, vel omne quod ipse potest facere, sicud omne verum, potest sine inconveniencia sustineri. Hoc tamen est certum quod omnia i potest, quia And God is Almighty, omnia que possunt esse, potest; et hoc est sibi proprium, because He and He alone can do 15 cum contradiccionem claudat quicquam aliud posse all, i. e. all that omnia possibilia; quia creacionem et causacionem uni- can be done. versitatis encium causatorum non potest alii communi- care. Nec sequitur quod ego sim maioris vel tante potencie intellective quam ipse sit potencie active, 20 quamvis possim maiora vel omnia intelligere que ipse potest causare. Si enim potencia intellectiva caperet That I can magnitudinem ab intellecto proporcionaliter ut illud conceive all that God can do esset magnum, cum propriissimum obiectum intellectus does not render me His equal sit deus, sequeretur quod quelibet potencia intellectiva in intelligence; it is not the 25 equeparatur deo et potencia sua causativa sit minor object, but the perfection of seipso; quia non potest in se nec in aliquod tantum. the act, which Potencia igitur intellectiva est eo maior quo potest in counts here. perfecciorem actum intelligendi. Ad tercium patet quod assertum est falsum. Nam et-III. The analogy does not hold. 3o si concedatur deum posse facere idem esse album et If God could make the same nigrum (et sic de ceteris denominacionibus que essent thing to be at contrarie respectu eiusdem pro eodem loco et tempore) once in two places, still the non tamen sunt contrarie pro diversis sitibus, ut potest places are different. dici. Nec credo quod potest facere duo instancia singu- But two instants 35 laria simul esse, quia hoc est imposibile. Immo si, per of time cannot exist at once; impossibile, a et b essent duo instancia, et c esset in a and if they could, this et non in b; adhuc non simul esset et non esset; quia would prove non sequitur: c non est in b; igitur non est. Nemo enim nothing. No one can negat pro omni mensura temporanea, instantanea, evo, assent to a known 40 vel eternitate. Nec credo aliquos philosophos vel aliquem contradiction; posse esse quod possit assentire contradiccioni scite assent woutd affirm esse tali. it to be no contradiction. We therefore, if we believe that, believe without proot what has all human nature against it. Whatever be the effects of God's power, they must be maintainable without absurdity. 6. MS. si deest.
CAP. III. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 11I F. 82" dencia ad copulativam, tunc esset evidencia ad primam partem sicud et ad secundam. Et per consequens, cum omnis evidencia movens ad unum contradictorium cre- dendum, movet ad dissenciendum opposito scito esse 5 tali, sequitur quod tota evidencia movet ad discredendum copulative. Et [si] credatur dicta copulativa sine eviden- cia movente, tunc est per se evidens cuius oppositum tota natura humana experitur, cum unanimiter profitetur primum principium esse per se evidens. Ideo certissimum 10 est quod quantecunque potencie deus est, vel omne quod ipse potest facere, sicud omne verum, potest sine inconveniencia sustineri. Hoc tamen est certum quod omnia i potest, quia And God is Almighty, omnia que possunt esse, potest; et hoc est sibi proprium, because He and He alone can do 15 cum contradiccionem claudat quicquam aliud posse all, i. e. all that omnia possibilia; quia creacionem et causacionem uni- can be done. versitatis encium causatorum non potest alii communi- care. Nec sequitur quod ego sim maioris vel tante potencie intellective quam ipse sit potencie active, 20 quamvis possim maiora vel omnia intelligere que ipse potest causare. Si enim potencia intellectiva caperet That I can magnitudinem ab intellecto proporcionaliter ut illud conceive all that God can do esset magnum, cum propriissimum obiectum intellectus does not render me His equal sit deus, sequeretur quod quelibet potencia intellectiva in intelligence; it is not the 25 equeparatur deo et potencia sua causativa sit minor object, but the perfection of seipso; quia non potest in se nec in aliquod tantum. the act, which Potencia igitur intellectiva est eo maior quo potest in counts here. perfecciorem actum intelligendi. Ad tercium patet quod assertum est falsum. Nam et-III. The analogy does not hold. 3o si concedatur deum posse facere idem esse album et If God could make the same nigrum (et sic de ceteris denominacionibus que essent thing to be at contrarie respectu eiusdem pro eodem loco et tempore) once in two places, still the non tamen sunt contrarie pro diversis sitibus, ut potest places are different. dici. Nec credo quod potest facere duo instancia singu- But two instants 35 laria simul esse, quia hoc est imposibile. Immo si, per of time cannot exist at once; impossibile, a et b essent duo instancia, et c esset in a and if they could, this et non in b; adhuc non simul esset et non esset; quia would prove non sequitur: c non est in b; igitur non est. Nemo enim nothing. No one can negat pro omni mensura temporanea, instantanea, evo, assent to a known 40 vel eternitate. Nec credo aliquos philosophos vel aliquem contradiction; posse esse quod possit assentire contradiccioni scite assent woutd affirm esse tali. it to be no contradiction. We therefore, if we believe that, believe without proot what has all human nature against it. Whatever be the effects of God's power, they must be maintainable without absurdity. 6. MS. si deest.
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112 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. III. Idem patet, quia concedentes idem simul esse et non esse negaverunt hoc esse contradiccionem, quia dixerunt quod fuit possibile et verum. Nec potuerunt habere evidencias ad sic credendum, nisi forte equivocaverint; sicud non est dubium quin fecerunt. Et forte in hoc stetit illorum equivocacio, secundum famosam distinc- cionem adhuc tentam: triplex est esse, scilicet esse actuale, esse potenciale, et esse intellectuale. Unde dixerunt, cum unus intelligit veritatem existentem, et alius intelligit suum contradictorium, et omne intellectum quodam- 10 modo habet esse (quia ad minimum esse intellectuale), sequitur quod duo contradictoria simul sunt. Et in ista equivocacione sunt multi moderni. Ideo Aristoteles dicit quod medium elenchicum arguendi contra eos est querere ab illis quid terminus signet, ne equivocent in signa- To refute them cionibus terminorum. Nam multis modis potest poni we must ask what they mean ens esse: vel complete, secundum esse totale; vel se- by Being; cundum partem, ut talia que possunt esse ex materia whether something que iam est; vel non simpliciter esse, sed esse intellecta, completely real, or ideal that qualia aliqui ponunt habere esse obiectivum. may exist in an Supponitur igitur quod loquamur ut oportet de esse existing subject, or purely ideal, simpliciter actuali; et suppositis aliis significacionibus With these distinctions, it communibus, patet quod nullus concedit eandem rem is impossible to grant that the in mundo simul esse [et non esse]. Si igitur hoc potest same completely esse; per idem omne ens potest simul esse et non esse, 25 real thing is and at the same quia tantum inconsequens sequitur de una sicud de time is not. And if this is quocunque, vel omnibus simul. Vel ponitur quod illud the meaning of ens quod simul est et non est sit signatum huius pro- the general proposition: posicionis: omne ens simul est et non est; ex quo posito Any being is and is not at non sequitur nisi contradiccio, que in principio fuit 30 the same time, concessa. Hoc igitur posito, patet quod habet concedere F. 83s it merely follows that the totum dictum suum esse falsum, ut Aristoteles arguit, proposition is et quod nemo debet credere sibi, quia ponit sicud incredible. Any nemo potest credere. Et ut breviter dicam, nihil est contradictory might follow cogitabile proponi, quia illud habet concedere tanquam 35 from its sequens; quia sibi est quelibet proposicio vel significacio admission; either that God exists, or that anything is God. All arguments to the contrary are mere equivocations. There are three orders of being : actual, possible, and fictive. As we can know the actual, and also its negation, they say that both are beings, and therefore two contradictories coëxist. 15 20 23. MS. nullis. 24. MS. et non esse deest. 5. Actuale, what exists independently of our mind and out of our mind; potenciale, what exists only in our mind, but independent thereof; intellectuale, what exists in our mind, and of which the intelligibility depends upon our mind. 17. Sed esse. Two or three words are wanting here, but the sense of the phrase is obvious. I should supply ... secundum quid ut talia...
112 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. III. Idem patet, quia concedentes idem simul esse et non esse negaverunt hoc esse contradiccionem, quia dixerunt quod fuit possibile et verum. Nec potuerunt habere evidencias ad sic credendum, nisi forte equivocaverint; sicud non est dubium quin fecerunt. Et forte in hoc stetit illorum equivocacio, secundum famosam distinc- cionem adhuc tentam: triplex est esse, scilicet esse actuale, esse potenciale, et esse intellectuale. Unde dixerunt, cum unus intelligit veritatem existentem, et alius intelligit suum contradictorium, et omne intellectum quodam- 10 modo habet esse (quia ad minimum esse intellectuale), sequitur quod duo contradictoria simul sunt. Et in ista equivocacione sunt multi moderni. Ideo Aristoteles dicit quod medium elenchicum arguendi contra eos est querere ab illis quid terminus signet, ne equivocent in signa- To refute them cionibus terminorum. Nam multis modis potest poni we must ask what they mean ens esse: vel complete, secundum esse totale; vel se- by Being; cundum partem, ut talia que possunt esse ex materia whether something que iam est; vel non simpliciter esse, sed esse intellecta, completely real, or ideal that qualia aliqui ponunt habere esse obiectivum. may exist in an Supponitur igitur quod loquamur ut oportet de esse existing subject, or purely ideal, simpliciter actuali; et suppositis aliis significacionibus With these distinctions, it communibus, patet quod nullus concedit eandem rem is impossible to grant that the in mundo simul esse [et non esse]. Si igitur hoc potest same completely esse; per idem omne ens potest simul esse et non esse, 25 real thing is and at the same quia tantum inconsequens sequitur de una sicud de time is not. And if this is quocunque, vel omnibus simul. Vel ponitur quod illud the meaning of ens quod simul est et non est sit signatum huius pro- the general proposition: posicionis: omne ens simul est et non est; ex quo posito Any being is and is not at non sequitur nisi contradiccio, que in principio fuit 30 the same time, concessa. Hoc igitur posito, patet quod habet concedere F. 83s it merely follows that the totum dictum suum esse falsum, ut Aristoteles arguit, proposition is et quod nemo debet credere sibi, quia ponit sicud incredible. Any nemo potest credere. Et ut breviter dicam, nihil est contradictory might follow cogitabile proponi, quia illud habet concedere tanquam 35 from its sequens; quia sibi est quelibet proposicio vel significacio admission; either that God exists, or that anything is God. All arguments to the contrary are mere equivocations. There are three orders of being : actual, possible, and fictive. As we can know the actual, and also its negation, they say that both are beings, and therefore two contradictories coëxist. 15 20 23. MS. nullis. 24. MS. et non esse deest. 5. Actuale, what exists independently of our mind and out of our mind; potenciale, what exists only in our mind, but independent thereof; intellectuale, what exists in our mind, and of which the intelligibility depends upon our mind. 17. Sed esse. Two or three words are wanting here, but the sense of the phrase is obvious. I should supply ... secundum quid ut talia...
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CAP. III. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 113 indifferens: ut idem est sibi proponere quod deus est, The sense of any term might et proponere quod nihil potest esse; vel quidlibet est be interchanged with that of any deus. Cum enim omne ens ymaginabile est idemtificatum other ; we must deny what we alteri, omne signatum signat convertibiliter cum alio; grant, and grant 5 et si negaverit antecedens, vel quidlibet aliud proponen- that we deny it ; there is no way dum, habet concedere suum oppositum esse; et cum of refuting, but by showing quidlibet simul est et non est, habet concedere illud inconsistency, non esse et oppositum negatum esse: immo habet con- but here inconsistency cedere et non habet concedere; et cum non possit is at its maximum at 1o reprobari ista opinio, nisi per deducens ad inconsequens, the very outset. patet quod si homo studuerit mille annis, non potest efficacius arguere contra illam quam ponendo talem casum, nec deducere ad maius inconsequens quam con- cedit in principio. Ideo est dubium apud logicos utrum debeat arguere Such persons ought not to be contra talem; et pro certo videtur mihi quod non, quia, argued with, for they cannot be sive bene respondeat sive male, non esset possibile made to deducere eum ad maius inconsequens quam quod contradict themselves male respondit; quod idem concessit et negavit; vel more than they do. 20 quod sic non est ut dicit. Et ipse, consequenter respon- dendo, potest libere eligere, concedere vel negare quod- libet propositum. Debet enim concedere quod hoc ne- gavit, immo quod quidlibet non est, et debet addere suum contradictorium, quod hoc nunquam negavit; quia 25 necesse est eum bene respondisse. Ideo videtur quod stultius est alloqui talem, quam bestiam, puerum, vel dementem. Redeundo igitur ad confirmacionem secundi argu- A return to the second menti, conceditur [quod] de multis sumus dubii [an] objection. There are many things 3o deus illa potest vel non; ut sunt talia; deus potest esse to which God's power may or asinus, ipse potest producere alium mundum, vel cum may not extend, isto, vel adnihilando istum; et sic de infinitis aliis, and which we cannot know quorum una pars tenetur a subtilibus philosophis et certainly. alia pars tenetur ab aliis. Et sic patet quod infinita 35 sunt necessaria, quorum quodlibet ignoramus, immo quorum nullum possemus scire, nisi possemus esse in- mortales et glorificati, videndo in speculo primo causante intuitive tales veritates. Nam (ut taceam de pretericionibus necessariis, ut sunt tales; a lapis fuit tunc generatus, 40 collisit b in fundo maris) patet hoc de veritatibus eternis quarum sciencia proficeret, et quas cupimus cognoscere; 15 18. MS. ew. 29. MS. qued deest; ib. an deest. 8
CAP. III. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 113 indifferens: ut idem est sibi proponere quod deus est, The sense of any term might et proponere quod nihil potest esse; vel quidlibet est be interchanged with that of any deus. Cum enim omne ens ymaginabile est idemtificatum other ; we must deny what we alteri, omne signatum signat convertibiliter cum alio; grant, and grant 5 et si negaverit antecedens, vel quidlibet aliud proponen- that we deny it ; there is no way dum, habet concedere suum oppositum esse; et cum of refuting, but by showing quidlibet simul est et non est, habet concedere illud inconsistency, non esse et oppositum negatum esse: immo habet con- but here inconsistency cedere et non habet concedere; et cum non possit is at its maximum at 1o reprobari ista opinio, nisi per deducens ad inconsequens, the very outset. patet quod si homo studuerit mille annis, non potest efficacius arguere contra illam quam ponendo talem casum, nec deducere ad maius inconsequens quam con- cedit in principio. Ideo est dubium apud logicos utrum debeat arguere Such persons ought not to be contra talem; et pro certo videtur mihi quod non, quia, argued with, for they cannot be sive bene respondeat sive male, non esset possibile made to deducere eum ad maius inconsequens quam quod contradict themselves male respondit; quod idem concessit et negavit; vel more than they do. 20 quod sic non est ut dicit. Et ipse, consequenter respon- dendo, potest libere eligere, concedere vel negare quod- libet propositum. Debet enim concedere quod hoc ne- gavit, immo quod quidlibet non est, et debet addere suum contradictorium, quod hoc nunquam negavit; quia 25 necesse est eum bene respondisse. Ideo videtur quod stultius est alloqui talem, quam bestiam, puerum, vel dementem. Redeundo igitur ad confirmacionem secundi argu- A return to the second menti, conceditur [quod] de multis sumus dubii [an] objection. There are many things 3o deus illa potest vel non; ut sunt talia; deus potest esse to which God's power may or asinus, ipse potest producere alium mundum, vel cum may not extend, isto, vel adnihilando istum; et sic de infinitis aliis, and which we cannot know quorum una pars tenetur a subtilibus philosophis et certainly. alia pars tenetur ab aliis. Et sic patet quod infinita 35 sunt necessaria, quorum quodlibet ignoramus, immo quorum nullum possemus scire, nisi possemus esse in- mortales et glorificati, videndo in speculo primo causante intuitive tales veritates. Nam (ut taceam de pretericionibus necessariis, ut sunt tales; a lapis fuit tunc generatus, 40 collisit b in fundo maris) patet hoc de veritatibus eternis quarum sciencia proficeret, et quas cupimus cognoscere; 15 18. MS. ew. 29. MS. qued deest; ib. an deest. 8
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114 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. III. ut sunt tales: “Hoc deus potest" et Hoc non potest". Yet we can Tamen confuse cognoscimus omnia possibilia, et solum know in general talia potest deus; et omnia impossibilia, et solum talia that there are possible things non potest. Difficultas tamen est, utrum deus ideo non and things impossible: and potest facere me esse asinum, quia ego non possum? that God's power extends esse asinus, vel contra. Et videtur quod econtra; ideo to the former sic non potest esse, quia deus non potest sic causare. alone. It seems that Nam, si affirmacio sit causa affirmacionis, tunc negacio things are impossible est causa negacionis, ut patet primo posteriorum; sed because His deum posse quodcunque possibile est causa quare illud 10 power does not extend to them, est impossibile. Minor patet ex hoc quod deum posse not vice versa. est prima veritas causans omnem aliam, et per con- sequens est causa cuiuscunque possibilis. For God's Similiter, inpossibilitas affirmacionis est privacio, et existence is the positive cause omnis privacionis est dare affirmativam causam que 15 on which these affirmative sit ipsa prior. Igitur ad minimum, deum esse F. 83 negations depend, and His est causa talis inpossibilis; et per consequens deum posse power makes them to be in hoc est causa huiusmodi. Et idem est, deum posse impossible, in negacionem et non posse in affirmacionem, ut idem which amounts to saying that it est: deum posse facere quod inpossibile sit me non 20 does not extend to making them fuisse, et non posse facere quod ego possum non fuisse. possible. In oppositum est vulgariter responsio, que respondet The general reply, nowever, querenti quare deus non potest in contradiccionem: takes it the other way round. Quia illud non potest fieri. Unde commentator (8vo Averrhoës phisicorum) vult quod deus non diminuitur in potencia, thinks that impossibility of quamvis non possit impossibile. Ac si necessitaret quod becoming est ex natura inpossibilis et non ex se, quod non potest causes impossibility of in illud. Sicud enim aliquod est per se formaliter ne- making. cessarium, sic aliquod est per se formaliter inpossibile oppositum illi necessario. Similiter deus potest facere 30 me mori per b horam et lapsa b hora non poterit illud propter inpotenciam reducendi idem tempus in numero. Igitur aliqua erit completa causa illius non potencie, et nulla particulariter significanda, nisi impossibilitas illius motus propter lapsum temporis. Igitur inpossibilitas 35 fiendi est causa inpossibilitatis faciendi. Ista videtur mihi difficultas, cum tres precipui philo- A difficult question this ; sophi fuerant in ista materia diversimode opinati, ut one on which the greatest patet per doctorem profundum (1° libro capitulo 13°) philosophers disagree. I am of opinion 25 2. MS. Before tamen, hoc. 22. MS. wlgariter. 25. MS. wit and so in general for vu. 27. Se refers here, I believe, to God.
114 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. III. ut sunt tales: “Hoc deus potest" et Hoc non potest". Yet we can Tamen confuse cognoscimus omnia possibilia, et solum know in general talia potest deus; et omnia impossibilia, et solum talia that there are possible things non potest. Difficultas tamen est, utrum deus ideo non and things impossible: and potest facere me esse asinum, quia ego non possum? that God's power extends esse asinus, vel contra. Et videtur quod econtra; ideo to the former sic non potest esse, quia deus non potest sic causare. alone. It seems that Nam, si affirmacio sit causa affirmacionis, tunc negacio things are impossible est causa negacionis, ut patet primo posteriorum; sed because His deum posse quodcunque possibile est causa quare illud 10 power does not extend to them, est impossibile. Minor patet ex hoc quod deum posse not vice versa. est prima veritas causans omnem aliam, et per con- sequens est causa cuiuscunque possibilis. For God's Similiter, inpossibilitas affirmacionis est privacio, et existence is the positive cause omnis privacionis est dare affirmativam causam que 15 on which these affirmative sit ipsa prior. Igitur ad minimum, deum esse F. 83 negations depend, and His est causa talis inpossibilis; et per consequens deum posse power makes them to be in hoc est causa huiusmodi. Et idem est, deum posse impossible, in negacionem et non posse in affirmacionem, ut idem which amounts to saying that it est: deum posse facere quod inpossibile sit me non 20 does not extend to making them fuisse, et non posse facere quod ego possum non fuisse. possible. In oppositum est vulgariter responsio, que respondet The general reply, nowever, querenti quare deus non potest in contradiccionem: takes it the other way round. Quia illud non potest fieri. Unde commentator (8vo Averrhoës phisicorum) vult quod deus non diminuitur in potencia, thinks that impossibility of quamvis non possit impossibile. Ac si necessitaret quod becoming est ex natura inpossibilis et non ex se, quod non potest causes impossibility of in illud. Sicud enim aliquod est per se formaliter ne- making. cessarium, sic aliquod est per se formaliter inpossibile oppositum illi necessario. Similiter deus potest facere 30 me mori per b horam et lapsa b hora non poterit illud propter inpotenciam reducendi idem tempus in numero. Igitur aliqua erit completa causa illius non potencie, et nulla particulariter significanda, nisi impossibilitas illius motus propter lapsum temporis. Igitur inpossibilitas 35 fiendi est causa inpossibilitatis faciendi. Ista videtur mihi difficultas, cum tres precipui philo- A difficult question this ; sophi fuerant in ista materia diversimode opinati, ut one on which the greatest patet per doctorem profundum (1° libro capitulo 13°) philosophers disagree. I am of opinion 25 2. MS. Before tamen, hoc. 22. MS. wlgariter. 25. MS. wit and so in general for vu. 27. Se refers here, I believe, to God.
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CAP. III. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 115 videtur tamen mihi pro nunc probabile [quod] utrumque that each causes the other est reciproce causa alterius: ut, deum non posse hoc est mutually, and agree with quasi quedam forma negativa dependens ex hoc im- Duns Scotus. possibili quasi ex materia; et hoc esse impossibile de- pendet ex non potencia dei tanquam ex forma. Et sic tenet doctor subtilis quod principiative est hoc impossibile ex intellectu divino; quia, posito intellectu divino pro- ducente hoc in esse intelligibili, etsi nihil absolutum producat ad extra, est hoc inpossibile. Et ideo dicit quod 10 non formaliter per omnipotenciam dei est hoc inpossibile. Et patet responsio utroque. Ulterius, credo quod deus non potest esse asinus; nec valet locus a simili, quo arguitur ipsum per idem posse esse asinum quo hominem. Cuius racionem relinquo theologis; sed si possit esse 15 asinus, grave esset ymaginari quomodo cognosceretur hoc, nisi (ut theologi ponunt aliqua cognosci) per re- velacionem. Sed ego non credam tali revelacioni. Ad tercium patet ex dictis quod idem est necessario hoc esse et inpossibile esse hoc non esse. Ideo deus est 20 impossibile esse ipsum non esse, quia est necesse esse ipsum esse; quod idem est, ideo me non esse asinum esse. Necessarium est impossibile esse me esse asinum; sed non est primum vel summum necessarium vel in- possibile, quia habet affirmacionem priorem causacione, 25 sed non consequencia. Et sic est hoc principium morale verum quod quam bonum est aliquod ens, tam mala esset eius privacio, si non loco illius succederet aliquod bonum suplens; ut, quam bonum est mihi habere Socratem amicum, tam malum esset mihi carere eius 3o amicicia per mortem eius, per translacionem ad maius dominium, vel aliunde, si non fieret suplecio loco de- perdicionis sue amicicie; quia illud malum est privacio for instance, we may lose a F. 84* comodi ex eius amicicia.] Quod si ex morte eius pro- friend, but gain yet more by videatur mihi aliunde de maiori bono quam habui de that loss. 35 eius amicicia, et adquisicio dominii cedat mihi in maius A further refutation of (III.) The Necessary is the same as the mpossibility of its negation. It is not quite true that the privation of any good thing is as bad as the thing itself is good ; 1. MS. quod deest. 13. MS. ipsum per idem ipsum. 15. MS. cognosceret. 31. MS. dmi and further. 12. Asinus. The question seems rather blasphemous; it is strikingly mediaeval. That it was possible for God to be man by hypostatic union, caused it to be asked whether it was possible for the same union to take place with other creatures besides man. St. Thomas and most Schoolmen are of a contrary opinion from Wyclif. 8 *
CAP. III. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 115 videtur tamen mihi pro nunc probabile [quod] utrumque that each causes the other est reciproce causa alterius: ut, deum non posse hoc est mutually, and agree with quasi quedam forma negativa dependens ex hoc im- Duns Scotus. possibili quasi ex materia; et hoc esse impossibile de- pendet ex non potencia dei tanquam ex forma. Et sic tenet doctor subtilis quod principiative est hoc impossibile ex intellectu divino; quia, posito intellectu divino pro- ducente hoc in esse intelligibili, etsi nihil absolutum producat ad extra, est hoc inpossibile. Et ideo dicit quod 10 non formaliter per omnipotenciam dei est hoc inpossibile. Et patet responsio utroque. Ulterius, credo quod deus non potest esse asinus; nec valet locus a simili, quo arguitur ipsum per idem posse esse asinum quo hominem. Cuius racionem relinquo theologis; sed si possit esse 15 asinus, grave esset ymaginari quomodo cognosceretur hoc, nisi (ut theologi ponunt aliqua cognosci) per re- velacionem. Sed ego non credam tali revelacioni. Ad tercium patet ex dictis quod idem est necessario hoc esse et inpossibile esse hoc non esse. Ideo deus est 20 impossibile esse ipsum non esse, quia est necesse esse ipsum esse; quod idem est, ideo me non esse asinum esse. Necessarium est impossibile esse me esse asinum; sed non est primum vel summum necessarium vel in- possibile, quia habet affirmacionem priorem causacione, 25 sed non consequencia. Et sic est hoc principium morale verum quod quam bonum est aliquod ens, tam mala esset eius privacio, si non loco illius succederet aliquod bonum suplens; ut, quam bonum est mihi habere Socratem amicum, tam malum esset mihi carere eius 3o amicicia per mortem eius, per translacionem ad maius dominium, vel aliunde, si non fieret suplecio loco de- perdicionis sue amicicie; quia illud malum est privacio for instance, we may lose a F. 84* comodi ex eius amicicia.] Quod si ex morte eius pro- friend, but gain yet more by videatur mihi aliunde de maiori bono quam habui de that loss. 35 eius amicicia, et adquisicio dominii cedat mihi in maius A further refutation of (III.) The Necessary is the same as the mpossibility of its negation. It is not quite true that the privation of any good thing is as bad as the thing itself is good ; 1. MS. quod deest. 13. MS. ipsum per idem ipsum. 15. MS. cognosceret. 31. MS. dmi and further. 12. Asinus. The question seems rather blasphemous; it is strikingly mediaeval. That it was possible for God to be man by hypostatic union, caused it to be asked whether it was possible for the same union to take place with other creatures besides man. St. Thomas and most Schoolmen are of a contrary opinion from Wyclif. 8 *
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116 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. IV. commodum de familiaritate quam prius habui amicicia, tunc mors et adquisicio dominii prosunt mihi. Et ideo dicitur quod quidam plus prosunt moriendo quam pro- sunt vivendo; et octavo ethicorum dicitur quod in casu debet velle amicum suum fore, dum autem perdendo5 amiciciam propter adquisicionem maioris boni. Et sic videtur mihi quod privacio boni non [est] formaliter mala, quia non esset mala, nisi occasione illius non succedat tantum bonum. Ulterius, quantum ad deduccionem inconsequentis 10 patet mihi satis quod si nihil est, non aliqualiter est, et per consequens non inpossibile est hominem esse asinum; et ultra necesse est hominem esse asinum et deum esse, et negans consequencias istas concedet alia inconsequencia mihi. Ideo constat mihi quod nemo 15 umquam inprobabit illas sequelas: nihil est, igitur ali- quid est; nihil est igitur etc. Et verum est quod nihil est; et sic de ceteris. Ego enim non intelligo per con- Every conditional dicionalem, nisi quod non possit sic esse (demonstrando proposition must imply the signatum antecedentis) nisi sic sit (demonstrando signatum 20 impossibility of the antecedent, consequentis). Et intelligo posse quandam esse potenciam; when the nec est inconsequens multa esse necessaria que opporteat consequent is denied. credere ex testibus, quia iuxta dicta tercio libro scibile mensurat scienciam de eodem, etc. It is clear enough that if you posit absolute non- existence, you get all sorts of contradictory inferences. CAPITULUM QUARTUM. 25 Is quality an Isto premisso, restat generaliter et specialiter dubi- absolute accident? tandum si qualitas sit res absoluta que posset per se No ; for some accidents existere sine substancia. Et videtur quod non: nam omne cannot possibly accidens est univoce accidens cum altero; sed aliqua exist by themselves sunt accidencia que claudit contradiccionem esse sine 30 (v. g. relations), and all must be substancia illis subiecta, ut patet de respectibus; igitur alike in this respect in order to distinguish 7. MS. est deest. 10. MS. 9'tut? pro consequentis. 17. MS. after igitur, a°. 18, 19. MS. 91e pro condicionalem. 25. MS. Capitulum etc. deest; large initial I in black ink. 5. Dum autem. Evidently corrupt. 27. Qualitas. Wyclif apparently proves his point against quality; but his arguments attack all absolute accidents. In the Scholastic system, quantity alone was thought to be an absolute accident. It was a force which gave extension to the substance (vis extensiva substantive), naturally existing in a subject, yet having enough entity to be able to exist — though by a miracle — without a subject.
116 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. IV. commodum de familiaritate quam prius habui amicicia, tunc mors et adquisicio dominii prosunt mihi. Et ideo dicitur quod quidam plus prosunt moriendo quam pro- sunt vivendo; et octavo ethicorum dicitur quod in casu debet velle amicum suum fore, dum autem perdendo5 amiciciam propter adquisicionem maioris boni. Et sic videtur mihi quod privacio boni non [est] formaliter mala, quia non esset mala, nisi occasione illius non succedat tantum bonum. Ulterius, quantum ad deduccionem inconsequentis 10 patet mihi satis quod si nihil est, non aliqualiter est, et per consequens non inpossibile est hominem esse asinum; et ultra necesse est hominem esse asinum et deum esse, et negans consequencias istas concedet alia inconsequencia mihi. Ideo constat mihi quod nemo 15 umquam inprobabit illas sequelas: nihil est, igitur ali- quid est; nihil est igitur etc. Et verum est quod nihil est; et sic de ceteris. Ego enim non intelligo per con- Every conditional dicionalem, nisi quod non possit sic esse (demonstrando proposition must imply the signatum antecedentis) nisi sic sit (demonstrando signatum 20 impossibility of the antecedent, consequentis). Et intelligo posse quandam esse potenciam; when the nec est inconsequens multa esse necessaria que opporteat consequent is denied. credere ex testibus, quia iuxta dicta tercio libro scibile mensurat scienciam de eodem, etc. It is clear enough that if you posit absolute non- existence, you get all sorts of contradictory inferences. CAPITULUM QUARTUM. 25 Is quality an Isto premisso, restat generaliter et specialiter dubi- absolute accident? tandum si qualitas sit res absoluta que posset per se No ; for some accidents existere sine substancia. Et videtur quod non: nam omne cannot possibly accidens est univoce accidens cum altero; sed aliqua exist by themselves sunt accidencia que claudit contradiccionem esse sine 30 (v. g. relations), and all must be substancia illis subiecta, ut patet de respectibus; igitur alike in this respect in order to distinguish 7. MS. est deest. 10. MS. 9'tut? pro consequentis. 17. MS. after igitur, a°. 18, 19. MS. 91e pro condicionalem. 25. MS. Capitulum etc. deest; large initial I in black ink. 5. Dum autem. Evidently corrupt. 27. Qualitas. Wyclif apparently proves his point against quality; but his arguments attack all absolute accidents. In the Scholastic system, quantity alone was thought to be an absolute accident. It was a force which gave extension to the substance (vis extensiva substantive), naturally existing in a subject, yet having enough entity to be able to exist — though by a miracle — without a subject.
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CAP. IV. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 117 per idem, omnia accidencia sunt huiusmodi. Maior patet per hoc quod aliqua est racio quare ens est accidens, eo quod ens in quantum accidens habet aliquam proprietatem distinguentem ipsum a substancia; quia 5 aliter omnis substancia que accidentaliter inesset alteri esset accidens. Confirmatur tripliciter: primo sic. Quacunque sub- stancia signata, claudit contradiccionem ipsam fore acci- dens; igitur, cum tantam et repugnanciam contingit to reperire inter accidens et substanciam sicud inter sub- stanciam et accidens, videtur quod nullum accidens potest fieri substancia. Patet illud per conversionem, eo quod nullum accidens posset [esse] substancia, nisi substancia posset esse accidens; et probabitur postmodum quod qua- 15 litas non posset per se existere, nisi posset esse substancia. Similiter, quam per se corpus vel anima est sub- stancia, tam per se quodlibet genus accidentis est acci- dens: igitur nulla qualitas potest esse non accidens. Assertum probatur per hoc quod iste terminus, ens, di- 20 viditur in substanciam et accidens; et accidens dividitur in per se opposita; quia aliter non valeret divisio, [ut unum membrum per accidens contineatur sub relico, sicud dicunt omnes ponentes omne accidens esse quali- tatem, quam ponunt posse per se existere, | et per F. 843 25 consequens nullum accidens accidentaliter est accidens. Similiter, omne ens predicabile, et specialiter omne (3) Every thing, absolute tale quod est res absoluta accidentaliter existens quod- accidents included, must cunque, presupponit ipsum per se existere in aliqua belong to a species, and if specie; sed omnis qualitas est res absoluta accidentaliter so, these 3o existens qualitas et accidens: igitur omnis talis est per accidents belong to the genus se in aliqua specie; et per consequens in alico genere: substance. et non dabitur nisi genus substancie. Maior patet ex dictis proximo capitulo; et de racione. Si enim a suc- cessive fuerit nunc accidens, nunc non accidens, manens 35 continue id quod est, tunc eius essencia et quiditas manet continue, et per consequens, cum multa secum conveniunt in perfeccione essenciali, sequitur quod est danda species in qua per se est. Item, si omnis qualitas posset per se existere, posset 40 esse multis substanciis perfeccior; consequens inpossibile. Et consequencia sic probatur. Quamcunque accionem (2) As a substance cannot be other than a substance, s0 an accident cannot be other than an accident: therefore it cannot possibly exist by itself, or its definition would include substance. them from substances, otherwise, if one substance happened to belong to another, it would be an accident. For (1) no substance can become an accident; therefore no accident a substance; but if quality were able to exist by itself, it would be a substance. Again, 11 a quality could exist by itself, it would be more pertect 5. MS. at pro alteri. 13. MS. esse deert. 19, 20. MS. divisus. 20. MS. in substanciam et substanciam. 21. MS. ut deest.
CAP. IV. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 117 per idem, omnia accidencia sunt huiusmodi. Maior patet per hoc quod aliqua est racio quare ens est accidens, eo quod ens in quantum accidens habet aliquam proprietatem distinguentem ipsum a substancia; quia 5 aliter omnis substancia que accidentaliter inesset alteri esset accidens. Confirmatur tripliciter: primo sic. Quacunque sub- stancia signata, claudit contradiccionem ipsam fore acci- dens; igitur, cum tantam et repugnanciam contingit to reperire inter accidens et substanciam sicud inter sub- stanciam et accidens, videtur quod nullum accidens potest fieri substancia. Patet illud per conversionem, eo quod nullum accidens posset [esse] substancia, nisi substancia posset esse accidens; et probabitur postmodum quod qua- 15 litas non posset per se existere, nisi posset esse substancia. Similiter, quam per se corpus vel anima est sub- stancia, tam per se quodlibet genus accidentis est acci- dens: igitur nulla qualitas potest esse non accidens. Assertum probatur per hoc quod iste terminus, ens, di- 20 viditur in substanciam et accidens; et accidens dividitur in per se opposita; quia aliter non valeret divisio, [ut unum membrum per accidens contineatur sub relico, sicud dicunt omnes ponentes omne accidens esse quali- tatem, quam ponunt posse per se existere, | et per F. 843 25 consequens nullum accidens accidentaliter est accidens. Similiter, omne ens predicabile, et specialiter omne (3) Every thing, absolute tale quod est res absoluta accidentaliter existens quod- accidents included, must cunque, presupponit ipsum per se existere in aliqua belong to a species, and if specie; sed omnis qualitas est res absoluta accidentaliter so, these 3o existens qualitas et accidens: igitur omnis talis est per accidents belong to the genus se in aliqua specie; et per consequens in alico genere: substance. et non dabitur nisi genus substancie. Maior patet ex dictis proximo capitulo; et de racione. Si enim a suc- cessive fuerit nunc accidens, nunc non accidens, manens 35 continue id quod est, tunc eius essencia et quiditas manet continue, et per consequens, cum multa secum conveniunt in perfeccione essenciali, sequitur quod est danda species in qua per se est. Item, si omnis qualitas posset per se existere, posset 40 esse multis substanciis perfeccior; consequens inpossibile. Et consequencia sic probatur. Quamcunque accionem (2) As a substance cannot be other than a substance, s0 an accident cannot be other than an accident: therefore it cannot possibly exist by itself, or its definition would include substance. them from substances, otherwise, if one substance happened to belong to another, it would be an accident. For (1) no substance can become an accident; therefore no accident a substance; but if quality were able to exist by itself, it would be a substance. Again, 11 a quality could exist by itself, it would be more pertect 5. MS. at pro alteri. 13. MS. esse deert. 19, 20. MS. divisus. 20. MS. in substanciam et substanciam. 21. MS. ut deest.
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118 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. IV. than many a habet substancia materialis, habet mediantibus qualitatibus substance, since- quo sunt eque potencie aut instrumenta, et omnes tales material substances can qualitates per adversarium possunt per se esse et agere. only act by means of their Sicud modo igitur omni accioni talis substancie quantum- qualities, and libet perfectam contingit per se fieri per qualitatem, cum 5 their qualities could act alone. perfecio proprii operis sit signum infallibiliter indicans perfeccionem essencialem operantis, sequitur quod cuilibet tali substancie sua propria qualitas sit pariter perfecta. For (1) no Confirmatur tripliciter: primo sic. Impossibile est absolute accident can aliquam rem absolutam plus quicquam perficere quam 10 give more illa essencialiter sit perfecta; sed quelibet qualitas est perfection than it has itself; res absoluta plus perficiens substanciam quam ipsa de yet, according se sit perfecta; igitur tantam perfeccionem est qualitas to this theory, quality would de sua essencia. Non enim potest quicquam per se do so. Nothing can be melius se causare; nec est aliquid magis bonum propter more perfect on account of what rem habitam quam illa sit in se bona. Loquamur igitur it possesses, de perfeccione, bonitate, aut melioracione, quam qualitas than the thing possessed is per se causat, non communicando cum perfeccione quam itself perfect. substancia habet de sui essencia; et patet quod talis est danda, cum, qualitas sit res absoluta, non includens 20 in sui esse substanciam. (2) Substance, Similiter, talis quantitas, si per se esset de possibili, according to its posset transmutari; ut moveri localiter, rarefieri, con- definition, is what underlies densari, cum posset agere, quod est plus quam pati: accidents; now, if quality could igitur posset per se substare accidentibus, et per con-25 possibly act by sequens esse substancia. Tale enim supponitur a philo- itself, it could a fortiori be sophis esse substancia de virtute vocabilis. Caliditas acted upon ; and therefore enim possibilis, cum tanta albedine per se existens, receive posset moveri localiter, et sic subici motui, rarefieri, motion, &c.; this would condensari, et sic subici quantitati et alteracioni, ex hoc 30 imply that it underlies the quod intenderetur et remitteretur. accident of motion. Similiter, talis qualitas ex posicione posset esse pars And (3) any quality might be substancie; igitur substancia. Antecedens sic: talis an essential qualitas, iam dependens a substancia dependencia na- part of substance, i. e. turali, potest esse independens ab illa; igitur, per idem, 35 its substantial substancia potest dependere ab illa. Si enim de depen- form. For take away the form denti potest fieri independens, ex duobus inpertinentibus of fire, and leave potest fieri quod unum dependeat ab altero et non con- only matter with heat, &c., veniencius quam ut a sua forma, cum qualitas non possit existing independently esse per se efficiens multa, vel finis substancie. Igitur 40 of matter ; these relinquitur quod qualitas posset esse forma essencialis would supply the place of substancie. Si enim deus uniret materie prime possibili form. 15 42. MS. pel. pro possibili.
118 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. IV. than many a habet substancia materialis, habet mediantibus qualitatibus substance, since- quo sunt eque potencie aut instrumenta, et omnes tales material substances can qualitates per adversarium possunt per se esse et agere. only act by means of their Sicud modo igitur omni accioni talis substancie quantum- qualities, and libet perfectam contingit per se fieri per qualitatem, cum 5 their qualities could act alone. perfecio proprii operis sit signum infallibiliter indicans perfeccionem essencialem operantis, sequitur quod cuilibet tali substancie sua propria qualitas sit pariter perfecta. For (1) no Confirmatur tripliciter: primo sic. Impossibile est absolute accident can aliquam rem absolutam plus quicquam perficere quam 10 give more illa essencialiter sit perfecta; sed quelibet qualitas est perfection than it has itself; res absoluta plus perficiens substanciam quam ipsa de yet, according se sit perfecta; igitur tantam perfeccionem est qualitas to this theory, quality would de sua essencia. Non enim potest quicquam per se do so. Nothing can be melius se causare; nec est aliquid magis bonum propter more perfect on account of what rem habitam quam illa sit in se bona. Loquamur igitur it possesses, de perfeccione, bonitate, aut melioracione, quam qualitas than the thing possessed is per se causat, non communicando cum perfeccione quam itself perfect. substancia habet de sui essencia; et patet quod talis est danda, cum, qualitas sit res absoluta, non includens 20 in sui esse substanciam. (2) Substance, Similiter, talis quantitas, si per se esset de possibili, according to its posset transmutari; ut moveri localiter, rarefieri, con- definition, is what underlies densari, cum posset agere, quod est plus quam pati: accidents; now, if quality could igitur posset per se substare accidentibus, et per con-25 possibly act by sequens esse substancia. Tale enim supponitur a philo- itself, it could a fortiori be sophis esse substancia de virtute vocabilis. Caliditas acted upon ; and therefore enim possibilis, cum tanta albedine per se existens, receive posset moveri localiter, et sic subici motui, rarefieri, motion, &c.; this would condensari, et sic subici quantitati et alteracioni, ex hoc 30 imply that it underlies the quod intenderetur et remitteretur. accident of motion. Similiter, talis qualitas ex posicione posset esse pars And (3) any quality might be substancie; igitur substancia. Antecedens sic: talis an essential qualitas, iam dependens a substancia dependencia na- part of substance, i. e. turali, potest esse independens ab illa; igitur, per idem, 35 its substantial substancia potest dependere ab illa. Si enim de depen- form. For take away the form denti potest fieri independens, ex duobus inpertinentibus of fire, and leave potest fieri quod unum dependeat ab altero et non con- only matter with heat, &c., veniencius quam ut a sua forma, cum qualitas non possit existing independently esse per se efficiens multa, vel finis substancie. Igitur 40 of matter ; these relinquitur quod qualitas posset esse forma essencialis would supply the place of substancie. Si enim deus uniret materie prime possibili form. 15 42. MS. pel. pro possibili.
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CAP. IV. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 119 caliditatem, siccitatem et quecunque cetera accidencia que sunt in igne sine forma substanciali alia, quid sufficeret ignis noster l facere quod tale non sufficeret? Item, iuxta istud sequitur neminem quicquam infalli- 5 biliter posse scire: quod est inpossibile, octavo libro. Et consequencia sic probatur. Omnis demonstracio na- turalis est ab apparencia sensitiva effectus convincientis eius causam; sed non est possibile talem infallibiliter concludere: igitur etc. Minor probatur ex opinione: nam 1o secundum opinionem omnis qualitas prima et secunda, spiritualis vel corporalis, sicud omnis quantitas vel re- licum accidens quod est in mundo posset manere et agere sicud modo, cum hoc quod totus mundus co- rumperetur, sic quod non esset alia nisi deus et homo. 15 Et certum est quod homo tunc crederet solem et celestia esse, ut modo [eodem] crederet nata coruptibilia et eterna esse; ut modo eodem sentiret frigus, calorem et omnia accidencia que modo sentit; immo nutriretur per dura cibaria que converterentur in accidencia cum 20 quibus sua anima copularetur eque ydonee sicud modo; quare igitur non forent talia accidencia partes sui, cum per illa sufficiat ambulare, ridere, et breviter quem- cunque actum corporeum vel incorporeum facere sicud modo? Non igitur solum esset anima, sed unum compo- 25 situm. Confirmatur tripliciter; primo sic. Quandocunque natura potest cum paucioribus mediis in finem aliquem non multiplicat plura, cum non sit superflui operatrix. Sed natura potest facere ita bonum mundum et utilem 3o vel congruum suo fini, etsi non producat res latentes distinctas a vocatis accidentibus, ut sequitur ex illa opinione: igitur superfluit addere plura. Minor patet ex hoc quod omnibus accidentibus servatis, coruptis sub- stanciis que sunt in mundo, non est fingendum aliquod 35 officium quoad accionem, decorem universi, vel ad complacenciam dei, quin vocata accidencia sufficerent in illud. Immo, cum idem in numero sit quodlibet sic multiplicabile, superfluit ponere multa numeraliter de- Again, in this theory, all certain knowledge would disappear; for we judge of a cause by its effect, and as all sense. impressions miglit proced from accidents without a substance, we could not know whether this did not actually occur. For (1) nature does not employ unnecessary means to attain its ends; it they could just as well be attained by accidents without substances. why should substances exist: F. 85a 4. MS. mem. 7. MS. conciens. 16. MS. codem deest. 10. 17. MS. corua et cta. 17. MS. cum pro codem. 27. MS. aliqer. 34. MS. enim pro non. 26—28. Quandocunque. This principle was called Ockam's razor for getting rid of superfluous entities. It is usually put thus: Frustra fit per plura, quod per pauciora fieri potest.
CAP. IV. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 119 caliditatem, siccitatem et quecunque cetera accidencia que sunt in igne sine forma substanciali alia, quid sufficeret ignis noster l facere quod tale non sufficeret? Item, iuxta istud sequitur neminem quicquam infalli- 5 biliter posse scire: quod est inpossibile, octavo libro. Et consequencia sic probatur. Omnis demonstracio na- turalis est ab apparencia sensitiva effectus convincientis eius causam; sed non est possibile talem infallibiliter concludere: igitur etc. Minor probatur ex opinione: nam 1o secundum opinionem omnis qualitas prima et secunda, spiritualis vel corporalis, sicud omnis quantitas vel re- licum accidens quod est in mundo posset manere et agere sicud modo, cum hoc quod totus mundus co- rumperetur, sic quod non esset alia nisi deus et homo. 15 Et certum est quod homo tunc crederet solem et celestia esse, ut modo [eodem] crederet nata coruptibilia et eterna esse; ut modo eodem sentiret frigus, calorem et omnia accidencia que modo sentit; immo nutriretur per dura cibaria que converterentur in accidencia cum 20 quibus sua anima copularetur eque ydonee sicud modo; quare igitur non forent talia accidencia partes sui, cum per illa sufficiat ambulare, ridere, et breviter quem- cunque actum corporeum vel incorporeum facere sicud modo? Non igitur solum esset anima, sed unum compo- 25 situm. Confirmatur tripliciter; primo sic. Quandocunque natura potest cum paucioribus mediis in finem aliquem non multiplicat plura, cum non sit superflui operatrix. Sed natura potest facere ita bonum mundum et utilem 3o vel congruum suo fini, etsi non producat res latentes distinctas a vocatis accidentibus, ut sequitur ex illa opinione: igitur superfluit addere plura. Minor patet ex hoc quod omnibus accidentibus servatis, coruptis sub- stanciis que sunt in mundo, non est fingendum aliquod 35 officium quoad accionem, decorem universi, vel ad complacenciam dei, quin vocata accidencia sufficerent in illud. Immo, cum idem in numero sit quodlibet sic multiplicabile, superfluit ponere multa numeraliter de- Again, in this theory, all certain knowledge would disappear; for we judge of a cause by its effect, and as all sense. impressions miglit proced from accidents without a substance, we could not know whether this did not actually occur. For (1) nature does not employ unnecessary means to attain its ends; it they could just as well be attained by accidents without substances. why should substances exist: F. 85a 4. MS. mem. 7. MS. conciens. 16. MS. codem deest. 10. 17. MS. corua et cta. 17. MS. cum pro codem. 27. MS. aliqer. 34. MS. enim pro non. 26—28. Quandocunque. This principle was called Ockam's razor for getting rid of superfluous entities. It is usually put thus: Frustra fit per plura, quod per pauciora fieri potest.
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120 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. IV. stincta, sed sufficit pro omni evidencia salvanda solum unum esse, ut dixerunt Parmenides et Millissius. (2) It would Similiter, cum omnis res potest ubicumque libet follow from the theory that the generari sine hoc quod informet subiectum, sequitur production quod generans accidentis talis multum distinguitur ab 5 of an accident is not alteracione subiecti; potest enim esse generacio quali- the same thing tatis huiusmodi, sine hoc quod informet; et potest post- as a change in its subject, but modum successive informare, et sic aliquid alterari sine is the creation adquisicione qualitatis. Et per consequens, quandocunque of a new entity independent of generacio qualitatis concomitatur eius informacionem et 10 its subject, like the human soul. inherenciam, subiectum movetur duobus modis in parti- bus; et sic generacio accidentis non esset generacio secundum quid substancie (sicud dicit Aristoteles, primo de generacione), set esset creacio rei absolute sine con- causacione alicuius comproducentis, sicud est de pro- 15 duccione anime; que, quamvis producatur in materia, tamen sine aliqua dependencia vel essenciali concau- sacione a suo subiecto. Et sic, secundum istam viam, est de qualibet qualitate. Similiter, iuxta illud sequitur quod nulla substancia 20 sit sensibilis, sed solum accidens; nam a albedo in Socrate est una res absoluta, ex cuius sensacione non sequitur subiectum sentiri; et sic est de omni subiecto F. 85b sensibilis qualitatis. Igitur, cum non ] [potest] sentiri nisi senciendo qualitatem eiusdem, sequitur quod etc.25 Antecedens sic: stat qualitatem sentiri et non informare subiectum, vel posito subiecto vel ipso corupto; igitur, eius sensacio est inpertinens sensacioni subiecti. Requi- ritur enim actus distinctus ad subiecti cognicionem; et ille transcendit omnem cognicionem sensus, cum cognicio 30 sensus est par in hominibus et brutis; sed ipsa non habent cognicionem de subiecto insensibiliter transmutato, puta vel corupto, vel non informato, preter cognicionem quam prius habuerat: igitur nec homo quo ad sensum. Non enim videtur quod qualitates plus inevitabiliter 35 gignant cognicionem sui subiecti a quo non essencialiter dependent, quam congnicionem sue essencialis cause, ut dei, etsi continue sint alie tales cause. Item, ponitur quod intellectus agens (qui ponitur una qualitas, puta potencia anime) eliciat actum contempla-40 cionis prime cause ipsa potencia per se existente, et And (3) not the feeling substance, but its accident, would ſeel. The sensation of whiteness might exist by itself, and not be experienced by its subject, according to this theory. The absurdity of this position demonstrated by an example. 3. MS. res ab. 19. MS. quantitate. 24. MS. ffir' pro sensibilis; ib. 25. MS. etc. deest. potest deest.
120 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. IV. stincta, sed sufficit pro omni evidencia salvanda solum unum esse, ut dixerunt Parmenides et Millissius. (2) It would Similiter, cum omnis res potest ubicumque libet follow from the theory that the generari sine hoc quod informet subiectum, sequitur production quod generans accidentis talis multum distinguitur ab 5 of an accident is not alteracione subiecti; potest enim esse generacio quali- the same thing tatis huiusmodi, sine hoc quod informet; et potest post- as a change in its subject, but modum successive informare, et sic aliquid alterari sine is the creation adquisicione qualitatis. Et per consequens, quandocunque of a new entity independent of generacio qualitatis concomitatur eius informacionem et 10 its subject, like the human soul. inherenciam, subiectum movetur duobus modis in parti- bus; et sic generacio accidentis non esset generacio secundum quid substancie (sicud dicit Aristoteles, primo de generacione), set esset creacio rei absolute sine con- causacione alicuius comproducentis, sicud est de pro- 15 duccione anime; que, quamvis producatur in materia, tamen sine aliqua dependencia vel essenciali concau- sacione a suo subiecto. Et sic, secundum istam viam, est de qualibet qualitate. Similiter, iuxta illud sequitur quod nulla substancia 20 sit sensibilis, sed solum accidens; nam a albedo in Socrate est una res absoluta, ex cuius sensacione non sequitur subiectum sentiri; et sic est de omni subiecto F. 85b sensibilis qualitatis. Igitur, cum non ] [potest] sentiri nisi senciendo qualitatem eiusdem, sequitur quod etc.25 Antecedens sic: stat qualitatem sentiri et non informare subiectum, vel posito subiecto vel ipso corupto; igitur, eius sensacio est inpertinens sensacioni subiecti. Requi- ritur enim actus distinctus ad subiecti cognicionem; et ille transcendit omnem cognicionem sensus, cum cognicio 30 sensus est par in hominibus et brutis; sed ipsa non habent cognicionem de subiecto insensibiliter transmutato, puta vel corupto, vel non informato, preter cognicionem quam prius habuerat: igitur nec homo quo ad sensum. Non enim videtur quod qualitates plus inevitabiliter 35 gignant cognicionem sui subiecti a quo non essencialiter dependent, quam congnicionem sue essencialis cause, ut dei, etsi continue sint alie tales cause. Item, ponitur quod intellectus agens (qui ponitur una qualitas, puta potencia anime) eliciat actum contempla-40 cionis prime cause ipsa potencia per se existente, et And (3) not the feeling substance, but its accident, would ſeel. The sensation of whiteness might exist by itself, and not be experienced by its subject, according to this theory. The absurdity of this position demonstrated by an example. 3. MS. res ab. 19. MS. quantitate. 24. MS. ffir' pro sensibilis; ib. 25. MS. etc. deest. potest deest.
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CAP. IV. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 121 videat Socrates utrumque, quorum primum sit a et se- cundum b, et patet quod a est alterabile et felicitabile ita perfecte sicud aliquis homo mundi. Gaudet enim naturaliter de obiecto quod cognoscit et appetit ita plene 5 sicud felix specularius; nec subiacet miseriis quales homo contrahit a corpore: igitur est felicior homine, et per consequens illo perfeccior. Socrates igitur cognoscens illam felicitatem, multum laboraret rogando potenciam ut impertiretur sibi b fore, per quam plus perficeretur 10 quam alia substancia citra deum. Si igitur finis sit melior hiis que sunt ad finem, longe melior est b, feli- citas gracia cuius est tota vita hominis, quam ille vel eius vita. Hinc dicitur quod omnia illa argumenta procedunt 15 si casus positi essent possibiles quoad naturam, sed modo sunt solum absolute possibiles quoad deum; et sic tolluntur omnia argumenta facta; ut puta, primum tollitur per hoc quod nullum accidens potest naturaliter sine miraculo esse sine subiecto, et sic posset accidens 20 esse substancia et econtra, sed non naturaliter; et sic per se qualitas est accidens quoad naturam; sed non quoad deum. Est tamen dare speciem sibi essencialis, sed illa non est nomen inpositum. Et ad secundum argumentum negat consequenciam; b) It is denied that any 25 quia nulla qualitas posset per se habere talem opera- accident can take the place cionem, [ut] supleret vicem subiecti; et sic non sequitur of a substance quod mira sic agens sit tante potencie aut sic per- by itself, and therefore the fectum. Ad primam confirmacionem dicit quod quelibet argument of its perfection must perfeccio accidentalis sit insubstancialis; et ad secundam fall. 3o dicit quod non posset sic se habere sine suplente vicem No accidental perfection can subiecti; ad tercium dicunt quod nulla qualitas potest be substantial; quality cannot esse pars substancie, quia de racione substancie est non underlie inherere nec habere essencialem [relacionem] subiecto another accident without cui inhereat; et de racione accidentalis est inherere vel some Power that takes the 35 equevalenter. place of the Et ad tercium dicit quod dupliciter contingit hominem subject. c) We can be infallibiliter cognoscere: vel excludendo potenciam fallacie infallible in two ways : either by per accionem solummodo naturalem, vel excludendo setting aside F. 86° fallibilitatem supernaturalem. Secundo modo non con- natural sources of error or 40 tingit hominem veritate affirmativa de causato infalli- supernatural biliter cognoscere; sed primo modo bene potest. Ad sources; but the latter does not give us positive truth. Answers to these arguments. a) The cases given are not absolutely impossible to God. An accident might by miracle exist without a subject. 21. MS. sed sunt. relacionem deest. 26. MS. ut deest. 31. MS. quid quod. 33. MS. 36, 37. MS. hominem et fallibiliter.
CAP. IV. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 121 videat Socrates utrumque, quorum primum sit a et se- cundum b, et patet quod a est alterabile et felicitabile ita perfecte sicud aliquis homo mundi. Gaudet enim naturaliter de obiecto quod cognoscit et appetit ita plene 5 sicud felix specularius; nec subiacet miseriis quales homo contrahit a corpore: igitur est felicior homine, et per consequens illo perfeccior. Socrates igitur cognoscens illam felicitatem, multum laboraret rogando potenciam ut impertiretur sibi b fore, per quam plus perficeretur 10 quam alia substancia citra deum. Si igitur finis sit melior hiis que sunt ad finem, longe melior est b, feli- citas gracia cuius est tota vita hominis, quam ille vel eius vita. Hinc dicitur quod omnia illa argumenta procedunt 15 si casus positi essent possibiles quoad naturam, sed modo sunt solum absolute possibiles quoad deum; et sic tolluntur omnia argumenta facta; ut puta, primum tollitur per hoc quod nullum accidens potest naturaliter sine miraculo esse sine subiecto, et sic posset accidens 20 esse substancia et econtra, sed non naturaliter; et sic per se qualitas est accidens quoad naturam; sed non quoad deum. Est tamen dare speciem sibi essencialis, sed illa non est nomen inpositum. Et ad secundum argumentum negat consequenciam; b) It is denied that any 25 quia nulla qualitas posset per se habere talem opera- accident can take the place cionem, [ut] supleret vicem subiecti; et sic non sequitur of a substance quod mira sic agens sit tante potencie aut sic per- by itself, and therefore the fectum. Ad primam confirmacionem dicit quod quelibet argument of its perfection must perfeccio accidentalis sit insubstancialis; et ad secundam fall. 3o dicit quod non posset sic se habere sine suplente vicem No accidental perfection can subiecti; ad tercium dicunt quod nulla qualitas potest be substantial; quality cannot esse pars substancie, quia de racione substancie est non underlie inherere nec habere essencialem [relacionem] subiecto another accident without cui inhereat; et de racione accidentalis est inherere vel some Power that takes the 35 equevalenter. place of the Et ad tercium dicit quod dupliciter contingit hominem subject. c) We can be infallibiliter cognoscere: vel excludendo potenciam fallacie infallible in two ways : either by per accionem solummodo naturalem, vel excludendo setting aside F. 86° fallibilitatem supernaturalem. Secundo modo non con- natural sources of error or 40 tingit hominem veritate affirmativa de causato infalli- supernatural biliter cognoscere; sed primo modo bene potest. Ad sources; but the latter does not give us positive truth. Answers to these arguments. a) The cases given are not absolutely impossible to God. An accident might by miracle exist without a subject. 21. MS. sed sunt. relacionem deest. 26. MS. ut deest. 31. MS. quid quod. 33. MS. 36, 37. MS. hominem et fallibiliter.
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122 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. IV. The imaginary primam confirmacionem dicit quod mundus ymaginatus world of accidents would non esset ita bonus, ut iste quamvis sufficeret in omnem be like, but not accionem et apparenciam in quam sufficit iste, cum hoc so good as our substantial esset per deum supernaturabiliter suplentem vicem world ; for it has subiecti. Ipse igitur, gracia communicandi bonitatem 5 pleased God to create diverse suam causat genera substanciarum, et hoc est melius et kinds of sibi placencius. Ad secundam, concedit conclusionem substances. The accident is quoad secunde cause modum; sed dicit quod subiectum evolved, not created ; but if est causa materialis accidentis et sic (naturaliter sequitur) God supplied the place of a informat generacionem accidentis. Quod si deus supleret 10 subject, that vicem subiecti, tunc accidens crearetur. Ad tercium dicit would be creation. quod sequitur naturaliter subiectum sentiri, sentito eius accidente; sed posito casu possibili supernaturali, non sentiretur subiectum, sed verum accidens. Istam responsionem ponunt theologi, alii uno, et alii 15 By nature it is the subject that alio superaddito aut variato; sed certum est quod illud feels through its accident; by multum discrepat ab excipientibus philosophorum de miracle, the accidentibus. Nam ex ista responsione sequitur quod est accident itself might be made dare qualitatem et accidencia que deus non posset de to feel. Such is the potencia absoluta facere per se esse, nec subiecta taliter 20 general drift of the answer ; accidentaliter se habere sine talibus. Igitur superfluit ponere but we see alia accidencia. Aristoteles sic dicit: Substanciam esse that there are accidents which aliqualem est accidens; et nec tale potest esse sine sub- cannot be separated from stancia, nec substancia potest actualiter agere aut se their substance. habere sine tali; igitur etc. Ponendo enim qualitatem 25 The accident of rem absolutam, adhuc impertinens est formaliter ad quality is the substance being modum accidentalem denominacionis subiecti; oportet in this or that wise. igitur, ponendo talem absolutum, ponere ad accidens When you make an absolute quod sit informacio subiecti per huiusmodi absolutum. accident of it. Igitur, si substancia potest salvari actualiter aliqualis 30 you must add another sine tali absoluto, superfluit illud ponere. Et illa racio accident to join it to the est mihi evidens. substance; Similiter, iuxta opinionem non est tibi nisi topice, et this other accident suffices suasione, chrismali cognosculo quod est aliquod tale without more ado. accidens absolutum; sed bene scitur quod cum omnibus 35 This theory has evidenciis iam habitis stat oppositum. Igitur non scitur but the slightest 16. MS. supperaddendo aut variando. 17. MS. excipibs. 19. MS. te (eciam?) pro et. 22. MS. ais sic aci. 24. MS. dicit pro aut. 30. MS. ale pro aliqualis. 34. MS. XIlI. 33. Est tibi.... cognosculo. Granted that cognosculum may mean an inkling, perhaps this form may be grammatically the same as Est mihi dolori.
122 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. IV. The imaginary primam confirmacionem dicit quod mundus ymaginatus world of accidents would non esset ita bonus, ut iste quamvis sufficeret in omnem be like, but not accionem et apparenciam in quam sufficit iste, cum hoc so good as our substantial esset per deum supernaturabiliter suplentem vicem world ; for it has subiecti. Ipse igitur, gracia communicandi bonitatem 5 pleased God to create diverse suam causat genera substanciarum, et hoc est melius et kinds of sibi placencius. Ad secundam, concedit conclusionem substances. The accident is quoad secunde cause modum; sed dicit quod subiectum evolved, not created ; but if est causa materialis accidentis et sic (naturaliter sequitur) God supplied the place of a informat generacionem accidentis. Quod si deus supleret 10 subject, that vicem subiecti, tunc accidens crearetur. Ad tercium dicit would be creation. quod sequitur naturaliter subiectum sentiri, sentito eius accidente; sed posito casu possibili supernaturali, non sentiretur subiectum, sed verum accidens. Istam responsionem ponunt theologi, alii uno, et alii 15 By nature it is the subject that alio superaddito aut variato; sed certum est quod illud feels through its accident; by multum discrepat ab excipientibus philosophorum de miracle, the accidentibus. Nam ex ista responsione sequitur quod est accident itself might be made dare qualitatem et accidencia que deus non posset de to feel. Such is the potencia absoluta facere per se esse, nec subiecta taliter 20 general drift of the answer ; accidentaliter se habere sine talibus. Igitur superfluit ponere but we see alia accidencia. Aristoteles sic dicit: Substanciam esse that there are accidents which aliqualem est accidens; et nec tale potest esse sine sub- cannot be separated from stancia, nec substancia potest actualiter agere aut se their substance. habere sine tali; igitur etc. Ponendo enim qualitatem 25 The accident of rem absolutam, adhuc impertinens est formaliter ad quality is the substance being modum accidentalem denominacionis subiecti; oportet in this or that wise. igitur, ponendo talem absolutum, ponere ad accidens When you make an absolute quod sit informacio subiecti per huiusmodi absolutum. accident of it. Igitur, si substancia potest salvari actualiter aliqualis 30 you must add another sine tali absoluto, superfluit illud ponere. Et illa racio accident to join it to the est mihi evidens. substance; Similiter, iuxta opinionem non est tibi nisi topice, et this other accident suffices suasione, chrismali cognosculo quod est aliquod tale without more ado. accidens absolutum; sed bene scitur quod cum omnibus 35 This theory has evidenciis iam habitis stat oppositum. Igitur non scitur but the slightest 16. MS. supperaddendo aut variando. 17. MS. excipibs. 19. MS. te (eciam?) pro et. 22. MS. ais sic aci. 24. MS. dicit pro aut. 30. MS. ale pro aliqualis. 34. MS. XIlI. 33. Est tibi.... cognosculo. Granted that cognosculum may mean an inkling, perhaps this form may be grammatically the same as Est mihi dolori.
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CAP. IV. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. a sic opinante guin sic naturale nullum est tale acci- dens; sed si credatur, hoc erit solum fide et opinione. Antecedens patet tripliciter; primo, quia, iuxta opi- nionem, deus posset concurrere cum substancia, cau- 5sando omnem apparenciam vel efficienciam quam modo substancia causat sine tali accidente absoluto: et se- cundo posset tale absolutum agere sicud modo, cum hoc quod non sit accidens sic in substancia, ut in con- 123 power to persuade, and every reason leads us to believe its contrary. There are no natural grounds for it; it is merely an opinion, based upon faith. God is supposed tinente, defective. Et tercio posset esse quod non esset ble to compete 10aliqua talis substancia, sed quod accidens integraret mundum ita conformissimum quoad sensibilem appa- renciam. Pono igitur quemcunque philosophum con- cedentem quocunque illorum trium modorum esse possibiliter posse esse; aut quarto modo ut posito, vel 15 quinto modo, ut ego dico; et inveniet quintum modum maxime consonum racioni. lllum enim oportet ponere, ex quo ponitur substancia sic actualiter qualis. Et illa non habundat in superfluis, cum ponit omnem rem esse substanciam, et accidencia esse modos substanciarum; et 20non habebitur medium ad eligendum quartam opinionem F.86^ pro naturali, et aliquam trium | viarum pro super- naturali, Si enim fuisset ordinatum sic a deo fore in- with the substance, causing thc appearances which it causes naturally; or the accidents themselves cause them ; or the whole world might be accident without substance. My opinion is more reasonable than any of these; uality is the substance itself, as being thus or thus. | very thing is fringibile eternaliter, sic fuisset pure naturale; et quod Ev substance; dicit quarta posicio fuisset de superfluo supernaturali; a5sed quis scit an uno illorum modorum fuit, an altero, cum quelibet eorum sit deo eque possibilis? Ideo apparet infatue assertum ab opinione quod quelibet via preter suam est supernaturalis. Similiter, quoad responsionem videtur mihi quod non 3o satisfacit argumentis in responsione. Namque ad primum argumentum patet quod sic opinans non potest cognoscere infallibiliter miraculum; nec scit infallibiliter utrum miraculum esset quod qualitatem informaret, vel esset; quia bene scit quod probabile est esse de communi 35cursu nature quod qualitas sit sine subiecto, aut quod non sit tale absolutum, stantibus apercius naturalibus sicud modo. Et tunc foret miraculum talem qualitatem informare; quia per se a deo preter cursum nature: et hoc est miraculum. Non igitur scitur quod si sic fieret, 39. MS. fiarc. 14. Quarto. I can find no trace of what this fourth opinion really was. accidents arc but its modcs. Which of thesc opinions is true? each is equally possible to God. Besides, thc answers to thc objections arc not satisfactory. It were impossible to know whether the miracle consists in making the accidents exist without or with a subject; if cither is possible, either may be according to nature, and the reverse would be a miracle.
CAP. IV. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. a sic opinante guin sic naturale nullum est tale acci- dens; sed si credatur, hoc erit solum fide et opinione. Antecedens patet tripliciter; primo, quia, iuxta opi- nionem, deus posset concurrere cum substancia, cau- 5sando omnem apparenciam vel efficienciam quam modo substancia causat sine tali accidente absoluto: et se- cundo posset tale absolutum agere sicud modo, cum hoc quod non sit accidens sic in substancia, ut in con- 123 power to persuade, and every reason leads us to believe its contrary. There are no natural grounds for it; it is merely an opinion, based upon faith. God is supposed tinente, defective. Et tercio posset esse quod non esset ble to compete 10aliqua talis substancia, sed quod accidens integraret mundum ita conformissimum quoad sensibilem appa- renciam. Pono igitur quemcunque philosophum con- cedentem quocunque illorum trium modorum esse possibiliter posse esse; aut quarto modo ut posito, vel 15 quinto modo, ut ego dico; et inveniet quintum modum maxime consonum racioni. lllum enim oportet ponere, ex quo ponitur substancia sic actualiter qualis. Et illa non habundat in superfluis, cum ponit omnem rem esse substanciam, et accidencia esse modos substanciarum; et 20non habebitur medium ad eligendum quartam opinionem F.86^ pro naturali, et aliquam trium | viarum pro super- naturali, Si enim fuisset ordinatum sic a deo fore in- with the substance, causing thc appearances which it causes naturally; or the accidents themselves cause them ; or the whole world might be accident without substance. My opinion is more reasonable than any of these; uality is the substance itself, as being thus or thus. | very thing is fringibile eternaliter, sic fuisset pure naturale; et quod Ev substance; dicit quarta posicio fuisset de superfluo supernaturali; a5sed quis scit an uno illorum modorum fuit, an altero, cum quelibet eorum sit deo eque possibilis? Ideo apparet infatue assertum ab opinione quod quelibet via preter suam est supernaturalis. Similiter, quoad responsionem videtur mihi quod non 3o satisfacit argumentis in responsione. Namque ad primum argumentum patet quod sic opinans non potest cognoscere infallibiliter miraculum; nec scit infallibiliter utrum miraculum esset quod qualitatem informaret, vel esset; quia bene scit quod probabile est esse de communi 35cursu nature quod qualitas sit sine subiecto, aut quod non sit tale absolutum, stantibus apercius naturalibus sicud modo. Et tunc foret miraculum talem qualitatem informare; quia per se a deo preter cursum nature: et hoc est miraculum. Non igitur scitur quod si sic fieret, 39. MS. fiarc. 14. Quarto. I can find no trace of what this fourth opinion really was. accidents arc but its modcs. Which of thesc opinions is true? each is equally possible to God. Besides, thc answers to thc objections arc not satisfactory. It were impossible to know whether the miracle consists in making the accidents exist without or with a subject; if cither is possible, either may be according to nature, and the reverse would be a miracle.
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124 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. IV. hoc esset miraculum, quia scitur cognoscibilem esse im- possibilem. Ulterius considera quam leve dictum est quod accidens potest esse substancia et quod caliditas per se est accidens, et tamen potest sine condicione esse non accidens. Facilius enim esset hominem fore asinum, cum: minus differant. Ulterius considera de essenciali specie, quod auctores diviserunt ens et sua membra usque ad speciem spe- cialissimam sufficienter per opposita, ut declarabitur principio naturalium; sic quod ex opposito essencialiter 1o distinguntur substancia et accidens; et quicquid est substancia, de essencia eius est quod sit substancia. Quia, si quidlibet posset mutaret in quidlibet, nulla if that were possible, there esset perfeccio essencialis, nec unum esset relico essen- would no longer be any essential cialiter perfeccius, et perversetur totus ordo nature, cum 15 perfection, nor nullus finis sit melior modus ad finem. Cum igitur sint degrees of perfection in per se species talium rerum, ille sunt cognoscibiles ab the world. Substance and homine, et illa nomina imponibilia sic per accidens accideut would be mere names speciebus. Non enim cognoscitur debite quid est acci- that might be given at random dentale, nisi precognita quid sit substanciale. to anything. Similiter, quoad solucionem secundi argumenti, patet We are here groping like ex dictis quod nemo sic opinans scit quod talis operacio blind men; is accidentis sit naturaliter operacio substancie, nisi con- the action of accident and iectura levi, sicud cecus proicit baculum; quia certum substance one? but there must est quod sic opinans habet dicere quod sunt due acciones, 25 be two, qualitatis et subiecti; et due difficultates, cum accio independent of each other, qualitatis posset manere, accione substancie cessante et since their sources are econtra; et eque, sicut oportet deum concausare ad independent. unam, oportet ipsum concausare ad aliam ad hoc [ut Yet there can be perficiatur. Nec posset substancia in talem accionem, but one, since God, sustaining nisi deus suppleret vicem accidentis, sicud nec econtra. the accident Posito igitur quod a substancia, et b qualitas, agant alone in its operation, does eque difficiles acciones, patet quod deus facit utrumque no more than accionem totaliter, nec plus concausat corupta substancia, when He sustains it with et b continuante eandem accionem, quam concausat 35 its substance. utroque manente; sicud eque potens est homo con- servatus a deo sine celo, sicud esset celo conservante. Nihil enim posset quicquid facere, nisi deus supleret vicem infinitorum que possent illud conservare. Being is essentially divided into substance and accident, and thus neither can become the other ; 20 30 5. MS. azim generally album. 10. MS. p. ilm. 14. MS. nisi vel pro nec unum. 18. MS. impossibilia? 29. MS. 9cor and below; ib. ut deest. 37. Sine celo. Without the influence of the Primum mobile.
124 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. IV. hoc esset miraculum, quia scitur cognoscibilem esse im- possibilem. Ulterius considera quam leve dictum est quod accidens potest esse substancia et quod caliditas per se est accidens, et tamen potest sine condicione esse non accidens. Facilius enim esset hominem fore asinum, cum: minus differant. Ulterius considera de essenciali specie, quod auctores diviserunt ens et sua membra usque ad speciem spe- cialissimam sufficienter per opposita, ut declarabitur principio naturalium; sic quod ex opposito essencialiter 1o distinguntur substancia et accidens; et quicquid est substancia, de essencia eius est quod sit substancia. Quia, si quidlibet posset mutaret in quidlibet, nulla if that were possible, there esset perfeccio essencialis, nec unum esset relico essen- would no longer be any essential cialiter perfeccius, et perversetur totus ordo nature, cum 15 perfection, nor nullus finis sit melior modus ad finem. Cum igitur sint degrees of perfection in per se species talium rerum, ille sunt cognoscibiles ab the world. Substance and homine, et illa nomina imponibilia sic per accidens accideut would be mere names speciebus. Non enim cognoscitur debite quid est acci- that might be given at random dentale, nisi precognita quid sit substanciale. to anything. Similiter, quoad solucionem secundi argumenti, patet We are here groping like ex dictis quod nemo sic opinans scit quod talis operacio blind men; is accidentis sit naturaliter operacio substancie, nisi con- the action of accident and iectura levi, sicud cecus proicit baculum; quia certum substance one? but there must est quod sic opinans habet dicere quod sunt due acciones, 25 be two, qualitatis et subiecti; et due difficultates, cum accio independent of each other, qualitatis posset manere, accione substancie cessante et since their sources are econtra; et eque, sicut oportet deum concausare ad independent. unam, oportet ipsum concausare ad aliam ad hoc [ut Yet there can be perficiatur. Nec posset substancia in talem accionem, but one, since God, sustaining nisi deus suppleret vicem accidentis, sicud nec econtra. the accident Posito igitur quod a substancia, et b qualitas, agant alone in its operation, does eque difficiles acciones, patet quod deus facit utrumque no more than accionem totaliter, nec plus concausat corupta substancia, when He sustains it with et b continuante eandem accionem, quam concausat 35 its substance. utroque manente; sicud eque potens est homo con- servatus a deo sine celo, sicud esset celo conservante. Nihil enim posset quicquid facere, nisi deus supleret vicem infinitorum que possent illud conservare. Being is essentially divided into substance and accident, and thus neither can become the other ; 20 30 5. MS. azim generally album. 10. MS. p. ilm. 14. MS. nisi vel pro nec unum. 18. MS. impossibilia? 29. MS. 9cor and below; ib. ut deest. 37. Sine celo. Without the influence of the Primum mobile.
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CAP. IV. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 125 F. 87° Ulterius, quoad primam confirmacionem, patet quod speculacio vel felicitas non denominat hominem, nisi ipsum esse felicem aut speculantem; et certum est quod hominem esse non est ita bonum sicud ipsum esse feli- 5 cem; et hoc invenies universaliter in omni accidente, quod denominacio sua communicatur cum denominante substancie quam presupponit. Ex quo sequitur quod simpliciter pocius facit accidens suum subiectum quam illius subiecti forma substancialis. [Nemo] enim dubitat 10 quin simpliciter eligibilius est esse felicem quam esse hominem; et per consequens melius. Quoad solucionem secunde confirmacionis, patet quod accidens non indiget subiecto conservante, cum esset naturaliter sine illo, ita quod si conservet, hoc est actualiter sicud qualitas con- 15 servat subiectum ut calor hominem, sicut anima causat compositum. Primo ad solucionem tercie confirmacionis, patet quod non potest cognosci ab homine quiditas substancie, nisi talis res per se existens et agens con- formiter ut substancia, esset substancia; nam, admisso 20 hoc, essent infinita accidencia: ut patet de accione, quan- titate, et aliis respectibus. Igitur esset aliqua substancia que substaret illis. Si igitur deus potest transmutare adeo naturam qualitatis, quod potest facere illam per se esse et agere, multo magis vel a pari potest unire If God can make an 25 illam materie prime, quam excedit in perfeccione; et accident exist facere quodammodo unum ex illis. Sic enim facit de by itself, He can still more rebus tantum distantibus. Non igitur potest isti vie ponere easily unite it to primordial raciones essenciales, cum omnia talia sunt accidencia matter, which is less perfect. quoad deum. 30 Similiter, quoad solucionem tercii argumenti, videtur The answers mply that God mirabile quod deus sit per se magis fallax quam aliqua is capable of deceiving us, res causata. Modicam enim certitudinem haberet homo and is more in eius doctrina adherendo sic per locum ab auctoritate, deceitful than anything in the si sit plus deceptivus hominis quam aliqua res causata. world. 35 Nec igitur imputaretur homini error talis, nec posset esse racio quare deus immediate deciperet; sed omnem If a quality be separable from its snbject, the latter only sustains it actually, as a fact, not necessarily. If any thing exists by itself and acts just like a substance, it is a substance: if not, there is no way to know what it is. Happiness merely means 'a man being happy', and it is surely a quality which adds something to 'man'. 6. MS. denoite. 8. MS. perfectis pro pocius. 9. MS. nemo deest. 19. MS. quin altered to mihi. 22. MS. substarent. 19. This goes well to the root of the matter ; it is a principle that could not fail, sooner or later, to set Wyclif in opposition with the dogma of Transubstantiation. See what I have said at length on the Scholastic idea of reality in De Simonia, Intro- duction.
CAP. IV. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 125 F. 87° Ulterius, quoad primam confirmacionem, patet quod speculacio vel felicitas non denominat hominem, nisi ipsum esse felicem aut speculantem; et certum est quod hominem esse non est ita bonum sicud ipsum esse feli- 5 cem; et hoc invenies universaliter in omni accidente, quod denominacio sua communicatur cum denominante substancie quam presupponit. Ex quo sequitur quod simpliciter pocius facit accidens suum subiectum quam illius subiecti forma substancialis. [Nemo] enim dubitat 10 quin simpliciter eligibilius est esse felicem quam esse hominem; et per consequens melius. Quoad solucionem secunde confirmacionis, patet quod accidens non indiget subiecto conservante, cum esset naturaliter sine illo, ita quod si conservet, hoc est actualiter sicud qualitas con- 15 servat subiectum ut calor hominem, sicut anima causat compositum. Primo ad solucionem tercie confirmacionis, patet quod non potest cognosci ab homine quiditas substancie, nisi talis res per se existens et agens con- formiter ut substancia, esset substancia; nam, admisso 20 hoc, essent infinita accidencia: ut patet de accione, quan- titate, et aliis respectibus. Igitur esset aliqua substancia que substaret illis. Si igitur deus potest transmutare adeo naturam qualitatis, quod potest facere illam per se esse et agere, multo magis vel a pari potest unire If God can make an 25 illam materie prime, quam excedit in perfeccione; et accident exist facere quodammodo unum ex illis. Sic enim facit de by itself, He can still more rebus tantum distantibus. Non igitur potest isti vie ponere easily unite it to primordial raciones essenciales, cum omnia talia sunt accidencia matter, which is less perfect. quoad deum. 30 Similiter, quoad solucionem tercii argumenti, videtur The answers mply that God mirabile quod deus sit per se magis fallax quam aliqua is capable of deceiving us, res causata. Modicam enim certitudinem haberet homo and is more in eius doctrina adherendo sic per locum ab auctoritate, deceitful than anything in the si sit plus deceptivus hominis quam aliqua res causata. world. 35 Nec igitur imputaretur homini error talis, nec posset esse racio quare deus immediate deciperet; sed omnem If a quality be separable from its snbject, the latter only sustains it actually, as a fact, not necessarily. If any thing exists by itself and acts just like a substance, it is a substance: if not, there is no way to know what it is. Happiness merely means 'a man being happy', and it is surely a quality which adds something to 'man'. 6. MS. denoite. 8. MS. perfectis pro pocius. 9. MS. nemo deest. 19. MS. quin altered to mihi. 22. MS. substarent. 19. This goes well to the root of the matter ; it is a principle that could not fail, sooner or later, to set Wyclif in opposition with the dogma of Transubstantiation. See what I have said at length on the Scholastic idea of reality in De Simonia, Intro- duction.
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126 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. IV. decepcionem possibilem communicare potest causato, cum non sit magnum ipsum excedere in deceptitate. Et semper est in qualibet tali responsione peticio ignoti de naturali et spirituali, ut docebitur octavo libro. Quantum ad solucionem prime instancie, patet quod The answer to the argument est quedam theologizacio. Per idem enim determinatur about a world of accidents is quod deus, gracia communicanda bonitatem suam, cau- a theological saret infinitas intelligencias, ut dixerunt Avicenna et juggle. It would go to Algazel; immo, cum maxima sit cuicunque philosopho 10 prove an endless number naturali quod non sint plura phisologice ponenda, ubi of created pauciora sufficiunt pro omni signo salvando naturaliter spirits, if this world were one concludente: et omne argumentum ab effectu captum of substances only because ad probandum talia accidentia esse, potest salvari, po- more perfect. A natural nendo illa non esse res absolutas, sed] modos sub- philosopher ought never to stanciarum, ut patuit et patebit. Sequitur quod non sit posit more phisologicum ponere accidencia huiusmodi absoluta: et things where fewer suffice to illa maxima asserta probari potest. Nam supponendum explain all. est deum et naturam semper meliori modo et breviori Substances and their modes are agere, ubi argumentum non convincit oppositum. Igitur, 20 amply sufficient. No argument cum nullum argumentum probat tantam multitudinem can prove such rerum, videtur esse probandum quod non sunt res F. 87" a vast multitude of accidental tales, sed modi substanciarum. Sic enim salvari possunt entities; and therefore we omnis experiencie certitudo sue naturalis, et non iuxta ought naturally opinionem oppositam, que nihil scit, sed quadam levi 25 to conclude that such do not coniectura suspicatur veritates. exist. Quantum ad solucionem secunde confirmacionis, patet Quality, according to quod non sequitur opinionem Aristotelis, qui diceret Aristotle, makes quod informacio tali qualitatis esset accidens quo forma- a being to be such; liter subiectum esset quale. Ipsa enim posita, vel ab-30 soluta ponitur, vel aufertur corespondenter quod sub- but an absolute iectum est tale; et per consequens ipsa immediate et accident does formaliter denominans subiectum esse tale est qualitas, not, whether separate from et non illa res absoluta que remote facit subiectum its subject, or therein (at least accidentaliter quale, ut deus et anima. Quandocunque intrinsically and aliqua res secundum se totam producitur, sic quod immediately). materia non fuit in potencia res talis: tunc creatur, sicud adnihilatur si secundum se totam corum- peretur et in nullam talem accionem potest causatum, vel facit subiectum recipiens quod productum non 40 creatur. 15 35 15. MS. sed deest. 22. MS. pland) pro probandum.
126 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. IV. decepcionem possibilem communicare potest causato, cum non sit magnum ipsum excedere in deceptitate. Et semper est in qualibet tali responsione peticio ignoti de naturali et spirituali, ut docebitur octavo libro. Quantum ad solucionem prime instancie, patet quod The answer to the argument est quedam theologizacio. Per idem enim determinatur about a world of accidents is quod deus, gracia communicanda bonitatem suam, cau- a theological saret infinitas intelligencias, ut dixerunt Avicenna et juggle. It would go to Algazel; immo, cum maxima sit cuicunque philosopho 10 prove an endless number naturali quod non sint plura phisologice ponenda, ubi of created pauciora sufficiunt pro omni signo salvando naturaliter spirits, if this world were one concludente: et omne argumentum ab effectu captum of substances only because ad probandum talia accidentia esse, potest salvari, po- more perfect. A natural nendo illa non esse res absolutas, sed] modos sub- philosopher ought never to stanciarum, ut patuit et patebit. Sequitur quod non sit posit more phisologicum ponere accidencia huiusmodi absoluta: et things where fewer suffice to illa maxima asserta probari potest. Nam supponendum explain all. est deum et naturam semper meliori modo et breviori Substances and their modes are agere, ubi argumentum non convincit oppositum. Igitur, 20 amply sufficient. No argument cum nullum argumentum probat tantam multitudinem can prove such rerum, videtur esse probandum quod non sunt res F. 87" a vast multitude of accidental tales, sed modi substanciarum. Sic enim salvari possunt entities; and therefore we omnis experiencie certitudo sue naturalis, et non iuxta ought naturally opinionem oppositam, que nihil scit, sed quadam levi 25 to conclude that such do not coniectura suspicatur veritates. exist. Quantum ad solucionem secunde confirmacionis, patet Quality, according to quod non sequitur opinionem Aristotelis, qui diceret Aristotle, makes quod informacio tali qualitatis esset accidens quo forma- a being to be such; liter subiectum esset quale. Ipsa enim posita, vel ab-30 soluta ponitur, vel aufertur corespondenter quod sub- but an absolute iectum est tale; et per consequens ipsa immediate et accident does formaliter denominans subiectum esse tale est qualitas, not, whether separate from et non illa res absoluta que remote facit subiectum its subject, or therein (at least accidentaliter quale, ut deus et anima. Quandocunque intrinsically and aliqua res secundum se totam producitur, sic quod immediately). materia non fuit in potencia res talis: tunc creatur, sicud adnihilatur si secundum se totam corum- peretur et in nullam talem accionem potest causatum, vel facit subiectum recipiens quod productum non 40 creatur. 15 35 15. MS. sed deest. 22. MS. pland) pro probandum.
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CAP. IV. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 127 Quantum ad solucionem secunde confirmacionis, vi- The answer that we, and detur mihi quod non satisfacit. Ponit enim sequelam not the quality of sensation, naturalem esse consequenciam impossibilem. Certum experience enim est quod stat et actum senciendi qualitatis, si sit feeling, implies that the 5 absoluta res mediate naturaliter, sine sensacione sui consequence I naturally drew subiecti, ut alibi docebitur. Non autem potest sic esse, is impossible. si qualitas sit substanciam esse qualem. Et patet quare If the act of feeling (by accidencia, que sunt modi subiectorum, inducunt in which I am thus) is an cognicionem illorum; non autem de necessitate vera absolute entity, to res absoluta causata inducit in cognicionem cuiuscunque it is separable and can feel sue cause, quamvis ipsa cognoscatur. Bruta enim without me. This difficulty cognoscunt quiditates talium accidencium, sicud cognos- does not exist in cuntur quiditates hominum, bestiarum, et mixtorum quibus the other theory. Animals know nutriuntur et de quibus habent experiencias. Et certum what things are, and how they 15 est quod illa non cognoscunt nisi de substancia quod are — hot, sit talis vel talis, ut calida, dulcis, etc. Igitur data acci- sweet &c. This knowledge dencia, cognita et brutis, sunt modi substanciarum. is of modes of substances ; for Non enim cognoscit brutum quod talis res absoluta they certainly est accidens, nec (ut credo) aliqua res mundi. Si tamen have no idea of absolute 20 esset qualitas res absoluta, sequitur cum veris quod accidents, as they should, omne senciens haberet intencionem absolutam prius if the theory naturaliter signantem qualitatem quam sit intencio signans were true. We have two substanciam. Et ultra sequitur cum veris quod omne apprehensions, sic senciens cognoscit substanciam signatam distingui ab one of the accidents, 25 accidente, eo quod cognoscit utrumque actum, et appre- another of the hensum utroque cognoscit esse. Et ex illo sequitur substance; if the subject ulterius quod non stat sentire accidens, et postmodum could disappear, the accidents subiectum corumpi, stante utraque intencione apprehensa, remaining, the second act nisi cognoscatur subiectum corumpi: quod est inpossibile. ought also to 30 Et consequencia patet per hoc quod quelibet sensus disappear; and we should know cognoscens suam cognicionem, cognoscit privacionem its existence by that substancie cognoscibilis, cum oppositorum idem sit disci- disappearance, plina; ut, cognoscendo quod album movetur, satis per- since contradictories cipit visu, post motum, privacionem cognoscibilis motus: are apprehended 35 et sic universaliter de cuiuscunque sensualis cognoscibilis by the same act. privacione [per] adnihilacionem substancie sensibilis, stantibus accidentibus. 24. MS. 9gacm. 32. MS. oppot; ib. scit. 36. MS. per deest.
CAP. IV. DE ACTIBUS ANIME. 127 Quantum ad solucionem secunde confirmacionis, vi- The answer that we, and detur mihi quod non satisfacit. Ponit enim sequelam not the quality of sensation, naturalem esse consequenciam impossibilem. Certum experience enim est quod stat et actum senciendi qualitatis, si sit feeling, implies that the 5 absoluta res mediate naturaliter, sine sensacione sui consequence I naturally drew subiecti, ut alibi docebitur. Non autem potest sic esse, is impossible. si qualitas sit substanciam esse qualem. Et patet quare If the act of feeling (by accidencia, que sunt modi subiectorum, inducunt in which I am thus) is an cognicionem illorum; non autem de necessitate vera absolute entity, to res absoluta causata inducit in cognicionem cuiuscunque it is separable and can feel sue cause, quamvis ipsa cognoscatur. Bruta enim without me. This difficulty cognoscunt quiditates talium accidencium, sicud cognos- does not exist in cuntur quiditates hominum, bestiarum, et mixtorum quibus the other theory. Animals know nutriuntur et de quibus habent experiencias. Et certum what things are, and how they 15 est quod illa non cognoscunt nisi de substancia quod are — hot, sit talis vel talis, ut calida, dulcis, etc. Igitur data acci- sweet &c. This knowledge dencia, cognita et brutis, sunt modi substanciarum. is of modes of substances ; for Non enim cognoscit brutum quod talis res absoluta they certainly est accidens, nec (ut credo) aliqua res mundi. Si tamen have no idea of absolute 20 esset qualitas res absoluta, sequitur cum veris quod accidents, as they should, omne senciens haberet intencionem absolutam prius if the theory naturaliter signantem qualitatem quam sit intencio signans were true. We have two substanciam. Et ultra sequitur cum veris quod omne apprehensions, sic senciens cognoscit substanciam signatam distingui ab one of the accidents, 25 accidente, eo quod cognoscit utrumque actum, et appre- another of the hensum utroque cognoscit esse. Et ex illo sequitur substance; if the subject ulterius quod non stat sentire accidens, et postmodum could disappear, the accidents subiectum corumpi, stante utraque intencione apprehensa, remaining, the second act nisi cognoscatur subiectum corumpi: quod est inpossibile. ought also to 30 Et consequencia patet per hoc quod quelibet sensus disappear; and we should know cognoscens suam cognicionem, cognoscit privacionem its existence by that substancie cognoscibilis, cum oppositorum idem sit disci- disappearance, plina; ut, cognoscendo quod album movetur, satis per- since contradictories cipit visu, post motum, privacionem cognoscibilis motus: are apprehended 35 et sic universaliter de cuiuscunque sensualis cognoscibilis by the same act. privacione [per] adnihilacionem substancie sensibilis, stantibus accidentibus. 24. MS. 9gacm. 32. MS. oppot; ib. scit. 36. MS. per deest.
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REPLICACIO DE UNIVERSALIBUS. In Cod. Holmiens.: Tractatus Wyklefl methaphysicl per manus Mag. Joh. Hus de an. 1398. A 77 B 102" Presentem agrediendo replicacionis materiam in 3s partes, distingo eam secundum tria puncta eiusdem replicacionis fundamentalia: quarum prima pars cuiusdam supposicionis materiam ennarrat; secunda duarum con- clusionum cum quibusdam anectendis sentenciam ex- 10 planat; tercia quedam correlaria earundem conclusionum exarat. Posuit igitur magister meus reverendus primo in sua determinacione, pro supposicione, istud: aliquid esse hominem est humanitas alicuius, et aliquid currere, est 15 cursus alicuius: et sic de aliis. Probavit hoc sic; [id quo aliquid est homo, hoc est ipsum esse hominem; sed humanitas est huius modi, igitur supposicio vera. Primam partem probat sic; quia esse hominem aliquid est actus substancialis quo aliquid est homo; sic Sortem currere 20 est veritas qua verum est quod Sors currit; et talis est cursus Sortis, cum a cursu Sortis Sortes currit. Contra quam supposicionem posui conclusionem pri- mam istam: nichil quod est currere, est cursus alicuius. Probatur. Quodlibet ens quod vere dicitur currere, est 25 currere; nullus cursus alicuius est ens quod vere dicitur currere; ergo, aliquid currere non est cursus alicuius; pari racione, et quodlibet currere non est cursus This work consists of three parts: The examination of an assumption, of two opposite conclusions, and several corollaries. Wyclif's assumption is that humanity is something being a man, and so of all like terms. Proved thus: Humanity is that by which anything is a man; . ., it is its being a man. For this, by which, is a substantial actuality, intrinsic to man. Thus, Socrates running is Socrates run: the running makes it true that he runs. This I deny, That which is running, is not a run of anybody. For running is not a being of which we can A = Cod. Holmiens. B = MS. Univ. Prag. III. G. 10. say that it runs. f. 102°—119°. 7. quorum A. 10. questoria A. 11. exclarat A. 15. id deest AB. 18. probavit B. 9
REPLICACIO DE UNIVERSALIBUS. In Cod. Holmiens.: Tractatus Wyklefl methaphysicl per manus Mag. Joh. Hus de an. 1398. A 77 B 102" Presentem agrediendo replicacionis materiam in 3s partes, distingo eam secundum tria puncta eiusdem replicacionis fundamentalia: quarum prima pars cuiusdam supposicionis materiam ennarrat; secunda duarum con- clusionum cum quibusdam anectendis sentenciam ex- 10 planat; tercia quedam correlaria earundem conclusionum exarat. Posuit igitur magister meus reverendus primo in sua determinacione, pro supposicione, istud: aliquid esse hominem est humanitas alicuius, et aliquid currere, est 15 cursus alicuius: et sic de aliis. Probavit hoc sic; [id quo aliquid est homo, hoc est ipsum esse hominem; sed humanitas est huius modi, igitur supposicio vera. Primam partem probat sic; quia esse hominem aliquid est actus substancialis quo aliquid est homo; sic Sortem currere 20 est veritas qua verum est quod Sors currit; et talis est cursus Sortis, cum a cursu Sortis Sortes currit. Contra quam supposicionem posui conclusionem pri- mam istam: nichil quod est currere, est cursus alicuius. Probatur. Quodlibet ens quod vere dicitur currere, est 25 currere; nullus cursus alicuius est ens quod vere dicitur currere; ergo, aliquid currere non est cursus alicuius; pari racione, et quodlibet currere non est cursus This work consists of three parts: The examination of an assumption, of two opposite conclusions, and several corollaries. Wyclif's assumption is that humanity is something being a man, and so of all like terms. Proved thus: Humanity is that by which anything is a man; . ., it is its being a man. For this, by which, is a substantial actuality, intrinsic to man. Thus, Socrates running is Socrates run: the running makes it true that he runs. This I deny, That which is running, is not a run of anybody. For running is not a being of which we can A = Cod. Holmiens. B = MS. Univ. Prag. III. G. 10. say that it runs. f. 102°—119°. 7. quorum A. 10. questoria A. 11. exclarat A. 15. id deest AB. 18. probavit B. 9
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130 JOHANNIS WYCLIF It follows that Wyclif's assumption cannot be upheld. “Humanity is that by which anything is a man; yes, but not as a part of man; as the whole. “Socrates running makes it true that he runs," yes; but it does not follow that it is, therefore, his run. Wyclif denies that running is not a run, unless we equivocate between running in two senses. What is truly said to be is a being; but it does not follow that what is truly said to be running is a run. alicuius. Maior patet, quia omne ens quod vere dicitur currere, est currere; et si non, dabitur causa quare non. Sed minor probatur; quia nihil vere dicitur currere nisi quod currit; sed nullus cursus alicuius currit, ut notum est. Ex ista conclusione intuli corrollarium tale: id quod magister posuit pro supposicione, scilicet, aliquid esse hominem est humanitas alicuius, et aliquid currere est cursus alicuius, non est sustinendum; quia ex conclusione dicta, que vera est, sequitur oppositum contrarium illius 10 quod posuit pro supposicione. Sed ad racionem qua arguebat sic: quo aliquid est homo, hoc est ipsum esse hominem; sed humanitas est huiusmodi [etc.];" capiendo humanitatem pro quidditate parciali hominis, negatur maior universaliter; intelligendo 15 eam, capiendo humanitatem pro quidditate totali ho- minis, conceditur maior et minor. Et tunc per hoc nihil arguitur ad propositum, eciam quando arguit sic: “Sortem currere est veritas, qua verum est quod Sors currit;" conceditur: “et eciam est cursus Sortis" negatur 20 illa: nam Sortem currere est Sors currens, et non cursus Sortis. Et quando assumitur a cursu Sortis, Sors currit, conceditur; et si infertur; ergo Sortem currere est cursus alicuius, negatur consequencia. Reverendus magister replicando negavit istam: nichil 25 quod est currere est cursus alicuius. Subiunxit causam: quia opus naturale in viventibus est generare sibi simile (2° de anima). Et ad racionem qua persuasi eandem, dixit, quando arguitur: quodlibet ens quod vere dicitur currere est currere, non equivocando currere, negavit 30 hoc. Et quando arguebam: quodlibet ens quod vere dicitur esse, est esse; igitur eciam et sic quod dicitur currere est currere, negavit consequenciam. Et causam negacionis subiunxit istam: quia esse dicit actum sub- stancialem rei qui cum reliquis est idem; currere autem 35 actum accidentalem; igitur stat totum substanciale rei esse idem et eiusdem essencie cum re; non sic autem 12. quam A. 14. etc. deest AB. 17. concedatur A. 19. quia B. 23. 9r = concedetur A. 20. tum pro eciam A. 22. accursu A. 30. concedendo A. 24. contra A. 35. rebus (?) 34. distinguit A. pro reliquis AB. 3. Currere. A part of the argument is wanting here. See a little further at the refutation.
130 JOHANNIS WYCLIF It follows that Wyclif's assumption cannot be upheld. “Humanity is that by which anything is a man; yes, but not as a part of man; as the whole. “Socrates running makes it true that he runs," yes; but it does not follow that it is, therefore, his run. Wyclif denies that running is not a run, unless we equivocate between running in two senses. What is truly said to be is a being; but it does not follow that what is truly said to be running is a run. alicuius. Maior patet, quia omne ens quod vere dicitur currere, est currere; et si non, dabitur causa quare non. Sed minor probatur; quia nihil vere dicitur currere nisi quod currit; sed nullus cursus alicuius currit, ut notum est. Ex ista conclusione intuli corrollarium tale: id quod magister posuit pro supposicione, scilicet, aliquid esse hominem est humanitas alicuius, et aliquid currere est cursus alicuius, non est sustinendum; quia ex conclusione dicta, que vera est, sequitur oppositum contrarium illius 10 quod posuit pro supposicione. Sed ad racionem qua arguebat sic: quo aliquid est homo, hoc est ipsum esse hominem; sed humanitas est huiusmodi [etc.];" capiendo humanitatem pro quidditate parciali hominis, negatur maior universaliter; intelligendo 15 eam, capiendo humanitatem pro quidditate totali ho- minis, conceditur maior et minor. Et tunc per hoc nihil arguitur ad propositum, eciam quando arguit sic: “Sortem currere est veritas, qua verum est quod Sors currit;" conceditur: “et eciam est cursus Sortis" negatur 20 illa: nam Sortem currere est Sors currens, et non cursus Sortis. Et quando assumitur a cursu Sortis, Sors currit, conceditur; et si infertur; ergo Sortem currere est cursus alicuius, negatur consequencia. Reverendus magister replicando negavit istam: nichil 25 quod est currere est cursus alicuius. Subiunxit causam: quia opus naturale in viventibus est generare sibi simile (2° de anima). Et ad racionem qua persuasi eandem, dixit, quando arguitur: quodlibet ens quod vere dicitur currere est currere, non equivocando currere, negavit 30 hoc. Et quando arguebam: quodlibet ens quod vere dicitur esse, est esse; igitur eciam et sic quod dicitur currere est currere, negavit consequenciam. Et causam negacionis subiunxit istam: quia esse dicit actum sub- stancialem rei qui cum reliquis est idem; currere autem 35 actum accidentalem; igitur stat totum substanciale rei esse idem et eiusdem essencie cum re; non sic autem 12. quam A. 14. etc. deest AB. 17. concedatur A. 19. quia B. 23. 9r = concedetur A. 20. tum pro eciam A. 22. accursu A. 30. concedendo A. 24. contra A. 35. rebus (?) 34. distinguit A. pro reliquis AB. 3. Currere. A part of the argument is wanting here. See a little further at the refutation.
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REPLICACIO DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 131 de esse accidentali. Eciam negavit minorem: scilicet, nullus cursus alicuius est ens quod vere dicitur currere; A 77" et quando arguebam pro minori (sic: | nichil vere dicitur He points out, currere nisi quod currit) negavit illam; et causam ne- js trulyeallcd a 5 gacionis posuit illam, quia opus [naturale in viventibus] "ving pen est generare; igitur dicitur generare, et tamen non yet ‘natural’ generat. Et quando intuli in eadem conclusione mea rate prima quod ‘esse hominem est humanitas, et currere conus my is alicuius est cursus alicuius, non est sustinendum;?? respon- false. 10 debat quod verum esset, si conclusio mea prima esset vera; sed quia non, igitur etc. Et quando respondebam ad racionem sue supposicionis, concedendo quod Sortem currere est veritas qua verum est quod Sors currit, et ulterius negando quod talis veritas est cursus Sortis (et 15 subiungebam quod Sortem currere est Sors currens); et quando negavi illacionem: *'igitur Sortem currere Wyclif's point . . . 1s a efru est cursus alicuius"; arguebat ad probandam illam con- of anything and i 1c: 1 i ; 1 1 . its entity are sequenciam, SIC: idem est veritas rei et entitas universa identical. liter; sic igitur [quia] Sortem currere est veritas qua As therefore, . . runs 1s the 20verum est quod Sors currit (ut ego concessi) wultiruth about A's i , 1 1 it: running, magister quod Sors currit erit entitas, qua Sors currit; perefore is an et talis est cursus Sortis; quia cursus Sortis est talis entity by which . . . . runs. entitas a qua Sors currit. Sic arguenda est entitas a qua Sors est currens. 25 Ad quam racionem primam suam respondebam quando ent I take a . . . . istinction as to arguebat sic: Opus naturale in viventibus est generare the example he . . . . o . . . . . . . ives. sibi simile (2° de anima). Distinxi illam; nam, capiendo ję S stara] opus pro re operata, tunc opus naturale est generare action means są. . . . is done sibi simile, quia tunc opus naturale est res operata I grant it, but i ibi simi ia his sense is 3o naturaliter, qua eadem res est generare sibi simile, quia "IP Aevant tunc generat sibi simile, sicud homo; sed iste sensus Je it means the . . . 1vi non est hic ad propositum. Sed capiendo opus pro being, 1 deny B actu operantis, negavi illam primam ‘‘opus naturale etc.” Sed opus quo vivens naturaliter generans sibi simile, ut 35 vivere, dicitur formaliter, naturaliter generare sibi simile est naturale viventi. Kt sic debet intelligi illud philo- sophi, 2% de anima, quando dicit quod naturale opus est viventibus generare sibi simile. Sed quando arguebam, Again, Wyclif "quodcunque dicitur esse est esse; igitur quodcunque analogy between emg an 1. accidentale B; ib. negat B. 2. unus B. — 5. naturale in viventibus deest AB. — 6. tm B. 7. ex pro in A. — 9. sustinendus B. 11. ctc. deest A ; ib. eciam (7) pro et A. 15. subiungebant AB. 1G. quia deest AR 20 est deest B. — 21. Sortem A. 24. currit est A. 28—29. tunc — tunc deest A. — 3o. materiuliter B. — 33. primam A. 9*
REPLICACIO DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 131 de esse accidentali. Eciam negavit minorem: scilicet, nullus cursus alicuius est ens quod vere dicitur currere; A 77" et quando arguebam pro minori (sic: | nichil vere dicitur He points out, currere nisi quod currit) negavit illam; et causam ne- js trulyeallcd a 5 gacionis posuit illam, quia opus [naturale in viventibus] "ving pen est generare; igitur dicitur generare, et tamen non yet ‘natural’ generat. Et quando intuli in eadem conclusione mea rate prima quod ‘esse hominem est humanitas, et currere conus my is alicuius est cursus alicuius, non est sustinendum;?? respon- false. 10 debat quod verum esset, si conclusio mea prima esset vera; sed quia non, igitur etc. Et quando respondebam ad racionem sue supposicionis, concedendo quod Sortem currere est veritas qua verum est quod Sors currit, et ulterius negando quod talis veritas est cursus Sortis (et 15 subiungebam quod Sortem currere est Sors currens); et quando negavi illacionem: *'igitur Sortem currere Wyclif's point . . . 1s a efru est cursus alicuius"; arguebat ad probandam illam con- of anything and i 1c: 1 i ; 1 1 . its entity are sequenciam, SIC: idem est veritas rei et entitas universa identical. liter; sic igitur [quia] Sortem currere est veritas qua As therefore, . . runs 1s the 20verum est quod Sors currit (ut ego concessi) wultiruth about A's i , 1 1 it: running, magister quod Sors currit erit entitas, qua Sors currit; perefore is an et talis est cursus Sortis; quia cursus Sortis est talis entity by which . . . . runs. entitas a qua Sors currit. Sic arguenda est entitas a qua Sors est currens. 25 Ad quam racionem primam suam respondebam quando ent I take a . . . . istinction as to arguebat sic: Opus naturale in viventibus est generare the example he . . . . o . . . . . . . ives. sibi simile (2° de anima). Distinxi illam; nam, capiendo ję S stara] opus pro re operata, tunc opus naturale est generare action means są. . . . is done sibi simile, quia tunc opus naturale est res operata I grant it, but i ibi simi ia his sense is 3o naturaliter, qua eadem res est generare sibi simile, quia "IP Aevant tunc generat sibi simile, sicud homo; sed iste sensus Je it means the . . . 1vi non est hic ad propositum. Sed capiendo opus pro being, 1 deny B actu operantis, negavi illam primam ‘‘opus naturale etc.” Sed opus quo vivens naturaliter generans sibi simile, ut 35 vivere, dicitur formaliter, naturaliter generare sibi simile est naturale viventi. Kt sic debet intelligi illud philo- sophi, 2% de anima, quando dicit quod naturale opus est viventibus generare sibi simile. Sed quando arguebam, Again, Wyclif "quodcunque dicitur esse est esse; igitur quodcunque analogy between emg an 1. accidentale B; ib. negat B. 2. unus B. — 5. naturale in viventibus deest AB. — 6. tm B. 7. ex pro in A. — 9. sustinendus B. 11. ctc. deest A ; ib. eciam (7) pro et A. 15. subiungebant AB. 1G. quia deest AR 20 est deest B. — 21. Sortem A. 24. currit est A. 28—29. tunc — tunc deest A. — 3o. materiuliter B. — 33. primam A. 9*
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132 JOHANNIS WYCLIF running, saying vere dicitur currere est currere," negavit consequenciam, that the latter, et assignavit talem causam; quia esse dicit actum sub- implies an accidental act ; stancialem, qui idem est cum re cuius est actus; sed currere dicit actum accidentalem, qui non est idem cum but this is to beg re cuius est actus. Hic magister petit in solucione, quia: the question, assumit hoc pro causa quod deberet probare; ideo negavi illam causam tamquam impertinentem ad pro- and my positum; scilicet quod currere est actus accidentalis, et argument esse actus substancialis. Et sic argumentum meum adhuc remains. Does he mean stat salvum; et magister meus vellet intelligere illam 10 that to run partem cause, scilicet “currere dicit actum accidentalem' implies an accident, from sic: scilicet, quod connotat actum accidentalem, per hoc which it non habet quod currere est actus accidentalis, et quod differs, as a white thing implies the currere non est currens; sicud album connotat albedinem, accident of et album non est albedo. Quis enim vellet concedere 15 whiteness which it is not? quod album esset albedo, ad illum sensum quod eadem This were again essencia secundum speciem est communis albo et albe- to beg the question. dini? Sed hoc iterum esset petere in materia propo- sita. Et quando ulterius arguebam: "nichil vere dicitur 20 Wyclif's argument about currere, nisi quod currit," negavit causam ex tali causa: generation being an action Opus dicitur generare et tamen non generat. Respon- supposes it not debam, negando quod opus est generare, capiendo opus to be the thing done, but the pro actu operantis, qualiter ipse sumpsit in proposito, doing; and in that sense it is et qualiter verba philosophi in 2° de anima, que videntur 25 false. hoc innuere, sint intelligenda prius expressis. Et quando arguebat, probando consequenciam negatam, scilicet: "a cursu Sortis Sors currit; igitur Sortem currere est cursus alicuius," concessi quod idem est veritas rei et entitas universaliter] et quando inferebat sibi: “igitur Sortem currere est veritas, qua verum est quod Sors currit; Sortem currere erit entitas qua verum est quod Sors currit;" negavi consequenciam. Sed bene sequitur: ergo Sortem currere est entitas, quo verum est quod Sors currit. Et quod currere non sit cursus alicuius, arguitur specialiter, sic. Sicud se habet discere ad disciplinam A 78. 35 To run is not a running any more than, according to 1. conclusionem B. 7. causam deest B. 17. sensum substancialem A. 21. illam B. 26. in mutacione A; ib. sic pro sint A; ib. prius est ex- 31. Sor currit A. pressus A. 28. accursu A. . 32. verum est quod deest A. 33—35. negavi— currit deest B. 35. Sors currit. I cannot understand the difference between the two propositions. Noting the universaliter a few lines above, we might read, instead of Sors currit, aliquid currit.
132 JOHANNIS WYCLIF running, saying vere dicitur currere est currere," negavit consequenciam, that the latter, et assignavit talem causam; quia esse dicit actum sub- implies an accidental act ; stancialem, qui idem est cum re cuius est actus; sed currere dicit actum accidentalem, qui non est idem cum but this is to beg re cuius est actus. Hic magister petit in solucione, quia: the question, assumit hoc pro causa quod deberet probare; ideo negavi illam causam tamquam impertinentem ad pro- and my positum; scilicet quod currere est actus accidentalis, et argument esse actus substancialis. Et sic argumentum meum adhuc remains. Does he mean stat salvum; et magister meus vellet intelligere illam 10 that to run partem cause, scilicet “currere dicit actum accidentalem' implies an accident, from sic: scilicet, quod connotat actum accidentalem, per hoc which it non habet quod currere est actus accidentalis, et quod differs, as a white thing implies the currere non est currens; sicud album connotat albedinem, accident of et album non est albedo. Quis enim vellet concedere 15 whiteness which it is not? quod album esset albedo, ad illum sensum quod eadem This were again essencia secundum speciem est communis albo et albe- to beg the question. dini? Sed hoc iterum esset petere in materia propo- sita. Et quando ulterius arguebam: "nichil vere dicitur 20 Wyclif's argument about currere, nisi quod currit," negavit causam ex tali causa: generation being an action Opus dicitur generare et tamen non generat. Respon- supposes it not debam, negando quod opus est generare, capiendo opus to be the thing done, but the pro actu operantis, qualiter ipse sumpsit in proposito, doing; and in that sense it is et qualiter verba philosophi in 2° de anima, que videntur 25 false. hoc innuere, sint intelligenda prius expressis. Et quando arguebat, probando consequenciam negatam, scilicet: "a cursu Sortis Sors currit; igitur Sortem currere est cursus alicuius," concessi quod idem est veritas rei et entitas universaliter] et quando inferebat sibi: “igitur Sortem currere est veritas, qua verum est quod Sors currit; Sortem currere erit entitas qua verum est quod Sors currit;" negavi consequenciam. Sed bene sequitur: ergo Sortem currere est entitas, quo verum est quod Sors currit. Et quod currere non sit cursus alicuius, arguitur specialiter, sic. Sicud se habet discere ad disciplinam A 78. 35 To run is not a running any more than, according to 1. conclusionem B. 7. causam deest B. 17. sensum substancialem A. 21. illam B. 26. in mutacione A; ib. sic pro sint A; ib. prius est ex- 31. Sor currit A. pressus A. 28. accursu A. . 32. verum est quod deest A. 33—35. negavi— currit deest B. 35. Sors currit. I cannot understand the difference between the two propositions. Noting the universaliter a few lines above, we might read, instead of Sors currit, aliquid currit.
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REPLICACIO DE UNIVERSALIBUS. et docere ad doctrinam, sic se habet currere ad cursum; sed discere non est disciplina, nec docere est doctrina: igitur nec currere est cursus. Consequencia tenet a simili; sed antecedens pro prima parte notum est. Sed 5pro secunda parte patet ex 3? phisicorum tractatu primo capitulo ultimo, ubi philosophus dicit: "at vero, neque si doccio et doctrina idem, et discere et docere idem sunt; in quo textu secundum commentatorem, Egidium, et Scotum, philosophus videtur dicere quod idem in re 10sunt doctrina et disciplina, et idem in re non sunt discere et docere. Ex quo sequitur quod discere non est disciplina, et docere non est doctrina. Et per consequens currere non est cursus. Innuit philosophus in eadem litera quod eadem est distancia ab hoc in hoc et e 15contrario. Sed non idem est in re distare hoc ab hoc, et distare hoc ab hoc, e converso; et ex consequencia distare non est distancia; igitur nec currere est cursus, Quantum ad 2", posuit magister reverendus pro con- clusione prima istud: Universale est. Probavit eam sic: 20 Humanitas universalis est, igitur etc. Antecedens probat sic: si ego sum homo, omnis homo est homo; igitur necessarium est, ad sme esse hominem, omnem hominem esse hominem; quia, si non, sit quod ego sim homo, sine hoc quod omnis homo est homo, igitur non, si 25ego sum homo, omnis homo est homo; quod est contra antecedens, ad me esse; ex consequente, necessarium est, ad me esse hominem, omnem hominem esse ho- minem: igitur ens necessarium est, omnem hominem esse hominem, ad me esse hominem ; quod est omnem hominem 3oesse hominem; quod est humanitas, Sed non humanitas mea est omnem hominem esse hominem, nec aliqua singulariter alia, nec collecta: igitur communis. 29 pro eadem conclusione arguebat sic. Proprie prius naturaliter est prima causa quam me esse et quam 35 hominem esse; igitur per idem naturaliter est hominem esse; et essenciale est ad me esse, hominem esse: igitur eque primo naturaliter est me esse hominem, sicud 16. v contrario A; ib. consequenti B. 19. probat causa A. — 20. etc. deest A. 36. ad me esse A; deest B, ib. contin- ente B. 27. esse hominem ad me A. — 35. et quam: per idem natura- Iter est me esse et B. 37. e consequencia pono A; ib. me esse et hominem esse B. 7. docendo A. 8. Commentatorem, Averrhoés. 37. Eque primo. is ren- dered in the side notes by together with; because, in the argu- 133 Aristotle, fo earn 1s learning, or to teach is doctrine, or (although distance from onc point to another is thc same) fo be distant is distance. Wyclif's first argument in favour of the Universals, is . that if I am a man every man must bc a man; and since the one is truc, thc other necessarily is so too; but my being a man is not humanity ; theretore we must posit thc Universal Humanity. Again, the existence ot universal humanity is necessary to mine; my existence is therefore, either together with, prior to, or consequent
REPLICACIO DE UNIVERSALIBUS. et docere ad doctrinam, sic se habet currere ad cursum; sed discere non est disciplina, nec docere est doctrina: igitur nec currere est cursus. Consequencia tenet a simili; sed antecedens pro prima parte notum est. Sed 5pro secunda parte patet ex 3? phisicorum tractatu primo capitulo ultimo, ubi philosophus dicit: "at vero, neque si doccio et doctrina idem, et discere et docere idem sunt; in quo textu secundum commentatorem, Egidium, et Scotum, philosophus videtur dicere quod idem in re 10sunt doctrina et disciplina, et idem in re non sunt discere et docere. Ex quo sequitur quod discere non est disciplina, et docere non est doctrina. Et per consequens currere non est cursus. Innuit philosophus in eadem litera quod eadem est distancia ab hoc in hoc et e 15contrario. Sed non idem est in re distare hoc ab hoc, et distare hoc ab hoc, e converso; et ex consequencia distare non est distancia; igitur nec currere est cursus, Quantum ad 2", posuit magister reverendus pro con- clusione prima istud: Universale est. Probavit eam sic: 20 Humanitas universalis est, igitur etc. Antecedens probat sic: si ego sum homo, omnis homo est homo; igitur necessarium est, ad sme esse hominem, omnem hominem esse hominem; quia, si non, sit quod ego sim homo, sine hoc quod omnis homo est homo, igitur non, si 25ego sum homo, omnis homo est homo; quod est contra antecedens, ad me esse; ex consequente, necessarium est, ad me esse hominem, omnem hominem esse ho- minem: igitur ens necessarium est, omnem hominem esse hominem, ad me esse hominem ; quod est omnem hominem 3oesse hominem; quod est humanitas, Sed non humanitas mea est omnem hominem esse hominem, nec aliqua singulariter alia, nec collecta: igitur communis. 29 pro eadem conclusione arguebat sic. Proprie prius naturaliter est prima causa quam me esse et quam 35 hominem esse; igitur per idem naturaliter est hominem esse; et essenciale est ad me esse, hominem esse: igitur eque primo naturaliter est me esse hominem, sicud 16. v contrario A; ib. consequenti B. 19. probat causa A. — 20. etc. deest A. 36. ad me esse A; deest B, ib. contin- ente B. 27. esse hominem ad me A. — 35. et quam: per idem natura- Iter est me esse et B. 37. e consequencia pono A; ib. me esse et hominem esse B. 7. docendo A. 8. Commentatorem, Averrhoés. 37. Eque primo. is ren- dered in the side notes by together with; because, in the argu- 133 Aristotle, fo earn 1s learning, or to teach is doctrine, or (although distance from onc point to another is thc same) fo be distant is distance. Wyclif's first argument in favour of the Universals, is . that if I am a man every man must bc a man; and since the one is truc, thc other necessarily is so too; but my being a man is not humanity ; theretore we must posit thc Universal Humanity. Again, the existence ot universal humanity is necessary to mine; my existence is therefore, either together with, prior to, or consequent
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134 JOHANNIS WYCLIF upon that of hominem esse; vel prius naturaliter, vel posterius na- Universal turaliter. Si primum, tunc quam primo naturaliter homo Humanity. Not the first, est, ego sum; igitur, si homo est, ego sum: quod est for then if any man existed, I impossibile. Et patet consequencia; quia si est homo, should exist. et ego non sum, tunc non quam primo in natura est 3 Not the second ; hominem esse, est me esse. Si prius natura est me for then humanity would esse, quam hominem esse: igitur naturaliter prius sum not be essential quam sum homo: quod est impossibile, cum tunc non to my existence. erit mihi essenciale esse hominem. Si posterius natura Therefore universal est me esse quam hominem esse, tunc prius est hominem 10 humanity. precedes mine esse, quam me esse: quocunque priori dato preter com- in nature. munem humanitatem est impertinens 3° confirmat sic: essencialiter mea singularis humanitas est humanitas vel convertibiliter vel non. 4° quecunque albedo intensior vel maior et essencialiter perfeccior 15 esset minus intensa. 5° non scirem determinate omnem piscem maritimum esse. 6° non scirem omnem ignem esse calidum determinate, nec verum nec veritates. 7° illa predicacio est accidentalis: humanitas est sin- gularis; igitur naturaliter prius est humanitas quam 20 singularis humanitas. 8° prius naturaliter est humanitas quam mea humanitas singularis. Et quamvis magister meus posuit ultimas sex raciones sub compendio, postea tamen manifestatur earum ] intencio. Contra quam conclusionem posui meam conclusionem 25 I affirm there are no real 2dam, scilicet istam: Nullum universale reale in essendo Universal entities. est. Arguebam pro ea sic: si est universale in essendo General reale, vel est universale 2m eius esse, vel 2m eius essen- argument: If there were ciam, vel 2m eius esse et essenciam. Sed nullum illorum any, they would be universal in est verum: igitur conclusio vera. Consequencia est nota; 3o their existence (thatness) or in sed antecedens pro prima sui parte probatur, quia (whatness'ocin pluribus modis non contingit esse universale in essendo both together; reale. Sed antecedens pro 2a sui parte probatur. none of these is Et primo quod non est universale in essendo reale true. If there were secundum eius esse, quia tunc aliquod esse realiter esset 35 things universal in multis suppositis, vel aptum esset esse realiter in in their existence, then the same thatness would exist in many, and the existence of one would be that of another ; Six other arguments, briefly stated. A 78 2. pono pro primo A. 5. pono A. 13. singulariter A. 16. unius A. 19, 20. singulariter A. 21. 22. singulariter A. 24. manifestabitur A; ib. corum B. 33. proprii A. 36. suppositis in multis B. ment, the questien is not whether my singular Humanity and the Universal Humanity are prior in time, but in nature, as to dependency of one on the other. 12. Humanitatem. Probably some words are wanting immediately after this.
134 JOHANNIS WYCLIF upon that of hominem esse; vel prius naturaliter, vel posterius na- Universal turaliter. Si primum, tunc quam primo naturaliter homo Humanity. Not the first, est, ego sum; igitur, si homo est, ego sum: quod est for then if any man existed, I impossibile. Et patet consequencia; quia si est homo, should exist. et ego non sum, tunc non quam primo in natura est 3 Not the second ; hominem esse, est me esse. Si prius natura est me for then humanity would esse, quam hominem esse: igitur naturaliter prius sum not be essential quam sum homo: quod est impossibile, cum tunc non to my existence. erit mihi essenciale esse hominem. Si posterius natura Therefore universal est me esse quam hominem esse, tunc prius est hominem 10 humanity. precedes mine esse, quam me esse: quocunque priori dato preter com- in nature. munem humanitatem est impertinens 3° confirmat sic: essencialiter mea singularis humanitas est humanitas vel convertibiliter vel non. 4° quecunque albedo intensior vel maior et essencialiter perfeccior 15 esset minus intensa. 5° non scirem determinate omnem piscem maritimum esse. 6° non scirem omnem ignem esse calidum determinate, nec verum nec veritates. 7° illa predicacio est accidentalis: humanitas est sin- gularis; igitur naturaliter prius est humanitas quam 20 singularis humanitas. 8° prius naturaliter est humanitas quam mea humanitas singularis. Et quamvis magister meus posuit ultimas sex raciones sub compendio, postea tamen manifestatur earum ] intencio. Contra quam conclusionem posui meam conclusionem 25 I affirm there are no real 2dam, scilicet istam: Nullum universale reale in essendo Universal entities. est. Arguebam pro ea sic: si est universale in essendo General reale, vel est universale 2m eius esse, vel 2m eius essen- argument: If there were ciam, vel 2m eius esse et essenciam. Sed nullum illorum any, they would be universal in est verum: igitur conclusio vera. Consequencia est nota; 3o their existence (thatness) or in sed antecedens pro prima sui parte probatur, quia (whatness'ocin pluribus modis non contingit esse universale in essendo both together; reale. Sed antecedens pro 2a sui parte probatur. none of these is Et primo quod non est universale in essendo reale true. If there were secundum eius esse, quia tunc aliquod esse realiter esset 35 things universal in multis suppositis, vel aptum esset esse realiter in in their existence, then the same thatness would exist in many, and the existence of one would be that of another ; Six other arguments, briefly stated. A 78 2. pono pro primo A. 5. pono A. 13. singulariter A. 16. unius A. 19, 20. singulariter A. 21. 22. singulariter A. 24. manifestabitur A; ib. corum B. 33. proprii A. 36. suppositis in multis B. ment, the questien is not whether my singular Humanity and the Universal Humanity are prior in time, but in nature, as to dependency of one on the other. 12. Humanitatem. Probably some words are wanting immediately after this.
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REPLICACIO DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 135 multis suppositis; et sic posset stare quod esse unius rei esset esse alterius rei ab ea realiter et suppositaliter which Wyclif distincte; quod magister meus reputavit impossibile esse, himself grants cum in una responsione dixit quod non eadem anima to be impossible, 5 numero esset in capite et in pede; quia alias idem esse saying that where existence unius rei in numero esset esse alterius rei ab eo realiter is identical, distincta; cum subiunxit: quorum esse idem numero est, there is numerical illa sunt idem numero. identity. Things Sed quod non est universale in essendo reale 2m eius universal in 10 essenciam probatur: quia tunc posset stare unam esse their essence are impossible; essenciam eandem in numero in multis suppositis realiter for one and the same essence a se invicem distinctis. Ex quo sequitur quod posset cannot exist in stare aliqua differre que non differunt: quod est virtualis diflerent subjects; they contradiccio. would differ and 15 Sed quod non est universale reale in essendo 2m eius not differ at the same time. essenciam et esse simul, pari racione potest convinci. The third alternative fails Et confirmatur. Vel universale in essendo reale, et for the same reasons. suum singulare differunt, vel non (per contradiccionem). Further: Either Si differunt, tunc universale non est suum singulare, the Universal differs 20 vel universale non est singulare: que ambo sunt contra entitatively from its intencionem conclusionis secunde magistri mei. Si uni- singular (so that versale in essendo et suum singulare non differunt, tunc one is not the other) or it docs universale non est naturaliter prius suo singulari: quod not. If the first, est contra racionem 2am magistri mei in qua vult quod either it is not 25 natura prius est hominem esse quam me esse. Sed quod its own singular, or is hoc sequitur patet: quia idem non est se ipso prius et not singular. If the second, posterius naturaliter. the Universal 3° arguitur ad idem, sic: Si esset universale in cannot be prior to its singular. essendo reale, naturaliter prius esset suo singulari (ut The Universal must be 3o magister meusmet vult); sed nullum universale in essendo naturally prior reale naturaliter est prius suo singulari: igitur nullum to its singular, if it have any universale reale in essendo est. Consequencia est nota nature or entity of its own de se; sed antecedens pro prima sui parte patet ex Now it can only racione 2a, quam magister meus aduxit pro probacione be prior 1° as an effect 35 sue conclusionis prime. Sed pro secunda parte probatur; depending ou its cause; but quia solum 3bus modis alterum altero dicitur prius as they are both naturaliter, ut habetur ex 5° methaphysice: scilicet identical, there is no secundum dependenciam, vel secundum inherenciam dependency ; accidentis in suo subiecto, vel secundum modum potencie 40 ad actum. Non primum, quia singulare non dependet 4. quod cum B; ib. dixi B. 10. quod B. 13. different B. milis A. 24. et qui B. 34. consequenciam A; qua B. herencia B. 16. si- 38. in-
REPLICACIO DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 135 multis suppositis; et sic posset stare quod esse unius rei esset esse alterius rei ab ea realiter et suppositaliter which Wyclif distincte; quod magister meus reputavit impossibile esse, himself grants cum in una responsione dixit quod non eadem anima to be impossible, 5 numero esset in capite et in pede; quia alias idem esse saying that where existence unius rei in numero esset esse alterius rei ab eo realiter is identical, distincta; cum subiunxit: quorum esse idem numero est, there is numerical illa sunt idem numero. identity. Things Sed quod non est universale in essendo reale 2m eius universal in 10 essenciam probatur: quia tunc posset stare unam esse their essence are impossible; essenciam eandem in numero in multis suppositis realiter for one and the same essence a se invicem distinctis. Ex quo sequitur quod posset cannot exist in stare aliqua differre que non differunt: quod est virtualis diflerent subjects; they contradiccio. would differ and 15 Sed quod non est universale reale in essendo 2m eius not differ at the same time. essenciam et esse simul, pari racione potest convinci. The third alternative fails Et confirmatur. Vel universale in essendo reale, et for the same reasons. suum singulare differunt, vel non (per contradiccionem). Further: Either Si differunt, tunc universale non est suum singulare, the Universal differs 20 vel universale non est singulare: que ambo sunt contra entitatively from its intencionem conclusionis secunde magistri mei. Si uni- singular (so that versale in essendo et suum singulare non differunt, tunc one is not the other) or it docs universale non est naturaliter prius suo singulari: quod not. If the first, est contra racionem 2am magistri mei in qua vult quod either it is not 25 natura prius est hominem esse quam me esse. Sed quod its own singular, or is hoc sequitur patet: quia idem non est se ipso prius et not singular. If the second, posterius naturaliter. the Universal 3° arguitur ad idem, sic: Si esset universale in cannot be prior to its singular. essendo reale, naturaliter prius esset suo singulari (ut The Universal must be 3o magister meusmet vult); sed nullum universale in essendo naturally prior reale naturaliter est prius suo singulari: igitur nullum to its singular, if it have any universale reale in essendo est. Consequencia est nota nature or entity of its own de se; sed antecedens pro prima sui parte patet ex Now it can only racione 2a, quam magister meus aduxit pro probacione be prior 1° as an effect 35 sue conclusionis prime. Sed pro secunda parte probatur; depending ou its cause; but quia solum 3bus modis alterum altero dicitur prius as they are both naturaliter, ut habetur ex 5° methaphysice: scilicet identical, there is no secundum dependenciam, vel secundum inherenciam dependency ; accidentis in suo subiecto, vel secundum modum potencie 40 ad actum. Non primum, quia singulare non dependet 4. quod cum B; ib. dixi B. 10. quod B. 13. different B. milis A. 24. et qui B. 34. consequenciam A; qua B. herencia B. 16. si- 38. in-
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136 JOHANNIS WYCLIF 2° or as an a suo universali eo quod sunt idem in numero (se- accident on its cundum conclusionem secundam magistri mei); et, quia substance; but the universal is idem non dependet a se ipso, igitur singulare non not the substance of dependet a suo universali. Non penes secundum modum, its singular; quia tunc singulare prerequireret suum universale sicud 5 accidens suum subiectum, quod ad propositum non est 3° or as the act pertinens; quoniam iste modus non est .... inter sub- depends upon iectum et suum accidens, qualiter non est de foro A 79" its possibility; which relation presenti. Non penes 3m modum, quia ille est imper- differs from that of Universal and tinens ad prioritatem nature que est inter universale et 10 Singular. suum singulare. 4° ad idem: sit casus, quod non sit nisi unica fenix Suppose there is, but one in mundo; tunc fenicitas universalis est, et fenicitas phoenix in the world ; there singularis est, tunc naturaliter prius est fenicitas uni- are the universal and the singular versalis fenicitate singulari. Ergo naturaliter prius est 15 phoenicities, the former fenicitas universalis fenicitate singulari, que est ipsamet naturally prior fenicitas, vel fenicitate singulari que non est ipsamet to the latter, which is neither fenicitas. Si primum, sequitur quod fenicitas que tunc Phoenicity in esset illa, esset naturaliter prior et posterior se ipsa, eo itself nor not. For if it were, quod secundum casum, tunc non esset nisi unica fenix 20 then it would be the same as in numero; non secundum, quia tunc essent plures feni- the Universal on which it citates naturaliter distincte: quod est contra casum. depends; 5° stante eodem casu, fenicitas est universale in and if it were essendo reale: ergo vel realiter fenicitas est in multis not, there would be more than vel apta nata est esse in multis suppositis. Consequencia 25 one phoenicity, which tenet ex quid nominis universalis realis in essendo: sed contradicts the hypothesis. consequens in eodem casu est falsum; ergo et illud ex In this case quo sequitur. Sed quod consequens sit falsum patet phoenicity would no longer sic: quia tunc fenicitas non esset in multis suppositis be a Universal realiter, eo quod tunc non essent plures fenicitates. Sed 30 i. c. capable of existing in quod tunc talis fenicitas non esset apta nata esse realiter many, for so long as in multis suppositis, probatur: quia illa fenicitas que there was but one, this tunc esset, non erit realiter in multis suppositis se- capacity would cundum aptitudinem. not exist. 10. negatur (?) 7. after est autem A, deest B; no gap in either MS. 18. Sic A. 21. animo (?) pro pro nature AB. 12. non deest A. „ non A. 21, 22. fenices B. 24. nihil (?) pro vel AB. 32. que fenicitas A. 12. Fenix. This Phoenix difficulty seems to have worried Wyclif considerably. He alludes to it twice in Logica (vol. II, pp. 37, 53) and goes into it at length in other philosophical works, not yet published. 26. Quid nominis means a definition which merely gives the meaning of a word used.
136 JOHANNIS WYCLIF 2° or as an a suo universali eo quod sunt idem in numero (se- accident on its cundum conclusionem secundam magistri mei); et, quia substance; but the universal is idem non dependet a se ipso, igitur singulare non not the substance of dependet a suo universali. Non penes secundum modum, its singular; quia tunc singulare prerequireret suum universale sicud 5 accidens suum subiectum, quod ad propositum non est 3° or as the act pertinens; quoniam iste modus non est .... inter sub- depends upon iectum et suum accidens, qualiter non est de foro A 79" its possibility; which relation presenti. Non penes 3m modum, quia ille est imper- differs from that of Universal and tinens ad prioritatem nature que est inter universale et 10 Singular. suum singulare. 4° ad idem: sit casus, quod non sit nisi unica fenix Suppose there is, but one in mundo; tunc fenicitas universalis est, et fenicitas phoenix in the world ; there singularis est, tunc naturaliter prius est fenicitas uni- are the universal and the singular versalis fenicitate singulari. Ergo naturaliter prius est 15 phoenicities, the former fenicitas universalis fenicitate singulari, que est ipsamet naturally prior fenicitas, vel fenicitate singulari que non est ipsamet to the latter, which is neither fenicitas. Si primum, sequitur quod fenicitas que tunc Phoenicity in esset illa, esset naturaliter prior et posterior se ipsa, eo itself nor not. For if it were, quod secundum casum, tunc non esset nisi unica fenix 20 then it would be the same as in numero; non secundum, quia tunc essent plures feni- the Universal on which it citates naturaliter distincte: quod est contra casum. depends; 5° stante eodem casu, fenicitas est universale in and if it were essendo reale: ergo vel realiter fenicitas est in multis not, there would be more than vel apta nata est esse in multis suppositis. Consequencia 25 one phoenicity, which tenet ex quid nominis universalis realis in essendo: sed contradicts the hypothesis. consequens in eodem casu est falsum; ergo et illud ex In this case quo sequitur. Sed quod consequens sit falsum patet phoenicity would no longer sic: quia tunc fenicitas non esset in multis suppositis be a Universal realiter, eo quod tunc non essent plures fenicitates. Sed 30 i. c. capable of existing in quod tunc talis fenicitas non esset apta nata esse realiter many, for so long as in multis suppositis, probatur: quia illa fenicitas que there was but one, this tunc esset, non erit realiter in multis suppositis se- capacity would cundum aptitudinem. not exist. 10. negatur (?) 7. after est autem A, deest B; no gap in either MS. 18. Sic A. 21. animo (?) pro pro nature AB. 12. non deest A. „ non A. 21, 22. fenices B. 24. nihil (?) pro vel AB. 32. que fenicitas A. 12. Fenix. This Phoenix difficulty seems to have worried Wyclif considerably. He alludes to it twice in Logica (vol. II, pp. 37, 53) and goes into it at length in other philosophical works, not yet published. 26. Quid nominis means a definition which merely gives the meaning of a word used.
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REPLICACIO DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 137 6° si universale in essendo reale est, tunc est in-Is the Universal an unchangeable corruptibile, sicud magister meusmet vult; sed cum, entity? secundum eum, universale reale est, queritur ergo in illa proposicione universale est incorruptibile, utrum 5 sumitur li “universale" pro se, vel pro alio? Non pro se; quia tunc illa esset falsa (ut notum est). Et, si pro alio, vel pro deo, vel pro non deo. Quod non pro deo, patet: quia sic non est ad propositum; quia secundum magistrum, deitas non est universalis vel universale. Si 1o pro eo non deo, tunc, stante supposicione vere istius proposicionis, aliquid aliud a deo esset incorruptibile; quod magister meus non admitteret. 7° sequitur quod consequencia non valeret que est A given human nature is a syllogismus expositorius: Sorteitas est corruptibile; uni- universal, and therefore 15 versale est Sorteitas; igitur universale est corruptibile; unchangeable quia consequens istius est falsum, ut wult magister. Et according to this theory ; yet maior notorie est vera; et minor probatur. Sorteitas it evidently 1s liable to est humanitas, et humanitas est universale; igitur Sor- dissolution. teitas est universale. Ergo, per conversionem simplicem, 20 universale est Sorteitas. 8° universale addit aliquid realiter super suum sin- gulare, vel non. Si non, tunc nullum esset universale reale in essendo, esset universale secundum considera- cionem, vel significacionem, vel causalitatem. Si aliud 25 supperadditur, detur illud; et arguitur, ut prius, quia illud superadditum est singulare, vel non, in essendo. 9° sequitur quod ista regula philosophi posita in antepredicamentis esset falsa, quando alterum de altero predicatur, ut de subiecto. Tunc patet quod hec regula 3o patitur instanciam circa universalia, arguendo: Sorteitas est humanitas; humanitas est universale; universale est incorruptibile: igitur Sorteitas est incorruptibile. Con- sequens falsum, ut notum est, tam secundum ponentes universalia realia, quam secundum ponentes contrarium. The doctrine of Universals would falsify the rules of syllogistic reasoning. If a universal adds not ing rcal to its singular, it is not a reality; if it adds anything, what does it add? something singular or universal? Wyclif says s0; but only God, be says, 1s unchangeable: all other things may pass from being to non- being ; and yet God is not a Universal! 11. incorporale A. 12. ad- 1, 1. incorporale A. 4. incorporale A. 14. corporale A. 21. realitatis B. 22. erit B. . 23. in mittet B. deest B; ib. ct pro esset B. 24. causalitatum A. . 28. quoniam A. 29. quia A. 30. esse pro circa A; ib. ordo B. 32. incorporale A; ib. incorporale A. 33. possibilitates (?) A. 1. Incorruptibile, means, in Scholastic language, all that does not undergo intrinsic change. The heavens, which were supposed only to change in so far as they revolved, were in- corruptible. But Wyclif seems to have understood change in the broadest possible way.
REPLICACIO DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 137 6° si universale in essendo reale est, tunc est in-Is the Universal an unchangeable corruptibile, sicud magister meusmet vult; sed cum, entity? secundum eum, universale reale est, queritur ergo in illa proposicione universale est incorruptibile, utrum 5 sumitur li “universale" pro se, vel pro alio? Non pro se; quia tunc illa esset falsa (ut notum est). Et, si pro alio, vel pro deo, vel pro non deo. Quod non pro deo, patet: quia sic non est ad propositum; quia secundum magistrum, deitas non est universalis vel universale. Si 1o pro eo non deo, tunc, stante supposicione vere istius proposicionis, aliquid aliud a deo esset incorruptibile; quod magister meus non admitteret. 7° sequitur quod consequencia non valeret que est A given human nature is a syllogismus expositorius: Sorteitas est corruptibile; uni- universal, and therefore 15 versale est Sorteitas; igitur universale est corruptibile; unchangeable quia consequens istius est falsum, ut wult magister. Et according to this theory ; yet maior notorie est vera; et minor probatur. Sorteitas it evidently 1s liable to est humanitas, et humanitas est universale; igitur Sor- dissolution. teitas est universale. Ergo, per conversionem simplicem, 20 universale est Sorteitas. 8° universale addit aliquid realiter super suum sin- gulare, vel non. Si non, tunc nullum esset universale reale in essendo, esset universale secundum considera- cionem, vel significacionem, vel causalitatem. Si aliud 25 supperadditur, detur illud; et arguitur, ut prius, quia illud superadditum est singulare, vel non, in essendo. 9° sequitur quod ista regula philosophi posita in antepredicamentis esset falsa, quando alterum de altero predicatur, ut de subiecto. Tunc patet quod hec regula 3o patitur instanciam circa universalia, arguendo: Sorteitas est humanitas; humanitas est universale; universale est incorruptibile: igitur Sorteitas est incorruptibile. Con- sequens falsum, ut notum est, tam secundum ponentes universalia realia, quam secundum ponentes contrarium. The doctrine of Universals would falsify the rules of syllogistic reasoning. If a universal adds not ing rcal to its singular, it is not a reality; if it adds anything, what does it add? something singular or universal? Wyclif says s0; but only God, be says, 1s unchangeable: all other things may pass from being to non- being ; and yet God is not a Universal! 11. incorporale A. 12. ad- 1, 1. incorporale A. 4. incorporale A. 14. corporale A. 21. realitatis B. 22. erit B. . 23. in mittet B. deest B; ib. ct pro esset B. 24. causalitatum A. . 28. quoniam A. 29. quia A. 30. esse pro circa A; ib. ordo B. 32. incorporale A; ib. incorporale A. 33. possibilitates (?) A. 1. Incorruptibile, means, in Scholastic language, all that does not undergo intrinsic change. The heavens, which were supposed only to change in so far as they revolved, were in- corruptible. But Wyclif seems to have understood change in the broadest possible way.
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138 A thing canno ossibly be included in itself, as the universal is included in its singular, making one with it. Therefore the assertion that the Universals exist really is false. Refutation of the arguments in their favour. We must admi the universal man, if we admit a singular, but only as a proposition necessarily following therefrom, not as a necessary entity or existence. If a chimera runs, it necessaril moves; it not follow categorically that #2 moves. You cannot get the necessity of a thing out of oes JOHANNIS WYCLIF t Sequitur quod idem realiter est in se ipso conclusum ad idemptitatem numeralem, quod est impossibile. Patet assumptum sic; quia universale est in suo singulari, secundum magistrum meum; sed idem numero cst sin- gulare et suum | universale, ut eciam met atestatur; igitur sequitur propositum. Ex ista conclusione cum eius probacione sequitur quod id quod magister posuit pro conclusione prima ad sui intencionem non est sustinendum. Patet, quia dicit quod universale reale est, et mea conclusio ponit oppo- situm illius quo ad intencionem magistri mel, quia dicit quod nullum universale reale est, etc. Sed ad raciones magistri mei quibus nititur persuadere oppositum conclusionis mee. Ad primam, cum arguit: *humanitas universalis est," negavi illam; et quando tassumpsit: si ego sum homo, omnis homo est homo, concessi; et quando inferebat; igitur necessarium est ad me esse hominem omnem hominem esse hominem, distinxi illam; vel consequens intelligitur logicaliter, scilicet, quod sit proposicio necessaria: Si ego sum homo, ergo omnis homo est homo. Et sic intelligendo consequens concessi. Sed intelligendo consequens realiter, scilicet sic quod aliquod ens realiter necessarium est ad me esse hominem, omnem hominem esse hominem, negavi ipsum ; quia sic contingens est ad me esse hominem, hominem esse. Eciam, si chymera currit, chymera mo- vetur; et tamen non necessarium est ad chymeram currere, chymeram moveri, ymmo impossibile est, in- telligendo realiter, Nam sic arguendo, magister meus pretendit arguere necessitatem rei ex necessitate pro- posicionis; qui modus arguendi ad propositum non est the necessity of conveniens: quare negavi consequenciam in illo sensu. a proposition. A man cannot exist without any animal existing, but it is not necessary for man to be an animal. Nec eadem consequencia valet in secundo sensu; quare similiter negavi. Sed quando assumpsit: "si non, tunc potest esse me esse hominem, sine hoc quod omnis: ahomo est?; nego illam. Nam non potest esse homo sine hoc quod sit animal; et tamen non est necessarium 5. meta zext line testatur B. 14. obiectum A. 22. intendo A. 28, 29. intendo A. I. conclusio A. 10, 11. obiectum A. 23. realiter deest B. 33. illo B. 37. Non est necessarium. As itis not necessary for a man to exist, it is not necessary for a man to be actually an animal. Such is, as I conceive, the meaning of this subtlety. 3. argumentum A. 11. conclusio A. 25. consequentis A. , w 3 o (ST) [T o
138 A thing canno ossibly be included in itself, as the universal is included in its singular, making one with it. Therefore the assertion that the Universals exist really is false. Refutation of the arguments in their favour. We must admi the universal man, if we admit a singular, but only as a proposition necessarily following therefrom, not as a necessary entity or existence. If a chimera runs, it necessaril moves; it not follow categorically that #2 moves. You cannot get the necessity of a thing out of oes JOHANNIS WYCLIF t Sequitur quod idem realiter est in se ipso conclusum ad idemptitatem numeralem, quod est impossibile. Patet assumptum sic; quia universale est in suo singulari, secundum magistrum meum; sed idem numero cst sin- gulare et suum | universale, ut eciam met atestatur; igitur sequitur propositum. Ex ista conclusione cum eius probacione sequitur quod id quod magister posuit pro conclusione prima ad sui intencionem non est sustinendum. Patet, quia dicit quod universale reale est, et mea conclusio ponit oppo- situm illius quo ad intencionem magistri mel, quia dicit quod nullum universale reale est, etc. Sed ad raciones magistri mei quibus nititur persuadere oppositum conclusionis mee. Ad primam, cum arguit: *humanitas universalis est," negavi illam; et quando tassumpsit: si ego sum homo, omnis homo est homo, concessi; et quando inferebat; igitur necessarium est ad me esse hominem omnem hominem esse hominem, distinxi illam; vel consequens intelligitur logicaliter, scilicet, quod sit proposicio necessaria: Si ego sum homo, ergo omnis homo est homo. Et sic intelligendo consequens concessi. Sed intelligendo consequens realiter, scilicet sic quod aliquod ens realiter necessarium est ad me esse hominem, omnem hominem esse hominem, negavi ipsum ; quia sic contingens est ad me esse hominem, hominem esse. Eciam, si chymera currit, chymera mo- vetur; et tamen non necessarium est ad chymeram currere, chymeram moveri, ymmo impossibile est, in- telligendo realiter, Nam sic arguendo, magister meus pretendit arguere necessitatem rei ex necessitate pro- posicionis; qui modus arguendi ad propositum non est the necessity of conveniens: quare negavi consequenciam in illo sensu. a proposition. A man cannot exist without any animal existing, but it is not necessary for man to be an animal. Nec eadem consequencia valet in secundo sensu; quare similiter negavi. Sed quando assumpsit: "si non, tunc potest esse me esse hominem, sine hoc quod omnis: ahomo est?; nego illam. Nam non potest esse homo sine hoc quod sit animal; et tamen non est necessarium 5. meta zext line testatur B. 14. obiectum A. 22. intendo A. 28, 29. intendo A. I. conclusio A. 10, 11. obiectum A. 23. realiter deest B. 33. illo B. 37. Non est necessarium. As itis not necessary for a man to exist, it is not necessary for a man to be actually an animal. Such is, as I conceive, the meaning of this subtlety. 3. argumentum A. 11. conclusio A. 25. consequentis A. , w 3 o (ST) [T o
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REPLICACIO DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 139 hominem esse animal; quia pro aliquo tempore potest hoc esse quod homo non sit animal; et sic contingens est hominem esse animal; quamvis necessarium est se- cundum naturam quod homo est animal. Ad 2am, quando arguebat: “proprie prius naturaliter est primam causam esse quam me esse, et quam hominem esse; igitur per idem naturaliter est me esse et per idem naturaliter est hominem esse", concessi; et “essen- ciale est ad me esse, hominem esse" concessi; “igitur, 10 tam primo naturaliter est me esse sicud hominem esse, vel prius vel posterius naturaliter," concessi consequen- ciam, et subiunxi quod eque primo est naturaliter me esse et hominem esse. Et quando inferebat: "igitur quam primo naturaliter homo est, ego sum;" concessi 15 consequenciam et consequens. Et quando intulit: "igitur, si homo est, ego sum," negavi consequenciam. Nam in simili non valet: eque primo naturaliter est Sors et Plato: igitur, si Sors est, Plato est. Eciam non sequitur: "eque primo naturaliter est equus et hircus; igitur, si equus 20 est, hircus est:" nec e converso etc. Et cum probabat sic: “Si est homo et ego non sum, tunc non quam primo in natura est hominem esse, est me esse:" con- cessi. Et quando intulit: Igitur prior consequencia fuit bona; negavi consequenciam. Unde bene stat in casu 25 quod pro certo tempore non est eque primo in natura me esse, sicud hominem esse, scilicet, tempore illo quo non ero; sed non est iam sic de facto quod non eque primo sum in natura sicud hominem esse. Ad terciam: “essencialiter mea humanitas singularis Are humanity and my 3o est humanitas," concessi; et quando assumebat: vel humanily interchangeable convertibiliter, vel non," distinxi: quod vel intelligitur terms? Not logically. loycaliter, quod ista duo convertuntur ad invicem; so that onc scilicet, li “mea singularis humanitas" et “humanitas," means the other ; A 80° in illo ] sensu negavi quod essencialiter mea singularis But the thing which is my 35 humanitas est humanitas convertibiliter. Sed intelligendo humanity is realiter, isto modo scilicet quod essencialiter sic est interchangeable with that which quod “res illa que est singularis mea humanitas est is universal humanity. In the argument as to the natural priority or posteriority of singular and universal humanity. but since I exist, that is not so as a fact. I say that neither is prior or posterior in nature. But it does not follow thence that if any man exists, I exist. True, a man might exist without my existing ; 2. consequentis A. 13. ct igitur A. 16. illam B. 17. simul B. 25. casus pro eque. 27. casus A. 33. singulariter A. 34. singula- 37. singulariter A. riter A. 35. intendo A. 28. Hominem esse. This reply to Wyclif is singularly weak. If there were no other reply possible, Universalists would cer- tainly have the best of the argument, here at least.
REPLICACIO DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 139 hominem esse animal; quia pro aliquo tempore potest hoc esse quod homo non sit animal; et sic contingens est hominem esse animal; quamvis necessarium est se- cundum naturam quod homo est animal. Ad 2am, quando arguebat: “proprie prius naturaliter est primam causam esse quam me esse, et quam hominem esse; igitur per idem naturaliter est me esse et per idem naturaliter est hominem esse", concessi; et “essen- ciale est ad me esse, hominem esse" concessi; “igitur, 10 tam primo naturaliter est me esse sicud hominem esse, vel prius vel posterius naturaliter," concessi consequen- ciam, et subiunxi quod eque primo est naturaliter me esse et hominem esse. Et quando inferebat: "igitur quam primo naturaliter homo est, ego sum;" concessi 15 consequenciam et consequens. Et quando intulit: "igitur, si homo est, ego sum," negavi consequenciam. Nam in simili non valet: eque primo naturaliter est Sors et Plato: igitur, si Sors est, Plato est. Eciam non sequitur: "eque primo naturaliter est equus et hircus; igitur, si equus 20 est, hircus est:" nec e converso etc. Et cum probabat sic: “Si est homo et ego non sum, tunc non quam primo in natura est hominem esse, est me esse:" con- cessi. Et quando intulit: Igitur prior consequencia fuit bona; negavi consequenciam. Unde bene stat in casu 25 quod pro certo tempore non est eque primo in natura me esse, sicud hominem esse, scilicet, tempore illo quo non ero; sed non est iam sic de facto quod non eque primo sum in natura sicud hominem esse. Ad terciam: “essencialiter mea humanitas singularis Are humanity and my 3o est humanitas," concessi; et quando assumebat: vel humanily interchangeable convertibiliter, vel non," distinxi: quod vel intelligitur terms? Not logically. loycaliter, quod ista duo convertuntur ad invicem; so that onc scilicet, li “mea singularis humanitas" et “humanitas," means the other ; A 80° in illo ] sensu negavi quod essencialiter mea singularis But the thing which is my 35 humanitas est humanitas convertibiliter. Sed intelligendo humanity is realiter, isto modo scilicet quod essencialiter sic est interchangeable with that which quod “res illa que est singularis mea humanitas est is universal humanity. In the argument as to the natural priority or posteriority of singular and universal humanity. but since I exist, that is not so as a fact. I say that neither is prior or posterior in nature. But it does not follow thence that if any man exists, I exist. True, a man might exist without my existing ; 2. consequentis A. 13. ct igitur A. 16. illam B. 17. simul B. 25. casus pro eque. 27. casus A. 33. singulariter A. 34. singula- 37. singulariter A. riter A. 35. intendo A. 28. Hominem esse. This reply to Wyclif is singularly weak. If there were no other reply possible, Universalists would cer- tainly have the best of the argument, here at least.
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140 JOHANNIS WYCLIF But I do not grant that my humanity becomes all that universal humanity becomes, or is wherever the latter is ; it only follows that what is common to both changes simultancously and is whatever either is. I simply deny the 4th, 5th (and 6th) arguments. I also deny the 7th argument. As to the 8th, I grant that the term humanity has logical priority over the term, my humanity, but not that the things represented by these terms have any priority one over the other. humanitas convertibiliter, vel non," in isto sensu con- cessi quod mea humanitas singularis est humanitas con- vertibiliter. Et “si tunc," ulterius sic argueretur “mea humanitas et humanitas sunt idem convertibiliter; ergo mea humanitas et humanitas sunt simul vertibiliter;" concessi consequenciam. Et quando arguitur ulterius; ergo in quodcunque vertitur humanitas vertitur et mea humanitas; vel si inferetur, “ergo ubicunque est huma- nitas, ibi est mea singularis humanitas;" ambas con- sequencias negavi. Nam non sequitur: “homo et animal 10 sunt simul vertibiliter, ergo in quodcunque vertibile est animal, vertibile est homo;" nec sequitur ergo ubi- cunque est animal est homo; sed bene sequitur ex primo antecedente, “ergo humanitas et humanitas mea sunt aliqua que, in quodcunque vertibile est mea humanitas, in illud vertibile est humanitas, et econtra." Et ex eodem bene sequitur: “ergo mea humanitas et humanitas sunt aliqua, que, ubicunque est humanitas, est mea humanitas." Ad 4am: Quecunque albedo intensior vel maior esset 20 essencialiter perfeccior esset minus intensa: negavi illam. Ad 5am: ergo nescirem determinate omnem piscem maritimam esse: negavi consequenciam. Ad septimam: illa est predicacio accidentalis; huma- 25 nitas est singularis; igitur naturaliter prius est humanitas quam humanitas singularis: negavi consequenciam. Nam non sequitur: “illa est predicacio accidentalis, homo est ad aliquid; igitur naturaliter est prius homo quam ad aliquid." Ad 8am: naturaliter prius est humanitas quam 30 mea humanitas singularis: distinxi illam; vel illa in- telligitur loycaliter (et tunc sensus est quod ille terminus humanitas est prius naturaliter loycaliter superius ad illum terminum mea humanitas; singularis) et in illo sensu concessi eam; sed realiter intelligendo eam, tunc 35 sensus eius esset quod humanitas esset realis naturaliter prius quam humanitas aliqua singularis realis; quod falsum est, et sic negavi in illo sensu. 15 7. id A; ib. vertibiliter twice A. 15. homo after est A, deest B. 35. intendo A. 9. singulariter A. 11. id A. „ 18. qua А. 31. singulariter A. 25. Ad septimam. The 6th argument is left unanswered; no doubt it is denied, like the 4th and 5th.
140 JOHANNIS WYCLIF But I do not grant that my humanity becomes all that universal humanity becomes, or is wherever the latter is ; it only follows that what is common to both changes simultancously and is whatever either is. I simply deny the 4th, 5th (and 6th) arguments. I also deny the 7th argument. As to the 8th, I grant that the term humanity has logical priority over the term, my humanity, but not that the things represented by these terms have any priority one over the other. humanitas convertibiliter, vel non," in isto sensu con- cessi quod mea humanitas singularis est humanitas con- vertibiliter. Et “si tunc," ulterius sic argueretur “mea humanitas et humanitas sunt idem convertibiliter; ergo mea humanitas et humanitas sunt simul vertibiliter;" concessi consequenciam. Et quando arguitur ulterius; ergo in quodcunque vertitur humanitas vertitur et mea humanitas; vel si inferetur, “ergo ubicunque est huma- nitas, ibi est mea singularis humanitas;" ambas con- sequencias negavi. Nam non sequitur: “homo et animal 10 sunt simul vertibiliter, ergo in quodcunque vertibile est animal, vertibile est homo;" nec sequitur ergo ubi- cunque est animal est homo; sed bene sequitur ex primo antecedente, “ergo humanitas et humanitas mea sunt aliqua que, in quodcunque vertibile est mea humanitas, in illud vertibile est humanitas, et econtra." Et ex eodem bene sequitur: “ergo mea humanitas et humanitas sunt aliqua, que, ubicunque est humanitas, est mea humanitas." Ad 4am: Quecunque albedo intensior vel maior esset 20 essencialiter perfeccior esset minus intensa: negavi illam. Ad 5am: ergo nescirem determinate omnem piscem maritimam esse: negavi consequenciam. Ad septimam: illa est predicacio accidentalis; huma- 25 nitas est singularis; igitur naturaliter prius est humanitas quam humanitas singularis: negavi consequenciam. Nam non sequitur: “illa est predicacio accidentalis, homo est ad aliquid; igitur naturaliter est prius homo quam ad aliquid." Ad 8am: naturaliter prius est humanitas quam 30 mea humanitas singularis: distinxi illam; vel illa in- telligitur loycaliter (et tunc sensus est quod ille terminus humanitas est prius naturaliter loycaliter superius ad illum terminum mea humanitas; singularis) et in illo sensu concessi eam; sed realiter intelligendo eam, tunc 35 sensus eius esset quod humanitas esset realis naturaliter prius quam humanitas aliqua singularis realis; quod falsum est, et sic negavi in illo sensu. 15 7. id A; ib. vertibiliter twice A. 15. homo after est A, deest B. 35. intendo A. 9. singulariter A. 11. id A. „ 18. qua А. 31. singulariter A. 25. Ad septimam. The 6th argument is left unanswered; no doubt it is denied, like the 4th and 5th.
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REPLICACIO DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 141 A 80" Magister meus, respondendo ad argumenta que adduxi Wyclif's replies to the pro probacione conclusionis mee ad primum argumentum arguments contra. respondendo, negat istam: nullum universale reale in He says that essendo est. Et quando arguebam: Si universale reale the Universal 5 in essendo est, vel secundum eius esse, vel secundum and the singular have essenciam vel secundum utrumque, concessit omnibus the same illis modis. Et quando arguebam, “non secundum esse, existence and essence; quia tunc aliquid esset realiter in multis suppositis, vel aptum esset esse in multis suppositis;" et cum inferebam 10 quod staret quod esse unius rei esset esse alterius. rei ab ea realiter et suppositaliter distincte, dicit quod hoc est possibile, et subiunxit ulterius quod esse rei secundum quod suppositaliter existit, quod illud idem in numero esset esse alterius rei, hoc esset inconveniens, ita quod 15 sic duo haberent unum esse reale specificum, et duo esse individua. Ad 2m: "universale et singulare suum differunt vel non," dixit quod quedam est differencia formalis, sicud albus et musicus differunt formaliter, licet idem numero 20 fuit album et musicum. Sed quedam est differencia essencialis, sicud qua homo et asinus differunt; quedam realis non essencialis, sicud quidam dicunt accidencium et substanciarum. Secundum hanc ergo distinccionem concessit quod universale differt a suo singulari primo 25 modo. Subiunxit quod non sequitur: “universale differt a suo singulari, ergo universale non est suum singulare;" sed bene sequitur quod universale secundum aliquam racionem vel disposicionem vel formam non est suum singulare; sed secundum essenciam et realitatem est 3o suum singulare. Et hoc dixit verum, quia universale est communicabile pluribus et secundum talem communi- cabilitatem non est suum singulare. Et non sequitur ultra quod igitur non sit singulare. Concluditur igitur quod universale differt a suo singulari, quia homo et 35 Sors sunt universale et singulare; et differunt. Ad 3m: “si universale reale est, ipsum est naturaliter prius suo singulari," concedit; et quando assumpsi, vel secundum dependenciam vel secundum inherenciam accidentis ad subiectum, vel secundum motum potencie that this is possible; it would only be impossible for a thatness to belong, whilst numerically the same, to two different beings. Wyclif, in answer to the question whether the universal differs from its singular, replies that they differ partly and are partly the same as a white man is not the same thing as a musician, yet one may be the other. The Universal is prior to its singular, as the cause is prior to the effect, in that is meant 2. proposicione A. 14. inconsequens A. 15. haberet AB. 16. in- differencia A. 18. contra pro quedam A. 20. contra A. 22. dis- finguunt A. 22, 23. accidenciam et substanciarum (! AB. 24, 25. priore 32. sequitur non B. 30. vel B. pro primo modo.
REPLICACIO DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 141 A 80" Magister meus, respondendo ad argumenta que adduxi Wyclif's replies to the pro probacione conclusionis mee ad primum argumentum arguments contra. respondendo, negat istam: nullum universale reale in He says that essendo est. Et quando arguebam: Si universale reale the Universal 5 in essendo est, vel secundum eius esse, vel secundum and the singular have essenciam vel secundum utrumque, concessit omnibus the same illis modis. Et quando arguebam, “non secundum esse, existence and essence; quia tunc aliquid esset realiter in multis suppositis, vel aptum esset esse in multis suppositis;" et cum inferebam 10 quod staret quod esse unius rei esset esse alterius. rei ab ea realiter et suppositaliter distincte, dicit quod hoc est possibile, et subiunxit ulterius quod esse rei secundum quod suppositaliter existit, quod illud idem in numero esset esse alterius rei, hoc esset inconveniens, ita quod 15 sic duo haberent unum esse reale specificum, et duo esse individua. Ad 2m: "universale et singulare suum differunt vel non," dixit quod quedam est differencia formalis, sicud albus et musicus differunt formaliter, licet idem numero 20 fuit album et musicum. Sed quedam est differencia essencialis, sicud qua homo et asinus differunt; quedam realis non essencialis, sicud quidam dicunt accidencium et substanciarum. Secundum hanc ergo distinccionem concessit quod universale differt a suo singulari primo 25 modo. Subiunxit quod non sequitur: “universale differt a suo singulari, ergo universale non est suum singulare;" sed bene sequitur quod universale secundum aliquam racionem vel disposicionem vel formam non est suum singulare; sed secundum essenciam et realitatem est 3o suum singulare. Et hoc dixit verum, quia universale est communicabile pluribus et secundum talem communi- cabilitatem non est suum singulare. Et non sequitur ultra quod igitur non sit singulare. Concluditur igitur quod universale differt a suo singulari, quia homo et 35 Sors sunt universale et singulare; et differunt. Ad 3m: “si universale reale est, ipsum est naturaliter prius suo singulari," concedit; et quando assumpsi, vel secundum dependenciam vel secundum inherenciam accidentis ad subiectum, vel secundum motum potencie that this is possible; it would only be impossible for a thatness to belong, whilst numerically the same, to two different beings. Wyclif, in answer to the question whether the universal differs from its singular, replies that they differ partly and are partly the same as a white man is not the same thing as a musician, yet one may be the other. The Universal is prior to its singular, as the cause is prior to the effect, in that is meant 2. proposicione A. 14. inconsequens A. 15. haberet AB. 16. in- differencia A. 18. contra pro quedam A. 20. contra A. 22. dis- finguunt A. 22, 23. accidenciam et substanciarum (! AB. 24, 25. priore 32. sequitur non B. 30. vel B. pro primo modo.
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142 JOHANNIS WYCLIF by dependency; ad actum," respondit quod secundum causam est prius but the term is et non proprie secundum dependenciam, nisi prius se- wrongly employed. cundum causam, et prius secundum dependenciam sume- rentur pro eodem; quod tamen proprie non est verum. Nam philosophus nullibi mencionem [facit] de prioritate secundum dependenciam 5° methaphysice. Sed bene innuit prioritatem secundum causam; et sic universale est prius secundum causam suo singulari. Et si arguitur: “et universale idem est in numero cum suo singulari," verum est, “et nichil idem in numero causat se," negat 10 consequenciam. As to the Ad 4am: “sit casus quod [non] sit nisi unica fenix;" 'Phoenix" admisit. "Tunc fenicitas universalis est, et fenicitas sin- difficulty, he admits that gularis est," concessit. "Igitur naturaliter prius est feni- the singular phoenicity is not citas universalis fenicitate singulari," concessit con- 15 the universal sequenciam. Et quando intuli ulterius, “igitur naturaliter phoenicity, prius est fenicitas universalis fenicitate singulari, que est ipsa fenicitas universalis, vel naturaliter prius est fenicitate singulari, que est fenicitas singularis, etc." respondit quod est prius naturaliter fenicitate singulari, 20 que fenicitas singularis non est fenicitas universalis. yet he denies Subiunxit igitur: si tunc inferetur, “igitur sunt plures that there are fenicitates naturaliter distincte, quod est contra casum, two distinct phoenicities; negavit consequenciam. Et dixit: Non sequitur, 'fenicitas there would be, universalis est, et fenicitas singularis est, et fenicitas 25 if the two did not make up universalis non est fenicitas singularis, igitur plures one and the fenicitates sunt;" bene tamen sequeretur, si fenicitas same entity, the same phoenix. universalis non esset ens quod est fenicitas singularis; sed illud dixit esse falsum. He also denies Ad 5am: stante eodem casu, “fenicitas est universale 30 that the universal reale;" concessit; “igitur est in multis realiter vel aptum phoenicity est esse in multis realiter," concessit quod aptum est would not be able to exist in esse in multis; et quando arguebam quod non, quia many individuals. fenicitas que iam est non erit secundum aptitudinem in multis fenicibus, negavit hoc. He admits that Ad 6am: “si universale est universale, est incorrupti- the Universal is unchangeable bile;" concessit consequenciam secundum predicacionem and changeable Wyclif grants that the Universal is one being with its singular, which it nevertheless causes. which is prior thereto, 35 5. recommendat pro men- 4. quia tunc B. 1. cam = casum? B. cionem A; ib. facit deest AB. 6. SiB. 10. negavit B. 12. sic before casus B; ib. non deest AB. 18. plis pro universalis B. 22. igitur after 25. ut pro et B. subiunxit deest B. 23. causam A. 35. fenicitati- bus A. 36. incorporale and so everywhere for incorruptibile A. 24. Negavit. On this point, Wyclif seems to have hesitated. See Logica, Vol. II, pp. 53, 54; also Introduction, pp. XV—XVII.
142 JOHANNIS WYCLIF by dependency; ad actum," respondit quod secundum causam est prius but the term is et non proprie secundum dependenciam, nisi prius se- wrongly employed. cundum causam, et prius secundum dependenciam sume- rentur pro eodem; quod tamen proprie non est verum. Nam philosophus nullibi mencionem [facit] de prioritate secundum dependenciam 5° methaphysice. Sed bene innuit prioritatem secundum causam; et sic universale est prius secundum causam suo singulari. Et si arguitur: “et universale idem est in numero cum suo singulari," verum est, “et nichil idem in numero causat se," negat 10 consequenciam. As to the Ad 4am: “sit casus quod [non] sit nisi unica fenix;" 'Phoenix" admisit. "Tunc fenicitas universalis est, et fenicitas sin- difficulty, he admits that gularis est," concessit. "Igitur naturaliter prius est feni- the singular phoenicity is not citas universalis fenicitate singulari," concessit con- 15 the universal sequenciam. Et quando intuli ulterius, “igitur naturaliter phoenicity, prius est fenicitas universalis fenicitate singulari, que est ipsa fenicitas universalis, vel naturaliter prius est fenicitate singulari, que est fenicitas singularis, etc." respondit quod est prius naturaliter fenicitate singulari, 20 que fenicitas singularis non est fenicitas universalis. yet he denies Subiunxit igitur: si tunc inferetur, “igitur sunt plures that there are fenicitates naturaliter distincte, quod est contra casum, two distinct phoenicities; negavit consequenciam. Et dixit: Non sequitur, 'fenicitas there would be, universalis est, et fenicitas singularis est, et fenicitas 25 if the two did not make up universalis non est fenicitas singularis, igitur plures one and the fenicitates sunt;" bene tamen sequeretur, si fenicitas same entity, the same phoenix. universalis non esset ens quod est fenicitas singularis; sed illud dixit esse falsum. He also denies Ad 5am: stante eodem casu, “fenicitas est universale 30 that the universal reale;" concessit; “igitur est in multis realiter vel aptum phoenicity est esse in multis realiter," concessit quod aptum est would not be able to exist in esse in multis; et quando arguebam quod non, quia many individuals. fenicitas que iam est non erit secundum aptitudinem in multis fenicibus, negavit hoc. He admits that Ad 6am: “si universale est universale, est incorrupti- the Universal is unchangeable bile;" concessit consequenciam secundum predicacionem and changeable Wyclif grants that the Universal is one being with its singular, which it nevertheless causes. which is prior thereto, 35 5. recommendat pro men- 4. quia tunc B. 1. cam = casum? B. cionem A; ib. facit deest AB. 6. SiB. 10. negavit B. 12. sic before casus B; ib. non deest AB. 18. plis pro universalis B. 22. igitur after 25. ut pro et B. subiunxit deest B. 23. causam A. 35. fenicitati- bus A. 36. incorporale and so everywhere for incorruptibile A. 24. Negavit. On this point, Wyclif seems to have hesitated. See Logica, Vol. II, pp. 53, 54; also Introduction, pp. XV—XVII.
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REPLICACIO DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 143 A 813 formalem universale esse incorruptibile; subiunxit quod in two different ways ; formally cum hoc stat quod universale est corruptibile in pre- and in itself unchangeable, dicacione, non formali, sed essenciali. Dixit ulterius: with regard to the essence of ymmo sic multa universalia sunt corruptibilia, quia its subject, it 5 multa universalia sunt res suorum individuorum, que may be changeable. sunt corruptibilia. Et quando querebam pro quo suppo- suit universale in illa proposicione: universale est in- corruptibile; respondit quod pro generacione substancie. Et dixit quod illud est incorruptibile. The expositorial 10 Ad septimam: sequitur quod hec consequencia non syllogism given above, valeret: 'Sorteitas est corruptibile; universale est Sor- concludes truly, teitas; igitur universale est corruptibile;" dixit quod he says, but valet. Et quando dicebam: antecedens verum, con- with reference only to a sequens falsum," negavit. Et dixit consequens esse verum singular subject. 15 predicacione particulari secundum essenciam, sicud ante- cedens. Ad 8vam: “vel universale addit aliquid super sin- gulare, vel non," dicebat quod addit unum singulare super reliquum, quandoque secundum actum, quandoque 20 secundum aptitudinem. Subiunxit: universale autem in singulari existens est idem in eodem, et non plus nec minus in illo;" sed ex hoc non sequitur quod non sit universale. Ad nonam sequitur quod illa regula non esset gene- 25 raliter vera. Quando alterum de altero predicatur; ut de subiecto etc. negavit consequenciam; et quando dixi:"circa universalia non tenet," hoc negavit. Et quando arguebam: "Sorteitas est humanitas, et humanitas est universale, et universale est incorruptibile; igitur Sorteitas est in- 30 corruptibile;" respondit: "Admisso quod consequencia non valet, non arguitur per regulam." Et quando dixi: in omnibus istis predicatur predicatum de suo sub- iecto," dixit quod non, quia hic humanitas est universale; predicatur predicatum ut in subiecto et non ut de 35 subiecto etc. Ad decimam: sequitur quod idem esset realiter in se ipso quo ad ydemptitatem numeralem; quod est im- possibile," respondebat, admisso quod consequencia de forma sit bona, tamen quo ad presens negavit eam. Et The Universal, he asserts, adds a singularity to its singular, with which it forms one being; but this singularity is universal. He does not grant that the law of predication fails here, because in such cases we do not predicate anything of a subject, but something in a subject, i. c. the Universal. He says that, though the universal and its singular make one, yet one includes the other, 5. sui A. 6. sunt deest B; ib. conclusione pro quo. 8. generato A; gna° B. 10. hic A. 15. pregicacione twice AB ; ib. particulari deest AB. 17. add.dit A. 21. non deest B. 26. et sic A; ib. tunc pro circa A. 37. conclusio A; ib. naturalem A.
REPLICACIO DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 143 A 813 formalem universale esse incorruptibile; subiunxit quod in two different ways ; formally cum hoc stat quod universale est corruptibile in pre- and in itself unchangeable, dicacione, non formali, sed essenciali. Dixit ulterius: with regard to the essence of ymmo sic multa universalia sunt corruptibilia, quia its subject, it 5 multa universalia sunt res suorum individuorum, que may be changeable. sunt corruptibilia. Et quando querebam pro quo suppo- suit universale in illa proposicione: universale est in- corruptibile; respondit quod pro generacione substancie. Et dixit quod illud est incorruptibile. The expositorial 10 Ad septimam: sequitur quod hec consequencia non syllogism given above, valeret: 'Sorteitas est corruptibile; universale est Sor- concludes truly, teitas; igitur universale est corruptibile;" dixit quod he says, but valet. Et quando dicebam: antecedens verum, con- with reference only to a sequens falsum," negavit. Et dixit consequens esse verum singular subject. 15 predicacione particulari secundum essenciam, sicud ante- cedens. Ad 8vam: “vel universale addit aliquid super sin- gulare, vel non," dicebat quod addit unum singulare super reliquum, quandoque secundum actum, quandoque 20 secundum aptitudinem. Subiunxit: universale autem in singulari existens est idem in eodem, et non plus nec minus in illo;" sed ex hoc non sequitur quod non sit universale. Ad nonam sequitur quod illa regula non esset gene- 25 raliter vera. Quando alterum de altero predicatur; ut de subiecto etc. negavit consequenciam; et quando dixi:"circa universalia non tenet," hoc negavit. Et quando arguebam: "Sorteitas est humanitas, et humanitas est universale, et universale est incorruptibile; igitur Sorteitas est in- 30 corruptibile;" respondit: "Admisso quod consequencia non valet, non arguitur per regulam." Et quando dixi: in omnibus istis predicatur predicatum de suo sub- iecto," dixit quod non, quia hic humanitas est universale; predicatur predicatum ut in subiecto et non ut de 35 subiecto etc. Ad decimam: sequitur quod idem esset realiter in se ipso quo ad ydemptitatem numeralem; quod est im- possibile," respondebat, admisso quod consequencia de forma sit bona, tamen quo ad presens negavit eam. Et The Universal, he asserts, adds a singularity to its singular, with which it forms one being; but this singularity is universal. He does not grant that the law of predication fails here, because in such cases we do not predicate anything of a subject, but something in a subject, i. c. the Universal. He says that, though the universal and its singular make one, yet one includes the other, 5. sui A. 6. sunt deest B; ib. conclusione pro quo. 8. generato A; gna° B. 10. hic A. 15. pregicacione twice AB ; ib. particulari deest AB. 17. add.dit A. 21. non deest B. 26. et sic A; ib. tunc pro circa A. 37. conclusio A; ib. naturalem A.
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144 JOHANNIS WYCLIF quando arguebam: universale est in suo singulo; sed idem in numero est universale et singulare suum; igitur sequitur propositum;" negavit consequenciam; et pro negacione consequencie adiunxit istam similitudinem, dicens: partes sunt priores suo toto, et partes sunt 5 idem in numero cum suo toto; igitur idem est prius se ipso." Dixit: antecedens pro utraque parte est verum, As he did not deny the force et consequens impossibile; quia tunc aliquid pro aliqua of my argument. mensura esset, pro qua ipsum non esset: quod est im- I asked whether his conclusion plicacio contradiccionis." Et quando intuli pro corollario 10 could stand: he said, Yes, if my quod prima conclusio ad intencionem suam esset falsa, proofs are good. dixit: verum est, si conclusio mea cum probacionibus suis haberet processum." Sed ad argumentum primum quo volui probare To my argument that quod nullum universale reale in essendo est, concessit 15 with real universals the quod universale reale est secundum esse et essenciam; existence of one thing would be et quando intuli: “tunc posset stare quod esse unius that of another, rei esset esse alterius rei ab eo suppositaliter realiter he at first admitted that it distincte," concessit. Sed hoc est contra argumentum might be so ; then, not to magistri, quo voluit probare quod impossibile est eandem 20 contradict animam in numero esse in manu et in pede (quod himself, proposuit in prima responsione); licet magister meus addidit illa “secundum quod suppositaliter est, esse unius said that the existence of rei non est esse alterius rei, ab ea realiter suppositaliter things quà individuals is distincte." Sed hoc prius non addidit. Posset tamen 25 distinct. It might be argui contra illam solucionem: 'Si esse unius rei est urged that, if esse alterius rei ab ea realiter suppositaliter distincte ut the existence of different. sic, ergo precise idem esse rei unius est precise esse individuals is precisely the rei alterius ab ea suppositaliter distincte [vel non]. Si same in all, then primum, sequitur quod omni modo quo una res est, 30 in every way, and also quà alia res est, et sic res suppositaliter distincte non essent individuals; suppositaliter distincte: quod est implicacio contradiccionis. if not, then all Si secundum, tunc non est verum quod esse unius rei that remains is a likeness est esse alterius rei ab ea suppositaliter distincte, nisi between ad istum intellectum, quod esse unius rei est simile in 35 different existing things, specie vel genere esse alterius rei ab ea suppositaliter which is not distincte. Et per hoc non habetur quod talis res est identity in being. universalis in essendo, vel universale in essendo, quoad eius esse vel quoad eius essenciam. as parts make one with their whole, and are prior thereto in nature. 3. conclusionem A. 7. esse B. 8. et per B. 9. quod contra pro pro qua A. 29. vel non deest AB. 23. sensu B. 14; quod A. 3o. conclusio A. 33. secundo AB. 36. ab ea deest B.
144 JOHANNIS WYCLIF quando arguebam: universale est in suo singulo; sed idem in numero est universale et singulare suum; igitur sequitur propositum;" negavit consequenciam; et pro negacione consequencie adiunxit istam similitudinem, dicens: partes sunt priores suo toto, et partes sunt 5 idem in numero cum suo toto; igitur idem est prius se ipso." Dixit: antecedens pro utraque parte est verum, As he did not deny the force et consequens impossibile; quia tunc aliquid pro aliqua of my argument. mensura esset, pro qua ipsum non esset: quod est im- I asked whether his conclusion plicacio contradiccionis." Et quando intuli pro corollario 10 could stand: he said, Yes, if my quod prima conclusio ad intencionem suam esset falsa, proofs are good. dixit: verum est, si conclusio mea cum probacionibus suis haberet processum." Sed ad argumentum primum quo volui probare To my argument that quod nullum universale reale in essendo est, concessit 15 with real universals the quod universale reale est secundum esse et essenciam; existence of one thing would be et quando intuli: “tunc posset stare quod esse unius that of another, rei esset esse alterius rei ab eo suppositaliter realiter he at first admitted that it distincte," concessit. Sed hoc est contra argumentum might be so ; then, not to magistri, quo voluit probare quod impossibile est eandem 20 contradict animam in numero esse in manu et in pede (quod himself, proposuit in prima responsione); licet magister meus addidit illa “secundum quod suppositaliter est, esse unius said that the existence of rei non est esse alterius rei, ab ea realiter suppositaliter things quà individuals is distincte." Sed hoc prius non addidit. Posset tamen 25 distinct. It might be argui contra illam solucionem: 'Si esse unius rei est urged that, if esse alterius rei ab ea realiter suppositaliter distincte ut the existence of different. sic, ergo precise idem esse rei unius est precise esse individuals is precisely the rei alterius ab ea suppositaliter distincte [vel non]. Si same in all, then primum, sequitur quod omni modo quo una res est, 30 in every way, and also quà alia res est, et sic res suppositaliter distincte non essent individuals; suppositaliter distincte: quod est implicacio contradiccionis. if not, then all Si secundum, tunc non est verum quod esse unius rei that remains is a likeness est esse alterius rei ab ea suppositaliter distincte, nisi between ad istum intellectum, quod esse unius rei est simile in 35 different existing things, specie vel genere esse alterius rei ab ea suppositaliter which is not distincte. Et per hoc non habetur quod talis res est identity in being. universalis in essendo, vel universale in essendo, quoad eius esse vel quoad eius essenciam. as parts make one with their whole, and are prior thereto in nature. 3. conclusionem A. 7. esse B. 8. et per B. 9. quod contra pro pro qua A. 29. vel non deest AB. 23. sensu B. 14; quod A. 3o. conclusio A. 33. secundo AB. 36. ab ea deest B.
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REPLICACIO DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 145 A 815 Sed ad secundum, quando argueram universale et His position that the suum singulare differunt vel non," respondit quod idem Universal and its singular are numero est universale et suum singulare, et differunt one in number, different in secundum racionem, sed non differunt differencia essen- thought, but not 5 ciali reali. Contra quam solucionem arguebam sic: se- really and essentially, is quitur quod non esset universale reale, nisi secundum untenable. racionem formalem, quia proprie universale reale est, This would make quod idem numero realiter est in multis suppositis, vel the Universal not real, but aptum est esse in multis suppositis: quod tamen magister only a form of thought. 10 meus negat, quamvis concedat quod idem secundum speciem est in multis suppositis. Et sic videtur ire ad Wyclif thus would seem verba, quando ponit quod universale reale in essendo only verbally to admit the est, quando ponit quod eadem humanitas est in Sorte reality of Universals, and et Platone; que opinio facit, quod non ponit universalia their identity 15 realia in essendo. Nam dicit magister meus quod non in various individuals. est deitas universalis nec communis, quia non potest Deity is not a esse alia deitas quam est nunc eiusdem speciei et ra- universal. cionis secum. Et in illo magister videtur dicere quod That there may humanitas universalis est, quia humanitas est; et potest be a singular 20 esse humanitas alia in numero eiusdem speciei secum, and a universal humanity does sed hoc non arguit universalitatem humanitatis in essendo, not prove the real entity of ut satis evidens est. Ex qua responsione magistri ulterius the latter. sequitur quod nulla res eadem in numero secundum numerum est in multis rebus suppositaliter distinctis. Ex 25 quo ulterius habetur quod universalitas non est realiter universalitas, nisi quoad racionem; non tamen intendo per racionem deffinicionem, sed rem subiectam racioni; et ita communiter eciam alia universalia. Sed ad 3um respondit quod universale naturaliter est 3o prius suo singulari, quamvis idem in numero est uni- versale et suum singulare. Contra illam solucionem arguebam sic: ex illo sequitur quod non secundum rem universale naturaliter est prius suo singulari, sed solum secundum racionem." Nam secundum philosophum 35 (5° metaphysice) illud dicitur realiter naturaliter prius In different individuals there can be nothing identically the same ; the identity is made by our mind. I also controvert Wyclif's position, that the Universal, identical with its singular, is prior in existence thereto. If it is identical, then it is only prior in thought, not in existence. 24. suppo- 14. in Platone B; ib. quam A; qua B. 10. concedit A. sitis A. 26. differenciam B. 27. differentem A. 30—33. prius suo singulari — prius suo singulari deest B. 35. materialiter B. 11. Ire ad verba. I have nowhere met with this expression, but I render it in the side-notes according to the most probable sense. 17. Deitas. This is no doubt brought in because Wyclif often uses the doctrine of the Trinity — one Deity in three persons, or individuals — to explain his doctrine. 10
REPLICACIO DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 145 A 815 Sed ad secundum, quando argueram universale et His position that the suum singulare differunt vel non," respondit quod idem Universal and its singular are numero est universale et suum singulare, et differunt one in number, different in secundum racionem, sed non differunt differencia essen- thought, but not 5 ciali reali. Contra quam solucionem arguebam sic: se- really and essentially, is quitur quod non esset universale reale, nisi secundum untenable. racionem formalem, quia proprie universale reale est, This would make quod idem numero realiter est in multis suppositis, vel the Universal not real, but aptum est esse in multis suppositis: quod tamen magister only a form of thought. 10 meus negat, quamvis concedat quod idem secundum speciem est in multis suppositis. Et sic videtur ire ad Wyclif thus would seem verba, quando ponit quod universale reale in essendo only verbally to admit the est, quando ponit quod eadem humanitas est in Sorte reality of Universals, and et Platone; que opinio facit, quod non ponit universalia their identity 15 realia in essendo. Nam dicit magister meus quod non in various individuals. est deitas universalis nec communis, quia non potest Deity is not a esse alia deitas quam est nunc eiusdem speciei et ra- universal. cionis secum. Et in illo magister videtur dicere quod That there may humanitas universalis est, quia humanitas est; et potest be a singular 20 esse humanitas alia in numero eiusdem speciei secum, and a universal humanity does sed hoc non arguit universalitatem humanitatis in essendo, not prove the real entity of ut satis evidens est. Ex qua responsione magistri ulterius the latter. sequitur quod nulla res eadem in numero secundum numerum est in multis rebus suppositaliter distinctis. Ex 25 quo ulterius habetur quod universalitas non est realiter universalitas, nisi quoad racionem; non tamen intendo per racionem deffinicionem, sed rem subiectam racioni; et ita communiter eciam alia universalia. Sed ad 3um respondit quod universale naturaliter est 3o prius suo singulari, quamvis idem in numero est uni- versale et suum singulare. Contra illam solucionem arguebam sic: ex illo sequitur quod non secundum rem universale naturaliter est prius suo singulari, sed solum secundum racionem." Nam secundum philosophum 35 (5° metaphysice) illud dicitur realiter naturaliter prius In different individuals there can be nothing identically the same ; the identity is made by our mind. I also controvert Wyclif's position, that the Universal, identical with its singular, is prior in existence thereto. If it is identical, then it is only prior in thought, not in existence. 24. suppo- 14. in Platone B; ib. quam A; qua B. 10. concedit A. sitis A. 26. differenciam B. 27. differentem A. 30—33. prius suo singulari — prius suo singulari deest B. 35. materialiter B. 11. Ire ad verba. I have nowhere met with this expression, but I render it in the side-notes according to the most probable sense. 17. Deitas. This is no doubt brought in because Wyclif often uses the doctrine of the Trinity — one Deity in three persons, or individuals — to explain his doctrine. 10
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146 JOHANNIS WYCLIF Aristotle says that priority of nature means independence of another, dependent on that which is prior. Wyclif says that if only one phoenix exists, singular phoenicity is not universal phoenicity. But they must be, if each stands for the same being; and if they stand for something else, for what? If the same essence which exists really in one, exists aptitudinally in many, this 'being apt is surely not a reality; and if only a thing of the mind, how can it be a universal entity? altero, quorum alterum sine altero esse non potest, sed bene e converso. Nam ponit philosophus 5° meta- physice, de prioritate secundum naturam, hec verba: alia vero secundum naturam et substanciam, et que- cunque contingit esse sine aliis, illa autem non sine eis.5 Qua deffinicione usus est Plato." Constat autem ex hiis verbis philosophi quod universale non est realiter na- turaliter prius suo singulari secundum primum modum prioritatis secundum naturam. Et certum est quod non penes secundum modum, nec secundum tercium modum 10 universale naturaliter est prius suo singulari realiter. Igitur, secundum primum modum prioritatis philosophi, universale naturaliter est prius suo singulari; quare responsio magistri non videtur esse salva. Ad 4am respondebat: "stante quod sit nisi unica fenix, 15 tunc fenicitas universalis non est fenicitas singularis. Contra quam responsionem arguebam sic: “Stante eodem casu, tunc in ista, fenicitas universalis non est fenicitas singularis: ergo subiectum et predicatum supponunt pre- cise pro eodem in numero, vel non. Si primum, tunc 20 est falsa: fenicitas universalis non est fenicitas singularis, eo quod secundum casum tunc non esset nisi una feni- citas. Si secundum, queritur pro quo supponit plus unum quam alterum; et non est reperibile aliquid assignandum, prioribus responsionibus omnibus salvis. Ad 5am respondebat (stante casu priori de fenice) quod fenicitas que iam est realiter secundum aptitudinem erit in multis suppositis. Contra quam responsionem arguebam sic: vel talis fenicitas erit secundum apti- tudinem in multis suppositis, vel secundum rem, vel 30 non. Non secundum rem, quia, secundum magistrum, sic non est universale, sed cognitum universaliter; ut posuit in responsione prima. Si non secundum rem, tunc secundum speciem] et racionem, ut magister meus A 82" dicit. Sed tunc, proprie loquendo, fenicitas non est 35 universale in essendo, quod est contra principale dictum magistri. Nisi dicat quod modus essendi est universalis, ex eo quod est vel potest esse alius modus essendi numero eiusdem speciei cum illo modo essendi qui iam est. Sed hoc non arguit universalitatem in essendo. 40 25 6. divisione A. 2. cuiusmodo A. 5. hiis eis A. clusio pro ergo. 20. vel in A; ib. non after tunc B. 31. magistrum deert B. 19. vel con- 22. causam A.
146 JOHANNIS WYCLIF Aristotle says that priority of nature means independence of another, dependent on that which is prior. Wyclif says that if only one phoenix exists, singular phoenicity is not universal phoenicity. But they must be, if each stands for the same being; and if they stand for something else, for what? If the same essence which exists really in one, exists aptitudinally in many, this 'being apt is surely not a reality; and if only a thing of the mind, how can it be a universal entity? altero, quorum alterum sine altero esse non potest, sed bene e converso. Nam ponit philosophus 5° meta- physice, de prioritate secundum naturam, hec verba: alia vero secundum naturam et substanciam, et que- cunque contingit esse sine aliis, illa autem non sine eis.5 Qua deffinicione usus est Plato." Constat autem ex hiis verbis philosophi quod universale non est realiter na- turaliter prius suo singulari secundum primum modum prioritatis secundum naturam. Et certum est quod non penes secundum modum, nec secundum tercium modum 10 universale naturaliter est prius suo singulari realiter. Igitur, secundum primum modum prioritatis philosophi, universale naturaliter est prius suo singulari; quare responsio magistri non videtur esse salva. Ad 4am respondebat: "stante quod sit nisi unica fenix, 15 tunc fenicitas universalis non est fenicitas singularis. Contra quam responsionem arguebam sic: “Stante eodem casu, tunc in ista, fenicitas universalis non est fenicitas singularis: ergo subiectum et predicatum supponunt pre- cise pro eodem in numero, vel non. Si primum, tunc 20 est falsa: fenicitas universalis non est fenicitas singularis, eo quod secundum casum tunc non esset nisi una feni- citas. Si secundum, queritur pro quo supponit plus unum quam alterum; et non est reperibile aliquid assignandum, prioribus responsionibus omnibus salvis. Ad 5am respondebat (stante casu priori de fenice) quod fenicitas que iam est realiter secundum aptitudinem erit in multis suppositis. Contra quam responsionem arguebam sic: vel talis fenicitas erit secundum apti- tudinem in multis suppositis, vel secundum rem, vel 30 non. Non secundum rem, quia, secundum magistrum, sic non est universale, sed cognitum universaliter; ut posuit in responsione prima. Si non secundum rem, tunc secundum speciem] et racionem, ut magister meus A 82" dicit. Sed tunc, proprie loquendo, fenicitas non est 35 universale in essendo, quod est contra principale dictum magistri. Nisi dicat quod modus essendi est universalis, ex eo quod est vel potest esse alius modus essendi numero eiusdem speciei cum illo modo essendi qui iam est. Sed hoc non arguit universalitatem in essendo. 40 25 6. divisione A. 2. cuiusmodo A. 5. hiis eis A. clusio pro ergo. 20. vel in A; ib. non after tunc B. 31. magistrum deert B. 19. vel con- 22. causam A.
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REPLICACIO DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 147 Quod clare patet intuenti dictam responsionem. Et ita magister meus concordat iam mecum quod non est universale in essendo secundum numerum, sed bene secundum racionem et speciem; et iam est communis 5 oppinio ponencium universalitatem in rebus. Ad 6am dicit quod universalia multa post datum tempus non erunt. Contra illam arguebam sic: sequitur quod aliqua sunt que non erunt, et aliqua fuerunt que non sunt. Cuius oppositum magister ponit, dicens: to quidquid erit, est, et quidquid fuit, est; et quidquid est, erit. Et assumptum patet de universalibus que post datum tempus non erunt. Ulterius dixit quod in illa proposicione: universale est incorruptibile, ibi li “uni- versale" stat pro generativo substancie: queritur ergo: 15 vel tale generatum est deus vel oracio? Et sic adhuc stat argumentum quod aliud a deo erit incorruptibile; cuius oppositum videtur magister sentire. Ad 7am respondit quod universale est incorruptibile, et talis [proposicio] est vera secundum predicacionem 20 secundum essenciam. Et, quia magister meus vult quod universale est incorruptibile secundum predicacionem formalem, contra hoc arguebam sic: vel duo subiecta dictarum proposicionum supponunt precise pro eodem, vel non. Si precise pro eodem, idem in numero est 25 corruptibile et incorruptibile; quod videtur implicare. Si non supponunt precise pro eodem, tunc aliquid erit universale quod non erit singulare, cuius oppositum habetur conclusione secunda et eius probacione. Ad 8am respondebat (quando argueram: vel uni- 3o versale addit aliquid realiter supra singulare suum, vel non") — dixit quod universale addit unum singulare super reliquum, quandoque secundum actum, quandoque secundum aptitudinem. Contra quam responsionem arguebam sic: Sequitur quod non est idem numero 35 universale et suum singulare. Probavi sic: quia, se- cundum magistrum, universale aliquid realiter addit super suum singulare, et sic universale est suum sin- He contradicts himself when he affirms that universals cease to exist. His contention that the Universal is changeless as an essential predication is worthless ; for Universal, when we say. The universal changes). would then neither stand for the same thing, nor ſor some- thing different. It is inconsistent at one time to say that the universal adds something real to its singular, Wyclif, therefore, agrees with me here. and at another to affirm that it is numerically identical therewith. 7. arguebatur A. 9. obiectum A. 11. argumentum A. 14. gene- ralissimo A; g'namo generativo? B. 15. ero B. 17. obiectum A. 19. proposicio deest AB. 22. ergo pro duo A. 23, 24. pro codem — pro codem deest B. 27. obiectum A. 32. aftu B. 25. Implicare. Contradiccionem is understood. 10*
REPLICACIO DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 147 Quod clare patet intuenti dictam responsionem. Et ita magister meus concordat iam mecum quod non est universale in essendo secundum numerum, sed bene secundum racionem et speciem; et iam est communis 5 oppinio ponencium universalitatem in rebus. Ad 6am dicit quod universalia multa post datum tempus non erunt. Contra illam arguebam sic: sequitur quod aliqua sunt que non erunt, et aliqua fuerunt que non sunt. Cuius oppositum magister ponit, dicens: to quidquid erit, est, et quidquid fuit, est; et quidquid est, erit. Et assumptum patet de universalibus que post datum tempus non erunt. Ulterius dixit quod in illa proposicione: universale est incorruptibile, ibi li “uni- versale" stat pro generativo substancie: queritur ergo: 15 vel tale generatum est deus vel oracio? Et sic adhuc stat argumentum quod aliud a deo erit incorruptibile; cuius oppositum videtur magister sentire. Ad 7am respondit quod universale est incorruptibile, et talis [proposicio] est vera secundum predicacionem 20 secundum essenciam. Et, quia magister meus vult quod universale est incorruptibile secundum predicacionem formalem, contra hoc arguebam sic: vel duo subiecta dictarum proposicionum supponunt precise pro eodem, vel non. Si precise pro eodem, idem in numero est 25 corruptibile et incorruptibile; quod videtur implicare. Si non supponunt precise pro eodem, tunc aliquid erit universale quod non erit singulare, cuius oppositum habetur conclusione secunda et eius probacione. Ad 8am respondebat (quando argueram: vel uni- 3o versale addit aliquid realiter supra singulare suum, vel non") — dixit quod universale addit unum singulare super reliquum, quandoque secundum actum, quandoque secundum aptitudinem. Contra quam responsionem arguebam sic: Sequitur quod non est idem numero 35 universale et suum singulare. Probavi sic: quia, se- cundum magistrum, universale aliquid realiter addit super suum singulare, et sic universale est suum sin- He contradicts himself when he affirms that universals cease to exist. His contention that the Universal is changeless as an essential predication is worthless ; for Universal, when we say. The universal changes). would then neither stand for the same thing, nor ſor some- thing different. It is inconsistent at one time to say that the universal adds something real to its singular, Wyclif, therefore, agrees with me here. and at another to affirm that it is numerically identical therewith. 7. arguebatur A. 9. obiectum A. 11. argumentum A. 14. gene- ralissimo A; g'namo generativo? B. 15. ero B. 17. obiectum A. 19. proposicio deest AB. 22. ergo pro duo A. 23, 24. pro codem — pro codem deest B. 27. obiectum A. 32. aftu B. 25. Implicare. Contradiccionem is understood. 10*
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148 JOHANNIS WYCLIF For humanity, being included in the idea universal, is therefore its subject, according to the general rule. gulare, et sic universale est suum singulare et plus; quia est suum singulare cum addito realiter super suum singulare. Sed hoc est contra magistrum, ubi dicit quod universale in singulari est singulare suum, et nec plus neque minus. Ad 9am respondit quod in ista proposicione, humanitas It is false that in 'Humanity is est universale, predicatum predicatur ut in subiecto non universal', Universal is ut de subiecto: quod est falsum. Patet prima pars not predicated of humanity as assumpti; quia, que sunt in subiecto nichil prohibet its subject. nomen predicari; de quo predicatur racionem vero im- 10 possibile est de eisdem predicari, ut habetur in predi- camentis. Sed secunda pars patet respiciendo racionem illius, quod est universale. Arguebam sic: ad idem prin- cipale hic predicatur superius in predicando de suo inferiori; igitur predicatum ibi predicatur ut de subiecto. 15 Consequencia tenet, quia hoc est predicari ut de sub- iecto; sed antecedens patet, ex quid nominis 1 illius quod A 823 est in predicando; et supposita responsione magistri mei ad precedencia. I reject Wyclif's Ad 10am respondit: partes sunt idem numero cum 20 example of suo toto." Contra hoc arguebam sic: si partes sunt parts being prior to their idem numero cum suo toto, et sunt priores suo toto, whole by maxime essent priores suo toto, prioritate nature, quia priority of nature. solum talis prioritas est hic pertinens ad propositum. Ergo primo modo vel secundo vel tercio modo. Non 25 secundo nec tercio modo, quia sunt impertinentes modi ad propositum. Nec eciam primo modo; quia tunc For then they would be parts staret esse illas partes, non existente toto, quod idem of which the whole might be numero est cum illis partibus: quod est impossibile, non-existent: but to be a part quia tunc idem esset et non esset. Patet consequencia: 30 supposes a prius naturaliter alterum altero est primo modo, quia whole. potest esse sine illa. Posuit magister istam conclusionem secundam; uni- versale est singulare. Arguebat pro ea sic: illa humanitas est humanitas; igitur humanitas est ista etc., 2° sic: si 35 est separatum, habet esse indivisum a quolibet alio divisum: igitur est individuum. Contra hanc conclusionem posui meam conclusionem terciam istam: nullum univer- Wyclif argues that the universal is singular, 2. reat? = realitatis B. 9. assumpta A. II. ha- 7, 8. ut non B. bentur B. 12. respondendo A. 30. sequela (?) A. 11. Predicamentis. This unintelligible sentence is no doubt corrupt.
148 JOHANNIS WYCLIF For humanity, being included in the idea universal, is therefore its subject, according to the general rule. gulare, et sic universale est suum singulare et plus; quia est suum singulare cum addito realiter super suum singulare. Sed hoc est contra magistrum, ubi dicit quod universale in singulari est singulare suum, et nec plus neque minus. Ad 9am respondit quod in ista proposicione, humanitas It is false that in 'Humanity is est universale, predicatum predicatur ut in subiecto non universal', Universal is ut de subiecto: quod est falsum. Patet prima pars not predicated of humanity as assumpti; quia, que sunt in subiecto nichil prohibet its subject. nomen predicari; de quo predicatur racionem vero im- 10 possibile est de eisdem predicari, ut habetur in predi- camentis. Sed secunda pars patet respiciendo racionem illius, quod est universale. Arguebam sic: ad idem prin- cipale hic predicatur superius in predicando de suo inferiori; igitur predicatum ibi predicatur ut de subiecto. 15 Consequencia tenet, quia hoc est predicari ut de sub- iecto; sed antecedens patet, ex quid nominis 1 illius quod A 823 est in predicando; et supposita responsione magistri mei ad precedencia. I reject Wyclif's Ad 10am respondit: partes sunt idem numero cum 20 example of suo toto." Contra hoc arguebam sic: si partes sunt parts being prior to their idem numero cum suo toto, et sunt priores suo toto, whole by maxime essent priores suo toto, prioritate nature, quia priority of nature. solum talis prioritas est hic pertinens ad propositum. Ergo primo modo vel secundo vel tercio modo. Non 25 secundo nec tercio modo, quia sunt impertinentes modi ad propositum. Nec eciam primo modo; quia tunc For then they would be parts staret esse illas partes, non existente toto, quod idem of which the whole might be numero est cum illis partibus: quod est impossibile, non-existent: but to be a part quia tunc idem esset et non esset. Patet consequencia: 30 supposes a prius naturaliter alterum altero est primo modo, quia whole. potest esse sine illa. Posuit magister istam conclusionem secundam; uni- versale est singulare. Arguebat pro ea sic: illa humanitas est humanitas; igitur humanitas est ista etc., 2° sic: si 35 est separatum, habet esse indivisum a quolibet alio divisum: igitur est individuum. Contra hanc conclusionem posui meam conclusionem terciam istam: nullum univer- Wyclif argues that the universal is singular, 2. reat? = realitatis B. 9. assumpta A. II. ha- 7, 8. ut non B. bentur B. 12. respondendo A. 30. sequela (?) A. 11. Predicamentis. This unintelligible sentence is no doubt corrupt.
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REPLICACIO DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 149 sale in essendo reale est suum singulare. Probatur: which I deny, Nullum universale reale est (ut ponit mea conclusio prima): igitur conclusio vera. Consequencia nota est, similiter et antecedens. Et confirmatur: Si est univer- sale in essendo reale, ipsum magis verisimiliter non esset singulare in essendo; eo quod esse realiter uni- versaliter et esse realiter singulariter opponerentur, ut patet per raciones utriusque esse. Intuli ex illa conclu- sione corollarium quod id quod magister ponit pro ro secunda conclusione non est sustinendum, etc. Sed ad racionem primam qua voluit probare suam When he points to any singular conclusionem, quando arguit sic; “ista humanitas est humanity, saying: This is humanitas," concessi; demonstrata humanitate, igitur Humanity, humanitas est ista humanitas," concessi consequenciam, I grant it only in the sense 15 demonstrata eadem humanitate. Et si argueret: "eciam that it is this humanity. est universalis (vel universale)", negavi illam. Ad 2am: “si est separatum, habet esse indivisum in I do not admit that the se, et a quolibet alio divisum," negavi consequenciam; difference of the Universal quia Plato vel Burleo, qui posuit universalia separata from its 20 a singularibus non indiguit concedere talem consequen- singular implies that it ciam. Sed ad racionem qua volui probare istam con- has a separate entity of its clusionem terciam, respondit quod esse universaliter own. Wyclif asserts realiter et esse singulariter realiter opponuntur, sicud that the relativa; et talia eidem possunt inesse, sicud eidem Universal and its singular are 25 inest esse istum hominem et esse hominem, ut in relativis only opposed as relative eidem inest esse patrem et esse illum filium; et primum terms are, v. g. est universale et secundum singulare. father and son. He objects to Et contra solucionem meam sui primi argumenti, my saying that quando negavi istam consequenciam, si ego sum homo, it is not necessary for 3o omnis homo est homo; igitur necessarium est, ad me a man to be an animal, since esse hominem, omnem hominem esse hominem" (et circa that is essential hoc dixi: "non potest esse homo sine hoc quod sit to man. animal, et tamen non est necessarium hominem esse animal"); dixit quod male do instanciam; sed sic non 35 potest esse homo sine hoc quod sit animal. Et tamen necessarium non est, ad esse hominem, animal esse, quia est ista necessaria simpliciter: si homo est, animal est;" igitur est necessitas simpliciter habitudinis, qua, because universal being and singular being are contrary to each other. But it is essential only hypothetically; for it is not necessary for a man to be at 3. consequencia A. 7. apponerentur A. 9. corellarie B. 19. Purley B. 21. voluit AB. 27. et deest B. 28. articuli A. 36. ad me A, deest B. 19. I have left the name as it stands in A, but Purley looks more like an English name. Perhaps it is a mistake for Burley. Cf. p. 153, 1. 5.
REPLICACIO DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 149 sale in essendo reale est suum singulare. Probatur: which I deny, Nullum universale reale est (ut ponit mea conclusio prima): igitur conclusio vera. Consequencia nota est, similiter et antecedens. Et confirmatur: Si est univer- sale in essendo reale, ipsum magis verisimiliter non esset singulare in essendo; eo quod esse realiter uni- versaliter et esse realiter singulariter opponerentur, ut patet per raciones utriusque esse. Intuli ex illa conclu- sione corollarium quod id quod magister ponit pro ro secunda conclusione non est sustinendum, etc. Sed ad racionem primam qua voluit probare suam When he points to any singular conclusionem, quando arguit sic; “ista humanitas est humanity, saying: This is humanitas," concessi; demonstrata humanitate, igitur Humanity, humanitas est ista humanitas," concessi consequenciam, I grant it only in the sense 15 demonstrata eadem humanitate. Et si argueret: "eciam that it is this humanity. est universalis (vel universale)", negavi illam. Ad 2am: “si est separatum, habet esse indivisum in I do not admit that the se, et a quolibet alio divisum," negavi consequenciam; difference of the Universal quia Plato vel Burleo, qui posuit universalia separata from its 20 a singularibus non indiguit concedere talem consequen- singular implies that it ciam. Sed ad racionem qua volui probare istam con- has a separate entity of its clusionem terciam, respondit quod esse universaliter own. Wyclif asserts realiter et esse singulariter realiter opponuntur, sicud that the relativa; et talia eidem possunt inesse, sicud eidem Universal and its singular are 25 inest esse istum hominem et esse hominem, ut in relativis only opposed as relative eidem inest esse patrem et esse illum filium; et primum terms are, v. g. est universale et secundum singulare. father and son. He objects to Et contra solucionem meam sui primi argumenti, my saying that quando negavi istam consequenciam, si ego sum homo, it is not necessary for 3o omnis homo est homo; igitur necessarium est, ad me a man to be an animal, since esse hominem, omnem hominem esse hominem" (et circa that is essential hoc dixi: "non potest esse homo sine hoc quod sit to man. animal, et tamen non est necessarium hominem esse animal"); dixit quod male do instanciam; sed sic non 35 potest esse homo sine hoc quod sit animal. Et tamen necessarium non est, ad esse hominem, animal esse, quia est ista necessaria simpliciter: si homo est, animal est;" igitur est necessitas simpliciter habitudinis, qua, because universal being and singular being are contrary to each other. But it is essential only hypothetically; for it is not necessary for a man to be at 3. consequencia A. 7. apponerentur A. 9. corellarie B. 19. Purley B. 21. voluit AB. 27. et deest B. 28. articuli A. 36. ad me A, deest B. 19. I have left the name as it stands in A, but Purley looks more like an English name. Perhaps it is a mistake for Burley. Cf. p. 153, 1. 5.
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150 JOHANNIS WYCLIF ad hominem esse (cum esset) esset animal esse. Et est simile; “Sors, quando est, necesse est esse;" licet Sors non sit, ut aliqui dicunt. Subiunxit quod dedi instanciam: non sequitur [ex], As to my . example of the si chymera currit, chymera movetur", quod igitur Chimera, he denies the necessarium est, ad chymeram currere, chymeram moveri, analogy, because a respondit quod prior sua consequencia tenet in virtute chimera is an ipothesis illius, quia necesse est posse esse me esse absurdity, which man is hominem, qualiter non est hic; et ergo non est simile. not. If a chimera Aliter dixit posse responderi quod est absoluta necessitas, were possible, ad hoc quod chymera currit, chymera movetur, dato he says, the conclusion quod aliqualiter esset apprehensibile chymeram currere. would follow, just as for man; Et quando dixi quod ibi arguitur a specie reali ad speciem loycalem, et ergo talis consequencia est im- pertinens ad probandum quod universale reale est; 15 respondit: planum est, posito quod sic esset, adhuc esset it matters not one whit that consequencia bona; quia argueretur a fundamento ad this is a pure fiction of the fundatum. Et subiunxit: nisi consequencia necessaria mind, if the consequence is in signato haberet signatum primarium necessarium ex necessary. parte rei, non esset necessaria, alias diceretur quod ista 20 est necessaria: chymera est; quia non oportet ita esse What would ex parte rei, si proposicio est necessaria". Et addidit: become Eciam nesciretur quid deus sciret, sciendo quod si of God's omniscience if chymera currit chymera movetur, non existentibus pro- such propositions, posicionibus; vel eciam, sciendo quod chimera non est, 25 necessarily true, vel quod vacuum non est, cum non essent proposiciones. did not exist? Et opposuit: Deberemus ergo studere significaciones et consignificaciones talium vocabulorum, et haberemus scienciam talium: Vacuum non est, sine ulterioribus fatigacionibus; quia, cum sciremus voces tales et signifi-30 caciones et consignificaciones, et non relinqueretur amplius scibile, haberemus propositum. Ad 2m suum articulum, quando dixi quod eque primo naturaliter est me esse et hominem esse, et quando con- cessi: igitur eque primo naturaliter [ut] est homo, ego 35 A 83. 10 all, unless we first posit his existence. I said that it does not ſollow, though my entity and human entity 2. Sors quando deest B. 3. differant A. 4. ex deest AB. 18. fundfu = fundamentum B. 10. posset B. 16. placitum (?) A. 32. amplius deest B. 29. talem A. 19. signo B. 21. arguitur A. 35. consequencia pro eque A; ib. ut deest AB. 23. Nesciretur. Because (I suppose), if a proposition could not be true unless its terms were possible, God would not know what was impossible nor (consequently) what was possible; and so on. But I admit that this explanation savours of subtlety.
150 JOHANNIS WYCLIF ad hominem esse (cum esset) esset animal esse. Et est simile; “Sors, quando est, necesse est esse;" licet Sors non sit, ut aliqui dicunt. Subiunxit quod dedi instanciam: non sequitur [ex], As to my . example of the si chymera currit, chymera movetur", quod igitur Chimera, he denies the necessarium est, ad chymeram currere, chymeram moveri, analogy, because a respondit quod prior sua consequencia tenet in virtute chimera is an ipothesis illius, quia necesse est posse esse me esse absurdity, which man is hominem, qualiter non est hic; et ergo non est simile. not. If a chimera Aliter dixit posse responderi quod est absoluta necessitas, were possible, ad hoc quod chymera currit, chymera movetur, dato he says, the conclusion quod aliqualiter esset apprehensibile chymeram currere. would follow, just as for man; Et quando dixi quod ibi arguitur a specie reali ad speciem loycalem, et ergo talis consequencia est im- pertinens ad probandum quod universale reale est; 15 respondit: planum est, posito quod sic esset, adhuc esset it matters not one whit that consequencia bona; quia argueretur a fundamento ad this is a pure fiction of the fundatum. Et subiunxit: nisi consequencia necessaria mind, if the consequence is in signato haberet signatum primarium necessarium ex necessary. parte rei, non esset necessaria, alias diceretur quod ista 20 est necessaria: chymera est; quia non oportet ita esse What would ex parte rei, si proposicio est necessaria". Et addidit: become Eciam nesciretur quid deus sciret, sciendo quod si of God's omniscience if chymera currit chymera movetur, non existentibus pro- such propositions, posicionibus; vel eciam, sciendo quod chimera non est, 25 necessarily true, vel quod vacuum non est, cum non essent proposiciones. did not exist? Et opposuit: Deberemus ergo studere significaciones et consignificaciones talium vocabulorum, et haberemus scienciam talium: Vacuum non est, sine ulterioribus fatigacionibus; quia, cum sciremus voces tales et signifi-30 caciones et consignificaciones, et non relinqueretur amplius scibile, haberemus propositum. Ad 2m suum articulum, quando dixi quod eque primo naturaliter est me esse et hominem esse, et quando con- cessi: igitur eque primo naturaliter [ut] est homo, ego 35 A 83. 10 all, unless we first posit his existence. I said that it does not ſollow, though my entity and human entity 2. Sors quando deest B. 3. differant A. 4. ex deest AB. 18. fundfu = fundamentum B. 10. posset B. 16. placitum (?) A. 32. amplius deest B. 29. talem A. 19. signo B. 21. arguitur A. 35. consequencia pro eque A; ib. ut deest AB. 23. Nesciretur. Because (I suppose), if a proposition could not be true unless its terms were possible, God would not know what was impossible nor (consequently) what was possible; and so on. But I admit that this explanation savours of subtlety.
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REPLICACIO DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 151 A 83 sum"; et ulterius negavi consequenciam: “igitur, si homo est, ego sum." Contra hoc arguebat sic: eque primo naturaliter est me esse et hominem esse: igitur simul naturaliter est me esse et hominem esse. Vel ergo primo 5 modo simultatis, vel secundo, vel tercio. Sed necessario non tercio modo; igitur hominem esse et me esse sunt simul naturaliter secundo modo vel primo modo. Sed secundo modo simul naturaliter sunt que se consecuntur, et neutrum est causa alterius. Igitur, si eque primo ro naturaliter est hominem esse et me esse, sequitur ergo quod, si homo est, ego sum. Consequencia tenet ex vir- tute illius medii, quia solum duobus modis aliqua sunt simul natura. [Si] non secundo modo simul natura est hominem esse If there be only a parity 15 et me esse; necessario sequitur quod si eque primo na- turaliter est hominem esse cum me esse, quod, si homo est, ego sum. Ad idem arguebat sic: essencialis est habitudo hominem esse ad me esse; igitur, si eque primo, naturaliter est hominem esse et me esse, tunc in ordine 20 essenciali me esse ad primam causam, et hominem esse ad eandem eque primo sunt. Ex quo ulterius arguitur; in ordine essenciali eque primo naturaliter sunt me esse et hominem esse. Vel ergo eodem ordine penitus, vel non. Si penitus in eodem ordine, igitur non stabit in 25 eodem ordine essenciali esse hominem sine me esse, vel nisi sit me esse. Igitur consequencia fuit bona. Si non penitus in eodem ordine est utrumque illorum, igitur erit ordo essencialis eius quod est hominem esse ad primam causam, in quo non erit me esse; et in quo- 3o cunque ordine essenciali ad primam causam est me esse, in eodem non erit hominem esse. Sequitur quod in ordine essenciali est prius hominem esse quam me esse, sic ergo ad me esse requiritur hominem esse, et non requiritur ad hominem esse, me esse. Utrobique uni- 35 formiter intelligendo hominem esse, essencialis est prioritas hominem esse ad me esse. Alias, non variando in in- telleccione consequentis, sicud sequitur "ego sum, ergo homo est" sic deberet sequi “homo est, igitur ego sum". Sed quando dedi instanciam: "non sequitur: eque primo 40 naturaliter est asinus et hircus; igitur, si asinus est, hircus est;" respondit quod non simpliciter eque primo Wyclif attempts to prove it; for if I admit parity of mutual connection, it necessarily follows. of essential relation, and both are of the same rank as beings, the existence of one will require that of the olher ; f not, then man will have a certain relation to the First Cause, which I have not. And then my being is presupposed that of a man, and not vice versa, as would be the case in the hypothesis of parity. My example of an ass and a goat fails, because they are on a par, that if any man exists, I exist. 14. Si deest AB. 30. oracione B. 34, 35. universaliter B. 35. in- tendo A.
REPLICACIO DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 151 A 83 sum"; et ulterius negavi consequenciam: “igitur, si homo est, ego sum." Contra hoc arguebat sic: eque primo naturaliter est me esse et hominem esse: igitur simul naturaliter est me esse et hominem esse. Vel ergo primo 5 modo simultatis, vel secundo, vel tercio. Sed necessario non tercio modo; igitur hominem esse et me esse sunt simul naturaliter secundo modo vel primo modo. Sed secundo modo simul naturaliter sunt que se consecuntur, et neutrum est causa alterius. Igitur, si eque primo ro naturaliter est hominem esse et me esse, sequitur ergo quod, si homo est, ego sum. Consequencia tenet ex vir- tute illius medii, quia solum duobus modis aliqua sunt simul natura. [Si] non secundo modo simul natura est hominem esse If there be only a parity 15 et me esse; necessario sequitur quod si eque primo na- turaliter est hominem esse cum me esse, quod, si homo est, ego sum. Ad idem arguebat sic: essencialis est habitudo hominem esse ad me esse; igitur, si eque primo, naturaliter est hominem esse et me esse, tunc in ordine 20 essenciali me esse ad primam causam, et hominem esse ad eandem eque primo sunt. Ex quo ulterius arguitur; in ordine essenciali eque primo naturaliter sunt me esse et hominem esse. Vel ergo eodem ordine penitus, vel non. Si penitus in eodem ordine, igitur non stabit in 25 eodem ordine essenciali esse hominem sine me esse, vel nisi sit me esse. Igitur consequencia fuit bona. Si non penitus in eodem ordine est utrumque illorum, igitur erit ordo essencialis eius quod est hominem esse ad primam causam, in quo non erit me esse; et in quo- 3o cunque ordine essenciali ad primam causam est me esse, in eodem non erit hominem esse. Sequitur quod in ordine essenciali est prius hominem esse quam me esse, sic ergo ad me esse requiritur hominem esse, et non requiritur ad hominem esse, me esse. Utrobique uni- 35 formiter intelligendo hominem esse, essencialis est prioritas hominem esse ad me esse. Alias, non variando in in- telleccione consequentis, sicud sequitur "ego sum, ergo homo est" sic deberet sequi “homo est, igitur ego sum". Sed quando dedi instanciam: "non sequitur: eque primo 40 naturaliter est asinus et hircus; igitur, si asinus est, hircus est;" respondit quod non simpliciter eque primo Wyclif attempts to prove it; for if I admit parity of mutual connection, it necessarily follows. of essential relation, and both are of the same rank as beings, the existence of one will require that of the olher ; f not, then man will have a certain relation to the First Cause, which I have not. And then my being is presupposed that of a man, and not vice versa, as would be the case in the hypothesis of parity. My example of an ass and a goat fails, because they are on a par, that if any man exists, I exist. 14. Si deest AB. 30. oracione B. 34, 35. universaliter B. 35. in- tendo A.
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152 JOHANNIS WYCLIF naturaliter sunt simul in natura, licet bene simul sunt in natura sub eodem genere tercio modo simultatis. Arguebat pro illo quia, cum prima causa in ordine universi simpliciter primum gradum essendi essencialem habeat, res que sunt perfecciores essencialiter aliis de tanto minus distant ab ea, scilicet, prima causa. Cum igitur quelibet species due universi diversificantur in perfeccione essenciali, erit una secundum suum gradum essencialem propinquior prime cause quam reliqua; et cum gradus essendi essencialis ponat rem in ordine 10 essenciali, sequitur quod nec res diversarum specierum sunt eque primo in natura; secundum autem individuale esse, habent ordinem accidentalem. My admission Ad 3am: quando concessi simul vertibiliter in toto that humanity sunt humanitas et mea humanitas singularis," negavi 15 and my humanity are illam consequenciam, 'igitur in quodcunque vertibile interchangeable est humanitas, in idem et mea". Arguit: sequitur quod terms, implies, according to Wyclif, that omnis homo mea singulari humanitate esset homo." one is the Ad 4am, quando negavi: “tunc albedo intensior esset essence of the other. perfeccior, saltem minus intensa," contra hoc arguit 20 He affirms that sic: "unus gradus albedinis addit perfeccionem essen- each degree of intensity of a cialem super priorem, et non communicat in eadem, quality gives it more essential igitur amplioris perfeccionis essencialis resultat". perfection ; Ad 5am et 6am respondebat quod vult sic arguere: and that our knowledge thatee contingit de communi cursu scire determinate omnem 25 fire is hot proves the ignem esse calidum;" et tunc dixit quod determinate universal entity sciatur, et non dabitur nisi caliditas communis igni. of heat. Ad 7am, quando negavi hanc consequenciam: “hoc est predicacio accidentalis, humanitas est singularis, igitur prius naturaliter est humanitas quam sit humanitas 30 singularis," (et dedi instanciam, quia non sequitur, “hec est predicacio accidentalis, homo est ad aliquid, igitur naturaliter prius est homo quam ad aliquid"), dixit magister, admisso quod non valet consequencia, non properly stated, tamen dedi instanciam. Sed dixit debere me sic arguere; it makes for his ee hec est predicacio accidentalis; homo est ad aliquid; contention. igitur naturaliter est prius hominem esse quam hominem esse ad aliquid. Et sic tunc antecedens est verum, con- sequens est verum. Subiunxit, "quia prius naturaliter est res secundum esse essenciale quam secundum acci-40 dentale; ut patet 5° metaphysice". Sed quando ad ra- may be on a par as being disparate; besides, all beings are in reality prior or posterior in nature to each other, as they approach more or less to Divine Perfection. He denies the analogy of the example, which leads me to say that universal is not prior to singular humanity; 5 35 3. oroe B. 8. et pro erit A. I1. mille pro nec B. 28. hoc A. 36. hoc A.
152 JOHANNIS WYCLIF naturaliter sunt simul in natura, licet bene simul sunt in natura sub eodem genere tercio modo simultatis. Arguebat pro illo quia, cum prima causa in ordine universi simpliciter primum gradum essendi essencialem habeat, res que sunt perfecciores essencialiter aliis de tanto minus distant ab ea, scilicet, prima causa. Cum igitur quelibet species due universi diversificantur in perfeccione essenciali, erit una secundum suum gradum essencialem propinquior prime cause quam reliqua; et cum gradus essendi essencialis ponat rem in ordine 10 essenciali, sequitur quod nec res diversarum specierum sunt eque primo in natura; secundum autem individuale esse, habent ordinem accidentalem. My admission Ad 3am: quando concessi simul vertibiliter in toto that humanity sunt humanitas et mea humanitas singularis," negavi 15 and my humanity are illam consequenciam, 'igitur in quodcunque vertibile interchangeable est humanitas, in idem et mea". Arguit: sequitur quod terms, implies, according to Wyclif, that omnis homo mea singulari humanitate esset homo." one is the Ad 4am, quando negavi: “tunc albedo intensior esset essence of the other. perfeccior, saltem minus intensa," contra hoc arguit 20 He affirms that sic: "unus gradus albedinis addit perfeccionem essen- each degree of intensity of a cialem super priorem, et non communicat in eadem, quality gives it more essential igitur amplioris perfeccionis essencialis resultat". perfection ; Ad 5am et 6am respondebat quod vult sic arguere: and that our knowledge thatee contingit de communi cursu scire determinate omnem 25 fire is hot proves the ignem esse calidum;" et tunc dixit quod determinate universal entity sciatur, et non dabitur nisi caliditas communis igni. of heat. Ad 7am, quando negavi hanc consequenciam: “hoc est predicacio accidentalis, humanitas est singularis, igitur prius naturaliter est humanitas quam sit humanitas 30 singularis," (et dedi instanciam, quia non sequitur, “hec est predicacio accidentalis, homo est ad aliquid, igitur naturaliter prius est homo quam ad aliquid"), dixit magister, admisso quod non valet consequencia, non properly stated, tamen dedi instanciam. Sed dixit debere me sic arguere; it makes for his ee hec est predicacio accidentalis; homo est ad aliquid; contention. igitur naturaliter est prius hominem esse quam hominem esse ad aliquid. Et sic tunc antecedens est verum, con- sequens est verum. Subiunxit, "quia prius naturaliter est res secundum esse essenciale quam secundum acci-40 dentale; ut patet 5° metaphysice". Sed quando ad ra- may be on a par as being disparate; besides, all beings are in reality prior or posterior in nature to each other, as they approach more or less to Divine Perfection. He denies the analogy of the example, which leads me to say that universal is not prior to singular humanity; 5 35 3. oroe B. 8. et pro erit A. I1. mille pro nec B. 28. hoc A. 36. hoc A.
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REPLICACIO DE UNIVERSA LIBUS. 153 cionem respondebam, qua arguebat quod universale est He urges that . . . . the U l singulare, negando istam consequenciam: *'si est sepa- the Universal, 9 Pa- it it be not its ratum, habet esse indivisum a se et a guolibet alio singer is divisum; igitur est individuum," quia dixi quod Plato own, S . . be it i 5et Burley negassent eam, tam primo quam eciam se- one and not . i 1 ią. ; many, though cundo: arguit pro illa consequencia; cum sit unum Together with ens et non plura, erit indivisum in se, et non erit many. alia; cum alia secum erunt, erit indivisum ab aliis; igitur consequencia fuit bona. 10 — Ad racionem, quando arguebam probando quod nullum He says that universale reale est singulare, respondit quod universale "Between the" a 1 i universal and A 84 et singulare opponuntur relative. Contra quod arguebam its singular is sic: sequitur quod, sicud ad invicem relativa sunt simul that of relation, natura, ita universale et suum singulare. Patet, quia JE Sol there 15 (ex predicamentis philosophi) omnia relativa sunt simul priori ot natura, saltem que sunt ad invicem relativa. Et talia nature. dicuntur ad convertenciam, ut patet ibidem; sed univer- sale et suum singulare non sunt simul natura, Nec Which is dicuntur ad convertenciam, ut magister meus intendit V yclit's 20 deducere in argumento suo secundo, quo nititur probare Position. quod universale in essendo reale est; ymmo dixit quod naturaliter prius est humanitas quam mea humanitas. Ergo non videtur quod universale et suum singulare sunt relative opposita. 25 In replicacione contra solucionem meam ad suum , He says: . * 4 ete . . Whether a man primum argumentum, dixit: "Sive homo sit, sive homo exists or does i i i i ?? not, it is simply non sit, necessarium est ad hominem esse, animal esse. necessary, that Probat sic: "ista est simpliciter necessaria; Si homo est, if a man exists, . EM . an animal animal est." Respondendo ad eam, negavi instanciam, should exist. ixi i 1 i ici And I say that 3oet dixi quod talis non est necessaria simpliciter, sed ihe necessity i sub condicione est necessaria. Sed quando dedi in- not simple, but . . . - conditional stanciam: “In modo suo arguendi non sequitur, Si upon the fact chymera currit, chymera movetur; igitur necessarium of a man's est ad chymeram currere, chymeram moveri;” dixit quod There is, he ee qe . asscrts, no 35non est simile ad argumentum suum, scilicet, “Si ego parity between sum homo, omnis homo est homo;" igitur necessarium his and the est ad me esse hominem, omnem hominem esse hominem." bec Chimera, Et assignavit causam, quia sua consequencia tenet in is possible, and virtute istius ipothesis: “necessario est me posse esse 4 Chimera is 40 hominem,” qualiter non est in secundo argumento meo de chymera. 1. contra A. _ 7. et proerit A. 17. durB. 19. conseguenciam A. 28. probat A. — 39. necessarie A; necessaria B.
REPLICACIO DE UNIVERSA LIBUS. 153 cionem respondebam, qua arguebat quod universale est He urges that . . . . the U l singulare, negando istam consequenciam: *'si est sepa- the Universal, 9 Pa- it it be not its ratum, habet esse indivisum a se et a guolibet alio singer is divisum; igitur est individuum," quia dixi quod Plato own, S . . be it i 5et Burley negassent eam, tam primo quam eciam se- one and not . i 1 ią. ; many, though cundo: arguit pro illa consequencia; cum sit unum Together with ens et non plura, erit indivisum in se, et non erit many. alia; cum alia secum erunt, erit indivisum ab aliis; igitur consequencia fuit bona. 10 — Ad racionem, quando arguebam probando quod nullum He says that universale reale est singulare, respondit quod universale "Between the" a 1 i universal and A 84 et singulare opponuntur relative. Contra quod arguebam its singular is sic: sequitur quod, sicud ad invicem relativa sunt simul that of relation, natura, ita universale et suum singulare. Patet, quia JE Sol there 15 (ex predicamentis philosophi) omnia relativa sunt simul priori ot natura, saltem que sunt ad invicem relativa. Et talia nature. dicuntur ad convertenciam, ut patet ibidem; sed univer- sale et suum singulare non sunt simul natura, Nec Which is dicuntur ad convertenciam, ut magister meus intendit V yclit's 20 deducere in argumento suo secundo, quo nititur probare Position. quod universale in essendo reale est; ymmo dixit quod naturaliter prius est humanitas quam mea humanitas. Ergo non videtur quod universale et suum singulare sunt relative opposita. 25 In replicacione contra solucionem meam ad suum , He says: . * 4 ete . . Whether a man primum argumentum, dixit: "Sive homo sit, sive homo exists or does i i i i ?? not, it is simply non sit, necessarium est ad hominem esse, animal esse. necessary, that Probat sic: "ista est simpliciter necessaria; Si homo est, if a man exists, . EM . an animal animal est." Respondendo ad eam, negavi instanciam, should exist. ixi i 1 i ici And I say that 3oet dixi quod talis non est necessaria simpliciter, sed ihe necessity i sub condicione est necessaria. Sed quando dedi in- not simple, but . . . - conditional stanciam: “In modo suo arguendi non sequitur, Si upon the fact chymera currit, chymera movetur; igitur necessarium of a man's est ad chymeram currere, chymeram moveri;” dixit quod There is, he ee qe . asscrts, no 35non est simile ad argumentum suum, scilicet, “Si ego parity between sum homo, omnis homo est homo;" igitur necessarium his and the est ad me esse hominem, omnem hominem esse hominem." bec Chimera, Et assignavit causam, quia sua consequencia tenet in is possible, and virtute istius ipothesis: “necessario est me posse esse 4 Chimera is 40 hominem,” qualiter non est in secundo argumento meo de chymera. 1. contra A. _ 7. et proerit A. 17. durB. 19. conseguenciam A. 28. probat A. — 39. necessarie A; necessaria B.
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154 JOHANNIS WYCLIF Sed adhuc consequencia magistri non valet; nam non sequitur: Si Sors currit, Sors movetur: ergo necessarium est ad Sortem currere, Sortem moveri. Quod argumentum suum cum solucione sua non probat aliquid pro sui intencione, sic patet: quia ypothesis virtute cuius debet tenere argumentum suum, debet intelligi realiter vel only logical loycaliter: realiter intelligendo, negavi eam; scilicet, quia necessity, or necesse est posse esse me esse hominem, quia nullum that of consequence. ens necessarium est posse esse me esse hominem. Loyca- The possibility of my existence liter intelligendo eam, concessi eam, et per illum sensum 10 is not a necessary nihil hic arguitur ad propositum. Primus sensus est existing thing falsus, eo quod nullomodo necessarium est ad Sortem Running implies movement; but currere, Sortem moveri; sed contingens est ad Sortem this neither proves running currere, Sortem moveri; semper intelligendo realiter, nor movement sicud contingens est Sortem currere, ad Sortem moveri, to exist. ergo adhuc stat solucio mea. Ad argumentum suum primum, quando dixit quod non do instanciam, quando dico, “Non potest esse homo sine hoc quod sit animal; et tamen non est necessarium hominem esse animal" (ymmo non scripsi quod hoc 20 esset instancia sui dicti, sed posui tamquam aliquid ex quo dici potest oppositum sui dicti); sed quando magister meus dicit quod deberem sic dare instanciam: Non potest esse homo, sine hoc quod sit animal; et tamen non est necessarium ad hominem esse, animal esse"; dixi concedendo illam etc. non contingens est hominem esse, etsi contingens est hominem esse ad animal [esse], semper realiter intelligendo. Sed quando dixit quod hoc est falsum, negavi illam. Sed quando ulterius dixi in responsione, quod ubi 30 arguitur a specie loycali ad speciem realem etc. con- sequencia est impertinens, respondit: posito quod sic sit, adhuc esset bona consequencia." Negavi illam; et quando dixit: “quia ibi arguitur a fundamento ad fun- datum, negavi illam responsionem; et racio est, quia 35 sensus substancialis non est fundatum sensus veri, nisi quis in materia ista uteretur equivocacione. Sed in tali I admit that animality is contingent to humanity, but in the sense of real existence. You cannot, by arguing from what includes to what is included, prove that the connection is a real entity. 15 25 But this does not prove necessity of existence, 5. sicut A; ib. dicit B. 10. intendendo A; ib. causam A. 11. vel hoc pro nichil hic A. 12. nullum AB. 14. super A. 15. sortem currit A. 22. obiectum A. 23. deberet A. 26. dixit AB; ib. con- cedo A; ib. consequentis A. 27. consequentis A; ib. esse deest AB. 28. super A. 29. illam deest A. 32. respondet A. 3o. ibi AB. 34. quando deest A; ib. a futo B. 36. ſlus pro sub- 35. racionem A. stancialis B.; ib. nisi veri nisi A. 37. communis A.
154 JOHANNIS WYCLIF Sed adhuc consequencia magistri non valet; nam non sequitur: Si Sors currit, Sors movetur: ergo necessarium est ad Sortem currere, Sortem moveri. Quod argumentum suum cum solucione sua non probat aliquid pro sui intencione, sic patet: quia ypothesis virtute cuius debet tenere argumentum suum, debet intelligi realiter vel only logical loycaliter: realiter intelligendo, negavi eam; scilicet, quia necessity, or necesse est posse esse me esse hominem, quia nullum that of consequence. ens necessarium est posse esse me esse hominem. Loyca- The possibility of my existence liter intelligendo eam, concessi eam, et per illum sensum 10 is not a necessary nihil hic arguitur ad propositum. Primus sensus est existing thing falsus, eo quod nullomodo necessarium est ad Sortem Running implies movement; but currere, Sortem moveri; sed contingens est ad Sortem this neither proves running currere, Sortem moveri; semper intelligendo realiter, nor movement sicud contingens est Sortem currere, ad Sortem moveri, to exist. ergo adhuc stat solucio mea. Ad argumentum suum primum, quando dixit quod non do instanciam, quando dico, “Non potest esse homo sine hoc quod sit animal; et tamen non est necessarium hominem esse animal" (ymmo non scripsi quod hoc 20 esset instancia sui dicti, sed posui tamquam aliquid ex quo dici potest oppositum sui dicti); sed quando magister meus dicit quod deberem sic dare instanciam: Non potest esse homo, sine hoc quod sit animal; et tamen non est necessarium ad hominem esse, animal esse"; dixi concedendo illam etc. non contingens est hominem esse, etsi contingens est hominem esse ad animal [esse], semper realiter intelligendo. Sed quando dixit quod hoc est falsum, negavi illam. Sed quando ulterius dixi in responsione, quod ubi 30 arguitur a specie loycali ad speciem realem etc. con- sequencia est impertinens, respondit: posito quod sic sit, adhuc esset bona consequencia." Negavi illam; et quando dixit: “quia ibi arguitur a fundamento ad fun- datum, negavi illam responsionem; et racio est, quia 35 sensus substancialis non est fundatum sensus veri, nisi quis in materia ista uteretur equivocacione. Sed in tali I admit that animality is contingent to humanity, but in the sense of real existence. You cannot, by arguing from what includes to what is included, prove that the connection is a real entity. 15 25 But this does not prove necessity of existence, 5. sicut A; ib. dicit B. 10. intendendo A; ib. causam A. 11. vel hoc pro nichil hic A. 12. nullum AB. 14. super A. 15. sortem currit A. 22. obiectum A. 23. deberet A. 26. dixit AB; ib. con- cedo A; ib. consequentis A. 27. consequentis A; ib. esse deest AB. 28. super A. 29. illam deest A. 32. respondet A. 3o. ibi AB. 34. quando deest A; ib. a futo B. 36. ſlus pro sub- 35. racionem A. stancialis B.; ib. nisi veri nisi A. 37. communis A.
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REPLICACIO DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 155 A 84 argumento quo arguebat: "antecedens est verum, con- sequens falsum;" et quando arguebat: "nisi consequencia in signo haberet signatum primarium ex parte rei, non esset necessaria," negavi illam; quia hec proposicio 5 est necessaria in signo: Si chimera currit, chymera movetur; et tamen non habet significatum primarium necessarium ex parte rei. Et quando assumpsit: “alias, ista esset necessaria: Chymera est;" et quando arguebat: “Non oportet esse necessarium ex parte rei, si propo- 10 sicio est necessaria," concessi; et si inferetur: “igitur hec est necessaria: Chymera est," negavi consequen- ciam. Et quando ulterius arguebat: "eciam nesciretur quid deus sciret, sciendo quod si chymera currit, chymera 15 movetur, non existentibus proposicionibus," dixi quod, non existente aliqua proposicione, deus non scit aliquid esse quod est ens; si chymera currit chymera movetur; sicud iam eciam non scit aliquid esse quod est ens: si chymera currit, chymera movetur, realiter loquendo. 20 Et quando inferebat; debemus ergo solum studere signi- ficaciones et consignificaciones talium vocabulorum et haberemus scienciam talium: si chymera currit, chymera movetur, et: vacuum non est; negavi consequenciam, quia ad habendam scienciam de altera illorum, non 25 sufficit habere solum significaciones, et consignificaciones terminorum ex quibus talis proposicio componitur, sed requiruntur adhuc alia, ut notum est in hoc exemplo. Nam multi sciunt significaciones illius proposicionis: “Nullus rex Boemie est in Praga," et tamen nescit eam, 3o vel dubitat eam aliquis. Sed contra hoc quod dixi in solucione argumenti sui secundi, scilicet, quod eque primo naturaliter est me esse et hominem esse, arguebat sic: “Eque primo na- turaliter est me esse et hominem esse; igitur simul na- 35 turaliter est me esse et hominem esse. Concessi. Et quando intulit: “igitur secundo modo simultatis similiter There may be a necessary connection between two unmeaning propositions; it does not follow that they are true, though Wyclif says it would. As to God's knowledge of such propositions, He certainly knows them not to be existing things. A necessary connection between propositions does not imply that we can know the truth of the latter. Wyclif's argument that singular and universal humanity are not on a par, only proves the logical priority of the Universal and no more. 1. quomodo A. 3. in signata A. 5. in signata A. 6. habet deest A. 18. illa etc. pro iam eciam A. 20, 21. signatas et consignatas A. 28. natura A. 29. causa A. 30. ymmo AB; ib. causa A. 31. qua A. 36. similiter both times B. 29. Praga. It occurs frequently enough, in copies made by Bohemians, that the names of cities are changed, what is in the English MSS. Londinium becoming Praga. It may be so in the present case.
REPLICACIO DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 155 A 84 argumento quo arguebat: "antecedens est verum, con- sequens falsum;" et quando arguebat: "nisi consequencia in signo haberet signatum primarium ex parte rei, non esset necessaria," negavi illam; quia hec proposicio 5 est necessaria in signo: Si chimera currit, chymera movetur; et tamen non habet significatum primarium necessarium ex parte rei. Et quando assumpsit: “alias, ista esset necessaria: Chymera est;" et quando arguebat: “Non oportet esse necessarium ex parte rei, si propo- 10 sicio est necessaria," concessi; et si inferetur: “igitur hec est necessaria: Chymera est," negavi consequen- ciam. Et quando ulterius arguebat: "eciam nesciretur quid deus sciret, sciendo quod si chymera currit, chymera 15 movetur, non existentibus proposicionibus," dixi quod, non existente aliqua proposicione, deus non scit aliquid esse quod est ens; si chymera currit chymera movetur; sicud iam eciam non scit aliquid esse quod est ens: si chymera currit, chymera movetur, realiter loquendo. 20 Et quando inferebat; debemus ergo solum studere signi- ficaciones et consignificaciones talium vocabulorum et haberemus scienciam talium: si chymera currit, chymera movetur, et: vacuum non est; negavi consequenciam, quia ad habendam scienciam de altera illorum, non 25 sufficit habere solum significaciones, et consignificaciones terminorum ex quibus talis proposicio componitur, sed requiruntur adhuc alia, ut notum est in hoc exemplo. Nam multi sciunt significaciones illius proposicionis: “Nullus rex Boemie est in Praga," et tamen nescit eam, 3o vel dubitat eam aliquis. Sed contra hoc quod dixi in solucione argumenti sui secundi, scilicet, quod eque primo naturaliter est me esse et hominem esse, arguebat sic: “Eque primo na- turaliter est me esse et hominem esse; igitur simul na- 35 turaliter est me esse et hominem esse. Concessi. Et quando intulit: “igitur secundo modo simultatis similiter There may be a necessary connection between two unmeaning propositions; it does not follow that they are true, though Wyclif says it would. As to God's knowledge of such propositions, He certainly knows them not to be existing things. A necessary connection between propositions does not imply that we can know the truth of the latter. Wyclif's argument that singular and universal humanity are not on a par, only proves the logical priority of the Universal and no more. 1. quomodo A. 3. in signata A. 5. in signata A. 6. habet deest A. 18. illa etc. pro iam eciam A. 20, 21. signatas et consignatas A. 28. natura A. 29. causa A. 30. ymmo AB; ib. causa A. 31. qua A. 36. similiter both times B. 29. Praga. It occurs frequently enough, in copies made by Bohemians, that the names of cities are changed, what is in the English MSS. Londinium becoming Praga. It may be so in the present case.
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156 IOHANNIS WYCLIF vel tercio modo simultatis naturaliter," respondebam negando consequenciam ad intencionem magistri mei; quia ipse intulit de secundo modo vel tercio modo si- multatis loycaliter, quia pro probacione consequencie allegat modos simultatis naturaliter philosophi in predi-5 camentis. Dixi igitur quod realiter, et non loycaliter, eque primo naturaliter sunt et simul naturaliter sunt me esse et hominem esse, quod est eque primo natura- liter esse me methaphysice et fisicaliter. Et racio est quia quodlibet illorum per idem naturaliter est, et non 10 The singulars of alterum altero est naturaliter prius nec posterius. Sed the same species are quod modus arguendi magistri non valet, patet ex alio; neither prior quia Sortem esse et Platonem esse, eque primo natura- nor posterior to each other, yet liter sunt. Racio est, quia quodlibet illorum per idem their parity is naturaliter est, et non alterum altero naturaliter prius 15 not of the kind Wyclif would est nec posterius; et tamen Sortem esse, et Platonem force on us. esse, non sunt simul naturaliter secundo modo vel tercio modo simultatis de quibus magister arguit. Con- He seems sequencia sua non valet, qua arguebat contra meum completely to concessum: nam magister videtur arguere ac si non 20 ignore the distinction poneret distinccionem inter simultatem loycalem et si- between logical and real parity, multatem naturalem methaphysicalem; quod non est and as to there faciendum. Et quando assumpsit: “Solum duobus modus being only two aliqua sunt simul natura," negavi hoc; quia, quamvis modes of parity, I have already loycaliter solum sunt duo modi simul natura, tamen 25 said there is a third. ultra illos duos modos loycales, est tercius modus si- multatis methaphysicalis, ut supra dictum est. Et quando arguebat ex alio: "Essencialis est habitudo One man and the Universal ad me esse, hominem esse," concessi; et quando intulit; Man, as to their esi igitur eque primo naturaliter est hominem esse et 30 relation with the First Cause, are on the same me ] esse, tunc in ordine essenciali me esse ad primam A 85 level. causam et hominem esse ad eandem, eque primo sunt,' respondebam: 'Si magister intendit loycaliter, negavi; si realiter, concessi;" et quando intulit: 'Nihil ergo eodem ordine penitus vel non," dixi quod in eodem 35 ordine penitus; et quando intulit: Igitur non stabit in ordine essenciali hominem esse sine me esse," negavi consequenciam. Sed bene sequitur: “ergo aliquid quod est hominem esse in ordine essenciali non stabit, nisi 9. et deest 3, 4. similiter A. 4. commune A. 5. similiter B. AB. 11—16. posterius — posterius deest B. 18. after modo, naturaliter AB, ib. similiter A. 20. concessi A. 24. aliqualiter A. 28. habitan- do A. 31. oroe = oracione B. 35. eadem oroe B; ib. dicit suppl. B. 35, 36. eadem oroe B. 36. stabat A. 39. oroe B.
156 IOHANNIS WYCLIF vel tercio modo simultatis naturaliter," respondebam negando consequenciam ad intencionem magistri mei; quia ipse intulit de secundo modo vel tercio modo si- multatis loycaliter, quia pro probacione consequencie allegat modos simultatis naturaliter philosophi in predi-5 camentis. Dixi igitur quod realiter, et non loycaliter, eque primo naturaliter sunt et simul naturaliter sunt me esse et hominem esse, quod est eque primo natura- liter esse me methaphysice et fisicaliter. Et racio est quia quodlibet illorum per idem naturaliter est, et non 10 The singulars of alterum altero est naturaliter prius nec posterius. Sed the same species are quod modus arguendi magistri non valet, patet ex alio; neither prior quia Sortem esse et Platonem esse, eque primo natura- nor posterior to each other, yet liter sunt. Racio est, quia quodlibet illorum per idem their parity is naturaliter est, et non alterum altero naturaliter prius 15 not of the kind Wyclif would est nec posterius; et tamen Sortem esse, et Platonem force on us. esse, non sunt simul naturaliter secundo modo vel tercio modo simultatis de quibus magister arguit. Con- He seems sequencia sua non valet, qua arguebat contra meum completely to concessum: nam magister videtur arguere ac si non 20 ignore the distinction poneret distinccionem inter simultatem loycalem et si- between logical and real parity, multatem naturalem methaphysicalem; quod non est and as to there faciendum. Et quando assumpsit: “Solum duobus modus being only two aliqua sunt simul natura," negavi hoc; quia, quamvis modes of parity, I have already loycaliter solum sunt duo modi simul natura, tamen 25 said there is a third. ultra illos duos modos loycales, est tercius modus si- multatis methaphysicalis, ut supra dictum est. Et quando arguebat ex alio: "Essencialis est habitudo One man and the Universal ad me esse, hominem esse," concessi; et quando intulit; Man, as to their esi igitur eque primo naturaliter est hominem esse et 30 relation with the First Cause, are on the same me ] esse, tunc in ordine essenciali me esse ad primam A 85 level. causam et hominem esse ad eandem, eque primo sunt,' respondebam: 'Si magister intendit loycaliter, negavi; si realiter, concessi;" et quando intulit: 'Nihil ergo eodem ordine penitus vel non," dixi quod in eodem 35 ordine penitus; et quando intulit: Igitur non stabit in ordine essenciali hominem esse sine me esse," negavi consequenciam. Sed bene sequitur: “ergo aliquid quod est hominem esse in ordine essenciali non stabit, nisi 9. et deest 3, 4. similiter A. 4. commune A. 5. similiter B. AB. 11—16. posterius — posterius deest B. 18. after modo, naturaliter AB, ib. similiter A. 20. concessi A. 24. aliqualiter A. 28. habitan- do A. 31. oroe = oracione B. 35. eadem oroe B; ib. dicit suppl. B. 35, 36. eadem oroe B. 36. stabat A. 39. oroe B.
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REPLICACIO DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 157 25 sit me esse." Et quando dixi in responsione ad idem argumentum; “eque primo est asinus et hircus," negavit hoc. Et quando replicavit: “Sic prima causa in ordine universi simpliciter primum gradum essendi essencialem 5 habet," concessi; et quando assumpsit; “res que sunt perfecciores essencialiter de tanto minus ab ea distant," concessi. 'Igitur, cum quelibet species universi diversi- ficantur in perfeccione essenciali," respondebam: 'Dato quod sit (quod tamen non credo) nihil tamen arguit ad 10 propositum". Et quando ulterius assumpsit: 'Igitur una secundum gradum suum essendi essencialem propinquior erit prime cause quam reliqua," concessi; "et gradus essendi essencialis ponit rem in ordine essenciali," con- cessi. "Sequitur quod nulle res diversarum specierum 15 sunt eque primo naturaliter," negavi consequenciam. Sed bene sequitur quod nulle res diversarum specierum universi sunt eque primo in ordine essenciali universali premenitate perfeccionis essencialis. Ex quo ulterius non sequitur quod non sunt eque primo naturaliter: ymo 20 due res, quarum una altera in perfeccione essenciali est prior, sunt simul naturaliter, et eque primo natura- liter. Et hoc potest ostendi ex secundo argumento magistri, quod probat quod universale reale in essendo est. Et quando arguebam: “universale est naturaliter prius Wyclif makes a distinction singulari; vel ergo naturaliter prius secundum depen- between dependency and denciam, vel secundum modum subiecti ad accidens, causality; vel secundum modum potencie ad actum," respondebat quod universale est naturaliter prius suo singulari se- 3o cundum causam, et non proprie secundum dependenciam. Contra hoc arguebam sic: Eadem prioritas est naturalis secundum causam et dependenciam, sicud eadem res est accio et passio. Nam motus, in quantum respicit illud a quo producitur, dicitur accio, sed in quantum 35 respicit illud in quod producitur, dicitur passio; ut habetur ex 3° phisicorum, tractatu primo. Sic similiter I admit that beings are nearer to or farther from Divine Perfection ; though this does not prove that none are equally distant. Each has its own degree of essential perfection, yet two may be on the same level, in so far as one is independent of the other. but this distinction is not admissible, 2. negavit B. 3. replicavi AB; ib. oroe = oracione B. 1. dixit B. 6. perfecciones A; ib. unus A. 10. proposicionem A. 14. diver- sorum A. 16. diversorum A. 19. yma A. 20. in deest B. 27. mo- 31. que pro 28. momentum A. mentum A. 29. est deest A. 36. 1° B. contra A; ib. naturale B. 18. Both MSS. have premenitate. It means no doubt the same as praceminentia.
REPLICACIO DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 157 25 sit me esse." Et quando dixi in responsione ad idem argumentum; “eque primo est asinus et hircus," negavit hoc. Et quando replicavit: “Sic prima causa in ordine universi simpliciter primum gradum essendi essencialem 5 habet," concessi; et quando assumpsit; “res que sunt perfecciores essencialiter de tanto minus ab ea distant," concessi. 'Igitur, cum quelibet species universi diversi- ficantur in perfeccione essenciali," respondebam: 'Dato quod sit (quod tamen non credo) nihil tamen arguit ad 10 propositum". Et quando ulterius assumpsit: 'Igitur una secundum gradum suum essendi essencialem propinquior erit prime cause quam reliqua," concessi; "et gradus essendi essencialis ponit rem in ordine essenciali," con- cessi. "Sequitur quod nulle res diversarum specierum 15 sunt eque primo naturaliter," negavi consequenciam. Sed bene sequitur quod nulle res diversarum specierum universi sunt eque primo in ordine essenciali universali premenitate perfeccionis essencialis. Ex quo ulterius non sequitur quod non sunt eque primo naturaliter: ymo 20 due res, quarum una altera in perfeccione essenciali est prior, sunt simul naturaliter, et eque primo natura- liter. Et hoc potest ostendi ex secundo argumento magistri, quod probat quod universale reale in essendo est. Et quando arguebam: “universale est naturaliter prius Wyclif makes a distinction singulari; vel ergo naturaliter prius secundum depen- between dependency and denciam, vel secundum modum subiecti ad accidens, causality; vel secundum modum potencie ad actum," respondebat quod universale est naturaliter prius suo singulari se- 3o cundum causam, et non proprie secundum dependenciam. Contra hoc arguebam sic: Eadem prioritas est naturalis secundum causam et dependenciam, sicud eadem res est accio et passio. Nam motus, in quantum respicit illud a quo producitur, dicitur accio, sed in quantum 35 respicit illud in quod producitur, dicitur passio; ut habetur ex 3° phisicorum, tractatu primo. Sic similiter I admit that beings are nearer to or farther from Divine Perfection ; though this does not prove that none are equally distant. Each has its own degree of essential perfection, yet two may be on the same level, in so far as one is independent of the other. but this distinction is not admissible, 2. negavit B. 3. replicavi AB; ib. oroe = oracione B. 1. dixit B. 6. perfecciones A; ib. unus A. 10. proposicionem A. 14. diver- sorum A. 16. diversorum A. 19. yma A. 20. in deest B. 27. mo- 31. que pro 28. momentum A. mentum A. 29. est deest A. 36. 1° B. contra A; ib. naturale B. 18. Both MSS. have premenitate. It means no doubt the same as praceminentia.
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158 JOHANNIS WYCLIF since causality prioritas naturalis in quantum respicit ad alteram causam, and dependence qua naturaliter est prius, dicitur prioritas secundum upon a cause are in the same causam; in quantum respicit illud cui alterum natura- relation as action and liter est prius, dicitur prioritas secundum dependenciam: passion. igitur non oportuit fieri evasionem quomodo ad diversum 5 modum prioritatis secundum dependenciam, et priori- tatis secundum causam. Et quando dixi in solucione: “realiter convertibiliter idem sunt humanitas singularis et humanitas," replicat sic: "igitur simul vertibiliter in toto modo est mea 1o singularis humanitas et humanitas." Concessi; quamvis non quelibet humanitas et mea singularis humanitas sunt simul vertibiliter in toto modo. Et quando in- ferebat: "igitur in quodcunque vertibile universale est humanitas, igitur et mea humanitas," negavi conse- 15 quenciam. Et quando arguit: “Quandocunque in toto That 1s, modo vertibiliter sunt duo, ubicunque est unum, ibi wherever is est alterum. Sed humanitas et mea singularis huma- humanity, there is something of nitas sunt in toto modo vertibiliter, ibi igitur, ubi- my humanity; and vice versâ. cunque est humanitas est mea singularis humanitas," 20 negavi consequenciam, et dixi quod non est in Darii; sed bene sequitur: ergo humanitas] et mea humanitas A 85b sunt alique, que ubicunque est unum, ibi est alterum. A degree of Et hoc est verum. whiteness is Ad 4am, quando dixi quod una albedo non est essen-25 not essentially more perfect cialiter perfeccior minus intensa, replicat sic: "Unus than another, for I deny that gradus albedinis addit essencialem perfeccionem super it adds priorem." Distinxi: quia ille intellexit quod unus gradus anything essential to the addit rem super alium gradum, qui est essencialiter whiteness that was before ; perfeccior. Si intellexit quod additum facit agregatum 30 every degree of essencialiter esse perfeccius quam fuit prior gradus albe- whiteness is essentially the dinis, negavi eam; quia quelibet albedo eque perfecta same, or at least that est essencialiter cum qualibet alia albedine; et una non which is white communicat cum alia. Dixi, intelligendo realiter, con- is only accidentally changed. As far as reality goes, humanity and my humanity are the same thing ; 1, 2. quod altera causa quam A; ad alteram tanquam B. 5. opor- tent A. 5, 6. divisum momentum A. 8. consequenter A. 10. si- 14. universale A. 16. quod- milis A. 13. in toto modo deest B. cunque A. 16, 17. in toto modo deest B. 18. me A. 19. in toto 26. unius A. 28. nihil AB. modo deest B; ib. idem pro ibi AB. 31. perfeccionis A. 21. Darii. The Scholastic name for the syllogism in the first mode that has a particular affirmative conclusion. Every M is P; some S is M; .. some S is P. In this case it is: What is interchangeable with Universal Humanity is wherever Hu- manity is; my humanity is interchangeable with Universal Humanity; therefore my humanity is wherever Humanity is.
158 JOHANNIS WYCLIF since causality prioritas naturalis in quantum respicit ad alteram causam, and dependence qua naturaliter est prius, dicitur prioritas secundum upon a cause are in the same causam; in quantum respicit illud cui alterum natura- relation as action and liter est prius, dicitur prioritas secundum dependenciam: passion. igitur non oportuit fieri evasionem quomodo ad diversum 5 modum prioritatis secundum dependenciam, et priori- tatis secundum causam. Et quando dixi in solucione: “realiter convertibiliter idem sunt humanitas singularis et humanitas," replicat sic: "igitur simul vertibiliter in toto modo est mea 1o singularis humanitas et humanitas." Concessi; quamvis non quelibet humanitas et mea singularis humanitas sunt simul vertibiliter in toto modo. Et quando in- ferebat: "igitur in quodcunque vertibile universale est humanitas, igitur et mea humanitas," negavi conse- 15 quenciam. Et quando arguit: “Quandocunque in toto That 1s, modo vertibiliter sunt duo, ubicunque est unum, ibi wherever is est alterum. Sed humanitas et mea singularis huma- humanity, there is something of nitas sunt in toto modo vertibiliter, ibi igitur, ubi- my humanity; and vice versâ. cunque est humanitas est mea singularis humanitas," 20 negavi consequenciam, et dixi quod non est in Darii; sed bene sequitur: ergo humanitas] et mea humanitas A 85b sunt alique, que ubicunque est unum, ibi est alterum. A degree of Et hoc est verum. whiteness is Ad 4am, quando dixi quod una albedo non est essen-25 not essentially more perfect cialiter perfeccior minus intensa, replicat sic: "Unus than another, for I deny that gradus albedinis addit essencialem perfeccionem super it adds priorem." Distinxi: quia ille intellexit quod unus gradus anything essential to the addit rem super alium gradum, qui est essencialiter whiteness that was before ; perfeccior. Si intellexit quod additum facit agregatum 30 every degree of essencialiter esse perfeccius quam fuit prior gradus albe- whiteness is essentially the dinis, negavi eam; quia quelibet albedo eque perfecta same, or at least that est essencialiter cum qualibet alia albedine; et una non which is white communicat cum alia. Dixi, intelligendo realiter, con- is only accidentally changed. As far as reality goes, humanity and my humanity are the same thing ; 1, 2. quod altera causa quam A; ad alteram tanquam B. 5. opor- tent A. 5, 6. divisum momentum A. 8. consequenter A. 10. si- 14. universale A. 16. quod- milis A. 13. in toto modo deest B. cunque A. 16, 17. in toto modo deest B. 18. me A. 19. in toto 26. unius A. 28. nihil AB. modo deest B; ib. idem pro ibi AB. 31. perfeccionis A. 21. Darii. The Scholastic name for the syllogism in the first mode that has a particular affirmative conclusion. Every M is P; some S is M; .. some S is P. In this case it is: What is interchangeable with Universal Humanity is wherever Hu- manity is; my humanity is interchangeable with Universal Humanity; therefore my humanity is wherever Humanity is.
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REPLICACIO DE UNIVERSALIBUS. cessi: loycaliter intelligendo, negavi. Et guando intulit: "jgitur amplior perfeccio essencialis resultabit," negavi consequenciam ad intellectum illum quod resultabit res essencialiter perfeccior. 5 Ad 5?" arguit sic: "Contingit de communi cursu scire determinate omnem ignem esse calidum," Negavi illam, quia solum de communi cürsu in confuso contingit scire omnem ignem calidum esse, Ulterius quando dixi: “Non sequitur. Hec est predicacio accidentalis: humanitas est 10 singularis; igitur naturaliter prius est universalis huma- nitas quam singularis humanitas;" et dedi instanciam; “non sequitur: Hec est predicacio accidentalis, homo est ad aliquid, igitur naturaliter est prius homo quam est ad aliquid;" dixit magister quod non dedi instanciam, 15sed dixit [quod] deberem sic arguere: "hec est predi- cacio accidentalis: homo est ad aliquid; igitur naturaliter prius est esse hominem quam hominem esse ad aliquid.” Subiunxit: et sic antecedens est verum et consequens. Salva reverencia magistri, non debeo dare sic instanciam; 20 quia ipsemet non arguit in tali forma, quia ipse arguit sic: "hec est predicacio accidentalis: humanitas est singularis; igitur naturaliter prius est humanitas quam humanitas mea singularis." Et non arguit sic, sicud iubet me arguere: Hec est predicacio accidentalis, hu- 25 manitas est singularis; igitur naturaliter est prius Auma- nitatem esse quam humanitatem esse singularem. Et dato quod sic arguisset, dicerem quod consequencia non valet. Nam non sequitur: hec est predicacio accidentalis: Hoc est ad aliquid; igitur naturaliter est prius hominem esse 3o quam hominem esse ad aliquid; quia antecedens verum, et consequens falsum. Et quando allegat philosophum, 5? methaphysice, quod prius naturaliter est res 2™ esse essenciale, quam 2"' accidentale, dico quod philosophus voluit tantum dicere, quod esse essenciale rei naturaliter 35est prius illo accidente quod est in illo esse; quia omne accidens posterius est suo subiecto naturaliter, ut habetur 59 et 7? methaphysice. Ulterius, quando negavi illam consequenciam: *Si est separatum, habet esse in se indivisum et a quolibet alio 40 divisum: igitur est individuum;" replicavit sic: "cum sic unum est, et non plura, erit indivisum in se, et non 2. resultavit B. 15 quod deest AB. 18. si (?) AB. 19. reve- randa A. 27. argui sed A. 3r. allegit A. 3t. tamen A. 39. in- dixisus A; indivisis B; ib. et deest B. — 40. divisus A. 159 That all fire is hot is true, but vaguely true, not determinately. Wyclif objects to the form of onc of my arguments, and shows how it should be changed. But it is absolutely analogous to one of his own arguments, and if it be taulty, his is faulty too. And even were it changed, as he proposes, the conclusion both of his argument and of my analogous one would be false. We cannot compare the singular and fts universal to the accident in its substance. Because the Universal is one In many, it does not follow that It has physical entity.
REPLICACIO DE UNIVERSALIBUS. cessi: loycaliter intelligendo, negavi. Et guando intulit: "jgitur amplior perfeccio essencialis resultabit," negavi consequenciam ad intellectum illum quod resultabit res essencialiter perfeccior. 5 Ad 5?" arguit sic: "Contingit de communi cursu scire determinate omnem ignem esse calidum," Negavi illam, quia solum de communi cürsu in confuso contingit scire omnem ignem calidum esse, Ulterius quando dixi: “Non sequitur. Hec est predicacio accidentalis: humanitas est 10 singularis; igitur naturaliter prius est universalis huma- nitas quam singularis humanitas;" et dedi instanciam; “non sequitur: Hec est predicacio accidentalis, homo est ad aliquid, igitur naturaliter est prius homo quam est ad aliquid;" dixit magister quod non dedi instanciam, 15sed dixit [quod] deberem sic arguere: "hec est predi- cacio accidentalis: homo est ad aliquid; igitur naturaliter prius est esse hominem quam hominem esse ad aliquid.” Subiunxit: et sic antecedens est verum et consequens. Salva reverencia magistri, non debeo dare sic instanciam; 20 quia ipsemet non arguit in tali forma, quia ipse arguit sic: "hec est predicacio accidentalis: humanitas est singularis; igitur naturaliter prius est humanitas quam humanitas mea singularis." Et non arguit sic, sicud iubet me arguere: Hec est predicacio accidentalis, hu- 25 manitas est singularis; igitur naturaliter est prius Auma- nitatem esse quam humanitatem esse singularem. Et dato quod sic arguisset, dicerem quod consequencia non valet. Nam non sequitur: hec est predicacio accidentalis: Hoc est ad aliquid; igitur naturaliter est prius hominem esse 3o quam hominem esse ad aliquid; quia antecedens verum, et consequens falsum. Et quando allegat philosophum, 5? methaphysice, quod prius naturaliter est res 2™ esse essenciale, quam 2"' accidentale, dico quod philosophus voluit tantum dicere, quod esse essenciale rei naturaliter 35est prius illo accidente quod est in illo esse; quia omne accidens posterius est suo subiecto naturaliter, ut habetur 59 et 7? methaphysice. Ulterius, quando negavi illam consequenciam: *Si est separatum, habet esse in se indivisum et a quolibet alio 40 divisum: igitur est individuum;" replicavit sic: "cum sic unum est, et non plura, erit indivisum in se, et non 2. resultavit B. 15 quod deest AB. 18. si (?) AB. 19. reve- randa A. 27. argui sed A. 3r. allegit A. 3t. tamen A. 39. in- dixisus A; indivisis B; ib. et deest B. — 40. divisus A. 159 That all fire is hot is true, but vaguely true, not determinately. Wyclif objects to the form of onc of my arguments, and shows how it should be changed. But it is absolutely analogous to one of his own arguments, and if it be taulty, his is faulty too. And even were it changed, as he proposes, the conclusion both of his argument and of my analogous one would be false. We cannot compare the singular and fts universal to the accident in its substance. Because the Universal is one In many, it does not follow that It has physical entity.
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160 JOHANNIS WYCLIF erit alia, cum alia secum erint: erit indivisum ab aliis." Concessi. "Igitur consequencia fuit bona," negavi con- sequenciam. Et intuli corollaria, [primo] quod supposicio simplex non est ponenda quam ipse ponit pro fundamento uni- 5 versalium realium in essendo. Sequitur 2° quod sicud non est dare terminum sin- gularem qui non potest esse communis, stante primaria A 86- significacione; sic et communem, qui non potest esse singularis, stante primaria significacione. Patet, quia 10 quilibet terminus singularis, stante primaria significacione, est singularis communis. Et est contra corrollarium eius secundum, quod est illud: Sicud est dare terminum singularem, qui non potest esse communis, stante pri- maria significacione, sic est dare terminum communem 15 qui non potest esse singularis, stante primaria sua significacione. (3) That a Sequitur 3° quod illud corollarium est falsum: Si demonstrative ad talem terminum communem adderetur pronomen pronoun, prefixed to a demonstrativum, non facit eum singularem; et nec potest 20 universal, renders it esse medium syllogismi expositorii. singular. Sequitur 4°, quod non est distinccio formalis inter (4) That there is no formal singulare et suum universale, intelligendo de universali distinction between the reali in essendo. Patet, quia inter ens et non ens non Universal and est differencia formalis. Sed universale reale est non 25 its singular, since the ens (ut potuit ex precedentibus), et hoc est contra former is really a nonentity. corrollarium 4m. (5) That a Patet 5°, quod illud corrollarium est falsum: natura specific nature is not threefold, specifica non est trina sed est triplex, quadruplex, (et fourfold, &c. cetera) divise nature essencialiter distincte. (6) That Sequitur 6°: illa consequencia non valet, “Illa identity in the species does not sunt eadem specie: ergo sunt eadem." Eciam hoc est mean absolute contra eius correllarium sextum, in quo dicit: “Illa identity, any more than consequencia est bona, illa sunt idem specie: ergo sunt the identical word king, said idem. Sed ad racionem qua persuadebat (sicud alias) 35 of a dead, a divisio eiusdem, scilicet idem, esset sicud divisio living or a painted king, means the same thing. I conclude (1) that Wyclif's fundamental assumption is false. (2) That every singular term may become universal, every universal singular. 30 4. corpore A; ib. primo deest AB; ib. suppono fenix A. 5. con- sequencia A. 8. stante que A; qui B. 8, 9. prima sermone and s0 on A. 10. quod B. 14, 15. prima sermone A. 19. prolatum A. 23. intendo A. 31. signi- 25, 26. non-ens deest B. 30. negatur A. ficant A. 35. sic quod A. 36. divisis A. 34. Sed ad racionem. The last sentence is grammatically unintelligible, but the example given by the author at the end shows what is meant.
160 JOHANNIS WYCLIF erit alia, cum alia secum erint: erit indivisum ab aliis." Concessi. "Igitur consequencia fuit bona," negavi con- sequenciam. Et intuli corollaria, [primo] quod supposicio simplex non est ponenda quam ipse ponit pro fundamento uni- 5 versalium realium in essendo. Sequitur 2° quod sicud non est dare terminum sin- gularem qui non potest esse communis, stante primaria A 86- significacione; sic et communem, qui non potest esse singularis, stante primaria significacione. Patet, quia 10 quilibet terminus singularis, stante primaria significacione, est singularis communis. Et est contra corrollarium eius secundum, quod est illud: Sicud est dare terminum singularem, qui non potest esse communis, stante pri- maria significacione, sic est dare terminum communem 15 qui non potest esse singularis, stante primaria sua significacione. (3) That a Sequitur 3° quod illud corollarium est falsum: Si demonstrative ad talem terminum communem adderetur pronomen pronoun, prefixed to a demonstrativum, non facit eum singularem; et nec potest 20 universal, renders it esse medium syllogismi expositorii. singular. Sequitur 4°, quod non est distinccio formalis inter (4) That there is no formal singulare et suum universale, intelligendo de universali distinction between the reali in essendo. Patet, quia inter ens et non ens non Universal and est differencia formalis. Sed universale reale est non 25 its singular, since the ens (ut potuit ex precedentibus), et hoc est contra former is really a nonentity. corrollarium 4m. (5) That a Patet 5°, quod illud corrollarium est falsum: natura specific nature is not threefold, specifica non est trina sed est triplex, quadruplex, (et fourfold, &c. cetera) divise nature essencialiter distincte. (6) That Sequitur 6°: illa consequencia non valet, “Illa identity in the species does not sunt eadem specie: ergo sunt eadem." Eciam hoc est mean absolute contra eius correllarium sextum, in quo dicit: “Illa identity, any more than consequencia est bona, illa sunt idem specie: ergo sunt the identical word king, said idem. Sed ad racionem qua persuadebat (sicud alias) 35 of a dead, a divisio eiusdem, scilicet idem, esset sicud divisio living or a painted king, means the same thing. I conclude (1) that Wyclif's fundamental assumption is false. (2) That every singular term may become universal, every universal singular. 30 4. corpore A; ib. primo deest AB; ib. suppono fenix A. 5. con- sequencia A. 8. stante que A; qui B. 8, 9. prima sermone and s0 on A. 10. quod B. 14, 15. prima sermone A. 19. prolatum A. 23. intendo A. 31. signi- 25, 26. non-ens deest B. 30. negatur A. ficant A. 35. sic quod A. 36. divisis A. 34. Sed ad racionem. The last sentence is grammatically unintelligible, but the example given by the author at the end shows what is meant.
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REPLICACIO DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 161 ista, alium aliud, lapis etc. negavi illam; quia li “rex" dividitur in regem vivum et regem mortuum, et depictum. Et tamen nec rex mortuus nec depictus est rex. Explicit replicacio de universalibus, quam si quis bene perspexerit videbit multo meliores raciones pro eisdem, quam contra eadem. Prime enim directe procedunt; alie vero cum extraneis cavillacionibus. 6. conspexerit B. 7. ducere A. 8. extraneis 4. rex etc. B. avillacionibus deest A. 11
REPLICACIO DE UNIVERSALIBUS. 161 ista, alium aliud, lapis etc. negavi illam; quia li “rex" dividitur in regem vivum et regem mortuum, et depictum. Et tamen nec rex mortuus nec depictus est rex. Explicit replicacio de universalibus, quam si quis bene perspexerit videbit multo meliores raciones pro eisdem, quam contra eadem. Prime enim directe procedunt; alie vero cum extraneis cavillacionibus. 6. conspexerit B. 7. ducere A. 8. extraneis 4. rex etc. B. avillacionibus deest A. 11
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DE MATERIA ET FORMA. CAPITULUM PRIMUM. Cum materia et forma sint universalia mundi prin- The world consisting of cipia, restat de eis primo, tam propter ordinacionem matter and form, and quam gracia consequencium disserendum. Et cum matter being unknowable materia non sit a nobis cognoscibilis, nisi per anologiam save in relation ad formam (1° physicorum commento 6°), ordo naturalis to form, we must first postulat primo de forma, post de materia pertractare. define the latter. Primo igitur supponitur pro diffinicione quid nominis A nominal definition of 10 termini, quod forma pro maxima sui communitate signi- Form is: that through which ficat rem per quam vel secundum quam aliquid est or according to which, any formaliter quid, vel alicuius modi. Dicendum enim, being 1s secundum variam antiquorum sentenciam: ex formis intrinsically this, or in this quedam est extrinseca, ut forme exemplares; et quedam wise. Extrinsic form 15 est intrinseca, ut forme a suis subiectis sustentate. Ille is the pattern sunt in duplici ordine; quia quedam est forma sub- according to which anything stancialis, secundum quam subiectum est illud quod est, is made ; ut igneitate est datum elementum ignis; et sic de qua- intrinsic form exists in a cumque alia substancia. Et alia est forma accidentalis, subject, and is either 20 ut singulorum generum accidencium. substantial, Conveniunt autem omnes forme analoice in hoc quod making a thing what it is ; or quelibet denominat formatum, extendendo denominacionem accidental, ad quodlibet nomen substanciale vel accidentale. Sed making it to be as it is. All are alike in this, that it is to them that the thing formed owes its name, A 53- 2. Cap. deest A; initial C in red ink AB. 4. after propter gene- racionem ordinem BDE. 5. gucm pro consequenciam. 6. a nobis crossed of E. 7. 9to pro commento everywhere in all the MSS. 8. ex- postulat BE. 9. ergo presupponitur D. 11. vel secundum quam deest A. 14. quod formarum BCDE. 15. est deest CE; ib. forma in B; ib. forma in suo subiecto subiectata D; ib. sbictme A; subiectata B; ib. Et ille BDE. 20. singulum CE. 23. quodcunque BDE. 19. alia deest E. A = Stockholm manuscript, which is taken as text. B = Prag. Univ. MS. VIII. F. 1. C = Prag. Univ. MS. III. G. 10. D = Prag. Univ. MS. VIII. G. 6. E = Prag. Univ. MS. IV. H. 9. 11*
DE MATERIA ET FORMA. CAPITULUM PRIMUM. Cum materia et forma sint universalia mundi prin- The world consisting of cipia, restat de eis primo, tam propter ordinacionem matter and form, and quam gracia consequencium disserendum. Et cum matter being unknowable materia non sit a nobis cognoscibilis, nisi per anologiam save in relation ad formam (1° physicorum commento 6°), ordo naturalis to form, we must first postulat primo de forma, post de materia pertractare. define the latter. Primo igitur supponitur pro diffinicione quid nominis A nominal definition of 10 termini, quod forma pro maxima sui communitate signi- Form is: that through which ficat rem per quam vel secundum quam aliquid est or according to which, any formaliter quid, vel alicuius modi. Dicendum enim, being 1s secundum variam antiquorum sentenciam: ex formis intrinsically this, or in this quedam est extrinseca, ut forme exemplares; et quedam wise. Extrinsic form 15 est intrinseca, ut forme a suis subiectis sustentate. Ille is the pattern sunt in duplici ordine; quia quedam est forma sub- according to which anything stancialis, secundum quam subiectum est illud quod est, is made ; ut igneitate est datum elementum ignis; et sic de qua- intrinsic form exists in a cumque alia substancia. Et alia est forma accidentalis, subject, and is either 20 ut singulorum generum accidencium. substantial, Conveniunt autem omnes forme analoice in hoc quod making a thing what it is ; or quelibet denominat formatum, extendendo denominacionem accidental, ad quodlibet nomen substanciale vel accidentale. Sed making it to be as it is. All are alike in this, that it is to them that the thing formed owes its name, A 53- 2. Cap. deest A; initial C in red ink AB. 4. after propter gene- racionem ordinem BDE. 5. gucm pro consequenciam. 6. a nobis crossed of E. 7. 9to pro commento everywhere in all the MSS. 8. ex- postulat BE. 9. ergo presupponitur D. 11. vel secundum quam deest A. 14. quod formarum BCDE. 15. est deest CE; ib. forma in B; ib. forma in suo subiecto subiectata D; ib. sbictme A; subiectata B; ib. Et ille BDE. 20. singulum CE. 23. quodcunque BDE. 19. alia deest E. A = Stockholm manuscript, which is taken as text. B = Prag. Univ. MS. VIII. F. 1. C = Prag. Univ. MS. III. G. 10. D = Prag. Univ. MS. VIII. G. 6. E = Prag. Univ. MS. IV. H. 9. 11*
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164 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I. either by extrinsic or intrinsic determination, the former by the word per the latter by secundum, the use of which words is justified by Aristotle and Scripture. As exemplars or pattern- forms are prion to forms in their subjects, we shall deal with them first. We can predicate of any subject in two ways only : essentially and accidentally, what it is and how it is. Substantial form is that by which a substance is what it is. discrepat forma exemplaris a forma intrinseca in hoc, quod nulla forma exemplaris ab intrinseco, sed ab ex- trinseco denominat illud cuius est exemplar; e contra autem est de quacunque forma intrinseca. Et illam differenciam suppono, ex modo loquendi Aristotelis et 5 scripture, signari per has duas preposiciones, per et secundum quod. Nam per significat circumstanciam cause efficientis vel exemplantis; ut patet secundo physicorum, et ad Rom. 11° ex ipso, et, per ipsum et in ipso sunt omnia. Per enim ponitur ad designandum formas exemplares in Verbo. Secundum quod autem significat circumstanciam cause formalis; ut patet in descripcione qualitatis. Idem patet de accione, per autorem sex prin- cipiorum; et conformem modum loquendi habet scriptura, prima ad Chor. 6°. Si quis non acquiescit ei, que se- cundum pietatem est doctrine. Supponendo igitur istam distinccionem circumstancie causalis assignari per istas proposiciones, posui sub- distinccionem, quod “forma est res per quam vel se- cundum quam, etc." Et prius indubie est forma exemplaris, 20 exemplans creaturam, quam forma intrinsece inexistens eidem. Ideo est prior naturalis consideracio de forma exemplari quam de forma exemplata. Ulterius notandum est quod essencia specifica, vel natura, tantum capit duplicem predicacionem formalem, 25 scilicet, essencialem et accidentalem; ut, substancia est eque formaliter ignis." Et cum non sit accidentale alicui subiecto quod sit ignis, vel presupponat ei aliam quidi- tatem, I patet quod igneitate est illud substancialiter quod A 53b est. Et hoc presupponitur, de vi vocis, esse forma sub-30 stancialis, scilicet, forma qua substancialiter est substancia id quod est. Rom. XI, 36. 10 1 Tim. VI, 3. 15 3. ad cuius A; ad quod E. est deest ACD. 6. signanter BE. 9. 2° pro 11° ACDE; ib. et after ipso deest AC. 7. quam BE. 11. quam BD; quod deest C. 13. Et idem BD. 15. ad deest B; ib. 17. ſp° quod facit diffinicionem before quia AC. 16. doctrina ACE. supponendo C. 18. signari BD; ib. illas D; ib. preposiciones BE. 24. ſa = pro essencia specifica E; ib. sba = substancia pro specifica BD. 25, 26. scilicet formalem D. 27. alteri A. 28. aliquam D. 29. sub- stancialiter deest E; substancialiter id B. 3o. hec ABC; ib. presupponit C; ib. esse deest D. 13. Autorem sex principiorum. Gilbert de la Porée. 15. Ad Chor. 6° should be Ad Timotheum VI, 3. Si quis aliter docet et non acquiescet sanis sermonibus Domini nostri Jesu Christi, et ei, quae secundum pietatem est, doctrinae.
164 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I. either by extrinsic or intrinsic determination, the former by the word per the latter by secundum, the use of which words is justified by Aristotle and Scripture. As exemplars or pattern- forms are prion to forms in their subjects, we shall deal with them first. We can predicate of any subject in two ways only : essentially and accidentally, what it is and how it is. Substantial form is that by which a substance is what it is. discrepat forma exemplaris a forma intrinseca in hoc, quod nulla forma exemplaris ab intrinseco, sed ab ex- trinseco denominat illud cuius est exemplar; e contra autem est de quacunque forma intrinseca. Et illam differenciam suppono, ex modo loquendi Aristotelis et 5 scripture, signari per has duas preposiciones, per et secundum quod. Nam per significat circumstanciam cause efficientis vel exemplantis; ut patet secundo physicorum, et ad Rom. 11° ex ipso, et, per ipsum et in ipso sunt omnia. Per enim ponitur ad designandum formas exemplares in Verbo. Secundum quod autem significat circumstanciam cause formalis; ut patet in descripcione qualitatis. Idem patet de accione, per autorem sex prin- cipiorum; et conformem modum loquendi habet scriptura, prima ad Chor. 6°. Si quis non acquiescit ei, que se- cundum pietatem est doctrine. Supponendo igitur istam distinccionem circumstancie causalis assignari per istas proposiciones, posui sub- distinccionem, quod “forma est res per quam vel se- cundum quam, etc." Et prius indubie est forma exemplaris, 20 exemplans creaturam, quam forma intrinsece inexistens eidem. Ideo est prior naturalis consideracio de forma exemplari quam de forma exemplata. Ulterius notandum est quod essencia specifica, vel natura, tantum capit duplicem predicacionem formalem, 25 scilicet, essencialem et accidentalem; ut, substancia est eque formaliter ignis." Et cum non sit accidentale alicui subiecto quod sit ignis, vel presupponat ei aliam quidi- tatem, I patet quod igneitate est illud substancialiter quod A 53b est. Et hoc presupponitur, de vi vocis, esse forma sub-30 stancialis, scilicet, forma qua substancialiter est substancia id quod est. Rom. XI, 36. 10 1 Tim. VI, 3. 15 3. ad cuius A; ad quod E. est deest ACD. 6. signanter BE. 9. 2° pro 11° ACDE; ib. et after ipso deest AC. 7. quam BE. 11. quam BD; quod deest C. 13. Et idem BD. 15. ad deest B; ib. 17. ſp° quod facit diffinicionem before quia AC. 16. doctrina ACE. supponendo C. 18. signari BD; ib. illas D; ib. preposiciones BE. 24. ſa = pro essencia specifica E; ib. sba = substancia pro specifica BD. 25, 26. scilicet formalem D. 27. alteri A. 28. aliquam D. 29. sub- stancialiter deest E; substancialiter id B. 3o. hec ABC; ib. presupponit C; ib. esse deest D. 13. Autorem sex principiorum. Gilbert de la Porée. 15. Ad Chor. 6° should be Ad Timotheum VI, 3. Si quis aliter docet et non acquiescet sanis sermonibus Domini nostri Jesu Christi, et ei, quae secundum pietatem est, doctrinae.
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CAP. I. DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 165 Sed cum novem genera accidencium, quorum duo As to accidental forms, though prima, que sunt accidencia quodammodo absoluta, scilicet, some are more, others less quantitas et qualitas, que habent propter suam famosi- important, all agree in that tatem nomina concreta contra alia accidencia, (scilicet, they are modes 5 quantum et quale); cetera autem, propter suam latenciam of a substance. ac parvitatem existencie, carent huiusmodi nominibus; sed omnia genera accidencium conveniunt in hoc, quia sunt modi substancie, includendo analoyce omnia novem genera accidencium. Quamvis autem probabiliter visum 10 sit multis quod omnis forma substancialis est modus essencialis, sicut forma accidentalis est modus acciden- talis, tamen famosius limitatur modus ad formam acci- dentalem, et ut reor, ne nimis inaniter solicitaremur circa quiditatem talis modi; cum non propter esse, sed propter inesse ordinaverint gramatici talia composita: huiusmodi, alicuiusmodi, et cetera, componi ex duo- bus generibus, ad denotandum quod idem est querere de quiditatibus talium modorum; et querere quomodo accidentis subiectum se habeat: ut querere, quid est 20 albedo, et querere qualiter subiectum oportet se habere ad hoc quod sit album; cum ipsum esse album sit albedo; et ita generaliter de quolibet alio accidente. Patet sentencia, secundo posteriorum, cap. 1°, ubi osten- ditur quod generaliter est idem querere, quid est? de passione, et querere, propter quid est? de subiecto, eo quod ad utramque questionem est eadem responsio. Ut, querenti quid est eclypsis lune? dicitur quod est defectus luminis in luna propter diametralem inter- posicionem terre inter solem et lunam. Et querenti quare 3o luna eclipsatur? dicitur eadem sentencia, quia hec est racio quia deficit in lumine, ex diametrali interposicione terre inter solem et lunam. Et ita invenies generaliter de qualibet forma accidentali, positiva vel privativa, quod quelibet dicit subiectum et 35 superaddit subiecto modum contingentem. Unde Augu- stinus, De natura summi boni, 2° dicit, 'Deus nec habere And the word mode is rightly given to them, not to substantial forms, because their whole entity consists in their subject existing in such or such a way. To ask, What is whiteness ? is to ask how certain substances impress the eye. What, asked of a phenomenon, has the same answer as why asked of its subject. What is an eclipse of the moon? for instance, means: Why is the moon eclipsed? Every accidental form implies a subject to which it adds a mode of being. Augustine, though he denies that 15 25 4. contra alia deest 1. duo deest A. 2. quodammodo deest A. ABDE; ib. accidentalia BDE. 5. quale etc. BČD; ib. carenciam E. 6 aut BCD. 9. enim C; after probabiliter DE. 13. solicitemur B. 14. proprie D; habeant in marg. D. 15. propter deest BCD. 16. cm pro cetera A. 17. gtis A; 9tis D: gtis E; ib. denominandum E; ib. idem querere est E. 17—20. querere — ut querere deest AC. 19. que- rere deest B. 10, 20. et idem est querere pro ut querere E. 21. de quiditate predicacionibus D; de predicacionibus B. 21. se deest A. 28. 20. propter — lunam in 22. alio deest F. 74. iden querere est E. marg. F. 33. genera C. 34. quia R; ib i pro ct A. 3o. 22° BDE; 2° C; ib. dicit deest DE; ib. autem nec BCDE.
CAP. I. DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 165 Sed cum novem genera accidencium, quorum duo As to accidental forms, though prima, que sunt accidencia quodammodo absoluta, scilicet, some are more, others less quantitas et qualitas, que habent propter suam famosi- important, all agree in that tatem nomina concreta contra alia accidencia, (scilicet, they are modes 5 quantum et quale); cetera autem, propter suam latenciam of a substance. ac parvitatem existencie, carent huiusmodi nominibus; sed omnia genera accidencium conveniunt in hoc, quia sunt modi substancie, includendo analoyce omnia novem genera accidencium. Quamvis autem probabiliter visum 10 sit multis quod omnis forma substancialis est modus essencialis, sicut forma accidentalis est modus acciden- talis, tamen famosius limitatur modus ad formam acci- dentalem, et ut reor, ne nimis inaniter solicitaremur circa quiditatem talis modi; cum non propter esse, sed propter inesse ordinaverint gramatici talia composita: huiusmodi, alicuiusmodi, et cetera, componi ex duo- bus generibus, ad denotandum quod idem est querere de quiditatibus talium modorum; et querere quomodo accidentis subiectum se habeat: ut querere, quid est 20 albedo, et querere qualiter subiectum oportet se habere ad hoc quod sit album; cum ipsum esse album sit albedo; et ita generaliter de quolibet alio accidente. Patet sentencia, secundo posteriorum, cap. 1°, ubi osten- ditur quod generaliter est idem querere, quid est? de passione, et querere, propter quid est? de subiecto, eo quod ad utramque questionem est eadem responsio. Ut, querenti quid est eclypsis lune? dicitur quod est defectus luminis in luna propter diametralem inter- posicionem terre inter solem et lunam. Et querenti quare 3o luna eclipsatur? dicitur eadem sentencia, quia hec est racio quia deficit in lumine, ex diametrali interposicione terre inter solem et lunam. Et ita invenies generaliter de qualibet forma accidentali, positiva vel privativa, quod quelibet dicit subiectum et 35 superaddit subiecto modum contingentem. Unde Augu- stinus, De natura summi boni, 2° dicit, 'Deus nec habere And the word mode is rightly given to them, not to substantial forms, because their whole entity consists in their subject existing in such or such a way. To ask, What is whiteness ? is to ask how certain substances impress the eye. What, asked of a phenomenon, has the same answer as why asked of its subject. What is an eclipse of the moon? for instance, means: Why is the moon eclipsed? Every accidental form implies a subject to which it adds a mode of being. Augustine, though he denies that 15 25 4. contra alia deest 1. duo deest A. 2. quodammodo deest A. ABDE; ib. accidentalia BDE. 5. quale etc. BČD; ib. carenciam E. 6 aut BCD. 9. enim C; after probabiliter DE. 13. solicitemur B. 14. proprie D; habeant in marg. D. 15. propter deest BCD. 16. cm pro cetera A. 17. gtis A; 9tis D: gtis E; ib. denominandum E; ib. idem querere est E. 17—20. querere — ut querere deest AC. 19. que- rere deest B. 10, 20. et idem est querere pro ut querere E. 21. de quiditate predicacionibus D; de predicacionibus B. 21. se deest A. 28. 20. propter — lunam in 22. alio deest F. 74. iden querere est E. marg. F. 33. genera C. 34. quia R; ib i pro ct A. 3o. 22° BDE; 2° C; ib. dicit deest DE; ib. autem nec BCDE.
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166 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I. there can be any modum dicendus est quoniam ab eo modus omnibus mode in God, in the sense of rebus tribuitur." Sensus tamen Augustini ibidem est an accident, quod omnis modus est forma, et e converso. Sic enim yet admits that scribitur consequenter ibidem: "Neque rursus moderatum He can be called the oportet dici deum, tanquam modum ab aliquo acceperit. 5 Supreme Mode Si enim dicimus ipsum esse summum modum, forte 1. e. the Supreme Form. aliquid dicimus; si tamen in eo quod dicimus summum modum, intelligimus summum bonum. Omnis enim modus, in quantum modus est, bonus est. Unde omnia moderata, modesta, vel modificata dici sine laude non 10 possunt." Sensus autem istius sancti est conformiter ad scrip- He says that a mode, in this turam ] tria dicere; primo, quod nihil potest esse bonum A 54 sense, is necessary to vel ordinatum sine modo; secundo, quod claudit re- goodness and order; that pugnanciam in terminis aliquid esse modestum, aliquid 15 nothing can be moderatum vel modificatum sine modo quo sit forma- modified without it; liter huiusmodi; et tercio, quod talis modus sit modestia, and that this is the same as ordo, pulchritudo, bonitas, vel forma. Et sic interpretatur Phi. beauty, illud apostoli ad phi. 4°: "Modestia vestra nota sit IV, 5. goodness and form. omnibus hominibus;" et prima ad Thim. 3°: "Oportet 20 In this he agrees episcopum irreprehensibilem esse, non percussorem, sed I. Tim. with Scripture. III, 2. modestum." Et sic de qualibet scriptura. Unde Augustinus, in De natura boni, 33°, sic scribit: 'Malus ergo modus vel mala species, vel malus ordo, aut ideo dicuntur, quia aliter sunt quam esse debent; aut, quia hiis rebus 25 non accomodantur quibus accomodanda sunt. Contingit enim idem fieri a duobus; ab uno quidem bene, propter ordinem et modum, et ab alia male, propter deficienciam ordinis, speciei, vel modi." Idem brevissime et saluberrime docet Apostolus, prima ad Chor. 14°: “Omnia autem 30 honeste et secundum ordinem fiant in vobis;" et Pro-I. Cor. XIV, verbiorum 23°: 'Noli laborare ut diteris, sed prudencie 40. tue pone modum." Quod igitur famosior significacio est Prov. artare modum ad formam accidentalem, et conveniens XXIII, 3. Aristoteli (7° Methaphysice secundo), patet convenientibus But it is clear that mode is usually taken for an accidental form. 4. rursum C. 2. enim DE. 5. accepit CE; acciperet D. 6. fieri unum pro summum AC. 12. est deest CD. 13. est tria C. 16. vel before moderatum. 17. quod omnis talis BD. 18. intelligitur C. 21. ipm pro episcopum D. 22. quolibet scripture CE; 19. illud 4° C. 25, 26. quia non quotlibet scripture BD. 23. 23° BCDE. 24. ff. A. 26. non deest A. omnino BDE. 27. idem deest D; ib. a bono D. a 28. ab deest B: aliter pro ab alio E; ib. defectum BCDE. 3o. ad deest 31. fint A. 32. nec ABCDE; ib. discere ACE; BD; ib. 4° ACE. 35. secundum ABC. 33. quia B. dicere BD; ib. paciencie AC.
166 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I. there can be any modum dicendus est quoniam ab eo modus omnibus mode in God, in the sense of rebus tribuitur." Sensus tamen Augustini ibidem est an accident, quod omnis modus est forma, et e converso. Sic enim yet admits that scribitur consequenter ibidem: "Neque rursus moderatum He can be called the oportet dici deum, tanquam modum ab aliquo acceperit. 5 Supreme Mode Si enim dicimus ipsum esse summum modum, forte 1. e. the Supreme Form. aliquid dicimus; si tamen in eo quod dicimus summum modum, intelligimus summum bonum. Omnis enim modus, in quantum modus est, bonus est. Unde omnia moderata, modesta, vel modificata dici sine laude non 10 possunt." Sensus autem istius sancti est conformiter ad scrip- He says that a mode, in this turam ] tria dicere; primo, quod nihil potest esse bonum A 54 sense, is necessary to vel ordinatum sine modo; secundo, quod claudit re- goodness and order; that pugnanciam in terminis aliquid esse modestum, aliquid 15 nothing can be moderatum vel modificatum sine modo quo sit forma- modified without it; liter huiusmodi; et tercio, quod talis modus sit modestia, and that this is the same as ordo, pulchritudo, bonitas, vel forma. Et sic interpretatur Phi. beauty, illud apostoli ad phi. 4°: "Modestia vestra nota sit IV, 5. goodness and form. omnibus hominibus;" et prima ad Thim. 3°: "Oportet 20 In this he agrees episcopum irreprehensibilem esse, non percussorem, sed I. Tim. with Scripture. III, 2. modestum." Et sic de qualibet scriptura. Unde Augustinus, in De natura boni, 33°, sic scribit: 'Malus ergo modus vel mala species, vel malus ordo, aut ideo dicuntur, quia aliter sunt quam esse debent; aut, quia hiis rebus 25 non accomodantur quibus accomodanda sunt. Contingit enim idem fieri a duobus; ab uno quidem bene, propter ordinem et modum, et ab alia male, propter deficienciam ordinis, speciei, vel modi." Idem brevissime et saluberrime docet Apostolus, prima ad Chor. 14°: “Omnia autem 30 honeste et secundum ordinem fiant in vobis;" et Pro-I. Cor. XIV, verbiorum 23°: 'Noli laborare ut diteris, sed prudencie 40. tue pone modum." Quod igitur famosior significacio est Prov. artare modum ad formam accidentalem, et conveniens XXIII, 3. Aristoteli (7° Methaphysice secundo), patet convenientibus But it is clear that mode is usually taken for an accidental form. 4. rursum C. 2. enim DE. 5. accepit CE; acciperet D. 6. fieri unum pro summum AC. 12. est deest CD. 13. est tria C. 16. vel before moderatum. 17. quod omnis talis BD. 18. intelligitur C. 21. ipm pro episcopum D. 22. quolibet scripture CE; 19. illud 4° C. 25, 26. quia non quotlibet scripture BD. 23. 23° BCDE. 24. ff. A. 26. non deest A. omnino BDE. 27. idem deest D; ib. a bono D. a 28. ab deest B: aliter pro ab alio E; ib. defectum BCDE. 3o. ad deest 31. fint A. 32. nec ABCDE; ib. discere ACE; BD; ib. 4° ACE. 35. secundum ABC. 33. quia B. dicere BD; ib. paciencie AC.
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CAP. I. DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 167 A 54 in illa significacione descripcio quid nominis forme supe- rius posita, situs et ordo terminorum; nec aliter describi potest in sua maxima communitate, propter anologiam parcium. Ex dictis finaliter capi potest descripcio cuiuslibet either by which a substance is forme communis; ut patet exemplariter de formis acci- said to have dimensions, dentalibus. Nam quantitas est forma accidentalis se- simultaneous or successive; cundum quam substancia dicitur esse quanta; ut substancia discrete multa est formaliter multa per naturam. Sub- 10 stancia materialis est mole magna secundum lineam, superficiem, vel corporeitatem; et mundus est successive quantus et diurnus secundum tempus. Qualitas est forma accidentalis secundum quam substancia dicitur formaliter qualis et accidentaliter virtuosa, potens, vel sana, calida 15 vel rotunda. Relacio est forma accidentalis, secundum quam dicitur substancia formaliter alteri relata. Accio est forma secundum quam dicimus formaliter substanciam agere, passio substanciam pati; et correspondenter de aliis. 20 Nec oportet timere instancias sophisticas, quibus aliqui instant quod non oportet, si aliquid sit virtuosum vel aliter accidentatum, quod dicatur huiusmodi. Nam claudit contradiccionem aliquam creaturam esse alicuius modi, nisi deus eam prius naturaliter dicat huiusmodi, quam 25 sit huiusmodi. Et preterea, cum quelibet res realiter et proprie dicit se, ut patet alibi ex racione et testi- monio scripturarum, patet quod claudit contradiccionem aliquod accidens inesse suo subiecto, cum hoc quod non dicat suum subiectum sic esse accidentatum. Et 3o illum sensum ex famositate sic acceperunt philosophi sine contencione. Et patet quod contencio de quiditate formarum accidentalium stat pro magna parte in equi- vocacionibus terminorum; unde quando homines in- ceperunt philosophari, aliqui negarunt accidencia; ut If we go through all the categories of accidents, we shall find they are forms, or to be virtuous, powerful, etc.: or to be related, active or passive. Sophists may object that a man may be virtuous, and not be said to be virtuous; but God at least calls him so; and every being tells of itself. Every accident, by the fact that it exists in its subject, proclaims it to be thus modified. The dispute about the entity of accidents is chiefly one of words. 9. torma ABCD. 10. na- 1. desc'pco A. . 6. vel pro ut ABCD. turalis ABC. 11. i pro ct B. 12. quantus per tempus D. 14. id est pro ct E.. 15. vel frigida E. 17. forma deest CD. 18. pro alio pro passio AC; ib. subiectum BCDE. 22. aliter deest AC. 23. modi deest AC. 26. et before proprie deest D; ib. aliter ACD; ib. racione et deest E. 33. ut ABCE. 34. phym — philoso- 29. sic deest BD. phiam C. 27. Alibi. There is something of this doctrine in Logica (see vol. I, p. 77, 1. 23—27; vol. II, p. 202, 1. 18—20), but Wyclif probably alludes to some other work, not yet published.
CAP. I. DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 167 A 54 in illa significacione descripcio quid nominis forme supe- rius posita, situs et ordo terminorum; nec aliter describi potest in sua maxima communitate, propter anologiam parcium. Ex dictis finaliter capi potest descripcio cuiuslibet either by which a substance is forme communis; ut patet exemplariter de formis acci- said to have dimensions, dentalibus. Nam quantitas est forma accidentalis se- simultaneous or successive; cundum quam substancia dicitur esse quanta; ut substancia discrete multa est formaliter multa per naturam. Sub- 10 stancia materialis est mole magna secundum lineam, superficiem, vel corporeitatem; et mundus est successive quantus et diurnus secundum tempus. Qualitas est forma accidentalis secundum quam substancia dicitur formaliter qualis et accidentaliter virtuosa, potens, vel sana, calida 15 vel rotunda. Relacio est forma accidentalis, secundum quam dicitur substancia formaliter alteri relata. Accio est forma secundum quam dicimus formaliter substanciam agere, passio substanciam pati; et correspondenter de aliis. 20 Nec oportet timere instancias sophisticas, quibus aliqui instant quod non oportet, si aliquid sit virtuosum vel aliter accidentatum, quod dicatur huiusmodi. Nam claudit contradiccionem aliquam creaturam esse alicuius modi, nisi deus eam prius naturaliter dicat huiusmodi, quam 25 sit huiusmodi. Et preterea, cum quelibet res realiter et proprie dicit se, ut patet alibi ex racione et testi- monio scripturarum, patet quod claudit contradiccionem aliquod accidens inesse suo subiecto, cum hoc quod non dicat suum subiectum sic esse accidentatum. Et 3o illum sensum ex famositate sic acceperunt philosophi sine contencione. Et patet quod contencio de quiditate formarum accidentalium stat pro magna parte in equi- vocacionibus terminorum; unde quando homines in- ceperunt philosophari, aliqui negarunt accidencia; ut If we go through all the categories of accidents, we shall find they are forms, or to be virtuous, powerful, etc.: or to be related, active or passive. Sophists may object that a man may be virtuous, and not be said to be virtuous; but God at least calls him so; and every being tells of itself. Every accident, by the fact that it exists in its subject, proclaims it to be thus modified. The dispute about the entity of accidents is chiefly one of words. 9. torma ABCD. 10. na- 1. desc'pco A. . 6. vel pro ut ABCD. turalis ABC. 11. i pro ct B. 12. quantus per tempus D. 14. id est pro ct E.. 15. vel frigida E. 17. forma deest CD. 18. pro alio pro passio AC; ib. subiectum BCDE. 22. aliter deest AC. 23. modi deest AC. 26. et before proprie deest D; ib. aliter ACD; ib. racione et deest E. 33. ut ABCE. 34. phym — philoso- 29. sic deest BD. phiam C. 27. Alibi. There is something of this doctrine in Logica (see vol. I, p. 77, 1. 23—27; vol. II, p. 202, 1. 18—20), but Wyclif probably alludes to some other work, not yet published.
Strana 168
168 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I. At the outset, patet primo physicorum. Aliqui dubitaverunt, si acci- some denied all dencia sunt encia, ut patet 7° Methaphysice, commento accidents, others doubted tercio. Unde (sicut habet textus Aristotelis) et forte whether they dubitabit aliquis utrum vadere, et sedere, et unumquod- had any entity or not. que eorum sit ens; similiter autem et aliis talibus.5 Talium enim nichil est secundum se aptum [esse], se- Later, it was found that parari scilicet a substancia. Sed post, subtilius philo- entily has not the same, but a sophantes, invenerunt quod ens dicitur anoloyce de like meaning, when said of substancia et accidente; et distinxerunt novem genera substance and accidencium, que non sunt encia, nisi quia entis; ut 10 of accident; the entity of an patet 7° Methaphysicorum secundo. accident is its Et revera, multum indisponuntur ad intelligendum belonging to another entity. It is difficult to veritates scripture qui nesciunt distinguere inter ista. understand Unde Augustinus (De Incarnacione, sexto, capitulo 1°), Scripture, if we do not admit a inquit: Qui nescit discernere inter equum et albedinem distinction between eius, quomodo in altissima trinitate discernet inter unum accident and simplicem deum et multas eius relaciones?" Unde opiniones substance. Of two extreme modernas pro magna parte reor stare in equivocacionibus opinions, one terminorum. Unde unus dicit quod nullum accidens est holds that a thing must exist ens, quia statuit sibi saltem verbaliter, quod ens signi- 20 by itself, and therefore an ficat solum illud quod potest per se esse. Aliam opinionem accident is audivi, que est conformior virtuti sermonis, dicentem nothing; the other, that quod claudit contradiccionem aliquam creaturam esse, every creature nisi sit accidens cuius substancia, omnem creaturam is an accident, and God alone induens et sustentans, est deus. Et si allegantur verba 25 a substance; philosophorum et scripture, dicit quod methaforice et inproprie dicitur substancia de quacumque creatura, cum quelibet accidit deo, sicud divicie accidunt homini. Ideo, distingwendo substanciam et accidens ex opposito, nulla creatura est substancia, sed large, inproprie ac figurative. 30 15 3. sic E. 5. et in D. 6. enim eorum 2. i E; ib. ut deest AC. ACDE; ib. aptum natum BDE; ib. nec pro esse ABCDE. 6, 7. se pari C; separari scilicet a D. 7. scilicet deest ABCE. 11. metaphysice 14. Augg ul Auff, E; ib. vI = verbi CD. 15. qui inquit AE; ib. BD. nesciunt D; ib. distingwere B; ib. inter deest E. 16. distingwet BD. 19. ut pro unde BD. 20. statuunt ABD; ib. saltem deest E. 20, 21. ens formallter D. 22. 1,0% = significacionis? D. 25. intuens DE; induens above D. 26. vel D. 29. exoto A. 27. dicatur B. 25. Deus. This is highly interesting. Modern writers have bitterly denounced Scholastics for their subservience to authority. Now here we find, in the full swing of Scholasticism, an opinion fundamentally the same as that of Spinoza, who, it is well known, considered God as the only substance, of which all other things were accidents. It is curious, too, how this opinion, whilst verbally admitting authority, manages to explain it away.
168 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I. At the outset, patet primo physicorum. Aliqui dubitaverunt, si acci- some denied all dencia sunt encia, ut patet 7° Methaphysice, commento accidents, others doubted tercio. Unde (sicut habet textus Aristotelis) et forte whether they dubitabit aliquis utrum vadere, et sedere, et unumquod- had any entity or not. que eorum sit ens; similiter autem et aliis talibus.5 Talium enim nichil est secundum se aptum [esse], se- Later, it was found that parari scilicet a substancia. Sed post, subtilius philo- entily has not the same, but a sophantes, invenerunt quod ens dicitur anoloyce de like meaning, when said of substancia et accidente; et distinxerunt novem genera substance and accidencium, que non sunt encia, nisi quia entis; ut 10 of accident; the entity of an patet 7° Methaphysicorum secundo. accident is its Et revera, multum indisponuntur ad intelligendum belonging to another entity. It is difficult to veritates scripture qui nesciunt distinguere inter ista. understand Unde Augustinus (De Incarnacione, sexto, capitulo 1°), Scripture, if we do not admit a inquit: Qui nescit discernere inter equum et albedinem distinction between eius, quomodo in altissima trinitate discernet inter unum accident and simplicem deum et multas eius relaciones?" Unde opiniones substance. Of two extreme modernas pro magna parte reor stare in equivocacionibus opinions, one terminorum. Unde unus dicit quod nullum accidens est holds that a thing must exist ens, quia statuit sibi saltem verbaliter, quod ens signi- 20 by itself, and therefore an ficat solum illud quod potest per se esse. Aliam opinionem accident is audivi, que est conformior virtuti sermonis, dicentem nothing; the other, that quod claudit contradiccionem aliquam creaturam esse, every creature nisi sit accidens cuius substancia, omnem creaturam is an accident, and God alone induens et sustentans, est deus. Et si allegantur verba 25 a substance; philosophorum et scripture, dicit quod methaforice et inproprie dicitur substancia de quacumque creatura, cum quelibet accidit deo, sicud divicie accidunt homini. Ideo, distingwendo substanciam et accidens ex opposito, nulla creatura est substancia, sed large, inproprie ac figurative. 30 15 3. sic E. 5. et in D. 6. enim eorum 2. i E; ib. ut deest AC. ACDE; ib. aptum natum BDE; ib. nec pro esse ABCDE. 6, 7. se pari C; separari scilicet a D. 7. scilicet deest ABCE. 11. metaphysice 14. Augg ul Auff, E; ib. vI = verbi CD. 15. qui inquit AE; ib. BD. nesciunt D; ib. distingwere B; ib. inter deest E. 16. distingwet BD. 19. ut pro unde BD. 20. statuunt ABD; ib. saltem deest E. 20, 21. ens formallter D. 22. 1,0% = significacionis? D. 25. intuens DE; induens above D. 26. vel D. 29. exoto A. 27. dicatur B. 25. Deus. This is highly interesting. Modern writers have bitterly denounced Scholastics for their subservience to authority. Now here we find, in the full swing of Scholasticism, an opinion fundamentally the same as that of Spinoza, who, it is well known, considered God as the only substance, of which all other things were accidents. It is curious, too, how this opinion, whilst verbally admitting authority, manages to explain it away.
Strana 169
CAP. I. DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 169 De virtute sermonis vocat apostolus virtutem fidei sub- Hebr. stanciam, ut patet ad Ebr. 2°. Et sic loquitur scola de it explains Scripture texts XI, 1. substancia actus, aut eius qualitate. Et quo ad verba by saying that substance may philosophorum distingwencium inter substanciam et be meant figuratively, 5 accidens ex opposito, dicunt quod philosophi false and the locuntur de virtute sermonis; cum eque dicant philosophi authority of philosophers by quod quantitas est subiectum qualitatis, et qualitas pointing out that, in the subiectum relacionis: et ita de generibus accidencium. Categories, Et cum negandum est eas de virtute sermonis esse certain accidents are as 1o substancias, correspondenter res primi predicamenti tam substances to others, which accidentaliter inherent deo, sicut quantitas inheret sibi. depend on Ideo solus deus est substancia. them ; and thus what we call In quotlibet talibus opinionibus, notum est quod equi- substances depend on God. vocant, non admittentes antiquas sentencias et signifi- I admit neither 15 caciones terminorum; vel aliter opinantur plane in- of these doctrines, which A 55° possibile. Tales autem contenciones in novitate verborum savour of fundate non decent theologum, ut patet prima ad Thim. 6°. unprofitable I. novelty; but, kceping to Tim. Ideo pepigi fedus cum me ipso, quod amplius non ac- the plain VI, 20. ciperem occasionem infructuose contendere in talibus, meaning of Scripture and 2o sed supponam famosam significacionem terminorum ac philosophy, distinccionem encium conformiter ad antiquos philo- maintain that the world, sophos et scripturam, quod tota universitas creata, licet though as an accident to God, sit accidens deo, tamen ipsa dividitur in substanciam et is itself divided accidens. Substancia est res prime cathegorie, quod, into substances and accidents. 25 licet non possit esse nisi a deo, tamen inter genera As created substance encium creata est prius substancia aliis. Ideo anoloyce cannot exist et famose sortitur nomen substancie, et [alia] sibi ordi- without being in God, so the nata sunt. Sic claudit contradiccionem substanciam esse, nine other categories nisi deo insit; et illius novem accidentibus suppono cannot exist 3o anoloyce appropriari nomen accidentis vel forme acci- without being in a substance dentalis; et privaciones illis oppositas suppono esse It is as absurd equivoce formas accidentales. to suppose a qualily in a Ex istis patet quod idem esset ponere qualitatem vel subject which it does not quamcunque aliam formam esse in subiecto cum hoc 'inform', as to suppose the subject having that 1. ſ,of D; ib. neronice A; de virtute fidei E. 2. ad debe 9 2° D. quality without that form. 6. f,of D. 10. cum BE. 13. aliis A. 14, 15. f,n D. 16. conti- nuaciones B. 17. fudate A; ib. docent A; ib. theologi AB. 18. pipegi D. 20. si pro sed A. 21. gencium A. 24. et BDE. 19. contendendi BD. 25. in pro a BC; insit DE. 26. accidencium D; ib. primum ABCDE; ib. alia deest ABCDE; ib. sicud pro sibi C; sic E. 27, 28. ordinate ABCDE. 28. sicud pro sic BC; aliam sicut D 29. in deo C; ib. illis ACDE; ib. novem deest BD. 31. eciam esse D. 32. est ACE; ib. quantitatem D). 2. The mistake is no doubt due to a confusion between Roman and Arabic numerals.
CAP. I. DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 169 De virtute sermonis vocat apostolus virtutem fidei sub- Hebr. stanciam, ut patet ad Ebr. 2°. Et sic loquitur scola de it explains Scripture texts XI, 1. substancia actus, aut eius qualitate. Et quo ad verba by saying that substance may philosophorum distingwencium inter substanciam et be meant figuratively, 5 accidens ex opposito, dicunt quod philosophi false and the locuntur de virtute sermonis; cum eque dicant philosophi authority of philosophers by quod quantitas est subiectum qualitatis, et qualitas pointing out that, in the subiectum relacionis: et ita de generibus accidencium. Categories, Et cum negandum est eas de virtute sermonis esse certain accidents are as 1o substancias, correspondenter res primi predicamenti tam substances to others, which accidentaliter inherent deo, sicut quantitas inheret sibi. depend on Ideo solus deus est substancia. them ; and thus what we call In quotlibet talibus opinionibus, notum est quod equi- substances depend on God. vocant, non admittentes antiquas sentencias et signifi- I admit neither 15 caciones terminorum; vel aliter opinantur plane in- of these doctrines, which A 55° possibile. Tales autem contenciones in novitate verborum savour of fundate non decent theologum, ut patet prima ad Thim. 6°. unprofitable I. novelty; but, kceping to Tim. Ideo pepigi fedus cum me ipso, quod amplius non ac- the plain VI, 20. ciperem occasionem infructuose contendere in talibus, meaning of Scripture and 2o sed supponam famosam significacionem terminorum ac philosophy, distinccionem encium conformiter ad antiquos philo- maintain that the world, sophos et scripturam, quod tota universitas creata, licet though as an accident to God, sit accidens deo, tamen ipsa dividitur in substanciam et is itself divided accidens. Substancia est res prime cathegorie, quod, into substances and accidents. 25 licet non possit esse nisi a deo, tamen inter genera As created substance encium creata est prius substancia aliis. Ideo anoloyce cannot exist et famose sortitur nomen substancie, et [alia] sibi ordi- without being in God, so the nata sunt. Sic claudit contradiccionem substanciam esse, nine other categories nisi deo insit; et illius novem accidentibus suppono cannot exist 3o anoloyce appropriari nomen accidentis vel forme acci- without being in a substance dentalis; et privaciones illis oppositas suppono esse It is as absurd equivoce formas accidentales. to suppose a qualily in a Ex istis patet quod idem esset ponere qualitatem vel subject which it does not quamcunque aliam formam esse in subiecto cum hoc 'inform', as to suppose the subject having that 1. ſ,of D; ib. neronice A; de virtute fidei E. 2. ad debe 9 2° D. quality without that form. 6. f,of D. 10. cum BE. 13. aliis A. 14, 15. f,n D. 16. conti- nuaciones B. 17. fudate A; ib. docent A; ib. theologi AB. 18. pipegi D. 20. si pro sed A. 21. gencium A. 24. et BDE. 19. contendendi BD. 25. in pro a BC; insit DE. 26. accidencium D; ib. primum ABCDE; ib. alia deest ABCDE; ib. sicud pro sibi C; sic E. 27, 28. ordinate ABCDE. 28. sicud pro sic BC; aliam sicut D 29. in deo C; ib. illis ACDE; ib. novem deest BD. 31. eciam esse D. 32. est ACE; ib. quantitatem D). 2. The mistake is no doubt due to a confusion between Roman and Arabic numerals.
Strana 170
170 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. II. quod non informet, deo suspendente actum informacionis, ac si poneretur quod deus faciat sic quod substancia sit accidentaliter qualis, vel taliter formata, sine hoc quod habeat ipsam formam. Nec audivi aliquando ar- gumenta directe contra oppiniones huiusmodi formarum 5 procedencia, nisi sentencia concluserit illum sensum quod nulla talia sint res inherentes, que possint per se existere. Illud probant multe famose raciones, tam mo- dernorum quam antiquorum, eque efficaciter de qualitate, sicud de quantitate vel quocunque alio genere respectivo. 10 Sed cum conclusio sit concedenda tanquam necessaria (ut sepe dicit Augustinus de qualitate et quocunque alio accidente) racionabiliter cessaret contencio. Sed non est color, si talia accidencia non possunt per se existere, quod tunc non existunt. There are many Scio tamen quod multe pulcre veritates circumstant difficulties accidents, all of difficultates [circa] novem genera accidencium, quia which may be cuncte res difficiles. Sed cuncte difficultates huiusmodi solved; but I will not discuss sunt (ex doctrina veritatis et eius professorum) satis them any further until solubiles ad laudem veritatis eiusdem. Amodo ergo non 20 new arguments contendem circa huiusmodi accidenciam metaphysicam, are brought forward ; nisi audivero novas argucias actenus inauditas. Sed puto and that, I me scire quod hoc non eveniet antequam archangelus think, will not be till in novissima tuba cecinerit; et tunc non erit necesse Doomsday. arguendo contendere. All arguments to the contrary make for this: that no accidents can exist by themselves. This should put an end to the controversy, but not bring us to conclude that they do not exist. 15 25 CAPITULUM SECUNDUM. We must now Post illud rudimentum premissum de significacione study ideal forms, of which quid nominis terminorum, restat, realitati amplius acce- there are in dendum, videre sensum formarum ydealium vel exempla- God an innumerable rium. Pro quo notandum quod in deo sunt quotlibet 30 multitude, which forme exemplares, eterne, per quas oportet creaturas identical with produci in existencia sui generis. Et quelibet earum est Him in essence, distinguishable essencialiter idem cum natura divina, secundum racionem from Him by our mind, are the patterns after which all things are produced ; 2. faciat sic quod deest ABCE. 5. dirte AB. 4. aliqua BC. 7. possunt B; ib. per se deest E. p ib. opposiciones C; posiciones D. 8. Et illud BD. 10. r'vo A. 13. accidentatum D; ib. contradiccio A. 14. sed pro si BC; quod A. 15. quia pro quod A. 17. diffiles DE; ib. 18. diffiniles = diffini- circa deest ABCDE; ib. vel pro quia ABCE. biles? C. 19. processorum D. 20. solules = solubiles? BDE; soles = sociabiles, sodales? A. 21. concedam ABE; ib. metaforam ABC; mecs DE. 22. nisi deest C; ib. audi ergo C. 23. evenit C. 24. tunc post A; ex post CE; et tunc povo D. 25. etc. etc. D; after contendere in marg: prdomi druzy wroh. 26. Cap. deest; larger initial P in red 29. ydearum A. ink A. 27. rudilu A. 28, 29. accidendum ABCDE. 31. ceteras A. 32. Et deest A.
170 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. II. quod non informet, deo suspendente actum informacionis, ac si poneretur quod deus faciat sic quod substancia sit accidentaliter qualis, vel taliter formata, sine hoc quod habeat ipsam formam. Nec audivi aliquando ar- gumenta directe contra oppiniones huiusmodi formarum 5 procedencia, nisi sentencia concluserit illum sensum quod nulla talia sint res inherentes, que possint per se existere. Illud probant multe famose raciones, tam mo- dernorum quam antiquorum, eque efficaciter de qualitate, sicud de quantitate vel quocunque alio genere respectivo. 10 Sed cum conclusio sit concedenda tanquam necessaria (ut sepe dicit Augustinus de qualitate et quocunque alio accidente) racionabiliter cessaret contencio. Sed non est color, si talia accidencia non possunt per se existere, quod tunc non existunt. There are many Scio tamen quod multe pulcre veritates circumstant difficulties accidents, all of difficultates [circa] novem genera accidencium, quia which may be cuncte res difficiles. Sed cuncte difficultates huiusmodi solved; but I will not discuss sunt (ex doctrina veritatis et eius professorum) satis them any further until solubiles ad laudem veritatis eiusdem. Amodo ergo non 20 new arguments contendem circa huiusmodi accidenciam metaphysicam, are brought forward ; nisi audivero novas argucias actenus inauditas. Sed puto and that, I me scire quod hoc non eveniet antequam archangelus think, will not be till in novissima tuba cecinerit; et tunc non erit necesse Doomsday. arguendo contendere. All arguments to the contrary make for this: that no accidents can exist by themselves. This should put an end to the controversy, but not bring us to conclude that they do not exist. 15 25 CAPITULUM SECUNDUM. We must now Post illud rudimentum premissum de significacione study ideal forms, of which quid nominis terminorum, restat, realitati amplius acce- there are in dendum, videre sensum formarum ydealium vel exempla- God an innumerable rium. Pro quo notandum quod in deo sunt quotlibet 30 multitude, which forme exemplares, eterne, per quas oportet creaturas identical with produci in existencia sui generis. Et quelibet earum est Him in essence, distinguishable essencialiter idem cum natura divina, secundum racionem from Him by our mind, are the patterns after which all things are produced ; 2. faciat sic quod deest ABCE. 5. dirte AB. 4. aliqua BC. 7. possunt B; ib. per se deest E. p ib. opposiciones C; posiciones D. 8. Et illud BD. 10. r'vo A. 13. accidentatum D; ib. contradiccio A. 14. sed pro si BC; quod A. 15. quia pro quod A. 17. diffiles DE; ib. 18. diffiniles = diffini- circa deest ABCDE; ib. vel pro quia ABCE. biles? C. 19. processorum D. 20. solules = solubiles? BDE; soles = sociabiles, sodales? A. 21. concedam ABE; ib. metaforam ABC; mecs DE. 22. nisi deest C; ib. audi ergo C. 23. evenit C. 24. tunc post A; ex post CE; et tunc povo D. 25. etc. etc. D; after contendere in marg: prdomi druzy wroh. 26. Cap. deest; larger initial P in red 29. ydearum A. ink A. 27. rudilu A. 28, 29. accidendum ABCDE. 31. ceteras A. 32. Et deest A.
Strana 171
CAP. II. DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 171 A 55b distingwuntur ab invicem et a deo, ut patet in materia de ydeis que est correlata. Ex cuius sensu plane sequitur God is thus the Form of all quod deus est forma cuiuslibet creature; quam sentenciam beings; and the egregie declarat dominus lincolniensis in quadam epistola, Godhead is the partes huius materie perscrutans usque ad fundamentum Form common to all three in ea. Primo itaque capiendum est ex dictis, cum que- Persons of the Trinity, each libet persona divina sit formaliter alicuiusmodi, hoc est, apart being that alicuius terminus communis, et non potest esse talis Form. alicuius, nisi sit forma, qua ipsa est huiusmodi, sequitur 10 quod est dare formam qua quelibet persona divina est deus. Cum igitur quelibet persona divina sit deus deitate formaliter, sequitur quod deitas sit forma communis cuilibet istarum trium personarum; et cum nulla istarum trium personarum sit deus accidentaliter, vel habens in 15 composicionem sue essencie potenciam ante actum, sequitur quod dicta deitas est quelibet istarum per- sonarum; et per consequens quelibet personarum divi- narum est essencialiter et ab intrinseco forma increata. Generaliter enim, quandocumque aliquid est formaliter 20 alicuiusmodi, et non accidentaliter, sed essencialiter, tunc forma est eadem essencia cum formato. Ut si mobile motu movetur, et non accidentaliter sed essencialiter, tunc iste motus quo movetur formaliter est idem essen- cialiter cum isto mobili. Ex isto concordati sunt philo- 25 sophi dicentes quod subiectum, quantitate quantum, habeat quantitatem formam inherentem, formam di- stinctam, cum nunc potest esse maius, nunc minus. Illa autem quantitas, cum sic quanta (et non sibi acciden- taliter) est formaliter quanta seipsa. Sic, igitur, cum 3o deus sit summe per se formosus et bonus, palam se- quitur quod deus sit illa forma, scilicet, formositas, bonitasque formaliter. For as quantity, if it existed by itself, would have a magnitude that was not distinct from itself, so God is self- subsistent form and goodness. 9. alicuiusmodi — alicuius 2. que est correlata deest ACD. 7.- 9. formaliter E; quia AB; ib. deest ACD; at bottom of page B. ipse AE; ipsum BCE. 10. divina deest BDE. 11. divina deest C. 13. cuiuslibet E. 18, 19. persona divina BCDE. 20. modi deest ABCD; ib. et deest D; ib. sed essencialiter D. 20—23. tunc — tunc deest AE. 25. dicentes deest ACDE. 24. Et ex opposito B; ib. corrupti ABCE. 27. magis D. 3o. forma D, ib. est 26. habeant C. 28. sit ABCE. seipsa ABCE; ib. igitur (1r) E. 32. et boni- 31. scilicet deest BCDE. tas C; ib. qua formatur BCD. 2. De Ideis. is the title of the last tractate but one of the second book of Wyclif's great philosophical work De Ente; the present tractate is in all probability later than that work. 4. The subject of Grosseteste's first letter is 'quid de hoc verbo sen- tenciam: Deus est prima forma et forma omnium? (Rob. Grosse- teste, Epistolae, Rolls Series, p. 1.)
CAP. II. DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 171 A 55b distingwuntur ab invicem et a deo, ut patet in materia de ydeis que est correlata. Ex cuius sensu plane sequitur God is thus the Form of all quod deus est forma cuiuslibet creature; quam sentenciam beings; and the egregie declarat dominus lincolniensis in quadam epistola, Godhead is the partes huius materie perscrutans usque ad fundamentum Form common to all three in ea. Primo itaque capiendum est ex dictis, cum que- Persons of the Trinity, each libet persona divina sit formaliter alicuiusmodi, hoc est, apart being that alicuius terminus communis, et non potest esse talis Form. alicuius, nisi sit forma, qua ipsa est huiusmodi, sequitur 10 quod est dare formam qua quelibet persona divina est deus. Cum igitur quelibet persona divina sit deus deitate formaliter, sequitur quod deitas sit forma communis cuilibet istarum trium personarum; et cum nulla istarum trium personarum sit deus accidentaliter, vel habens in 15 composicionem sue essencie potenciam ante actum, sequitur quod dicta deitas est quelibet istarum per- sonarum; et per consequens quelibet personarum divi- narum est essencialiter et ab intrinseco forma increata. Generaliter enim, quandocumque aliquid est formaliter 20 alicuiusmodi, et non accidentaliter, sed essencialiter, tunc forma est eadem essencia cum formato. Ut si mobile motu movetur, et non accidentaliter sed essencialiter, tunc iste motus quo movetur formaliter est idem essen- cialiter cum isto mobili. Ex isto concordati sunt philo- 25 sophi dicentes quod subiectum, quantitate quantum, habeat quantitatem formam inherentem, formam di- stinctam, cum nunc potest esse maius, nunc minus. Illa autem quantitas, cum sic quanta (et non sibi acciden- taliter) est formaliter quanta seipsa. Sic, igitur, cum 3o deus sit summe per se formosus et bonus, palam se- quitur quod deus sit illa forma, scilicet, formositas, bonitasque formaliter. For as quantity, if it existed by itself, would have a magnitude that was not distinct from itself, so God is self- subsistent form and goodness. 9. alicuiusmodi — alicuius 2. que est correlata deest ACD. 7.- 9. formaliter E; quia AB; ib. deest ACD; at bottom of page B. ipse AE; ipsum BCE. 10. divina deest BDE. 11. divina deest C. 13. cuiuslibet E. 18, 19. persona divina BCDE. 20. modi deest ABCD; ib. et deest D; ib. sed essencialiter D. 20—23. tunc — tunc deest AE. 25. dicentes deest ACDE. 24. Et ex opposito B; ib. corrupti ABCE. 27. magis D. 3o. forma D, ib. est 26. habeant C. 28. sit ABCE. seipsa ABCE; ib. igitur (1r) E. 32. et boni- 31. scilicet deest BCDE. tas C; ib. qua formatur BCD. 2. De Ideis. is the title of the last tractate but one of the second book of Wyclif's great philosophical work De Ente; the present tractate is in all probability later than that work. 4. The subject of Grosseteste's first letter is 'quid de hoc verbo sen- tenciam: Deus est prima forma et forma omnium? (Rob. Grosse- teste, Epistolae, Rolls Series, p. 1.)
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172 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. II. Three noteworthy points: (1) that Christ has taken Divine honours on Himself. (2) That any one assuming what he has no right to commits robbery; though in the case of Divine honours, only in intention. Et illum sensum plane innuit apostolus ad phi. 2° Phi. II, 6. ubi de Cristo nostro deo dicit: Qui cum in forma dei esset, non rapinam arbitratus est esse se equalem deo." Pro cuius intellectu sunt tria notanda; primum, quod apostolus supponit Cristum sepe assumpsisse honorem 5 divinum; ut patet in confessione Angelorum et hominum divinitatem eius clarificancium, in faccione miraculorum potestate ac virtute propria, et in multis subtilibus asser- cionibus in persona propria. Ex quibus palam sequitur ipsum esse deum: quia formaliter sequitur quod dedit 10 illi pater, maius omnibus est; ergo cui illud datur est verus deus. Et antecedens asseruit Cristus Judeis. Joh. 10°. Joh. X, Illud autem eternaliter datum est nomen super omne 29. nomen" de quo ad Phi. ubi supra. Ex quo nomine Phi. II, 9. apostolus arguit ipsum esse deum. Ad Hebreos 1°: Hebr. et Tanto melior angelis effectus est, quanto differencius Iprej I, 4. illis nomen hereditavit. Preter, secundo notandum quod quandocunque aliquis recipit vel usurpat sibi quod non est suum, invito domino, ista accepcio est rapina; ut si quis realiter acciperet 20 sibi divinos honores, sicud usurpare arbitratus est He- rodes (Actuum 12°) cui populus acclamabat dei voces, Act. sicud eciam faciet anticristus; ut patet 2a ad Thesaloni- XII, 22. 2. censes 2° ubi dicit quod 'in templo sedebit, ostendens Thess. se, tanquam ipse sit deus". Certum namque est quod II, 4. non potest esse de voluntate dei quod alius adoretur A 56* latria; quia Ysa. 42 scribitur, “Gloriam meam alteri Is. non dabo." Igitur, quicumque alius a deo arbitratur se XLII,8. esse latria colendum ut deum, arbitratur implicite ra- pinam; quia si talis vere haberet illum honorem, raperet 30 ipsum a deo, ipso invito, et per consequens, ipsum esse equalem deo est rapina. Taliter enim loquitur scriptura cum complexis; et patet quare dicit “arbitratus est", et non dicit quod non fecit rapinam" talem; quia notum This doctrine is confirmed by Holy Writ. 5. sic pro sepe A; sese BC: 1. Et secundum ACDE; ib. intendit D. sepe corr. sese E. 8. confitenciam BCE. 10. se ipsum BE. II. sibi pro illi AC; ib. magis ACDE ; ib. ille pro est BC. 16. anglus AC; ib. diucius D; ib. ibi D. ib. pre deest omnes M.S. 17 hereditabit D. 18. pr (pater?) ACDE; ib. quantumcunque ABCE. 19, 20. suo illa pro domino ista. 21. mores vel honores A; hnores vel hono'es C; ib. sic E. 23,24. timotheum D. 25. esset AC. 27. ysa deest C; ib. noname 2° D; ib. sequitur in marg. B. 28. Patet igitur quod BCE. 29. implicare C. 30. tunc BCDE; ib. reciperet ACE. 33. creberrime cum BDE; ib. creberrime after complexis C.
172 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. II. Three noteworthy points: (1) that Christ has taken Divine honours on Himself. (2) That any one assuming what he has no right to commits robbery; though in the case of Divine honours, only in intention. Et illum sensum plane innuit apostolus ad phi. 2° Phi. II, 6. ubi de Cristo nostro deo dicit: Qui cum in forma dei esset, non rapinam arbitratus est esse se equalem deo." Pro cuius intellectu sunt tria notanda; primum, quod apostolus supponit Cristum sepe assumpsisse honorem 5 divinum; ut patet in confessione Angelorum et hominum divinitatem eius clarificancium, in faccione miraculorum potestate ac virtute propria, et in multis subtilibus asser- cionibus in persona propria. Ex quibus palam sequitur ipsum esse deum: quia formaliter sequitur quod dedit 10 illi pater, maius omnibus est; ergo cui illud datur est verus deus. Et antecedens asseruit Cristus Judeis. Joh. 10°. Joh. X, Illud autem eternaliter datum est nomen super omne 29. nomen" de quo ad Phi. ubi supra. Ex quo nomine Phi. II, 9. apostolus arguit ipsum esse deum. Ad Hebreos 1°: Hebr. et Tanto melior angelis effectus est, quanto differencius Iprej I, 4. illis nomen hereditavit. Preter, secundo notandum quod quandocunque aliquis recipit vel usurpat sibi quod non est suum, invito domino, ista accepcio est rapina; ut si quis realiter acciperet 20 sibi divinos honores, sicud usurpare arbitratus est He- rodes (Actuum 12°) cui populus acclamabat dei voces, Act. sicud eciam faciet anticristus; ut patet 2a ad Thesaloni- XII, 22. 2. censes 2° ubi dicit quod 'in templo sedebit, ostendens Thess. se, tanquam ipse sit deus". Certum namque est quod II, 4. non potest esse de voluntate dei quod alius adoretur A 56* latria; quia Ysa. 42 scribitur, “Gloriam meam alteri Is. non dabo." Igitur, quicumque alius a deo arbitratur se XLII,8. esse latria colendum ut deum, arbitratur implicite ra- pinam; quia si talis vere haberet illum honorem, raperet 30 ipsum a deo, ipso invito, et per consequens, ipsum esse equalem deo est rapina. Taliter enim loquitur scriptura cum complexis; et patet quare dicit “arbitratus est", et non dicit quod non fecit rapinam" talem; quia notum This doctrine is confirmed by Holy Writ. 5. sic pro sepe A; sese BC: 1. Et secundum ACDE; ib. intendit D. sepe corr. sese E. 8. confitenciam BCE. 10. se ipsum BE. II. sibi pro illi AC; ib. magis ACDE ; ib. ille pro est BC. 16. anglus AC; ib. diucius D; ib. ibi D. ib. pre deest omnes M.S. 17 hereditabit D. 18. pr (pater?) ACDE; ib. quantumcunque ABCE. 19, 20. suo illa pro domino ista. 21. mores vel honores A; hnores vel hono'es C; ib. sic E. 23,24. timotheum D. 25. esset AC. 27. ysa deest C; ib. noname 2° D; ib. sequitur in marg. B. 28. Patet igitur quod BCE. 29. implicare C. 30. tunc BCDE; ib. reciperet ACE. 33. creberrime cum BDE; ib. creberrime after complexis C.
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DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 173 CAP. II. est cuilibet fideli quod nemo potest facere talem ra- pinam. Tercio, notandum est quod intencionis apostoli est probare Cristum non inplicasse rapinam honoris divini quem arbitratus est sibi attribui. Et antecedens ad hoc probandum est quod Cristus fuit in forma dei. Mos enim scripture et philosophorum est dicere quod aliquid est in forma data, quando ipsum est forma illa; ut ra- cionale mortale est in motu hoc (in labore, sanitate, 1o vel alia tali forma), quando ipsum est formaliter huius- modi. Sic eciam Cristus fuit in forma dei, id est, in deitate, cum fuit deus; ut apostolus ibi supponit. Ex quo formaliter sequitur quod, arbitrando sibi divinos honores, arbitratus est sibi solum illud attribui quod ex debito 15 fuit suum. Non ergo, ut sic, inplicuit rapinam, ut patet ex secundo notabili. Ex isto patet quod deitas est forma communis cuilibet trium personarum, quia aliter inefficaciter caperet apo- stolus Cristum fuisse in forma dei, ad probandum quod, 20 accipiendo et asserendo se esse equalem deo, accipit illud quod eternaliter necessario fuit suum, ut exposuit Augustinus super Joh. Omelia 48a. Sed advertendum quod, licet forma dei accipiatur but the word Form, applied communiter pro deitate vel essencia cuilibet harum trium to God, sometimes 25 personarum, tamen forma dei aliquando accipitur per- means the sonaliter, appropriate pro verbo. Sicut enim in creatura, Person of the Word. vestigiante trinitatem increatam, ex materia emanat forma As the form per efficaciam extrinseci, et ex eis constat tercium in emanates from matter, and quo finaliter quietantur, que omnia sunt una substancia terminates with it in the 30 (ut prius docebatur) sic infinito modo, nobis inenarabili, existence of the causatur ex patre ut sit filius ab intra et non ab ex- compound; so the Son trinseco agente, ut fit forma in materia. Filius igitur emanates from the Father, est verbum, diccio, vel forma, vel manifestacio creature who is to him as memory is to formose. Et hinc doctores dicunt patrem, non memoriam the knowledge which it Deity is therefore common to the whole Trinity ; (3) That if Christ assumed Divine honours to which He had a right, He really was God. 3. intencio C; intenciones AC; ib. sunt A. 5. adhuc D. 8. for- maliter E. 9. ho = homo pro hoc BCE. 11. et pro id est ACDE. 18. harum trium BCD. 12. scripsit A. 16. nol A. 17. cuinslibet C 19. at assumendum D. 20. et asserendo deest D; ib. accepit E; acci- peret AE. 21. exponit BD. 22. 49° D; 98a ? E. 23—25. forma dei — forma dei deest C. 27. que est vestigium trinitatis increate BDE; ib. ex intra A; ib. emanans C. 29. quietatur CE; ib. una substancie D); sunt pro substancia E. 30. post docebitur BCDE; ib. infinitum A. 31. expresse AC. 33. est deest AC. 34. hic B; ib. per DE; ib. mam (materiam?) ABDE; materiam (full) C.
DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 173 CAP. II. est cuilibet fideli quod nemo potest facere talem ra- pinam. Tercio, notandum est quod intencionis apostoli est probare Cristum non inplicasse rapinam honoris divini quem arbitratus est sibi attribui. Et antecedens ad hoc probandum est quod Cristus fuit in forma dei. Mos enim scripture et philosophorum est dicere quod aliquid est in forma data, quando ipsum est forma illa; ut ra- cionale mortale est in motu hoc (in labore, sanitate, 1o vel alia tali forma), quando ipsum est formaliter huius- modi. Sic eciam Cristus fuit in forma dei, id est, in deitate, cum fuit deus; ut apostolus ibi supponit. Ex quo formaliter sequitur quod, arbitrando sibi divinos honores, arbitratus est sibi solum illud attribui quod ex debito 15 fuit suum. Non ergo, ut sic, inplicuit rapinam, ut patet ex secundo notabili. Ex isto patet quod deitas est forma communis cuilibet trium personarum, quia aliter inefficaciter caperet apo- stolus Cristum fuisse in forma dei, ad probandum quod, 20 accipiendo et asserendo se esse equalem deo, accipit illud quod eternaliter necessario fuit suum, ut exposuit Augustinus super Joh. Omelia 48a. Sed advertendum quod, licet forma dei accipiatur but the word Form, applied communiter pro deitate vel essencia cuilibet harum trium to God, sometimes 25 personarum, tamen forma dei aliquando accipitur per- means the sonaliter, appropriate pro verbo. Sicut enim in creatura, Person of the Word. vestigiante trinitatem increatam, ex materia emanat forma As the form per efficaciam extrinseci, et ex eis constat tercium in emanates from matter, and quo finaliter quietantur, que omnia sunt una substancia terminates with it in the 30 (ut prius docebatur) sic infinito modo, nobis inenarabili, existence of the causatur ex patre ut sit filius ab intra et non ab ex- compound; so the Son trinseco agente, ut fit forma in materia. Filius igitur emanates from the Father, est verbum, diccio, vel forma, vel manifestacio creature who is to him as memory is to formose. Et hinc doctores dicunt patrem, non memoriam the knowledge which it Deity is therefore common to the whole Trinity ; (3) That if Christ assumed Divine honours to which He had a right, He really was God. 3. intencio C; intenciones AC; ib. sunt A. 5. adhuc D. 8. for- maliter E. 9. ho = homo pro hoc BCE. 11. et pro id est ACDE. 18. harum trium BCD. 12. scripsit A. 16. nol A. 17. cuinslibet C 19. at assumendum D. 20. et asserendo deest D; ib. accepit E; acci- peret AE. 21. exponit BD. 22. 49° D; 98a ? E. 23—25. forma dei — forma dei deest C. 27. que est vestigium trinitatis increate BDE; ib. ex intra A; ib. emanans C. 29. quietatur CE; ib. una substancie D); sunt pro substancia E. 30. post docebitur BCDE; ib. infinitum A. 31. expresse AC. 33. est deest AC. 34. hic B; ib. per DE; ib. mam (materiam?) ABDE; materiam (full) C.
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JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. II. 174 engenders; and sed ut memoriam. Vocant eum tamen memoriam ac- the Holy Spirit tualissimam, semper gignentem actu sapienciam vel connects them both in One noticiam sibi parem; et illa est filius; et in spiritu Essence. sancto, qui est nexus amborum, consistit quoad per- sonalem produccionem ad intra; sicud ex composicione 5 materie cum forma terminatur creata essencia. Iste autem ] tres res omnino in deo sunt sic pares, ut sint A 563 penitus eadem essencia, ut alias declaratum est. Confirmation of Isti autem sensui alludit apostolus ad Rom. 11° dicens Rom. this from texts �Quoniam ex ipso (quoad patrem), et per ipsum (quo-XI, 36. of Scripture. Grosseteste, ad filium), et in ipso (quoad spiritum sanctum) sunt therefore, says that God is an omnia)". Et hic vocat apostolus deum verbum “splen- eternal, dorem patris" et figuram substancie eius", ad Hebr. 1°. absolute Form, in this following Habito isto quod deus est eternaliter forma absoluta, Augustine. declarat lincolniensis (ubi supra) quod deus est exem- plaris forma cuiuslibet creatura: Si queris", inquit, quid movet me ad ponendum deum esse formam, re- spondeo quod magna magni Augustini auctoritas." Et allegat ad hoc tria dicta Augustini, quorum primum est libero arbitrio, capitulo 2°, ubi diffuse declarat 20 Augustinus quod oportet omnem creaturam formari forma incomunicabili et eterna. Secundum dictum est Augu- stini, 11° de confessione, cap. 32°; et tercium est 13° cap. ubi plane docet dictam conclusionem, sicud et lincol- niensis, triplici racione. Sed quia diversi sunt, insensibilia 25 non potentes concipere, alii autem laborant in equi- vocacione vel anologia huius nominis, forma: ideo declarat differenciam inter formam exemplarem et formam intrinsecam, partem qualitativam formati. Dicitur enim primo forma, exemplar ad quod respicit artifex, ut ad 30 eius imitacionem vel similitudinem formet suum arti- ficium, sicut pes ligneus ad quem respicit sutor, ut A form is the pattern which the artificer follows in making anything; and this sense is frequent in Scripture. Hebr. I, 3. 15 1. meoria A; mam above B; memoriam C. 2. propter pro semper AD; ib. cognoscentem ADE. 4. est deest C; ib. existit A; ib. quantum ad pro quoad BD. 7. omnia D. 7, 8. sint penitus deest AC; ut sic D. 12. dictum pro deum CE. 13. eius 11, 12. sunt omnia deest ACE. deest AC. 14. absolute BC. 17. probandum AD. 18. magni deest D ; ib. eciam E. 20. est deest ABC; ib. 8° B; 18° AC. 22. est deest AC. 24. plato (plo) pro 23. 5° BD; XI, 5° above E; ib. ca° 2° BCD; p'o E. plane C. 25. d3 A. 28. declarare A; declaratur differencia C. 32. poligres pro pes ligneus ABCDE. 23. Aug. Confessions. 1. XI, 30, and 1. XIII, 2. Grosseteste 32. Pes ligneus. Nothing can be gives no other references. made of the abbreviation; yet it evidently stands for pes lig- neus. See De Ente predicamentali, p. 261, 1. 20—22; and Intr. XXII.
JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. II. 174 engenders; and sed ut memoriam. Vocant eum tamen memoriam ac- the Holy Spirit tualissimam, semper gignentem actu sapienciam vel connects them both in One noticiam sibi parem; et illa est filius; et in spiritu Essence. sancto, qui est nexus amborum, consistit quoad per- sonalem produccionem ad intra; sicud ex composicione 5 materie cum forma terminatur creata essencia. Iste autem ] tres res omnino in deo sunt sic pares, ut sint A 563 penitus eadem essencia, ut alias declaratum est. Confirmation of Isti autem sensui alludit apostolus ad Rom. 11° dicens Rom. this from texts �Quoniam ex ipso (quoad patrem), et per ipsum (quo-XI, 36. of Scripture. Grosseteste, ad filium), et in ipso (quoad spiritum sanctum) sunt therefore, says that God is an omnia)". Et hic vocat apostolus deum verbum “splen- eternal, dorem patris" et figuram substancie eius", ad Hebr. 1°. absolute Form, in this following Habito isto quod deus est eternaliter forma absoluta, Augustine. declarat lincolniensis (ubi supra) quod deus est exem- plaris forma cuiuslibet creatura: Si queris", inquit, quid movet me ad ponendum deum esse formam, re- spondeo quod magna magni Augustini auctoritas." Et allegat ad hoc tria dicta Augustini, quorum primum est libero arbitrio, capitulo 2°, ubi diffuse declarat 20 Augustinus quod oportet omnem creaturam formari forma incomunicabili et eterna. Secundum dictum est Augu- stini, 11° de confessione, cap. 32°; et tercium est 13° cap. ubi plane docet dictam conclusionem, sicud et lincol- niensis, triplici racione. Sed quia diversi sunt, insensibilia 25 non potentes concipere, alii autem laborant in equi- vocacione vel anologia huius nominis, forma: ideo declarat differenciam inter formam exemplarem et formam intrinsecam, partem qualitativam formati. Dicitur enim primo forma, exemplar ad quod respicit artifex, ut ad 30 eius imitacionem vel similitudinem formet suum arti- ficium, sicut pes ligneus ad quem respicit sutor, ut A form is the pattern which the artificer follows in making anything; and this sense is frequent in Scripture. Hebr. I, 3. 15 1. meoria A; mam above B; memoriam C. 2. propter pro semper AD; ib. cognoscentem ADE. 4. est deest C; ib. existit A; ib. quantum ad pro quoad BD. 7. omnia D. 7, 8. sint penitus deest AC; ut sic D. 12. dictum pro deum CE. 13. eius 11, 12. sunt omnia deest ACE. deest AC. 14. absolute BC. 17. probandum AD. 18. magni deest D ; ib. eciam E. 20. est deest ABC; ib. 8° B; 18° AC. 22. est deest AC. 24. plato (plo) pro 23. 5° BD; XI, 5° above E; ib. ca° 2° BCD; p'o E. plane C. 25. d3 A. 28. declarare A; declaratur differencia C. 32. poligres pro pes ligneus ABCDE. 23. Aug. Confessions. 1. XI, 30, and 1. XIII, 2. Grosseteste 32. Pes ligneus. Nothing can be gives no other references. made of the abbreviation; yet it evidently stands for pes lig- neus. See De Ente predicamentali, p. 261, 1. 20—22; and Intr. XXII.
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Thess. 1,6, 17 CAP. II. DE MATERIA ET FORMA. secundum ipsum formet soleam, dicitur forma solee; et sic vita bonorum ad cuius similitudinem mores vite nostre formamus, dicitur nobis forma vivendi, ut patet ad philippenses. 39: ''/mitatores mei estote fratres, et 5 observate eos qui ita ambulant, sicut habetis formam nostram;" et prima ad thesalonicenses, 1° comendat eos in hec verba, **Et vos imitatores facti estis domini ac- sitis in omnibus credentibus in Macedonia.” Et idem 10 patet prime Petri. 5° “forma facti gregis ex animo". Non I Petr. jgitur est extraneum a scriptura exemplar tale vocare more closely to 92e 2 formam exemplandi. Quod si dictum exemplar habet cum dictis condicionibus exemplandi formam concavitati inversam (ut sigillum), vel formam convexitati eversam 5 (ut exemplar campane), vel alterius sensibilis per cuius applicacionem capit essenciam artificialem, tunc verius format exemplar exemplati talis. Ex istis ymaginacionibus ad invisibilia ascendendo, capiet intellectus totam universitatem creatam esse aquam fluidissimam, que cito flueret | in nichilum, si ab arte summi artificis et opificis desisteret sustentari. Intelige ergo deum opificem esse idem essencialiter cum sua arte, illabi in intima cuiuslibet creature, pura voluntate creantem totam universitatem quam induit secundum 5 exemplaria sue artis, et non deserit, sed manet continue eis illapsu, conservans omnem creaturam in sua essencia, tam quoad formas substanciales quam eciam acciden- tales ab arte exemplante continue dependentes; et facit eas continue suo exemplari finaliter innitentes; sic, in- 3oquam, trinitas increata penetrat exemplariter quamlibet creaturam in pulcerima statura, mensura et pondere, ut dicit Augustinus (49 super Genesi ad literam) et alii doctores concorditer exponunt, et notata materia de 2. est exemplar ad C; í£» marg. E. 3. patet deest AC. 4. mci deest. ACD. 5. observatores C; ib. eos deest C. 6. vestram CD. 7, 8. excipletes A; corr. above B; cxcipientes C. n. gregi ABCD. 12. exa! D; ib. dictum deest ABCE. 14. immersam DE; ib. immer- sam D. 16. res execuam pro essenciam artificialem BD; sb. tc A. 17. foret ABDE; ib. etc. pro talis B; deest CE. 21. artiticis deest D ; ib. et deest CD; ib. Intelliget B. — 22. 2° DC; sb. dictum BC; ib. esse deest BCDE; ib. eundem D. — 36. illapsum C; illapsus BD; ib. existencia CD. 27. before accidentales ad formas C. ^ 29. eos C. 3o. principiat et exemplat BD. 31. pulceria A; pulcerrimo numero BD; ib. statura deest è 32. dicit deest ACD; ib. supra Genesim D. — 33. nota D; voca- tur (quite plain) C; ib. ante pro materia A. “cipientes verbum in multa tribulacione, ut forma facti 175 And as this pattern or model approaches the form of the thing which is to be, the greater is its perfection. Imagine the created Universe as a fluid that by itself would at once flow away to nothingness, an the Artificer of all, present in all creatures, shaping them according to His art, and continuously upholdin them, so that the Trinity penetrates everything, giving it size, beauty, measure and weight.
Thess. 1,6, 17 CAP. II. DE MATERIA ET FORMA. secundum ipsum formet soleam, dicitur forma solee; et sic vita bonorum ad cuius similitudinem mores vite nostre formamus, dicitur nobis forma vivendi, ut patet ad philippenses. 39: ''/mitatores mei estote fratres, et 5 observate eos qui ita ambulant, sicut habetis formam nostram;" et prima ad thesalonicenses, 1° comendat eos in hec verba, **Et vos imitatores facti estis domini ac- sitis in omnibus credentibus in Macedonia.” Et idem 10 patet prime Petri. 5° “forma facti gregis ex animo". Non I Petr. jgitur est extraneum a scriptura exemplar tale vocare more closely to 92e 2 formam exemplandi. Quod si dictum exemplar habet cum dictis condicionibus exemplandi formam concavitati inversam (ut sigillum), vel formam convexitati eversam 5 (ut exemplar campane), vel alterius sensibilis per cuius applicacionem capit essenciam artificialem, tunc verius format exemplar exemplati talis. Ex istis ymaginacionibus ad invisibilia ascendendo, capiet intellectus totam universitatem creatam esse aquam fluidissimam, que cito flueret | in nichilum, si ab arte summi artificis et opificis desisteret sustentari. Intelige ergo deum opificem esse idem essencialiter cum sua arte, illabi in intima cuiuslibet creature, pura voluntate creantem totam universitatem quam induit secundum 5 exemplaria sue artis, et non deserit, sed manet continue eis illapsu, conservans omnem creaturam in sua essencia, tam quoad formas substanciales quam eciam acciden- tales ab arte exemplante continue dependentes; et facit eas continue suo exemplari finaliter innitentes; sic, in- 3oquam, trinitas increata penetrat exemplariter quamlibet creaturam in pulcerima statura, mensura et pondere, ut dicit Augustinus (49 super Genesi ad literam) et alii doctores concorditer exponunt, et notata materia de 2. est exemplar ad C; í£» marg. E. 3. patet deest AC. 4. mci deest. ACD. 5. observatores C; ib. eos deest C. 6. vestram CD. 7, 8. excipletes A; corr. above B; cxcipientes C. n. gregi ABCD. 12. exa! D; ib. dictum deest ABCE. 14. immersam DE; ib. immer- sam D. 16. res execuam pro essenciam artificialem BD; sb. tc A. 17. foret ABDE; ib. etc. pro talis B; deest CE. 21. artiticis deest D ; ib. et deest CD; ib. Intelliget B. — 22. 2° DC; sb. dictum BC; ib. esse deest BCDE; ib. eundem D. — 36. illapsum C; illapsus BD; ib. existencia CD. 27. before accidentales ad formas C. ^ 29. eos C. 3o. principiat et exemplat BD. 31. pulceria A; pulcerrimo numero BD; ib. statura deest è 32. dicit deest ACD; ib. supra Genesim D. — 33. nota D; voca- tur (quite plain) C; ib. ante pro materia A. “cipientes verbum in multa tribulacione, ut forma facti 175 And as this pattern or model approaches the form of the thing which is to be, the greater is its perfection. Imagine the created Universe as a fluid that by itself would at once flow away to nothingness, an the Artificer of all, present in all creatures, shaping them according to His art, and continuously upholdin them, so that the Trinity penetrates everything, giving it size, beauty, measure and weight.
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176 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. III. Thus God is not only a Form in Himself, but also as forming all that is good and beautiful in His creatures. Aristotle and Averrhoes agree in ascribing all actions primarily to the First Form of all. y deis; quoniam oportet creaturam procedere in existen- ciam conformiter exemplaribus tam increatis quam non increatis. Et patet quod deus nedum est essencialiter vel per- sonaliter forma secundum quam intrinsecus est formosus, 5 sed exemplar formans extrinsecus et efficiens formositatem cuiuslibet creature. Unde, in hoc concordati sunt philo- sophus et commentator; septimo methaphysice commento 9°, dicit quod acciones formarum provenient ab accione prime forme que non est in materia, et est primus 10 motor; et (libro 12° commento 37) dividit commentator formas in substanciales et accidentales; substanciales autem dividit in materiales et inmateriales; et in hoc genere formarum inmaterialium, inquit commentator, collocantur, ut animatum et desideratum. 15 CAPITULUM TERCIUM. Restat consequenter tractare de formis mediis, scilicet, de formis substancialibus creaturarum. Patet autem ex dictis quod quelibet huiusmodi forma substancialis est forma intrinseca substancie create, qua est formaliter id 20 quod est. Quamvis, extensive loquendo de substancia, quodlibet per se existens in genere posset dici aliquid et substancia (ut patebit posterius); tamen, propter ano- loycam famositatem, suppono intencionem substancie As all creatures restringi ad res per se in primo genere. Sicud enim 25 depend on God, so all tota universitas creaturarum inheret ipsi deo, et respectu accidents depend on their sui pocius dicitur entis quam ens, sic tota universitas substances, both as to being generum accidencium inheret cathegorice substancie, et and as to being non dicuntur encia, nisi quia sunt modi entis a quo known. sustentantur in existencia et intelleccione, ut patet 30 We now deal with substantia forms. A substance, in a wide sense, 1s any self- existent thing; but we restrict it here to generic self- existence. 1. quando ADE; qm = quoniam BC; ib. existenciam creature ABDE. 2. conformibus BDE; a formis BDE. 2—3. tam creatis quam in creatis C. 6. exemplariter C. 7, 8 philosophi et commentatores ABE. 9. ad 14. commentator deest A. 15. etc. sequitur aliud accionem ACE. capitolum C. . 16. in fine cap. Buh Wssudy in red ink A; cap. deest A; initial R in red ink ABE. 22. quelibet ABE; quomodolibet C: ib. ali- 24. substanciam AE. 25. re- quod C. 23. ut deest AD; ib. patet C. stringenti D ; ib. proprio B. 26. ipsi deest BD. 27. dicit D. 28. cathe- gorie B. 29. quia nisi ABCDE. 25. Primo genere. The first genus of the Categories is Sub- stance, as distinguished from the nine genera of accidents. God though self-existent, does not belong to a genus, nor underlie accidents.
176 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. III. Thus God is not only a Form in Himself, but also as forming all that is good and beautiful in His creatures. Aristotle and Averrhoes agree in ascribing all actions primarily to the First Form of all. y deis; quoniam oportet creaturam procedere in existen- ciam conformiter exemplaribus tam increatis quam non increatis. Et patet quod deus nedum est essencialiter vel per- sonaliter forma secundum quam intrinsecus est formosus, 5 sed exemplar formans extrinsecus et efficiens formositatem cuiuslibet creature. Unde, in hoc concordati sunt philo- sophus et commentator; septimo methaphysice commento 9°, dicit quod acciones formarum provenient ab accione prime forme que non est in materia, et est primus 10 motor; et (libro 12° commento 37) dividit commentator formas in substanciales et accidentales; substanciales autem dividit in materiales et inmateriales; et in hoc genere formarum inmaterialium, inquit commentator, collocantur, ut animatum et desideratum. 15 CAPITULUM TERCIUM. Restat consequenter tractare de formis mediis, scilicet, de formis substancialibus creaturarum. Patet autem ex dictis quod quelibet huiusmodi forma substancialis est forma intrinseca substancie create, qua est formaliter id 20 quod est. Quamvis, extensive loquendo de substancia, quodlibet per se existens in genere posset dici aliquid et substancia (ut patebit posterius); tamen, propter ano- loycam famositatem, suppono intencionem substancie As all creatures restringi ad res per se in primo genere. Sicud enim 25 depend on God, so all tota universitas creaturarum inheret ipsi deo, et respectu accidents depend on their sui pocius dicitur entis quam ens, sic tota universitas substances, both as to being generum accidencium inheret cathegorice substancie, et and as to being non dicuntur encia, nisi quia sunt modi entis a quo known. sustentantur in existencia et intelleccione, ut patet 30 We now deal with substantia forms. A substance, in a wide sense, 1s any self- existent thing; but we restrict it here to generic self- existence. 1. quando ADE; qm = quoniam BC; ib. existenciam creature ABDE. 2. conformibus BDE; a formis BDE. 2—3. tam creatis quam in creatis C. 6. exemplariter C. 7, 8 philosophi et commentatores ABE. 9. ad 14. commentator deest A. 15. etc. sequitur aliud accionem ACE. capitolum C. . 16. in fine cap. Buh Wssudy in red ink A; cap. deest A; initial R in red ink ABE. 22. quelibet ABE; quomodolibet C: ib. ali- 24. substanciam AE. 25. re- quod C. 23. ut deest AD; ib. patet C. stringenti D ; ib. proprio B. 26. ipsi deest BD. 27. dicit D. 28. cathe- gorie B. 29. quia nisi ABCDE. 25. Primo genere. The first genus of the Categories is Sub- stance, as distinguished from the nine genera of accidents. God though self-existent, does not belong to a genus, nor underlie accidents.
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CAP. III. DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 177 7° Methaphysice; quia nec deus nec creatura posset ipsa intelligere, nisi cointellecta substancia. Ideo vere Thus substance precedes dicit philosophus (in eodem) quod substancia est nobis prior accident (1) as to the accidente cognicione quiditativa, cum nemo cognoscat knowledge of its whatness, 5 quid sit accidens, nisi prius cognoscat quomodo sub- (2) as to its stancia est modificata; prior diffinicione loyca, cum logical definition, and oportet, specificando substancias accidentis, capere signi- (3) in time, at ficacionem specialem per quam unum accidens differt least as regards some particular a reliqua (nec est ista prioritas solum naturalis, sed accidents. 10 temporalis; quamvis noticia, si est de accidentibus, sit nobis prior in tempore; vel posset dici quod substancia est prior cognicione nature ipso accidente, et hoc nature A 57° prime, que cognoscit omnia sicut sunt; et sic substancia diffinicione qualificatur in suis generibus et differenciis). 15 Et tercio, quotcunque significata, cum tota multitudine suorum accidencium, oportet tamen temporaliter pre- cedere illam multitudinem, saltem secundum aliquod singulare; et iste sensus, sive fuerit philosophi, sive non, est tamen philosophicus, quia primo est res in cognicione 20 nature, secundo in suo genere (et per consequens in sua diffinicione) ac tercio in suis accidentibus, ut suc- cessiva transmutacione; et istis tribus modis precedet substancia accidens ordinate. Est autem duplex forma substancialis: vel pure per se There are two kinds of 25 stans, sive natura alia subiectante; ut substancie quoad substantial forms ; one molem indivisibiles et intelligibiles quoad operacionem, self-subsistent que sunt creature deo proxime, quas philosophi ab and requiring no subject to innata accione vocant intelligencias, et nostri ab officio sustain it ; these are vocant eos angelos, quoniam oportet hoc supponere. creatures very 30 Iste autem, cum sint formaliter substancie, non habent nigh to God, called Intelligences by 5. est D; ib. agnoscat B. n 4. agnoscat B. 3. nobis est C. 6. est accidentaliter B; accidente DE. 7.8. substanciam BCD. 11. prima B; ib. possit C. 13. pure pro prime BCD; ib. sic substancia deest ABCE. 14. diffinicione deest ABCE; ib. que limitantur ACE: qua limitantur B; ib. generibus deest AC. 15. quecunque C; ib. si'gta A. 16. spe- cialiter pro temporaliter AE. 20. ne 19. phific9 D. 18. sinre A. or re = racione: A. 24. 95 = complex D. 26. passionem pro opera- cionem ACE. 29. eas B. 18. Substance cannot be without any accidents, nor an accident without a substance; but the former may be without this or that particular accident at a certain time. 29. Supponere. From this point, the collation of E has been done very rapidly Though it is one of the best MSS., yet, coming after so many others, its variants are less important. Still, as there was the chance that a whole paragraph might be wanting in all the other MSS, E had to be looked through. 12
CAP. III. DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 177 7° Methaphysice; quia nec deus nec creatura posset ipsa intelligere, nisi cointellecta substancia. Ideo vere Thus substance precedes dicit philosophus (in eodem) quod substancia est nobis prior accident (1) as to the accidente cognicione quiditativa, cum nemo cognoscat knowledge of its whatness, 5 quid sit accidens, nisi prius cognoscat quomodo sub- (2) as to its stancia est modificata; prior diffinicione loyca, cum logical definition, and oportet, specificando substancias accidentis, capere signi- (3) in time, at ficacionem specialem per quam unum accidens differt least as regards some particular a reliqua (nec est ista prioritas solum naturalis, sed accidents. 10 temporalis; quamvis noticia, si est de accidentibus, sit nobis prior in tempore; vel posset dici quod substancia est prior cognicione nature ipso accidente, et hoc nature A 57° prime, que cognoscit omnia sicut sunt; et sic substancia diffinicione qualificatur in suis generibus et differenciis). 15 Et tercio, quotcunque significata, cum tota multitudine suorum accidencium, oportet tamen temporaliter pre- cedere illam multitudinem, saltem secundum aliquod singulare; et iste sensus, sive fuerit philosophi, sive non, est tamen philosophicus, quia primo est res in cognicione 20 nature, secundo in suo genere (et per consequens in sua diffinicione) ac tercio in suis accidentibus, ut suc- cessiva transmutacione; et istis tribus modis precedet substancia accidens ordinate. Est autem duplex forma substancialis: vel pure per se There are two kinds of 25 stans, sive natura alia subiectante; ut substancie quoad substantial forms ; one molem indivisibiles et intelligibiles quoad operacionem, self-subsistent que sunt creature deo proxime, quas philosophi ab and requiring no subject to innata accione vocant intelligencias, et nostri ab officio sustain it ; these are vocant eos angelos, quoniam oportet hoc supponere. creatures very 30 Iste autem, cum sint formaliter substancie, non habent nigh to God, called Intelligences by 5. est D; ib. agnoscat B. n 4. agnoscat B. 3. nobis est C. 6. est accidentaliter B; accidente DE. 7.8. substanciam BCD. 11. prima B; ib. possit C. 13. pure pro prime BCD; ib. sic substancia deest ABCE. 14. diffinicione deest ABCE; ib. que limitantur ACE: qua limitantur B; ib. generibus deest AC. 15. quecunque C; ib. si'gta A. 16. spe- cialiter pro temporaliter AE. 20. ne 19. phific9 D. 18. sinre A. or re = racione: A. 24. 95 = complex D. 26. passionem pro opera- cionem ACE. 29. eas B. 18. Substance cannot be without any accidents, nor an accident without a substance; but the former may be without this or that particular accident at a certain time. 29. Supponere. From this point, the collation of E has been done very rapidly Though it is one of the best MSS., yet, coming after so many others, its variants are less important. Still, as there was the chance that a whole paragraph might be wanting in all the other MSS, E had to be looked through. 12
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178 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. III. potenciam ad actum tanquam duas naturas, sed sunt philosophers, on account of forme pure in abstracto quibus sunt formaliter id quod their innate activity of sunt; ut patet ex dictis. Unde Avicebron et alii, volentes thought, and ipsas et quamlibet creaturam componi ex materia spiri- by us Angels, because of their office. tuali et forma sibi proporcionata, equivocant in signis.5 But it is an Nam verum est quod quelibet creatura habet posse ex error to suppose quo producitur in existencia creature; quod quidem with Avicebron that they are posse, cum sit eternum et absolute necessarium, est composed of a spiritual matter natura divina, per consequens cum nulla creatura com- and form; it is true that they ponens, sed esse intelligibili creature correspondens. Non 10 are made up of igitur propter illud posse dicitur creatura esse ex duabus possibility and actuality of naturis; nec sortitur idem posse digne nomen materie: existence; but sed est in existencia creature corporee fundamentum this possibility is purely ideal, quoddam posse temporale propinquum, ex quo potest and is one with fieri aliquod corporeum, generacione vel specie trans- the Divine Essence. mutativum nature prioris; et illud posse vocatur materia Whereas matter de qua locuntur philosophi, ut patet posterius. Unde, is a corporeal quia corpus celeste non est expertum esse in potencia, potentiality apt to be ut ex eius transmutacione cedat secundum naturam in transmuted in many ways ; corpus alterius speciei, inventi sunt philosophi ponere 20 which made Averrhoës say ipsum puram formam, et non componi ipsum ex materia that the heavens et forma, ut oportet corpora sublunaria. Et hinc com- are not of matter, because mentator, in suo libello de substancia orbis, dicit quod not transmutable; subiectum celi non est dignum sortiri nomen materie. this is false. Certum est tamen quod omnis substancia corporea com-25 It is also false that, form being ponitur ex materia et forma; quia omnis talis existencia correlative with naturaliter prius existit, antequam sit in tali vel tali matter, these Intelligences are specle; ut patebit posterius. Nec moveat quod intelli- not forms. gencia non est forma, eo quod ipsa est inmaterialis, et forma dicitur relative ad formatam materiam. Nam 30 falsum assumitur, cum forma dicitur simpliciter relative ad formatum ut causa ad causatum, aut materia ad materiatum; cum deus absolute et necessitate est forma, sicud essencia sui ipsius. Angeli autem exemplariter formantur a Deo, et intrinsece a se ipsis, cum eadem 35 indivisibilis natura sit forma et formatum. Nec sequitur Nor are they formed by themselves, except as a figure of speech the form and that which is formed being identical. 15 1. nec A; ib. sic AC. 4. et deest AC. 6. talis pro quelibet AB. 7. in deest C; ib. existenciam AB. 9. et per B; ib. cu pro cum A. 10. vite pro intelligibile A. 11. esse deest; a gap B. 12. forter A; ib. illud B; ib. after materie, sut A. 13. est deest D; ib. fundatum ABC. 15. vel substancie vel speciei pro generacione vel specie A; generacione vel deest BC. 22. corruptibilia D. 25, 26. componatur B. 26. essencia B. 28. ut deest A; ib. patet BC; ut p9 ps D. 29. cum forma AB. 30. formatum A. 30—32, formatam — formatum deest A. 33. cum deest ACD; ib. necessario B. 36. natura deest A.
178 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. III. potenciam ad actum tanquam duas naturas, sed sunt philosophers, on account of forme pure in abstracto quibus sunt formaliter id quod their innate activity of sunt; ut patet ex dictis. Unde Avicebron et alii, volentes thought, and ipsas et quamlibet creaturam componi ex materia spiri- by us Angels, because of their office. tuali et forma sibi proporcionata, equivocant in signis.5 But it is an Nam verum est quod quelibet creatura habet posse ex error to suppose quo producitur in existencia creature; quod quidem with Avicebron that they are posse, cum sit eternum et absolute necessarium, est composed of a spiritual matter natura divina, per consequens cum nulla creatura com- and form; it is true that they ponens, sed esse intelligibili creature correspondens. Non 10 are made up of igitur propter illud posse dicitur creatura esse ex duabus possibility and actuality of naturis; nec sortitur idem posse digne nomen materie: existence; but sed est in existencia creature corporee fundamentum this possibility is purely ideal, quoddam posse temporale propinquum, ex quo potest and is one with fieri aliquod corporeum, generacione vel specie trans- the Divine Essence. mutativum nature prioris; et illud posse vocatur materia Whereas matter de qua locuntur philosophi, ut patet posterius. Unde, is a corporeal quia corpus celeste non est expertum esse in potencia, potentiality apt to be ut ex eius transmutacione cedat secundum naturam in transmuted in many ways ; corpus alterius speciei, inventi sunt philosophi ponere 20 which made Averrhoës say ipsum puram formam, et non componi ipsum ex materia that the heavens et forma, ut oportet corpora sublunaria. Et hinc com- are not of matter, because mentator, in suo libello de substancia orbis, dicit quod not transmutable; subiectum celi non est dignum sortiri nomen materie. this is false. Certum est tamen quod omnis substancia corporea com-25 It is also false that, form being ponitur ex materia et forma; quia omnis talis existencia correlative with naturaliter prius existit, antequam sit in tali vel tali matter, these Intelligences are specle; ut patebit posterius. Nec moveat quod intelli- not forms. gencia non est forma, eo quod ipsa est inmaterialis, et forma dicitur relative ad formatam materiam. Nam 30 falsum assumitur, cum forma dicitur simpliciter relative ad formatum ut causa ad causatum, aut materia ad materiatum; cum deus absolute et necessitate est forma, sicud essencia sui ipsius. Angeli autem exemplariter formantur a Deo, et intrinsece a se ipsis, cum eadem 35 indivisibilis natura sit forma et formatum. Nec sequitur Nor are they formed by themselves, except as a figure of speech the form and that which is formed being identical. 15 1. nec A; ib. sic AC. 4. et deest AC. 6. talis pro quelibet AB. 7. in deest C; ib. existenciam AB. 9. et per B; ib. cu pro cum A. 10. vite pro intelligibile A. 11. esse deest; a gap B. 12. forter A; ib. illud B; ib. after materie, sut A. 13. est deest D; ib. fundatum ABC. 15. vel substancie vel speciei pro generacione vel specie A; generacione vel deest BC. 22. corruptibilia D. 25, 26. componatur B. 26. essencia B. 28. ut deest A; ib. patet BC; ut p9 ps D. 29. cum forma AB. 30. formatum A. 30—32, formatam — formatum deest A. 33. cum deest ACD; ib. necessario B. 36. natura deest A.
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CAP. III. DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 179 ex hoc quod idem causat se; sicud non sequitur: natura dei est deus, igitur deus causat se etc.] Sunt enim talia intransitive intelligenda: "essencia, bonitas, vel inmensitas dei est deus"; quiditas vel diffinicio hominis est homo". 5 Et sic de ceteris. Habito ergo quod quelibet intelligencia sit forma As to corporeal forms, they are essencialis, restat discutere de forma nature corporee, that by which anything is quam commentator, 1° Physicorum, vocat partem quali- essentially tnat tativam; et patet ex dictis quod quelibet substancia which it is. 10 corporea habet talem formam, eo quod formaliter est in specie predicata in eo quod quid est; et per con- sequens habet universalem singulariter, per quam est formaliter id quod est; et illa est forma ex descripcione superius proposita: ut ignis datus est formaliter ignis 15 igneitate quadam, lapis lapiditate, et sic de aliis. Talibus enim, propter eorum latenciam, non sunt specialia nomina inposita; ideo licitum est philosophis fingere nomina a concretis substancialibus, sicud faciunt: ut patet per Ursonem, aphorismo ultimo, et alios recte philoso- 20 phantes de formis substancialibus. Et plane patet quod oportet omnem philosophum rectilogum ponere talem formam. Nam nullus negabit quin datum individuum sit aer vel ferrum vel planta, aut aliud huiusmodi. Et ultra non negabit sapiens logicam vel metaphysicam 25 quin tale individuum sit essencialiter et per se et non accidentaliter aer vel ferrum vel planta vel aliud huius- modi. Ex quo patet quod ipsum esse aerem, ferrum, etc., sit substanciale; et ista veritas est forma quam ponunt philosophi. Ergo talis forma substancialis est ponenda. 30 Et patet quanto philosophi moderni difficultent iuvenes incipientes philosophari, fingendo quod forma substan- cialis sit una res potens per se existere coniuncta cum Thus a given fire is fire by its gneity, a stone is a stone by its stoniness, and so on ; for we may coin abstract words out of concrete ones ad libitum to name the form of each thing. For any individual being must be air or iron, &c.; and its being air &c., is acrity, which is its form. A 583 The fiction of a form which exists in combination with matter, making a 2. etc. deest BD. 9. tractatis B1); ib. dictis in marg. B. 12. uni- versalia AB; unam C; ib. singularem D; ib. que pro per quam AB; formam qua pro per quam C. 13. inquid A; id quid B; forma in 18. cunctis AB; ib. marg. B; ib. et illa et ista C. 11. posita C. sicud ACD. 19. amphiorismi D. 20. patet quam plane BD; quod plane C. 23. vel pro aut B; vel aliquid D). 23—27. huiusmodi - huius- modi deest A. 24. et pro vel C. 26. ferrum planta C. 20. after 31. tugiedo A. est, forma A. 3o. quantum BD. 19. Urso's Aphorisms. Sce De Compositione Hominis, 71. 29. Talis forma. This is called by Scholastics the abstract form, which stands for the whole essence taken abstractedly. But they also admit a concrete form which is only a part of the substance: this Wyclif certainly seems to deny in the follow- ing paragraph. 12
CAP. III. DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 179 ex hoc quod idem causat se; sicud non sequitur: natura dei est deus, igitur deus causat se etc.] Sunt enim talia intransitive intelligenda: "essencia, bonitas, vel inmensitas dei est deus"; quiditas vel diffinicio hominis est homo". 5 Et sic de ceteris. Habito ergo quod quelibet intelligencia sit forma As to corporeal forms, they are essencialis, restat discutere de forma nature corporee, that by which anything is quam commentator, 1° Physicorum, vocat partem quali- essentially tnat tativam; et patet ex dictis quod quelibet substancia which it is. 10 corporea habet talem formam, eo quod formaliter est in specie predicata in eo quod quid est; et per con- sequens habet universalem singulariter, per quam est formaliter id quod est; et illa est forma ex descripcione superius proposita: ut ignis datus est formaliter ignis 15 igneitate quadam, lapis lapiditate, et sic de aliis. Talibus enim, propter eorum latenciam, non sunt specialia nomina inposita; ideo licitum est philosophis fingere nomina a concretis substancialibus, sicud faciunt: ut patet per Ursonem, aphorismo ultimo, et alios recte philoso- 20 phantes de formis substancialibus. Et plane patet quod oportet omnem philosophum rectilogum ponere talem formam. Nam nullus negabit quin datum individuum sit aer vel ferrum vel planta, aut aliud huiusmodi. Et ultra non negabit sapiens logicam vel metaphysicam 25 quin tale individuum sit essencialiter et per se et non accidentaliter aer vel ferrum vel planta vel aliud huius- modi. Ex quo patet quod ipsum esse aerem, ferrum, etc., sit substanciale; et ista veritas est forma quam ponunt philosophi. Ergo talis forma substancialis est ponenda. 30 Et patet quanto philosophi moderni difficultent iuvenes incipientes philosophari, fingendo quod forma substan- cialis sit una res potens per se existere coniuncta cum Thus a given fire is fire by its gneity, a stone is a stone by its stoniness, and so on ; for we may coin abstract words out of concrete ones ad libitum to name the form of each thing. For any individual being must be air or iron, &c.; and its being air &c., is acrity, which is its form. A 583 The fiction of a form which exists in combination with matter, making a 2. etc. deest BD. 9. tractatis B1); ib. dictis in marg. B. 12. uni- versalia AB; unam C; ib. singularem D; ib. que pro per quam AB; formam qua pro per quam C. 13. inquid A; id quid B; forma in 18. cunctis AB; ib. marg. B; ib. et illa et ista C. 11. posita C. sicud ACD. 19. amphiorismi D. 20. patet quam plane BD; quod plane C. 23. vel pro aut B; vel aliquid D). 23—27. huiusmodi - huius- modi deest A. 24. et pro vel C. 26. ferrum planta C. 20. after 31. tugiedo A. est, forma A. 3o. quantum BD. 19. Urso's Aphorisms. Sce De Compositione Hominis, 71. 29. Talis forma. This is called by Scholastics the abstract form, which stands for the whole essence taken abstractedly. But they also admit a concrete form which is only a part of the substance: this Wyclif certainly seems to deny in the follow- ing paragraph. 12
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180 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. III. whole, like a materia, ex quibus coextensis fit unum, sicud ex tunica tunic and its et furrura. Nam certum est quod omnes homines mundi fur, is a conception only non possunt talem formam convincere; sed convincere likely to render the study of formam datam satis est. Periculum ideo est, cum ponere philosophy plura sine evidencia sit superfluum, ubi pauciora suffi- harder. ciunt. Patet quanto degenerant a philosophia, qui tales formas ponunt. Secundo, patet quod nulla forma substancialis suscipit Such forms are not susceptible magis et minus, cum nichil secundum substanciam possit of increase or diminution, intendi et remitti; ut probat Aristoteles in predicamentis, since they are substantial; cap. De Substancia, et racio satis convincit; et patet Averrhoës quam sinistre Averrois concepit Aristotelem (3° De celo, therefore, when he says that the commento 67), formas substanciales elementorum po- forms of the elements nendo manere in mixto, sub esse remisso, tanquam remain in the quedam media inter substancias et accidencia. Nam, compound, but are less intense, cum idem sit forma intendi et subiectum esse intensum quite formaliter; patet quod, si forma substancialis ignis in- misconstrues Aristotle. tenditur, tunc possibile est quod aliquid sit alio magis Fire cannot be more or less ignis; ut, si albedo intenditur, tunc aliquid est alio fire than it is. magis album. Et ita generaliter de qualibet forma in-20 tensa. Consequens autem est inpossibile, cum tunc esse ignem foret accidens, eo quod, uno gradu existente forma accidentali, tota forma est tunc accidentalis, cum, secundum sua principia, idem sit iudicium de toto et de partibus in talibus; ut, quamvis esse quantum non 25 possit separari a substancia, tamen esse sic contractum potest adesse vel abesse.] Ideo ponunt philosophi totum A 583 genus quantitatis esse accidens. Correspondenter, si esse sic aut sic intense ignem sit accidentale, tunc esse simpli- citer ignem esset accidentale, et per consequens oporteret 30 ponere substanciam in actu per formam substancialem, cui adveniret accidentaliter intensio aut remissio forme ignis; et per consequens forma ignis adveniens sic enti in actu foret accidens. Tercio, patet veridica sentencia lincolniensis, 1°35 posteriorum cap. 11°, ponentis formam substancialem If it could, it would be an accident of the genus of quantity. If it were accidental for fire to be more or less what it is, its very being would be accidental. 10 15 Form is extended into parts in its 1. tinca A; aqua BD. 2. furmera A; ſarina B; ib. quam pro nam AD. 4. dictam BC; ib. patulum BD; ib. est deest A; ib. componere A: ponere C. 6. quante D. 8. substancia B. 10. ponit BC 12. quod eciam AC; ib. conceperit AD; concipit BD; ib. celi AC. 13. elementorum 18—20. Pro aliquid sit — album, aliquid deest B. 16. et deest C. est alio ignis ut albedo intenditur, tunc aliquid erit alio magis vel minus album DE. 18. esset ACD. 19. alio deest C.m 20. magis vel minus BC. 22. uno deest BCD; ib. gradu forme BD; ib. exnte A. 23. forma before accidentali deest BD; ib. est deest D. 25. parte AC. 26. before tamen, 30. esse quia ABD; ib. quantum BCD. 29. ignem deest ABC. 31. actum ABC. 36. 5t° BD; in marg. B. ignem BD.
180 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. III. whole, like a materia, ex quibus coextensis fit unum, sicud ex tunica tunic and its et furrura. Nam certum est quod omnes homines mundi fur, is a conception only non possunt talem formam convincere; sed convincere likely to render the study of formam datam satis est. Periculum ideo est, cum ponere philosophy plura sine evidencia sit superfluum, ubi pauciora suffi- harder. ciunt. Patet quanto degenerant a philosophia, qui tales formas ponunt. Secundo, patet quod nulla forma substancialis suscipit Such forms are not susceptible magis et minus, cum nichil secundum substanciam possit of increase or diminution, intendi et remitti; ut probat Aristoteles in predicamentis, since they are substantial; cap. De Substancia, et racio satis convincit; et patet Averrhoës quam sinistre Averrois concepit Aristotelem (3° De celo, therefore, when he says that the commento 67), formas substanciales elementorum po- forms of the elements nendo manere in mixto, sub esse remisso, tanquam remain in the quedam media inter substancias et accidencia. Nam, compound, but are less intense, cum idem sit forma intendi et subiectum esse intensum quite formaliter; patet quod, si forma substancialis ignis in- misconstrues Aristotle. tenditur, tunc possibile est quod aliquid sit alio magis Fire cannot be more or less ignis; ut, si albedo intenditur, tunc aliquid est alio fire than it is. magis album. Et ita generaliter de qualibet forma in-20 tensa. Consequens autem est inpossibile, cum tunc esse ignem foret accidens, eo quod, uno gradu existente forma accidentali, tota forma est tunc accidentalis, cum, secundum sua principia, idem sit iudicium de toto et de partibus in talibus; ut, quamvis esse quantum non 25 possit separari a substancia, tamen esse sic contractum potest adesse vel abesse.] Ideo ponunt philosophi totum A 583 genus quantitatis esse accidens. Correspondenter, si esse sic aut sic intense ignem sit accidentale, tunc esse simpli- citer ignem esset accidentale, et per consequens oporteret 30 ponere substanciam in actu per formam substancialem, cui adveniret accidentaliter intensio aut remissio forme ignis; et per consequens forma ignis adveniens sic enti in actu foret accidens. Tercio, patet veridica sentencia lincolniensis, 1°35 posteriorum cap. 11°, ponentis formam substancialem If it could, it would be an accident of the genus of quantity. If it were accidental for fire to be more or less what it is, its very being would be accidental. 10 15 Form is extended into parts in its 1. tinca A; aqua BD. 2. furmera A; ſarina B; ib. quam pro nam AD. 4. dictam BC; ib. patulum BD; ib. est deest A; ib. componere A: ponere C. 6. quante D. 8. substancia B. 10. ponit BC 12. quod eciam AC; ib. conceperit AD; concipit BD; ib. celi AC. 13. elementorum 18—20. Pro aliquid sit — album, aliquid deest B. 16. et deest C. est alio ignis ut albedo intenditur, tunc aliquid erit alio magis vel minus album DE. 18. esset ACD. 19. alio deest C.m 20. magis vel minus BC. 22. uno deest BCD; ib. gradu forme BD; ib. exnte A. 23. forma before accidentali deest BD; ib. est deest D. 25. parte AC. 26. before tamen, 30. esse quia ABD; ib. quantum BCD. 29. ignem deest ABC. 31. actum ABC. 36. 5t° BD; in marg. B. ignem BD.
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CAP. III. DE MATERIA ET VORMA. 181 (elementi, vel elementati), extensam partibiliter induci subject, but not in itself, or as quoad subiectum, sed non quoad partes intensivas, vel regards intensity. naturam forme. Ut si signetur una essencia que fieret ignis; cum natura ordinate procedit, primo pars eius 5 minor et postea maior fiet ignis. Et per consequens esse ignem vel igneitas, (quod idem est) adveniet date essencie partibiliter quoad subiectum; et idem contingit de quacunque forma substanciali extensa quam natura potest successive producere. 10 Unde commentatur, 12 Methaphysice, commento 19°, vocans levitatem formam substancialem ignis, ex infecta radice abutitur termino. Nam levitas est commune aëri, igni, et quotlibet mixtis ipsis participiantibus; et potest intendi et remitti. Ideo non est illud quo ignis est 15 formaliter illud, sed accidens consequens ad ignem et aerem ac mixta illis participata, per quod deferuntur ad loca sua naturalia, sicud gravitas naturaliter locat terram ac elementa particularia. Unde, sicut corpus naturaliter prius est, quam sit locale, cum subiectum 20 precedit passionem, sic prius naturaliter est ignis, quam grave vel leve. Gravitas igitur, vel levitas, sunt qualitates sensibiles sensu tactus (ut dicit philosophus, secundo de generacione, cap. tercio, concorditer ad experienciam), et non forme substanciales. Nec tunc movet multum 25 quod gravitas ageret in sensum appositum et levitas in sensum suppositum, per locum a simili de accione calidi- tatis et frigiditatis; quia quelibet qualitas activa habet suam legem agendi; ut [patet] discurrendo per omnes qualitates sensibiles. Et idem dictat racio senciendum 3o de quibuslibet sensibilibus; ut ignis, licet vigorosius calefaciat suprapositum quam suppositum, tamen non calefacit orbem celestem, nec forte calefaceret conbustibile Averrhoës, starting from a false principle, commits an abuse of language in saying that lightness is the substantial form of fire ; for it is an accident common to air and many compounds, and its idea depends on the position of its subject: but substance naturally comes before position. The objection that gravity and lightness act, and are therefore substantial forms, has little worth. When we say that gravity acts one way, lightness the other, remember that when things are 1. ut pro vel C; ib. extensa A. 2. non ergo A. 3. fiet CD. 7. 9tit A. 4. eius deest BD. 13. partibus A. 16. partita AD. 18. pticiela D. 22. Aristoteles BCD. 25. oppositum A. 26. locum pro sensum B. 27. caliditas actualiter AC. 28. patet deest ABCDE. 29. ascois = asccucionis? pro senciendum A. 3o. insensibilibus ACD. 31. vel pro quam ABCDE. 25. Qualitas ageret. The objection is as follows: only sub- stantial forms act; now lightness acts, pulling a balloon upwards. Wyclif's answer might be put thus: When the hydrogen in the balloon has got to its proper place in the air, there is no longer any action, yet the lightness is the same. It is, therefore, not lightness that acts, but the substantial form of hydrogen, tending to its proper place.
CAP. III. DE MATERIA ET VORMA. 181 (elementi, vel elementati), extensam partibiliter induci subject, but not in itself, or as quoad subiectum, sed non quoad partes intensivas, vel regards intensity. naturam forme. Ut si signetur una essencia que fieret ignis; cum natura ordinate procedit, primo pars eius 5 minor et postea maior fiet ignis. Et per consequens esse ignem vel igneitas, (quod idem est) adveniet date essencie partibiliter quoad subiectum; et idem contingit de quacunque forma substanciali extensa quam natura potest successive producere. 10 Unde commentatur, 12 Methaphysice, commento 19°, vocans levitatem formam substancialem ignis, ex infecta radice abutitur termino. Nam levitas est commune aëri, igni, et quotlibet mixtis ipsis participiantibus; et potest intendi et remitti. Ideo non est illud quo ignis est 15 formaliter illud, sed accidens consequens ad ignem et aerem ac mixta illis participata, per quod deferuntur ad loca sua naturalia, sicud gravitas naturaliter locat terram ac elementa particularia. Unde, sicut corpus naturaliter prius est, quam sit locale, cum subiectum 20 precedit passionem, sic prius naturaliter est ignis, quam grave vel leve. Gravitas igitur, vel levitas, sunt qualitates sensibiles sensu tactus (ut dicit philosophus, secundo de generacione, cap. tercio, concorditer ad experienciam), et non forme substanciales. Nec tunc movet multum 25 quod gravitas ageret in sensum appositum et levitas in sensum suppositum, per locum a simili de accione calidi- tatis et frigiditatis; quia quelibet qualitas activa habet suam legem agendi; ut [patet] discurrendo per omnes qualitates sensibiles. Et idem dictat racio senciendum 3o de quibuslibet sensibilibus; ut ignis, licet vigorosius calefaciat suprapositum quam suppositum, tamen non calefacit orbem celestem, nec forte calefaceret conbustibile Averrhoës, starting from a false principle, commits an abuse of language in saying that lightness is the substantial form of fire ; for it is an accident common to air and many compounds, and its idea depends on the position of its subject: but substance naturally comes before position. The objection that gravity and lightness act, and are therefore substantial forms, has little worth. When we say that gravity acts one way, lightness the other, remember that when things are 1. ut pro vel C; ib. extensa A. 2. non ergo A. 3. fiet CD. 7. 9tit A. 4. eius deest BD. 13. partibus A. 16. partita AD. 18. pticiela D. 22. Aristoteles BCD. 25. oppositum A. 26. locum pro sensum B. 27. caliditas actualiter AC. 28. patet deest ABCDE. 29. ascois = asccucionis? pro senciendum A. 3o. insensibilibus ACD. 31. vel pro quam ABCDE. 25. Qualitas ageret. The objection is as follows: only sub- stantial forms act; now lightness acts, pulling a balloon upwards. Wyclif's answer might be put thus: When the hydrogen in the balloon has got to its proper place in the air, there is no longer any action, yet the lightness is the same. It is, therefore, not lightness that acts, but the substantial form of hydrogen, tending to its proper place.
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182 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. IV. ibi positum propter appetitum quem habet ad tenendum se in loco suo naturali. Correspondenter omnino, grave vel leve habet legem naturalem ex levitate propellere incidens quod inpedit eius locacionem, et non aliud iuxtapositum. Non enim sunt qualitates active sensui similes, secundum philosophum, sicud nec alie qualitates sensitive. Ideo non ponderantes istam consideracionem per locum ab insufficienti similitudine vel ymaginacione, [fingunt] quod dicte forme sunt res potentes per se existere: quod est impossibile. Ideo, ut alibi patet, activa 10 non sunt accidencia, nisi ad sensum equivocum; quia substancie ] sunt secundum huiusmodi accidencia sic A 59" active. However, Iste autem cui placeret insistere ad glosandum Commen- Averrhoës may tatorem posset dicere quod intelligit per substanciale 15 be understood to mean by istud quod inseparabiliter consequitur naturam rei. Unde, substantial that which is an quia levitas et caliditas inseparabiliter assecuntur ignem, inseparable property of any ideo possunt dici forme ignis, ad hunc sensum sub- substance ; and stanciales. Certum namque est ex regula commentatoris, in this sense he would be right. quod nec caliditas, nec levitas est forma qua ignis est 20 formaliter id quod est; quia 8° Methaphysice, commento 5°, vere dicitur quod nulla forma que est accidens in- herens alicui subiecto est realiter substancia; ut patet de igneitate et consimilibus. in their right place, neither acts at all. Accidents are not properly active, but substances are active by their means. CAPITULUM QUARTUM. 25 Objections to this theory. I. The same individual essence would now be one thing, now another, and specific differences would be utterly destroyed. That which, v. g. now has the form of fire might Contra hanc doctrinem de forma instatur, primo, per hoc quod ponitur ean 'em essenciam in numero nunc esse ignem, nunc aerem; et sic de quolibet elemento vel elementato, et per consequens nulla talia corpora differunt in specie, cum ignis erit aqua, et sic reciproce. Sequitur enim expositorie: Ista essencia erit ignis; et ista eadem essencia erit aqua: ergo ignis erit aqua. Et isti sentencie videtur consonare scriptura de conversione 30 1. ad deest ABC; ib. tenendo B. 3. et leve D. 4. locacio A. 5, 6. sui silis A; filis BCD. b. alique D. 7. due pro sensitive BD; 8. after insufficienti, divisione A; ib. secunde C; ib. non deest ABCD. ymaginaria C. 9. fingunt deest ABCDE. 10, 11. accidencia non sunt activa CD. 12, 13. sic active deest ABD. 14. isti D; ib. placet ABD. 17. consecuntur BD. 18. possent B. 19. res A. 16. rei deest ABC. 23. subiecto deest ABC. 24. in fine etc. CD; Averoys osra haczye in 26. hec marg. in red ink A. 25. Cap. deest A; initial C in red ink B. 3i. exposicione D); ib. esset A. dicta BD. 30. esset A.
182 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. IV. ibi positum propter appetitum quem habet ad tenendum se in loco suo naturali. Correspondenter omnino, grave vel leve habet legem naturalem ex levitate propellere incidens quod inpedit eius locacionem, et non aliud iuxtapositum. Non enim sunt qualitates active sensui similes, secundum philosophum, sicud nec alie qualitates sensitive. Ideo non ponderantes istam consideracionem per locum ab insufficienti similitudine vel ymaginacione, [fingunt] quod dicte forme sunt res potentes per se existere: quod est impossibile. Ideo, ut alibi patet, activa 10 non sunt accidencia, nisi ad sensum equivocum; quia substancie ] sunt secundum huiusmodi accidencia sic A 59" active. However, Iste autem cui placeret insistere ad glosandum Commen- Averrhoës may tatorem posset dicere quod intelligit per substanciale 15 be understood to mean by istud quod inseparabiliter consequitur naturam rei. Unde, substantial that which is an quia levitas et caliditas inseparabiliter assecuntur ignem, inseparable property of any ideo possunt dici forme ignis, ad hunc sensum sub- substance ; and stanciales. Certum namque est ex regula commentatoris, in this sense he would be right. quod nec caliditas, nec levitas est forma qua ignis est 20 formaliter id quod est; quia 8° Methaphysice, commento 5°, vere dicitur quod nulla forma que est accidens in- herens alicui subiecto est realiter substancia; ut patet de igneitate et consimilibus. in their right place, neither acts at all. Accidents are not properly active, but substances are active by their means. CAPITULUM QUARTUM. 25 Objections to this theory. I. The same individual essence would now be one thing, now another, and specific differences would be utterly destroyed. That which, v. g. now has the form of fire might Contra hanc doctrinem de forma instatur, primo, per hoc quod ponitur ean 'em essenciam in numero nunc esse ignem, nunc aerem; et sic de quolibet elemento vel elementato, et per consequens nulla talia corpora differunt in specie, cum ignis erit aqua, et sic reciproce. Sequitur enim expositorie: Ista essencia erit ignis; et ista eadem essencia erit aqua: ergo ignis erit aqua. Et isti sentencie videtur consonare scriptura de conversione 30 1. ad deest ABC; ib. tenendo B. 3. et leve D. 4. locacio A. 5, 6. sui silis A; filis BCD. b. alique D. 7. due pro sensitive BD; 8. after insufficienti, divisione A; ib. secunde C; ib. non deest ABCD. ymaginaria C. 9. fingunt deest ABCDE. 10, 11. accidencia non sunt activa CD. 12, 13. sic active deest ABD. 14. isti D; ib. placet ABD. 17. consecuntur BD. 18. possent B. 19. res A. 16. rei deest ABC. 23. subiecto deest ABC. 24. in fine etc. CD; Averoys osra haczye in 26. hec marg. in red ink A. 25. Cap. deest A; initial C in red ink B. 3i. exposicione D); ib. esset A. dicta BD. 30. esset A.
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CAP. IV. DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 183 Gen. unius substancie in aliam; ut uxor Loth dicitur con- afterwards have XIX,26 versa in statuam salis, Gen. 3°, virga Moysis in serpentem x. 1V,3 Jo. II, 9 Exod. 4?, aqua, nedum conversa, sed facta vinum, Joh. 2?; et sic de quotlibet conversionibus ex dictis scripture, que videntur sonare quod subiectum unius nature fit subiectum alterius nature. Et confirmacio istius est, quod omnis mutacio requirit subiectum; et, cum ipsum (quidquid fuerit) est ad minimum substancia, videtur quod forma adveniens est 1osibi accidentalis, cum adest et abest preter subiecti corrupcionem. Confirmacio secunda est, quod omnis motus successivus dicit subiectum successive moveri isto motu; sed omnis generacio substancialis est motus suc- cessivus (ut patet ex dictis): ergo, oportet subiectum 15successive moveri isto motu. Pro solucione istius, opus est loyca et methaphysica. Ideo notandum quod essencia dicit rem absolute, sine contraccione ad genus aliquod per aliquam formam, Sicut esse eius contractum significat mere, sine aliqua 20tali contraccione, Et ideo deus Exod. 3? signanter docuit illum eximium philosophum Moysen quod esse fuit nomen Ex. III, suum: ubi sic dicit: "Si dixerint mihi, quod est nomen 13—15 eius? quid dicam? dixit ad Moysen, Ego sum qui sum; sic dices filiis Israël: Qui est, misit me ad vos. Et 25sequitur: Hoc nomen mihi est in eternum, et hoc memo- riale meum in generacione et generacionem." Cuius dicti subtilitatem sanctus Dyonisius (de divinis nominibus, cap. I9), et quotlibet alii precipui philosophi admirantur, considerantes racione invincibili quod nullum nomen in 3ogenere per se est nature divine conveniens, quia quod- А 50° libet decem generum | connotat creatam racionem. Ideo Avicenna et Algazel, inter raciones quas dicunt deo competere, dicunt (sicud et beatus Dyonisius, ubi supra) quod deus non est substancia. Et idem declarat Augu- 1. speciei A ; ib. et ut B; ib. dicitur deest A. 2. Moysi AB. 4. de deest. AC; ib. et pro сх AC. 5. quia pro que C; ib. quia pro quod ABCD. 6. sit? ACD. 12,13. isto motu deest ACD. 19. after eius, sigt A; ib. concretum C; ib. m'e A. 22. dicitur BD; :b. dixerit C. 23. dominus BCD. — 26. in omni ABC; ib. etin D. — 29. nullum deest A. 33. et deest BC. 34. ibidem D 34. Dcus non est substancia. Modern Scholastics have in- vented the term Supersubstantia, to designate God; but all agree that the limitations implied by the usual definitions of substance fail here. the form of water. Scripture speaks of Lot's wife as changed into salt, and of water made wine. Now, if it is the sme cssence, it must be a substance, and the supervening form will be accidental. Besides, its supervention would imply succession, which could not be without a pre-existing subject. Answer. We must note that . essence signifies a thing without reference to any genus. God's name is He that Is, precisely because no generic term can stand for Him, who is beyond all genera. And in this sensc God is not a substance.
CAP. IV. DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 183 Gen. unius substancie in aliam; ut uxor Loth dicitur con- afterwards have XIX,26 versa in statuam salis, Gen. 3°, virga Moysis in serpentem x. 1V,3 Jo. II, 9 Exod. 4?, aqua, nedum conversa, sed facta vinum, Joh. 2?; et sic de quotlibet conversionibus ex dictis scripture, que videntur sonare quod subiectum unius nature fit subiectum alterius nature. Et confirmacio istius est, quod omnis mutacio requirit subiectum; et, cum ipsum (quidquid fuerit) est ad minimum substancia, videtur quod forma adveniens est 1osibi accidentalis, cum adest et abest preter subiecti corrupcionem. Confirmacio secunda est, quod omnis motus successivus dicit subiectum successive moveri isto motu; sed omnis generacio substancialis est motus suc- cessivus (ut patet ex dictis): ergo, oportet subiectum 15successive moveri isto motu. Pro solucione istius, opus est loyca et methaphysica. Ideo notandum quod essencia dicit rem absolute, sine contraccione ad genus aliquod per aliquam formam, Sicut esse eius contractum significat mere, sine aliqua 20tali contraccione, Et ideo deus Exod. 3? signanter docuit illum eximium philosophum Moysen quod esse fuit nomen Ex. III, suum: ubi sic dicit: "Si dixerint mihi, quod est nomen 13—15 eius? quid dicam? dixit ad Moysen, Ego sum qui sum; sic dices filiis Israël: Qui est, misit me ad vos. Et 25sequitur: Hoc nomen mihi est in eternum, et hoc memo- riale meum in generacione et generacionem." Cuius dicti subtilitatem sanctus Dyonisius (de divinis nominibus, cap. I9), et quotlibet alii precipui philosophi admirantur, considerantes racione invincibili quod nullum nomen in 3ogenere per se est nature divine conveniens, quia quod- А 50° libet decem generum | connotat creatam racionem. Ideo Avicenna et Algazel, inter raciones quas dicunt deo competere, dicunt (sicud et beatus Dyonisius, ubi supra) quod deus non est substancia. Et idem declarat Augu- 1. speciei A ; ib. et ut B; ib. dicitur deest A. 2. Moysi AB. 4. de deest. AC; ib. et pro сх AC. 5. quia pro que C; ib. quia pro quod ABCD. 6. sit? ACD. 12,13. isto motu deest ACD. 19. after eius, sigt A; ib. concretum C; ib. m'e A. 22. dicitur BD; :b. dixerit C. 23. dominus BCD. — 26. in omni ABC; ib. etin D. — 29. nullum deest A. 33. et deest BC. 34. ibidem D 34. Dcus non est substancia. Modern Scholastics have in- vented the term Supersubstantia, to designate God; but all agree that the limitations implied by the usual definitions of substance fail here. the form of water. Scripture speaks of Lot's wife as changed into salt, and of water made wine. Now, if it is the sme cssence, it must be a substance, and the supervening form will be accidental. Besides, its supervention would imply succession, which could not be without a pre-existing subject. Answer. We must note that . essence signifies a thing without reference to any genus. God's name is He that Is, precisely because no generic term can stand for Him, who is beyond all genera. And in this sensc God is not a substance.
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184 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. IV. Grammatically stinus, 7° de trinitate, 31° et 32°. Et hoc est quod speaking, substance (or balbuciendo locuntur gramatici ignorantes quid nominis subject) is the significare substanciam cum qualitate (propria, vel com- same as essence; quality muni) intelligendo per substanciam, essenciam, vel ab- is everything solute naturam; et per qualitatem, quamcunque formam, that can be said of a subjeci. substancialem vel accidentalem; ut: homo dicit essenciam et connotat humanitatem; humanitas autem dicit istam communem humanitatem et essenciam cui inest; et ita generaliter, de quocunque nomine cathegorico positivo. Pronomina autem et verba substantiva ponunt gramatici 10 significare meram substanciam, sine connotacione huius- modi qualitativa. Et super illam consideracionem credo sanctum Thomam et alios loquentes de esse et essencia pro magna parte fundari. Quorum conformis et sana sentencia est, quod in deo est idem esse et essencia omnino, quia in illo non est potencia ante actum, nec contraccio per formam potencialem superadendam possibili essencie. In qualibet autem creatura est distinccio, saltem racionis, inter esse et essenciam, cum essencia dicit mere rem sine con-20 traccione per formam, vel racionem alicuius generis; sed esse, cum sit actus essencie create, dicit contracte formam vel racionem alicuius generis. Ideo dicunt quod essencia, ens et esse differunt secundum racionem, sicut lux, lucens, et lucere. Quidquid autem sit de hoc exemplo 25 et sensu, concedendum de esse et essencia videtur mihi quod omne esse sit essencia, et econtra; distingwuntur tamen secundum racionem in creaturis, cum esse habitum per formam aut racionem specialem alicuius generis presupponit essenciam, et non econtra; cum esse con-30 Digression concerning the distinction between existence and essence. I consider that the distinction between existence and essence is one of reason; for though each is the other, existence presupposes the idea of essence. 15 3. que cum D. 8. humanitatem deest D. 9. kace C. 11. signi- ficare deest ABC. 12. qualitatum CD. 14. ente ABD. 15. 9ſois A; concors BCD. 18. possibilem pro possibili BCD. 21—23. generis — 25. quomodocunque CD. generis deest A. 13. Sanctum Thomam. This question, not easy to set forth in untechnical terms, marks a great split amongst Scholastics. St. Thomas and the whole Thomist school hold that the actual (not possible) essence of any existing creature is really distinct from its existence, and that in God alone these are identical. Scotists and most of the modern school, including Suarez, affirm the contrary. The question, though seemingly idle, has a great bearing on Theology. St. Thomas was so convinced of the truth of his view, that he uses it to prove many of God's attributes, notably infinitude. See Sum. c. Gent. 1. I. cap. XXVIII, XLIII and S. Theol. 1° Pars, qu. VII, art. 1.
184 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. IV. Grammatically stinus, 7° de trinitate, 31° et 32°. Et hoc est quod speaking, substance (or balbuciendo locuntur gramatici ignorantes quid nominis subject) is the significare substanciam cum qualitate (propria, vel com- same as essence; quality muni) intelligendo per substanciam, essenciam, vel ab- is everything solute naturam; et per qualitatem, quamcunque formam, that can be said of a subjeci. substancialem vel accidentalem; ut: homo dicit essenciam et connotat humanitatem; humanitas autem dicit istam communem humanitatem et essenciam cui inest; et ita generaliter, de quocunque nomine cathegorico positivo. Pronomina autem et verba substantiva ponunt gramatici 10 significare meram substanciam, sine connotacione huius- modi qualitativa. Et super illam consideracionem credo sanctum Thomam et alios loquentes de esse et essencia pro magna parte fundari. Quorum conformis et sana sentencia est, quod in deo est idem esse et essencia omnino, quia in illo non est potencia ante actum, nec contraccio per formam potencialem superadendam possibili essencie. In qualibet autem creatura est distinccio, saltem racionis, inter esse et essenciam, cum essencia dicit mere rem sine con-20 traccione per formam, vel racionem alicuius generis; sed esse, cum sit actus essencie create, dicit contracte formam vel racionem alicuius generis. Ideo dicunt quod essencia, ens et esse differunt secundum racionem, sicut lux, lucens, et lucere. Quidquid autem sit de hoc exemplo 25 et sensu, concedendum de esse et essencia videtur mihi quod omne esse sit essencia, et econtra; distingwuntur tamen secundum racionem in creaturis, cum esse habitum per formam aut racionem specialem alicuius generis presupponit essenciam, et non econtra; cum esse con-30 Digression concerning the distinction between existence and essence. I consider that the distinction between existence and essence is one of reason; for though each is the other, existence presupposes the idea of essence. 15 3. que cum D. 8. humanitatem deest D. 9. kace C. 11. signi- ficare deest ABC. 12. qualitatum CD. 14. ente ABD. 15. 9ſois A; concors BCD. 18. possibilem pro possibili BCD. 21—23. generis — 25. quomodocunque CD. generis deest A. 13. Sanctum Thomam. This question, not easy to set forth in untechnical terms, marks a great split amongst Scholastics. St. Thomas and the whole Thomist school hold that the actual (not possible) essence of any existing creature is really distinct from its existence, and that in God alone these are identical. Scotists and most of the modern school, including Suarez, affirm the contrary. The question, though seemingly idle, has a great bearing on Theology. St. Thomas was so convinced of the truth of his view, that he uses it to prove many of God's attributes, notably infinitude. See Sum. c. Gent. 1. I. cap. XXVIII, XLIII and S. Theol. 1° Pars, qu. VII, art. 1.
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CAP. IV. DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 185 A 6o* tracte dicit huiusmodi racionem. Exemplum est de specie et individuo, que distingwuntur secundum racionem in- communicabilitatis, tamen omnis species est individuum, et econtra; et talem distinccionem racionis ponunt 5 quidam inter essenciam divinam et personam. Unde ad pauca respiciunt, qui arguunt; a et b distingwuntur; ergo, a non est b; vel econtra. Nam satis est ad aliquam distinccionem, scilicet ad distinccionem secundum ra- cionem aliquam secundum quam unum non est reliquum; ro nec sequitur ex isto quod idem distingwuntur a se. Licet enim Sor senex differt a se puero, non tamen differt a se. Istis premissis, conceditur quod eadem essencia, eciam in numero, est nunc ignis, nunc aqua; et sic de qualibet 15 specie substancie materialis. Nec ex hoc sequitur non equivocantibus quod ignis formaliter possit esse aqua; et sic de ceteris speciebus. Et de predicacione formali, propter eius famositatem suppono quod limitate fiat locucio; sic enim locuntur philosophi et maior pars 20 scole, abicientes alias predicaciones; de quibus tamen postmodum, cap. 6 et septimo. Suppono igitur quod Essence means anything that nomen essencie sit commune ad significandum naturam, is, without any reference quacunque qualitate substanciali vel accidentali qualifi- whatever to its suchness; catam; quia aliter pateremur nimis magnam penuriam otherwise it in loquendo de essencia materie prime. Non enim would not be possible to habemus aliquod nomen absolutum ad exprimendum speak of rem manentem in transmutacionibus formarum sub- primordial matter; no stancialium competentibus. Igitur videtur dici talis res word implying suchness would essencia, cum nomen essencie dicit anoloyce deum et be adequate to express it. 30 quamcunque rem per se in genere, connotacione alicuius Essence thus generalis vel specialis qualitatis. Non enim dicit, quid does not say what anything res est, aut cuiusmodi est; sed solum dicit quod est: is, only that it is. que est prima questio de re, ex secundo posteriorum. The species and the individual thus differ, one being common to many, the other not; yet one is the other. It does not follow, therefore, that where there is distinction, there are different entities. I fully admit that the same essence is now fire, now water ; but not that fire, as such, can be water. 3. et suppl. CD. 6. si a BČD. 2. quia D; ib. in deest BCD. 7. tunc BCD. 9. after aliquam: quod alterum sit secundum racionem aliquam B; ib. unum deest CD. 11. senex deest ABC. 13. eciam deest D. 19. philosophus C. 20. obicientes D. 21. 5to D; ib. crit sermo pro et septimo BCD; ib. iterum BCD. 22. essenciale A; ib. de- signandum BD. 23, 24. qualiticata B. 26. naturaliter pro aliquod CA. 27. intransmutabilem A. 28. 9peter? A; 9petet' D; competent' E. 29. essenciale ACD. 30. generacione AC. 32. aut deest C; ib. a'cur?) moi C. 25. Materie prime. Primordial matter, in the very words of Aristotle, is neither this thing, nor such, nor so great, nor has it any determining attribute whatever: it has only the potentiality of becoming anything.
CAP. IV. DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 185 A 6o* tracte dicit huiusmodi racionem. Exemplum est de specie et individuo, que distingwuntur secundum racionem in- communicabilitatis, tamen omnis species est individuum, et econtra; et talem distinccionem racionis ponunt 5 quidam inter essenciam divinam et personam. Unde ad pauca respiciunt, qui arguunt; a et b distingwuntur; ergo, a non est b; vel econtra. Nam satis est ad aliquam distinccionem, scilicet ad distinccionem secundum ra- cionem aliquam secundum quam unum non est reliquum; ro nec sequitur ex isto quod idem distingwuntur a se. Licet enim Sor senex differt a se puero, non tamen differt a se. Istis premissis, conceditur quod eadem essencia, eciam in numero, est nunc ignis, nunc aqua; et sic de qualibet 15 specie substancie materialis. Nec ex hoc sequitur non equivocantibus quod ignis formaliter possit esse aqua; et sic de ceteris speciebus. Et de predicacione formali, propter eius famositatem suppono quod limitate fiat locucio; sic enim locuntur philosophi et maior pars 20 scole, abicientes alias predicaciones; de quibus tamen postmodum, cap. 6 et septimo. Suppono igitur quod Essence means anything that nomen essencie sit commune ad significandum naturam, is, without any reference quacunque qualitate substanciali vel accidentali qualifi- whatever to its suchness; catam; quia aliter pateremur nimis magnam penuriam otherwise it in loquendo de essencia materie prime. Non enim would not be possible to habemus aliquod nomen absolutum ad exprimendum speak of rem manentem in transmutacionibus formarum sub- primordial matter; no stancialium competentibus. Igitur videtur dici talis res word implying suchness would essencia, cum nomen essencie dicit anoloyce deum et be adequate to express it. 30 quamcunque rem per se in genere, connotacione alicuius Essence thus generalis vel specialis qualitatis. Non enim dicit, quid does not say what anything res est, aut cuiusmodi est; sed solum dicit quod est: is, only that it is. que est prima questio de re, ex secundo posteriorum. The species and the individual thus differ, one being common to many, the other not; yet one is the other. It does not follow, therefore, that where there is distinction, there are different entities. I fully admit that the same essence is now fire, now water ; but not that fire, as such, can be water. 3. et suppl. CD. 6. si a BČD. 2. quia D; ib. in deest BCD. 7. tunc BCD. 9. after aliquam: quod alterum sit secundum racionem aliquam B; ib. unum deest CD. 11. senex deest ABC. 13. eciam deest D. 19. philosophus C. 20. obicientes D. 21. 5to D; ib. crit sermo pro et septimo BCD; ib. iterum BCD. 22. essenciale A; ib. de- signandum BD. 23, 24. qualiticata B. 26. naturaliter pro aliquod CA. 27. intransmutabilem A. 28. 9peter? A; 9petet' D; competent' E. 29. essenciale ACD. 30. generacione AC. 32. aut deest C; ib. a'cur?) moi C. 25. Materie prime. Primordial matter, in the very words of Aristotle, is neither this thing, nor such, nor so great, nor has it any determining attribute whatever: it has only the potentiality of becoming anything.
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186 JOHANNIS WYCLIF СAP. IV. However, its Nomen tamen essencie secundum famositatem et ano- sense is often restricted to logiam quandoque contrahitur, sicud nomen entis, ad substance significandum substanciam appropriate. alone. This essence is Redeundo igitur, concedendo quod essencia ignis erit eternal, and cannot cease to aqua, vel signata essencia materiali per aquam, dico: be, save by quod oportet illam esse perpetuam, cum non possit annihilation, desinere esse, nisi per annichilacionem, que non potest which is impossible. esse. Et illam essenciam contingit nunc esse ignem per And the very same essence, induccionem igneitatis, nunc aquam per induccionem if it has the form of fire, is aqueitatis; et sic de ceteris formis materialibus; sed non fire ; if of water sequitur: ista essencia erit aqua, et ista essencia erit is water &c. “That which is ignis; ergo ignis erit aqua; sed satis est quod illud quod fire will be water," does est ille ignis erit aqua. Exemplum patet in supernatu- not imply that ralibus, in naturalibus, et mixtum. fire will be water. In supernaturalibus; sicud non sequitur: Ista essencia 15 Of this non- sequence I shall est iste pater, et ista eadem essencia est iste filius; give examples ergo, iste pater est iste filius." Secundum exemplum in the supernatural naturale est. Hoc non sequitur: "Ista natura specifica order, in the natural, and in erit Petrus, et ista eadem natura specifica erit Paulus: both. igitur, Paulus erit Petrus." Defectus autem istorum 20 The same essence is the argumentorum declaratus est alibi satis diffuse, cum Father and the medium sit commune ad utrumque extremum; quod est Son; yet the Father is not contra naturam silogismorum expositoriorum. Exemplum the Son. The same tercium mixtum est hoc; non sequitur: Suppositum verbi essence is at est natura humana, et hoc idem suppositum est natura 25 one time Peter, at another Paul; divina (ut post declarabitur); igitur natura humana est yet Peter is not Paul. natura divina. Non sequitur, ut post patebit. Non ergo The Person of sequitur: 'Hoc erit ignis et hoc erit aqua: ergo ignis the Word is a human nature erit aqua", licet demonstratur essencia singularis, quia and a Divine Nature; yet the eadem essencia in numero est communis ad quotlibet 30 human nature is not the corpora, eciam distincta specie, cum forme substanciales, Divine Nature. sicud et species, a posteriori insunt essencie: cum pars And thus it does not follow that prima omnium rerum creatarum sit esse, ut dicit auctor fire will be de Causis, 4a proposicione. water. Conversion or Quo ad conversiones de quibus loquitur scriptura, 35 change may mean (1) trans-notandum est quod tripliciter in genere dicitur conversio mutation from 10 1. et deest B. 1, 2. analogam C. 4. conceditur BCD; ib. sit AC. 14. mixtu A. 16. iste deest D. 17. In naturalibus pro Hoc B. 20. autem Descns? utrobique D; utriusque C. 22. extremorum BD; ib. 23. after naturam: phi A; ib. expositorum C sed pro quod ACD. 24. Hoc suppositum BD. 25. erit C; ib. erit BCD. „ 26. erit CD. 27. ut post patebit struck out D. 31. corpoa C; ib. specifice B. 32. pars deest ABD. 33. prima deest C; primum A; ib. creaturarum C. 36. tr� A; triplex BC. 34. 14 E. 34. Auctor de Causis. Alpharabicus. See Sermones, III, 255, note.
186 JOHANNIS WYCLIF СAP. IV. However, its Nomen tamen essencie secundum famositatem et ano- sense is often restricted to logiam quandoque contrahitur, sicud nomen entis, ad substance significandum substanciam appropriate. alone. This essence is Redeundo igitur, concedendo quod essencia ignis erit eternal, and cannot cease to aqua, vel signata essencia materiali per aquam, dico: be, save by quod oportet illam esse perpetuam, cum non possit annihilation, desinere esse, nisi per annichilacionem, que non potest which is impossible. esse. Et illam essenciam contingit nunc esse ignem per And the very same essence, induccionem igneitatis, nunc aquam per induccionem if it has the form of fire, is aqueitatis; et sic de ceteris formis materialibus; sed non fire ; if of water sequitur: ista essencia erit aqua, et ista essencia erit is water &c. “That which is ignis; ergo ignis erit aqua; sed satis est quod illud quod fire will be water," does est ille ignis erit aqua. Exemplum patet in supernatu- not imply that ralibus, in naturalibus, et mixtum. fire will be water. In supernaturalibus; sicud non sequitur: Ista essencia 15 Of this non- sequence I shall est iste pater, et ista eadem essencia est iste filius; give examples ergo, iste pater est iste filius." Secundum exemplum in the supernatural naturale est. Hoc non sequitur: "Ista natura specifica order, in the natural, and in erit Petrus, et ista eadem natura specifica erit Paulus: both. igitur, Paulus erit Petrus." Defectus autem istorum 20 The same essence is the argumentorum declaratus est alibi satis diffuse, cum Father and the medium sit commune ad utrumque extremum; quod est Son; yet the Father is not contra naturam silogismorum expositoriorum. Exemplum the Son. The same tercium mixtum est hoc; non sequitur: Suppositum verbi essence is at est natura humana, et hoc idem suppositum est natura 25 one time Peter, at another Paul; divina (ut post declarabitur); igitur natura humana est yet Peter is not Paul. natura divina. Non sequitur, ut post patebit. Non ergo The Person of sequitur: 'Hoc erit ignis et hoc erit aqua: ergo ignis the Word is a human nature erit aqua", licet demonstratur essencia singularis, quia and a Divine Nature; yet the eadem essencia in numero est communis ad quotlibet 30 human nature is not the corpora, eciam distincta specie, cum forme substanciales, Divine Nature. sicud et species, a posteriori insunt essencie: cum pars And thus it does not follow that prima omnium rerum creatarum sit esse, ut dicit auctor fire will be de Causis, 4a proposicione. water. Conversion or Quo ad conversiones de quibus loquitur scriptura, 35 change may mean (1) trans-notandum est quod tripliciter in genere dicitur conversio mutation from 10 1. et deest B. 1, 2. analogam C. 4. conceditur BCD; ib. sit AC. 14. mixtu A. 16. iste deest D. 17. In naturalibus pro Hoc B. 20. autem Descns? utrobique D; utriusque C. 22. extremorum BD; ib. 23. after naturam: phi A; ib. expositorum C sed pro quod ACD. 24. Hoc suppositum BD. 25. erit C; ib. erit BCD. „ 26. erit CD. 27. ut post patebit struck out D. 31. corpoa C; ib. specifice B. 32. pars deest ABD. 33. prima deest C; primum A; ib. creaturarum C. 36. tr� A; triplex BC. 34. 14 E. 34. Auctor de Causis. Alpharabicus. See Sermones, III, 255, note.
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CAP. IV. DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 187 A 60 b Tob. 1I, 6 unius rei in aliam; primo, quando eadem essencia se- one substantial form to cundum transmutacionem materie, nunc est corpus unius another, as in speciei, nunc alterius; ut patet in exemplis positis, et the examples above quoted quotlibet similibus. Et ista est conversio substancialis from Holy Writ. propter communicacionem materie. Secundo, quando Or (?) the same subject, losing idem subiectum convertitur ab una forma sibi acciden- one accidental form to gain tali in aliam; et taliter convertitur viciosus. Et huius another; as in conversionis tot sunt subdivisiones, quot sunt genera conversion from vice to formarum accidentalium; ut patet respicienti scripturam. virtue; change of place, &c. 10 Unde, Jeremie 3° scribitur, Ecce dies veniunt, dicit dominus, convertam conversionem populi mei." Tales autem sunt conversiones locorum, posicionum vel or- dinum, ita quod omnis mutacio dicitur conversio, et specialiter si sonat in bonum. Et tercio dicuntur nedum subiecta sed forme converti in formas, quando una succedit post aliam, sicut Aristoteles dicit ex nocte fieri diem. Et sic loquitur scriptura, Thobie, 2° “Dies festi vestri convertentur in lamentacionem et luctum." Et patet quomodo intelligitur Augustinus, in De Immortalitate 20 anime 19°: 'Cum per animam corpus subsistat, ipsa in corpus verti nullo modo potest." Et racio istorum est, quia una est substancia inmaterialis et alia substancia materialis; ideo non communicant in materia vel sub- iecto, vel altero duorum modorum quo unum convertitur 25 in reliquum; et tercius modus nature incorruptibili non potest competere. Et quoad primam auctoritatem respondet Augustinus in De mirabilibus sacre scripture cap. 18°, declarans auctorem nature in uxore Loth non fecisse aliquid contra 3o naturam; pro quo declarando capit quod multe sunt partes salse in homine; patet hoc de lacrimis, sputo, fleumate salso, et urina. Potens ergo rerum gubernator faciliter posset modicam partem ad naturam salis la- tentem in mulieris corpore in partem tenuem super- 35 ficialem diffundere. Nec solicitemur utrum subtile Or (3) one form giving place to another, as night to day. In this sense Augustine says that the soul cannot be changed into the body, the latter existing only by the former. As to Lot’s wife, Augustine thinks that the surface of her body might have been incrusted with the salt that was within it previously; that would suffice for the change. 3. et deest D. 5. 2° modo CD. 10. veut A. 12. eciam BD. 14. et deest C. 15. substancia BD. 17. scriptura theologie ACD. 18. mihi ABC: ib. convertitur AB; convertuntur CD. 19. demorlite ABE. 20. 1psum AC. 23, 24. substancia C. 21. zdor pro duorum D; 1h. quo deest ABC; ib. convertatur BCD. 29. auctote A; auctoritatem D); ib. uxorem ALC. 31. He, in marg. false B. 32. fleu's A ; et fleumate B. 10. Jer. XXXIII, 7 is the nearest approach to this text that I can find.
CAP. IV. DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 187 A 60 b Tob. 1I, 6 unius rei in aliam; primo, quando eadem essencia se- one substantial form to cundum transmutacionem materie, nunc est corpus unius another, as in speciei, nunc alterius; ut patet in exemplis positis, et the examples above quoted quotlibet similibus. Et ista est conversio substancialis from Holy Writ. propter communicacionem materie. Secundo, quando Or (?) the same subject, losing idem subiectum convertitur ab una forma sibi acciden- one accidental form to gain tali in aliam; et taliter convertitur viciosus. Et huius another; as in conversionis tot sunt subdivisiones, quot sunt genera conversion from vice to formarum accidentalium; ut patet respicienti scripturam. virtue; change of place, &c. 10 Unde, Jeremie 3° scribitur, Ecce dies veniunt, dicit dominus, convertam conversionem populi mei." Tales autem sunt conversiones locorum, posicionum vel or- dinum, ita quod omnis mutacio dicitur conversio, et specialiter si sonat in bonum. Et tercio dicuntur nedum subiecta sed forme converti in formas, quando una succedit post aliam, sicut Aristoteles dicit ex nocte fieri diem. Et sic loquitur scriptura, Thobie, 2° “Dies festi vestri convertentur in lamentacionem et luctum." Et patet quomodo intelligitur Augustinus, in De Immortalitate 20 anime 19°: 'Cum per animam corpus subsistat, ipsa in corpus verti nullo modo potest." Et racio istorum est, quia una est substancia inmaterialis et alia substancia materialis; ideo non communicant in materia vel sub- iecto, vel altero duorum modorum quo unum convertitur 25 in reliquum; et tercius modus nature incorruptibili non potest competere. Et quoad primam auctoritatem respondet Augustinus in De mirabilibus sacre scripture cap. 18°, declarans auctorem nature in uxore Loth non fecisse aliquid contra 3o naturam; pro quo declarando capit quod multe sunt partes salse in homine; patet hoc de lacrimis, sputo, fleumate salso, et urina. Potens ergo rerum gubernator faciliter posset modicam partem ad naturam salis la- tentem in mulieris corpore in partem tenuem super- 35 ficialem diffundere. Nec solicitemur utrum subtile Or (3) one form giving place to another, as night to day. In this sense Augustine says that the soul cannot be changed into the body, the latter existing only by the former. As to Lot’s wife, Augustine thinks that the surface of her body might have been incrusted with the salt that was within it previously; that would suffice for the change. 3. et deest D. 5. 2° modo CD. 10. veut A. 12. eciam BD. 14. et deest C. 15. substancia BD. 17. scriptura theologie ACD. 18. mihi ABC: ib. convertitur AB; convertuntur CD. 19. demorlite ABE. 20. 1psum AC. 23, 24. substancia C. 21. zdor pro duorum D; 1h. quo deest ABC; ib. convertatur BCD. 29. auctote A; auctoritatem D); ib. uxorem ALC. 31. He, in marg. false B. 32. fleu's A ; et fleumate B. 10. Jer. XXXIII, 7 is the nearest approach to this text that I can find.
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188 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. IV. humidum fuerit exspiratum, vel latuerit intrinsecus; aut si tota substancia corporis fuerit versa in sal, vel tantum pars tenuis in superficie; et sic de variis questionibus inpertinentibus, quas querimus hodie. Nam satis est The answer is the same as quod ipsa secundum corpus versa est in statuam salis. concerns the other changes : Et correspondenter dicitur de conversione virge in ser- God Almighty is able to produce pentem, de conversione aque in vinum, et quacunque any form that conversione substanciali de qua loquitur scriptura. Fa- is educible from matter. cillimum namque est auctori nature capere minucias elementorum vel inordinate sparsas vel noviter generatas, 10 et armonice componere illas, ut forma serpentis vel vini, vel quecunque alia de potencia materie educibilis, statim resultet; cum nichil ibi creatur, sed vel generatur pure naturaliter, vel prius generatur aliter situaliter. If an alchemist Quod si alchimicus vel magus scit aptare mineras ele- 15 succeeds in mentorum conmixtas proporcionaliter ad formam auri, mixing his elements aright, vel alicuius alterius mixti, dator forme non invidus God at once gives them the promptissime dabit formam. Et ille principaliter generat; form of gold ; for He it is who alii autem a natura vel artificio instrumentaliter disponunt works as prime materiam. Et sic patet veritas sentencie ex asumpto 20 Artificer in all things. God Mt. 3° ' Potens est deus de lapidibus istis suscitare filios Matth. could make a III, 9 Abrahe." Cum enim anima potest uniri cuicunque man of a stone, since He can materie, servata proporcione ad universam materiam, give a soul to anything. facile est deo proporcionare materiam lapidis in corpus hominis cuiuscunque per unionem anime cum eodem. 25 Nec obstat isti sensui quod sanctus propheta intellexit mistice, quod deus potest idem de induratis iudeis, ut lapides, vel de gentilibus contratiis, qui vocantur petra in scriptura, suscitare homines spiritualiter per graciam, faciendo eos filios Abrahe per imitacionem. Talis enim 30 A change may be either real or suscitacio per graciam direccius manifestaret] divinam A 61“ supposed; as when Nabucho- potenciam. Ex istis coligi potest quod dupliciter contingit donosor fancied himself to be intelligere transformacionem; vel substancialiter, vel a brute animal. 2. salem (sic) CD. 4. pertinentibus AC. 10. vel deest AB 11. Ispetis vim A; ib. vel deest 9. mineras A. 14. generatum 13. relucet in marg. BE; ib. vel deest D. ABD. BD; tb. ar A; alr BC ; ib. situatur D. 15. quod deest ABD; ib. after si a blank space for three words; ib. alchkimicus (!) E; ib. magu9 C; ib. apportare D; ib. municias; under mineras B. 17. commixti B. 19. ali- quando pro alii; ib. 1ſciter A. 20. sic deest ABC. 20, 21. quo affupto illo Mae 3° D. 21. inquit de BCD. 24. faciliter D; ib. eadem BCD. 26. obstet; corr. in red ink A; obest BCD. 27. idem deest B; vel pro idem D; ib. vel D. 28. vel deest D; ib. gentibus A; ib. 9tiis A; con- 30. mutacionem C. vertendis BCD; ib. petre ABD. 31. manifestare D. 31, 32. graciam potenciam D. 1. fuit BD; ib. latuit BD.
188 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. IV. humidum fuerit exspiratum, vel latuerit intrinsecus; aut si tota substancia corporis fuerit versa in sal, vel tantum pars tenuis in superficie; et sic de variis questionibus inpertinentibus, quas querimus hodie. Nam satis est The answer is the same as quod ipsa secundum corpus versa est in statuam salis. concerns the other changes : Et correspondenter dicitur de conversione virge in ser- God Almighty is able to produce pentem, de conversione aque in vinum, et quacunque any form that conversione substanciali de qua loquitur scriptura. Fa- is educible from matter. cillimum namque est auctori nature capere minucias elementorum vel inordinate sparsas vel noviter generatas, 10 et armonice componere illas, ut forma serpentis vel vini, vel quecunque alia de potencia materie educibilis, statim resultet; cum nichil ibi creatur, sed vel generatur pure naturaliter, vel prius generatur aliter situaliter. If an alchemist Quod si alchimicus vel magus scit aptare mineras ele- 15 succeeds in mentorum conmixtas proporcionaliter ad formam auri, mixing his elements aright, vel alicuius alterius mixti, dator forme non invidus God at once gives them the promptissime dabit formam. Et ille principaliter generat; form of gold ; for He it is who alii autem a natura vel artificio instrumentaliter disponunt works as prime materiam. Et sic patet veritas sentencie ex asumpto 20 Artificer in all things. God Mt. 3° ' Potens est deus de lapidibus istis suscitare filios Matth. could make a III, 9 Abrahe." Cum enim anima potest uniri cuicunque man of a stone, since He can materie, servata proporcione ad universam materiam, give a soul to anything. facile est deo proporcionare materiam lapidis in corpus hominis cuiuscunque per unionem anime cum eodem. 25 Nec obstat isti sensui quod sanctus propheta intellexit mistice, quod deus potest idem de induratis iudeis, ut lapides, vel de gentilibus contratiis, qui vocantur petra in scriptura, suscitare homines spiritualiter per graciam, faciendo eos filios Abrahe per imitacionem. Talis enim 30 A change may be either real or suscitacio per graciam direccius manifestaret] divinam A 61“ supposed; as when Nabucho- potenciam. Ex istis coligi potest quod dupliciter contingit donosor fancied himself to be intelligere transformacionem; vel substancialiter, vel a brute animal. 2. salem (sic) CD. 4. pertinentibus AC. 10. vel deest AB 11. Ispetis vim A; ib. vel deest 9. mineras A. 14. generatum 13. relucet in marg. BE; ib. vel deest D. ABD. BD; tb. ar A; alr BC ; ib. situatur D. 15. quod deest ABD; ib. after si a blank space for three words; ib. alchkimicus (!) E; ib. magu9 C; ib. apportare D; ib. municias; under mineras B. 17. commixti B. 19. ali- quando pro alii; ib. 1ſciter A. 20. sic deest ABC. 20, 21. quo affupto illo Mae 3° D. 21. inquit de BCD. 24. faciliter D; ib. eadem BCD. 26. obstet; corr. in red ink A; obest BCD. 27. idem deest B; vel pro idem D; ib. vel D. 28. vel deest D; ib. gentibus A; ib. 9tiis A; con- 30. mutacionem C. vertendis BCD; ib. petre ABD. 31. manifestare D. 31, 32. graciam potenciam D. 1. fuit BD; ib. latuit BD.
Strana 189
CAP. IV. DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 189 accidentaliter. Sic enim dicitur transformacio duplex quando homo transformatur, vel transformatur secundum rem vel opinionem vel utrumque, in vitam bestialem. Dan. Et talis creditur transmutacio Nabuchodonosor, Daniel 4°. IV, 30 Mansit enim suppositum humane nature per illud septennium; sed deus in pena peccati percussit eum tanta mania, quod putaret se secundum corpus con- versum in bestiam, ut contingit multis inanimatis. Possi- bile est eciam corpus hominis converti in corpus avis, vel 10 cuiuscunque alterius mixti; sed generaliter post mortem convertitur in terram, et sunt eadem elementa. Et ista vocatur transformacio substancialis, que non ponit possi- bilitatem huius, quod homo sit formaliter bestia, vel individuum unius speciei, individuum relique; cum non 15 sit possibile idem numero secundum formam converti in aliud ultime singularitatis, eo quod forma non potest converti in formam, si non equivocetur. Illud tamen secundum naturam potest converti in quodcunque, manens idem secundum materiam, ut post dicetur. De conver- 20 sione autem panis in corpus Christi, quam ecclesia vocat transsubstanciacionem, est longus sermo, et mihi adhuc inscrutabilis. Ulterius conceditur quod omnis generacio forme sub- stancialis materialis, cum sit mutacio, requirit subiectum 25 mutari; ut patet de virtute sermonis, cum omnis motus dicit mobile moveri, quod oportet esse aliquid, et non pure nichil. Ideo dicunt philosophi concorditer quod subiectum talis generacionis est materia prima. Sicut enim accidentalis transmutacio forme materialis requirit 3o subiectum in actu ens, ita transmutacio forme sub- stancialis requirit subiectum ens in potencia, scilicet Bur a man’s body may, after his death, become a bird or any other being. This transformation is substantial, and does not imply that a man, remaining man, becomes a brute. I will not here go into the question of Transubstan- tiation, which I have not yet solved. I admit that every substantial change is a change in the subject itself; that which remains unchanged is primal matter, or pure p. tentiality. Movement requires a complete, transmutation an incomplete entity. 2. quando deest A; ib. vel transformatur deest D. 1. sicut D. 6. permisit A. 7. causata(?) pro tanta A; ib. avaricia pro 4. X° A. . mania D; ib. putavit C. 8. maniacis C; animatis D. 9. vel deest D. 11. converti C; ib. terra A; ib. after converti in terra: est ca elementa, et illa vocatur transformacio, with a line in red ink drawn through A; ib. eadem in causa E. 12. substancialis deest A; ib. posseit BD; possit C. 15 unum in numero idem E. 14. huius C; ib. relique struck out D. 15.—17: converti — converti deest A. 16. illud pro aliud C; ib. singu- laris C. 17. equivoce ABC. 8. materiam in marg. B. 20. autem deest BDE; ib. in corpus deest AC. 20. accidentalis deest ABC; in marg. D; ib. forme materialis deest ABD. so. subiectum deest D. 31. scilicet deest BCD. 8. Is not inanimatis a translation of the common expression: Out of their minds ?
CAP. IV. DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 189 accidentaliter. Sic enim dicitur transformacio duplex quando homo transformatur, vel transformatur secundum rem vel opinionem vel utrumque, in vitam bestialem. Dan. Et talis creditur transmutacio Nabuchodonosor, Daniel 4°. IV, 30 Mansit enim suppositum humane nature per illud septennium; sed deus in pena peccati percussit eum tanta mania, quod putaret se secundum corpus con- versum in bestiam, ut contingit multis inanimatis. Possi- bile est eciam corpus hominis converti in corpus avis, vel 10 cuiuscunque alterius mixti; sed generaliter post mortem convertitur in terram, et sunt eadem elementa. Et ista vocatur transformacio substancialis, que non ponit possi- bilitatem huius, quod homo sit formaliter bestia, vel individuum unius speciei, individuum relique; cum non 15 sit possibile idem numero secundum formam converti in aliud ultime singularitatis, eo quod forma non potest converti in formam, si non equivocetur. Illud tamen secundum naturam potest converti in quodcunque, manens idem secundum materiam, ut post dicetur. De conver- 20 sione autem panis in corpus Christi, quam ecclesia vocat transsubstanciacionem, est longus sermo, et mihi adhuc inscrutabilis. Ulterius conceditur quod omnis generacio forme sub- stancialis materialis, cum sit mutacio, requirit subiectum 25 mutari; ut patet de virtute sermonis, cum omnis motus dicit mobile moveri, quod oportet esse aliquid, et non pure nichil. Ideo dicunt philosophi concorditer quod subiectum talis generacionis est materia prima. Sicut enim accidentalis transmutacio forme materialis requirit 3o subiectum in actu ens, ita transmutacio forme sub- stancialis requirit subiectum ens in potencia, scilicet Bur a man’s body may, after his death, become a bird or any other being. This transformation is substantial, and does not imply that a man, remaining man, becomes a brute. I will not here go into the question of Transubstan- tiation, which I have not yet solved. I admit that every substantial change is a change in the subject itself; that which remains unchanged is primal matter, or pure p. tentiality. Movement requires a complete, transmutation an incomplete entity. 2. quando deest A; ib. vel transformatur deest D. 1. sicut D. 6. permisit A. 7. causata(?) pro tanta A; ib. avaricia pro 4. X° A. . mania D; ib. putavit C. 8. maniacis C; animatis D. 9. vel deest D. 11. converti C; ib. terra A; ib. after converti in terra: est ca elementa, et illa vocatur transformacio, with a line in red ink drawn through A; ib. eadem in causa E. 12. substancialis deest A; ib. posseit BD; possit C. 15 unum in numero idem E. 14. huius C; ib. relique struck out D. 15.—17: converti — converti deest A. 16. illud pro aliud C; ib. singu- laris C. 17. equivoce ABC. 8. materiam in marg. B. 20. autem deest BDE; ib. in corpus deest AC. 20. accidentalis deest ABC; in marg. D; ib. forme materialis deest ABD. so. subiectum deest D. 31. scilicet deest BCD. 8. Is not inanimatis a translation of the common expression: Out of their minds ?
Strana 190
190 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. IV. materiam primam, ut dicitur 1° physicorum, et primo de generacione. Et ideo, cum omnis motus proprie dictus requirit subiectum ens actu per totum tempus ipsius motus, ex 5° physicorum, bene dicunt perypatetici quod generacio substancie non est motus proprie dictus, nec alteracio, ut dixerunt antiqui distingwentes inter formam I never well substancialem et accidentalem. Ista verba etsi sepe audivi understood et balbuciendo protuli, quando incepi philosophari, what this meant, until I was legendo libros Aristotelis, longe tamen fui a sensu ver- enlightened by Scripture and borum, sicud forte alii mihi similes, quousque fui pau- 1o the Fathers, especially lulum illustratus in noticia materie prime secundum Augustine. sensum scripture a sanctis doctoribus mihi expositum, After pointing et specialiter a beato Augustino, exponente illud Gen. 1° out the various ce In principio creavit Deus celum et terram." Pro ista senses of Substance, and sentencia declaranda, conformiter ad scripturam in qua assuming the creation of the omnis veritas philosophica, premittenda est, primo, huius world, I shall expound what nominis, substancia, equivocacio. Secundo, supponendus I have learned. est philosophicus articulus fidei de produccione mundi. Tercio, declarabitur sentencia scripture et philosophorum de materia prima. Pro quo notandum quod substancia nunc accipitur analoyce pro cuiuscunque rei quiditate, sive sit sub- stancia, sive quodcunque accidens. 'Substancia", inquit Comentator, 5° Methaphysice commento 15° “dicitur de illo quod datur ad interrogacionem factam per Quid? de unaquaque re; et hoc est substancia uniuscuiusque rei. Et conformiter loquitur apostolus, vocando substanciam, fidem. Et communitas scole vocat genus cuiusque rei per se in genere, substanciam eius; ut patet de acci- dentibus et similibus. Secundo modo, valde equivoce 30 dicitur deus substancia, essencia, vel natura, eo quod est ens per se stans, natura; et equivoce est ens in conparacione ad creaturam, et equivoce est per se, ut patet ex primo posteriorum de 4ta significacione rei per se. Deus enim, secundum Lincolniensem, est per se 35 negative, intelligendo talem proposicionem: Sed quelibet Thus the generation of a substance is no properly a movement, no an alteration. (1) Any answer to the question What? is sometimes called the substance of a thing; 1. e. its whatness, or essence. (2) God, a being self-existent, is called a substance, with the understood assumption of the dependence of all creatures upon Him. Gen. I, 1 15 20 A 61b 3. ipsius deest BCD. 4. before 1, 2. et — generacione deest CD. bene: unde struck out A; unde bene BD. 10. after forte: et BD; ib. 12. sen- mei pro mihi B; alij 44 m' C; deest D. 11. secundum deest D. sum deest A. 15. magis est pro conformiter — qua D. 18. phies arlus A. 24. com- 19. Et tercio BD. 22. before analoyce: nunc C. mento deest BD; ib. dicitur deest; ſup C. 26. rerum 25. per B. BCD. 32. nam et D. 33. per se deest AB. 36. ctalem = causalem pro talem D.
190 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. IV. materiam primam, ut dicitur 1° physicorum, et primo de generacione. Et ideo, cum omnis motus proprie dictus requirit subiectum ens actu per totum tempus ipsius motus, ex 5° physicorum, bene dicunt perypatetici quod generacio substancie non est motus proprie dictus, nec alteracio, ut dixerunt antiqui distingwentes inter formam I never well substancialem et accidentalem. Ista verba etsi sepe audivi understood et balbuciendo protuli, quando incepi philosophari, what this meant, until I was legendo libros Aristotelis, longe tamen fui a sensu ver- enlightened by Scripture and borum, sicud forte alii mihi similes, quousque fui pau- 1o the Fathers, especially lulum illustratus in noticia materie prime secundum Augustine. sensum scripture a sanctis doctoribus mihi expositum, After pointing et specialiter a beato Augustino, exponente illud Gen. 1° out the various ce In principio creavit Deus celum et terram." Pro ista senses of Substance, and sentencia declaranda, conformiter ad scripturam in qua assuming the creation of the omnis veritas philosophica, premittenda est, primo, huius world, I shall expound what nominis, substancia, equivocacio. Secundo, supponendus I have learned. est philosophicus articulus fidei de produccione mundi. Tercio, declarabitur sentencia scripture et philosophorum de materia prima. Pro quo notandum quod substancia nunc accipitur analoyce pro cuiuscunque rei quiditate, sive sit sub- stancia, sive quodcunque accidens. 'Substancia", inquit Comentator, 5° Methaphysice commento 15° “dicitur de illo quod datur ad interrogacionem factam per Quid? de unaquaque re; et hoc est substancia uniuscuiusque rei. Et conformiter loquitur apostolus, vocando substanciam, fidem. Et communitas scole vocat genus cuiusque rei per se in genere, substanciam eius; ut patet de acci- dentibus et similibus. Secundo modo, valde equivoce 30 dicitur deus substancia, essencia, vel natura, eo quod est ens per se stans, natura; et equivoce est ens in conparacione ad creaturam, et equivoce est per se, ut patet ex primo posteriorum de 4ta significacione rei per se. Deus enim, secundum Lincolniensem, est per se 35 negative, intelligendo talem proposicionem: Sed quelibet Thus the generation of a substance is no properly a movement, no an alteration. (1) Any answer to the question What? is sometimes called the substance of a thing; 1. e. its whatness, or essence. (2) God, a being self-existent, is called a substance, with the understood assumption of the dependence of all creatures upon Him. Gen. I, 1 15 20 A 61b 3. ipsius deest BCD. 4. before 1, 2. et — generacione deest CD. bene: unde struck out A; unde bene BD. 10. after forte: et BD; ib. 12. sen- mei pro mihi B; alij 44 m' C; deest D. 11. secundum deest D. sum deest A. 15. magis est pro conformiter — qua D. 18. phies arlus A. 24. com- 19. Et tercio BD. 22. before analoyce: nunc C. mento deest BD; ib. dicitur deest; ſup C. 26. rerum 25. per B. BCD. 32. nam et D. 33. per se deest AB. 36. ctalem = causalem pro talem D.
Strana 191
CAP. IV. DE MATERIA ET FORMA. creatura sibi inheret. Et iste est sensus beati Augustini, et concorditer aliorum philosophorum ponencium quod deus est prius naturaliter quam aliquod genus. Et sic est principium cuiuslibet generis. Tercio, dicitur sub- 5stancia de quacunque re primi generis, sive fuerit sin- gularis (quam Aristoteles vocat in predicamentis sub- stanciam primam, ut commentator exponit 5? Metha- physice, 15? commento), sive fuerit universalis; ut genus, species, et differencia; ut eciam loquitur Aristoteles cum 10 Commentatore, 7? Methaphysice, commento 7? et 33?. Et illa vocatur substancia secunda in predicamentis; et dividitur in genus, speciem et differenciam, ut patet 7? Methaphysice. Substancia autem singularis, sive cor- IgI (3) Everything in the first category, whether singular or universal, is a substance ; universal substance being divided into genera, species and differences. The existence of singular substances is generally porea, ut corpora simplicia, sive incorporea, ut spiritus agmitted by all 15 creatus, conceditur (ut nota), a communitate scole. Pio o Phet ao Quarto modo, dicitur substancia pro quocunque quod est fundamentum alteri; ut superficies albedini, linea! curvitati et quantitas et qualitas relacioni; et ut reor, ad huiusmodi similitudinem vocat scriptura utriusque 20testamenti bona fortune homini adiacencia subslanciam P hominis, quia debent sibi subici pro necessitatibus cor- rov. (4) Anything hat is reguired by another to exist goes by the name of substance; as wealth is called a man's substance, because it |i, o. Poris relevandis Unde Prov. 3? scribitur: honora deum ministers to his Luc. de tua substancia; et Luc. 15? da mihi porcionis sub- XV, 12 stanciam que me contingit. Sed quinto ac sexto accipitur 25pro materia et forma valde equivoce a priori. Et propter illam equivocacionem declarandam concordati sunt greci wants. (5) Form and (0) matter are often called substance, though in vocare materiam, formam et compositum ypostasim, widely different usiasim, et usiam. Latini eciam quidam vocant materiam subsistenciam, formam subinsistenciam et appropriate 3ocompositum substanciam, ut patet aphorismo ultimo Ursonis. Et hinc concordati sunt philosophi, cum solum res que potest per se esse sit in prima cathegoria, ct nec materia potest per se esse, patet quod non sit per se in genere substancie, cum non sit formaliter natura 35 completa, sed pars nature; sed ut pocius univoce sub- 4. tercio modo BD; ib. after dicitur: de A... 8. commento deest B. . diffinicio C. 12. distinguitur D; źb. diffinicionem BC. 18. et efore ut deest AC. 19. huiusmodi deest. AC. 23. 14* A; ib. pro- porcionis D. 25. ap'ori A. 26. grammatici C. 28. vífvoiv C; ib. ufyam C. 20. sbsistsm (very illegible) A; supersistenciam BD: superstanciam E; ib. pp'e'* A. 30. ultimo deest C. — 33. patet deest E; ib, cum E. — 35. ncc pro sed ut BD; ib. ponimus A. 35, 1. sub- stanciam D. 28. Usiasim. See Logica, III, 120. senses. Matter indeed, unable to exist without any form, only belongs to this category as being that of which a substance consists.
CAP. IV. DE MATERIA ET FORMA. creatura sibi inheret. Et iste est sensus beati Augustini, et concorditer aliorum philosophorum ponencium quod deus est prius naturaliter quam aliquod genus. Et sic est principium cuiuslibet generis. Tercio, dicitur sub- 5stancia de quacunque re primi generis, sive fuerit sin- gularis (quam Aristoteles vocat in predicamentis sub- stanciam primam, ut commentator exponit 5? Metha- physice, 15? commento), sive fuerit universalis; ut genus, species, et differencia; ut eciam loquitur Aristoteles cum 10 Commentatore, 7? Methaphysice, commento 7? et 33?. Et illa vocatur substancia secunda in predicamentis; et dividitur in genus, speciem et differenciam, ut patet 7? Methaphysice. Substancia autem singularis, sive cor- IgI (3) Everything in the first category, whether singular or universal, is a substance ; universal substance being divided into genera, species and differences. The existence of singular substances is generally porea, ut corpora simplicia, sive incorporea, ut spiritus agmitted by all 15 creatus, conceditur (ut nota), a communitate scole. Pio o Phet ao Quarto modo, dicitur substancia pro quocunque quod est fundamentum alteri; ut superficies albedini, linea! curvitati et quantitas et qualitas relacioni; et ut reor, ad huiusmodi similitudinem vocat scriptura utriusque 20testamenti bona fortune homini adiacencia subslanciam P hominis, quia debent sibi subici pro necessitatibus cor- rov. (4) Anything hat is reguired by another to exist goes by the name of substance; as wealth is called a man's substance, because it |i, o. Poris relevandis Unde Prov. 3? scribitur: honora deum ministers to his Luc. de tua substancia; et Luc. 15? da mihi porcionis sub- XV, 12 stanciam que me contingit. Sed quinto ac sexto accipitur 25pro materia et forma valde equivoce a priori. Et propter illam equivocacionem declarandam concordati sunt greci wants. (5) Form and (0) matter are often called substance, though in vocare materiam, formam et compositum ypostasim, widely different usiasim, et usiam. Latini eciam quidam vocant materiam subsistenciam, formam subinsistenciam et appropriate 3ocompositum substanciam, ut patet aphorismo ultimo Ursonis. Et hinc concordati sunt philosophi, cum solum res que potest per se esse sit in prima cathegoria, ct nec materia potest per se esse, patet quod non sit per se in genere substancie, cum non sit formaliter natura 35 completa, sed pars nature; sed ut pocius univoce sub- 4. tercio modo BD; ib. after dicitur: de A... 8. commento deest B. . diffinicio C. 12. distinguitur D; źb. diffinicionem BC. 18. et efore ut deest AC. 19. huiusmodi deest. AC. 23. 14* A; ib. pro- porcionis D. 25. ap'ori A. 26. grammatici C. 28. vífvoiv C; ib. ufyam C. 20. sbsistsm (very illegible) A; supersistenciam BD: superstanciam E; ib. pp'e'* A. 30. ultimo deest C. — 33. patet deest E; ib, cum E. — 35. ncc pro sed ut BD; ib. ponimus A. 35, 1. sub- stanciam D. 28. Usiasim. See Logica, III, 120. senses. Matter indeed, unable to exist without any form, only belongs to this category as being that of which a substance consists.
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192 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. IV. stancia cum corpore vel spiritu, quam deus: sed per reduccionem, ut in genere substancie cuius est prin- cipium, sicud deus in quolibet genere et qualibet creatura. We must Secundo, suppono auctorem nature in primo instanti 5 assume that the temporis creasse universam naturam corpoream, cuius world was created by God unam partem formavit in celum, aliam in terram; et at the first instant of time, sic de porcionibus quorumcunque corporum cuiuscunque as philosophy speciei. Patet illud ex dictis philosophie de creacione and Scripture teach us. mundi, quomodo oportet ipsum processisse in effeccionem 10 per creacionem a deo in primo instanti temporis. Patet A 62* eciam illud ex irrefragibili testimonio sacre scripture, Gen. 1° In principio Deus creavit celum et terram, tum exposicione sanctorum, et specialiter sancti Augustini, 12° de Confessione, ubi subtiliter et philosophice de- 15 clarat illam sentenciam. Ex istis patet, tercio, quod essencia vel natura cor- It follows that the essence of porea prius est antequam est ignis, aer vel quecunque things existed before the species substancie, quia non est in aliqua specie, nisi things themselves, per aliquam formam substancialem, qua est formaliter 20 since it quid, ut patet rectilogo; sed priusquam est sub qua- belonged to no species by itself, cunque tali forma, naturaliter est; ergo prius est quam only by means of forms. in aliqua specie. Minor patet ex hoc quod ad esse sub The reception tali specie presupponit esse receptivum talis forme; et of any form presupposes per consequens presupponitur essencia. Deus igitur 25 the existence of something able naturaliter produxit essenciam corpoream in existenciam, to receive it; for the question antequam foret eadem in quacunque luce (vel forma; Whether this quod idem est). Et hoc est quod dicunt philosophi: is? precedes the question quod sicud questio, si est? precedit questionem quid What is this ? est? ita essencia presupponit quiditatem, non tempore 30 sed natura. Essencia igitur in potencia, ex se indifferens ad quamcunque formam, est materia prima, de qua locuntur philosophi. Et sic prima materia, quam Com- mentator vocat fundamentum nature, dicitur esse prin- cipium dicte essencie, pro primo instanti nature; et 35 supperaddit potenciam, vel capacitatem ad totum genus Matter is the foundation of a substance, an existing receptivity. 8. cuiuscumque BC. 2. substancie deest C. 9. sicud patet pro patet illud BD; ib. philosophice BD. 10. quoniam B; ib. effectum D. 12. infringibili BD; ib. sacre deest A. 13. cum B. 18. after prius est: vel eciam ipsa natura corporea struck through with red ink A; not struck through C. 20. que ACD. 21. rtilogo A. 22. prius ergo prius ABD. 26. after in existenciam: corpoream struck through with red ink A. 30. precedit BCD. 31. I por A; ut 27. formavit BD; ib. eam D. 1 ponir B; igitur ponitur CD. 34. dicit D. 35. illo BD. 36. passi- onem ACD.
192 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. IV. stancia cum corpore vel spiritu, quam deus: sed per reduccionem, ut in genere substancie cuius est prin- cipium, sicud deus in quolibet genere et qualibet creatura. We must Secundo, suppono auctorem nature in primo instanti 5 assume that the temporis creasse universam naturam corpoream, cuius world was created by God unam partem formavit in celum, aliam in terram; et at the first instant of time, sic de porcionibus quorumcunque corporum cuiuscunque as philosophy speciei. Patet illud ex dictis philosophie de creacione and Scripture teach us. mundi, quomodo oportet ipsum processisse in effeccionem 10 per creacionem a deo in primo instanti temporis. Patet A 62* eciam illud ex irrefragibili testimonio sacre scripture, Gen. 1° In principio Deus creavit celum et terram, tum exposicione sanctorum, et specialiter sancti Augustini, 12° de Confessione, ubi subtiliter et philosophice de- 15 clarat illam sentenciam. Ex istis patet, tercio, quod essencia vel natura cor- It follows that the essence of porea prius est antequam est ignis, aer vel quecunque things existed before the species substancie, quia non est in aliqua specie, nisi things themselves, per aliquam formam substancialem, qua est formaliter 20 since it quid, ut patet rectilogo; sed priusquam est sub qua- belonged to no species by itself, cunque tali forma, naturaliter est; ergo prius est quam only by means of forms. in aliqua specie. Minor patet ex hoc quod ad esse sub The reception tali specie presupponit esse receptivum talis forme; et of any form presupposes per consequens presupponitur essencia. Deus igitur 25 the existence of something able naturaliter produxit essenciam corpoream in existenciam, to receive it; for the question antequam foret eadem in quacunque luce (vel forma; Whether this quod idem est). Et hoc est quod dicunt philosophi: is? precedes the question quod sicud questio, si est? precedit questionem quid What is this ? est? ita essencia presupponit quiditatem, non tempore 30 sed natura. Essencia igitur in potencia, ex se indifferens ad quamcunque formam, est materia prima, de qua locuntur philosophi. Et sic prima materia, quam Com- mentator vocat fundamentum nature, dicitur esse prin- cipium dicte essencie, pro primo instanti nature; et 35 supperaddit potenciam, vel capacitatem ad totum genus Matter is the foundation of a substance, an existing receptivity. 8. cuiuscumque BC. 2. substancie deest C. 9. sicud patet pro patet illud BD; ib. philosophice BD. 10. quoniam B; ib. effectum D. 12. infringibili BD; ib. sacre deest A. 13. cum B. 18. after prius est: vel eciam ipsa natura corporea struck through with red ink A; not struck through C. 20. que ACD. 21. rtilogo A. 22. prius ergo prius ABD. 26. after in existenciam: corpoream struck through with red ink A. 30. precedit BCD. 31. I por A; ut 27. formavit BD; ib. eam D. 1 ponir B; igitur ponitur CD. 34. dicit D. 35. illo BD. 36. passi- onem ACD.
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CAP. IV. forme corporee. Et patet quomodo intelligitur illud Aristotelis 5° Methaphysice, 8° commento, quod materia prima nec est secundum se vel formaliter quid, quantum, nec quale, nec aliquod aliorum encium predicabilium. Ipsa enim est ante formam, a qua capit esse quid vel quo- modolibet aliter accidentata. Ex istis claret mihi quare generacio substancie non It is quite clear now why the est motus proprie dictus; quia omnis talis motus pre- production of substance is not supponit naturaliter unum aliquid, et substanciam per a movement, for that which 10 se in specie, quod illo motu formaliter moveatur. Sed is moved must respectu nullius generacionis huiusmodi est tale sub- be complete as an actual iectum significabile. Ideo nulla talis generacio est motus substance, proprie dictus; quia omnis talis motus presupponit na- turaliter unum aliquid, id est substanciam per se in specie, que illo motu moveatur formaliter. Sed in gene- racione, corpus ex quo aliquid generatur corrumpitur adveniente nova forma, et per consequens non defert talem motum. Et essencia [est] communis utrique ter- minorum solum secundum esse primum et non secundum 20 esse quid; cum aliquid sit prius, aliquid posterius. Ideo non est dare quid moveretur, licet sit dare rem que movetur. Patet igitur veridica sentencia Aristotelis, primo Physicorum, commento sexto, quod sicut motus quo aquiritur forma accidentalis requirit ens in actu, sic motus quo aquiritur forma substancialis requirit subiectum ens in potencia et naturam corpoream precedentem naturaliter Matter is not omnem formam huiusmodi. Et patet quod subiectum pro properly the tali mensura nature non est substancia nisi equivoce, substance which it underlies, ad primum sensum, et non ad tercium; cum non se- except in the 3o cundum tale esse sit per se in genere, sed presuppositum first sense above given. ad genus substancie corporee. Et ulterius, quando argu- It may be objected that mentatur formam esse huiusmodi accidens, conceditur form is an accident to aliquo modo, ut divicie accedunt homini, et universitas matter. creata accedit deo modo quo loquitur scriptura, vere ponens quod omnia contingencia accidunt alicui stabili fundamento. Unde Prov. 12° “Non contristabit iustum quidquid ei acciderit;" ubi notum est non solum fieri This explains Aristotle's definition of matter. and that which is produced requires only the possibility of its production ; what is common in the change of one substance into another is a potential existing thing. 5 15 25 DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 193 35 Prov. XII, 21 A 62b So it is, taken thus ; but we suppose that accidental 2. Aristotelis deest D; ib. 8° 8° D; ib. commento deest BCD. 3. vel 5. recipiet in marg. B; caperet CD. 9. id est pro pro nec BCD. et BD. 12. sigle = signale? A. 14. et pro id est AC. 16. aliud BD. 18. est deest ABCD. 20. esse deest A; ib. afler prius: et aliquid BD; 26. ad naturam C; ib. id est B; in- 21. moveatur BD. et aliud C. corpoream ACD. 27. quod tale BCD. 29. secundum pro primum C. 33. quo pro aliquo D. 33—34. aliquo — modo deest AC. 35. contin- 37. quid CD; ib. accidet D. genter ABC. 13
CAP. IV. forme corporee. Et patet quomodo intelligitur illud Aristotelis 5° Methaphysice, 8° commento, quod materia prima nec est secundum se vel formaliter quid, quantum, nec quale, nec aliquod aliorum encium predicabilium. Ipsa enim est ante formam, a qua capit esse quid vel quo- modolibet aliter accidentata. Ex istis claret mihi quare generacio substancie non It is quite clear now why the est motus proprie dictus; quia omnis talis motus pre- production of substance is not supponit naturaliter unum aliquid, et substanciam per a movement, for that which 10 se in specie, quod illo motu formaliter moveatur. Sed is moved must respectu nullius generacionis huiusmodi est tale sub- be complete as an actual iectum significabile. Ideo nulla talis generacio est motus substance, proprie dictus; quia omnis talis motus presupponit na- turaliter unum aliquid, id est substanciam per se in specie, que illo motu moveatur formaliter. Sed in gene- racione, corpus ex quo aliquid generatur corrumpitur adveniente nova forma, et per consequens non defert talem motum. Et essencia [est] communis utrique ter- minorum solum secundum esse primum et non secundum 20 esse quid; cum aliquid sit prius, aliquid posterius. Ideo non est dare quid moveretur, licet sit dare rem que movetur. Patet igitur veridica sentencia Aristotelis, primo Physicorum, commento sexto, quod sicut motus quo aquiritur forma accidentalis requirit ens in actu, sic motus quo aquiritur forma substancialis requirit subiectum ens in potencia et naturam corpoream precedentem naturaliter Matter is not omnem formam huiusmodi. Et patet quod subiectum pro properly the tali mensura nature non est substancia nisi equivoce, substance which it underlies, ad primum sensum, et non ad tercium; cum non se- except in the 3o cundum tale esse sit per se in genere, sed presuppositum first sense above given. ad genus substancie corporee. Et ulterius, quando argu- It may be objected that mentatur formam esse huiusmodi accidens, conceditur form is an accident to aliquo modo, ut divicie accedunt homini, et universitas matter. creata accedit deo modo quo loquitur scriptura, vere ponens quod omnia contingencia accidunt alicui stabili fundamento. Unde Prov. 12° “Non contristabit iustum quidquid ei acciderit;" ubi notum est non solum fieri This explains Aristotle's definition of matter. and that which is produced requires only the possibility of its production ; what is common in the change of one substance into another is a potential existing thing. 5 15 25 DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 193 35 Prov. XII, 21 A 62b So it is, taken thus ; but we suppose that accidental 2. Aristotelis deest D; ib. 8° 8° D; ib. commento deest BCD. 3. vel 5. recipiet in marg. B; caperet CD. 9. id est pro pro nec BCD. et BD. 12. sigle = signale? A. 14. et pro id est AC. 16. aliud BD. 18. est deest ABCD. 20. esse deest A; ib. afler prius: et aliquid BD; 26. ad naturam C; ib. id est B; in- 21. moveatur BD. et aliud C. corpoream ACD. 27. quod tale BCD. 29. secundum pro primum C. 33. quo pro aliquo D. 33—34. aliquo — modo deest AC. 35. contin- 37. quid CD; ib. accidet D. genter ABC. 13
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194 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. IV. distinccionem pro forma inherente. Verumtamen non est dare aliquod subiectum per se quod vocatur a philosophis ens in actu, cui accidat prima forma sub- stancialis; et solum talis forma, accidens rei in actu, que prius naturaliter est quid, vocatur forma accidentalis 5 alicuius novem generum. Et patet quomodo intelligendus est commentator 7° Methaphysice, commento 4° et 5°, ubi dicit quamlibet formam esse disposicionem essencie; et formam principi- antem substanciam vocat disposicionem substancialem; 10 formam autem presupponentem quiditatem substancie, vocat disposicionem accidentalem. Omnes enim forme in natura presupponunt subiectum, et in hoc conveniunt quod quelibet est contingens, vel accidentaliter adveniens subiecto; ut patet 7° Metaphysice, commento 8°. Patet 15 eciam quomodo intelligitur commentator 7° Methaphysice, commento 18° quod si materia prima haberet de se aliquam formam, nullam substancialem reciperet; quia omne quod advenit enti in actu est accidens." Tales sunt multe proposiciones antiquitus famose, quarum sensus 20 expositus est propinquus per se notis. Et si queratur quid generatur tali forma receptiva, si If it be said that the receptivity est generaliter passiva, dicitur quod claudit contra- possessed by matter is a diccionem aliquam talem formam esse, nisi denominet form, and subiectum, et aliquod generari formaliter; et illud est 25 therefore we have a complete substancia, que in fine est primo completa. Illa enim substance generated: successive et partibiliter generatur. Et si instetur quod I reply that every form talis substancia interim non est, ergo non subiectat implies both the generacionem; negatur assumptum, quia est tam secundum subiect and the thing produced naturam quam secundum partem quantitativam. Et sic 30 which the subject habet esse successivum dum est in generari, secundum underlies. quod esse subiectat generacionem huiusmodi successivam. Nor can we suppose that in Verumtamen inpossibile est motum esse, nisi innitatur the interval between the alicui fixo, habenti esse permanens; et ista essencia de- arrival of one nominatur moveri dicta generacione, denominante dictam 35 form and the disparition of substanciam generari; et ita generari, vel generacio de- the other, matter does not exist: for it exists as the subject of the change taking place. We cannot conceive movement save as being in something actual and permanent. Every form implies a subject; if absolutely potential, the form gives something substantial to its subject; if the subject be actual already, what it adds is accidental. 3. illa pro prima BCD. 1. distribucionem BD. 4. forma est A. 17. primo C. 5. quod AD. 15—17. 8°—18° deest BD. 15. 1410 D. 19. in deest C. 20. proposiciones philosophice BD; habite C; ib. anti- 22. queri- quitate D; tb. quia C. 21. propinqus A; propinquior BD. 23. gene- tur BC; ib. quar C; ib. respectiva ABCD; ib. quod pro si. 25. et before aliquod deest AC; ib. formaliter deest BD. ralicio B. 30. materiam CD; ib. quali- 26. primo est AC. 27. particulariter C. tativam E. 32. after Verumtamen cum BCD. 21. generacione BD. 35, 36. dum cunet dictam causam A. 36. generatur A; generaliter CD ; ib. vel deest D. forms supervene only on complete substances.
194 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. IV. distinccionem pro forma inherente. Verumtamen non est dare aliquod subiectum per se quod vocatur a philosophis ens in actu, cui accidat prima forma sub- stancialis; et solum talis forma, accidens rei in actu, que prius naturaliter est quid, vocatur forma accidentalis 5 alicuius novem generum. Et patet quomodo intelligendus est commentator 7° Methaphysice, commento 4° et 5°, ubi dicit quamlibet formam esse disposicionem essencie; et formam principi- antem substanciam vocat disposicionem substancialem; 10 formam autem presupponentem quiditatem substancie, vocat disposicionem accidentalem. Omnes enim forme in natura presupponunt subiectum, et in hoc conveniunt quod quelibet est contingens, vel accidentaliter adveniens subiecto; ut patet 7° Metaphysice, commento 8°. Patet 15 eciam quomodo intelligitur commentator 7° Methaphysice, commento 18° quod si materia prima haberet de se aliquam formam, nullam substancialem reciperet; quia omne quod advenit enti in actu est accidens." Tales sunt multe proposiciones antiquitus famose, quarum sensus 20 expositus est propinquus per se notis. Et si queratur quid generatur tali forma receptiva, si If it be said that the receptivity est generaliter passiva, dicitur quod claudit contra- possessed by matter is a diccionem aliquam talem formam esse, nisi denominet form, and subiectum, et aliquod generari formaliter; et illud est 25 therefore we have a complete substancia, que in fine est primo completa. Illa enim substance generated: successive et partibiliter generatur. Et si instetur quod I reply that every form talis substancia interim non est, ergo non subiectat implies both the generacionem; negatur assumptum, quia est tam secundum subiect and the thing produced naturam quam secundum partem quantitativam. Et sic 30 which the subject habet esse successivum dum est in generari, secundum underlies. quod esse subiectat generacionem huiusmodi successivam. Nor can we suppose that in Verumtamen inpossibile est motum esse, nisi innitatur the interval between the alicui fixo, habenti esse permanens; et ista essencia de- arrival of one nominatur moveri dicta generacione, denominante dictam 35 form and the disparition of substanciam generari; et ita generari, vel generacio de- the other, matter does not exist: for it exists as the subject of the change taking place. We cannot conceive movement save as being in something actual and permanent. Every form implies a subject; if absolutely potential, the form gives something substantial to its subject; if the subject be actual already, what it adds is accidental. 3. illa pro prima BCD. 1. distribucionem BD. 4. forma est A. 17. primo C. 5. quod AD. 15—17. 8°—18° deest BD. 15. 1410 D. 19. in deest C. 20. proposiciones philosophice BD; habite C; ib. anti- 22. queri- quitate D; tb. quia C. 21. propinqus A; propinquior BD. 23. gene- tur BC; ib. quar C; ib. respectiva ABCD; ib. quod pro si. 25. et before aliquod deest AC; ib. formaliter deest BD. ralicio B. 30. materiam CD; ib. quali- 26. primo est AC. 27. particulariter C. tativam E. 32. after Verumtamen cum BCD. 21. generacione BD. 35, 36. dum cunet dictam causam A. 36. generatur A; generaliter CD ; ib. vel deest D. forms supervene only on complete substances.
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CAP. IV. DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 195 10 А 633 25 30 nominat subiectum suum proximum specialiter generari. Subiectum autem motus generacionis vel augmentacionis denominat generaliter maiorari. Commentator tamen vocat illam generacionem “denominacionem secundum quid"; quia sicud res, quando calescit, non fit, licet fiat calida, sic materia prima induit formam et fit materia ignis, quod est sibi accidentale. Nec tamen est possibile quod materia prima sit formaliter ignis, vel quecunque substancia (loquendo formaliter et univoce), licet sit eadem essencia que est materia, forma, et compo- situm; ut patebit post, in solucione argumentorum loycalium concernencium istam materiam. Ex illis potest patere sentencia quam dixi in materia We see that in all material de trinitate, quod in qualibet natura corporea nobis bodies there is a vestige of the 15 relucet, licet obscure, vestigium trinitatis. Non enim est Trinity. Matter is that of possibile aliquod esse corpusculum, nisi ipsum habeat which the form and the essenciam que communiter sit materia, forma, et com- compound positum (vel composicio) simul, sicud essencia divina result, as the Father is that of est pater et filius et spiritus sanctus; ita quod materia which the Son 20 correspondet patri, ex quo est filius, sicud ex materia and the Spirit are ; form est forma; forma autem correspondet filio; et amborum corresponding to the Son, and composicio correspondet spiritui sancto, qui est amor the compound patris ad filium. Non tamen intelligendum est quod una to the Spirit; though all three persona divina appropriate] causat materiam, et alia Persons concurred in appropriate causat formam, cum opera trinitatis sunt the creation of ad extra indivisa; quia claudit contradiccionem unam each. illarum personarum quidquid operari, nisi ipsum sit cooperatum a qualibet earum communiter, verumtamen speciale respresentacione exemplata. Inducit nos materia in cognicionem patris, et forma cognicionem filii, et compo- sicio cognicionem spiritus sancti. Et cum relativorum no- ticie se mutuo gignunt, patet quod harum naturarum no- ticia arguit secundarie noticiam alicuius persone colorate. Here we have not absolute but relative generation ; a thing heated does not become a thing, but it becomes hot. Other objections will be solved later. 2. vel augmentacionis deest ABC. 3. autem BD. 4. denomina- cionem generacionem BD. 6. fiet C; ib. sicut D; ib. primum ABC; ib. et sic pro et fit D. 8. forma AC. 11. patet C. 12. 9t'nciu A; 9c'eneciu B. 13. Et ex BD. 14. creatura D. 22. corundem pro correspondet A. 26. quod ABCD. 29. reputacione A; ib. Induit AC. 29. in deest CD. 33. ſcdaie = secundarie A. 33. corroborate B; colo'ata in marg. B; corrobet; colorate in marg. D. 2. Motus generacionis. Generation (or production) is a sort of movement, according to Aristotle. 14. De Trinitate. The fourth treatise of the second Book of De Ente, not yet published. 34. Colorate seems to be nonsense, but I have let it stand, as the other readings are no better. 13 *
CAP. IV. DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 195 10 А 633 25 30 nominat subiectum suum proximum specialiter generari. Subiectum autem motus generacionis vel augmentacionis denominat generaliter maiorari. Commentator tamen vocat illam generacionem “denominacionem secundum quid"; quia sicud res, quando calescit, non fit, licet fiat calida, sic materia prima induit formam et fit materia ignis, quod est sibi accidentale. Nec tamen est possibile quod materia prima sit formaliter ignis, vel quecunque substancia (loquendo formaliter et univoce), licet sit eadem essencia que est materia, forma, et compo- situm; ut patebit post, in solucione argumentorum loycalium concernencium istam materiam. Ex illis potest patere sentencia quam dixi in materia We see that in all material de trinitate, quod in qualibet natura corporea nobis bodies there is a vestige of the 15 relucet, licet obscure, vestigium trinitatis. Non enim est Trinity. Matter is that of possibile aliquod esse corpusculum, nisi ipsum habeat which the form and the essenciam que communiter sit materia, forma, et com- compound positum (vel composicio) simul, sicud essencia divina result, as the Father is that of est pater et filius et spiritus sanctus; ita quod materia which the Son 20 correspondet patri, ex quo est filius, sicud ex materia and the Spirit are ; form est forma; forma autem correspondet filio; et amborum corresponding to the Son, and composicio correspondet spiritui sancto, qui est amor the compound patris ad filium. Non tamen intelligendum est quod una to the Spirit; though all three persona divina appropriate] causat materiam, et alia Persons concurred in appropriate causat formam, cum opera trinitatis sunt the creation of ad extra indivisa; quia claudit contradiccionem unam each. illarum personarum quidquid operari, nisi ipsum sit cooperatum a qualibet earum communiter, verumtamen speciale respresentacione exemplata. Inducit nos materia in cognicionem patris, et forma cognicionem filii, et compo- sicio cognicionem spiritus sancti. Et cum relativorum no- ticie se mutuo gignunt, patet quod harum naturarum no- ticia arguit secundarie noticiam alicuius persone colorate. Here we have not absolute but relative generation ; a thing heated does not become a thing, but it becomes hot. Other objections will be solved later. 2. vel augmentacionis deest ABC. 3. autem BD. 4. denomina- cionem generacionem BD. 6. fiet C; ib. sicut D; ib. primum ABC; ib. et sic pro et fit D. 8. forma AC. 11. patet C. 12. 9t'nciu A; 9c'eneciu B. 13. Et ex BD. 14. creatura D. 22. corundem pro correspondet A. 26. quod ABCD. 29. reputacione A; ib. Induit AC. 29. in deest CD. 33. ſcdaie = secundarie A. 33. corroborate B; colo'ata in marg. B; corrobet; colorate in marg. D. 2. Motus generacionis. Generation (or production) is a sort of movement, according to Aristotle. 14. De Trinitate. The fourth treatise of the second Book of De Ente, not yet published. 34. Colorate seems to be nonsense, but I have let it stand, as the other readings are no better. 13 *
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196 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. V. Differencia autem magna est in illo vestigio exemplato Yet there is a great difference ad formam trinitatis, cum hic sint due nature, quarum between the Trinity and its prior est perpetua et imperfecta; secunda est temporalis vestige ; matter, form and et priore perfeccior. Tercia autem est perfectissima, et compound are finis utriusque. In hac autem trinitate benedicta nichil5 unequal in perfection, and est natura prius aut posterius; nichil in bonitate, po- not coeval; the Divine Persons tencia aut duracione, aut in virtute, inmensitate vel alio are equal in all attributo magis aut minus: Ideo dicunt doctores sancti things. A body is not quod corpus non est trinum sed triplex, propter ter- triune but threefold ; it is narium naturarum, que non possunt esse in deo. Non 10 not, like our ergo est corpus ymago vel ad ymaginem trinitatis, sicud soul, the image of the Trinity, homo interior, sed vestigium trinitatis, per quod recte only its vestige. philosophantes manuduci possunt ad convincendum deum esse trinum et unum. Et sic possunt demonstrare a signo ex qualibet creatura. Unde contendentes in ista 15 conclusione expediret primo a bassiore incipere, ut a loyca de universalibus et de gradibus individuacionis, a sentencia philosophica de materia, forma, et composito, ac tercio methaphysica entis in communi, cum eius tribus quasi passionibus, scilicet, uno, vero et bono. 20 Tunc enim essent capaces huius doctrine perspicue. But we ought first to study less sublime matters, and ascend gradually. CAPITULUM QUINTUM. A second Secundo, principaliter instatur per hoc quod innui, objection is that either matter quamlibet naturam corpoream esse eque simplicem, et and form are per consequens nec materiam nec formam esse distinctas 25 not distinct, or we must deny naturas in corpore. Sequitur enim expositorie: "illa the value of the natura singularissima est tam materia quam forma (ut expositorial syllogism. superius innui); ergo materia est forma." Aliter enim pari evidencia diceretur quod nullibi valet silogismus expositorius; et per consequens, cum iste sit principium 30 sylogismi in veritate, periret omnis forma sylogistica. 4. Illa pro tercia A. 7. inmensitate deest ABCD. 15. concedentes ABC. 18. de 16. affiori A; alciori B; abbassiori C; ab alciori D. deest ACD. 20. communibus pro quasi BD. 21. Cap. 5 next line after doctrine: quamlibet perspicue naturam D; in marg. in red ink Boh Day Wuclefowy nebeske kralewstwye A. 22. Capitulum quintum deest : initial S in red ink AB. 23. invit C; innuitur BD. r 27. simplicissima D. 28. innuitur BCD. 31. in vero A; quelibet per consequens pro in vero C. 30. The expositorial syllogism has all its terms singular, the middle term having the force, though not the form, of univer- sality. Thus: This man is Lord Salisbury; This man is Prime minister of England: Lord Salisbury is Prime minister of Eng-
196 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. V. Differencia autem magna est in illo vestigio exemplato Yet there is a great difference ad formam trinitatis, cum hic sint due nature, quarum between the Trinity and its prior est perpetua et imperfecta; secunda est temporalis vestige ; matter, form and et priore perfeccior. Tercia autem est perfectissima, et compound are finis utriusque. In hac autem trinitate benedicta nichil5 unequal in perfection, and est natura prius aut posterius; nichil in bonitate, po- not coeval; the Divine Persons tencia aut duracione, aut in virtute, inmensitate vel alio are equal in all attributo magis aut minus: Ideo dicunt doctores sancti things. A body is not quod corpus non est trinum sed triplex, propter ter- triune but threefold ; it is narium naturarum, que non possunt esse in deo. Non 10 not, like our ergo est corpus ymago vel ad ymaginem trinitatis, sicud soul, the image of the Trinity, homo interior, sed vestigium trinitatis, per quod recte only its vestige. philosophantes manuduci possunt ad convincendum deum esse trinum et unum. Et sic possunt demonstrare a signo ex qualibet creatura. Unde contendentes in ista 15 conclusione expediret primo a bassiore incipere, ut a loyca de universalibus et de gradibus individuacionis, a sentencia philosophica de materia, forma, et composito, ac tercio methaphysica entis in communi, cum eius tribus quasi passionibus, scilicet, uno, vero et bono. 20 Tunc enim essent capaces huius doctrine perspicue. But we ought first to study less sublime matters, and ascend gradually. CAPITULUM QUINTUM. A second Secundo, principaliter instatur per hoc quod innui, objection is that either matter quamlibet naturam corpoream esse eque simplicem, et and form are per consequens nec materiam nec formam esse distinctas 25 not distinct, or we must deny naturas in corpore. Sequitur enim expositorie: "illa the value of the natura singularissima est tam materia quam forma (ut expositorial syllogism. superius innui); ergo materia est forma." Aliter enim pari evidencia diceretur quod nullibi valet silogismus expositorius; et per consequens, cum iste sit principium 30 sylogismi in veritate, periret omnis forma sylogistica. 4. Illa pro tercia A. 7. inmensitate deest ABCD. 15. concedentes ABC. 18. de 16. affiori A; alciori B; abbassiori C; ab alciori D. deest ACD. 20. communibus pro quasi BD. 21. Cap. 5 next line after doctrine: quamlibet perspicue naturam D; in marg. in red ink Boh Day Wuclefowy nebeske kralewstwye A. 22. Capitulum quintum deest : initial S in red ink AB. 23. invit C; innuitur BD. r 27. simplicissima D. 28. innuitur BCD. 31. in vero A; quelibet per consequens pro in vero C. 30. The expositorial syllogism has all its terms singular, the middle term having the force, though not the form, of univer- sality. Thus: This man is Lord Salisbury; This man is Prime minister of England: Lord Salisbury is Prime minister of Eng-
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CAP. V. DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 197 A 633 Nec valet illud triplex exemplum positum superius ad declarandum defectum huius sylogismi, cum sic in- duceretur ignotum. Nam essenciam divinam esse trinam solum fide supra vires naturales concipimus. Et se- 5 cundum exemplum de universalibus videtur esse inpro- batum ab Aristotele, et communiter philosophancium ab inicio. Et quoad tercium exemplum de humanitate in Cristo, quod sit persona verbi assumens, communitas scole moderne dicit hoc esse inpossibile. Non igitur to manuducuntur per illud triplex exemplum ad negandum sylogismum expositorium, cum multa sunt concedenda in materia de trinitate beata, que sunt neganda in materia creata. Et confirmatur ex hoc quod, si materia et forma sunt due nature distincte, tunc plus differunt quam duo individua eiusdem speciei specialissime, quoniam omnia talia sunt eiusdem nature. Si ergo duo individua non possunt ydemptificari in aliquo tercio individuo singulari, multo minus dicte due nature, plus differentes. Sed videtur, cum materia sit substancia longa, lata et pro- 20 funda, sicud et forma materialis coextensa, quod utrum- que sit corpus, et sic duo corpora incommunicancia coextensa sunt. Et per consequens termini predicati de illis naturis tam disparibus forent species ex opposito distincte in genere corporis, cum res per eos signate plus 25 differunt quam homo et asinus; quia illi communicant in proprio genere, non sic autem materia et forma. Nec facit situalis extensio convenienciam in essencia, quia sic beatus extensus cum celo, subiectum cum accidente, vel unum unius generis cum alio, faceret 30 convenienciam in natura. Nec facit convenienciam quoad illud compositum, quia tunc dicerentur partes eterogenee, sicud elementa specie distincta. Ymmo, secundum philo- sophos, ex substancia et accidente est unum agregatum compositum. For the examples above given explain the unknown by the unknown. The Trinity is a mystery of faith; the reality of universals is denied by most philosophers; and the doctrine of Christ's humanity being the Word is also generally rejected. If matter and form are two distinct natures, they differ more than two individuals of the same species. Both being extended things, they are bodies ; thus two very different bodies occupy the same part of space ; which occupation by no means implies their forming one compound, of which they would be merely heterogeneous parts. 3. per ignocius CD; per ignorans ABC. 2, 3. sit inducere A. 5. esse deest B. 6. per communitatem C; zquire D. 4. fides AC. 7. ab recco B; ab r'teo D. 8. personam B; ib. ut communitas BD. 12, 13. in materia creata 12. sed pro que ABCE. 11. non sunt A. deest AD. 13. et before confirmatur deest BD. 15. specificative A. 18. magis B. 19. quod materia cum ABC. 16. sunt deest D. 25. conveniunt BC. 29. faceret 24. distinccione D; ib. prius ABC. 31. integrat idem pro illud BCD; ad ABC. 30. inconvenienciam AC. ib. differunt BCD. 32. specifice B. 33. fit D. land. It is called the principle or basis of all syllogisms, because every syllogism may be supposed to be made up of a number of these.
CAP. V. DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 197 A 633 Nec valet illud triplex exemplum positum superius ad declarandum defectum huius sylogismi, cum sic in- duceretur ignotum. Nam essenciam divinam esse trinam solum fide supra vires naturales concipimus. Et se- 5 cundum exemplum de universalibus videtur esse inpro- batum ab Aristotele, et communiter philosophancium ab inicio. Et quoad tercium exemplum de humanitate in Cristo, quod sit persona verbi assumens, communitas scole moderne dicit hoc esse inpossibile. Non igitur to manuducuntur per illud triplex exemplum ad negandum sylogismum expositorium, cum multa sunt concedenda in materia de trinitate beata, que sunt neganda in materia creata. Et confirmatur ex hoc quod, si materia et forma sunt due nature distincte, tunc plus differunt quam duo individua eiusdem speciei specialissime, quoniam omnia talia sunt eiusdem nature. Si ergo duo individua non possunt ydemptificari in aliquo tercio individuo singulari, multo minus dicte due nature, plus differentes. Sed videtur, cum materia sit substancia longa, lata et pro- 20 funda, sicud et forma materialis coextensa, quod utrum- que sit corpus, et sic duo corpora incommunicancia coextensa sunt. Et per consequens termini predicati de illis naturis tam disparibus forent species ex opposito distincte in genere corporis, cum res per eos signate plus 25 differunt quam homo et asinus; quia illi communicant in proprio genere, non sic autem materia et forma. Nec facit situalis extensio convenienciam in essencia, quia sic beatus extensus cum celo, subiectum cum accidente, vel unum unius generis cum alio, faceret 30 convenienciam in natura. Nec facit convenienciam quoad illud compositum, quia tunc dicerentur partes eterogenee, sicud elementa specie distincta. Ymmo, secundum philo- sophos, ex substancia et accidente est unum agregatum compositum. For the examples above given explain the unknown by the unknown. The Trinity is a mystery of faith; the reality of universals is denied by most philosophers; and the doctrine of Christ's humanity being the Word is also generally rejected. If matter and form are two distinct natures, they differ more than two individuals of the same species. Both being extended things, they are bodies ; thus two very different bodies occupy the same part of space ; which occupation by no means implies their forming one compound, of which they would be merely heterogeneous parts. 3. per ignocius CD; per ignorans ABC. 2, 3. sit inducere A. 5. esse deest B. 6. per communitatem C; zquire D. 4. fides AC. 7. ab recco B; ab r'teo D. 8. personam B; ib. ut communitas BD. 12, 13. in materia creata 12. sed pro que ABCE. 11. non sunt A. deest AD. 13. et before confirmatur deest BD. 15. specificative A. 18. magis B. 19. quod materia cum ABC. 16. sunt deest D. 25. conveniunt BC. 29. faceret 24. distinccione D; ib. prius ABC. 31. integrat idem pro illud BCD; ad ABC. 30. inconvenienciam AC. ib. differunt BCD. 32. specifice B. 33. fit D. land. It is called the principle or basis of all syllogisms, because every syllogism may be supposed to be made up of a number of these.
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198 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. V. (5) for whatever action proceeds from nature; Ad illud dicitur quod necesse est eamdem essenciam singularem esse materiam, formam, et compositum ex hiis; et tamen nullum eorum est reliquum formaliter. Pro cuius declaracione necesse est prelibatam sentenciam de universalibus et distinccione formarum accidentalium 5 supponere, quia aliter non caperetur sentencia philo- sophorum in hac parte. Quibus suppositis cum sentencia supra dicta de materia prima, oportet primo notare distinccionem nature, secundo, oportet notare distinc- cionem de simplicitate, et tercio ponere distinccionem 10 sive differenciam inter materiam et formam substan- cialem: quibus habitis, patebit responsio. Pro quo notandum secundum philosophum, 5° Metha- physice, cap. 1°, quod natura" est equivocum ad septem. Primo namque omnis essencia vel substancia dicitur 15 natura; et sic anoloyce competit deo et cuicunque per se in genere, scilicet, ut dictum est de substancia. Secundo, accipitur pro re per se in primo predicamento, sive fuerit substancia corporea, sive incorporea, sive universalis, sive singularis. Et isto modo loquitur com-20 muniter scola theologorum de natura angelica et humana, cum ceteris naturis substanciarum. Et sic loquitur commentator 11° Methaphysice, commento 4to, vocando humanitatem naturam hominis; et illo modo dicunt theologi humanitatem integram, constitutam ex corpore 25 et anima, esse assumptam a Verbo, ut patet in simbolo et per Augustinum, 83 questionum, questione 81, et alibi in multis locis. Natura sic accepta est contraccior quam natura primo modo dicta. Tercio modo dicitur natura, vel creatura, pro materia; et quarto modo pro forma; 30 ut patet secundo physicorum, et primo. Et ille signi- ficaciones sunt equivoce respectu priorum, cum materia non possit de dei potencia esse sine forma, nec forma materialis sine materia. Quinto accipitur natura pro genitura, vel pro nativitate, vel pro quocunque alio 35 motu procedente a natura. Sic enim significant abstracta (6) for anything conformis terminacionis. Sexto modo accipitur essen- resulting from such action; (3) For matter, (4) for form; We shall first note the various senses of the word nature, then those of simplicity; and finally, point out the distinction between matter and form. Nature has seven significations. (1) It means any essence whatever. Answer. Neither matter nor form nor compound is identical one with another, though they form the same essence. (2) It is taken for substance in the first category. 1. ncce = necessitate? A. 3. corpus ABC; core = eorum or 5. et de C. 6. supponere in corpus D. 4. est superius BED. g marg. A; deest BCD. 9. nature deest ACD. 10, 11. distinccionem sive deest BC. 16. convenit BCD. 17. scilicet deest BD; ib. de deest D. 30. capitur 23. 7° CD. 26. rem pro esse C. 27. qonn qoue 98m E. 37. modo 35. ntite A; natimte B. pro creature BC. 31. et deest C. deest C.
198 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. V. (5) for whatever action proceeds from nature; Ad illud dicitur quod necesse est eamdem essenciam singularem esse materiam, formam, et compositum ex hiis; et tamen nullum eorum est reliquum formaliter. Pro cuius declaracione necesse est prelibatam sentenciam de universalibus et distinccione formarum accidentalium 5 supponere, quia aliter non caperetur sentencia philo- sophorum in hac parte. Quibus suppositis cum sentencia supra dicta de materia prima, oportet primo notare distinccionem nature, secundo, oportet notare distinc- cionem de simplicitate, et tercio ponere distinccionem 10 sive differenciam inter materiam et formam substan- cialem: quibus habitis, patebit responsio. Pro quo notandum secundum philosophum, 5° Metha- physice, cap. 1°, quod natura" est equivocum ad septem. Primo namque omnis essencia vel substancia dicitur 15 natura; et sic anoloyce competit deo et cuicunque per se in genere, scilicet, ut dictum est de substancia. Secundo, accipitur pro re per se in primo predicamento, sive fuerit substancia corporea, sive incorporea, sive universalis, sive singularis. Et isto modo loquitur com-20 muniter scola theologorum de natura angelica et humana, cum ceteris naturis substanciarum. Et sic loquitur commentator 11° Methaphysice, commento 4to, vocando humanitatem naturam hominis; et illo modo dicunt theologi humanitatem integram, constitutam ex corpore 25 et anima, esse assumptam a Verbo, ut patet in simbolo et per Augustinum, 83 questionum, questione 81, et alibi in multis locis. Natura sic accepta est contraccior quam natura primo modo dicta. Tercio modo dicitur natura, vel creatura, pro materia; et quarto modo pro forma; 30 ut patet secundo physicorum, et primo. Et ille signi- ficaciones sunt equivoce respectu priorum, cum materia non possit de dei potencia esse sine forma, nec forma materialis sine materia. Quinto accipitur natura pro genitura, vel pro nativitate, vel pro quocunque alio 35 motu procedente a natura. Sic enim significant abstracta (6) for anything conformis terminacionis. Sexto modo accipitur essen- resulting from such action; (3) For matter, (4) for form; We shall first note the various senses of the word nature, then those of simplicity; and finally, point out the distinction between matter and form. Nature has seven significations. (1) It means any essence whatever. Answer. Neither matter nor form nor compound is identical one with another, though they form the same essence. (2) It is taken for substance in the first category. 1. ncce = necessitate? A. 3. corpus ABC; core = eorum or 5. et de C. 6. supponere in corpus D. 4. est superius BED. g marg. A; deest BCD. 9. nature deest ACD. 10, 11. distinccionem sive deest BC. 16. convenit BCD. 17. scilicet deest BD; ib. de deest D. 30. capitur 23. 7° CD. 26. rem pro esse C. 27. qonn qoue 98m E. 37. modo 35. ntite A; natimte B. pro creature BC. 31. et deest C. deest C.
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CAP. V. DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 199 cialiter vel materialiter pro effectu producto a natura; and (7) for a specific et septimo pro passione consequente speciem. passivity. Pro secundo dicitur quod, quot modis dicitur “com- Simple has as many senses as A 64“ positum", quod tot modis oppositis potest intelligi compound. God is supreme simplex". In summo igitur gradu simplicitatis est natura and absolute divina, excludens possibilitatem ad quamcunque compo- simplicity. sicionem ex partibus, vel variacionem in accidentibus; et taliter claudit repugnanciam aliquam creaturam esse simplicem. Et tamen quelibet creatura per se est in 10 genere indivisibilis quoad molem; ut spiritus creatus componitur ex genere et differencia, tanquam suis partibus quiditativis, licet non habeat partes quantitativas: tum eciam quia quelibet creatura est mobilis, cum sit de nichilo. Cristus igitur, qui potest nunc gaudere, nunc tristari de 15 cunctis affectibus et actibus intrinsecus, non est tam simplex ut deus, qui non potest incipere vel desinere sic affici, intelligere, cognoscere, vel velle. In secundo gradu sunt spiritus creati et alia indivisibilia quoad partes quantitativas; ut punctus, instans, et similia. In 20 tercio gradu sunt materia et forme substanciales vel accidentales, non habentes partes quantitativas disparium naturarum. Et sic loquitur auctor sex principiorum, cap. 1° describens formam, dum addit gradum pro diffe- rencia, quod est consistens in simplici essencia. In 25 quarto gradu sunt quatuor elementa, quorum quelibet pars quantitativa est eiusdem nature cum toto; in isto gradu sunt multa omogenia, quorum quelibet pars quanti- tativa per se sensibiliter est eiusdem nature cum suo toto, ut caro, os, nervus et cetera. In talibus enim 3o elementa sunt commixta ultra discrecionem humani sensus. Alie autem sunt significaciones mistice de sim- plicitate, quas oportet hic propter impertinenciam ob- But every creature is in its generic whatness an indivisible thing, consisting only of genus and difference. The simplicity of Christ's nature is, therefore, less than that of God. In the second rank are all created spirits and whatever has no quantitative parts. Matter and form are in the third class of simplicity, each having integral parts, but of the same nature with the whole. The elements are less simple yet; 5. simplicitatis deest AB; simplex ABC. 2. supplimodo BC. 9. quia BDE; ib. et pro est ACD. 12. sed pro licet D; ib. tamen C. 13. natura creata BCD; ib. est deest C. 14. vel pro nunc BD. 15. affec- tionibus BD. 16. potest deest BC. 17. afficiere BD; ib. velle potest BD. 18. vel pro et B; ib. intelligibilia AC; vel indivisibilia BDC. 19. in deest C. 21. dispariarum (sic) C. 22. pu'bior? C. 25. elementa tam multa C. 28. suo deest BCD. 29. nervus deest A; v'nus D. 30. distinccionem B. 18. Alia indivisibilia. This would puzzle a modern philo- sopher, who admits nothing to exist really but mind and matter, the latter certainly divisible. No doubt Wyclif had the Universals in mind when he wrote this. 29. Caro. There must here be a gap in all the MSS. For flesh is indubitably a compound body ; yet Wyclif seems to be speaking of the elements.
CAP. V. DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 199 cialiter vel materialiter pro effectu producto a natura; and (7) for a specific et septimo pro passione consequente speciem. passivity. Pro secundo dicitur quod, quot modis dicitur “com- Simple has as many senses as A 64“ positum", quod tot modis oppositis potest intelligi compound. God is supreme simplex". In summo igitur gradu simplicitatis est natura and absolute divina, excludens possibilitatem ad quamcunque compo- simplicity. sicionem ex partibus, vel variacionem in accidentibus; et taliter claudit repugnanciam aliquam creaturam esse simplicem. Et tamen quelibet creatura per se est in 10 genere indivisibilis quoad molem; ut spiritus creatus componitur ex genere et differencia, tanquam suis partibus quiditativis, licet non habeat partes quantitativas: tum eciam quia quelibet creatura est mobilis, cum sit de nichilo. Cristus igitur, qui potest nunc gaudere, nunc tristari de 15 cunctis affectibus et actibus intrinsecus, non est tam simplex ut deus, qui non potest incipere vel desinere sic affici, intelligere, cognoscere, vel velle. In secundo gradu sunt spiritus creati et alia indivisibilia quoad partes quantitativas; ut punctus, instans, et similia. In 20 tercio gradu sunt materia et forme substanciales vel accidentales, non habentes partes quantitativas disparium naturarum. Et sic loquitur auctor sex principiorum, cap. 1° describens formam, dum addit gradum pro diffe- rencia, quod est consistens in simplici essencia. In 25 quarto gradu sunt quatuor elementa, quorum quelibet pars quantitativa est eiusdem nature cum toto; in isto gradu sunt multa omogenia, quorum quelibet pars quanti- tativa per se sensibiliter est eiusdem nature cum suo toto, ut caro, os, nervus et cetera. In talibus enim 3o elementa sunt commixta ultra discrecionem humani sensus. Alie autem sunt significaciones mistice de sim- plicitate, quas oportet hic propter impertinenciam ob- But every creature is in its generic whatness an indivisible thing, consisting only of genus and difference. The simplicity of Christ's nature is, therefore, less than that of God. In the second rank are all created spirits and whatever has no quantitative parts. Matter and form are in the third class of simplicity, each having integral parts, but of the same nature with the whole. The elements are less simple yet; 5. simplicitatis deest AB; simplex ABC. 2. supplimodo BC. 9. quia BDE; ib. et pro est ACD. 12. sed pro licet D; ib. tamen C. 13. natura creata BCD; ib. est deest C. 14. vel pro nunc BD. 15. affec- tionibus BD. 16. potest deest BC. 17. afficiere BD; ib. velle potest BD. 18. vel pro et B; ib. intelligibilia AC; vel indivisibilia BDC. 19. in deest C. 21. dispariarum (sic) C. 22. pu'bior? C. 25. elementa tam multa C. 28. suo deest BCD. 29. nervus deest A; v'nus D. 30. distinccionem B. 18. Alia indivisibilia. This would puzzle a modern philo- sopher, who admits nothing to exist really but mind and matter, the latter certainly divisible. No doubt Wyclif had the Universals in mind when he wrote this. 29. Caro. There must here be a gap in all the MSS. For flesh is indubitably a compound body ; yet Wyclif seems to be speaking of the elements.
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200 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. V. mittere; ut omne creatum quod recte correspondet suo numero indivisibili, eterno, sine obliquitate ad turpitu- dinem vel inequalitatem, vocatur simplex spiritualiter. Job Sic enim beatus Job commendatus est de simplicitate II, 3 excludente duplicitatem cordis. Sermo suus fuit est, est, 5 non, non, iuxta doctrinam Salvatoris Matth. quinto; et Matth. sic commendatur simplicitas oculi interioris hominis V, 37 Mt. 6° Si oculus tuus fuerit simplex; et quidquid fuerit Matth. sine plica mendacitatis vel dolositatis dicitur mistice VI, 22 simplex. Unde simplex ethimologice dicitur quasi sine plica. 10 Now the Istis duabus significacionibus habitis, dicitur quod distinction between matter cuilibet possessori veritatis est patula distinccio inter and form is that materiam primam et formam materialem, licet utraque the former is the fundamental habeat eandem essenciam pro fundamento. Nam aliud essence, qua capable of est datam essenciam esse ipsam, ut sit ignis, vel alia 15 of receiving any substancia, et aliud est eam esse actualiter ignem vel form, and of generating it; talem substanciam, cum ipsa prima veritas sit materia, and the latter is et secunda, forma. Patet differencia, cum materia sit that essence, qua generable in perpetua, ingenerabilis, cuiuscunque speciei forme ma- matter and apt terialis sustentiva et susceptiva, ut presuppositum est 20 with it to produce the in natura. Econtra autem est forma ex tali materia complete generabilis, ex cuius disposicione indivisibili et secundum substances. formam est substancia, formaliter et actualiter, illud quid. Secundum materiam autem non est illud quod est, sed est in potencia ut sit illud; et sic de quotlibet 25 I suppose that differenciis quas philosophi exquisite discuciunt. Verum- those who deny tamen reor quod quicunque negaverit formam acciden- accidental forms must also talem communiter, et forte evidencius negare debet deny substantial materiam primam] et quamlibet materialem formam forms and substancialem. primal matter. Sed quia non de talibus est nobis sermo, ex suppo- sicione et prefacione superius premissis, patet cuicunque professori veritatis predicta distinccio; et patet evidencia in qua deducti sunt philosophi ad concedendum ma- teriam primam esse potenciam, ut patet 1° physicorum. 35 Nam cum materia sit natura abstracta, fundata in There is also the mystical sense of simplicity, which is opposed to duplicity. A 64 30 3. equalitatem AC. 5. simplici- 1. recte deest D. 4. Joh. ABC. tatem pro duplicitatem BD. 6. quinto deest ACD. 7. communiter A; 9. plica ib. hominis deest CD. 8. etc. BD; ib. et breviter BCD. deest A; ib. mendacitate A; ib. dolositate A. 12. veritatis deest D. 17. illa pro 15. ipsam pro in potencia A. 14. eandem deest AC. ipsa B. 19. indivisibilis ABC. 20. subiectiva pro susceptiva ACi ib. et pro ut C. 21. est deest C. 22. indisposicione ABC. 23. illud deest D. 24. quid deest B; ib. idem C; aut C; ib. est deest C. 29, 30. mlem forlem sbalem AC. 33. et deest C; ib. premissa B. 34. traducti B; inducti C. 37. natura AC.
200 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. V. mittere; ut omne creatum quod recte correspondet suo numero indivisibili, eterno, sine obliquitate ad turpitu- dinem vel inequalitatem, vocatur simplex spiritualiter. Job Sic enim beatus Job commendatus est de simplicitate II, 3 excludente duplicitatem cordis. Sermo suus fuit est, est, 5 non, non, iuxta doctrinam Salvatoris Matth. quinto; et Matth. sic commendatur simplicitas oculi interioris hominis V, 37 Mt. 6° Si oculus tuus fuerit simplex; et quidquid fuerit Matth. sine plica mendacitatis vel dolositatis dicitur mistice VI, 22 simplex. Unde simplex ethimologice dicitur quasi sine plica. 10 Now the Istis duabus significacionibus habitis, dicitur quod distinction between matter cuilibet possessori veritatis est patula distinccio inter and form is that materiam primam et formam materialem, licet utraque the former is the fundamental habeat eandem essenciam pro fundamento. Nam aliud essence, qua capable of est datam essenciam esse ipsam, ut sit ignis, vel alia 15 of receiving any substancia, et aliud est eam esse actualiter ignem vel form, and of generating it; talem substanciam, cum ipsa prima veritas sit materia, and the latter is et secunda, forma. Patet differencia, cum materia sit that essence, qua generable in perpetua, ingenerabilis, cuiuscunque speciei forme ma- matter and apt terialis sustentiva et susceptiva, ut presuppositum est 20 with it to produce the in natura. Econtra autem est forma ex tali materia complete generabilis, ex cuius disposicione indivisibili et secundum substances. formam est substancia, formaliter et actualiter, illud quid. Secundum materiam autem non est illud quod est, sed est in potencia ut sit illud; et sic de quotlibet 25 I suppose that differenciis quas philosophi exquisite discuciunt. Verum- those who deny tamen reor quod quicunque negaverit formam acciden- accidental forms must also talem communiter, et forte evidencius negare debet deny substantial materiam primam] et quamlibet materialem formam forms and substancialem. primal matter. Sed quia non de talibus est nobis sermo, ex suppo- sicione et prefacione superius premissis, patet cuicunque professori veritatis predicta distinccio; et patet evidencia in qua deducti sunt philosophi ad concedendum ma- teriam primam esse potenciam, ut patet 1° physicorum. 35 Nam cum materia sit natura abstracta, fundata in There is also the mystical sense of simplicity, which is opposed to duplicity. A 64 30 3. equalitatem AC. 5. simplici- 1. recte deest D. 4. Joh. ABC. tatem pro duplicitatem BD. 6. quinto deest ACD. 7. communiter A; 9. plica ib. hominis deest CD. 8. etc. BD; ib. et breviter BCD. deest A; ib. mendacitate A; ib. dolositate A. 12. veritatis deest D. 17. illa pro 15. ipsam pro in potencia A. 14. eandem deest AC. ipsa B. 19. indivisibilis ABC. 20. subiectiva pro susceptiva ACi ib. et pro ut C. 21. est deest C. 22. indisposicione ABC. 23. illud deest D. 24. quid deest B; ib. idem C; aut C; ib. est deest C. 29, 30. mlem forlem sbalem AC. 33. et deest C; ib. premissa B. 34. traducti B; inducti C. 37. natura AC.
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CAP. V. DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 201 essencia, est illud quo essencia est formaliter formalis. Unde Augustinus, qui profundius scrutatus est istam materiam in De vera religione, 35°, postquam probaverat mundum esse creatum, eo quod fiebat ex inferiori 5 materia, sic scribit de dicta materia: "Bonum est", in- quit, "esse formatum nonnullum, igitur bonum est ut ca- pacitas forme; et ideo omnium bonorum auctor, qui „ prescivit formam, ipse scivit eciam posse eam formari." Et idem plane patet, De fide et simbolo, cap. 1°; et ro communiter ubi loquitur de materia. Ex istis premissis, patet quod illa essencia que est tam materia quam forma, pro illo instanti nature vel mensura prior est naturaliter, quia non actualiter forma sive simplex sine composicione parcium diversarum naturarum; sed pro 15 quocumque instanti nature vel temporis quo habet formam substancialem pro actu quo ponitur in esse generis, componitur ex diversis naturis, et cadit in propor- cionalem composicionem. Conceditur igitur quod illa essencia, quandocunque 20 est, est composita ex naturis disparibus; per consequens componitur perpetue ex disparibus naturis, cum claudit contradiccionem illam esse, nisi fuerit formata. Ad primam dicitur quod oppositum sequitur, cum homo secundum naturam corpoream sit compositiva pars 25 mundi quo ad diversitatem naturarum; quod innuit nobis Moyses recitans nobis hominem secundum corpus ultimo factum, nedum quia homo debet dominari toti nature corruptive, sed quia presupponit ad eius com- posicionem alias species corporearum rerum. Et ideo 3o signanter ponit Moyses hominem secundum tempus ultimo productum. Et si forte anima fuerit primo pro- Augustine's doctrine is that as it is good for something having a form to exist, it is also good that the receptivity of that form should exist. The simple essence, therefore, which is matter and form, is prior in nature to either, but when it has this form or that, it is no longer simple, but a compound. We therefore grant that at any time of its existence it is composite. Man in his bodily nature is the most complex being n the universe, as we see by the testimony of Moses. 1, 2. fudal ut = a B; fundamentalis C; fundabilis D; ut essencia CD. 1. essencia after quo deest C; ib. formabilis B. 3. regilioe D; ib. patva't AD; p'va't D. 4. fuisse CD. 5. boni ABC. 6. ut sit BD. 8. prestitit BC; ib. fecit BCD; ib. eam deest ACD. 9. scivit; patet above, in red ink A; dicitur BC. 10. consequenter AC. II. illa est B. 12, 13. mensuratur illa prioritate naturali B; prioritatis naturalis est deest CD. 13. qua B; ib. sic B. 17, 18. after proporcionalem: univer- salem D. 19. quecunque ABD. 20. est before composita deest ACD; ib. et per BC. 24. compositiva ACD. 25. quod ad A; ib. diversitatem diversarium B; ib. quod deest ABD. 26. veritates notabiles pro recitans nobis AC. 2. Essencia. I am not sure whether the word forma ought not to be added after essencia. 13. Sine. This might be changed to sive, but the sense is not clear with either reading. Every form is and must be simple; as it stands, the sentence is a pleonasm, but not an inconsistency.
CAP. V. DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 201 essencia, est illud quo essencia est formaliter formalis. Unde Augustinus, qui profundius scrutatus est istam materiam in De vera religione, 35°, postquam probaverat mundum esse creatum, eo quod fiebat ex inferiori 5 materia, sic scribit de dicta materia: "Bonum est", in- quit, "esse formatum nonnullum, igitur bonum est ut ca- pacitas forme; et ideo omnium bonorum auctor, qui „ prescivit formam, ipse scivit eciam posse eam formari." Et idem plane patet, De fide et simbolo, cap. 1°; et ro communiter ubi loquitur de materia. Ex istis premissis, patet quod illa essencia que est tam materia quam forma, pro illo instanti nature vel mensura prior est naturaliter, quia non actualiter forma sive simplex sine composicione parcium diversarum naturarum; sed pro 15 quocumque instanti nature vel temporis quo habet formam substancialem pro actu quo ponitur in esse generis, componitur ex diversis naturis, et cadit in propor- cionalem composicionem. Conceditur igitur quod illa essencia, quandocunque 20 est, est composita ex naturis disparibus; per consequens componitur perpetue ex disparibus naturis, cum claudit contradiccionem illam esse, nisi fuerit formata. Ad primam dicitur quod oppositum sequitur, cum homo secundum naturam corpoream sit compositiva pars 25 mundi quo ad diversitatem naturarum; quod innuit nobis Moyses recitans nobis hominem secundum corpus ultimo factum, nedum quia homo debet dominari toti nature corruptive, sed quia presupponit ad eius com- posicionem alias species corporearum rerum. Et ideo 3o signanter ponit Moyses hominem secundum tempus ultimo productum. Et si forte anima fuerit primo pro- Augustine's doctrine is that as it is good for something having a form to exist, it is also good that the receptivity of that form should exist. The simple essence, therefore, which is matter and form, is prior in nature to either, but when it has this form or that, it is no longer simple, but a compound. We therefore grant that at any time of its existence it is composite. Man in his bodily nature is the most complex being n the universe, as we see by the testimony of Moses. 1, 2. fudal ut = a B; fundamentalis C; fundabilis D; ut essencia CD. 1. essencia after quo deest C; ib. formabilis B. 3. regilioe D; ib. patva't AD; p'va't D. 4. fuisse CD. 5. boni ABC. 6. ut sit BD. 8. prestitit BC; ib. fecit BCD; ib. eam deest ACD. 9. scivit; patet above, in red ink A; dicitur BC. 10. consequenter AC. II. illa est B. 12, 13. mensuratur illa prioritate naturali B; prioritatis naturalis est deest CD. 13. qua B; ib. sic B. 17, 18. after proporcionalem: univer- salem D. 19. quecunque ABD. 20. est before composita deest ACD; ib. et per BC. 24. compositiva ACD. 25. quod ad A; ib. diversitatem diversarium B; ib. quod deest ABD. 26. veritates notabiles pro recitans nobis AC. 2. Essencia. I am not sure whether the word forma ought not to be added after essencia. 13. Sine. This might be changed to sive, but the sense is not clear with either reading. Every form is and must be simple; as it stands, the sentence is a pleonasm, but not an inconsistency.
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202 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. V. ducta, cum spirituali celo, natura tamen componens hominem ex tot manieribus corporum, preexigit pre- paracionem componencium; nec introduceret hominem in perfectum dominum in orbem, nisi preparato dominio preparacionis. Talem igitur subtilem et decentem originem 5 nature innuit nobis Moyses per faccionem sexto die. The essence of Redeundo ad propositum, patet ex predictis de a body is simple simplicitate, essenciam corpoream esse simplicem suo in the aforesaid sense, and is modo, et tamen compositam ex diversis naturis, ut nevertheless made up of materia et forma; (non quod materia haberet appropriate 10 matter and locum suum, sicud res que possunt per se existere form, so that the quantitative, componentes aliquod tercium qualitative same essence possesses the intelligendo), quod eidem essencie insunt hec duo: posse two diverse suscipere quamcunque formam materialem, et habere qualities of being able to actualiter eamdem formam. In elemento igitur est talis 15 have a given form, and of essencia simplicior, et in mixto est composicior, cum sit actually having quelibet natura corporea que est substancia, saltem illa it. Therefore, in communis. Et sic, quando dicitur quod ista natura all but the first singu ] larissima est tanquam forma, oportet intelligere sense of the word, the naturam primo modo dictam, ut pure dicit essenciam; 20 essence is neither matter, quia accipiendo naturam secundo modo pro substancia form, nor per se in genere, aut tercio vel quarto modo quo parte compound ; but in the first sense qualificativa rei, non est verum quod talis natura est it is. materia forma et composicio; sed ista natura que est communis essencia, est ille tres nature; scilicet; materia, 25 et forma, et compositum. Nam, ut dictum est supra, Deus pro primo instanti temporis cognoscit essenciam cui inseparabiliter inest, quod ipsa est capax cuiuscumque forme substantialis corporee; et illa capacitas est materia prima. Quando autem est actualiter aqua, ignis vel 30 aliquid talium corporum universi, tunc inest sibi forma substancialis, que est illam esse ignem (vel aliam speciem corporis). Si igitur queratur que essencia est, illam esse capacem cuiuscumque talis forme, aut que essencia est, illam eamdem essenciam esse actualiter ignem vel tale 35 aliquod formaliter, non invenitur nisi prima pura essen- cia demonstrata, cui iste due nature insunt, scilicet, What is there common to this capacity for receiving a form, and to this actualily Of having it, save the pure abstract essence of the thing ? A 65* 1. composicionis CD. 2. extat AC. 3. introducet ACD. 4. Dinim D; ib. Dmo AC; Dinie D. 4, 5. nisi d'mo preparacionis BD. 5. ecne (cene?) pro originem A; ordinem B. 9. componi CD. 12. quantitative deest D. 13. integrando A; ib. et hec C. 14. dandam D; ib. ex pro in A. 16. compositum D; ib. sic pro cum sit D. 18. materia D. 19. simpli- cissima corr. below D; ib. intelligi BD. 20. dicat D. 23. qualitativa ABC. 23—24. materia natura forma esset composicior A. 25. ter minus C. 27. produxit pro cognoscit BC; 26. composicio BCD. deest D. 28. nſe pro inest D. 32. capacitatem ABD.
202 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. V. ducta, cum spirituali celo, natura tamen componens hominem ex tot manieribus corporum, preexigit pre- paracionem componencium; nec introduceret hominem in perfectum dominum in orbem, nisi preparato dominio preparacionis. Talem igitur subtilem et decentem originem 5 nature innuit nobis Moyses per faccionem sexto die. The essence of Redeundo ad propositum, patet ex predictis de a body is simple simplicitate, essenciam corpoream esse simplicem suo in the aforesaid sense, and is modo, et tamen compositam ex diversis naturis, ut nevertheless made up of materia et forma; (non quod materia haberet appropriate 10 matter and locum suum, sicud res que possunt per se existere form, so that the quantitative, componentes aliquod tercium qualitative same essence possesses the intelligendo), quod eidem essencie insunt hec duo: posse two diverse suscipere quamcunque formam materialem, et habere qualities of being able to actualiter eamdem formam. In elemento igitur est talis 15 have a given form, and of essencia simplicior, et in mixto est composicior, cum sit actually having quelibet natura corporea que est substancia, saltem illa it. Therefore, in communis. Et sic, quando dicitur quod ista natura all but the first singu ] larissima est tanquam forma, oportet intelligere sense of the word, the naturam primo modo dictam, ut pure dicit essenciam; 20 essence is neither matter, quia accipiendo naturam secundo modo pro substancia form, nor per se in genere, aut tercio vel quarto modo quo parte compound ; but in the first sense qualificativa rei, non est verum quod talis natura est it is. materia forma et composicio; sed ista natura que est communis essencia, est ille tres nature; scilicet; materia, 25 et forma, et compositum. Nam, ut dictum est supra, Deus pro primo instanti temporis cognoscit essenciam cui inseparabiliter inest, quod ipsa est capax cuiuscumque forme substantialis corporee; et illa capacitas est materia prima. Quando autem est actualiter aqua, ignis vel 30 aliquid talium corporum universi, tunc inest sibi forma substancialis, que est illam esse ignem (vel aliam speciem corporis). Si igitur queratur que essencia est, illam esse capacem cuiuscumque talis forme, aut que essencia est, illam eamdem essenciam esse actualiter ignem vel tale 35 aliquod formaliter, non invenitur nisi prima pura essen- cia demonstrata, cui iste due nature insunt, scilicet, What is there common to this capacity for receiving a form, and to this actualily Of having it, save the pure abstract essence of the thing ? A 65* 1. composicionis CD. 2. extat AC. 3. introducet ACD. 4. Dinim D; ib. Dmo AC; Dinie D. 4, 5. nisi d'mo preparacionis BD. 5. ecne (cene?) pro originem A; ordinem B. 9. componi CD. 12. quantitative deest D. 13. integrando A; ib. et hec C. 14. dandam D; ib. ex pro in A. 16. compositum D; ib. sic pro cum sit D. 18. materia D. 19. simpli- cissima corr. below D; ib. intelligi BD. 20. dicat D. 23. qualitativa ABC. 23—24. materia natura forma esset composicior A. 25. ter minus C. 27. produxit pro cognoscit BC; 26. composicio BCD. deest D. 28. nſe pro inest D. 32. capacitatem ABD.
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CAP. V. DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 203 esse in potencia ad actum et esse actualiter quid huius- modi. Hec itaque duo eidem essencie singulari funda- In this they both inhere, as the mentaliter insunt, sicut eidem homini inest esse risibile, ability to laugh and the ability quod est passio corporea, et esse intellectivum, quod est to understand inhere in the passio incorporea; quia, cum dicte due nature (scilicet same man, potencia et actus) non presupponunt illam essenciam ut without being the same one quid, sed ut ens creatum absolutum possibile per se with the other. esse; ideo non sunt passiones vel accidencia alicuius novem generum. Unde, sicut aliud est esse risibile et ro aliud est esse intellectivum, licet eidem essencie insunt; sic aliud est materia que est illam essenciam esse in potencia ut sit ignis, et aliud est eadem forma, que est eamdem essenciam esse actualiter ignem. Et patet quomodo talis natura vel substancia equi- 15 voce dicitur natura vel substancia respectu tocius compositi. Et patet plane quod talis essencia est com- munis ad illam esse in potencia et ad illam esse actua- liter illud, quorum primum est materia, et secundum forma. 20 Ex quo clare sequitur ulterius quod non valet paraloysmus vocatus expositorius, cuius medium est commune ad utrumque extremum. Nec est color ex isto quod nullibi valet syloysmus expositorius; ut nullus literatus negabit istum esse paraloysmum: Leccio mea 25 hodierna est me legere, et leccio mea hesterna est me legere: igitur leccio mea hesterna est leccio mea hodierna. Correspondenter, dato esse illo (quod est, essencia de- monstrata), est commune ad esse ignem et aquam vel quodlibet corporum reliquorum. 30 Item, non sequitur quod iste forme non distinguuntur, licet eadem sit essencia. Et si asseritur quod tot sunt materie prime, quot sunt forme sensibiles (quia tot sunt potencie; et per consequens, cum forma corruptiva desinat esse potencia, sequitur quod materie prime sunt 35 corruptibiles): hic dicitur quod materia prima dicit datam puram essenciam, et capacitatem in genere ad quamcunque formam substancialem corpoream; ideo, in qualibet huiusmodi essencia, est una materia adequata. This clearly shows the fallacy of the 80-called expositorial syllogism. It does not follow that no expositorial syllogism is valid ; but there are syllogisms, expositorial in form, that no one could possibly admit. Nor does it follow that various forms do not differ, because they are based on the same common essence. If it be said that there must be as many primal matters as there are forms, we point out that matter is the pure essence qua capable of receiving any forms. We cannot, therefore, call such an essence a 'nature', or a substance, in the same sense as we call the compound so. 2. due nature due essencie D. 3. essenciale pro esse risibile ACD. 8. esse 7. ois (eis?) pro ut ens A; ut eis C. 4. est pro esse D. 10. essencie deest C. deest D. 8. aliquid D; ib. visibile A. 23. est pro valet ABC. 24. mea deest 1). 14. 15. valde equivoce BC. 26. mea before hodierna deest BCD. 27. datam rem esse pro dato esse illo BD: dato rem esse quod C. 3o. Ideo BD; ib. quin BCD; ib. non deest BD. 31. arguitur BD. 37. in genere corpoream B.
CAP. V. DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 203 esse in potencia ad actum et esse actualiter quid huius- modi. Hec itaque duo eidem essencie singulari funda- In this they both inhere, as the mentaliter insunt, sicut eidem homini inest esse risibile, ability to laugh and the ability quod est passio corporea, et esse intellectivum, quod est to understand inhere in the passio incorporea; quia, cum dicte due nature (scilicet same man, potencia et actus) non presupponunt illam essenciam ut without being the same one quid, sed ut ens creatum absolutum possibile per se with the other. esse; ideo non sunt passiones vel accidencia alicuius novem generum. Unde, sicut aliud est esse risibile et ro aliud est esse intellectivum, licet eidem essencie insunt; sic aliud est materia que est illam essenciam esse in potencia ut sit ignis, et aliud est eadem forma, que est eamdem essenciam esse actualiter ignem. Et patet quomodo talis natura vel substancia equi- 15 voce dicitur natura vel substancia respectu tocius compositi. Et patet plane quod talis essencia est com- munis ad illam esse in potencia et ad illam esse actua- liter illud, quorum primum est materia, et secundum forma. 20 Ex quo clare sequitur ulterius quod non valet paraloysmus vocatus expositorius, cuius medium est commune ad utrumque extremum. Nec est color ex isto quod nullibi valet syloysmus expositorius; ut nullus literatus negabit istum esse paraloysmum: Leccio mea 25 hodierna est me legere, et leccio mea hesterna est me legere: igitur leccio mea hesterna est leccio mea hodierna. Correspondenter, dato esse illo (quod est, essencia de- monstrata), est commune ad esse ignem et aquam vel quodlibet corporum reliquorum. 30 Item, non sequitur quod iste forme non distinguuntur, licet eadem sit essencia. Et si asseritur quod tot sunt materie prime, quot sunt forme sensibiles (quia tot sunt potencie; et per consequens, cum forma corruptiva desinat esse potencia, sequitur quod materie prime sunt 35 corruptibiles): hic dicitur quod materia prima dicit datam puram essenciam, et capacitatem in genere ad quamcunque formam substancialem corpoream; ideo, in qualibet huiusmodi essencia, est una materia adequata. This clearly shows the fallacy of the 80-called expositorial syllogism. It does not follow that no expositorial syllogism is valid ; but there are syllogisms, expositorial in form, that no one could possibly admit. Nor does it follow that various forms do not differ, because they are based on the same common essence. If it be said that there must be as many primal matters as there are forms, we point out that matter is the pure essence qua capable of receiving any forms. We cannot, therefore, call such an essence a 'nature', or a substance, in the same sense as we call the compound so. 2. due nature due essencie D. 3. essenciale pro esse risibile ACD. 8. esse 7. ois (eis?) pro ut ens A; ut eis C. 4. est pro esse D. 10. essencie deest C. deest D. 8. aliquid D; ib. visibile A. 23. est pro valet ABC. 24. mea deest 1). 14. 15. valde equivoce BC. 26. mea before hodierna deest BCD. 27. datam rem esse pro dato esse illo BD: dato rem esse quod C. 3o. Ideo BD; ib. quin BCD; ib. non deest BD. 31. arguitur BD. 37. in genere corpoream B.
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204 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. V. Yet if we Inveniuntur subtilissimi expositores, ut Magister Valtherus consider primal Burley et alii, qui dicunt quod materia prima potest matter as the essence with its dicere datam essenciam cum disposicione vel potencia relation to form, ad datam formam;! et sic sunt tot materie prime que A 65b this too is true, and has been dicuntur agregate ex essencia et relacione, quot sunt 5 ably defended, whether we forme in potencia. Et sic intelligunt Aristotelem, 5° admit that such methaphysica, 5°, quod unumquodque corporum sit ex kinds of primal matter may propria materia. Nec sequitur quod talis materia possit disappear from corrumpi, cum semper manet ad recipiendam formam; existence, or not. sicud patet ampliantibus verba. Illi autem qui non 10 ampliant ista verba, non est inconveniens sed consonum quod materia propinqua agregata ex materia prima et disposicione huiusmodi relativa corrumpatur secundum partem, disposione huiusmodi corupta; forma ergo variatur ad variacionem temporis sue generacionis, ut 15 dictum est in materia de individuacione. Sed remota materia, manet eadem (in numero scilicet) essencia. I am accused of Et quoad illud obiectum de induccione, ignotum proving the per ignocius, dicitur quod olym tempore Aristotelis fuit unknown by what is more notum cuicunque, quod universale est commune cui-20 unknown; but cunque eius supposito. Et per illam consideracionem even in Aristotle's time loycam dispositi erant loyci ad cognoscendum materiam it was known that the et formam ydemptificari in eadem essencia; modo autem, Universal is common to all propter inmersionem in singularibus, reputatur illud its subjects. esse inpossibile. Et inconvenienter dicitur (cum pudet 25 Now it is not so, and men are negare materiam et formam substancialem) quod que- driven to affirm libet materia vel forma substancialis potest per se that matter and form are self- existere; cum sint nature integre, coextense, ponentes existent. absolutas essencias condistinctas, quia modicus error in principiis abducit distancius a via veritatis. Nego 30 ergo quod intencio Aristotelis est negare universalia ex parte rei. Quoad illud dictum de trinitate increata, certum est The Holy Trinity is the quod illa eadem trinitas, essencia ydemtifica, est causa cause of the threefold entity quare materia et forma et composicio sunt eadem 35 of matter, form 1, 2. Walterg de Wyroloy C. 2. de burley BDE. 5. agregata C. 8: forma materia A; ib. nam or non pro nec D. 7. commento B. 9. maneat B; ib. retinendam B. 10. sic AC. 15. sine CD. 17. sicud BCD. 18. dicitur D; ib. individuacione A. 19. obiectum pro olym A. 20, 21. unicuique D. 24. inver- 23. potenciam pro formam AC. 27. natura pro materia AC. sionem B. 25. hinc convenienter D. 28. extense D. 29. absolutas deest D. 30. principio CD. 34. illa deest D; ib. ydemptica A; ydemptifica B. 35. eadem deest A. (6 16. Probably De Individuatione Temporis or De Tempore Tractate of Book 1"'t of De Ente) not yet published.
204 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. V. Yet if we Inveniuntur subtilissimi expositores, ut Magister Valtherus consider primal Burley et alii, qui dicunt quod materia prima potest matter as the essence with its dicere datam essenciam cum disposicione vel potencia relation to form, ad datam formam;! et sic sunt tot materie prime que A 65b this too is true, and has been dicuntur agregate ex essencia et relacione, quot sunt 5 ably defended, whether we forme in potencia. Et sic intelligunt Aristotelem, 5° admit that such methaphysica, 5°, quod unumquodque corporum sit ex kinds of primal matter may propria materia. Nec sequitur quod talis materia possit disappear from corrumpi, cum semper manet ad recipiendam formam; existence, or not. sicud patet ampliantibus verba. Illi autem qui non 10 ampliant ista verba, non est inconveniens sed consonum quod materia propinqua agregata ex materia prima et disposicione huiusmodi relativa corrumpatur secundum partem, disposione huiusmodi corupta; forma ergo variatur ad variacionem temporis sue generacionis, ut 15 dictum est in materia de individuacione. Sed remota materia, manet eadem (in numero scilicet) essencia. I am accused of Et quoad illud obiectum de induccione, ignotum proving the per ignocius, dicitur quod olym tempore Aristotelis fuit unknown by what is more notum cuicunque, quod universale est commune cui-20 unknown; but cunque eius supposito. Et per illam consideracionem even in Aristotle's time loycam dispositi erant loyci ad cognoscendum materiam it was known that the et formam ydemptificari in eadem essencia; modo autem, Universal is common to all propter inmersionem in singularibus, reputatur illud its subjects. esse inpossibile. Et inconvenienter dicitur (cum pudet 25 Now it is not so, and men are negare materiam et formam substancialem) quod que- driven to affirm libet materia vel forma substancialis potest per se that matter and form are self- existere; cum sint nature integre, coextense, ponentes existent. absolutas essencias condistinctas, quia modicus error in principiis abducit distancius a via veritatis. Nego 30 ergo quod intencio Aristotelis est negare universalia ex parte rei. Quoad illud dictum de trinitate increata, certum est The Holy Trinity is the quod illa eadem trinitas, essencia ydemtifica, est causa cause of the threefold entity quare materia et forma et composicio sunt eadem 35 of matter, form 1, 2. Walterg de Wyroloy C. 2. de burley BDE. 5. agregata C. 8: forma materia A; ib. nam or non pro nec D. 7. commento B. 9. maneat B; ib. retinendam B. 10. sic AC. 15. sine CD. 17. sicud BCD. 18. dicitur D; ib. individuacione A. 19. obiectum pro olym A. 20, 21. unicuique D. 24. inver- 23. potenciam pro formam AC. 27. natura pro materia AC. sionem B. 25. hinc convenienter D. 28. extense D. 29. absolutas deest D. 30. principio CD. 34. illa deest D; ib. ydemptica A; ydemptifica B. 35. eadem deest A. (6 16. Probably De Individuatione Temporis or De Tempore Tractate of Book 1"'t of De Ente) not yet published.
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CAP. V. DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 205 singularis essencia. Et quia hodie necessitati sumus ex and compound, we must grant fide (saltem vocatenus) illud concedere, ideo ipsum est this, and every argument nobis medium ad removendum illud quod olim fuit a against my doctrine is an philosophis famosissime acceptatum. Nec est possibile attack upon the invenire defectum argumenti in materia theoloyca, quin Trinity. conformem contingit reperire in materia creata, cum ex effecta manuducti possumus demonstrare a signo po- steriori ad convincendum deum esse trinum. Quoad tercium exemplum, certum est quod illud fuit 10 tempore Aristotelis et usque incarnacionem veritatis ignoratum, et est hodie a communitate theologorum verbaliter negatum. Ideo non induci illud [ut] nobis nocius ad notificandum dictam trinitatem de materia et forma substancie; sed iuxta posui tanquam posterius declarandum, ut evidencius detur sibi fides pro loco sue declaracionis in eadem essencia singulari ymaginata, ut in confirmacione tangitur quod sunt due nature integre, habentes proprias essencias coextense; quod tamen est inpossibile, ut post patebit. 20 Ulterius, quoad confirmacionem, dicitur quod sicud materia et forma non sunt per se in genere, sic nec differunt differencia per se in genere, sed differencia extra genus. Ut, cum potencia et actus dividunt totum genus entis ex opposito, ut patet 9° methaphysice 2°, cum omnis potencia, secundum commentatorem, forma dicitur, videtur mihi quod materia et forma plus diffe- runt differencia racionis quam quecunque supposita eiusdem generis, licet conveniant in eodem supposito singulari essencialiter. Prima pars patet eo quod iste 30 sunt raciones plus dispares: naturam substancie posse in quamcunque formam substancialem, et illam esse actualiter formatam, quam sunt raciones individuorum eiusdem generis; cum omne genus predicamentale secundum quodlibet eius suppositum dividitur sic in 35 potenciam et actum, ut ponit philosophus, ubi supra. As to Christ's incarnation, it was certainly unknown of old times, and I brought it forward merely as an illustration. Matter and form differ more than any subject of the same genus, but by a logical difference only. like potentiality and actuality which is a cross division applicable to the whole of Being. 15 25 7. manuduci C: ib. asig° A. 1. singulariter A. 6. cum deest AC. 9. quod pro fuit A. 10. veritatem incarnacionis B. 11. ignoratam C. 12. ut deest ABCD. 13, 14. nobis nocius deest AC. 15. ad declaran- 23. totum dam BD. 21. non C. 18. existencias D; ib. co deest BD. deest ABC. 28. subiecto pro supposito D. 29. essencialiter in BCD. 31. et in C. 35. et in B. 15. Declarandum. In Wyclif's De Benedicta Incarnatione, already published (edited by E. Harris). The present work is therefore anterior.
CAP. V. DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 205 singularis essencia. Et quia hodie necessitati sumus ex and compound, we must grant fide (saltem vocatenus) illud concedere, ideo ipsum est this, and every argument nobis medium ad removendum illud quod olim fuit a against my doctrine is an philosophis famosissime acceptatum. Nec est possibile attack upon the invenire defectum argumenti in materia theoloyca, quin Trinity. conformem contingit reperire in materia creata, cum ex effecta manuducti possumus demonstrare a signo po- steriori ad convincendum deum esse trinum. Quoad tercium exemplum, certum est quod illud fuit 10 tempore Aristotelis et usque incarnacionem veritatis ignoratum, et est hodie a communitate theologorum verbaliter negatum. Ideo non induci illud [ut] nobis nocius ad notificandum dictam trinitatem de materia et forma substancie; sed iuxta posui tanquam posterius declarandum, ut evidencius detur sibi fides pro loco sue declaracionis in eadem essencia singulari ymaginata, ut in confirmacione tangitur quod sunt due nature integre, habentes proprias essencias coextense; quod tamen est inpossibile, ut post patebit. 20 Ulterius, quoad confirmacionem, dicitur quod sicud materia et forma non sunt per se in genere, sic nec differunt differencia per se in genere, sed differencia extra genus. Ut, cum potencia et actus dividunt totum genus entis ex opposito, ut patet 9° methaphysice 2°, cum omnis potencia, secundum commentatorem, forma dicitur, videtur mihi quod materia et forma plus diffe- runt differencia racionis quam quecunque supposita eiusdem generis, licet conveniant in eodem supposito singulari essencialiter. Prima pars patet eo quod iste 30 sunt raciones plus dispares: naturam substancie posse in quamcunque formam substancialem, et illam esse actualiter formatam, quam sunt raciones individuorum eiusdem generis; cum omne genus predicamentale secundum quodlibet eius suppositum dividitur sic in 35 potenciam et actum, ut ponit philosophus, ubi supra. As to Christ's incarnation, it was certainly unknown of old times, and I brought it forward merely as an illustration. Matter and form differ more than any subject of the same genus, but by a logical difference only. like potentiality and actuality which is a cross division applicable to the whole of Being. 15 25 7. manuduci C: ib. asig° A. 1. singulariter A. 6. cum deest AC. 9. quod pro fuit A. 10. veritatem incarnacionis B. 11. ignoratam C. 12. ut deest ABCD. 13, 14. nobis nocius deest AC. 15. ad declaran- 23. totum dam BD. 21. non C. 18. existencias D; ib. co deest BD. deest ABC. 28. subiecto pro supposito D. 29. essencialiter in BCD. 31. et in C. 35. et in B. 15. Declarandum. In Wyclif's De Benedicta Incarnatione, already published (edited by E. Harris). The present work is therefore anterior.
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206 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. VI. This does not Et tamen in quacunque substancia sunt illa idem A 66. hinder their being one in the essencialiter, ut qualitas et relacio, licet differant in same subject, genere, tamen sunt idem subiecto. Et unio naturarum and thence the union of Deity tam disparium in eodem supposito inducit philosophos and humanity is ad credendum possibilitatem unionis nature divine et 5 credible to us. The argument humane in eodem supposito. Nec valet sequens argu- which would mentum consimile de ydemptificacione; nec sequitur identify matter with form, quod dicte nature sunt formaliter corpora, etsi sunt because each has three longe, late, et profunde; quia corpus de genere sub- dimensions in stancie preexigit cum illa condicione, se esse substanciam, 10 space, is worthless. id est, de primo genere per se potentem existere; quod Mere occupation of space is not non potest competere formaliter alteri istarum naturarum. substantiality; but self- Illi autem qui solum attendunt ad terminos concedunt subsistence is. quod forma substancialis corporea et materia prima It is against all philosophy to sunt due species substancie: quod est contra philosophiam, 15 make of matter and form two ut postea patebit. species of substances. CAPITULUM SEXTUM. Tercio principaliter argumentatur contra sepe dicta The third objection is de informitate materie vel simplicitate essencie create. against the formlessness Videtur enim quod claudit contradiccionem essenciam 20 and simplicity talem esse informem; quia eo ipso quod est, est for- of our created essence'. mata; et eo quod est formata, non est informis. Con- Formless in this theory, it must firmatur tripliciter, primo ex hoc quod quelibet talis have some form essencia semper est formata et aliquando est informis: or other, if it be an entity and igitur simul est formata et informis. Item, quam cito 25 created ; it could not be utterly creata est a spiritu sancto, tam cito est bona, pulcra without et ordinata; et quam primo est huiusmodi est formata; goodness, beauty, and igitur, quam primo est a spiritu sancto est formata, order. igitur simul est formata et informis. Sed quam primo Granted it is threefold, as I naturaliter est ens ab essencia divina, est bonum a 30 say; then it is persona patris, est bonum a persona filii, est eciam not simple, but composite ; and bonum similiter a persona spiritus sancti: ergo non if matter is that essence, then prius naturaliter est essencia quam bonum. Item, si matter is both matter, form essencia talis communis sit materia, forma et composi- and compound. tum tunc ipso est compositum, et per consequens est 35 6. ut 1. sint C. 2. quas A; ib. differunt A. 5. unionis deest D. pro nec C; ib. videtur pro valet AC. 8. sint BC. 11. et rem pro id 13. actum dicunt pro attendunt AC. , 16. patebit, etc. C; in est A. fine cap. haha in red ink A; capitulum sextum deest A; initial T in red 25. similiter ABC. 26. creatura B. ink B. 22. Igitur BD; etc. D. 29. igitur— sed deest AD; ib. sicut D. 35. tunc— et deest BC.
206 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. VI. This does not Et tamen in quacunque substancia sunt illa idem A 66. hinder their being one in the essencialiter, ut qualitas et relacio, licet differant in same subject, genere, tamen sunt idem subiecto. Et unio naturarum and thence the union of Deity tam disparium in eodem supposito inducit philosophos and humanity is ad credendum possibilitatem unionis nature divine et 5 credible to us. The argument humane in eodem supposito. Nec valet sequens argu- which would mentum consimile de ydemptificacione; nec sequitur identify matter with form, quod dicte nature sunt formaliter corpora, etsi sunt because each has three longe, late, et profunde; quia corpus de genere sub- dimensions in stancie preexigit cum illa condicione, se esse substanciam, 10 space, is worthless. id est, de primo genere per se potentem existere; quod Mere occupation of space is not non potest competere formaliter alteri istarum naturarum. substantiality; but self- Illi autem qui solum attendunt ad terminos concedunt subsistence is. quod forma substancialis corporea et materia prima It is against all philosophy to sunt due species substancie: quod est contra philosophiam, 15 make of matter and form two ut postea patebit. species of substances. CAPITULUM SEXTUM. Tercio principaliter argumentatur contra sepe dicta The third objection is de informitate materie vel simplicitate essencie create. against the formlessness Videtur enim quod claudit contradiccionem essenciam 20 and simplicity talem esse informem; quia eo ipso quod est, est for- of our created essence'. mata; et eo quod est formata, non est informis. Con- Formless in this theory, it must firmatur tripliciter, primo ex hoc quod quelibet talis have some form essencia semper est formata et aliquando est informis: or other, if it be an entity and igitur simul est formata et informis. Item, quam cito 25 created ; it could not be utterly creata est a spiritu sancto, tam cito est bona, pulcra without et ordinata; et quam primo est huiusmodi est formata; goodness, beauty, and igitur, quam primo est a spiritu sancto est formata, order. igitur simul est formata et informis. Sed quam primo Granted it is threefold, as I naturaliter est ens ab essencia divina, est bonum a 30 say; then it is persona patris, est bonum a persona filii, est eciam not simple, but composite ; and bonum similiter a persona spiritus sancti: ergo non if matter is that essence, then prius naturaliter est essencia quam bonum. Item, si matter is both matter, form essencia talis communis sit materia, forma et composi- and compound. tum tunc ipso est compositum, et per consequens est 35 6. ut 1. sint C. 2. quas A; ib. differunt A. 5. unionis deest D. pro nec C; ib. videtur pro valet AC. 8. sint BC. 11. et rem pro id 13. actum dicunt pro attendunt AC. , 16. patebit, etc. C; in est A. fine cap. haha in red ink A; capitulum sextum deest A; initial T in red 25. similiter ABC. 26. creatura B. ink B. 22. Igitur BD; etc. D. 29. igitur— sed deest AD; ib. sicut D. 35. tunc— et deest BC.
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CAP. VI. DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 207 А 665 35 res composita, quia essencia composita (ex quo sequitur quod tam materia quam forma est compositum ex materia et forma). Non igitur est dare tres naturas distinctas, secundum quas essencia est triplex, modo quo ponitur; sed sequitur quod tam materia quam forma est compositum ex seipsa. Hic dicitur quod, sicud materia prima non potest I answer (1) that matter cannot esse de dei potencia, nisi actuata fuerit vel formata, exist without form, yet (2) it sic non potest esse, nisi pro aliqua mensura sit in- must exist 10 formis. Patet prima pars ex hoc, cum non possit esse, without form in some measure. nisi fuerit a tota trinitate, et per consequens ordinata, (1) For every being by the moderata, vel formosa; cum igitur esse tale ponit for- fact that it is mam analogam (ut patet sepe per Augustinum) sequitur created, requires some prima pars. Nec solum sequitur materiam primam de form, some determination; 15 quanto est creata, esse formatam forma analoga extra and matter requires a genus, sed et forma substanciali contrahente ad genus substantial form substancie; quia non posset manere per tempus vel whereby it should be a istans temporis, nisi esset quanta, situata et quotlibet substance. Otherwise it accidentibus talibus accidentata; et omnia talia accidencia could not exist 20 presupponunt substanciam; que sit aliquid cui formaliter for a single instant of time. inexistant, ut patet ex dictis tercio capitulo. Ergo materia prima, cum non possit esse pro tempore vel instanti temporis, nisi sit forma substanciali actuata (aliter enim posset esse cum hoc quod non esset aliquid, 25 eo quod non est quid, nisi per formam substancialem) quamvis ergo prius naturaliter sit essencia bona, vera, antequam forma substanciali actuata; illa tamen prioritas nature non implicat quod talis essencia possit manere cum hoc quod non esset aliqua forma substanciali for- 30 mata: ut patet generaliter de prioritate nature subiecti ad suam passionem, et multis similibus in quibus inest naturalis prioritas quoad causacionem, et non quoad consequenciam, ut] vere dicit Aristoteles in capitulo De priori. Et secunda pars conclusionis requirit convenienciam in loyca in significationibus terminorum; ut, si aliquid sit natura prius quam reliquum, tunc est dare mensuram vel gradum prioritatis naturalis, materialis, vel instans (2) In some measure signifies natural priority, by which one thing is in its nature beſore another. 14. solum 9. nec B. 10. posset BD. 11. foret D. 12. omne BD. 20. sic alicui pro sit ali- deest ACD; in marg. B. 15. esse twice C. quid cui AC; ib. formaliter deest ACD. 23. csset D. 26. natura D; k 27—20. substanciali — substanciali deest D. 30. substancie D. ib. est D. 31. est pro inest BI). 36. after loyca et pro in B; 34. prioritate BD. 38. gradus C; ib. instantes pro instans ACD. ib. in sermomibus C.
CAP. VI. DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 207 А 665 35 res composita, quia essencia composita (ex quo sequitur quod tam materia quam forma est compositum ex materia et forma). Non igitur est dare tres naturas distinctas, secundum quas essencia est triplex, modo quo ponitur; sed sequitur quod tam materia quam forma est compositum ex seipsa. Hic dicitur quod, sicud materia prima non potest I answer (1) that matter cannot esse de dei potencia, nisi actuata fuerit vel formata, exist without form, yet (2) it sic non potest esse, nisi pro aliqua mensura sit in- must exist 10 formis. Patet prima pars ex hoc, cum non possit esse, without form in some measure. nisi fuerit a tota trinitate, et per consequens ordinata, (1) For every being by the moderata, vel formosa; cum igitur esse tale ponit for- fact that it is mam analogam (ut patet sepe per Augustinum) sequitur created, requires some prima pars. Nec solum sequitur materiam primam de form, some determination; 15 quanto est creata, esse formatam forma analoga extra and matter requires a genus, sed et forma substanciali contrahente ad genus substantial form substancie; quia non posset manere per tempus vel whereby it should be a istans temporis, nisi esset quanta, situata et quotlibet substance. Otherwise it accidentibus talibus accidentata; et omnia talia accidencia could not exist 20 presupponunt substanciam; que sit aliquid cui formaliter for a single instant of time. inexistant, ut patet ex dictis tercio capitulo. Ergo materia prima, cum non possit esse pro tempore vel instanti temporis, nisi sit forma substanciali actuata (aliter enim posset esse cum hoc quod non esset aliquid, 25 eo quod non est quid, nisi per formam substancialem) quamvis ergo prius naturaliter sit essencia bona, vera, antequam forma substanciali actuata; illa tamen prioritas nature non implicat quod talis essencia possit manere cum hoc quod non esset aliqua forma substanciali for- 30 mata: ut patet generaliter de prioritate nature subiecti ad suam passionem, et multis similibus in quibus inest naturalis prioritas quoad causacionem, et non quoad consequenciam, ut] vere dicit Aristoteles in capitulo De priori. Et secunda pars conclusionis requirit convenienciam in loyca in significationibus terminorum; ut, si aliquid sit natura prius quam reliquum, tunc est dare mensuram vel gradum prioritatis naturalis, materialis, vel instans (2) In some measure signifies natural priority, by which one thing is in its nature beſore another. 14. solum 9. nec B. 10. posset BD. 11. foret D. 12. omne BD. 20. sic alicui pro sit ali- deest ACD; in marg. B. 15. esse twice C. quid cui AC; ib. formaliter deest ACD. 23. csset D. 26. natura D; k 27—20. substanciali — substanciali deest D. 30. substancie D. ib. est D. 31. est pro inest BI). 36. after loyca et pro in B; 34. prioritate BD. 38. gradus C; ib. instantes pro instans ACD. ib. in sermomibus C.
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208 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. VI. nature (que omnia in idem sonant) secundum quam To be without mensuram unum est prius reliquo in natura. In hoc form means to enim nullus qui non wult gratis contendere dissentit in be capable of form and animo. Secundo, suppono quod esse informe significat naturally prior thereto, since rem formabilem sine forma substanciali existere pro 5 I understand the words in this aliqua mensura pro qua non formatur forma substan- signification. ciali. Patet quod supposicio debet admitti, cum nomen sit vox significativa ad placitum; et sic utuntur auctores termino, ut patebit. Istis duobus suppositis, patet tercio, quod materia prima non possit esse, nisi prius esset 10 naturaliter substancialiter formabilis quam formata, cum ideo est formata quia formabilis. Ergo, iuxta primam supposicionem est mensura naturalis, vel instans nature, pro quo est formabilis, et non pro illo est formata. Si enim pro isto instanti nature esset substancialiter for-15 mata, tunc pro illo non esset prius naturaliter forma- bilis quam formata. Ergo, iuxta secundam supposicionem, materiam esse informem dicit illam pro aliqua mensura pro qua non formatur. Patet quod sequitur ex posicione quod materia prima, pro illo instanti nature pro quo 20 est formabilis et non formatur, sit informis. Unde Augustinus, 8° super Gen. 19°: 'Deus format materiam primam quam nec alius nec ullus, sed omnino ipse in- formem at formabilem instituit, ut formacionem suam non tempore, sed origine, preveniret." Nec aliter Deus 25 posset scire se creaturum mundum, vel creacionem eius fore, vel non esse mundi precedere suum esse. Et patet secunda pars conclusionis. Et patet quod minor argumenti principalis est in- Thus the objection supposes what possibilis, scilicet, eo ipso quod materia prima est 30 is impossible, formata, non est informis"; quia necesse est eam esse viz., that "because matter formatam ex prima parte conclusionis, et necesse est is always formed it is not eam esse informem ex secunda parte conclusionis eius- without form"; dem. Ideo planum est istam reduplicativam esse in- in order to receive a form, possibilem: "eo ipso quod materia prima est formata 35 it must non est informis"; cum non possit esse formata, nisi previously be formless. Of prius sit informis. Verumtamen bene sequitur ut neces- course matter, in what measure soever it is actually formed, is not formless ; And thus it is clear that primal matter being capable of capable of form and naturally prior thereto, exists in some measure without form,or independently of it. This I call an instant not of time, but of nature; and in that instant matter exists without form. 2. naturam B. 3. 9cede' D; ib. in deest AC. 5. formalem ACD; ib. sine above in red ink A; deest BD. 9. terminorum C; ib. ptebt (pccb'?) 11. naturaliter deest D; ib. formalis AC. 11, 12. formabilis— formabilis in marg. E. 12. cum ergo BD; ib. per D. 14. formalis ACD ; ib. et materia BD. 16. est pro non esset AC. 19. expositorie BD. 21. formalis ACD. 26. se se BD; ib. pcactm' pro creaturum D. 30. scilicet deest D; ib. cum est BD. 32. et deest ABC. 37. quod ut C.
208 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. VI. nature (que omnia in idem sonant) secundum quam To be without mensuram unum est prius reliquo in natura. In hoc form means to enim nullus qui non wult gratis contendere dissentit in be capable of form and animo. Secundo, suppono quod esse informe significat naturally prior thereto, since rem formabilem sine forma substanciali existere pro 5 I understand the words in this aliqua mensura pro qua non formatur forma substan- signification. ciali. Patet quod supposicio debet admitti, cum nomen sit vox significativa ad placitum; et sic utuntur auctores termino, ut patebit. Istis duobus suppositis, patet tercio, quod materia prima non possit esse, nisi prius esset 10 naturaliter substancialiter formabilis quam formata, cum ideo est formata quia formabilis. Ergo, iuxta primam supposicionem est mensura naturalis, vel instans nature, pro quo est formabilis, et non pro illo est formata. Si enim pro isto instanti nature esset substancialiter for-15 mata, tunc pro illo non esset prius naturaliter forma- bilis quam formata. Ergo, iuxta secundam supposicionem, materiam esse informem dicit illam pro aliqua mensura pro qua non formatur. Patet quod sequitur ex posicione quod materia prima, pro illo instanti nature pro quo 20 est formabilis et non formatur, sit informis. Unde Augustinus, 8° super Gen. 19°: 'Deus format materiam primam quam nec alius nec ullus, sed omnino ipse in- formem at formabilem instituit, ut formacionem suam non tempore, sed origine, preveniret." Nec aliter Deus 25 posset scire se creaturum mundum, vel creacionem eius fore, vel non esse mundi precedere suum esse. Et patet secunda pars conclusionis. Et patet quod minor argumenti principalis est in- Thus the objection supposes what possibilis, scilicet, eo ipso quod materia prima est 30 is impossible, formata, non est informis"; quia necesse est eam esse viz., that "because matter formatam ex prima parte conclusionis, et necesse est is always formed it is not eam esse informem ex secunda parte conclusionis eius- without form"; dem. Ideo planum est istam reduplicativam esse in- in order to receive a form, possibilem: "eo ipso quod materia prima est formata 35 it must non est informis"; cum non possit esse formata, nisi previously be formless. Of prius sit informis. Verumtamen bene sequitur ut neces- course matter, in what measure soever it is actually formed, is not formless ; And thus it is clear that primal matter being capable of capable of form and naturally prior thereto, exists in some measure without form,or independently of it. This I call an instant not of time, but of nature; and in that instant matter exists without form. 2. naturam B. 3. 9cede' D; ib. in deest AC. 5. formalem ACD; ib. sine above in red ink A; deest BD. 9. terminorum C; ib. ptebt (pccb'?) 11. naturaliter deest D; ib. formalis AC. 11, 12. formabilis— formabilis in marg. E. 12. cum ergo BD; ib. per D. 14. formalis ACD ; ib. et materia BD. 16. est pro non esset AC. 19. expositorie BD. 21. formalis ACD. 26. se se BD; ib. pcactm' pro creaturum D. 30. scilicet deest D; ib. cum est BD. 32. et deest ABC. 37. quod ut C.
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CAP. VI. DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 209 A 673 25 sarium quod, si materia prima pro aliqua mensura sit but a measure of time can be formata, tunc pro illa mensura non est informis; sed distinguished non sequitur: “materia prima pro nulla mensura tem- from that of nature. poris est informis, ergo non est informis. Per hoc patet responsio ad confirmacionem primam. Nam supposito quod aliquando ille terminus “aliquando" limitetur iuxta famosius significatum, quod significet mensuram temporalem, patet quod minor est neganda, cum non pro mensura temporis, sed pro mensura 10 nature, que est prior omni mensura temporis, est in- formis. Et ille est sensus Augustini, 12° de Confessione, ubi, priusquam declarat angelum et materiam primam esse creaturam dei, et per consequens mutabilem, non 15 eternum, licet utrumque sit supra tempus, sic recapitulat assertive: 'Istis consideratis, quantum donas, deus meus, quantum me ad pulsandum excitas; quantum aperis pul- santi! Duo recipio que fecisti carencia temporis, cum tamen tibi neutrum coeternum sit. Unum quod ita for- matum sit, ut sine ullo] defectu contemplacionis, sine ullo intervallo inmutacionis, quamvis mutabile, tamen non mutatum, tua eternitate atque incommutabilitate perfrua- tur ; alterum quod ita informe erat ut ex qua forma in quam formam, vel stacionis vel mocionis, mutaretur cui ipsi subderetur non haberet; sed hoc ut informe esset non reliquisti, quoniam fecisti omnem diem in principio celum et terram, et hec duo que dicebam." Intencio huius sancti est, ut patet quotlibet locis Explanation of this passage. illius libri, quod materia prima creata est a deo pro The book of Genesis, in 3o mensura nature, non temporis, informis, et post natura- order to be liter primo die ordinis formata luce corporea, id est understood, calls matter by forma: Et hoc asserit spiritum sanctum (significare) the names of carth, water, per veram proposicionem, Gen. 1° “In principio creavit abyss, which give the idea of deus celum et terram"; id est: In verbo creavit deus formlessness, 35 spiritualem creaturam et corpoream. Unde ordinate et and says it was without form, mirabili subtilitate communiter eandem creaturam vocat void, and dark. If we limit aliquando, as it usually is limited, to mean time, then we simply deny that matter is formless in that sense. A quotation from Augustine's Confessions. 3, 4. after temporis non 1. si — sit deest D. 3. illa pro nulla AC. 6. aliquando after terminus deest AC. cst AC.. 7. limitate BD. 7, 8. famosiores significet mensuram BD. 12. ca° 12°; above primo BD. 13. declaravit BC; ib. primam deest D. 16. donat BD. 17. excusad, (very illegible) A; expulsandum in marg.; accusandum B. 18. carencia; correspondencia below D; ib. temporibus ABCD ; temporis in marg. B. 22. 19mutats A. 23. c'at A. 25. ipi A; ib. subde'r B: sed habet ABD) ; ib. non informe C. 26. quin ABD). 3r. in pro id est ACD. 32. ex 36. candem 31. et pro id est ABCD. pro et AC; ib. sentire CD. tempore D. 14
CAP. VI. DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 209 A 673 25 sarium quod, si materia prima pro aliqua mensura sit but a measure of time can be formata, tunc pro illa mensura non est informis; sed distinguished non sequitur: “materia prima pro nulla mensura tem- from that of nature. poris est informis, ergo non est informis. Per hoc patet responsio ad confirmacionem primam. Nam supposito quod aliquando ille terminus “aliquando" limitetur iuxta famosius significatum, quod significet mensuram temporalem, patet quod minor est neganda, cum non pro mensura temporis, sed pro mensura 10 nature, que est prior omni mensura temporis, est in- formis. Et ille est sensus Augustini, 12° de Confessione, ubi, priusquam declarat angelum et materiam primam esse creaturam dei, et per consequens mutabilem, non 15 eternum, licet utrumque sit supra tempus, sic recapitulat assertive: 'Istis consideratis, quantum donas, deus meus, quantum me ad pulsandum excitas; quantum aperis pul- santi! Duo recipio que fecisti carencia temporis, cum tamen tibi neutrum coeternum sit. Unum quod ita for- matum sit, ut sine ullo] defectu contemplacionis, sine ullo intervallo inmutacionis, quamvis mutabile, tamen non mutatum, tua eternitate atque incommutabilitate perfrua- tur ; alterum quod ita informe erat ut ex qua forma in quam formam, vel stacionis vel mocionis, mutaretur cui ipsi subderetur non haberet; sed hoc ut informe esset non reliquisti, quoniam fecisti omnem diem in principio celum et terram, et hec duo que dicebam." Intencio huius sancti est, ut patet quotlibet locis Explanation of this passage. illius libri, quod materia prima creata est a deo pro The book of Genesis, in 3o mensura nature, non temporis, informis, et post natura- order to be liter primo die ordinis formata luce corporea, id est understood, calls matter by forma: Et hoc asserit spiritum sanctum (significare) the names of carth, water, per veram proposicionem, Gen. 1° “In principio creavit abyss, which give the idea of deus celum et terram"; id est: In verbo creavit deus formlessness, 35 spiritualem creaturam et corpoream. Unde ordinate et and says it was without form, mirabili subtilitate communiter eandem creaturam vocat void, and dark. If we limit aliquando, as it usually is limited, to mean time, then we simply deny that matter is formless in that sense. A quotation from Augustine's Confessions. 3, 4. after temporis non 1. si — sit deest D. 3. illa pro nulla AC. 6. aliquando after terminus deest AC. cst AC.. 7. limitate BD. 7, 8. famosiores significet mensuram BD. 12. ca° 12°; above primo BD. 13. declaravit BC; ib. primam deest D. 16. donat BD. 17. excusad, (very illegible) A; expulsandum in marg.; accusandum B. 18. carencia; correspondencia below D; ib. temporibus ABCD ; temporis in marg. B. 22. 19mutats A. 23. c'at A. 25. ipi A; ib. subde'r B: sed habet ABD) ; ib. non informe C. 26. quin ABD). 3r. in pro id est ACD. 32. ex 36. candem 31. et pro id est ABCD. pro et AC; ib. sentire CD. tempore D. 14
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210 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. VI. dictam essenciam corpoream (sub racione qua est ma- teria) terram, aquam et abissum, quia rudis populus non sufficiebat comprehendere naturam corpoream sub racione qua materia; ideo necesse habuit illam exprimere no- minibus rerum sensibilium, que maxime accidunt ad: informitatem. Nec false nominat, ut post dicetur; et ad testandum eius informitatem dicit eam inanem, vacuam et tenebrosam. Dicte autem privaciones non sunt nisi informitates materie huius. Post hoc (natura non tem- pore) facta est, prima die ordinis, lux in forma sub- 10 stanciali in primo instanti temporis et materia natura- liter, non temporaliter, ante idem instans. Aristotle here Hec exposicio sancti Augustini cum illa eciam sen- agrees with tencia concordat Aristotelem 1° physicorum. "Materia," Augustine. When was inquit, se habet priusquam accipiat formam." Patet 15 matter illa ex racione et scriptura cum testimonio illorum formless? never in time, for that duorum philosophorum Augustini et Aristotelis quod is a mode of oportet ut dicta materia sit informis. Et si queritur being not measured by quando? dicitur quod nunquam; cum sic supra tempus time. est, sed pro mensura prioritatis naturalis ante tempus. 20 Pro quo notandum, ut alibi dictum est, cum decla- racione quod septupliciter aliquid dicitur existere in mensura. Uno modo, quando includitur secundum eius principium et finem in uno indivisibili vel parte tem- poris, ut mutaciones subite, vel alia tempori inclusa; 25 et illa dicuntur proprie esse in tempore, sicud idem illud dicitur proprie locatum quod est in loco secundum unumquodque ambitum. Secundo modo dicitur aliquid (2) to have a commencement existere in tempore, quando ipsum incipit cum tempore, together with time, or to sed non temporaliter preceditur a tempore; vel incipit 30 begin after and not to be ended in tempore, sed non finitur a tempore; ut terra primo in time; producta, et anima posterius creata. Tercio modo dicitur (3) to be everlasting, like aliquid esse, quod est sempiternum; ut mundus et the universe ; quotlibet eius partes; quas Augustinus dicit factas cum tempore, sed non in tempore. Talia tamen sunt in quo-35 libet instanti temporis. Quarto modo dicitur aliquid existere quando est in totali tempore, sed non simpli- citer in aliquo instanti vel parte temporis; ut est talis veritas: Omne tempus vel instans temporis est. Non enim Light signified substantial form created afterwards, not in time, but as a natural sequence. To be in any way or measure may mean (1) to be completely comprised in time, or space (4) to exist in timie in general, but not in any particular part of time ; 7. attestandum BD. 9. huius 4. necessario B. 6. informitati BD. deest C; ib. prioritas pro post hoc ABC. 13. Hic est BD. 13. Aristo- tetes D; ib. 1° phys. 6° D. 17. Augustino et Aristotele A. 17, 18. oportet esse D. 18. dicitur pro queritur AC. 21, 22. cum 20. est ante BD. declaracione deest D. 22. septuter AC. 28. habitum ; 26. idem B. corr. in marg. D. 35. Talia deest D.
210 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. VI. dictam essenciam corpoream (sub racione qua est ma- teria) terram, aquam et abissum, quia rudis populus non sufficiebat comprehendere naturam corpoream sub racione qua materia; ideo necesse habuit illam exprimere no- minibus rerum sensibilium, que maxime accidunt ad: informitatem. Nec false nominat, ut post dicetur; et ad testandum eius informitatem dicit eam inanem, vacuam et tenebrosam. Dicte autem privaciones non sunt nisi informitates materie huius. Post hoc (natura non tem- pore) facta est, prima die ordinis, lux in forma sub- 10 stanciali in primo instanti temporis et materia natura- liter, non temporaliter, ante idem instans. Aristotle here Hec exposicio sancti Augustini cum illa eciam sen- agrees with tencia concordat Aristotelem 1° physicorum. "Materia," Augustine. When was inquit, se habet priusquam accipiat formam." Patet 15 matter illa ex racione et scriptura cum testimonio illorum formless? never in time, for that duorum philosophorum Augustini et Aristotelis quod is a mode of oportet ut dicta materia sit informis. Et si queritur being not measured by quando? dicitur quod nunquam; cum sic supra tempus time. est, sed pro mensura prioritatis naturalis ante tempus. 20 Pro quo notandum, ut alibi dictum est, cum decla- racione quod septupliciter aliquid dicitur existere in mensura. Uno modo, quando includitur secundum eius principium et finem in uno indivisibili vel parte tem- poris, ut mutaciones subite, vel alia tempori inclusa; 25 et illa dicuntur proprie esse in tempore, sicud idem illud dicitur proprie locatum quod est in loco secundum unumquodque ambitum. Secundo modo dicitur aliquid (2) to have a commencement existere in tempore, quando ipsum incipit cum tempore, together with time, or to sed non temporaliter preceditur a tempore; vel incipit 30 begin after and not to be ended in tempore, sed non finitur a tempore; ut terra primo in time; producta, et anima posterius creata. Tercio modo dicitur (3) to be everlasting, like aliquid esse, quod est sempiternum; ut mundus et the universe ; quotlibet eius partes; quas Augustinus dicit factas cum tempore, sed non in tempore. Talia tamen sunt in quo-35 libet instanti temporis. Quarto modo dicitur aliquid existere quando est in totali tempore, sed non simpli- citer in aliquo instanti vel parte temporis; ut est talis veritas: Omne tempus vel instans temporis est. Non enim Light signified substantial form created afterwards, not in time, but as a natural sequence. To be in any way or measure may mean (1) to be completely comprised in time, or space (4) to exist in timie in general, but not in any particular part of time ; 7. attestandum BD. 9. huius 4. necessario B. 6. informitati BD. deest C; ib. prioritas pro post hoc ABC. 13. Hic est BD. 13. Aristo- tetes D; ib. 1° phys. 6° D. 17. Augustino et Aristotele A. 17, 18. oportet esse D. 18. dicitur pro queritur AC. 21, 22. cum 20. est ante BD. declaracione deest D. 22. septuter AC. 28. habitum ; 26. idem B. corr. in marg. D. 35. Talia deest D.
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CAP. VI. DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 211 est possibile illam veritatem simpliciter esse in parte temporis, cum residua pars temporis includit quotlibet instancia que non sunt in parte data. Sic enim est dare quotlibet veritates, quarum nulla potest esse in 5 instanti, nec per tempus; ut est talis veritas: Illa sunt" (demonstrando) quotcunque instancia inmediata. Quinto, dicitur ens esse quod non potest esse in tem- pore; ut sunt tales veritates, mundum esse creandum, quod- libet instans esse futurum; et sic de quotlibet similibus. 10 Cum enim deus ante mundum sciverit in eternitate se esse producturum primum instans, patet quod illud fuit futurum, sed non in primo instanti vel unquam post; et in isto gradu est informitas materie prime. Sexto modo perfectissime et evidentissime dicitur aliquid in 15 tempore esse, quod in cuiuslibet temporis quolibet in- stanti est secundum se totum et ante omne tempus, et post omne tempus; quod solius dei est inter omnes naturas possibiles, cum solum illius nature formalis mensura sit eternitas. 20 Ex istis patet quod vanum est querere quando essencia corporea, que est simplex, est informis. Oportet enim hanc esse pro mensura nature, et non pro aliquo in- stanti temporis. Nec talis veritas potest incipere vel desinere esse, cum non potest esse in instanti temporis. Quando autem minus sapui scripturam, et solum fluctuavi in tortura animi, nunc negando informitatem materie, nunc dicendo quod non est informis nisi quo ad illud instans nature, sed non ex hoc sequitur quod est informis; et sic intelligendo quod pro omni mensura 3o pro qua [est] est informata, sed non de se. Et sic de quibuslibet de ceculis a veritate, que cecati circum- palpitantes veritatem langwide suspicantur. Ad secundum: patet ex dictis quod conclusio est I fully admit that all nature concedenda; nam eque primo natura, sicud creatura, is beautiful, but with a different 35 est analoyce formosa, ad modum loquendi beati Dyonisii beauty when considered in De divinis nominibus, cap. 1°. Sed posterius natura apart from, and est forma, vel formositas quam natura habet, ut est when as having its form. (5) to exist out of time, as the truth of the world's future existence, &c. Or (6) To exist completely at every instant, before all time, and after all time ; which is God's measure of existence. It is, therefore, useless to ask when matter is formless, since this formlessness exists in the fifth sense of measured existence. Before I studied Holy Writ, my answer to this objection used to be wavering and uncertain, for I was groping after truth in the dark. 25 A 67 7. modo B: 6. est pro sunt AC: ib. oimoda pro demonstrando ABC. et isto modo pro quinto D; ib. after ens eo pro esse BC. 8. veritates 14. evaeme D. deest BD). 10. sciurt A; scivit D. 12. vmquod A. 20. vacuum BD. 22. hoc BD. 22, 23. quando pro instanti B. 25. f8m = sensum BD. 27. non deest AC; ib. nisi deest ABC. 28. est 30. est deest ABCD. 31. dececiclis pro ad ABC. 29. intendendo ABC. cecati in marg. A; circulis BD; cticlis C; de'ccitulis E; ib. cecitl = ce- citati D. 34. prima A. 14*
CAP. VI. DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 211 est possibile illam veritatem simpliciter esse in parte temporis, cum residua pars temporis includit quotlibet instancia que non sunt in parte data. Sic enim est dare quotlibet veritates, quarum nulla potest esse in 5 instanti, nec per tempus; ut est talis veritas: Illa sunt" (demonstrando) quotcunque instancia inmediata. Quinto, dicitur ens esse quod non potest esse in tem- pore; ut sunt tales veritates, mundum esse creandum, quod- libet instans esse futurum; et sic de quotlibet similibus. 10 Cum enim deus ante mundum sciverit in eternitate se esse producturum primum instans, patet quod illud fuit futurum, sed non in primo instanti vel unquam post; et in isto gradu est informitas materie prime. Sexto modo perfectissime et evidentissime dicitur aliquid in 15 tempore esse, quod in cuiuslibet temporis quolibet in- stanti est secundum se totum et ante omne tempus, et post omne tempus; quod solius dei est inter omnes naturas possibiles, cum solum illius nature formalis mensura sit eternitas. 20 Ex istis patet quod vanum est querere quando essencia corporea, que est simplex, est informis. Oportet enim hanc esse pro mensura nature, et non pro aliquo in- stanti temporis. Nec talis veritas potest incipere vel desinere esse, cum non potest esse in instanti temporis. Quando autem minus sapui scripturam, et solum fluctuavi in tortura animi, nunc negando informitatem materie, nunc dicendo quod non est informis nisi quo ad illud instans nature, sed non ex hoc sequitur quod est informis; et sic intelligendo quod pro omni mensura 3o pro qua [est] est informata, sed non de se. Et sic de quibuslibet de ceculis a veritate, que cecati circum- palpitantes veritatem langwide suspicantur. Ad secundum: patet ex dictis quod conclusio est I fully admit that all nature concedenda; nam eque primo natura, sicud creatura, is beautiful, but with a different 35 est analoyce formosa, ad modum loquendi beati Dyonisii beauty when considered in De divinis nominibus, cap. 1°. Sed posterius natura apart from, and est forma, vel formositas quam natura habet, ut est when as having its form. (5) to exist out of time, as the truth of the world's future existence, &c. Or (6) To exist completely at every instant, before all time, and after all time ; which is God's measure of existence. It is, therefore, useless to ask when matter is formless, since this formlessness exists in the fifth sense of measured existence. Before I studied Holy Writ, my answer to this objection used to be wavering and uncertain, for I was groping after truth in the dark. 25 A 67 7. modo B: 6. est pro sunt AC: ib. oimoda pro demonstrando ABC. et isto modo pro quinto D; ib. after ens eo pro esse BC. 8. veritates 14. evaeme D. deest BD). 10. sciurt A; scivit D. 12. vmquod A. 20. vacuum BD. 22. hoc BD. 22, 23. quando pro instanti B. 25. f8m = sensum BD. 27. non deest AC; ib. nisi deest ABC. 28. est 30. est deest ABCD. 31. dececiclis pro ad ABC. 29. intendendo ABC. cecati in marg. A; circulis BD; cticlis C; de'ccitulis E; ib. cecitl = ce- citati D. 34. prima A. 14*
Strana 212
212 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. VI. Matter, qua quid in genere. Unde, si queritur quid est materia formless, is not prima, vel essencia pro mensura qua est informis, dicitur a thing, that is, a substance; quod vere loquendo non est aliquid, quia non est quid pro ista mensura; quia aliquid dicit ethimoloyce quasi aliud quid. Et iste est sensus Augustini 12° de: Confessione: 7°: 'Fecisti, domine, celum et terram, duo quidem: unum prope, te alterum prope nichil; unum quo superior tu es, alterum quo inferius nichil est." Nec oportet timere instancias sophisticas, quibus argu- mentatur quod materia prima non est prope nichil. 10 Quod sic intelligitur: quod materia est prope nichil in effectu; multa enim sunt possibilia, que sunt nichil in effectu; et materia, que fit informis, est medium inter aliquid in effectu et nichil in effectu. Ideo, ut dicit cap. 6°, materia est medium inter formam 15 et nichil. Et eumdem modum loquendi habet Aristoteles, 1° physicorum, 75° dicens, “Nos autem et ipsi dicimus, nichil fieri quidem simpliciter ex eo quod non est, sed tamen fieri ex eo quod non est ut secundum accidens.' Ideo dicit philosophus quod antiqui, negantes gene-20 racionem substancie, non cognoverunt quomodo oportet latere quamdam naturam in potencia ad quamcunque formam, et pro mensura illius potencie esse quid secun- dum potenciam ante actum. Nec aliter concipit philosophus racionem materie 25 prime nisi considerando gradum prioristicum nature precedere prioritatem temporis. Ideo Augustinus (12° de Confessione) nominanter ponit decem gradus prioritatis, dicens quod quicunque non intelligit eos, non est ydoneus ad intelligendum I scripturam, Gen. 1° dicentem quod primo deus fecit materiam informem, et post formavit eamdem. Sunt autem alia priora eternitate, alia tempore, alia eleccione, alia origine. Eternitate, sicud deus trinitas precedit universitatem creatam; tempore, sicud flos fructum, eleccione sicud 35 fructus florem; origine, sicud sonus cantum. Et con- cordat Aristoteles, 5° metaphysice, 16°. as angelic natures are all but Infinite, so matter is all but nothing; at any rate, in effect. What is purely possible is nothing as to effeet; primal matter is between something and nothing. Something cannot come out of pure nothingness, but of what happens not to be. Potentiality existing before actuality is at the root of the whole theory of generation. Various degrees of priority, posited by Augustine. А 68 4. et ABD; quia above in red ink A; ib. quasi deest AC. 8. su- perius D. 10. prima deest D. 12. ncca AC; multa above A. 13. cum sit BD. 14. media BD; mere C. 16. loquendi deest AC; ib. philo- sophus D. 18. sunt quidem nichil pro nichil fieri quidem A; ib. po'est 21. se pro 19. sunt pro fieri A. 20. quod above line A. AC. substancíe AC. 25. conciperet BD. 23. non above esse B. 28. nout' ABD. 29, 30. est 26. p'oristicu A. 27. precedens A. 30. intelligendam C;. dicente D. inydoneus BD. 33. before origine : et alia BCD. 30. eleccione pro origine C.
212 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. VI. Matter, qua quid in genere. Unde, si queritur quid est materia formless, is not prima, vel essencia pro mensura qua est informis, dicitur a thing, that is, a substance; quod vere loquendo non est aliquid, quia non est quid pro ista mensura; quia aliquid dicit ethimoloyce quasi aliud quid. Et iste est sensus Augustini 12° de: Confessione: 7°: 'Fecisti, domine, celum et terram, duo quidem: unum prope, te alterum prope nichil; unum quo superior tu es, alterum quo inferius nichil est." Nec oportet timere instancias sophisticas, quibus argu- mentatur quod materia prima non est prope nichil. 10 Quod sic intelligitur: quod materia est prope nichil in effectu; multa enim sunt possibilia, que sunt nichil in effectu; et materia, que fit informis, est medium inter aliquid in effectu et nichil in effectu. Ideo, ut dicit cap. 6°, materia est medium inter formam 15 et nichil. Et eumdem modum loquendi habet Aristoteles, 1° physicorum, 75° dicens, “Nos autem et ipsi dicimus, nichil fieri quidem simpliciter ex eo quod non est, sed tamen fieri ex eo quod non est ut secundum accidens.' Ideo dicit philosophus quod antiqui, negantes gene-20 racionem substancie, non cognoverunt quomodo oportet latere quamdam naturam in potencia ad quamcunque formam, et pro mensura illius potencie esse quid secun- dum potenciam ante actum. Nec aliter concipit philosophus racionem materie 25 prime nisi considerando gradum prioristicum nature precedere prioritatem temporis. Ideo Augustinus (12° de Confessione) nominanter ponit decem gradus prioritatis, dicens quod quicunque non intelligit eos, non est ydoneus ad intelligendum I scripturam, Gen. 1° dicentem quod primo deus fecit materiam informem, et post formavit eamdem. Sunt autem alia priora eternitate, alia tempore, alia eleccione, alia origine. Eternitate, sicud deus trinitas precedit universitatem creatam; tempore, sicud flos fructum, eleccione sicud 35 fructus florem; origine, sicud sonus cantum. Et con- cordat Aristoteles, 5° metaphysice, 16°. as angelic natures are all but Infinite, so matter is all but nothing; at any rate, in effect. What is purely possible is nothing as to effeet; primal matter is between something and nothing. Something cannot come out of pure nothingness, but of what happens not to be. Potentiality existing before actuality is at the root of the whole theory of generation. Various degrees of priority, posited by Augustine. А 68 4. et ABD; quia above in red ink A; ib. quasi deest AC. 8. su- perius D. 10. prima deest D. 12. ncca AC; multa above A. 13. cum sit BD. 14. media BD; mere C. 16. loquendi deest AC; ib. philo- sophus D. 18. sunt quidem nichil pro nichil fieri quidem A; ib. po'est 21. se pro 19. sunt pro fieri A. 20. quod above line A. AC. substancíe AC. 25. conciperet BD. 23. non above esse B. 28. nout' ABD. 29, 30. est 26. p'oristicu A. 27. precedens A. 30. intelligendam C;. dicente D. inydoneus BD. 33. before origine : et alia BCD. 30. eleccione pro origine C.
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CAP. VI. DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 213 Prioritas autem, qua deus, qui est principium primum, precedit omnem creaturam, non potest habere gradum sibi conformem, cum solus sit natura simpliciter eterna. Ab illo tamen exemplificatur quecunque prioritas per 5 se cause cuiuscunque effectus, quem deus non potest per se producere sine coefficiencia date cause secunde; ut anima se habet respectu sui actus, et generaliter quecunque substancia respectu sui accidentis. Et talis vocatur prioritas in natura secundum causam in Predica- to mentis. Illa autem excludit unitatem requisitam ad genus; ut ens non est genus loycum ad substanciam et accidens, quia genus substancie est naturaliter prius quam genus accidentis; nec accidens est genus loycum ad respectivum et absolutum; quia totum accidens 15 respectivum presupponit causaliter absolutum. Nec ac- cidens absolutum est genus loycum ad quantitatem et qualitatem, quia totum genus qualitatis presupponit taliter causaliter qualitatem; et ita de aliis, que non communicant in partibus quantitativis vel subiectivis. 20 Non sic autem de speciebus eiusdem generis. Et differt illa prioritas a prioritate universalioris ad minus uni- versale, quia hoc prius non communicat in natura cum suo posteriori. Alia autem prioritas universalis est eadem natura que minus universale. 25 Secundo prioritas (temporis) hodie est tam famosa quod vulgus non concipit aliam. Unde, quam statim dicitur quod a fuit prius b, intelligitur, propter famo- sitatem, quod fuit tempore illo prius. Tercia prioritas, quam Augustinus vocat eleccionis, 3o est generaliter cuiuscunque finis naturalis procedentis ex eius mediis origine preeminente ad eandem, cum finis huiusmodi sit melior hiis que sunt ad finem, et per consequens eligibilior. Et sic est compositum prius materia et forma, et generaliter totum prius sua parte, 35 cum sit finis racione cuius natura intendit partem. Et patet, notando equivoce prioritatem elementi ad ele- mentatum prioritate nature, et cum hac prioritate finis (1) Priority of everlastingness, of the First Principle, God. That of cause und effect is analogous thereto. But this is not included in any genus, since it divides all beings (as substance and accident) the latter being caused by the former, and accidents of various sorts are caused one by another. This is different from the priority of the more over the less universal, since these have something of the same nature. (2) Temporal priority is s0 well known that many conceive no other. (3) Priority of choice is that of a given end over a thing chosen in view of that end, since the end must be chosen first. In this sense, every compound is prior to its matter and 1. qui deest BD. 2. alium gradum BD. 5. esse pro cause B. 6. efficiencia D. 7. alia pro anima C. 9, 10. pitis A. 10. unionem CD. 15. calr' A. 18. quantitatem D. 24. 9ne (commune?) A. 26. concepit D. 27. a'fuit D. 29. eleccionem AB. 30. est deest ABC; ib. tuerit pro finis A. ib. eadem CD; ib. co pro 31. preeminencie ACD; cum AC. 32. 111 ABC. 31. vel formaliter Bl; ib. prius deest BD. 36. clcti A; elci BD. 37. p'o'ite thrice D. 36, 37. eltmtu B; eln'tu D.
CAP. VI. DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 213 Prioritas autem, qua deus, qui est principium primum, precedit omnem creaturam, non potest habere gradum sibi conformem, cum solus sit natura simpliciter eterna. Ab illo tamen exemplificatur quecunque prioritas per 5 se cause cuiuscunque effectus, quem deus non potest per se producere sine coefficiencia date cause secunde; ut anima se habet respectu sui actus, et generaliter quecunque substancia respectu sui accidentis. Et talis vocatur prioritas in natura secundum causam in Predica- to mentis. Illa autem excludit unitatem requisitam ad genus; ut ens non est genus loycum ad substanciam et accidens, quia genus substancie est naturaliter prius quam genus accidentis; nec accidens est genus loycum ad respectivum et absolutum; quia totum accidens 15 respectivum presupponit causaliter absolutum. Nec ac- cidens absolutum est genus loycum ad quantitatem et qualitatem, quia totum genus qualitatis presupponit taliter causaliter qualitatem; et ita de aliis, que non communicant in partibus quantitativis vel subiectivis. 20 Non sic autem de speciebus eiusdem generis. Et differt illa prioritas a prioritate universalioris ad minus uni- versale, quia hoc prius non communicat in natura cum suo posteriori. Alia autem prioritas universalis est eadem natura que minus universale. 25 Secundo prioritas (temporis) hodie est tam famosa quod vulgus non concipit aliam. Unde, quam statim dicitur quod a fuit prius b, intelligitur, propter famo- sitatem, quod fuit tempore illo prius. Tercia prioritas, quam Augustinus vocat eleccionis, 3o est generaliter cuiuscunque finis naturalis procedentis ex eius mediis origine preeminente ad eandem, cum finis huiusmodi sit melior hiis que sunt ad finem, et per consequens eligibilior. Et sic est compositum prius materia et forma, et generaliter totum prius sua parte, 35 cum sit finis racione cuius natura intendit partem. Et patet, notando equivoce prioritatem elementi ad ele- mentatum prioritate nature, et cum hac prioritate finis (1) Priority of everlastingness, of the First Principle, God. That of cause und effect is analogous thereto. But this is not included in any genus, since it divides all beings (as substance and accident) the latter being caused by the former, and accidents of various sorts are caused one by another. This is different from the priority of the more over the less universal, since these have something of the same nature. (2) Temporal priority is s0 well known that many conceive no other. (3) Priority of choice is that of a given end over a thing chosen in view of that end, since the end must be chosen first. In this sense, every compound is prior to its matter and 1. qui deest BD. 2. alium gradum BD. 5. esse pro cause B. 6. efficiencia D. 7. alia pro anima C. 9, 10. pitis A. 10. unionem CD. 15. calr' A. 18. quantitatem D. 24. 9ne (commune?) A. 26. concepit D. 27. a'fuit D. 29. eleccionem AB. 30. est deest ABC; ib. tuerit pro finis A. ib. eadem CD; ib. co pro 31. preeminencie ACD; cum AC. 32. 111 ABC. 31. vel formaliter Bl; ib. prius deest BD. 36. clcti A; elci BD. 37. p'o'ite thrice D. 36, 37. eltmtu B; eln'tu D.
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214 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. VI. form, every ad sua media eciam prioritatem nature, quam Augustinus whole to its vocat prioritatem eleccionis, non est inconveniens, sed parts. Thus it is quite conveniens, quod in casu a sit prius naturaliter b, et possible for one being to be e contra b prius naturaliter a, sed in dispari natura prior to another in speciei prioritate. Et ad illa duo membra habet reduci 5 nature, and prioritas originis et prioritas dignitatis vel honoris. Nam posterior as to choice. elementum et prius naturaliter quam elementatum ex An element is eo compositum. E contra autem elementatum est prius prior in nature to its dignitate vel perfeccione suo elemento, et principalius compound, but as it exists to est intentum a natura; et ad huiusmodi similitudinem 10 make the compound, it is prelati vocatur in politicis subditis priores. Et sic in- posterior to it telligitur illud Joh, primo, dictum a Baptista de Cristo: Jo. as to choice, I, 27 Christ, who “ Qui, inquit, post me venit, ante me factus est." Cristus came after John enim secundum humanitatem est factus prior tocius Baptist, was before him in ecclesie; et sic ante Baptistam qui fuit sub priori] ut God's election sentenciat Augustinus sermone 13° super Joh. notans which made Christ the Head quod scriptura non dicit 'factus est priusquam ego of the Church. essem", sed factus est", inquit, “ante me"; ita quod ante significat prioritatem dignitatis, modo quo loquitur Aristoteles 5° methaphysice. Quarta autem prioritas est originis et generis; et (4) Priority of origin presents propterea est difficillima ad intelligendum secundum some great difficulties; Augustinum. Est autem generaliter prioritas generis ad but it is that of the geuus to its suam speciem, et speciei ad suum individuum, prioritas species, and of the species to originis, quam Aristoteles vocat prioritatem nature. Sic 25 its individuals. enim secundum Augustinum, sonus, qui est cantus for- A sound is prior in this sense to matus est prius origine cantu, quia sonus est prius the time of natura quam est formatus cantus, cum cantus non which it forms part, and which formatur ut sit sonus, sed sonus ut sit cantus, non it originates; ymaginando quod sonus possit mora temporis proferri 30 yet it is not prior in time. informis, et post formaretur in cantum, cum sit suc- cessivum; sed origine precedit sonus informis sonum formatum. Sic" (inquit Augustinus) hoc exemplo qui potest intelligat materiam rerum primo factam informem, et post origine, non tempore, formatam". Ista autem 35 А 685 20 Primal matter has like priority. 2, 3. secundum consequens pro sed con- 1. et pro eciam BD. veniens AC. 5. specie AC; ib. et deest C. 6. ordinis BD. 7. elec- tivum A ; ib. electum A. 8. elem ratum pro elementatum C. 9. ectio A. ib. prius AC. 10. anima pro a natura A; ib. similitudines B. 15. pabta D; ib. sub prior ACD. 16. vocans; notans above line A. 18. ante ; nam above in red ink A; nam C. 22. sunt AC. 28. natura- liter BC; ib. cantus after formatus deest BD. 35. prius ACD. 30. Mora temporis. I understand this to mean in a lapse', or 'in a certain duration, of time.' Sound is not previous in time to the time which consists of it.
214 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. VI. form, every ad sua media eciam prioritatem nature, quam Augustinus whole to its vocat prioritatem eleccionis, non est inconveniens, sed parts. Thus it is quite conveniens, quod in casu a sit prius naturaliter b, et possible for one being to be e contra b prius naturaliter a, sed in dispari natura prior to another in speciei prioritate. Et ad illa duo membra habet reduci 5 nature, and prioritas originis et prioritas dignitatis vel honoris. Nam posterior as to choice. elementum et prius naturaliter quam elementatum ex An element is eo compositum. E contra autem elementatum est prius prior in nature to its dignitate vel perfeccione suo elemento, et principalius compound, but as it exists to est intentum a natura; et ad huiusmodi similitudinem 10 make the compound, it is prelati vocatur in politicis subditis priores. Et sic in- posterior to it telligitur illud Joh, primo, dictum a Baptista de Cristo: Jo. as to choice, I, 27 Christ, who “ Qui, inquit, post me venit, ante me factus est." Cristus came after John enim secundum humanitatem est factus prior tocius Baptist, was before him in ecclesie; et sic ante Baptistam qui fuit sub priori] ut God's election sentenciat Augustinus sermone 13° super Joh. notans which made Christ the Head quod scriptura non dicit 'factus est priusquam ego of the Church. essem", sed factus est", inquit, “ante me"; ita quod ante significat prioritatem dignitatis, modo quo loquitur Aristoteles 5° methaphysice. Quarta autem prioritas est originis et generis; et (4) Priority of origin presents propterea est difficillima ad intelligendum secundum some great difficulties; Augustinum. Est autem generaliter prioritas generis ad but it is that of the geuus to its suam speciem, et speciei ad suum individuum, prioritas species, and of the species to originis, quam Aristoteles vocat prioritatem nature. Sic 25 its individuals. enim secundum Augustinum, sonus, qui est cantus for- A sound is prior in this sense to matus est prius origine cantu, quia sonus est prius the time of natura quam est formatus cantus, cum cantus non which it forms part, and which formatur ut sit sonus, sed sonus ut sit cantus, non it originates; ymaginando quod sonus possit mora temporis proferri 30 yet it is not prior in time. informis, et post formaretur in cantum, cum sit suc- cessivum; sed origine precedit sonus informis sonum formatum. Sic" (inquit Augustinus) hoc exemplo qui potest intelligat materiam rerum primo factam informem, et post origine, non tempore, formatam". Ista autem 35 А 685 20 Primal matter has like priority. 2, 3. secundum consequens pro sed con- 1. et pro eciam BD. veniens AC. 5. specie AC; ib. et deest C. 6. ordinis BD. 7. elec- tivum A ; ib. electum A. 8. elem ratum pro elementatum C. 9. ectio A. ib. prius AC. 10. anima pro a natura A; ib. similitudines B. 15. pabta D; ib. sub prior ACD. 16. vocans; notans above line A. 18. ante ; nam above in red ink A; nam C. 22. sunt AC. 28. natura- liter BC; ib. cantus after formatus deest BD. 35. prius ACD. 30. Mora temporis. I understand this to mean in a lapse', or 'in a certain duration, of time.' Sound is not previous in time to the time which consists of it.
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CAP. VI. DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 215 15 A 69° prioritas originis, secundum Augustinum, habet membra equivoca; ut pater origine vel causa non precedit ver- bum natura, ut dicit Augustinus, in Questionibus veteris et nove legis, questione 122a. Materia autem, origine 5 et natura incompleta, precedit formam, et ambo com- positum, licet hec tria sunt eadem essencialis natura. Genus igitur et quodlibet universalius origine precedit inferius, licet sit eadem natura, et in omnibus hiis tribus est quasi anologa similitudo. Ex istis patet quod 10 nulla creatura est prius ens natura quam est bonum, cum bonitas essencialis creature sit unitas, entitas et veritas eiusdem. Verumtamen, antequam creatura habeat existenciam in genere, habet existenciam essencie vel nature, secundum quam est naturaliter priusquam est quid. Ad tercium dicitur quod racio currit sub equivoca- cione illius termini “compositum", qui potest supponere simpliciter pro natura integra ut unit in se materiam et formam tanquam duas naturas incompletas, quali- ficative componentes (et illa supposicio est famosa aput 20 philosophos), vel personaliter pro essencia illa, ut sibi accidit separabiliter componi ex materia et a forma; vel tercio modo, pro altero componencium. Cum enim natura componit materiam cum forma, sequitur quod utraque est composita a dicta natura cum reliqua, et 25 per consequens est compositum, licet non sit composita ex materia et forma, sed cum materia et forma. Secundo modo igitur sumitur in argumento pro essencia que accidentaliter sic componitur; primo modo nec materia nec forma est compositum, quia tunc esset composicio 3o in abstracto; secundo et tercio modo tam materia quam forma est compositum, quia essencia que componitur; et propter equivocacionem vitandam, inveniuntur auctores ponere abstractum ad primum sensum. Et sic loquitur auctor sex principiorum, describendo formam, quod est 35 hoc quod est contingens composicioni, id est, nature in- tegre ex duabus naturis incompletis composite. Et ita videtur ] dicta descripcio contingentis cuilibet forme substanciali superaddite, et cuilibet forme, cum sit 3. naturaliter D; ib. et item in AC. 6. tercia sit ABD; ib. essencia vel BCD. 8. informis A. 10. natura creata A; quedam C; ib. ipsa est BD. 15. crit A. 15, 10. subversionem A. 19. est deest D. 20. participialiter D; ib. potencia pro essencia AC; illa dees! ABC. 24. in 21. sepater A; ib. data pro a ADE. 22. tantum pro enim B. pro a C. 25. compositum BCD. 26. vel pro et ABC. 28. vel C. 35. est 3o. modo AC. 32, 33. inveniuntur deest; auctores ponunt BD. deest ABC; ib. et pro id est AD. 37. generis D. What is more universal naturally precedes the less universal; but transcendental attributes, equally universal with Being, are second to none. The opponent equivocates about the meaning of the word compound; which may mean either a complete nature containing others that are incomplete; or the essence that may happen to be made up of matter and form ; or either of the elements of the compound ; matter being together with form, it is consequently composite in a sense. The argument takes it in the second sense; in the first, neither matter nor form is composite, in the others, both are so. Thus when a form is said to be contingent to a complete nature composed of two that are incomplete, it is superadded to substantial form.
CAP. VI. DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 215 15 A 69° prioritas originis, secundum Augustinum, habet membra equivoca; ut pater origine vel causa non precedit ver- bum natura, ut dicit Augustinus, in Questionibus veteris et nove legis, questione 122a. Materia autem, origine 5 et natura incompleta, precedit formam, et ambo com- positum, licet hec tria sunt eadem essencialis natura. Genus igitur et quodlibet universalius origine precedit inferius, licet sit eadem natura, et in omnibus hiis tribus est quasi anologa similitudo. Ex istis patet quod 10 nulla creatura est prius ens natura quam est bonum, cum bonitas essencialis creature sit unitas, entitas et veritas eiusdem. Verumtamen, antequam creatura habeat existenciam in genere, habet existenciam essencie vel nature, secundum quam est naturaliter priusquam est quid. Ad tercium dicitur quod racio currit sub equivoca- cione illius termini “compositum", qui potest supponere simpliciter pro natura integra ut unit in se materiam et formam tanquam duas naturas incompletas, quali- ficative componentes (et illa supposicio est famosa aput 20 philosophos), vel personaliter pro essencia illa, ut sibi accidit separabiliter componi ex materia et a forma; vel tercio modo, pro altero componencium. Cum enim natura componit materiam cum forma, sequitur quod utraque est composita a dicta natura cum reliqua, et 25 per consequens est compositum, licet non sit composita ex materia et forma, sed cum materia et forma. Secundo modo igitur sumitur in argumento pro essencia que accidentaliter sic componitur; primo modo nec materia nec forma est compositum, quia tunc esset composicio 3o in abstracto; secundo et tercio modo tam materia quam forma est compositum, quia essencia que componitur; et propter equivocacionem vitandam, inveniuntur auctores ponere abstractum ad primum sensum. Et sic loquitur auctor sex principiorum, describendo formam, quod est 35 hoc quod est contingens composicioni, id est, nature in- tegre ex duabus naturis incompletis composite. Et ita videtur ] dicta descripcio contingentis cuilibet forme substanciali superaddite, et cuilibet forme, cum sit 3. naturaliter D; ib. et item in AC. 6. tercia sit ABD; ib. essencia vel BCD. 8. informis A. 10. natura creata A; quedam C; ib. ipsa est BD. 15. crit A. 15, 10. subversionem A. 19. est deest D. 20. participialiter D; ib. potencia pro essencia AC; illa dees! ABC. 24. in 21. sepater A; ib. data pro a ADE. 22. tantum pro enim B. pro a C. 25. compositum BCD. 26. vel pro et ABC. 28. vel C. 35. est 3o. modo AC. 32, 33. inveniuntur deest; auctores ponunt BD. deest ABC; ib. et pro id est AD. 37. generis D. What is more universal naturally precedes the less universal; but transcendental attributes, equally universal with Being, are second to none. The opponent equivocates about the meaning of the word compound; which may mean either a complete nature containing others that are incomplete; or the essence that may happen to be made up of matter and form ; or either of the elements of the compound ; matter being together with form, it is consequently composite in a sense. The argument takes it in the second sense; in the first, neither matter nor form is composite, in the others, both are so. Thus when a form is said to be contingent to a complete nature composed of two that are incomplete, it is superadded to substantial form.
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216 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. VI. contingens nature corporee quod formam huiusmodi sibi adveniat. Notandum tamen quod composicio quandoque dicit active actum componentis, qui est componere; quandoque passionem compositi; et hoc tripliciter: vel utrumque? componencium componi cum reliquo, vel collective, ista componi ad invicem, vel tercio, unum esse compositum ex talibus; et isto modo sumitur composicio, cum dici- tur quod materia et forma et composicio sunt una Matter and essencia vel natura. Et capit composicio subdivisionem, 10 form are secundum divisionem parcium composicionem parti- composed of the same thing cipancium; et patet quod ultima conclusio perfecta est which is matter concedenda. Sicud enim natura divina est compositum and form, i. e. of the abstract et tamen est simplicissima natura, et non potest com- essence; and yet neither poni vel esse composita, sic materia prima est res 15 is composed; just as God composita ex eadem materia et forma, que est essencia consists of the vel suppositum sic compositum; et tamen non com- Trinity, yet is the most simple ponitur nec est composita ex materia et forma. Nam of natures. There is also compositum est posterius natura quam alterum com- an analogy between the ponencium; sed longe hoc ad concludendum quod 20 Incarnate Word, materia aut componatur ex seipsa, aut quod sit prior, taking up flesh, simplicior et perfeccior seipsa; correspondenter sicud and matter taking up dicitur in materia de incarnacione. Sicud enim essencia forms. divina in supposito verbi assumpsit formam hominis sibi accidentalem, sic essencia corporea ante tempus 25 creata, assumpsit et assumit sepe formas varias sub- stanciales, licet sint sibi accidentales, ut patet alibi, etc. Diverse meanings of the word composition. CAPITULUM SEPTIMUM. Consequenter restat videre si concedi debeat in pre- Can we say : The same dicacione secundum essenciam, quod materia prima erit 30 primal matter will be fire, ignis, terra, et sic de qualibet substancia corporea. Et earth etc.? patet quod sic, eo quod quelibet essencia est quodlibet Certainly ; for they are all the tale corpus, et materia ac forma. Ergo, cum sufficit same essence, which is matter and form. 1. quod formam huiusmodi deest AD. 2. sibi adiciat BD. 3. nota BC. 5. temporaliter ABCD. 6. compositi ACD. 7. simpliciter unum BCD. 8. quando BD. 9. et composicio deest AC. 10. et compositum C. 11. componencium pro composicionem AC. 12. ultima in marg, in red ink A; ultima multa A; ib. per factum pro perfecta A. 16. quia D. 18. composicio AC; ib. materia et forma et materia ABCD; ib. ut pro nam BD; vel pro nam C. 21. idem pro materia BD; ib. componat seipsam A. 21. seipsum BD. 21, 22, aut — seipsa deest A. 22. simpliciter B. 24. presupposita verbum A; verbo B. 27. etc. 30. est pro twice D. 28. Cap. deest A; Initial C in red ink AB. 31. aqua pro terra B. erit A.
216 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. VI. contingens nature corporee quod formam huiusmodi sibi adveniat. Notandum tamen quod composicio quandoque dicit active actum componentis, qui est componere; quandoque passionem compositi; et hoc tripliciter: vel utrumque? componencium componi cum reliquo, vel collective, ista componi ad invicem, vel tercio, unum esse compositum ex talibus; et isto modo sumitur composicio, cum dici- tur quod materia et forma et composicio sunt una Matter and essencia vel natura. Et capit composicio subdivisionem, 10 form are secundum divisionem parcium composicionem parti- composed of the same thing cipancium; et patet quod ultima conclusio perfecta est which is matter concedenda. Sicud enim natura divina est compositum and form, i. e. of the abstract et tamen est simplicissima natura, et non potest com- essence; and yet neither poni vel esse composita, sic materia prima est res 15 is composed; just as God composita ex eadem materia et forma, que est essencia consists of the vel suppositum sic compositum; et tamen non com- Trinity, yet is the most simple ponitur nec est composita ex materia et forma. Nam of natures. There is also compositum est posterius natura quam alterum com- an analogy between the ponencium; sed longe hoc ad concludendum quod 20 Incarnate Word, materia aut componatur ex seipsa, aut quod sit prior, taking up flesh, simplicior et perfeccior seipsa; correspondenter sicud and matter taking up dicitur in materia de incarnacione. Sicud enim essencia forms. divina in supposito verbi assumpsit formam hominis sibi accidentalem, sic essencia corporea ante tempus 25 creata, assumpsit et assumit sepe formas varias sub- stanciales, licet sint sibi accidentales, ut patet alibi, etc. Diverse meanings of the word composition. CAPITULUM SEPTIMUM. Consequenter restat videre si concedi debeat in pre- Can we say : The same dicacione secundum essenciam, quod materia prima erit 30 primal matter will be fire, ignis, terra, et sic de qualibet substancia corporea. Et earth etc.? patet quod sic, eo quod quelibet essencia est quodlibet Certainly ; for they are all the tale corpus, et materia ac forma. Ergo, cum sufficit same essence, which is matter and form. 1. quod formam huiusmodi deest AD. 2. sibi adiciat BD. 3. nota BC. 5. temporaliter ABCD. 6. compositi ACD. 7. simpliciter unum BCD. 8. quando BD. 9. et composicio deest AC. 10. et compositum C. 11. componencium pro composicionem AC. 12. ultima in marg, in red ink A; ultima multa A; ib. per factum pro perfecta A. 16. quia D. 18. composicio AC; ib. materia et forma et materia ABCD; ib. ut pro nam BD; vel pro nam C. 21. idem pro materia BD; ib. componat seipsam A. 21. seipsum BD. 21, 22, aut — seipsa deest A. 22. simpliciter B. 24. presupposita verbum A; verbo B. 27. etc. 30. est pro twice D. 28. Cap. deest A; Initial C in red ink AB. 31. aqua pro terra B. erit A.
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DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 217 A 69" CAP. VII. hoc ad veritatem predicacionis secundum essenciam (ut patet in tractatu de universalibus, cap. 1°) sequitur verum esse, in predicacione secundum essenciam, tam materiam quam formam esse quodcunque corpus mundi. 5 Confirmatur ex testimonio scripture, cap. 1° sepe alle- gato, ubi scriptura, iuxta exposicionem Augustini, in- telligit per terram, aquam et abissum, materiam primam informem. Et revera est verisimile quod tam sanctus vir, tam ingeniosus, tam exercitatus in studio divino, 1o et specialiter scripture illius, et deum tam devoto rogans (ut patet eiusdem 12° de confessione 10 et 16°) quod haberet rectam significacionem eiusdem scripture; specialiter cum tam confidenter asserit se esse illumina- tum a deo, quod certe sciat hunc esse sensum sancti 15 spiritus in hac scriptura Moysi sic intellexit verisimiliter sine . . . . . . cap. 19° confitendo decem veritates de materia prima, quas dicit ostensas a prima luce men- cium. Prima veritas est ista. "Verum est," inquit, quod 2o unde sit aliquid, quodam genere locucionis, potest habere iam nomen illius rei que inde fit." Unde potuit vocari celum et terra quelibet informitas, unde I factum est celum et terra; et illam confitetur esse veram senten- ciam scripture infra, 29°. Gen. Secundo confirmatur hoc testimonio primo, Gen. 3° III, 19 ubi deus sic aloquitur Adam: “In sudore wultus tui vesceris pane tuo, donec revertaris in terram de qua sumptus es, quia pulvis es, et in pulverem reverteris. Propter peccatum ipsius Ade homo versus est de limo 3o in pulverem. Tercio, confirmatur ex loyca celestis evangeliste Joh. 2°, ubi narrat, ut supra tactum est, quod in primo miraculo Cristi architriclinius gustavit This is proved by the first chapter of Genesis and its commentary by Augustine, a most holy and learned man, who explicitly states that he owed his illumination on this point to God Himself. He points out (1) that the source of a thing may be called by the name of that thing; (2) That God speaks of Adam, who once was clay returning to dust. 3) That Christ, changing water into wine at Cana, only did suddenly what he is ever doing slowly in the vinevards. 8. re ABCD; ib. est deest ABC. 4. quotcunque C. 7. et deest AC. 10. de voto AB. 11. eiusdem ut patet B; ib. et quod omnes MS. 12. quot C; ib. habere AC; ib. rectum sensum BD. 14. a deo deest D; ib. certificat AC. 15. after intellexit quod CD; ib. after verisimiliter ssine,en with credit in marg. C. 16. after sine a blank space for a word A; ib. decimo octavo CD. 17. quod vi'si'r ceddit ſy mo BD. 19. alia pro prima A. 20. bene pro unde AC; ib. aliud C. 21. nunc pro inde AC. 25. luc A ; luce pro hoc BD); dupliciter in marg. D. 26. sic deest D. 27. vescieris BD; ib. ad pro in ACD. 28. as sumptus ABC. 29. perpetuum A; ppetm B; ib. p pecm C; ib. ipsius deest A ; ib. homo apius A. 31. 2° cao B; ib. tactum est deest D. 32. Cristi deest A. 2. De Universalibus. The fifth tractate of Wyclif's De Ente, Book I. Not yet published.
DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 217 A 69" CAP. VII. hoc ad veritatem predicacionis secundum essenciam (ut patet in tractatu de universalibus, cap. 1°) sequitur verum esse, in predicacione secundum essenciam, tam materiam quam formam esse quodcunque corpus mundi. 5 Confirmatur ex testimonio scripture, cap. 1° sepe alle- gato, ubi scriptura, iuxta exposicionem Augustini, in- telligit per terram, aquam et abissum, materiam primam informem. Et revera est verisimile quod tam sanctus vir, tam ingeniosus, tam exercitatus in studio divino, 1o et specialiter scripture illius, et deum tam devoto rogans (ut patet eiusdem 12° de confessione 10 et 16°) quod haberet rectam significacionem eiusdem scripture; specialiter cum tam confidenter asserit se esse illumina- tum a deo, quod certe sciat hunc esse sensum sancti 15 spiritus in hac scriptura Moysi sic intellexit verisimiliter sine . . . . . . cap. 19° confitendo decem veritates de materia prima, quas dicit ostensas a prima luce men- cium. Prima veritas est ista. "Verum est," inquit, quod 2o unde sit aliquid, quodam genere locucionis, potest habere iam nomen illius rei que inde fit." Unde potuit vocari celum et terra quelibet informitas, unde I factum est celum et terra; et illam confitetur esse veram senten- ciam scripture infra, 29°. Gen. Secundo confirmatur hoc testimonio primo, Gen. 3° III, 19 ubi deus sic aloquitur Adam: “In sudore wultus tui vesceris pane tuo, donec revertaris in terram de qua sumptus es, quia pulvis es, et in pulverem reverteris. Propter peccatum ipsius Ade homo versus est de limo 3o in pulverem. Tercio, confirmatur ex loyca celestis evangeliste Joh. 2°, ubi narrat, ut supra tactum est, quod in primo miraculo Cristi architriclinius gustavit This is proved by the first chapter of Genesis and its commentary by Augustine, a most holy and learned man, who explicitly states that he owed his illumination on this point to God Himself. He points out (1) that the source of a thing may be called by the name of that thing; (2) That God speaks of Adam, who once was clay returning to dust. 3) That Christ, changing water into wine at Cana, only did suddenly what he is ever doing slowly in the vinevards. 8. re ABCD; ib. est deest ABC. 4. quotcunque C. 7. et deest AC. 10. de voto AB. 11. eiusdem ut patet B; ib. et quod omnes MS. 12. quot C; ib. habere AC; ib. rectum sensum BD. 14. a deo deest D; ib. certificat AC. 15. after intellexit quod CD; ib. after verisimiliter ssine,en with credit in marg. C. 16. after sine a blank space for a word A; ib. decimo octavo CD. 17. quod vi'si'r ceddit ſy mo BD. 19. alia pro prima A. 20. bene pro unde AC; ib. aliud C. 21. nunc pro inde AC. 25. luc A ; luce pro hoc BD); dupliciter in marg. D. 26. sic deest D. 27. vescieris BD; ib. ad pro in ACD. 28. as sumptus ABC. 29. perpetuum A; ppetm B; ib. p pecm C; ib. ipsius deest A ; ib. homo apius A. 31. 2° cao B; ib. tactum est deest D. 32. Cristi deest A. 2. De Universalibus. The fifth tractate of Wyclif's De Ente, Book I. Not yet published.
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218 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. VII. aquam vinum factam, quod exponit Augustinus, Johannis omelia 8a, dicens quod non est mirum nisi quia in- solitum de dicta conversione; ipse enim, die uno nup- ciarum, fecit hoc in sex ydriis quod omni anno facit in vitibus. Sicud enim quod ministri in ydriis fundunt5 in vinum convertitur; sic quod nubes fundunt in vinum convertitur opere eiusdem. Illud non miramur, quia And Urso omni anno fit idem. Dicit Urso in primo Aphoris- remarks that morum suorum: Nec valet dicere quod non est inten- Augustine evidently cionis Augustini dicere quod aqua erit vinum, vel res 10 intends to say here that water unius speciei erit res alterius speciei, quia intencionis becomes wine, sue frequentis est, 13° de confessione, quod tota natura for his theory asserts the same corporalis est terra, aqua, abissus, et omne corpus quod of all things corporal. ex ea formatum est. Unde 5° de trinitate 9° movet And speaking dubium quomodo accidens aliquod sit inseparabile, cum 15 of what is called an de racione accidentis sit contingenter inesse; et respondet inseparable accident, sub hiis verbis: Et, si qua sunt accidencia inseparabilia, he says that ut plume corvi, albedo nivis amittit cum tamen, non they are separable in quidem quamdiu pluma est, sed quia non semper est. reality because they vanish Quapropter ipsa materies mutabilis est, eo quod desinit 20 with the substantial esse illud animal, et illa pluma, totumque idem corpus form which nunc in terra mutatur et vertitur Set] amittit illum co- upholds them ; the same body, lorem." Ex illis planum est Augustinum sentire quod changed to materia est nunc corpus unius speciei, nunc alterius. earth, loses its colour. Unde, libro de inmortalitate anime 13°. Mutabilitas," 25 "Mutability, he asserts, is not inquit, enon adimit corpori corpus esse, sed de specie in annihilation, but the passage speciem transire facit motu ordinatissimo. Non enim quid- of a body from piam est, illius partes ad nichilum redigi sinuntur." one species to another. Et patet quod ignorancia huiusmodi veritatum physi- Ignorance alone carum facit modernos parum pendere scripturam et 30 has made modern writers inponere sanctis doctoribus ignoranciam loyce vel philo- slight Scripture, and accuse the sophie, vel asseruisse multa inpossibilia pro devocione. Holy Doctors of want of knowledge, and pious, but ímpossible assertions. 1. aquam deest AC; ib. exponit Johss Aug9 C; ib. Johannis deest A. 2. dicit B; ib. quia deest A. 6. in vinum convertitur deest D; ib. sic quod nubes fundunt in marg. D. 8. fit et BCD; ib. dicit deest D. 11. et pro erit res A. 12. frequenter D. 14. quando movet BD. 15. dubium deest D. 17. quedam C; que D. 18. color pro albedo BD; ib. animis D; ib. cum? pro eum A. 19. qmdq, dem D; ib. quod B. 20. ex eo ABC. 21. esse deest D; ib. idem BD; ib. illis BD. 22. et deest ABCD. 23. illo AB. 24. erit BC. 25. anime deest C. 26. ad'm tit D; corpori deest D; ib. esse pro specie D. 27, 28. q, pia 28. simitr A; sinitur B; sumitur D. 3o. parvipendere D. 31. in- ponit D; ib. et pro vel D. 31, 32. phie A. 18. Cum tamen. Neither this nor the variant gives any sense. Some words must be wanting; and I am not in a position to verify the reference.
218 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. VII. aquam vinum factam, quod exponit Augustinus, Johannis omelia 8a, dicens quod non est mirum nisi quia in- solitum de dicta conversione; ipse enim, die uno nup- ciarum, fecit hoc in sex ydriis quod omni anno facit in vitibus. Sicud enim quod ministri in ydriis fundunt5 in vinum convertitur; sic quod nubes fundunt in vinum convertitur opere eiusdem. Illud non miramur, quia And Urso omni anno fit idem. Dicit Urso in primo Aphoris- remarks that morum suorum: Nec valet dicere quod non est inten- Augustine evidently cionis Augustini dicere quod aqua erit vinum, vel res 10 intends to say here that water unius speciei erit res alterius speciei, quia intencionis becomes wine, sue frequentis est, 13° de confessione, quod tota natura for his theory asserts the same corporalis est terra, aqua, abissus, et omne corpus quod of all things corporal. ex ea formatum est. Unde 5° de trinitate 9° movet And speaking dubium quomodo accidens aliquod sit inseparabile, cum 15 of what is called an de racione accidentis sit contingenter inesse; et respondet inseparable accident, sub hiis verbis: Et, si qua sunt accidencia inseparabilia, he says that ut plume corvi, albedo nivis amittit cum tamen, non they are separable in quidem quamdiu pluma est, sed quia non semper est. reality because they vanish Quapropter ipsa materies mutabilis est, eo quod desinit 20 with the substantial esse illud animal, et illa pluma, totumque idem corpus form which nunc in terra mutatur et vertitur Set] amittit illum co- upholds them ; the same body, lorem." Ex illis planum est Augustinum sentire quod changed to materia est nunc corpus unius speciei, nunc alterius. earth, loses its colour. Unde, libro de inmortalitate anime 13°. Mutabilitas," 25 "Mutability, he asserts, is not inquit, enon adimit corpori corpus esse, sed de specie in annihilation, but the passage speciem transire facit motu ordinatissimo. Non enim quid- of a body from piam est, illius partes ad nichilum redigi sinuntur." one species to another. Et patet quod ignorancia huiusmodi veritatum physi- Ignorance alone carum facit modernos parum pendere scripturam et 30 has made modern writers inponere sanctis doctoribus ignoranciam loyce vel philo- slight Scripture, and accuse the sophie, vel asseruisse multa inpossibilia pro devocione. Holy Doctors of want of knowledge, and pious, but ímpossible assertions. 1. aquam deest AC; ib. exponit Johss Aug9 C; ib. Johannis deest A. 2. dicit B; ib. quia deest A. 6. in vinum convertitur deest D; ib. sic quod nubes fundunt in marg. D. 8. fit et BCD; ib. dicit deest D. 11. et pro erit res A. 12. frequenter D. 14. quando movet BD. 15. dubium deest D. 17. quedam C; que D. 18. color pro albedo BD; ib. animis D; ib. cum? pro eum A. 19. qmdq, dem D; ib. quod B. 20. ex eo ABC. 21. esse deest D; ib. idem BD; ib. illis BD. 22. et deest ABCD. 23. illo AB. 24. erit BC. 25. anime deest C. 26. ad'm tit D; corpori deest D; ib. esse pro specie D. 27, 28. q, pia 28. simitr A; sinitur B; sumitur D. 3o. parvipendere D. 31. in- ponit D; ib. et pro vel D. 31, 32. phie A. 18. Cum tamen. Neither this nor the variant gives any sense. Some words must be wanting; and I am not in a position to verify the reference.
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CAP. VII. DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 219 A 70* 15 Non sic autem quando scriptura fuit in reverencia et Holy Writ should be not utilitate, exemplar aliis, nedum ad recte vivendum, sed only our model of life, but also ad vere loquendum et philosophice sapiendum. Nunc autem of right thinking. dicimus auctores scripture fuisse incautos sermone, con- Now we try to stituimus loycam nostram tanquam regulam rectificantem wrest Scripture to our own scripturam, et illam postponimus, cum tamen debet esse senses, and make our logic e contra. Nec tamen oportet multiplicare argumenta the standard to in ista materia; quia, dato quod eadem essencia est judge it by. But I merely materia, forma et compositum, et quod forma, licet quote Augustine as a favourable 1o sit substancialis composicioni, est tamen accidentalis testimony; essencie, plane sequitur quod essencia ignis erit aqua; et there is no doubt that if sic de ceteris. Et ideo satis est hic pro documento de- matter, form, and compound ducere, testimonio habito insuspecto, ne videar ex capite are one essence, proprio theologizare, vel significaciones insolitas fingere. then the same essence that is Ex istis colligi potest evidencia concedendi quod fire will be water. simplex essencia corporea potest esse vicissim qualis- And it may cunque essencia corporalis, ut nunc homo, nunc terra, become successively any nunc semen, nunc fructus; et sic de quacunque natura bodily essence whatever. corporea. Et iste sensus facilitat ad intelligendum Scripture is 20 scripturam, et concordat cum philosophis. Sic enim rendered more intelligible by Matth. dyabolus loquitur Cristo, Matth. 4°: “Dic," inquit, “ut this very IV, 3 lapides isti panes fiant." Nec dubium theologo quin dic- philosophical theory. tus spiritus, qui fuit inicium precipuum viarum domini, For instance, Satan saying to scivit melius veritates physicas quam nunc viator, tum Christ: "Let these stones be 25 propter subtilitatem nature vivacis, ingenio non extincto, made bread', tum propter experiencias effectum quas vidit per tempus knew quite well what he was tam diurnum, tum propter revelacionem secretorum about, spirituum, ut allegat magister sentenciarum, distinccione 7ma per Ysidorum, li. 1° De summo bono, ca. 10; et 3o Augustinum, 2° super Genesim, 26° cap. Nec mirum, quod longe subtiliora cognoscant demones, ut patet de maycis artibus, qui sciunt transformare et proporcionare agencia naturalia. Ymmo ipse cognovit illud primo, ut patet ibidem. Verisimile est ergo quod tam subtilis 35 angelus, tam diligenter tentans hominem quem ex mira- culis vidit tam subtilem philosophum, non proponeret 4. auctoritate ABC. 5. naturalem pro nostram A; ib. tanquam 5, 6 tanquam mensuram scripture D. 7. tamen deest B. deest D. 8. diccio AD; dicto C. 9. et deest ACD. 10. compositi A; compo- nencium BD. 1. est A. 12. et deest BD; ib. directe pro pro docu- mento D. 13. in supposito AD. 18. stamen ABC. 20. phis A. 21. 10 Dicit D. 26. tam pro tum D; ib. expediencias ACD. 27. tam deest BD; ib. tam pro tum D; ib. relevacionem D; ib. superiorum BCD. 29. per deest D. 28. sentenciarum deest D. 20. 1° pro 10 D. l 3o. Augustinus A. 3r. cognoscunt ACD. 33. primo deest D; ib. after primo: contra philosophiam de Cristi A; Cristo C; patre A; dexpe s . 35. que pro quem AD. 36. physicum ABC; phm D. and that, if he proposed an impossibility, his temptation would have no force.
CAP. VII. DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 219 A 70* 15 Non sic autem quando scriptura fuit in reverencia et Holy Writ should be not utilitate, exemplar aliis, nedum ad recte vivendum, sed only our model of life, but also ad vere loquendum et philosophice sapiendum. Nunc autem of right thinking. dicimus auctores scripture fuisse incautos sermone, con- Now we try to stituimus loycam nostram tanquam regulam rectificantem wrest Scripture to our own scripturam, et illam postponimus, cum tamen debet esse senses, and make our logic e contra. Nec tamen oportet multiplicare argumenta the standard to in ista materia; quia, dato quod eadem essencia est judge it by. But I merely materia, forma et compositum, et quod forma, licet quote Augustine as a favourable 1o sit substancialis composicioni, est tamen accidentalis testimony; essencie, plane sequitur quod essencia ignis erit aqua; et there is no doubt that if sic de ceteris. Et ideo satis est hic pro documento de- matter, form, and compound ducere, testimonio habito insuspecto, ne videar ex capite are one essence, proprio theologizare, vel significaciones insolitas fingere. then the same essence that is Ex istis colligi potest evidencia concedendi quod fire will be water. simplex essencia corporea potest esse vicissim qualis- And it may cunque essencia corporalis, ut nunc homo, nunc terra, become successively any nunc semen, nunc fructus; et sic de quacunque natura bodily essence whatever. corporea. Et iste sensus facilitat ad intelligendum Scripture is 20 scripturam, et concordat cum philosophis. Sic enim rendered more intelligible by Matth. dyabolus loquitur Cristo, Matth. 4°: “Dic," inquit, “ut this very IV, 3 lapides isti panes fiant." Nec dubium theologo quin dic- philosophical theory. tus spiritus, qui fuit inicium precipuum viarum domini, For instance, Satan saying to scivit melius veritates physicas quam nunc viator, tum Christ: "Let these stones be 25 propter subtilitatem nature vivacis, ingenio non extincto, made bread', tum propter experiencias effectum quas vidit per tempus knew quite well what he was tam diurnum, tum propter revelacionem secretorum about, spirituum, ut allegat magister sentenciarum, distinccione 7ma per Ysidorum, li. 1° De summo bono, ca. 10; et 3o Augustinum, 2° super Genesim, 26° cap. Nec mirum, quod longe subtiliora cognoscant demones, ut patet de maycis artibus, qui sciunt transformare et proporcionare agencia naturalia. Ymmo ipse cognovit illud primo, ut patet ibidem. Verisimile est ergo quod tam subtilis 35 angelus, tam diligenter tentans hominem quem ex mira- culis vidit tam subtilem philosophum, non proponeret 4. auctoritate ABC. 5. naturalem pro nostram A; ib. tanquam 5, 6 tanquam mensuram scripture D. 7. tamen deest B. deest D. 8. diccio AD; dicto C. 9. et deest ACD. 10. compositi A; compo- nencium BD. 1. est A. 12. et deest BD; ib. directe pro pro docu- mento D. 13. in supposito AD. 18. stamen ABC. 20. phis A. 21. 10 Dicit D. 26. tam pro tum D; ib. expediencias ACD. 27. tam deest BD; ib. tam pro tum D; ib. relevacionem D; ib. superiorum BCD. 29. per deest D. 28. sentenciarum deest D. 20. 1° pro 10 D. l 3o. Augustinus A. 3r. cognoscunt ACD. 33. primo deest D; ib. after primo: contra philosophiam de Cristi A; Cristo C; patre A; dexpe s . 35. que pro quem AD. 36. physicum ABC; phm D. and that, if he proposed an impossibility, his temptation would have no force.
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220 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. VII. sibi notorie inpossibilia, quia tunc non fecisset eviden- ciam ad sensum. Again, the Sic eciam loquitur apostolus ad hebreos, 7° docens Hebr. Apostle's preeminenciam sacerdocii Melchisedech super sacer- VII, 10 statement that Levi, and Christ docium leviticum, eo quod Levi decimatus fuit in lumbis 5 too, in the loins of Abrahe solventis decimas Melchisedech, ut maiori. Abraham, es Adhuc enim," inquit Apostolus “in lumbis patris erat, paid tithes to Melchisedech, quando obviavit feij Melchisedech." Cristus autem, licet is a striking confirmation of fuisset in lumbis Abrahe, ut dicit scriptura, tamen non the theory ; fuit decimatus, quia non ex racione seminali eorum, procreatus in utero virginis; et racio seminalis, non nuda essencia eis pertinuit, et propter veneranciam Cristi quam Abraham scivit prophetice esse in lumbis eius, fecit servum suum iurando manum ponere sub femore, non supra femur Abrahe, gen. 24° quia scivit illam massam substanciam assumendam esse speciosam formam pre filiis hominum, ut exponit Augustinus omelia. 43a super Joh. Quotlibet talia dicte scripture que tam verba- liter quam sentencialiter sonant in dictam sentenciam. Unde omnis natura vel essencia corporea vocatur in 20 Ignorant men murmur, on scriptura nunc terra, nunc aqua, secundum Augustinum; hearing that the Scripture calls et hoc facit ignaros murmurare contra scripturam di- the same entity now earth and centem hominem esse terram, cum alia elementa et now water, or says that man is mixta sint in homine. Mirantur eciam quomodo sunt dust, together aque super celos, ut dicitur gen. 1° et ps. 148, ymagi- with other cavils. nando quod sunt res fluide, violente ibi detente, quales sunt aque nostre, vel attendunt quomodo illud chaos confusum, ex quo factus est mundus, vocatur gen. 1° tam terra quam aqua. Et sic secundum Augustinum, But Augustine points out that prima essencia corporea quidquid fuerit, potest] vocari the primal essence of eodem nomine, cum disposiciones superaddite sunt sibi bodily things may receive the accidentales, non addentes novam essenciam. Potest igitur names of that which it is the ista essencia, licet quodammodo equivoce, vere vocari essence of, since terra, aqua, abissus, materia, chaos, et sic de quolibet every, and there are many other similar texts of Scripture which also bear it out. 10 Gen. XXIV, 2 Gen. 1, 7 Ps. CXLVIII, A 70b 3. et pro eciam ABC. 5. after lumbis pris struck through A. 6. patris Abrahe C; ib. ad hoc et pro Abrahe D; ib. et solventes B. 8. quando Abraham ABCD; ib. ei deest ABCD. 9. fuit BD; ib. in deest D. 10. corporis pro corum A. 12. reverenciam BD. 13. femor C. 16. sponsam forma (sic) BD. 19. quam deest ACD; ib. finaliter deest 22, 23. quando dicimus B; dicentem deest AC. BC; finaliter A. 26. violete B. 23. aut BD. 24. sicud B. 25. supra BD; ib. 14 AC. 27. nichil pro vel AC. v 28. confusa D. 30. illa pro prima BCD. a 33. sentencia D; ib. quodammodo licet BC; ib. vere deest AB. 30. Vocari. If a given man happens to be a carpenter and a butcher, I can call him by either name ; if the same essence happens to be dust and man, I can say that man is dust.
220 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. VII. sibi notorie inpossibilia, quia tunc non fecisset eviden- ciam ad sensum. Again, the Sic eciam loquitur apostolus ad hebreos, 7° docens Hebr. Apostle's preeminenciam sacerdocii Melchisedech super sacer- VII, 10 statement that Levi, and Christ docium leviticum, eo quod Levi decimatus fuit in lumbis 5 too, in the loins of Abrahe solventis decimas Melchisedech, ut maiori. Abraham, es Adhuc enim," inquit Apostolus “in lumbis patris erat, paid tithes to Melchisedech, quando obviavit feij Melchisedech." Cristus autem, licet is a striking confirmation of fuisset in lumbis Abrahe, ut dicit scriptura, tamen non the theory ; fuit decimatus, quia non ex racione seminali eorum, procreatus in utero virginis; et racio seminalis, non nuda essencia eis pertinuit, et propter veneranciam Cristi quam Abraham scivit prophetice esse in lumbis eius, fecit servum suum iurando manum ponere sub femore, non supra femur Abrahe, gen. 24° quia scivit illam massam substanciam assumendam esse speciosam formam pre filiis hominum, ut exponit Augustinus omelia. 43a super Joh. Quotlibet talia dicte scripture que tam verba- liter quam sentencialiter sonant in dictam sentenciam. Unde omnis natura vel essencia corporea vocatur in 20 Ignorant men murmur, on scriptura nunc terra, nunc aqua, secundum Augustinum; hearing that the Scripture calls et hoc facit ignaros murmurare contra scripturam di- the same entity now earth and centem hominem esse terram, cum alia elementa et now water, or says that man is mixta sint in homine. Mirantur eciam quomodo sunt dust, together aque super celos, ut dicitur gen. 1° et ps. 148, ymagi- with other cavils. nando quod sunt res fluide, violente ibi detente, quales sunt aque nostre, vel attendunt quomodo illud chaos confusum, ex quo factus est mundus, vocatur gen. 1° tam terra quam aqua. Et sic secundum Augustinum, But Augustine points out that prima essencia corporea quidquid fuerit, potest] vocari the primal essence of eodem nomine, cum disposiciones superaddite sunt sibi bodily things may receive the accidentales, non addentes novam essenciam. Potest igitur names of that which it is the ista essencia, licet quodammodo equivoce, vere vocari essence of, since terra, aqua, abissus, materia, chaos, et sic de quolibet every, and there are many other similar texts of Scripture which also bear it out. 10 Gen. XXIV, 2 Gen. 1, 7 Ps. CXLVIII, A 70b 3. et pro eciam ABC. 5. after lumbis pris struck through A. 6. patris Abrahe C; ib. ad hoc et pro Abrahe D; ib. et solventes B. 8. quando Abraham ABCD; ib. ei deest ABCD. 9. fuit BD; ib. in deest D. 10. corporis pro corum A. 12. reverenciam BD. 13. femor C. 16. sponsam forma (sic) BD. 19. quam deest ACD; ib. finaliter deest 22, 23. quando dicimus B; dicentem deest AC. BC; finaliter A. 26. violete B. 23. aut BD. 24. sicud B. 25. supra BD; ib. 14 AC. 27. nichil pro vel AC. v 28. confusa D. 30. illa pro prima BCD. a 33. sentencia D; ib. quodammodo licet BC; ib. vere deest AB. 30. Vocari. If a given man happens to be a carpenter and a butcher, I can call him by either name ; if the same essence happens to be dust and man, I can say that man is dust.
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CAP. VII. DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 221 quod in ipsa est in potencia, ut dicit Augustinus, 12° de Confessione, 14° veritate septima. "Unde est," inquit, "quod fit, unde fit aliquid potest quodammodo genere „ locucionis habere iam nomen eiusdem rei que inde fit." Sed contra illud sic argumentatur: data illa racione, nichil potest generari vel corrumpi; quod est contra scripturam, physicam et racionem experimentalem. Et confirmatur eo quod, si substancia generatur, ipsa incipit esse; et per consequens prius non fuit. Si vero corrumpitur, 10 post non erit. Sed quocunque elemento vel elementato dato, ipsum fuit in mundi principio. Ergo nullum tale in aliquo instanti infra tempus incipit vel desinit esse. Pro solucione illius et [ad] sentenciam auctorum concordandum, necesse est tria supponere. Primo, com- 15 municacionem essencie corporee tribus naturis, scilicet, materie, forme et compositi. Secundo, notanda est supposicionis personalis et simplicis distinccio et sub- divisio: ut simpliciter loquendo ad modum loquendi Aristotelis et physicorum, album vel musicum generatur 20 vel corrumpitur, quin subiectum incipit vel desinit esse album vel musicum: ut patet 1° physicorum. Quod tantum sonat apud eos, ac si sic diceretur quod subiectum esse album aut musicum sic incipit vel de- sinit; et hinc dicunt concorditer philosophi quod album 25 et musicum sunt accidencia, ut patet per philosophum quotlibet locis, et per Augustinum in libro suo de falso grammatico. Si autem supponat subiectum pro sub- stancia cui accidit talis qualitas, tunc vere dicunt, quod non album tali generacione, sed albedo incipit esse tali 3o alteracione. Tercio, supponenda est distinccio triplicis predicacionis, scilicet formalis, causalis et secundum habitudinem; ut dictum est in tractatu de universalibus, cap. 1°. Theologus igitur qui admittit predicacionem secundum causam, concedendo de qualibet creatura supervening form is an accident that adds nothing new to the essence. Objection: This would make against doctrine of generation and dissolution ; for when a substance is generated, it begins to be, and was not before. But according to this doctrine, every substance existed from the beginning. To answer this, note (1) that the same essence is common to matter, form, and compound ; (2) that personal and impersonal supposition give quite distinct meanings to terms ; a white man is a musician, but to be while is not to be musical; and (3) that we may predicate one thing of another as its cause, or formally, or merely as its possession. 5. prima pro illa A. 7. et after physicam deest AC. 4. unde A. 8. consequencia BD; probatur ex BD. 10. est pro erit BCD. 13. ad deest ABCDE; ib. sentenciam deest B; sentencia ACDE. 14. concor- 14, 13. commutacionem ; corr. in marg. B. dante AC; concordandi B. 17. et simplicis twice D. 18. loquendo deest BD. 19. in pro et AC; ib. vel deest D. 21. sir A; simpliciter C. . 22. tamen A; ib. diceret A. 24. dicunt per hoc D. 26. per deest B; ib. in libro suo deest AC; ib. flo A; deest BD. 28, 29. non quod AC. 29. tali generacione deest AC- 20. Quin subiectum. It is thus in the MSS., but (unless we understand by subiectum the ideal universal, the that which) it is a flagrant absurdity. Mr. Matthew's suggestion, quia, totally changes the sense, but I incline to think he is right.
CAP. VII. DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 221 quod in ipsa est in potencia, ut dicit Augustinus, 12° de Confessione, 14° veritate septima. "Unde est," inquit, "quod fit, unde fit aliquid potest quodammodo genere „ locucionis habere iam nomen eiusdem rei que inde fit." Sed contra illud sic argumentatur: data illa racione, nichil potest generari vel corrumpi; quod est contra scripturam, physicam et racionem experimentalem. Et confirmatur eo quod, si substancia generatur, ipsa incipit esse; et per consequens prius non fuit. Si vero corrumpitur, 10 post non erit. Sed quocunque elemento vel elementato dato, ipsum fuit in mundi principio. Ergo nullum tale in aliquo instanti infra tempus incipit vel desinit esse. Pro solucione illius et [ad] sentenciam auctorum concordandum, necesse est tria supponere. Primo, com- 15 municacionem essencie corporee tribus naturis, scilicet, materie, forme et compositi. Secundo, notanda est supposicionis personalis et simplicis distinccio et sub- divisio: ut simpliciter loquendo ad modum loquendi Aristotelis et physicorum, album vel musicum generatur 20 vel corrumpitur, quin subiectum incipit vel desinit esse album vel musicum: ut patet 1° physicorum. Quod tantum sonat apud eos, ac si sic diceretur quod subiectum esse album aut musicum sic incipit vel de- sinit; et hinc dicunt concorditer philosophi quod album 25 et musicum sunt accidencia, ut patet per philosophum quotlibet locis, et per Augustinum in libro suo de falso grammatico. Si autem supponat subiectum pro sub- stancia cui accidit talis qualitas, tunc vere dicunt, quod non album tali generacione, sed albedo incipit esse tali 3o alteracione. Tercio, supponenda est distinccio triplicis predicacionis, scilicet formalis, causalis et secundum habitudinem; ut dictum est in tractatu de universalibus, cap. 1°. Theologus igitur qui admittit predicacionem secundum causam, concedendo de qualibet creatura supervening form is an accident that adds nothing new to the essence. Objection: This would make against doctrine of generation and dissolution ; for when a substance is generated, it begins to be, and was not before. But according to this doctrine, every substance existed from the beginning. To answer this, note (1) that the same essence is common to matter, form, and compound ; (2) that personal and impersonal supposition give quite distinct meanings to terms ; a white man is a musician, but to be while is not to be musical; and (3) that we may predicate one thing of another as its cause, or formally, or merely as its possession. 5. prima pro illa A. 7. et after physicam deest AC. 4. unde A. 8. consequencia BD; probatur ex BD. 10. est pro erit BCD. 13. ad deest ABCDE; ib. sentenciam deest B; sentencia ACDE. 14. concor- 14, 13. commutacionem ; corr. in marg. B. dante AC; concordandi B. 17. et simplicis twice D. 18. loquendo deest BD. 19. in pro et AC; ib. vel deest D. 21. sir A; simpliciter C. . 22. tamen A; ib. diceret A. 24. dicunt per hoc D. 26. per deest B; ib. in libro suo deest AC; ib. flo A; deest BD. 28, 29. non quod AC. 29. tali generacione deest AC- 20. Quin subiectum. It is thus in the MSS., but (unless we understand by subiectum the ideal universal, the that which) it is a flagrant absurdity. Mr. Matthew's suggestion, quia, totally changes the sense, but I incline to think he is right.
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222 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. VII. Causally, every quod ipsa secundum esse intelligibile est vita in deo creature exists and lives in God, (secundum illud Joh. primo; quod factum est in ipso Joh. and matter is vita erat") ut declaratum est in materia de ydeis, con- 1, 3, 4 essentially similiter pari racione vel maiori habet concedere pre- predicated of bodies. dicacionem secundum causam vel essencialem nature 5 create de sua materia vel suo subiecto; potissime, cum non dicit supra essenciam simplicem, nisi disposicionem sibi accidentalem; ut patet 7° methaphysice 8°. Et in illa equivocacione laborant, qui contendunt contra scripturam et dicta philosophorum, dicendo quod sunt falsa de 10 virtute sermonis, quando asserunt istam sentenciam. We say that, in Istis premissis, dicitur quod, essencialiter vel persona- essential or personal liter intelligendo, concedendum est quamlibet materialem predication, all naturam esse perpetuam, quia creatam in primo instanti matter is perpetual, since temporis; et manet continue creatura. Si enim aliquid 15 it always remains what it est creatura, tunc est illud quod tempore suo creabatur was at first — et manet post in eternum, nunc corpus unius speciei, a created being. In this senes it nunc alterius. Et sic intelligit Augustinus, 4° super is said that all Gen. ad literam cap. 121°, et Ecclesiastici 18° “Qui things were created vivit in eternum creavit omnia simul". Nam omne corpus together, fiendum, factum est in primo instanti temporis quoad essenciam; cui essencie dedit deus raciones seminales, ut tempore administracionis producatur forma in suo tempore. Et breviter esse substanciale vel accidentale productum est in primo instanti temporis, vel in causis materialibus vel universalibus. Et sic intelligitur illud Ecclesiasticis 1° quid est quod] fuit? ipsum quod futu- rum est. Quid est, quod factum est? ipsum quod facien- dum est: nichil novi sub sole. Nec valet quisquam dicere: hoc recens est. But if nature is Si autem simpliciter intelligitur natura pro compo- taken to mean a compound of sicione ex materia et forma, sic indubie fiunt et matter and corrumpuntur substancie sublunares opere nature, modo form, then there are certainly quo loquitur scriptura et philosophi, ponentes genera- new substances. cionem et corrupcionem. Et in hoc equivocant Plato et 35 Plato and Aristotle Aristoteles de materia prima. Nam Plato in Timeo vere contradict each et catholice Aristoteli posuit quod aliqua pars materie other, but from different points of view ; the former rightly affirms that Those who do not admit this contradict both Scripture and philosophy. and that there is nothing new under the sun. Eccl. XVIII, 1 20 25 Eccl. 9, 10 A 719 30 1. in vita D. 4. in materia pro vel maiori AC. 6. suo deest D; ib. vel potissime A; ib. tamen C. 9. 9tedut D. 13. intendendo AB. 14. na- turam corpoream BCD. 18. after alterius: et sic de aliis BD. 19. illud 23. amistcois A. 23, 24. suo specie BD. pro et ACD; ib. 14° B. 24. omne BCD. 25. producendum A; prodiendum C. 27. Ecciel A; Ecclis B; ib. quod after prius deest ACD. 28. perfectum ACD. 29. novum D; ib. oportet A; ib. quispp A. 3o. est deest ACD. telligatur D. 37. after catholice: irrepugnanter BCD. 31. in-
222 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. VII. Causally, every quod ipsa secundum esse intelligibile est vita in deo creature exists and lives in God, (secundum illud Joh. primo; quod factum est in ipso Joh. and matter is vita erat") ut declaratum est in materia de ydeis, con- 1, 3, 4 essentially similiter pari racione vel maiori habet concedere pre- predicated of bodies. dicacionem secundum causam vel essencialem nature 5 create de sua materia vel suo subiecto; potissime, cum non dicit supra essenciam simplicem, nisi disposicionem sibi accidentalem; ut patet 7° methaphysice 8°. Et in illa equivocacione laborant, qui contendunt contra scripturam et dicta philosophorum, dicendo quod sunt falsa de 10 virtute sermonis, quando asserunt istam sentenciam. We say that, in Istis premissis, dicitur quod, essencialiter vel persona- essential or personal liter intelligendo, concedendum est quamlibet materialem predication, all naturam esse perpetuam, quia creatam in primo instanti matter is perpetual, since temporis; et manet continue creatura. Si enim aliquid 15 it always remains what it est creatura, tunc est illud quod tempore suo creabatur was at first — et manet post in eternum, nunc corpus unius speciei, a created being. In this senes it nunc alterius. Et sic intelligit Augustinus, 4° super is said that all Gen. ad literam cap. 121°, et Ecclesiastici 18° “Qui things were created vivit in eternum creavit omnia simul". Nam omne corpus together, fiendum, factum est in primo instanti temporis quoad essenciam; cui essencie dedit deus raciones seminales, ut tempore administracionis producatur forma in suo tempore. Et breviter esse substanciale vel accidentale productum est in primo instanti temporis, vel in causis materialibus vel universalibus. Et sic intelligitur illud Ecclesiasticis 1° quid est quod] fuit? ipsum quod futu- rum est. Quid est, quod factum est? ipsum quod facien- dum est: nichil novi sub sole. Nec valet quisquam dicere: hoc recens est. But if nature is Si autem simpliciter intelligitur natura pro compo- taken to mean a compound of sicione ex materia et forma, sic indubie fiunt et matter and corrumpuntur substancie sublunares opere nature, modo form, then there are certainly quo loquitur scriptura et philosophi, ponentes genera- new substances. cionem et corrupcionem. Et in hoc equivocant Plato et 35 Plato and Aristotle Aristoteles de materia prima. Nam Plato in Timeo vere contradict each et catholice Aristoteli posuit quod aliqua pars materie other, but from different points of view ; the former rightly affirms that Those who do not admit this contradict both Scripture and philosophy. and that there is nothing new under the sun. Eccl. XVIII, 1 20 25 Eccl. 9, 10 A 719 30 1. in vita D. 4. in materia pro vel maiori AC. 6. suo deest D; ib. vel potissime A; ib. tamen C. 9. 9tedut D. 13. intendendo AB. 14. na- turam corpoream BCD. 18. after alterius: et sic de aliis BD. 19. illud 23. amistcois A. 23, 24. suo specie BD. pro et ACD; ib. 14° B. 24. omne BCD. 25. producendum A; prodiendum C. 27. Ecciel A; Ecclis B; ib. quod after prius deest ACD. 28. perfectum ACD. 29. novum D; ib. oportet A; ib. quispp A. 3o. est deest ACD. telligatur D. 37. after catholice: irrepugnanter BCD. 31. in-
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CAP. VII. DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 223 prime ignita, ignis est, et aliqua pars materie, terreitate actuata, terra est. Aristoteles autem, non admittens predicacionem essencialem, negat quod materia prima est composita substancia, vel quod ignis erit aqua, vel sic de quacunque transmutacione substancie; sed non negat sentenciam supra dictam. Et sic in multis laborant tam antiqui quam moderni in equivocacione signorum. Data ergo substancia que generatur vel corrumpitur, conceditur quod illa incipit vel desinit esse; et quod, 10 ante vel post talem mutacionem, non fuit: et tunc in- telligitur simpliciter pro unione duarum naturarum ad invicem, et non pro altera earum; quia, secundum philosophum (7° metaphysice), nec materia nec forma simpliciter per se et proprie generatur, sed compositum quod per se est habens principia generacionis. Et si queritur quid hoc fuit in principio mundi et eternaliter erit, demonstrando eamdem essenciam quam tu ponis generari vel corrumpi, dicitur quod contingit illud sane vel sinistre intelligi. Ideo, exemplativo sensu, 20 dicit post quod hoc est ut sic et est ut non, ad modum loquendi Aristotelis in tali materia. Et sic sophistice volentes extorquere racionem, simpliciter potest eligi alterutra pars, negando reliquam ad sensum contra- dictorium; vel tercio, negando utrumque, ad sensus or say it is neither one nor 25 equivocos; et cum in equivocis non sit contradiccio, the other, i. e. in different senses. non conceditur falsum. Et illa responsio plus decet To a theologum, qui non affectat aparenciam sophisticam, theologian who ought to avoid ut non videatur redargui a male intelligentibus; sicud sophistical affectation, the patet ex modo loquendi scripture et sanctorum doc- latter answer is 3o torum": “Wult," inquit sapiens, "et non wult piger" the best. Scripture gives et Augustinus, 5° super genes. ad literam 14°, postquam us examples of the affirmation declaravit quod deus nichil noscit nisi quod est, movet and negation of dubium quomodo creature erant et non erant antequam the same thing. fierent: et respondet quod erant et non erant; erant in 35 dei sciencia et non erant in sui natura. Cum enim in primal matter, quâ ignited, is fire ; Aristotle denies that, but he takes primal matter as it is in itself, and therefore the contradiction is only apparent. The substance which is generated begins to be at a given time, that is, the union of matter with form begins, and neither of these is properly said to be generated. What then is that which began with time, and will exist cternally? Is it or is it not, a given corruptible body? We may answer yes or no as we like ; 15 1. 19 or e' D; materia deest B; ib. before materie terre A; ib. terre AC. 8. correspondenter corrumpitur 4. quod deest D: ib. est pro erit AB. (sic) pro que generatur vel corrumpitur BD. 9. quando B. 10. talem deest ABC. 11. per unio D. 13. 13° nec B. 14. spp° = specie? A; spee = specifice C; ib. esset pro et B. 16. Et si accipitur quod BI; argumentatur in marg. B. 17. est A. 18. tu pois A. 19. explanato BD. 20. hoc deest AC. 25. potest A; est BD. 24. 9dtoi'm A. 28. ut deest D. 29. philosophorum pro scripture E. 26. concedit D). 32. declarat AC. 31. 18° BD. 33. erant deest D: ib. et non erant deest AC. 34. respondet quod deest ACD; respondent D. 35. Cum enim deest D.
CAP. VII. DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 223 prime ignita, ignis est, et aliqua pars materie, terreitate actuata, terra est. Aristoteles autem, non admittens predicacionem essencialem, negat quod materia prima est composita substancia, vel quod ignis erit aqua, vel sic de quacunque transmutacione substancie; sed non negat sentenciam supra dictam. Et sic in multis laborant tam antiqui quam moderni in equivocacione signorum. Data ergo substancia que generatur vel corrumpitur, conceditur quod illa incipit vel desinit esse; et quod, 10 ante vel post talem mutacionem, non fuit: et tunc in- telligitur simpliciter pro unione duarum naturarum ad invicem, et non pro altera earum; quia, secundum philosophum (7° metaphysice), nec materia nec forma simpliciter per se et proprie generatur, sed compositum quod per se est habens principia generacionis. Et si queritur quid hoc fuit in principio mundi et eternaliter erit, demonstrando eamdem essenciam quam tu ponis generari vel corrumpi, dicitur quod contingit illud sane vel sinistre intelligi. Ideo, exemplativo sensu, 20 dicit post quod hoc est ut sic et est ut non, ad modum loquendi Aristotelis in tali materia. Et sic sophistice volentes extorquere racionem, simpliciter potest eligi alterutra pars, negando reliquam ad sensum contra- dictorium; vel tercio, negando utrumque, ad sensus or say it is neither one nor 25 equivocos; et cum in equivocis non sit contradiccio, the other, i. e. in different senses. non conceditur falsum. Et illa responsio plus decet To a theologum, qui non affectat aparenciam sophisticam, theologian who ought to avoid ut non videatur redargui a male intelligentibus; sicud sophistical affectation, the patet ex modo loquendi scripture et sanctorum doc- latter answer is 3o torum": “Wult," inquit sapiens, "et non wult piger" the best. Scripture gives et Augustinus, 5° super genes. ad literam 14°, postquam us examples of the affirmation declaravit quod deus nichil noscit nisi quod est, movet and negation of dubium quomodo creature erant et non erant antequam the same thing. fierent: et respondet quod erant et non erant; erant in 35 dei sciencia et non erant in sui natura. Cum enim in primal matter, quâ ignited, is fire ; Aristotle denies that, but he takes primal matter as it is in itself, and therefore the contradiction is only apparent. The substance which is generated begins to be at a given time, that is, the union of matter with form begins, and neither of these is properly said to be generated. What then is that which began with time, and will exist cternally? Is it or is it not, a given corruptible body? We may answer yes or no as we like ; 15 1. 19 or e' D; materia deest B; ib. before materie terre A; ib. terre AC. 8. correspondenter corrumpitur 4. quod deest D: ib. est pro erit AB. (sic) pro que generatur vel corrumpitur BD. 9. quando B. 10. talem deest ABC. 11. per unio D. 13. 13° nec B. 14. spp° = specie? A; spee = specifice C; ib. esset pro et B. 16. Et si accipitur quod BI; argumentatur in marg. B. 17. est A. 18. tu pois A. 19. explanato BD. 20. hoc deest AC. 25. potest A; est BD. 24. 9dtoi'm A. 28. ut deest D. 29. philosophorum pro scripture E. 26. concedit D). 32. declarat AC. 31. 18° BD. 33. erant deest D: ib. et non erant deest AC. 34. respondet quod deest ACD; respondent D. 35. Cum enim deest D.
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224 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. VII. With men who equivocis non sit contra diccio (ut patet 1° elenchorum, affect the subtlities of 4°) et quia esse intelligibile et esse existere competit vain wisdom, equivoce creaturis, non est dubium quod in istis non I beat down their arguments est contradiccio: creature eternaliter erant secundum by denials made esse intelligibile; et non eternaliter secundum existen- in various senses; but I ciam. Vel sapientis aut acute disputantis nego eis nega- proceed otherwise with tum, modificans sensus earum, ut infructuositas intencionis sincere seckers earum magis appareat. Quando autem communico cum after truth. sensatis qui sensum appetunt, non vanam gloriam, facio e converso. Theologus autem debet inniti sensui et 10 loyci scripture; et in illo, sedatis tumultibus sophisticis, quietari. Sed generando inconveniencia videtur contra physicam As to the argument that Aristotelis concedere quod ignis est aqua; quia per idem our doctrine would make de possibili terra, vermis, et sic species confuse essent 15 everything to et permixte. Hic dicitur quod sensus predictus] non est A 71 be everything else, and destroy contra physicam, et usualiter scripture sunt consona the distinction of species, I que longe melius logisant quam Aristoteles. Ipse enim reply that it is conformable to ad tantum innititur predicacioni formali (primo physi- Scripture. corum 61) quod negavit es esse statuam: “ex ere", inquit, 20 Aristotle goes too far when he “dicimus statuam fieri, non es statuam". Et 7° Metha- says that brass physice, 34°, dicit quod compositum ex substancia et does not l become a statue, accidente generatur per medium componencium, ut but that the statue itself spera cuprea; et nichil est spera nisi cuprum. Nos becomes autem consonancius dicimus quod ydolum est lapis et 25 realized. We say that an lignum ; et correspondenter de aliis artificialibus; et idol is stone, wood. &c. that quod ignis est aqua, sed non simul et semel et secundum fire is water, though not at idem. Et sic de individuis materialibus, stante distinc- the same time ; cione specifica, que fit a forma. Aliter autem non the distinction between things diceret sapiens Ecclesiastes, ultimo, ubi docet hominem proceeding from disponere se creatori in via presenti antequam", inquit, successive forms. revertatur pulvis in terram suam". Nec video quod sit If a man is, according to inpossibile quod homo secundum naturam corpoream Job, rottenness and worms, why should he not be ſas to bodily substance) identical with an ass? Eccl. XII, 7 1. est ABCD. 2. existe' A. 3. est deest BD. 5. et deest ACD. 6. disputationis ABCD ; neo vis A. 7. eorum APBD. 8. covinco A; gvinco D. 9. 9m = quoniam pro qui D; ib. facio deest AC. 10. autem theologus ABCD. 11. scripture deest B; ib. seda D. 14, et pro quia BD. 15. et deest D. 17. verba BD: vlalia sunt scripture C. 18. afler melius a blank space A; ib. logizat A: logizant C; legizant D. 20. 6i? A; 16° BD; ib. negat D; ib. es deest D. 22. 24 D. 24. cupra AC; ib. 29. spectata AC. nulla AB; ib. vel B. 32. revertetur ACD; ib. after suam: et spiritus dirigatur ad deum BCD. 6. The text is no doubt corrupt here, and the various read- ings are far from sufficient to make the meaning clear. My marginal note is only a guess.
224 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. VII. With men who equivocis non sit contra diccio (ut patet 1° elenchorum, affect the subtlities of 4°) et quia esse intelligibile et esse existere competit vain wisdom, equivoce creaturis, non est dubium quod in istis non I beat down their arguments est contradiccio: creature eternaliter erant secundum by denials made esse intelligibile; et non eternaliter secundum existen- in various senses; but I ciam. Vel sapientis aut acute disputantis nego eis nega- proceed otherwise with tum, modificans sensus earum, ut infructuositas intencionis sincere seckers earum magis appareat. Quando autem communico cum after truth. sensatis qui sensum appetunt, non vanam gloriam, facio e converso. Theologus autem debet inniti sensui et 10 loyci scripture; et in illo, sedatis tumultibus sophisticis, quietari. Sed generando inconveniencia videtur contra physicam As to the argument that Aristotelis concedere quod ignis est aqua; quia per idem our doctrine would make de possibili terra, vermis, et sic species confuse essent 15 everything to et permixte. Hic dicitur quod sensus predictus] non est A 71 be everything else, and destroy contra physicam, et usualiter scripture sunt consona the distinction of species, I que longe melius logisant quam Aristoteles. Ipse enim reply that it is conformable to ad tantum innititur predicacioni formali (primo physi- Scripture. corum 61) quod negavit es esse statuam: “ex ere", inquit, 20 Aristotle goes too far when he “dicimus statuam fieri, non es statuam". Et 7° Metha- says that brass physice, 34°, dicit quod compositum ex substancia et does not l become a statue, accidente generatur per medium componencium, ut but that the statue itself spera cuprea; et nichil est spera nisi cuprum. Nos becomes autem consonancius dicimus quod ydolum est lapis et 25 realized. We say that an lignum ; et correspondenter de aliis artificialibus; et idol is stone, wood. &c. that quod ignis est aqua, sed non simul et semel et secundum fire is water, though not at idem. Et sic de individuis materialibus, stante distinc- the same time ; cione specifica, que fit a forma. Aliter autem non the distinction between things diceret sapiens Ecclesiastes, ultimo, ubi docet hominem proceeding from disponere se creatori in via presenti antequam", inquit, successive forms. revertatur pulvis in terram suam". Nec video quod sit If a man is, according to inpossibile quod homo secundum naturam corpoream Job, rottenness and worms, why should he not be ſas to bodily substance) identical with an ass? Eccl. XII, 7 1. est ABCD. 2. existe' A. 3. est deest BD. 5. et deest ACD. 6. disputationis ABCD ; neo vis A. 7. eorum APBD. 8. covinco A; gvinco D. 9. 9m = quoniam pro qui D; ib. facio deest AC. 10. autem theologus ABCD. 11. scripture deest B; ib. seda D. 14, et pro quia BD. 15. et deest D. 17. verba BD: vlalia sunt scripture C. 18. afler melius a blank space A; ib. logizat A: logizant C; legizant D. 20. 6i? A; 16° BD; ib. negat D; ib. es deest D. 22. 24 D. 24. cupra AC; ib. 29. spectata AC. nulla AB; ib. vel B. 32. revertetur ACD; ib. after suam: et spiritus dirigatur ad deum BCD. 6. The text is no doubt corrupt here, and the various read- ings are far from sufficient to make the meaning clear. My marginal note is only a guess.
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CAP. VII. DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 225 Job sit asinus aliquo tempore, cum sit 'putredo et vermis", XXV, 6 ut dicit Job 25; et (quod magis mirabile est) “verbum Joh. caro factum est", ut dicitur Joh. 1°. Non autem video I, 14 quod sit possibile eamdem personam hominis simul esse 5 hominem et asinum, vel quod eadem persona secundum formam sit res alterius speciei, sicud admittunt illi qui dicunt verbum divinum simul posse esse hominem et asinum. Et ita . . . . . . .. refugium in hoc quiesco, concedens scripturam de virtute sermonis, que vocat 10 hominem terram vel aliam naturam de virtute sermonis. Et illum sensum innuit commentator, 12° Methaphysice 15 assimilans materiam primam generi; quia, sicud genus simul et semel includit multa supposita distincta specie, sic materia prima est potencia multa supposita, 15 distincta in specie actualiter pro diversis temporibus. Sed ultimo obicitur iuxta hec quod per loycam con- cedendum esset patrem esse filium, humanitatem deitatem, et sic de ceteris que ponuntur de eadem essencia vel persona. Sic enim conceditur quod pater 20 est idem essencialiter cum filio. Ad illud dicitur quod omnia talia sunt absolute inpossibilia. In talibus predi- cacio secundum essenciam non debet admitti nisi in concreatis, quibus abstrahitur una res in potencia ad formam sibi accidentalem. Ergo non pater essencialiter 25 vel personaliter est filius, licet sit idem cum filio. Nec humanitas esset divinitas, nisi in quantum aliud est hominem esse ipsum quiditative, aut e contra. Ideo scriptura hoc previdens, quantum recolo non sic locuta est, vel si loquitur alicubi, loquitur propter scitum non 3o extranee, et in alia parte expositorie exprimit sensum suum. Not indeed whilst he is a man; and I reject as impossible the theory that God might be incarnate in several subjects at once. My refuge is Scripture ; I admit its expressions as literally true, in my doctrine. Averrhoës, assimilating matter to a genus, which may be many specifically different things, shares my view. To the objection that this theory would identify the Father with the Son, I reply that we may not abstract Paternity from Godhead ; forming one Essence, they must be predicated together. The Father is one with the Son, God is (in Christ) one with man ; but Paternity is not Filiation, nor is humanity Deity. 2. 24 C; ib. materiale AD. 8. after ita, a blank space for some words; unum latens BCDE. 12. assignans ABC; ib. generari ABC. 14. in specie BD; ib. prima pro potencia A. 17. est pro esset D; ib. et pro esse D. 18. piitr A; predicantur B. 21, 22. predicacionibus ABCD. 23. de A; concretis D; ib. obst'mar pro abstrahitur D. 26. deitas BD; ib. aliquid BCD. 27. homo esset BCD. 29. logitur pro loquitur twice B. 29, 30. propter — parte deest; exsequitur illud B. 29. ſcitu A. 3o. et deest ACD. 31. after suum: et cetera sequuntur obiecciones etc. C. 8. If we read quœro for quiesco, we might fill the preceding gap with unum latens. As it is, the sense is not improved by adding these words. 15
CAP. VII. DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 225 Job sit asinus aliquo tempore, cum sit 'putredo et vermis", XXV, 6 ut dicit Job 25; et (quod magis mirabile est) “verbum Joh. caro factum est", ut dicitur Joh. 1°. Non autem video I, 14 quod sit possibile eamdem personam hominis simul esse 5 hominem et asinum, vel quod eadem persona secundum formam sit res alterius speciei, sicud admittunt illi qui dicunt verbum divinum simul posse esse hominem et asinum. Et ita . . . . . . .. refugium in hoc quiesco, concedens scripturam de virtute sermonis, que vocat 10 hominem terram vel aliam naturam de virtute sermonis. Et illum sensum innuit commentator, 12° Methaphysice 15 assimilans materiam primam generi; quia, sicud genus simul et semel includit multa supposita distincta specie, sic materia prima est potencia multa supposita, 15 distincta in specie actualiter pro diversis temporibus. Sed ultimo obicitur iuxta hec quod per loycam con- cedendum esset patrem esse filium, humanitatem deitatem, et sic de ceteris que ponuntur de eadem essencia vel persona. Sic enim conceditur quod pater 20 est idem essencialiter cum filio. Ad illud dicitur quod omnia talia sunt absolute inpossibilia. In talibus predi- cacio secundum essenciam non debet admitti nisi in concreatis, quibus abstrahitur una res in potencia ad formam sibi accidentalem. Ergo non pater essencialiter 25 vel personaliter est filius, licet sit idem cum filio. Nec humanitas esset divinitas, nisi in quantum aliud est hominem esse ipsum quiditative, aut e contra. Ideo scriptura hoc previdens, quantum recolo non sic locuta est, vel si loquitur alicubi, loquitur propter scitum non 3o extranee, et in alia parte expositorie exprimit sensum suum. Not indeed whilst he is a man; and I reject as impossible the theory that God might be incarnate in several subjects at once. My refuge is Scripture ; I admit its expressions as literally true, in my doctrine. Averrhoës, assimilating matter to a genus, which may be many specifically different things, shares my view. To the objection that this theory would identify the Father with the Son, I reply that we may not abstract Paternity from Godhead ; forming one Essence, they must be predicated together. The Father is one with the Son, God is (in Christ) one with man ; but Paternity is not Filiation, nor is humanity Deity. 2. 24 C; ib. materiale AD. 8. after ita, a blank space for some words; unum latens BCDE. 12. assignans ABC; ib. generari ABC. 14. in specie BD; ib. prima pro potencia A. 17. est pro esset D; ib. et pro esse D. 18. piitr A; predicantur B. 21, 22. predicacionibus ABCD. 23. de A; concretis D; ib. obst'mar pro abstrahitur D. 26. deitas BD; ib. aliquid BCD. 27. homo esset BCD. 29. logitur pro loquitur twice B. 29, 30. propter — parte deest; exsequitur illud B. 29. ſcitu A. 3o. et deest ACD. 31. after suum: et cetera sequuntur obiecciones etc. C. 8. If we read quœro for quiesco, we might fill the preceding gap with unum latens. As it is, the sense is not improved by adding these words. 15
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226 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. VIII. CAPITULUM OCTAVUM. Primal matter, Sed obicitur contra predicta, primo ex hoc quod it is objected, is formless in materia prima, in quantum huiusmodi, est informis: itself; now since cum ergo pro nullo instanti temporis potest esse in- it never is formless, it formis, sequitur quod pro nullo instanti temporis potest 5 never is anything in esse materia prima. itself. Hic dicitur quod non est necesse materiam primam But it does not follow that it esse, quia satis est adhuc ipsam esse materiam, qua has no distinct non sit prior, ipsam qualificative elementans, quoniam entity of its own. est necessarium semper sibi inesse. Non enim sequitur: 10 non potest esse nisi sit informis, quia pro nulla mensura potest esse, nisi pro eadem sit informis; ut non est A creature is essentially possibile creaturam esse nisi creetur, sic nec est created; yet who will say possibile hominem esse virtuosum moraliter, nisi opere- that it is created tur virtuose pro tempore suo. Tamen non est color 15 at each moment of its existence? ex isto inferri quod si pro aliqua mensura creatura est, A 72 And a man may be virtuous, tunc pro illa mensura creatur; et sic de virtuoso mora- even though not liter qui consistit in habitu. Materia ergo prima dicit actually doing a virtuous deed. concretive subiectum, ut est susceptivum qualiscunque Matter, understood forme pro tempore suo. Et sic est substancia et funda-20 concretely, is a subject able mentum nature subsistens omni predicacione forme to receive any universalis vel particularis nature corporee, ut patet 1° form; as such, its entity Physicorum 52°. Si autem intelligatur abstractive, pro corresponds to its receptivity. informitate essencie corporee, ut loquitur Augustinus, Understood non video quod talis informitas sit quid, quantum, vel 25 abstractively, as not being aliquod ens positivum, sed sic est carencia, media inter form, it is a aliquid et nichil in effectu. Et illa non potest subici mere negation, a lack, and is alicui forme, cum fugaretur in adventu cuiuscunque nothing positive. forme, sicud privacio, que est tercium principium, de Now this lack quo primo Physicorum. Ipsa enim, quamvis non possit 30 cannot underlie any form, since propter suam violenciam ingredi composicionem cuius when the latter supervenes, it principium est antecedens, tamen vere dicitur a philo- at once disappears; sopho principium intrinsecum, cum subiectatur in ma- yet, like teria, que est tota essencia compositi. privation, it is an intrinsic principle of things, since it is an essential property of matter. 1. Capitulum octavum deest A; Initial S in red ink AB. 7. non deest DE. 8. Before quia suppl. materiam primam BD. 9. q1il A; quod BCD. 13. creatoris ABD; ib. sicud BC; ib. non pro nec BD. 16. istis infere D. 17. tunc deest ACD; ib. creator C. 18. qui — habitu deest D. 19. contractive ACD. 20. esset ACD. 20, 21. fundatum ABCD. 21. ſb qm (sub communi) D. 26. sit pro sic est ACD; ib. correspondencia BD. 28. fugere BD. 29. sit B; ib. tercium deest D. 30. posset CD. 31, 32. est principium BD. 32. tamen deest BC; ib. enim pro vere D.
226 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. VIII. CAPITULUM OCTAVUM. Primal matter, Sed obicitur contra predicta, primo ex hoc quod it is objected, is formless in materia prima, in quantum huiusmodi, est informis: itself; now since cum ergo pro nullo instanti temporis potest esse in- it never is formless, it formis, sequitur quod pro nullo instanti temporis potest 5 never is anything in esse materia prima. itself. Hic dicitur quod non est necesse materiam primam But it does not follow that it esse, quia satis est adhuc ipsam esse materiam, qua has no distinct non sit prior, ipsam qualificative elementans, quoniam entity of its own. est necessarium semper sibi inesse. Non enim sequitur: 10 non potest esse nisi sit informis, quia pro nulla mensura potest esse, nisi pro eadem sit informis; ut non est A creature is essentially possibile creaturam esse nisi creetur, sic nec est created; yet who will say possibile hominem esse virtuosum moraliter, nisi opere- that it is created tur virtuose pro tempore suo. Tamen non est color 15 at each moment of its existence? ex isto inferri quod si pro aliqua mensura creatura est, A 72 And a man may be virtuous, tunc pro illa mensura creatur; et sic de virtuoso mora- even though not liter qui consistit in habitu. Materia ergo prima dicit actually doing a virtuous deed. concretive subiectum, ut est susceptivum qualiscunque Matter, understood forme pro tempore suo. Et sic est substancia et funda-20 concretely, is a subject able mentum nature subsistens omni predicacione forme to receive any universalis vel particularis nature corporee, ut patet 1° form; as such, its entity Physicorum 52°. Si autem intelligatur abstractive, pro corresponds to its receptivity. informitate essencie corporee, ut loquitur Augustinus, Understood non video quod talis informitas sit quid, quantum, vel 25 abstractively, as not being aliquod ens positivum, sed sic est carencia, media inter form, it is a aliquid et nichil in effectu. Et illa non potest subici mere negation, a lack, and is alicui forme, cum fugaretur in adventu cuiuscunque nothing positive. forme, sicud privacio, que est tercium principium, de Now this lack quo primo Physicorum. Ipsa enim, quamvis non possit 30 cannot underlie any form, since propter suam violenciam ingredi composicionem cuius when the latter supervenes, it principium est antecedens, tamen vere dicitur a philo- at once disappears; sopho principium intrinsecum, cum subiectatur in ma- yet, like teria, que est tota essencia compositi. privation, it is an intrinsic principle of things, since it is an essential property of matter. 1. Capitulum octavum deest A; Initial S in red ink AB. 7. non deest DE. 8. Before quia suppl. materiam primam BD. 9. q1il A; quod BCD. 13. creatoris ABD; ib. sicud BC; ib. non pro nec BD. 16. istis infere D. 17. tunc deest ACD; ib. creator C. 18. qui — habitu deest D. 19. contractive ACD. 20. esset ACD. 20, 21. fundatum ABCD. 21. ſb qm (sub communi) D. 26. sit pro sic est ACD; ib. correspondencia BD. 28. fugere BD. 29. sit B; ib. tercium deest D. 30. posset CD. 31, 32. est principium BD. 32. tamen deest BC; ib. enim pro vere D.
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CAP. VIII. DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 227 Ex istis patet quod claudit contradiccionem formalem materiam primam habere formam de se, et componi ex materia et forma substanciali. Tunc enim non esset materia prima, sed pars materialis, quia aliter esset 5 processus in infinitum in materiis. Et sic vere dicit philosophus, 1° physicorum et 7° methaphysice, 8°, quod si de se haberet formam que sic fieret eius pars quali- ficativa, tunc non esset [in] potencia ad quamcunque formam, cum oportet recipiens denudari a natura 10 recepti. Sufficit autem ad denudacionem de qua loqu- untur philosophi, quod subiectum recipiens quamcunque formam, substancialem vel accidentalem, sit pro aliqua mensura nature vel temporis pro qua non habet formam huiusmodi ut materia prima, licet pro nulla mensura 15 temporis sit informis, tamen pro mensura nature (que est supra tempus) pro qua nullam formam habet, sicud nec pro tali mensura est quid; et pro illa mensura denudatur a natura rei recepte posterius in tempore. Correspondenter essencia anime, cum recipit secundum 20 intellectum possibilem speciem vel quamcunque inten- cionem cognoscibilem se ipsam conveniens, est tunc pro instanti temporis vel nature pro quo nullam formam talem habet; et correspondenter de virtutibus sensitivis. In cuius testificacionem virtutes organice non distincte 25 percipiunt subtilitatem diaphanee cristalidis, nec auditus sonum tremulum aeris coronalis in meringa. Et sic de aliis sensibus, sive naturaliter dispositis sive indispositis. Secundo obicitur per hoc quod, si materia pro men- sura temporis sit informis, tunc pro illa mensura non 30 est formata, et per consequens negacio forme precessit eius existenciam. Et cum non sit racio diversitatis quin idem sit de materia et qualibet creatura, sequitur quod cuiuslibet creature negacio precesserit eius existenciam. sic quod cuiuslibet creature non esse precesserit eius 35 esse. Quod tripliciter confirmatur, primo ex hoc quod Primal matter has by itself no form whatever ; if it had, it would consist of matter and form, and this matter would be likewise composed ; and so on for ever. But this not having any form is meant not in time, but as to the nature of matter itself, which is something that does not belong to time. Thus the essence of the soul passing from thought to thought, it is deprived of actual thought, not at any instant of time, but in its nature as a potentiality of thimking. Another difficulty is that the negation of form is true before the existence of matter, and indeed of any creature; its negation is true before its existence is so; 2 — 2. id est pro et B; ib. compo- 4. materiam — prima deest D. situm ABD. 3, 4. non esse materiam primam D. 4. vel pro quia AC. 6. 21° C; ib. 18° B. 7. si pro sic BD. 8. est ACD; ib. in deesl ABCD. 20. intellectivam 9. recipiens deest D); esse B; ib. denudatum BD. potenciam BD. 21. sequens se ipsam esse B; conveniens se ipsam est deest A; sequens est ipsam CD; tunc C; esse D; ib. est tunc deest B. 21—23. est tunc — correspondenter deest D. 24. cuius instantis C; ib. 21. destincte C. m cuius vi'tabq = veritatibus D; vi'te = veritatis E. 25. dyafanice x'talla no ut D. 26. conralis A; generabilis pro coronales 33. precessit B. BDE. 32. sic pro idem D. 31, 32. per idem BC. 34. precessit C; pre cessit D. 15%
CAP. VIII. DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 227 Ex istis patet quod claudit contradiccionem formalem materiam primam habere formam de se, et componi ex materia et forma substanciali. Tunc enim non esset materia prima, sed pars materialis, quia aliter esset 5 processus in infinitum in materiis. Et sic vere dicit philosophus, 1° physicorum et 7° methaphysice, 8°, quod si de se haberet formam que sic fieret eius pars quali- ficativa, tunc non esset [in] potencia ad quamcunque formam, cum oportet recipiens denudari a natura 10 recepti. Sufficit autem ad denudacionem de qua loqu- untur philosophi, quod subiectum recipiens quamcunque formam, substancialem vel accidentalem, sit pro aliqua mensura nature vel temporis pro qua non habet formam huiusmodi ut materia prima, licet pro nulla mensura 15 temporis sit informis, tamen pro mensura nature (que est supra tempus) pro qua nullam formam habet, sicud nec pro tali mensura est quid; et pro illa mensura denudatur a natura rei recepte posterius in tempore. Correspondenter essencia anime, cum recipit secundum 20 intellectum possibilem speciem vel quamcunque inten- cionem cognoscibilem se ipsam conveniens, est tunc pro instanti temporis vel nature pro quo nullam formam talem habet; et correspondenter de virtutibus sensitivis. In cuius testificacionem virtutes organice non distincte 25 percipiunt subtilitatem diaphanee cristalidis, nec auditus sonum tremulum aeris coronalis in meringa. Et sic de aliis sensibus, sive naturaliter dispositis sive indispositis. Secundo obicitur per hoc quod, si materia pro men- sura temporis sit informis, tunc pro illa mensura non 30 est formata, et per consequens negacio forme precessit eius existenciam. Et cum non sit racio diversitatis quin idem sit de materia et qualibet creatura, sequitur quod cuiuslibet creature negacio precesserit eius existenciam. sic quod cuiuslibet creature non esse precesserit eius 35 esse. Quod tripliciter confirmatur, primo ex hoc quod Primal matter has by itself no form whatever ; if it had, it would consist of matter and form, and this matter would be likewise composed ; and so on for ever. But this not having any form is meant not in time, but as to the nature of matter itself, which is something that does not belong to time. Thus the essence of the soul passing from thought to thought, it is deprived of actual thought, not at any instant of time, but in its nature as a potentiality of thimking. Another difficulty is that the negation of form is true before the existence of matter, and indeed of any creature; its negation is true before its existence is so; 2 — 2. id est pro et B; ib. compo- 4. materiam — prima deest D. situm ABD. 3, 4. non esse materiam primam D. 4. vel pro quia AC. 6. 21° C; ib. 18° B. 7. si pro sic BD. 8. est ACD; ib. in deesl ABCD. 20. intellectivam 9. recipiens deest D); esse B; ib. denudatum BD. potenciam BD. 21. sequens se ipsam esse B; conveniens se ipsam est deest A; sequens est ipsam CD; tunc C; esse D; ib. est tunc deest B. 21—23. est tunc — correspondenter deest D. 24. cuius instantis C; ib. 21. destincte C. m cuius vi'tabq = veritatibus D; vi'te = veritatis E. 25. dyafanice x'talla no ut D. 26. conralis A; generabilis pro coronales 33. precessit B. BDE. 32. sic pro idem D. 31, 32. per idem BC. 34. precessit C; pre cessit D. 15%
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228 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. VIII. omnis generacio vel creacio creature est a non esse eius simpliciter ad eius esse; ut patet per philosophos et theologos. Ergo cuiuslibet creature non esse precessit suum esse. Similiter pro mensura quacunque fuit deum velle mundum vel existere ante mundum, vel ipsum non 5 A 72b existere. Sed] pro mensura eternitatis fuit talis dei volicio; ergo et mundum existere vel non existere. Sed pro quacunque mensura veritatis est sic disiuncta contra- dictoriis, est alterum illorum. Ergo pro mensura eter- nitatis vel est dicta affirmacio, vel est dicta negacio. 10 Et cum affirmacio non potest tunc esse, quia tunc omnis creatura esset eterna, relinquitur quod dicta negacio fuit eterna futuricio. Ergo eternitas mundi a parte ante habet non esse mundum sibi coevum ante mundum, cum pro illo priori contingenti nichil fuit 15 non esse mundum. Similiter in eternitate est verum quod iste mundus non existit; et per consequens verum est istum mundum pro mensura sua aliqua non existere, et per consequens aliquando non existere. Sic enim concedunt theologi precipui quod omnis creatura habet 20 esse intelligibile eternum, secundum quod cognoscitur necessario a deo vel noticia simplicis apprehensionis (ut possibilia non existencia) vel intuitive, ut omnia tem- pore suo existencia. Cum igitur omnis creatura cognita But every creature has a deo habet esse intelligibile eternum, cum defectu 25 eternal existence in God, and has existencie, sequitur quod habet cum deo esse intelligibile it therefore when it does eternum, non coexistenciam precedentem. Et antecedens not exist, as non negatur a catholico, cum, prima Petri primo, dicit I. Petr. may be proved by Scripture. apostolus Petrus quod deus elegit apostolos ante mundi I, 20 constitucionem". Et Ieremie primo dicitur quod deus 30 nedum cognovit Ieremiam antequam fuit, sed antequam ipsum formaret in utero. In ista materia est duplex responsio. Prima, concedens quod omnis creatura habet non existenciam eternam precedentem suum esse existere, ut sentenciant raciones 35 et modi loquendi philosophorum limitancium terminos and the world's non-existence is an eternal truth, though it is nothing at all. And if it was eternally true, then there was a when in which it could be predicated of the world. We may answer this in two different ways : (1) by admitting that non- existence is the terminus a quo of creation ; 1. ex eius non esse BD. 2. patet deest D. 5. inexistere AC; ut existere BD; ib. ante deest BD. 6. quacumque fuit BD; ib. dei deest D. 8. patet pro pro ABC; ib. quod veritas C; ib. est deest 6. et deest AC. AC; ib. sic distincta ex D; definita A; ib. distincta ex; disiuncia in marg. B. II. sic tunc AC. 13. eternalitas BD. 17, 18. verum est istum deest; fuit AC. 18. sua B aliqua deest AC. 19. aliquod pro aliquando AC. 24. cognita deest D. 22. vel deest AC. 26. esse deest BD. 26, 27. in- telligenciam eternam D. 27. existenciam B. 30. Et eciam D. 35. esse deest BD; ib. ſmant A.
228 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. VIII. omnis generacio vel creacio creature est a non esse eius simpliciter ad eius esse; ut patet per philosophos et theologos. Ergo cuiuslibet creature non esse precessit suum esse. Similiter pro mensura quacunque fuit deum velle mundum vel existere ante mundum, vel ipsum non 5 A 72b existere. Sed] pro mensura eternitatis fuit talis dei volicio; ergo et mundum existere vel non existere. Sed pro quacunque mensura veritatis est sic disiuncta contra- dictoriis, est alterum illorum. Ergo pro mensura eter- nitatis vel est dicta affirmacio, vel est dicta negacio. 10 Et cum affirmacio non potest tunc esse, quia tunc omnis creatura esset eterna, relinquitur quod dicta negacio fuit eterna futuricio. Ergo eternitas mundi a parte ante habet non esse mundum sibi coevum ante mundum, cum pro illo priori contingenti nichil fuit 15 non esse mundum. Similiter in eternitate est verum quod iste mundus non existit; et per consequens verum est istum mundum pro mensura sua aliqua non existere, et per consequens aliquando non existere. Sic enim concedunt theologi precipui quod omnis creatura habet 20 esse intelligibile eternum, secundum quod cognoscitur necessario a deo vel noticia simplicis apprehensionis (ut possibilia non existencia) vel intuitive, ut omnia tem- pore suo existencia. Cum igitur omnis creatura cognita But every creature has a deo habet esse intelligibile eternum, cum defectu 25 eternal existence in God, and has existencie, sequitur quod habet cum deo esse intelligibile it therefore when it does eternum, non coexistenciam precedentem. Et antecedens not exist, as non negatur a catholico, cum, prima Petri primo, dicit I. Petr. may be proved by Scripture. apostolus Petrus quod deus elegit apostolos ante mundi I, 20 constitucionem". Et Ieremie primo dicitur quod deus 30 nedum cognovit Ieremiam antequam fuit, sed antequam ipsum formaret in utero. In ista materia est duplex responsio. Prima, concedens quod omnis creatura habet non existenciam eternam precedentem suum esse existere, ut sentenciant raciones 35 et modi loquendi philosophorum limitancium terminos and the world's non-existence is an eternal truth, though it is nothing at all. And if it was eternally true, then there was a when in which it could be predicated of the world. We may answer this in two different ways : (1) by admitting that non- existence is the terminus a quo of creation ; 1. ex eius non esse BD. 2. patet deest D. 5. inexistere AC; ut existere BD; ib. ante deest BD. 6. quacumque fuit BD; ib. dei deest D. 8. patet pro pro ABC; ib. quod veritas C; ib. est deest 6. et deest AC. AC; ib. sic distincta ex D; definita A; ib. distincta ex; disiuncia in marg. B. II. sic tunc AC. 13. eternalitas BD. 17, 18. verum est istum deest; fuit AC. 18. sua B aliqua deest AC. 19. aliquod pro aliquando AC. 24. cognita deest D. 22. vel deest AC. 26. esse deest BD. 26, 27. in- telligenciam eternam D. 27. existenciam B. 30. Et eciam D. 35. esse deest BD; ib. ſmant A.
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CAP. VIII. DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 229 A 735 generacionis et corrupcionis per esse et non esse, ut generacionis terminus a quo est non esse generati, et terminus ad quem est esse generati; ut patet in predi- camentis, 5° physicorum, et primo generacione. E 5 contra autem est de corrupcione. Addit eciam hec adding, however, that responsio, quod tales termini infinitati “non esse talis negative terms like non-being aut talis rei", non negant simpliciter esse talis rei pro do not simply omni mensura temporis vel nature. Unde, sicud non deny all being, but only a repugnat quod unum sit album pro una mensura tem- certain degree and perfection 10 poris, et nigrum pro alia, sic nec hoc repugnat, sed of being, oportet omnem creaturam primo habere non existenciam, attained when that which was id est, et non esse actuale extra deum, et post existen- non-existent save in God, ciam in esse actuale ad extra. Et hinc vere dicit scrip- Eccl. comes to exist tura ecclesiastis, quod omnia citra deum sunt vana et outside of Him. I, 2 15 falsa de quanto pro aliqua mensura deficiunt ab existencia. Nam omnia creata habent esse intelligibile Every being has absolutely eternum, et absolute necessarium, ut patet 6° Gen. ad necessary existence in literam 13°; et illi superadditur existencia pro tempore God's mind, to which, at the suo, que existencia deficit eis pro mensura eternitatis. right time, 20 Et patet ista sentencia per beatum Dyonisium de mistica actual existence ad extra is theoloyca, particula tercia, cap. 1°, ubi dicit quod omnium superadded. encium tam raciones positive quam negative dicunt deum; nec sunt iste negaciones omnibus affirmacionibus oppo- site, cum in omni creato sit suum non esse ante suum 25 esse. Natura autem increata precedit omne non esse, ut sanctus Bartholomeus testatus est. Wult autem iste sanctus dicere quod omnis creatura habet esse possibile precedens eius existenciam; et cum illa potencia ponit eiusdem creature non existenciam] patet quod in omni 30 creatura non existencia precedit suam existenciam et suum esse. Actus autem, qui est deus, precedit poten- ciam, ut dicitur 9° methaphysice. Et cum ista existencia et ista non existencia creature sunt pro diversis mensuris, non sunt opposite, ut patet ex regula Aristotelis, primo 35 elenchorum cap. 4°. Et sic vocant philosophi terminos generacionis et corrupcionis contradicciones in sua Such is also the doctrine of Dionysius, who holds that every creature has in God an eternal existence of pure possibility, including its actual non- existence; and therefore the latter precedes its existence as and when created: but these do not contradict each other. What is contradictory is the simultancous 1. limitationis pro corrupcionis BD. 6. infiniti D. 7. non esse AC. 12. et pro id est AD. 13. extra deum D. 14, 15. ad existenciam AC. 22. negative in marg. B. 17. patet deest D. 18. pro deest BD. 21. after sit unun D. „ 31. autem deest D. 27. potenciale BD. 33. fint ACD. 34. ex r'a A. 36. contradictorios BD; ib. sui deest B. 20. Dionysius. There exist several spurious works of St. Dionysius the Areopagite, which had much vogue during the Middle Ages. The allusion to St. Bartholomew (l. 26) is propably taken from one of them.
CAP. VIII. DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 229 A 735 generacionis et corrupcionis per esse et non esse, ut generacionis terminus a quo est non esse generati, et terminus ad quem est esse generati; ut patet in predi- camentis, 5° physicorum, et primo generacione. E 5 contra autem est de corrupcione. Addit eciam hec adding, however, that responsio, quod tales termini infinitati “non esse talis negative terms like non-being aut talis rei", non negant simpliciter esse talis rei pro do not simply omni mensura temporis vel nature. Unde, sicud non deny all being, but only a repugnat quod unum sit album pro una mensura tem- certain degree and perfection 10 poris, et nigrum pro alia, sic nec hoc repugnat, sed of being, oportet omnem creaturam primo habere non existenciam, attained when that which was id est, et non esse actuale extra deum, et post existen- non-existent save in God, ciam in esse actuale ad extra. Et hinc vere dicit scrip- Eccl. comes to exist tura ecclesiastis, quod omnia citra deum sunt vana et outside of Him. I, 2 15 falsa de quanto pro aliqua mensura deficiunt ab existencia. Nam omnia creata habent esse intelligibile Every being has absolutely eternum, et absolute necessarium, ut patet 6° Gen. ad necessary existence in literam 13°; et illi superadditur existencia pro tempore God's mind, to which, at the suo, que existencia deficit eis pro mensura eternitatis. right time, 20 Et patet ista sentencia per beatum Dyonisium de mistica actual existence ad extra is theoloyca, particula tercia, cap. 1°, ubi dicit quod omnium superadded. encium tam raciones positive quam negative dicunt deum; nec sunt iste negaciones omnibus affirmacionibus oppo- site, cum in omni creato sit suum non esse ante suum 25 esse. Natura autem increata precedit omne non esse, ut sanctus Bartholomeus testatus est. Wult autem iste sanctus dicere quod omnis creatura habet esse possibile precedens eius existenciam; et cum illa potencia ponit eiusdem creature non existenciam] patet quod in omni 30 creatura non existencia precedit suam existenciam et suum esse. Actus autem, qui est deus, precedit poten- ciam, ut dicitur 9° methaphysice. Et cum ista existencia et ista non existencia creature sunt pro diversis mensuris, non sunt opposite, ut patet ex regula Aristotelis, primo 35 elenchorum cap. 4°. Et sic vocant philosophi terminos generacionis et corrupcionis contradicciones in sua Such is also the doctrine of Dionysius, who holds that every creature has in God an eternal existence of pure possibility, including its actual non- existence; and therefore the latter precedes its existence as and when created: but these do not contradict each other. What is contradictory is the simultancous 1. limitationis pro corrupcionis BD. 6. infiniti D. 7. non esse AC. 12. et pro id est AD. 13. extra deum D. 14, 15. ad existenciam AC. 22. negative in marg. B. 17. patet deest D. 18. pro deest BD. 21. after sit unun D. „ 31. autem deest D. 27. potenciale BD. 33. fint ACD. 34. ex r'a A. 36. contradictorios BD; ib. sui deest B. 20. Dionysius. There exist several spurious works of St. Dionysius the Areopagite, which had much vogue during the Middle Ages. The allusion to St. Bartholomew (l. 26) is propably taken from one of them.
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230 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. VIII. communitate, quia sunt termini quorum unus est affirmacio, alius autem eiusdem rei negacio, quos re- pugnat eidem simul et semel inesse. Et sic dicunt tales mutaciones esse a contradictorio in contradictorium; et sic contradictoria inesse rei pro diversis mensuris; ut 5 me non existere (quod est commune ad me non existere tunc aut tunc), contradicit huic: me existere et desinit esse me existentem, quia non potest esse pro tempore existencie mee, et contradiccio est ut sit cum existencia mea pro eodem tempore. Ideo dicitur quod contradiccio 10 est eiusdem negacio sue affirmacioni. Illud autem est valde difficile, implicans multa dicenda (2) But as this answer, though contra communem scolam, licet doctores sic loquantur. approved by doctors of the Et insuper, [ut] sophistarum audaciam probem, ut Church, implies many pomposius multiplicent suas argucias, ideo ego elegi positions not pro loco et tempore responsionem secundam, subglosans generally admitted, I dicta sanctorum per modificacionem necessariam, ut prefer another, quod non existencia creature, coeterna cum deo, pre- more available against cessit suam existenciam; et illa manet, nulli veritati sophistical quibbling. opposita secundum actum. Unde ista responsio, valens 20 I deny that any non-existence evitare apparenciam inconveniencie sophistice, negat ever was, is, or quod alicuius nature non existencia est, fuit vel erit, will be. From the et per consequens precessit eius existenciam. Nec se- restricted formlessness of quitur: materia prima pro illa mensura non est formata, primal matter vel aliquid; igitur pro illa mensura est non formata; 25 you cannot conclude in vel quod negacio sue formacionis fuit pro aliqua men- general that it sura; set bene sequitur quid materia sit non formata is formless, without any pro ista mensura. Sed ultra, non est color, si sit non restrictions; for then you formata pro ista mensura tunc non est formata, cum argue from the particular to argumentatur ab inferiori ad superius, negacione prece- 30 the general. dente. Ac si sic argueretur. Tu es non asinus; ergo tu Not an ass does not include Not es non animal; et ita de consimilibus; cum sequitur, an animal, though not Petrus est non albus; igitur pro nulla mensura sui est white implies albus. Et sic de consimilibus. Ex quo sequitur quod not white in any way. nulla talis affirmativa de predicato privativo aut con-35 Can we say: X is blind .. x trario infert simpliciter affirmativam de predicato opposito is not seeing ; or X is white.. X is not black? A being therefore may successively have two contradictory predicates. 15 position and denial of the same thing. 1. communi D. 3. et deest D. 4. esse deest BD. 5. contradiccio 7. et A; aut B. 8. existenté D; ib. tunc pro non est a parte rei BD. AC. 12. inexplicans A. 10, 11. negacio est eiusdem contradiccio ABD. 13. locuntur D. 14. ut deest ABCD; ib. sophistis AC; ib. probem deest BD. 16. sub deest BD. 17. negacionum B; negancium C. 19. valet D. 20. prima pro ista BD; ib. volens C. 23. non precessit BCD. 24. prima 25, 26. vel — vel deest A. pro illa ABD. 26—28. mensura — mensura 29. mensura deest D; ib. est non D. 32. est pro non BD; deest AD. ib. con deest BD. 33. est after sui deest ABD. 34. non albus ABCD; 35. negativa affirmativo: affirmativa AB; ib. p'uato AB; ib. con deest B. 36. oppositam affirmativam BD. ib. privato C.
230 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. VIII. communitate, quia sunt termini quorum unus est affirmacio, alius autem eiusdem rei negacio, quos re- pugnat eidem simul et semel inesse. Et sic dicunt tales mutaciones esse a contradictorio in contradictorium; et sic contradictoria inesse rei pro diversis mensuris; ut 5 me non existere (quod est commune ad me non existere tunc aut tunc), contradicit huic: me existere et desinit esse me existentem, quia non potest esse pro tempore existencie mee, et contradiccio est ut sit cum existencia mea pro eodem tempore. Ideo dicitur quod contradiccio 10 est eiusdem negacio sue affirmacioni. Illud autem est valde difficile, implicans multa dicenda (2) But as this answer, though contra communem scolam, licet doctores sic loquantur. approved by doctors of the Et insuper, [ut] sophistarum audaciam probem, ut Church, implies many pomposius multiplicent suas argucias, ideo ego elegi positions not pro loco et tempore responsionem secundam, subglosans generally admitted, I dicta sanctorum per modificacionem necessariam, ut prefer another, quod non existencia creature, coeterna cum deo, pre- more available against cessit suam existenciam; et illa manet, nulli veritati sophistical quibbling. opposita secundum actum. Unde ista responsio, valens 20 I deny that any non-existence evitare apparenciam inconveniencie sophistice, negat ever was, is, or quod alicuius nature non existencia est, fuit vel erit, will be. From the et per consequens precessit eius existenciam. Nec se- restricted formlessness of quitur: materia prima pro illa mensura non est formata, primal matter vel aliquid; igitur pro illa mensura est non formata; 25 you cannot conclude in vel quod negacio sue formacionis fuit pro aliqua men- general that it sura; set bene sequitur quid materia sit non formata is formless, without any pro ista mensura. Sed ultra, non est color, si sit non restrictions; for then you formata pro ista mensura tunc non est formata, cum argue from the particular to argumentatur ab inferiori ad superius, negacione prece- 30 the general. dente. Ac si sic argueretur. Tu es non asinus; ergo tu Not an ass does not include Not es non animal; et ita de consimilibus; cum sequitur, an animal, though not Petrus est non albus; igitur pro nulla mensura sui est white implies albus. Et sic de consimilibus. Ex quo sequitur quod not white in any way. nulla talis affirmativa de predicato privativo aut con-35 Can we say: X is blind .. x trario infert simpliciter affirmativam de predicato opposito is not seeing ; or X is white.. X is not black? A being therefore may successively have two contradictory predicates. 15 position and denial of the same thing. 1. communi D. 3. et deest D. 4. esse deest BD. 5. contradiccio 7. et A; aut B. 8. existenté D; ib. tunc pro non est a parte rei BD. AC. 12. inexplicans A. 10, 11. negacio est eiusdem contradiccio ABD. 13. locuntur D. 14. ut deest ABCD; ib. sophistis AC; ib. probem deest BD. 16. sub deest BD. 17. negacionum B; negancium C. 19. valet D. 20. prima pro ista BD; ib. volens C. 23. non precessit BCD. 24. prima 25, 26. vel — vel deest A. pro illa ABD. 26—28. mensura — mensura 29. mensura deest D; ib. est non D. 32. est pro non BD; deest AD. ib. con deest BD. 33. est after sui deest ABD. 34. non albus ABCD; 35. negativa affirmativo: affirmativa AB; ib. p'uato AB; ib. con deest B. 36. oppositam affirmativam BD. ib. privato C.
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CAP. VIII. DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 231 15 A 733 25 35 infinito; ut non sequitur: iste est cecus vel albus, ergo est non videns vel non niger: quia tunc esset non huius- modi pro aliqua mensura. Sed bene sequitur ex tali antecedenti quod sit non videns tunc; sed tunc non sequeretur quod sit non videns; cum argumentatur ab inferiori ad superius, cum negacione precedente sive speciali materia bonam faciente consequenciam. Et per hoc respondetur ad terciam confirmacionem. Ad primam dicitur quod dicta philosophorum sunt 10 intelligenda modificative, ut generacio substancie est a non existencia simpliciter pro danda mensura, usque ad existenciam; et e contrario de corrupcione. Nec concedat aliquis contradictoria esse terminos generacionis vel corrupcionis. Nam iuxta restringentes, verba sunt vera, etsi dicatur quod negacio contradictoria precessit affir- macionem. Adhuc negantes veritates communes non habebunt nisi quod rem esse pro data mensura pre- Thus we shall cessit suam existenciam pro mensura sequente. Et ] hec find simply non sunt contradictoria. Ideo satis est pro sensu philo- that existence in one way 20 sophorum quod esse generacione productum sive effectum precedes existence in habet suum esse intelligibile pro mensura eternitatis (ut another ; and mundum existere, vel ipsum non existere), cum sit veritas there is no contradiction. absolute necessaria, idem essencialiter cum deo. Et pro Intelligible being is eternal; illa mensura nec est mundum existere, nec pro illa and that eternity mensura est mundum non existere, cum nec in eternitate is irrelevant nec in tempore est mundum non existere; quia tunc both to the world's esset verum quod pro illa mensura mundus existit. existence and to its non- Unde falsum assumitur quod veritas disiunctiva requirit existence in time. pro omni mensura sui esse veritatem alterius partis; "The world either exists or 30 quia, licet pro nullo tempore vel instanti temporis possit does not," is a esse talis veritas, nisi pro eodem sit mundum existere disjunctive truth of which vel non existere; secus tamen est de instanti nature, ut one or the other part must be patet eciam ceco methaphysico. Unde insipienter acci- true in all time ; piunt aliqui quod unum et idem est iudicium de una but the essence of intelligibility mensura et qualibet, ad probandum ex isto sequi quod abstracts from time. esse est medium inter contradictoria. Sic igitur, cum It is foolish to futuricione mundi eterna est ista negacio eciam coeterna, conclude from one order of existence to another. What is said by philosophers of generation and corruption should be understood as meaning the passage from non-existence in a certain way, to existence in that way ; not absolutely. 4, 5. videns — videns deest 1. non albus AC. 3. modi deest ACD. 10. cum AC. 4. ex hoc non D. 6. suum superius BD. 7. boni D. modificacione BD. 15. contradictorio D. 12. e converso BCD. 15, 16. negacionem ABC. 20. vel C. 21. secundum pro suum BD; ib. certa mensura scilicet eternitatis cum C. 23. et deest D. 25, 26. non existere — non existere deest BD. 27. quod deest B; ib. mundus non BD. 28. after falsum: ſ = scilicet D. 33. et in pro 20. ſua' pro sui D. eciam ceco B; ib. metaphysica D. 36. E8se 34. aliqui deest D). deest D. 37. eterna deest D.
CAP. VIII. DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 231 15 A 733 25 35 infinito; ut non sequitur: iste est cecus vel albus, ergo est non videns vel non niger: quia tunc esset non huius- modi pro aliqua mensura. Sed bene sequitur ex tali antecedenti quod sit non videns tunc; sed tunc non sequeretur quod sit non videns; cum argumentatur ab inferiori ad superius, cum negacione precedente sive speciali materia bonam faciente consequenciam. Et per hoc respondetur ad terciam confirmacionem. Ad primam dicitur quod dicta philosophorum sunt 10 intelligenda modificative, ut generacio substancie est a non existencia simpliciter pro danda mensura, usque ad existenciam; et e contrario de corrupcione. Nec concedat aliquis contradictoria esse terminos generacionis vel corrupcionis. Nam iuxta restringentes, verba sunt vera, etsi dicatur quod negacio contradictoria precessit affir- macionem. Adhuc negantes veritates communes non habebunt nisi quod rem esse pro data mensura pre- Thus we shall cessit suam existenciam pro mensura sequente. Et ] hec find simply non sunt contradictoria. Ideo satis est pro sensu philo- that existence in one way 20 sophorum quod esse generacione productum sive effectum precedes existence in habet suum esse intelligibile pro mensura eternitatis (ut another ; and mundum existere, vel ipsum non existere), cum sit veritas there is no contradiction. absolute necessaria, idem essencialiter cum deo. Et pro Intelligible being is eternal; illa mensura nec est mundum existere, nec pro illa and that eternity mensura est mundum non existere, cum nec in eternitate is irrelevant nec in tempore est mundum non existere; quia tunc both to the world's esset verum quod pro illa mensura mundus existit. existence and to its non- Unde falsum assumitur quod veritas disiunctiva requirit existence in time. pro omni mensura sui esse veritatem alterius partis; "The world either exists or 30 quia, licet pro nullo tempore vel instanti temporis possit does not," is a esse talis veritas, nisi pro eodem sit mundum existere disjunctive truth of which vel non existere; secus tamen est de instanti nature, ut one or the other part must be patet eciam ceco methaphysico. Unde insipienter acci- true in all time ; piunt aliqui quod unum et idem est iudicium de una but the essence of intelligibility mensura et qualibet, ad probandum ex isto sequi quod abstracts from time. esse est medium inter contradictoria. Sic igitur, cum It is foolish to futuricione mundi eterna est ista negacio eciam coeterna, conclude from one order of existence to another. What is said by philosophers of generation and corruption should be understood as meaning the passage from non-existence in a certain way, to existence in that way ; not absolutely. 4, 5. videns — videns deest 1. non albus AC. 3. modi deest ACD. 10. cum AC. 4. ex hoc non D. 6. suum superius BD. 7. boni D. modificacione BD. 15. contradictorio D. 12. e converso BCD. 15, 16. negacionem ABC. 20. vel C. 21. secundum pro suum BD; ib. certa mensura scilicet eternitatis cum C. 23. et deest D. 25, 26. non existere — non existere deest BD. 27. quod deest B; ib. mundus non BD. 28. after falsum: ſ = scilicet D. 33. et in pro 20. ſua' pro sui D. eciam ceco B; ib. metaphysica D. 36. E8se 34. aliqui deest D). deest D. 37. eterna deest D.
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232 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. VIII. mundum non existere pro mensura eternitatis. Nota tamen quod est dare quotlibet veritates disiunctivarum con- tingencium, que eternaliter sunt. Et tamen nec semper est una pars, nec altera semper nec in omni instanti temporis. Questio est talis: veritas absolute necessaria est vel affirmacio vel negacio; ut semper est, me scribere vel non scribere. Sequitur ergo quod idem est iudicium de omni significato disiunctive ex contradictoriis, cuius pars affirmativa significat veritatem temporalem. Unde isti termini: numquam, aliquando, sicud et isti termini, semper et nunc, sic significant, ut nunc est ita quod ego nascor, nec umquam erit ita quod non nascor; ideo veritates disiunctive distingwuntur veritate alterius partis. Per hoc ad secundum argumentum conceditur quod deus scit hunc mundum pro aliqua mensura non existere; sed mundum pro data mensura non existere non est aliquid non existere, licet sit aliquod non existere tunc. Et ita conceditur, cum beato Augustino et precipuis doctoribus, quod omnis creatura habet esse intelligibile deo coeternum, cum formaliter sequitur: deus wult, cognoscit et intelligit hoc esse, quodcunque fuerit: ergo Whatever God hoc est. Et antecedens est verum de omni possibili, knows, is by ergo et consequens. Ideo, sicud alias declaravi, omne the fact of His knowledge; quod potest esse, est; sicud omne quod deus potest yet God may know me as cognoscere, cognoscit. Et tamen filius meus potest esse 25 having a son, et non esse, sicud et deus potest cognoscere me non without that son's actually sedere vel dampnari; et tamen non cognoscit sic: ut existing. God's eternal declaratum est in materia de ydeis. Conceditur igitur knowledge of quod me non existere coeternum cum deo est absolute my non- existence is not necessarium cum esse meo intelligibili coeternum. Sed 30 a negation, but a true vision, hoc non est, nec potest esse, negacio existencie mee, corresponding sed est veritas quam deus absolute et necessario vidit, to the time when I do not et me non existente, videt illam: me non existere. Me exist. autem existente, eternaliter intuetur, cognoscendo me To my eternally existere, et non cognoscendo me tum existere, sed 35 intelligible being may be cognoscendo me non esse sibi coeternum, cui potest added the fact accidere quod non existo, sed esse meo intelligibili potest of temporal existence, as a happening. Such a disjunctive truth, with one part modified by the idea of time, requires that the other part should be modified likewise. That God knows when the world does not exist does not imply its absolute non-existence. 10 15 20 1. non pro nota D. 2. est deest D. 5. que D. 7. medium A. 13. alicuius A; 8, 9. una pars, scilicet BD. 12. vmq A; ib. est AC. 14. tercium ABC; ib. argumentum deest AC. ib. partis cum sit BD. 17. ipsum pro aliquid BD; ib. ipsum pro aliquod BD. 20. indicat pro 25. meus deest ABC. 26. et after sicud wult A. 22. hoc deest D. deest AC. 27. dampnare AC. 30. coevum B. 31. sed pro nec AC. 32. est deest D. 33. videndo AC; ib. illam deest BD. 34. cognoscente ACD. 37. pro intelligibili D. 35. non or nunc? pro tum BC; non D.
232 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. VIII. mundum non existere pro mensura eternitatis. Nota tamen quod est dare quotlibet veritates disiunctivarum con- tingencium, que eternaliter sunt. Et tamen nec semper est una pars, nec altera semper nec in omni instanti temporis. Questio est talis: veritas absolute necessaria est vel affirmacio vel negacio; ut semper est, me scribere vel non scribere. Sequitur ergo quod idem est iudicium de omni significato disiunctive ex contradictoriis, cuius pars affirmativa significat veritatem temporalem. Unde isti termini: numquam, aliquando, sicud et isti termini, semper et nunc, sic significant, ut nunc est ita quod ego nascor, nec umquam erit ita quod non nascor; ideo veritates disiunctive distingwuntur veritate alterius partis. Per hoc ad secundum argumentum conceditur quod deus scit hunc mundum pro aliqua mensura non existere; sed mundum pro data mensura non existere non est aliquid non existere, licet sit aliquod non existere tunc. Et ita conceditur, cum beato Augustino et precipuis doctoribus, quod omnis creatura habet esse intelligibile deo coeternum, cum formaliter sequitur: deus wult, cognoscit et intelligit hoc esse, quodcunque fuerit: ergo Whatever God hoc est. Et antecedens est verum de omni possibili, knows, is by ergo et consequens. Ideo, sicud alias declaravi, omne the fact of His knowledge; quod potest esse, est; sicud omne quod deus potest yet God may know me as cognoscere, cognoscit. Et tamen filius meus potest esse 25 having a son, et non esse, sicud et deus potest cognoscere me non without that son's actually sedere vel dampnari; et tamen non cognoscit sic: ut existing. God's eternal declaratum est in materia de ydeis. Conceditur igitur knowledge of quod me non existere coeternum cum deo est absolute my non- existence is not necessarium cum esse meo intelligibili coeternum. Sed 30 a negation, but a true vision, hoc non est, nec potest esse, negacio existencie mee, corresponding sed est veritas quam deus absolute et necessario vidit, to the time when I do not et me non existente, videt illam: me non existere. Me exist. autem existente, eternaliter intuetur, cognoscendo me To my eternally existere, et non cognoscendo me tum existere, sed 35 intelligible being may be cognoscendo me non esse sibi coeternum, cui potest added the fact accidere quod non existo, sed esse meo intelligibili potest of temporal existence, as a happening. Such a disjunctive truth, with one part modified by the idea of time, requires that the other part should be modified likewise. That God knows when the world does not exist does not imply its absolute non-existence. 10 15 20 1. non pro nota D. 2. est deest D. 5. que D. 7. medium A. 13. alicuius A; 8, 9. una pars, scilicet BD. 12. vmq A; ib. est AC. 14. tercium ABC; ib. argumentum deest AC. ib. partis cum sit BD. 17. ipsum pro aliquid BD; ib. ipsum pro aliquod BD. 20. indicat pro 25. meus deest ABC. 26. et after sicud wult A. 22. hoc deest D. deest AC. 27. dampnare AC. 30. coevum B. 31. sed pro nec AC. 32. est deest D. 33. videndo AC; ib. illam deest BD. 34. cognoscente ACD. 37. pro intelligibili D. 35. non or nunc? pro tum BC; non D.
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A 74 15 CAP. VIII. accidere quod existo. Et sicud deus non aliud cognoscit cognoscendo me existere, nec perfeccius hoc intuendo quam cognosceret noscendo me noticia simplicis apprehen- sionis; sic nec aliud cognoscit, cognoscendo me non esse secum coeternum, et cum hoc cognoscendo] me existere. Unde sicud est fallacia accidentis: "Omnem hominem quem cognovi, nunc cognosco: Sortem album cognovi; ergo Sortem album nunc cognosco": sic hec est fallacia accidentis: “Omne quod potest deus cog- 10 noscere cognoscit; filium meum potest cognoscere, ergo filium meum cognoscit; tunc illum qui est filius meus, cognoscit, et per consequens ille habet existenciam in genere extra deum." Sic enim inplicat predicatum spe- cialem existenciam creature in proprio genere; ut patet in materia de ydeis. Verumtamen ex talibus premissis concluditur verissime necessarium isto modo: "Omne quod potest deus cognoscere, cognoscit; hoc potest cog- noscere (demonstrando illum qui potest esse filius meus); igitur illum cognoscit." Sed silogizando expresse in 20 terminis accidentalibus, oportet sic capere in minore: * Filius meus est aliquid quod deus potest cognoscere, et cetera. Unde intelligitur quod filium meum cognoscit; quia, data minori, sequitur quod habeo filium. Et cor- respondenter ad omnes tales evidencias: 'Omne quod 25 potest esse, est; filius meus potest esse, igitur filius meus est;" non sequitur, quia vel oportet in minori capere quod filius meus est aliquid quod potest esse; vel aliter, demonstrando pronomine illud qui potest esse filius meus, vere concluditur quod hoc est. Quod est 3o necessarium, quia habet esse intelligibile; sed falsum est quod filius meus habet esse intelligibile, quia tunc ille qui hic esset filius meus habet esse intelligibile, etsi alius est filius meus; tunc habet formalem existenciam in genere extra deum; ut patet ex grammatica subtili 35 antiquorum doctorum in ista materia. Et correspondenter dicitur ad istum tércium para- loysmum. "Omne quod potest deus cognoscere, cog- That God knows my son as existing, since He can know him as such, is a fallacia accidentis. God knows my son as possibly existing; or if I am to have a son, as existing at some future time. Other similar fallacies are answered in like manner. DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 233 "God, who knows all that is possible, therefore knows that I am not teaching now 4. sic enim E: sicud 1, 2. cognoscendo me — noscendo me deest D. enim A; ib. alid C. 6. hoc est BD. 7. quem deest D. 8. est hic B. 10. medium D. 14. essenciam ABD. 19. illud B; ib. silodo A; ib. ex- presse deest D. 22. cetera deest D; ib. Et tunc bene infertur quod BCD; 23. heo A. 24. tales pro omnes BDE; deest AC; ib. ib. meum deest D. evide'as A. 26. vel deest B. 28. meo pronomine AC; ib. illud quod A. 3o. habet deest D); ib. esse deest D. 30 - 32. intelligibile — intelligibile 31. quia si B. deest A. 36. istum deest BCD. 32. quia before etsi D.
A 74 15 CAP. VIII. accidere quod existo. Et sicud deus non aliud cognoscit cognoscendo me existere, nec perfeccius hoc intuendo quam cognosceret noscendo me noticia simplicis apprehen- sionis; sic nec aliud cognoscit, cognoscendo me non esse secum coeternum, et cum hoc cognoscendo] me existere. Unde sicud est fallacia accidentis: "Omnem hominem quem cognovi, nunc cognosco: Sortem album cognovi; ergo Sortem album nunc cognosco": sic hec est fallacia accidentis: “Omne quod potest deus cog- 10 noscere cognoscit; filium meum potest cognoscere, ergo filium meum cognoscit; tunc illum qui est filius meus, cognoscit, et per consequens ille habet existenciam in genere extra deum." Sic enim inplicat predicatum spe- cialem existenciam creature in proprio genere; ut patet in materia de ydeis. Verumtamen ex talibus premissis concluditur verissime necessarium isto modo: "Omne quod potest deus cognoscere, cognoscit; hoc potest cog- noscere (demonstrando illum qui potest esse filius meus); igitur illum cognoscit." Sed silogizando expresse in 20 terminis accidentalibus, oportet sic capere in minore: * Filius meus est aliquid quod deus potest cognoscere, et cetera. Unde intelligitur quod filium meum cognoscit; quia, data minori, sequitur quod habeo filium. Et cor- respondenter ad omnes tales evidencias: 'Omne quod 25 potest esse, est; filius meus potest esse, igitur filius meus est;" non sequitur, quia vel oportet in minori capere quod filius meus est aliquid quod potest esse; vel aliter, demonstrando pronomine illud qui potest esse filius meus, vere concluditur quod hoc est. Quod est 3o necessarium, quia habet esse intelligibile; sed falsum est quod filius meus habet esse intelligibile, quia tunc ille qui hic esset filius meus habet esse intelligibile, etsi alius est filius meus; tunc habet formalem existenciam in genere extra deum; ut patet ex grammatica subtili 35 antiquorum doctorum in ista materia. Et correspondenter dicitur ad istum tércium para- loysmum. "Omne quod potest deus cognoscere, cog- That God knows my son as existing, since He can know him as such, is a fallacia accidentis. God knows my son as possibly existing; or if I am to have a son, as existing at some future time. Other similar fallacies are answered in like manner. DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 233 "God, who knows all that is possible, therefore knows that I am not teaching now 4. sic enim E: sicud 1, 2. cognoscendo me — noscendo me deest D. enim A; ib. alid C. 6. hoc est BD. 7. quem deest D. 8. est hic B. 10. medium D. 14. essenciam ABD. 19. illud B; ib. silodo A; ib. ex- presse deest D. 22. cetera deest D; ib. Et tunc bene infertur quod BCD; 23. heo A. 24. tales pro omnes BDE; deest AC; ib. ib. meum deest D. evide'as A. 26. vel deest B. 28. meo pronomine AC; ib. illud quod A. 3o. habet deest D); ib. esse deest D. 30 - 32. intelligibile — intelligibile 31. quia si B. deest A. 36. istum deest BCD. 32. quia before etsi D.
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234 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. VIII. If my not noscit; me non docere potest deus cognoscere; igitur teaching were a me non docere cognoscit." Hoc non sequitur, sed oportet fact, the inference would in minori capere quod me non docere est veritas quam be valid; as it stands, it is deus potest cognoscere, et tunc formaliter ex falso si- worthless, logizatur ad falsum; vel absolute capiendo sic: "Omne 5 unless we understand by quod potest deus cognoscere, cognoscit: hoc potest deus my not teaching now cognoscere (demonstrando illud quod potest esse me the mere possibility of non docere), ergo hoc deus cognoscit, quod est absolute such a thing; necessarium, sicut me esse intellectum a deo est absolute God knows me necessarium, cui potest accidere quod scit me existere; not to be teaching, et sic de qualibet creatura. Sic ergo doctrinam meam supposing that I do not teach. non esse deo coeternam est veritas absolute necessaria, God does not see that which cui potest accidere quod scit me non docere, posito is not, but He quod non doceam. Et talis veritas est racio vel exemplar sees it to be possible; and quod deus necessario videt, et videndo illud quod est the fact of His seeing it only essencialiter divina essencia, videt omnes creaturas, si when it exists sint in tempore suo; sed si non sint, non videt illas does not argue a change in intuitive, sed videt illas posse esse, et de causato, licet Him, since He is present in all non in esse creato. Nec est color in illo: Si deus non time. intuetur illum hominem, et potest intueri illum hominem, 20 quod potest incipere vel desinere; sicud non sequitur in suo convertibili: Si deus non ordinat illum hominem esse et potest ordinare illum esse, tunc potest incipere vel desinere sic ordinare. Omnes enim creaturas, quan- What is possible, but tumlibet remotas, preteritas vel futuras deus intuetur, 25 never exists, is known by Him, quia sunt in tempore suo; et solum deus intuetur. not in its existing, but in Alias autem possibiles, que non existunt in tempore its possible suo, cognoscit noticia simplicis apprehensionis, de A 74" essence. quando cognoscit ista habere esse intelligibile, et posse existere, ut docet sanctus Thomas prima parte summe, 30 questione 14a, articulo 9°, et primo contra gentiles, 66°. 10 15 1. non before docere deest D; ib. si pro sed A. 4, 5. sequitur aliud BD. 5. capiendo deest BD. 6. deus deest BD. 8. deus non D. 9, 10. necessarium — necessarium deest A; at top of page B. 11. ergo deest AC. 15. before deus qua B; quam D. 17. before in fiunt AB; 18. tanto CD. 19. creature BD. ib. sed si non sint deest AC. 20. possit B.. 21. sic intueri D. 22. suo deest D; ib. hominem deest A. 23. illum hominem A; ib. quod pro tunc BD. 27. autem et ACD. 31. 34 B; 24 D; ib. after 66° D runs on 31. ut pro et AC; in C. without even a blank space for the initial. In fine cap. in marg. Rosumyeg. in red ink. 30. Sum. Theol. 1° Pars, qu. XIV, 9 in corpore articuli. De Veritate Catholicae Fidei, 1. I, c. 66. "Quod Deus cognoscit ea quae non sunt."
234 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. VIII. If my not noscit; me non docere potest deus cognoscere; igitur teaching were a me non docere cognoscit." Hoc non sequitur, sed oportet fact, the inference would in minori capere quod me non docere est veritas quam be valid; as it stands, it is deus potest cognoscere, et tunc formaliter ex falso si- worthless, logizatur ad falsum; vel absolute capiendo sic: "Omne 5 unless we understand by quod potest deus cognoscere, cognoscit: hoc potest deus my not teaching now cognoscere (demonstrando illud quod potest esse me the mere possibility of non docere), ergo hoc deus cognoscit, quod est absolute such a thing; necessarium, sicut me esse intellectum a deo est absolute God knows me necessarium, cui potest accidere quod scit me existere; not to be teaching, et sic de qualibet creatura. Sic ergo doctrinam meam supposing that I do not teach. non esse deo coeternam est veritas absolute necessaria, God does not see that which cui potest accidere quod scit me non docere, posito is not, but He quod non doceam. Et talis veritas est racio vel exemplar sees it to be possible; and quod deus necessario videt, et videndo illud quod est the fact of His seeing it only essencialiter divina essencia, videt omnes creaturas, si when it exists sint in tempore suo; sed si non sint, non videt illas does not argue a change in intuitive, sed videt illas posse esse, et de causato, licet Him, since He is present in all non in esse creato. Nec est color in illo: Si deus non time. intuetur illum hominem, et potest intueri illum hominem, 20 quod potest incipere vel desinere; sicud non sequitur in suo convertibili: Si deus non ordinat illum hominem esse et potest ordinare illum esse, tunc potest incipere vel desinere sic ordinare. Omnes enim creaturas, quan- What is possible, but tumlibet remotas, preteritas vel futuras deus intuetur, 25 never exists, is known by Him, quia sunt in tempore suo; et solum deus intuetur. not in its existing, but in Alias autem possibiles, que non existunt in tempore its possible suo, cognoscit noticia simplicis apprehensionis, de A 74" essence. quando cognoscit ista habere esse intelligibile, et posse existere, ut docet sanctus Thomas prima parte summe, 30 questione 14a, articulo 9°, et primo contra gentiles, 66°. 10 15 1. non before docere deest D; ib. si pro sed A. 4, 5. sequitur aliud BD. 5. capiendo deest BD. 6. deus deest BD. 8. deus non D. 9, 10. necessarium — necessarium deest A; at top of page B. 11. ergo deest AC. 15. before deus qua B; quam D. 17. before in fiunt AB; 18. tanto CD. 19. creature BD. ib. sed si non sint deest AC. 20. possit B.. 21. sic intueri D. 22. suo deest D; ib. hominem deest A. 23. illum hominem A; ib. quod pro tunc BD. 27. autem et ACD. 31. 34 B; 24 D; ib. after 66° D runs on 31. ut pro et AC; in C. without even a blank space for the initial. In fine cap. in marg. Rosumyeg. in red ink. 30. Sum. Theol. 1° Pars, qu. XIV, 9 in corpore articuli. De Veritate Catholicae Fidei, 1. I, c. 66. "Quod Deus cognoscit ea quae non sunt."
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CAP. IX. DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 235 CAPITULUM NONUM. Sed contra hec instatur tripliciter. Primo, videtur quod quelibet creatura sit deo coeterna: et per con- sequens multe sunt substancie coeterne. Nam quelibet 5 creatura eternaliter habet esse intelligibile; et de quanto habet esse intelligibile, est. Ergo eternaliter est, et per consequens est eterna. Et per consequens sequitur omnem creaturam semper fuisse et semper fore, et per consequens esse sempiternam. Nam quandocunque ali- 10 quid habuit vel habebit esse intelligibile, tunc habet vel habuit esse. Sed quelibet creatura semper habet in- telligibile esse, ergo semper habet esse. Tercio, ex eodem sequitur quod possibile est intuitum a deo, quia secundum esse intelligibile est vita eterna et illa est intuita a deo; igitur, et hoc est intuitum a deo, et per idem sequitur quod hoc idem habet esse existere, quia hoc est vita eterna, et ipsa habet esse existere. Igitur, hoc habet existenciam. Pro solucione istorum, oportet supponere grammaticam 20 et loycam sanctorum doctorum, quam eliciunt ex scriptura; primo, quod pronomina et termini transcendentes signi- ficant mere essencias sine connotacione specialis quali- tatis aut forme substancialis vel accidentalis. Patet illud ex dictis superius. Secundo supponitur quod nomina per se vel per accidens in genere connotant qualitatem, vel racionem generis, secundum quam creatura nata est existere extra deum. Tercio, supponitur ampliacio huius verbi, esse, ad hec Also that to be, is said either of 3o tria, scilicet, esse intelligibile, esse possibile, et esse in anything thinkable, of actuali existere, cum dicitur quasi extra sistere: quod the Possible, or of what actually dictum esse actuale, quod esse habent creature extra exists; deum, et deus extra intellectum creatum. In deo autem possibility and existence being omnino est idem esse et existere, cum intelligibilitas one and the 35 aut potencia in eo non precedit actum. E contra tamen same in God. Three further objections. (1) Every creature would be coëternal with God, on account of its intelligible being. (2) Every being consequently would last for ever. (3) And this being would moreover have actual existence. To answer these, note first that pronouns and transcendental terms mean nothing but the essence without denoting any form whatever. Then, that all other nouns indicate a genus. 15 25 1. Capitulum nonum deest; initial S in red ink A. 2. hec instatur deest B; instatur deest D; ib. primo deest BD. 7. idem pro conse- quens B. 9. sempiternum AC; ib. quantumcunque B; non quam- cunque D. 10, 11. esse — esse deest D. 13-14. a deo -- a deo deest AD ; ib. secundum esse intelligibile deest C. 25. suppono BD. 29. est 31. actu AC. 30. pole potee = potenciale potencie BD. BD. 32. dicit B; ib cuiusmodi pro quod esse BD. 35. autem BD.
CAP. IX. DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 235 CAPITULUM NONUM. Sed contra hec instatur tripliciter. Primo, videtur quod quelibet creatura sit deo coeterna: et per con- sequens multe sunt substancie coeterne. Nam quelibet 5 creatura eternaliter habet esse intelligibile; et de quanto habet esse intelligibile, est. Ergo eternaliter est, et per consequens est eterna. Et per consequens sequitur omnem creaturam semper fuisse et semper fore, et per consequens esse sempiternam. Nam quandocunque ali- 10 quid habuit vel habebit esse intelligibile, tunc habet vel habuit esse. Sed quelibet creatura semper habet in- telligibile esse, ergo semper habet esse. Tercio, ex eodem sequitur quod possibile est intuitum a deo, quia secundum esse intelligibile est vita eterna et illa est intuita a deo; igitur, et hoc est intuitum a deo, et per idem sequitur quod hoc idem habet esse existere, quia hoc est vita eterna, et ipsa habet esse existere. Igitur, hoc habet existenciam. Pro solucione istorum, oportet supponere grammaticam 20 et loycam sanctorum doctorum, quam eliciunt ex scriptura; primo, quod pronomina et termini transcendentes signi- ficant mere essencias sine connotacione specialis quali- tatis aut forme substancialis vel accidentalis. Patet illud ex dictis superius. Secundo supponitur quod nomina per se vel per accidens in genere connotant qualitatem, vel racionem generis, secundum quam creatura nata est existere extra deum. Tercio, supponitur ampliacio huius verbi, esse, ad hec Also that to be, is said either of 3o tria, scilicet, esse intelligibile, esse possibile, et esse in anything thinkable, of actuali existere, cum dicitur quasi extra sistere: quod the Possible, or of what actually dictum esse actuale, quod esse habent creature extra exists; deum, et deus extra intellectum creatum. In deo autem possibility and existence being omnino est idem esse et existere, cum intelligibilitas one and the 35 aut potencia in eo non precedit actum. E contra tamen same in God. Three further objections. (1) Every creature would be coëternal with God, on account of its intelligible being. (2) Every being consequently would last for ever. (3) And this being would moreover have actual existence. To answer these, note first that pronouns and transcendental terms mean nothing but the essence without denoting any form whatever. Then, that all other nouns indicate a genus. 15 25 1. Capitulum nonum deest; initial S in red ink A. 2. hec instatur deest B; instatur deest D; ib. primo deest BD. 7. idem pro conse- quens B. 9. sempiternum AC; ib. quantumcunque B; non quam- cunque D. 10, 11. esse — esse deest D. 13-14. a deo -- a deo deest AD ; ib. secundum esse intelligibile deest C. 25. suppono BD. 29. est 31. actu AC. 30. pole potee = potenciale potencie BD. BD. 32. dicit B; ib cuiusmodi pro quod esse BD. 35. autem BD.
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236 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. IX. in creaturis est, cum prius naturaliter intelligibiles sunt et possibiles, quam actualiter existant. Hiis tribus habitis de noticia grammatica, capiendum est de loyca quod termini denotantes qualitatem vel racionem generis subiecti huic verbo, est (illimitati5 aliunde) vel cuicunque verbo ipso inferiori, supponunt pro actuali existencia sui significati. Ut sic dicendo, et Filius meus est", vel “Homo est talis" denotatur quod talis res habet existenciam racione limitati subiecti connotantis formam qua res habet esse in genere. E 10 contra autem, supposito pronomine vel termino trans- cendente, eo quod ipsum mere significat essenciam, sine connotacione huiusmodi racionis. Ex istis patet quod prima conclusio sit inpossibilis, The first conclusion is cum nulla creatura sit eterna secundum racionem qua 15 therefore impossible, creatura est. Eterna dico simpliciter, sine principio vel since no fine; quia si esset sic eterna, tunc esset deus; et per con- creature, as such, is eternal sequens, cum subiectum limitat predicatum ad existenciam if it were, it would be in genere proprio, sequitur quod non sit aliqua existencia identical with rei in proprio genere, sed quelibet foret existencia 20 God, who alone is divina. Tantum ergo est una substancia vel essencia vel everlasting, and natura eterna, que deus est, in qua sunt quotlibet ra- has in Himself the exemplars ciones exemplares et veritates eterne, que omnes sunt of all that is, which. idem essencialiter cum essencia divina, licet distinguantur essencially God formaliter invicem et a deo. are formally distinct from Inveniuntur autem quotlibet dicta sanctorum doctorum Him and each other. concedencium quod quelibet creatura habet esse in- Many doctors admit that the telligibile] eternum, et est vita eterna in deo, et sic A 75- intelligible deus. Et sic intelligunt ipsam secundum esse intelligibile. being of creâtures lives Alii autem non admittunt quamlibet creaturam esse 30 cternally in deum, propter limitacionem subiecti ad existenciam God. Others, limiting creature; sed cum termino mere denominante essenciam the word creature to one sine tali racione alicuius decem generum. Unde con- of the ten categories, cedunt omnia que possunt existere, esse; et cum modi- deny, this, but ficacione concedunt omnia secundum esse intelligibile 35 grant that everything is esse deum; ut omne quod factum est erat vita in deo, God, as to its mere intelligible licet nulla substancia, qualitas aut alia creatura fuit being, though this intelligible vita ista. Sed quelibet creatura secundum esse intelligibile So far as regards grammar. We must also note that when to be is employed without any modifying, it means actual existence; when modified, it signifies mere intelligibility. 25 3. notata AC. 4. connotantes C. 5. racione D; ib. illicite A. 6. in singulari A. 8. etc. pro talis BD; et C. 9. habeat B; ib. limi- I1. supponenta A. tantis ABD; ib. subiectis BD. 10. 9nons D. 14. est C. 16. deo BD. 17. sit pro esset sic 12. ipse A; ipsa BD. AC; et sic C; ib. esset pro est AC. 18. cum deest BD. 23. ex res 28. sic sit BD. 29. eam B; bene C. 32. con- AC. 25. et deest AC. notante BD ; denotante C. 36. omne pro esse A. 37. quantitas et ABC. 38. sicud pro sed BCD.
236 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. IX. in creaturis est, cum prius naturaliter intelligibiles sunt et possibiles, quam actualiter existant. Hiis tribus habitis de noticia grammatica, capiendum est de loyca quod termini denotantes qualitatem vel racionem generis subiecti huic verbo, est (illimitati5 aliunde) vel cuicunque verbo ipso inferiori, supponunt pro actuali existencia sui significati. Ut sic dicendo, et Filius meus est", vel “Homo est talis" denotatur quod talis res habet existenciam racione limitati subiecti connotantis formam qua res habet esse in genere. E 10 contra autem, supposito pronomine vel termino trans- cendente, eo quod ipsum mere significat essenciam, sine connotacione huiusmodi racionis. Ex istis patet quod prima conclusio sit inpossibilis, The first conclusion is cum nulla creatura sit eterna secundum racionem qua 15 therefore impossible, creatura est. Eterna dico simpliciter, sine principio vel since no fine; quia si esset sic eterna, tunc esset deus; et per con- creature, as such, is eternal sequens, cum subiectum limitat predicatum ad existenciam if it were, it would be in genere proprio, sequitur quod non sit aliqua existencia identical with rei in proprio genere, sed quelibet foret existencia 20 God, who alone is divina. Tantum ergo est una substancia vel essencia vel everlasting, and natura eterna, que deus est, in qua sunt quotlibet ra- has in Himself the exemplars ciones exemplares et veritates eterne, que omnes sunt of all that is, which. idem essencialiter cum essencia divina, licet distinguantur essencially God formaliter invicem et a deo. are formally distinct from Inveniuntur autem quotlibet dicta sanctorum doctorum Him and each other. concedencium quod quelibet creatura habet esse in- Many doctors admit that the telligibile] eternum, et est vita eterna in deo, et sic A 75- intelligible deus. Et sic intelligunt ipsam secundum esse intelligibile. being of creâtures lives Alii autem non admittunt quamlibet creaturam esse 30 cternally in deum, propter limitacionem subiecti ad existenciam God. Others, limiting creature; sed cum termino mere denominante essenciam the word creature to one sine tali racione alicuius decem generum. Unde con- of the ten categories, cedunt omnia que possunt existere, esse; et cum modi- deny, this, but ficacione concedunt omnia secundum esse intelligibile 35 grant that everything is esse deum; ut omne quod factum est erat vita in deo, God, as to its mere intelligible licet nulla substancia, qualitas aut alia creatura fuit being, though this intelligible vita ista. Sed quelibet creatura secundum esse intelligibile So far as regards grammar. We must also note that when to be is employed without any modifying, it means actual existence; when modified, it signifies mere intelligibility. 25 3. notata AC. 4. connotantes C. 5. racione D; ib. illicite A. 6. in singulari A. 8. etc. pro talis BD; et C. 9. habeat B; ib. limi- I1. supponenta A. tantis ABD; ib. subiectis BD. 10. 9nons D. 14. est C. 16. deo BD. 17. sit pro esset sic 12. ipse A; ipsa BD. AC; et sic C; ib. esset pro est AC. 18. cum deest BD. 23. ex res 28. sic sit BD. 29. eam B; bene C. 32. con- AC. 25. et deest AC. notante BD ; denotante C. 36. omne pro esse A. 37. quantitas et ABC. 38. sicud pro sed BCD.
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DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 237 CAP. IX. est vita ista; et ex hoc non sequitur quod quelibet being, living in God, is not creatura est illa vita propter equivocacionem ex nomi- identical with any creature. nacione termini limitantis subiectum et varie supponen- It were false to dum Et sic negatur prima consequencia: Quelibet infer that every 5 creatura habet eternaliter esse intelligibile, et de quanto creature is eternal, though habet esse intelligibile, de tanto est; igitur quelibet we may infer that every creatura est eterna, vel eternaliter est." Bene tamen creature is (in sequitur ex dictis premissis quod quelibet creatura est. God). Conceditur tamen quecunque creatura demonstrata et 10 mere intellecta sine connotacione racionis creature, quod hoc est eternaliter, et per consequens hoc est ad intra deus. Et si queritur quid demonstro, dicitur quod ra- cionem exemplarem, in deo, secundum quam deus est productivus huius creature; et per consequens deum ac 15 istam creaturam, si ipsa aliquando est: Unde, hic est notanda fallacia: “Illa racio est deus, et illa racio est hec creatura: igitur hec creatura est deus." Et istam loycam innuit nobis beatus loh. conclusione Analysis of the text of St. John. octava sui libri, dicens quod factum est in ipso vita He uses the term. That 20 erat". Ponit autem terminum significantem multum, which, the most general of indubie propter notandum misterium, et simpliciter ad all, to indicate denotandum quod omnia facta a deo sunt universitas, the mere essence of una creata. created things, abstracting Addit autem terminum .... . .... ad mere intelligen- from all the 25 dum ea et ad sciendum raciones vitales quas habent rest; and also to in deo, seclusa racione proprii generis; et ad denotandum denote substance, quod prius naturaliter sunt substancie quam accidencia; which in its ut homo naturaliter prius est essencia quam est homo nature is prior to the accidents vel substancia, ut patet ex dictis de informitate materie that it underlies. 3o et cuiuslibet alterius creature. Sic enim essencia creature precedit suum esse. Et tercio, ad limitandum quod universitas die septimo est completa in genere proprio, addit particulum pre- What is that which is eternal ? The patterns of all creatures; that is, God as the principle of all things. The past tense (factum est) is used to imply 2, 3. ex nominacione deest D. 6. de tanto deest AC. 7. eterna- liter BD. 8. dictis deest BD. 11. pducts A ; ib. huiusmodi before si B. 15. si ipsa aliquando est deest AC. 21. quia simplicem; corr. in marg. B. 22. omnia ista BD; ib. a deo deest D): ib. unitas ACD; in marg. B. 23. creatura BC. 24. terminum deest D; after terminum a blank space for two words A; ib. mitu = intellectum BD; multu CE; above scilicet hoc pronomen est qnod: in marg. quia 2m dicta prius pronomina signi- ficant mere essenciam etc. C. 28. naturaliter deest D; ib. est deest AC. 32. medio D. 31. recedit D. 24. The marginal notes in C lead me to conjecture that the gap should be filled by the words significantem multum. Wyelif evidently alludes to quod factum est.
DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 237 CAP. IX. est vita ista; et ex hoc non sequitur quod quelibet being, living in God, is not creatura est illa vita propter equivocacionem ex nomi- identical with any creature. nacione termini limitantis subiectum et varie supponen- It were false to dum Et sic negatur prima consequencia: Quelibet infer that every 5 creatura habet eternaliter esse intelligibile, et de quanto creature is eternal, though habet esse intelligibile, de tanto est; igitur quelibet we may infer that every creatura est eterna, vel eternaliter est." Bene tamen creature is (in sequitur ex dictis premissis quod quelibet creatura est. God). Conceditur tamen quecunque creatura demonstrata et 10 mere intellecta sine connotacione racionis creature, quod hoc est eternaliter, et per consequens hoc est ad intra deus. Et si queritur quid demonstro, dicitur quod ra- cionem exemplarem, in deo, secundum quam deus est productivus huius creature; et per consequens deum ac 15 istam creaturam, si ipsa aliquando est: Unde, hic est notanda fallacia: “Illa racio est deus, et illa racio est hec creatura: igitur hec creatura est deus." Et istam loycam innuit nobis beatus loh. conclusione Analysis of the text of St. John. octava sui libri, dicens quod factum est in ipso vita He uses the term. That 20 erat". Ponit autem terminum significantem multum, which, the most general of indubie propter notandum misterium, et simpliciter ad all, to indicate denotandum quod omnia facta a deo sunt universitas, the mere essence of una creata. created things, abstracting Addit autem terminum .... . .... ad mere intelligen- from all the 25 dum ea et ad sciendum raciones vitales quas habent rest; and also to in deo, seclusa racione proprii generis; et ad denotandum denote substance, quod prius naturaliter sunt substancie quam accidencia; which in its ut homo naturaliter prius est essencia quam est homo nature is prior to the accidents vel substancia, ut patet ex dictis de informitate materie that it underlies. 3o et cuiuslibet alterius creature. Sic enim essencia creature precedit suum esse. Et tercio, ad limitandum quod universitas die septimo est completa in genere proprio, addit particulum pre- What is that which is eternal ? The patterns of all creatures; that is, God as the principle of all things. The past tense (factum est) is used to imply 2, 3. ex nominacione deest D. 6. de tanto deest AC. 7. eterna- liter BD. 8. dictis deest BD. 11. pducts A ; ib. huiusmodi before si B. 15. si ipsa aliquando est deest AC. 21. quia simplicem; corr. in marg. B. 22. omnia ista BD; ib. a deo deest D): ib. unitas ACD; in marg. B. 23. creatura BC. 24. terminum deest D; after terminum a blank space for two words A; ib. mitu = intellectum BD; multu CE; above scilicet hoc pronomen est qnod: in marg. quia 2m dicta prius pronomina signi- ficant mere essenciam etc. C. 28. naturaliter deest D; ib. est deest AC. 32. medio D. 31. recedit D. 24. The marginal notes in C lead me to conjecture that the gap should be filled by the words significantem multum. Wyelif evidently alludes to quod factum est.
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238 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. IX. the completed teriti temporis. Sic enim specificat Aristoteles (primo work of creation. physicorum) inter fieri et factum esse. Et quarto, ad exprimendum dicte universitatis esse Life, not indeed the limited life intelligibile, addit beatus Joh. ewangelista. “In ipso vita of things existing apart erat"; non dicit in proprio genere, sed secundum esse5 from God, but Divine Life intelligibile, quod habet in ipso verbo, vita erat. Et itself — God signanter addit vita, nam inpossibile est agens aliquid knowing His creatures — is ad extra producere secundum proporcionalem racionem, employed with great ut corpora animata habent eis insitam vim, secundum significancy. quam possunt per applicacionem ad passum producere 10 Animals are sibi simile. Inanimata autem vegetabilia, ut herbe et able to arbores, habent in se raciones seminales secundum reproduce their like, quas possunt per se et per influencias celestes producere and plants also, sibi similia, ut patet de constantibus seminalibus que but they all require some producunt vivencia vita sibi simili; possunt et per se 15 extrinsic determination ; decidere semen liquidum et devinare in ipsum virtutem informativam, secundum quam sibi similem in specie producatur. Omnia tamen ista oportet moveri ab extrinseco ad actum generacionis; et cum non possit esse processus in infinitum ] patet quod est devenire ad unum principium generans omnia ad extra producta; quod est deus. Et cum ipse ordinate et per consequens intelligendo hec omnia producit, est tam proporcionalis sibi quam productis. Sibi autem non esset proporcionale, si esset accidens distinctum, ut virtus informativa vel 25 racio seminalis. Nec potest dici pars dei, cum ipse sit omnino indivisibilis; ideo relinquitur quod sit racio solum dicens essenciam que deus est. Et cum sit racio universe creature specialiter attendendo ad generalitatem creaturarum vitalium, in quibus sunt expressius huius-30 modi raciones, et ad modum essendi dei producentis, non cogitabitur terminus apcior quo exprimetur racio eterna in deo secundum quam producit universitatem ad extra, quam iste terminus, vita. Sicud ergo homo fuit semen in lumbis patrum et quodlibet productum a 35 causa secunda habet esse potenciale in illa, sic esse productum ad extra a causa prima oportet habere esse God alone does this by Himself, not adding to Himself any accidental form, nor dividing His indivisibile nature into parts; thus this generation of exemplars is simply the Divine essence, and no better term can be found for it than life ; the cternal actuality of creatures in God's thought, A 75b 1. falso pro sic AD; ib. specat A. 5. quod in ABC. 8. ad deest AC. 9. habent deest BD. 11. similem ACD. 13. per deest B. 15. vine? A; ib. vita sensibili BC; ib. ponunt AD. 14. seminali D. . 16. devinae' A; divinare BD (diua'e?); derrua'e C (derivare?) 19. in- trinseco B; ib. potest D. 21. generacionis generans C. 22. ipso E; ib. ordinante B; et deesi; per quem B; ib. perfecte C; p q E. 26. cum 27. sit ſp dare C; ib. racionem ACD. ipse sit deest A. 26. est C. 34, 35. non habuit pro homo fuit A. 36. secunda deest AC; ib. mundi pro in illa B.
238 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. IX. the completed teriti temporis. Sic enim specificat Aristoteles (primo work of creation. physicorum) inter fieri et factum esse. Et quarto, ad exprimendum dicte universitatis esse Life, not indeed the limited life intelligibile, addit beatus Joh. ewangelista. “In ipso vita of things existing apart erat"; non dicit in proprio genere, sed secundum esse5 from God, but Divine Life intelligibile, quod habet in ipso verbo, vita erat. Et itself — God signanter addit vita, nam inpossibile est agens aliquid knowing His creatures — is ad extra producere secundum proporcionalem racionem, employed with great ut corpora animata habent eis insitam vim, secundum significancy. quam possunt per applicacionem ad passum producere 10 Animals are sibi simile. Inanimata autem vegetabilia, ut herbe et able to arbores, habent in se raciones seminales secundum reproduce their like, quas possunt per se et per influencias celestes producere and plants also, sibi similia, ut patet de constantibus seminalibus que but they all require some producunt vivencia vita sibi simili; possunt et per se 15 extrinsic determination ; decidere semen liquidum et devinare in ipsum virtutem informativam, secundum quam sibi similem in specie producatur. Omnia tamen ista oportet moveri ab extrinseco ad actum generacionis; et cum non possit esse processus in infinitum ] patet quod est devenire ad unum principium generans omnia ad extra producta; quod est deus. Et cum ipse ordinate et per consequens intelligendo hec omnia producit, est tam proporcionalis sibi quam productis. Sibi autem non esset proporcionale, si esset accidens distinctum, ut virtus informativa vel 25 racio seminalis. Nec potest dici pars dei, cum ipse sit omnino indivisibilis; ideo relinquitur quod sit racio solum dicens essenciam que deus est. Et cum sit racio universe creature specialiter attendendo ad generalitatem creaturarum vitalium, in quibus sunt expressius huius-30 modi raciones, et ad modum essendi dei producentis, non cogitabitur terminus apcior quo exprimetur racio eterna in deo secundum quam producit universitatem ad extra, quam iste terminus, vita. Sicud ergo homo fuit semen in lumbis patrum et quodlibet productum a 35 causa secunda habet esse potenciale in illa, sic esse productum ad extra a causa prima oportet habere esse God alone does this by Himself, not adding to Himself any accidental form, nor dividing His indivisibile nature into parts; thus this generation of exemplars is simply the Divine essence, and no better term can be found for it than life ; the cternal actuality of creatures in God's thought, A 75b 1. falso pro sic AD; ib. specat A. 5. quod in ABC. 8. ad deest AC. 9. habent deest BD. 11. similem ACD. 13. per deest B. 15. vine? A; ib. vita sensibili BC; ib. ponunt AD. 14. seminali D. . 16. devinae' A; divinare BD (diua'e?); derrua'e C (derivare?) 19. in- trinseco B; ib. potest D. 21. generacionis generans C. 22. ipso E; ib. ordinante B; et deesi; per quem B; ib. perfecte C; p q E. 26. cum 27. sit ſp dare C; ib. racionem ACD. ipse sit deest A. 26. est C. 34, 35. non habuit pro homo fuit A. 36. secunda deest AC; ib. mundi pro in illa B.
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CAP. IX. DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 239 proporcionale in ipsa, non esse materiale vel esse poten- ciale ut in materia, sed actualissime, eternaliter in- tellectum. Quod indubie essencialiter est vita. Non ergo sunt raciones mortue, nec raciones potenciales tantum 5 ut in materia, nec raciones tantum intellective, sensitive, sed una vita, dans generaliter esse fundamentale omni creature. Addit quinto non hoc verbum fuit vel est, sed hoc verbum erat, quod secundum modum loquendi gram- 10 maticorum est quasi medium inter presens et preteritum. Ponitur de forma eternaliter emanante a suo originante principio; ut verbum et raciones exemplares eternaliter originantur et causantur a deo, sed non simpliciter. Ideo dicit 1° loh. quod universitas facta ad extra in 15 suo genere erat in deo secundum quamlibet partem I. Tim. mundi. Ideo primo ad Thi. 6° dicit apostolus quod deus VI, 13 vivificat omnia; et conformi verbo dicit Aristoteles in expressione formarum universalium; ut patet tractatu de universalibus de "quod quid erat esse". Et patet 20 quod non ex indifferencia posita sunt universalia verba; in decem conclusionibus mistice theologie Johannis. Quod erat est signanter sexies replicatum. My answer is Utendo ergo modificacione huius Johannis tam alti therefore quite theologi patet responsio ad secundum. Non enim licet clear; I cannot go so far as to 25 michi pusillo ampliare modus loquendi in tam alta et assert the subtili materia, concedendo asinum et quodlibet nomina- identity of everything with bile esse deum, specialiter inter illos qui non sunt God, since I nutriti in sensu posteriorum doctorum huiusmodi pro- should risk being posiciones concedencium. Sed concedo quod esse huius- misunderstood; but, granting 30 modi, secundum esse intelligibile vel vitale quod habet that intelligible being is life in in deo est vita; et nego ex hoc sequi omnem creaturam God, I deny that the eternity semper fuisse vel fore; quia adverbium temporis limitat of any creature creature existenciam pro signata mensura temporali; follows thence, or that ut, si aliquid tunc fuit vel erit, ipsum habuit vel habebit intelligible 35 pro tunc existenciam. Et sic negatur quod 'quando- existence means existence at a certain time. The imperfect tense is used — a tense between the present and the perfect — to imply what is eternally both past and present. on which the very possibility of them all depends. This form is used by Aristotle to denote abstraction from time. 6. fundabile BD. 2. ut deest AC. 1. esse after vel deest B. 10. est deest C; ib. et deest ABD. 11. producitur pro ponitur ABD. 13. causancia AB. 19. quot quid erat D. 20. in deest BD. 22. esse D. 24, 25. n'i, a 23. Joh. tam huins D. 24. rn9 A; ib. ad sensum AC. word a half effaced pro licet michi A. 29, 30. proposiciones con- cedencium BC. 34. esset pro erit AD; ib. vel after habuit deest AE. 35, 1. quodeunque BCD. 35. ex pro pro AC; ib. negetur C. 19. Quid erat esse. An expression translated literally from Aristotle: o ti ny stvat, and meaning the same as essence or whatness.
CAP. IX. DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 239 proporcionale in ipsa, non esse materiale vel esse poten- ciale ut in materia, sed actualissime, eternaliter in- tellectum. Quod indubie essencialiter est vita. Non ergo sunt raciones mortue, nec raciones potenciales tantum 5 ut in materia, nec raciones tantum intellective, sensitive, sed una vita, dans generaliter esse fundamentale omni creature. Addit quinto non hoc verbum fuit vel est, sed hoc verbum erat, quod secundum modum loquendi gram- 10 maticorum est quasi medium inter presens et preteritum. Ponitur de forma eternaliter emanante a suo originante principio; ut verbum et raciones exemplares eternaliter originantur et causantur a deo, sed non simpliciter. Ideo dicit 1° loh. quod universitas facta ad extra in 15 suo genere erat in deo secundum quamlibet partem I. Tim. mundi. Ideo primo ad Thi. 6° dicit apostolus quod deus VI, 13 vivificat omnia; et conformi verbo dicit Aristoteles in expressione formarum universalium; ut patet tractatu de universalibus de "quod quid erat esse". Et patet 20 quod non ex indifferencia posita sunt universalia verba; in decem conclusionibus mistice theologie Johannis. Quod erat est signanter sexies replicatum. My answer is Utendo ergo modificacione huius Johannis tam alti therefore quite theologi patet responsio ad secundum. Non enim licet clear; I cannot go so far as to 25 michi pusillo ampliare modus loquendi in tam alta et assert the subtili materia, concedendo asinum et quodlibet nomina- identity of everything with bile esse deum, specialiter inter illos qui non sunt God, since I nutriti in sensu posteriorum doctorum huiusmodi pro- should risk being posiciones concedencium. Sed concedo quod esse huius- misunderstood; but, granting 30 modi, secundum esse intelligibile vel vitale quod habet that intelligible being is life in in deo est vita; et nego ex hoc sequi omnem creaturam God, I deny that the eternity semper fuisse vel fore; quia adverbium temporis limitat of any creature creature existenciam pro signata mensura temporali; follows thence, or that ut, si aliquid tunc fuit vel erit, ipsum habuit vel habebit intelligible 35 pro tunc existenciam. Et sic negatur quod 'quando- existence means existence at a certain time. The imperfect tense is used — a tense between the present and the perfect — to imply what is eternally both past and present. on which the very possibility of them all depends. This form is used by Aristotle to denote abstraction from time. 6. fundabile BD. 2. ut deest AC. 1. esse after vel deest B. 10. est deest C; ib. et deest ABD. 11. producitur pro ponitur ABD. 13. causancia AB. 19. quot quid erat D. 20. in deest BD. 22. esse D. 24, 25. n'i, a 23. Joh. tam huins D. 24. rn9 A; ib. ad sensum AC. word a half effaced pro licet michi A. 29, 30. proposiciones con- cedencium BC. 34. esset pro erit AD; ib. vel after habuit deest AE. 35, 1. quodeunque BCD. 35. ex pro pro AC; ib. negetur C. 19. Quid erat esse. An expression translated literally from Aristotle: o ti ny stvat, and meaning the same as essence or whatness.
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240 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. IX. cunque aliquid habet esse intelligibile, tunc habet esse". Though to run Nam, licet sequitur ab inferiori ad superius, vel pocius implies to be, ab equo ad equum: Hoc habet esse intelligibile, igitur yet not to run to church does not hoc habet esse; tamen non oportet, si tunc non habet imply not to be at church. esse intelligibile quod tunc non habet esse. Quamvis 5 enim currere] sit inferius ad esse, sicud currere ad ecclesiam sit inferius ad esse ad ecclesiam, tamen non sequitur quod non curro ad ecclesiam, si non sum ad ecclesiam. Sed satis est quod sum ad ecclesiam in tempore suo. Sicud enim currere ad ecclesiam ... .. . . 10 sic: “hoc nunc esse" infert “hoc esse pro mensura sua". Unde creditur esse possibile secundum ficticias philosophorum quod “hoc moveri ad a punctum" sit eternum a parte post, cum “hoc esse ad a punctum' (quod est superius) sit tantum instantaneum. Correspondenter dicendum est iterum: Hoc instans est eternum, et hoc instans est vel esset intellectui intuitum: quod est equum ad rem esse tantum instan- taneum; et quesito quando hoc est (demonstrando unum We reply, possibile quod non existit)? dicitur quod nunquam, sed 20 Never, but in in eternitate est, in qua est esse suum intelligibile. the eternity to which its Unde non repugnat ista: 'Hoc est, et hoc semper non possibility est," propter limitacionem ad esse equivocum, scilicet belongs; the former is the ad esse intelligibile in eternitate, et ad esse existere in negation of temporal tempore: cui opponitur nunquam esse, vel non existere 25 existence, the latter affirms its creature. existence in Et si queritur evidencia, unde tale possibile habet God's mind. But if it exists esse intelligibile in quolibet instanti temporis, quin per eternally, how can we deny its idem habet esse in instanti temporis, potissime cum existence at any omne esse intelligibile sit esse, nec aliquod tempus 30 moment of time? mensurare esse intelligibile creature: hic dicitur quod racio primi est, quia idem est rem habere esse intelligi- bile et instans intelligi in eodem tempore. Sed cum When we assert that a given possible thing is, the opponent asks us. "At what instant?" A 76" 15 4. non esse D. I. habet esse aliquid AC. 2. sequatur BD. 6, 7. ad esse — ad esse deest BD. 6. sic pro sicud ABD. 8. si non curro D; non currere ABC; ib. after si nunc pro non ABD. 9. in deest BD. 10. after ecclesiam a blank space of over one line A. 11, 12. sic — unde deest A. 12. esse possibile deest A; ib. sicut secun- dum D. 13. nomen pro moveri AC; ib. ada C. 14. ante pro post BD ; above post C; ib. hoc quod BD; esse quod BD; cum hoc quod est ada C. 15. sed infert pro sit C; deest D. 16. after dicendum, a very illegible word A. 16. est deest; utrum C. 17. after instans esse pro est BD; ib. esse pro esset BD. 18. intuitum deest AD; ib. cum quod AD; ib. inesse esset pro rem esse AD. 19. generaliter pro queritur AC; ib. verbum pro unum AD. 28. intelligibile deest B; ib. quolibet deest B; quotlibet D. 28, 29. temporis — temporis deest B. 3o. aliquid tem- 31. quod deest ABC. poris D. 33. tempore deest BD.
240 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. IX. cunque aliquid habet esse intelligibile, tunc habet esse". Though to run Nam, licet sequitur ab inferiori ad superius, vel pocius implies to be, ab equo ad equum: Hoc habet esse intelligibile, igitur yet not to run to church does not hoc habet esse; tamen non oportet, si tunc non habet imply not to be at church. esse intelligibile quod tunc non habet esse. Quamvis 5 enim currere] sit inferius ad esse, sicud currere ad ecclesiam sit inferius ad esse ad ecclesiam, tamen non sequitur quod non curro ad ecclesiam, si non sum ad ecclesiam. Sed satis est quod sum ad ecclesiam in tempore suo. Sicud enim currere ad ecclesiam ... .. . . 10 sic: “hoc nunc esse" infert “hoc esse pro mensura sua". Unde creditur esse possibile secundum ficticias philosophorum quod “hoc moveri ad a punctum" sit eternum a parte post, cum “hoc esse ad a punctum' (quod est superius) sit tantum instantaneum. Correspondenter dicendum est iterum: Hoc instans est eternum, et hoc instans est vel esset intellectui intuitum: quod est equum ad rem esse tantum instan- taneum; et quesito quando hoc est (demonstrando unum We reply, possibile quod non existit)? dicitur quod nunquam, sed 20 Never, but in in eternitate est, in qua est esse suum intelligibile. the eternity to which its Unde non repugnat ista: 'Hoc est, et hoc semper non possibility est," propter limitacionem ad esse equivocum, scilicet belongs; the former is the ad esse intelligibile in eternitate, et ad esse existere in negation of temporal tempore: cui opponitur nunquam esse, vel non existere 25 existence, the latter affirms its creature. existence in Et si queritur evidencia, unde tale possibile habet God's mind. But if it exists esse intelligibile in quolibet instanti temporis, quin per eternally, how can we deny its idem habet esse in instanti temporis, potissime cum existence at any omne esse intelligibile sit esse, nec aliquod tempus 30 moment of time? mensurare esse intelligibile creature: hic dicitur quod racio primi est, quia idem est rem habere esse intelligi- bile et instans intelligi in eodem tempore. Sed cum When we assert that a given possible thing is, the opponent asks us. "At what instant?" A 76" 15 4. non esse D. I. habet esse aliquid AC. 2. sequatur BD. 6, 7. ad esse — ad esse deest BD. 6. sic pro sicud ABD. 8. si non curro D; non currere ABC; ib. after si nunc pro non ABD. 9. in deest BD. 10. after ecclesiam a blank space of over one line A. 11, 12. sic — unde deest A. 12. esse possibile deest A; ib. sicut secun- dum D. 13. nomen pro moveri AC; ib. ada C. 14. ante pro post BD ; above post C; ib. hoc quod BD; esse quod BD; cum hoc quod est ada C. 15. sed infert pro sit C; deest D. 16. after dicendum, a very illegible word A. 16. est deest; utrum C. 17. after instans esse pro est BD; ib. esse pro esset BD. 18. intuitum deest AD; ib. cum quod AD; ib. inesse esset pro rem esse AD. 19. generaliter pro queritur AC; ib. verbum pro unum AD. 28. intelligibile deest B; ib. quolibet deest B; quotlibet D. 28, 29. temporis — temporis deest B. 3o. aliquid tem- 31. quod deest ABC. poris D. 33. tempore deest BD.
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CAP. IX. DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 241 deus in quolibet instanti temporis intelligit omne possi- Because it is not known by bile, oportet quod omne possibile in quolibet instanti God as having an existence temporis habeat esse intelligibile sicud intelligitur, scilicet, measured by a deo, quod idem est. Sed rem habere esse in tempore time; what it is, is one with 5 vel instanti est ipsam eodem mensurari, et per con- God's One Thought. sequens rem esse per tempus vel instans est ipsam durare per idem; et omne durare presupponit suum existere. Ideo idem in sentencia est querere predictam questionem, et querere utrum deus intelligit rem, cum 1o hoc quod ipsa non duret per tempus? Sic enim signi- ficant termini ex predictis. Licet ergo omne esse in- telligibile sit esse, non tamen omne esse intelligibile nunc est esse nunc, ut a simili: licet omne currere sit esse, non tamen omne currere ad ecclesiam est esse ad 15 ecclesiam. Extraneacio autem significacionis talium est solerter attendenda. Talia autem eterna sunt in tempore concomitanter ad existenciam dei in tempore, qui dicitur equivoce, respectu existencie creature in tempore, ut patet tractatu 20 de tempore. Et per idem quo conceditur omne tale possibile et non existens esse et non esse aliquando, concedi debet quod omnia talia sunt et non sunt alicubi; nec proficiunt nec causant aliquid, nec fuerunt nec erunt, sed intelligantur; quia fore et fuisse connotant 25 esse in tempore. Et, si queritur quid hoc est, ex quo est? videtur enim quod hoc sit hoc et per consequens hoc est aliquid, et sic existit; nam si hoc est non hoc, per idem hoc est non homo, et potest esse homo: ergo homo potest esse 3o non homo. Et per idem sequitur quod quelibet creatura naturaliter prius sit non creatura quam ipsa sit creatura; et cum omne quod fuit vel erit est, patet quod sequitur hominem esse non hominem, et ita generaliter de omni contradictorio in connexo. Nam ille homo eternaliter est 35 vita in deo, et non eternaliter erat homo in deo; igitur If we can say that God exists in time, we can say that these possible entities exist in time as He does. And as they are and are not somewhen, so they are and are not somewhere; and all their being consists in being known. It may be asked if a given possible is itself. If it is, it exists actually. If not, then a man is not a man, but God, and every creature is likewise a not- creature. The question amounts to this : Can God know anything that has not temporal duration? To be intelligible now does not imply to be now. 2. quotlibet D. 3. scilicet deest BD. 4. ab eo pro a deo D; ib. 2— pro sed D; ib. tempore esse Ci esse intelligibile D. 5. esse pro 7. disponit ACD. est D; ib. eodemmodo B. 8. per dictam C. 9. utrum deest AC. 11. ex predictis deest D. 11, 12. omne — omne first nunc deesl B- 13. et pro ut B. 14. currere ad deest D. 15. Exnea mo D. 16. solercia AC . 19. create ACD; ib. intractatu B. 20. after tempore: cap. and a blank space for a word AC; ib. co pro et D; ib. concluditur C. 21. after possibile eciam pro ct BC. 22. ali- quando pro alicubi BD. 23. profint A. 24. et deest D. 25. intelligi- bile pro in tempore D. 27. hoc est deest AC. 28. after si hoc twice D. 28—33. hoc per idem — et ita deest AD. 28. after idem homo pro hoc C. 34. incomplexo BCD; ib. erat BD. 16
CAP. IX. DE MATERIA ET FORMA. 241 deus in quolibet instanti temporis intelligit omne possi- Because it is not known by bile, oportet quod omne possibile in quolibet instanti God as having an existence temporis habeat esse intelligibile sicud intelligitur, scilicet, measured by a deo, quod idem est. Sed rem habere esse in tempore time; what it is, is one with 5 vel instanti est ipsam eodem mensurari, et per con- God's One Thought. sequens rem esse per tempus vel instans est ipsam durare per idem; et omne durare presupponit suum existere. Ideo idem in sentencia est querere predictam questionem, et querere utrum deus intelligit rem, cum 1o hoc quod ipsa non duret per tempus? Sic enim signi- ficant termini ex predictis. Licet ergo omne esse in- telligibile sit esse, non tamen omne esse intelligibile nunc est esse nunc, ut a simili: licet omne currere sit esse, non tamen omne currere ad ecclesiam est esse ad 15 ecclesiam. Extraneacio autem significacionis talium est solerter attendenda. Talia autem eterna sunt in tempore concomitanter ad existenciam dei in tempore, qui dicitur equivoce, respectu existencie creature in tempore, ut patet tractatu 20 de tempore. Et per idem quo conceditur omne tale possibile et non existens esse et non esse aliquando, concedi debet quod omnia talia sunt et non sunt alicubi; nec proficiunt nec causant aliquid, nec fuerunt nec erunt, sed intelligantur; quia fore et fuisse connotant 25 esse in tempore. Et, si queritur quid hoc est, ex quo est? videtur enim quod hoc sit hoc et per consequens hoc est aliquid, et sic existit; nam si hoc est non hoc, per idem hoc est non homo, et potest esse homo: ergo homo potest esse 3o non homo. Et per idem sequitur quod quelibet creatura naturaliter prius sit non creatura quam ipsa sit creatura; et cum omne quod fuit vel erit est, patet quod sequitur hominem esse non hominem, et ita generaliter de omni contradictorio in connexo. Nam ille homo eternaliter est 35 vita in deo, et non eternaliter erat homo in deo; igitur If we can say that God exists in time, we can say that these possible entities exist in time as He does. And as they are and are not somewhen, so they are and are not somewhere; and all their being consists in being known. It may be asked if a given possible is itself. If it is, it exists actually. If not, then a man is not a man, but God, and every creature is likewise a not- creature. The question amounts to this : Can God know anything that has not temporal duration? To be intelligible now does not imply to be now. 2. quotlibet D. 3. scilicet deest BD. 4. ab eo pro a deo D; ib. 2— pro sed D; ib. tempore esse Ci esse intelligibile D. 5. esse pro 7. disponit ACD. est D; ib. eodemmodo B. 8. per dictam C. 9. utrum deest AC. 11. ex predictis deest D. 11, 12. omne — omne first nunc deesl B- 13. et pro ut B. 14. currere ad deest D. 15. Exnea mo D. 16. solercia AC . 19. create ACD; ib. intractatu B. 20. after tempore: cap. and a blank space for a word AC; ib. co pro et D; ib. concluditur C. 21. after possibile eciam pro ct BC. 22. ali- quando pro alicubi BD. 23. profint A. 24. et deest D. 25. intelligi- bile pro in tempore D. 27. hoc est deest AC. 28. after si hoc twice D. 28—33. hoc per idem — et ita deest AD. 28. after idem homo pro hoc C. 34. incomplexo BCD; ib. erat BD. 16
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242 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. IX. eternaliter erat non homo in deo; et per consequens est non homo in deo. Hic dicitur quod, quocunque] demonstrato quod um- A 76 I answer supposing this possible to exist quam est creatura, conceditur querenti quid est hoc? at any time — that it is a quod est hec creatura signandi generis. Si autem pro 5 creature of this nullo tempore habet existenciam creature, tunc dicitur or that genus. If it never quod hoc est deus, sicut et omne ens est deus; et hoc exists, then it per consequens est res, ens, unum; et sic de similibus has no self, but that of God. transcendentalibus supra genus et pro nominibus signi- ficantibus essenciam. Sic, quocunque intelligibili de- 10 monstrato, conceditur quod hoc est hoc, essencia divina sed non creatura vel aliquid signandum nomine generis connotantis differenciam vel qualitatem, nisi pro suo tempore habuerit existenciam creature. Et patet quod, demonstrando hominem, non est compossibile quod 15 homo sit non homo, cum ante mundi constitucionem hoc est deus, et per consequens hoc est non homo tunc, vel pro illa mensura. Sed exinde non sequitur quod hoc sit non homo. We must Oportet enim concipere quod omnes creature sunt 20 conceive accidencia deo essencialiter inherencia que induit sicud creatures as essential vestimenta, quando producit eas ad existencias, et longe accidents that essencialius adherent sibi (si fieri potest) quam accidens inhere in God more closely respectivum inheret substancie; ut notum est ei qui scit than any accidents in ascendere ab existencia creature ad eius esse possibile 25 their substance ; in causis secundis, et ab illo tercio gradu ad quartum, thus ascending from the actual qui est esse intelligibile vel causale in prima causa. Et existence of things to their in utroque illorum graduum nullum ens dicit prius vel possibility as causable, and ex equo aliquam essenciam preter deum, qui sit bene- thence to their dictus in secula seculorum. Amen. everlasting intelligibility in Explicit tractatus de materia et forma Magistri loh. God. Vycleph. A man is not a man. Yes, but when? When thought in eternity, he is God. 30 3. after dicitur quod deest BD. 4, 5. hoc quod est deest BD. 5. 1,tu pro signandi AC. 6. dicatur BD. 7. deus — deus deest B. 8. sic deest AD. 10. existencias; in marg. essencias B. 11. before essencia hoc et B; hoc ex C. 14. quod deest BD. 15. quod non B; 16. before sit hoc pro homo D. 17. be- ib. inpossibile B; possibile D. fore deus scit pro est ACD. 18 et D. 22. vestimentum D; ib. ipsas BD. 23. quod pro quam A. 24. substancie tempore create ut non est ei dubium BD. 25. potenciale D. 29. ex equo deest AD; ib. after deum: etc. C. 29, 30. qui — seculorum deest AC. 30. Amen deest ABCD; suppl. E. 31. Explicit veritas de materia et forma in red ink B; Explicit etc deest CD. 31. after Vycleph, in red letters: O Wicleff, Wycleff, negednomu ty hlawu zwycless O Wycleff, Wycleff, indigno homini tu caput illustrabis A.
242 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. IX. eternaliter erat non homo in deo; et per consequens est non homo in deo. Hic dicitur quod, quocunque] demonstrato quod um- A 76 I answer supposing this possible to exist quam est creatura, conceditur querenti quid est hoc? at any time — that it is a quod est hec creatura signandi generis. Si autem pro 5 creature of this nullo tempore habet existenciam creature, tunc dicitur or that genus. If it never quod hoc est deus, sicut et omne ens est deus; et hoc exists, then it per consequens est res, ens, unum; et sic de similibus has no self, but that of God. transcendentalibus supra genus et pro nominibus signi- ficantibus essenciam. Sic, quocunque intelligibili de- 10 monstrato, conceditur quod hoc est hoc, essencia divina sed non creatura vel aliquid signandum nomine generis connotantis differenciam vel qualitatem, nisi pro suo tempore habuerit existenciam creature. Et patet quod, demonstrando hominem, non est compossibile quod 15 homo sit non homo, cum ante mundi constitucionem hoc est deus, et per consequens hoc est non homo tunc, vel pro illa mensura. Sed exinde non sequitur quod hoc sit non homo. We must Oportet enim concipere quod omnes creature sunt 20 conceive accidencia deo essencialiter inherencia que induit sicud creatures as essential vestimenta, quando producit eas ad existencias, et longe accidents that essencialius adherent sibi (si fieri potest) quam accidens inhere in God more closely respectivum inheret substancie; ut notum est ei qui scit than any accidents in ascendere ab existencia creature ad eius esse possibile 25 their substance ; in causis secundis, et ab illo tercio gradu ad quartum, thus ascending from the actual qui est esse intelligibile vel causale in prima causa. Et existence of things to their in utroque illorum graduum nullum ens dicit prius vel possibility as causable, and ex equo aliquam essenciam preter deum, qui sit bene- thence to their dictus in secula seculorum. Amen. everlasting intelligibility in Explicit tractatus de materia et forma Magistri loh. God. Vycleph. A man is not a man. Yes, but when? When thought in eternity, he is God. 30 3. after dicitur quod deest BD. 4, 5. hoc quod est deest BD. 5. 1,tu pro signandi AC. 6. dicatur BD. 7. deus — deus deest B. 8. sic deest AD. 10. existencias; in marg. essencias B. 11. before essencia hoc et B; hoc ex C. 14. quod deest BD. 15. quod non B; 16. before sit hoc pro homo D. 17. be- ib. inpossibile B; possibile D. fore deus scit pro est ACD. 18 et D. 22. vestimentum D; ib. ipsas BD. 23. quod pro quam A. 24. substancie tempore create ut non est ei dubium BD. 25. potenciale D. 29. ex equo deest AD; ib. after deum: etc. C. 29, 30. qui — seculorum deest AC. 30. Amen deest ABCD; suppl. E. 31. Explicit veritas de materia et forma in red ink B; Explicit etc deest CD. 31. after Vycleph, in red letters: O Wicleff, Wycleff, negednomu ty hlawu zwycless O Wycleff, Wycleff, indigno homini tu caput illustrabis A.
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INDEX. Ability, the, of man to thake off the yoke of imagination, 108. Abstract words may be coined ad libitum out of concrete ones, 179. Absurd, the, is a proposition from wbich any conseguence may be drawn, 61; it may be admitted provisionally, to see what conseguences will follow, 79. Absurdities, the, resulting from the doc- trine that past events are only con- tingently true, 66, 67; from the doc- trine that only those propositions are impossible, which include self-contra- diction, 94, 96. Accidents are but modes ofsubstances, 123. Accidents, absolute, would require cre- ation to exist, just like substances, 7; must be capable of acting, as of exis- ting, by themselves, Ig; do not need a subject, but are subjects, 32, and note. Act, a complex mental, is not a mere aggregate of acts, 9; many such acts are essentially successive, ib.; some are by their nature either morally good or bad, 22; and must be good as entities, and evil as acts, 55. Actions, the same bodily, may be good or bad according to circumstances, 2I. Actuality, the, of old-world Metaphysi- cal discussions at the present day XAV— XXVII. Adam, created immortal, 76. Affirmation, more knowable than nega- tion, 88. Algazel, 90, 183. Alhacen, 12 and note. Alteration is the acquisition of some ex- tended quality by the loss of its con- trary, 112. Analysis, the, of the contents of De Acti- bus Anime XXXII—XLVI; of Repli- cacio de. Universalibus, LXVI—LXVIIT; of De Materia et Forma, LXXIII to LXXXII. Animality is contingent to humanity in the sense of real existence, but neces- sary thereto in a logical sense, 154. Anselm, 55, 74, 90, 96. Antichrist, 82. Appearance, an, of self-contradiction in Wyclif's explanation of pure possibi- lity (of things which never were nor will be), LXXXI. Aptitudinal existence, the, of the Univer- sal, 146. Aquinas (St. Thomas) serves to eluci- date Wyclif, 40 and note; says that God cannot restore lost virginity, 66; that God knows things which are not, 234. Argument, the, of Aristotle for the cter- nity of the world, 99. Aristotle, 3, 36, 39, 42, 59, 60, 65, 72, 74, 75, 80, 88, 92, 99, 102, 108, 109, 120, 133, 146, 164, 176, 177, 191, 196, 199, 200, 207, 210, 212, 214, 222, 223, 226. Assent, the, to a known contradiction would be an affirmation that it is not a contradiction, III. Assent, the, to the proposition, *Possibly nothing exists, is impossible, 97. Assumption, Wyclif's, that humanity is that by which any subject is a man, denied by his adversary, 129; distinc- tions made by the latter, 130; Wyclif's rejoinder, 130, 131. Attention is often lacking to our mental acts, 29. Augustine, 46, 90, 165, 108, 170, 173, 174, 187, 190, 192, 198, 200, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 224, 226. 16%
INDEX. Ability, the, of man to thake off the yoke of imagination, 108. Abstract words may be coined ad libitum out of concrete ones, 179. Absurd, the, is a proposition from wbich any conseguence may be drawn, 61; it may be admitted provisionally, to see what conseguences will follow, 79. Absurdities, the, resulting from the doc- trine that past events are only con- tingently true, 66, 67; from the doc- trine that only those propositions are impossible, which include self-contra- diction, 94, 96. Accidents are but modes ofsubstances, 123. Accidents, absolute, would require cre- ation to exist, just like substances, 7; must be capable of acting, as of exis- ting, by themselves, Ig; do not need a subject, but are subjects, 32, and note. Act, a complex mental, is not a mere aggregate of acts, 9; many such acts are essentially successive, ib.; some are by their nature either morally good or bad, 22; and must be good as entities, and evil as acts, 55. Actions, the same bodily, may be good or bad according to circumstances, 2I. Actuality, the, of old-world Metaphysi- cal discussions at the present day XAV— XXVII. Adam, created immortal, 76. Affirmation, more knowable than nega- tion, 88. Algazel, 90, 183. Alhacen, 12 and note. Alteration is the acquisition of some ex- tended quality by the loss of its con- trary, 112. Analysis, the, of the contents of De Acti- bus Anime XXXII—XLVI; of Repli- cacio de. Universalibus, LXVI—LXVIIT; of De Materia et Forma, LXXIII to LXXXII. Animality is contingent to humanity in the sense of real existence, but neces- sary thereto in a logical sense, 154. Anselm, 55, 74, 90, 96. Antichrist, 82. Appearance, an, of self-contradiction in Wyclif's explanation of pure possibi- lity (of things which never were nor will be), LXXXI. Aptitudinal existence, the, of the Univer- sal, 146. Aquinas (St. Thomas) serves to eluci- date Wyclif, 40 and note; says that God cannot restore lost virginity, 66; that God knows things which are not, 234. Argument, the, of Aristotle for the cter- nity of the world, 99. Aristotle, 3, 36, 39, 42, 59, 60, 65, 72, 74, 75, 80, 88, 92, 99, 102, 108, 109, 120, 133, 146, 164, 176, 177, 191, 196, 199, 200, 207, 210, 212, 214, 222, 223, 226. Assent, the, to a known contradiction would be an affirmation that it is not a contradiction, III. Assent, the, to the proposition, *Possibly nothing exists, is impossible, 97. Assumption, Wyclif's, that humanity is that by which any subject is a man, denied by his adversary, 129; distinc- tions made by the latter, 130; Wyclif's rejoinder, 130, 131. Attention is often lacking to our mental acts, 29. Augustine, 46, 90, 165, 108, 170, 173, 174, 187, 190, 192, 198, 200, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 224, 226. 16%
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244 Austin, the late Mr., the transcriber of most of Wyclif's philosophical works, XXIX. Authenticity, the, of De Actibus Anime discussed, XXVII; of Replicacio de Universalibus, LVI, LVII and LXIII to LXVI; of De Materia et Forma, LXXI to LXXIL Authorship, the probable, of Replicacio de Universalibus, LXV, LXVI. Averrhoes (or the Commentator), 39, 114, I33, 176, 178, 179, 180, 181, 190, 198, 225. Avicebron, 178. Avicenna, 90, 183. Bat, the, cannot look upon the sun, nor can we contemplate God with clear vision, 107. Beatific vision, the, results necessarily from a full knowledge of its object, 43; is impossible, unless the Blessed know that they are perfectly, i. e. eter- nally to enjoy it, 46. Being, is, according to Wyclif, that which is identically the same in God and His creatures, XIII. Being; three orders of: actual, possible, and fictive, or intelligible, 112, 235; two essential divisions of; accident and substance, I24; another fivefold div- ision, 38; created Being is limited by its cause, 49. Being, one, may be further than another from Divine Perfection, or both may be equally distant, 157. Body, a, may conceivably remain un- changed for ever, 81. Bohemian words and sentences in the Stockholm MS., LXI—LXIII. Bradwa dine (Doctor Profundus), 37 and note, 55, 72, 73, 92, IIS. Brocardicum 103 and no'e. Burkhard, 103 note. Burleigh, Walter, LVI, 49, 149. Causal proposition, a, containing a ne gation, 90. Causality, and dependency; does not one imply the other? 157. Change implies something lost, something acquired, and something remaining, 35, but may also mean the actuality of any new determination in a subject, INDEX. or the acquisition of a new quality, 42; change in the soul does not imply the acquisition of an absolute (or se- parable) entity, 52. Chimera, the, adduced as an example, 138. Compound and simple, various senses of the words, 199, 200. Conceptualism expounded, VIII; how re- futed by Wyclif, VIII—X. Conditional propositions, two sorts of, 61 note. Confirmed in grace, a man, cannot lose this gift, 78. Conflict, the eternal, between Nomina- lism and Realism, XXV—XXVII. Confusion, a, in Wyclifs argument, bet- ween the doing of a thing, and the thing as done, 32. Connection, a necessary, between two unmeaning propositions would not prove either to be true, ISK. Consequent. the, of a conditional propo- sition implies (if denied) the impossi- bility of its antecedent, 116. Contempt, the, of Modern for Mediaeval thought is unjustifiable, XVIII, XIX. Contingent, can the, become necessary? 259. It can, but not vice versa, 75. Continuous motion, according to Wyclif, is only apparent, and does not really take place, XVIII. Contradictories, two, are apprehended by one and the same act, I27. Contrition for sin changes the Past, 64, not as to the fact of its occurrence, but as to the present state of the soul which that occurrence has produced, 86. Controversy, the, upon Necessity pro- ceeds in great part from a confusion of terms, 73. Creation, the, or annihilation of an act is an improper expression, 54. Darii, a syllogism of the form, 158. Date, the approximate, of De Actibus Anime, XXXII, XXXIII; of Replicacio de Universalibus, LXVI; of De Materia et Forma, LXXII. De Apostasia, XLV. De Benedicta Incarnacione, note. Deceit, an act of, is essentially evil, 56. De Ecclesia, 92, note. Definition of Form, a nominal, 163. 205 and
244 Austin, the late Mr., the transcriber of most of Wyclif's philosophical works, XXIX. Authenticity, the, of De Actibus Anime discussed, XXVII; of Replicacio de Universalibus, LVI, LVII and LXIII to LXVI; of De Materia et Forma, LXXI to LXXIL Authorship, the probable, of Replicacio de Universalibus, LXV, LXVI. Averrhoes (or the Commentator), 39, 114, I33, 176, 178, 179, 180, 181, 190, 198, 225. Avicebron, 178. Avicenna, 90, 183. Bat, the, cannot look upon the sun, nor can we contemplate God with clear vision, 107. Beatific vision, the, results necessarily from a full knowledge of its object, 43; is impossible, unless the Blessed know that they are perfectly, i. e. eter- nally to enjoy it, 46. Being, is, according to Wyclif, that which is identically the same in God and His creatures, XIII. Being; three orders of: actual, possible, and fictive, or intelligible, 112, 235; two essential divisions of; accident and substance, I24; another fivefold div- ision, 38; created Being is limited by its cause, 49. Being, one, may be further than another from Divine Perfection, or both may be equally distant, 157. Body, a, may conceivably remain un- changed for ever, 81. Bohemian words and sentences in the Stockholm MS., LXI—LXIII. Bradwa dine (Doctor Profundus), 37 and note, 55, 72, 73, 92, IIS. Brocardicum 103 and no'e. Burkhard, 103 note. Burleigh, Walter, LVI, 49, 149. Causal proposition, a, containing a ne gation, 90. Causality, and dependency; does not one imply the other? 157. Change implies something lost, something acquired, and something remaining, 35, but may also mean the actuality of any new determination in a subject, INDEX. or the acquisition of a new quality, 42; change in the soul does not imply the acquisition of an absolute (or se- parable) entity, 52. Chimera, the, adduced as an example, 138. Compound and simple, various senses of the words, 199, 200. Conceptualism expounded, VIII; how re- futed by Wyclif, VIII—X. Conditional propositions, two sorts of, 61 note. Confirmed in grace, a man, cannot lose this gift, 78. Conflict, the eternal, between Nomina- lism and Realism, XXV—XXVII. Confusion, a, in Wyclifs argument, bet- ween the doing of a thing, and the thing as done, 32. Connection, a necessary, between two unmeaning propositions would not prove either to be true, ISK. Consequent. the, of a conditional propo- sition implies (if denied) the impossi- bility of its antecedent, 116. Contempt, the, of Modern for Mediaeval thought is unjustifiable, XVIII, XIX. Contingent, can the, become necessary? 259. It can, but not vice versa, 75. Continuous motion, according to Wyclif, is only apparent, and does not really take place, XVIII. Contradictories, two, are apprehended by one and the same act, I27. Contrition for sin changes the Past, 64, not as to the fact of its occurrence, but as to the present state of the soul which that occurrence has produced, 86. Controversy, the, upon Necessity pro- ceeds in great part from a confusion of terms, 73. Creation, the, or annihilation of an act is an improper expression, 54. Darii, a syllogism of the form, 158. Date, the approximate, of De Actibus Anime, XXXII, XXXIII; of Replicacio de Universalibus, LXVI; of De Materia et Forma, LXXII. De Apostasia, XLV. De Benedicta Incarnacione, note. Deceit, an act of, is essentially evil, 56. De Ecclesia, 92, note. Definition of Form, a nominal, 163. 205 and
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INDEX. Degrees of intensity of quality give greater essential perfection, 152. De Individuacione Temporis, 204 and note. Deity is not a Universal, 145. Demonstration, Wyclif's; that the world is made of punctal atoms, and time of indivisible instants, X VI— XIX. Denominacio univoce participata, 87 and note. Dependency, a natural, of a form upon its subject, which can be removed tey supernatural power, is absurd, 8. Descartes’ denial of absolute accidents, XLV. Determination, a, which makes its sub- ject active is essentially implied in the idea of an act, 25, 26. Determinism, Wyclif’s, XX—XXII. De Trinitate (Wyclif's) 195 and note. De Universalibus, 217 and note. Devil-worship is excusable, if we mistake the devil for God, 21. Difference between the Universal and the Singular in Wyclif's system, 14I. Differentiation between acts specifically the same, what causes the, 50. Difficulties, the, of Wyclif as regards the Eucharist, apparent in De Materia et Forma, LXXVIII. Dimension, the Fourth, AVI. Dionysius (Saint), 183, 211, 229. Distance, the, between the Necessary and the Contingent can be got over, 76, 77. Doctor Profundus (Bradwardine) 37, 55, 72, 73, 92, 115. Doctor Solemnis, Henry Gothals of Ghent, LVI, 92. Dolein, Stephen von; his “Epistola ad Hussitas?, I.X. Dreamer, a Mediaeval Hegelian, attacked by Wyclif, 100. Dudik, Dr, repeatedly referred to in Pastor L.undstrom's Introduction, XLVII to LXIII. Egidius, 133. Entity, the, of anything, identical with its truth in Wyclif's system, 13r. Envy. the act of, is essentially bad, 56. Error in judging of things is impos- sible if we but abstract from all natural and supernatural possibilities that might make us judge otherwise, I2I. 245 Essence, one and the same: cannot exist in different subjects, 135. Essential difference, the, between sub- stantial and accedental form, 20. Eucharist, Wyclifs doctrine of the, springs from his philosophical views, XXII—XXIV. Evil has no positive entity, 20; is in itself mere deprivation, 56. Exemplar forms, 170—176; first to be dealt with, why, 164; are the innu- merable multitude of patterns of things, existing in the Divine Mind, 170; Deity is the common form of the Three Persons, 171; Christ had this *form of God”, 172—174; in this sense God is the form of all, since a model is called a form, 174, and the nearer we approach Him, the more perfect we are, 175; God is everywhere in the universe, giving it unity and beauty, ib., and He is the source of all the actions of His creatures, 176. Existence and essence, the difference between, is one of reason only, 184, 185. Existence, the, of God is the primordial Truth on which all others depend, 73; it is the most known of all, 107. Experience is against the theory that mental acts are separable entities, 16, 17. Extrinsic or intrinsic determination, the, of a thing by its form, 164. Faculty, a, is the more powerful, the more directly it attains its object, 3. Fallacia accidentis, a, 233. Falsity is predicated of things truly in a negative sense, 105; ‘A falsity is a truth”, mcans no more than “It is true that such and such a proposition is false, 106. Feeling exists, not in the object felt, but in the being that feels it, 18 and note. Foreshadowings by Wyclif of modern chemical discoveries, XIX; of modern philosophical theories, XXXIV to XXXVI. Forms are either substantial or acci- dental, as they express the orhatness or the how-ness of the thing formed, 164; accidental forms are modes of a substance, 165 ; they answer the question,
INDEX. Degrees of intensity of quality give greater essential perfection, 152. De Individuacione Temporis, 204 and note. Deity is not a Universal, 145. Demonstration, Wyclif's; that the world is made of punctal atoms, and time of indivisible instants, X VI— XIX. Denominacio univoce participata, 87 and note. Dependency, a natural, of a form upon its subject, which can be removed tey supernatural power, is absurd, 8. Descartes’ denial of absolute accidents, XLV. Determination, a, which makes its sub- ject active is essentially implied in the idea of an act, 25, 26. Determinism, Wyclif’s, XX—XXII. De Trinitate (Wyclif's) 195 and note. De Universalibus, 217 and note. Devil-worship is excusable, if we mistake the devil for God, 21. Difference between the Universal and the Singular in Wyclif's system, 14I. Differentiation between acts specifically the same, what causes the, 50. Difficulties, the, of Wyclif as regards the Eucharist, apparent in De Materia et Forma, LXXVIII. Dimension, the Fourth, AVI. Dionysius (Saint), 183, 211, 229. Distance, the, between the Necessary and the Contingent can be got over, 76, 77. Doctor Profundus (Bradwardine) 37, 55, 72, 73, 92, 115. Doctor Solemnis, Henry Gothals of Ghent, LVI, 92. Dolein, Stephen von; his “Epistola ad Hussitas?, I.X. Dreamer, a Mediaeval Hegelian, attacked by Wyclif, 100. Dudik, Dr, repeatedly referred to in Pastor L.undstrom's Introduction, XLVII to LXIII. Egidius, 133. Entity, the, of anything, identical with its truth in Wyclif's system, 13r. Envy. the act of, is essentially bad, 56. Error in judging of things is impos- sible if we but abstract from all natural and supernatural possibilities that might make us judge otherwise, I2I. 245 Essence, one and the same: cannot exist in different subjects, 135. Essential difference, the, between sub- stantial and accedental form, 20. Eucharist, Wyclifs doctrine of the, springs from his philosophical views, XXII—XXIV. Evil has no positive entity, 20; is in itself mere deprivation, 56. Exemplar forms, 170—176; first to be dealt with, why, 164; are the innu- merable multitude of patterns of things, existing in the Divine Mind, 170; Deity is the common form of the Three Persons, 171; Christ had this *form of God”, 172—174; in this sense God is the form of all, since a model is called a form, 174, and the nearer we approach Him, the more perfect we are, 175; God is everywhere in the universe, giving it unity and beauty, ib., and He is the source of all the actions of His creatures, 176. Existence and essence, the difference between, is one of reason only, 184, 185. Existence, the, of God is the primordial Truth on which all others depend, 73; it is the most known of all, 107. Experience is against the theory that mental acts are separable entities, 16, 17. Extrinsic or intrinsic determination, the, of a thing by its form, 164. Faculty, a, is the more powerful, the more directly it attains its object, 3. Fallacia accidentis, a, 233. Falsity is predicated of things truly in a negative sense, 105; ‘A falsity is a truth”, mcans no more than “It is true that such and such a proposition is false, 106. Feeling exists, not in the object felt, but in the being that feels it, 18 and note. Foreshadowings by Wyclif of modern chemical discoveries, XIX; of modern philosophical theories, XXXIV to XXXVI. Forms are either substantial or acci- dental, as they express the orhatness or the how-ness of the thing formed, 164; accidental forms are modes of a substance, 165 ; they answer the question,
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246 ‘In what manner does this thing exist?’ ib.; they add an entity, but only a modal one, to their subject, 165, 166; God is called by Augustine, the Su- preme Mode, but not in this sense, ‘mode’ here meaning goodness and order, 166; the sense of ‘mode’ as an accident means one of the nine cate- gories exclusive of substance, 167; the disputes as to the entity conferred by a mode is one of mere words, 168; entity, when predicated of accident and of substance, has two like but not identical meanings, ib.; some say that an accident is nothing, and that all beings are substances, some that God alone is a substance and all other beings are accidents; both views are exaggerated, but the latter is nearest the truth, 167, 168; substantial form is that by which any substance is that substance, 176; two kinds, one requi- ring no subject to sustain their entity, as angels, 177, who are not made up of matter and form, 178; the other, of forms upheld by a body, 179, are merely the whole essence, taken abstractly, ib; it is foolish to think of matter and form as two separate but combined parts, of which the substance con- sists, 179, 180; or that the latter is capable of increase and diminution, for that would then be accidental, not sub- stantial, which is added or taken away from the form, 180; but we may un- derstand substantial form in a wider sense, as that which is always found with the substance, 182. Objection that this view destroys specific diffe- rences, by positing that the same one essence may become anything in the world, 182, 183; answered by the fact that essence bears no reference to genera or species; one thing cannot be another at the same time, 183— 185; examples confirming Wyclif's doctrine: the Trinity, Christ's dual nature, and the singulars of the same Universal, 186; Scripture texts in its favour, 187; explanation of various transformations, 188, 189; Transubstantiation is a ques- tion not to be dealt with here, 189; various senses of the word Substance, 190, 191; what the matter of a sub- stance is, 192; hence the production INDEX. of a form is not movement (or change), 193; every form is, in a sense, acci- dental to matter, ib ; but when its sub- ject is absolutely potential, it gives it actual substantiality, 194; the recepti- vity of matter, utterly passive, cannot be called a form or a determination, 194, 195. Objections: that in this view matter and form are identical, or the expositorial syllogism is worthless, 196; that the examples given explain the unknown by the unknown, 197, and that, if matter and form be not identical, they are two different beings occupying the same space, ib.; ans- wered by the statement that these are not identical, though they go to form one and the same essence, 198; matter is the essence quà receptive of form, form is the essence qvà generable in matter, 200; the simple essence, receiving form, becomes composite, 201, 202; these distinctions given, no expositorial syllogism concludes any- thing against Wyclif. 203; he does not prove the unknown by the unknown, but points out that any attack upon his doctrine menaces Christianity, 204, 205; the difference between matter and form is merely logical, 205, 206. Free-will was always at least nomi- nally admitted by Wyclif, XXII. Galen, 85 and note. Giczin, John of, LVIII. Gilbert de la Porrée (Auctor Sex Prin- cipiorum) 2, 35, 39. God is or is not a substance, according to the meaning of the word, 41; per- mits but does not formally produce evil, 56; is mighty to do any thing, but not to make to be that which can have no entity, 82; cannot make an absurdity exist, 83; is a pure act without potentiality, 90. Gospel of St. John, analysis of the be- ginning of the; importance of the words, Quod factum est in ipso vita erat; quod used to denote the mere essence of things; factum est to indicate the complete work of creation, vita, to show the nature of the Divine Act of knowing all things, on which this very possibility depends; and erat in the imperfect, to denote the past together
246 ‘In what manner does this thing exist?’ ib.; they add an entity, but only a modal one, to their subject, 165, 166; God is called by Augustine, the Su- preme Mode, but not in this sense, ‘mode’ here meaning goodness and order, 166; the sense of ‘mode’ as an accident means one of the nine cate- gories exclusive of substance, 167; the disputes as to the entity conferred by a mode is one of mere words, 168; entity, when predicated of accident and of substance, has two like but not identical meanings, ib.; some say that an accident is nothing, and that all beings are substances, some that God alone is a substance and all other beings are accidents; both views are exaggerated, but the latter is nearest the truth, 167, 168; substantial form is that by which any substance is that substance, 176; two kinds, one requi- ring no subject to sustain their entity, as angels, 177, who are not made up of matter and form, 178; the other, of forms upheld by a body, 179, are merely the whole essence, taken abstractly, ib; it is foolish to think of matter and form as two separate but combined parts, of which the substance con- sists, 179, 180; or that the latter is capable of increase and diminution, for that would then be accidental, not sub- stantial, which is added or taken away from the form, 180; but we may un- derstand substantial form in a wider sense, as that which is always found with the substance, 182. Objection that this view destroys specific diffe- rences, by positing that the same one essence may become anything in the world, 182, 183; answered by the fact that essence bears no reference to genera or species; one thing cannot be another at the same time, 183— 185; examples confirming Wyclif's doctrine: the Trinity, Christ's dual nature, and the singulars of the same Universal, 186; Scripture texts in its favour, 187; explanation of various transformations, 188, 189; Transubstantiation is a ques- tion not to be dealt with here, 189; various senses of the word Substance, 190, 191; what the matter of a sub- stance is, 192; hence the production INDEX. of a form is not movement (or change), 193; every form is, in a sense, acci- dental to matter, ib ; but when its sub- ject is absolutely potential, it gives it actual substantiality, 194; the recepti- vity of matter, utterly passive, cannot be called a form or a determination, 194, 195. Objections: that in this view matter and form are identical, or the expositorial syllogism is worthless, 196; that the examples given explain the unknown by the unknown, 197, and that, if matter and form be not identical, they are two different beings occupying the same space, ib.; ans- wered by the statement that these are not identical, though they go to form one and the same essence, 198; matter is the essence quà receptive of form, form is the essence qvà generable in matter, 200; the simple essence, receiving form, becomes composite, 201, 202; these distinctions given, no expositorial syllogism concludes any- thing against Wyclif. 203; he does not prove the unknown by the unknown, but points out that any attack upon his doctrine menaces Christianity, 204, 205; the difference between matter and form is merely logical, 205, 206. Free-will was always at least nomi- nally admitted by Wyclif, XXII. Galen, 85 and note. Giczin, John of, LVIII. Gilbert de la Porrée (Auctor Sex Prin- cipiorum) 2, 35, 39. God is or is not a substance, according to the meaning of the word, 41; per- mits but does not formally produce evil, 56; is mighty to do any thing, but not to make to be that which can have no entity, 82; cannot make an absurdity exist, 83; is a pure act without potentiality, 90. Gospel of St. John, analysis of the be- ginning of the; importance of the words, Quod factum est in ipso vita erat; quod used to denote the mere essence of things; factum est to indicate the complete work of creation, vita, to show the nature of the Divine Act of knowing all things, on which this very possibility depends; and erat in the imperfect, to denote the past together
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INDEX. with the present, and to abstract from time, 237—239. Gothals of Ghent, Henry (Doctor Solem- nis, LVI. Grace is indispensable to man, 44. Green, Mr. T. H., mentioned XXXVI. Grosseteste (Lincolniensis) often quoted by Wyclif is an evidence for the authenticity of De Materia et Forma, I.XXI; quotations from his works, 76, 96, 177, 180. Habit, a, is capable of potential (without actual) existence in its subject, 25. Happiness being a quality, all mental acts must be so too, 35. Hatred of God is an act that we cannot possibly conceive to be morally good. 23. Hegcl, foreshadowed by an unknown precursor in the XIVth century, 99 and mote. Hell and purgatory, difference between the pains of, 33. Humanity and my humanity are inter- changeable terms, not logically, but in reality, I39. Humanity, universal, follows as a real entity in Wyclif's view, from the fact that ‘I am a man’, 133; and particular humanity depends upon the Universal for its existence, 133, 134. Huss, John, de Hussynetz, repeatedly referred to by Pastor Lundstrom in his Introduction, XI.VII—L XIII; is not believed to be the author of any of the treatises in the Stockholm MS,, I.11I-—" VII; is supposed merely to have copied these tractates and lectured upon them, LIX, I.X. Hypostatic union, startling consequence of the dogma of, 115 and note. Hypostatized abstractions, XXXIV; Mr. 1 ziewicki's paper (Aristotelian Society) quoted on the subject, XXXVII. Jdeal forms, LXXV, I XXVI. Identity, the, of two recurring acts is specific, not numerical, 49; of soul and of body in the Resurrection is nume- rical, 51. Imagination in many cases implies a succession of images, 9. Immortality, the, of mankind, if Adam had not sinned, 76. 247 Immutability, the, of the Universal dis- cussed, 137 and note. Impossibility, the, of committing the same sin twice, 52. Impossibility, hypothetical and absolute; only the latter is admitted in Wyclif's system, XXI. Impossible, can the, be admitted ? 60. Yes, either out of ignorance, or in the case of the Past, or to see what the ad- mission leads to, 79. Impossible things are so because God's power docs not extend to them, and not the reverse, 114. Impotence, the, of our will, if we chose to fly; inference drawn thence, 5. Impotent is a privative term; not potent, a mere negative one, 82. Incertitude, the, of our knowledge whether God's power extends to cer- tain things or not, II3. Indestructibility, the supposed, of our acts in the hypothesis that they are separable entities, 32. Inferior things may be known more clearly than things superior, but the latter are fiist known, 108. Infinite power, must, extend to all time, even to the Past? 62. Infinite series, an, of acts to be elicited before any act takes place, in the theory of Wyclif's opponents, 6. Informity, the, of matter, and its sim- plicity, objections against: matter can never exist without form; and as it is identical with the compound essence, it is compound, 206, 207; answered by the statement that matter is prior to form, not in time, but by nature, 207 to 212; and that ‘compound’ refers to the complete nature, not to the ele- ments of which it consists, 215, 216; the Trinity is not a compound, 216. Insolubles, 28 and note. Instant, an, in the Scholastic sense, 50. Instantancous acts cannot explain lasting sensations, I2; they cannot feel a suc- cessive continuzm 4s successive, 13. Intensive parts may always be predicated of acts, 54. Instrinsic acts, 38. Introspective thought, or sclf-knowledge, is impossible if we posit one act know- ing another, and to suppose an act knowing itself is absurd, 29.
INDEX. with the present, and to abstract from time, 237—239. Gothals of Ghent, Henry (Doctor Solem- nis, LVI. Grace is indispensable to man, 44. Green, Mr. T. H., mentioned XXXVI. Grosseteste (Lincolniensis) often quoted by Wyclif is an evidence for the authenticity of De Materia et Forma, I.XXI; quotations from his works, 76, 96, 177, 180. Habit, a, is capable of potential (without actual) existence in its subject, 25. Happiness being a quality, all mental acts must be so too, 35. Hatred of God is an act that we cannot possibly conceive to be morally good. 23. Hegcl, foreshadowed by an unknown precursor in the XIVth century, 99 and mote. Hell and purgatory, difference between the pains of, 33. Humanity and my humanity are inter- changeable terms, not logically, but in reality, I39. Humanity, universal, follows as a real entity in Wyclif's view, from the fact that ‘I am a man’, 133; and particular humanity depends upon the Universal for its existence, 133, 134. Huss, John, de Hussynetz, repeatedly referred to by Pastor Lundstrom in his Introduction, XI.VII—L XIII; is not believed to be the author of any of the treatises in the Stockholm MS,, I.11I-—" VII; is supposed merely to have copied these tractates and lectured upon them, LIX, I.X. Hypostatic union, startling consequence of the dogma of, 115 and note. Hypostatized abstractions, XXXIV; Mr. 1 ziewicki's paper (Aristotelian Society) quoted on the subject, XXXVII. Jdeal forms, LXXV, I XXVI. Identity, the, of two recurring acts is specific, not numerical, 49; of soul and of body in the Resurrection is nume- rical, 51. Imagination in many cases implies a succession of images, 9. Immortality, the, of mankind, if Adam had not sinned, 76. 247 Immutability, the, of the Universal dis- cussed, 137 and note. Impossibility, the, of committing the same sin twice, 52. Impossibility, hypothetical and absolute; only the latter is admitted in Wyclif's system, XXI. Impossible, can the, be admitted ? 60. Yes, either out of ignorance, or in the case of the Past, or to see what the ad- mission leads to, 79. Impossible things are so because God's power docs not extend to them, and not the reverse, 114. Impotence, the, of our will, if we chose to fly; inference drawn thence, 5. Impotent is a privative term; not potent, a mere negative one, 82. Incertitude, the, of our knowledge whether God's power extends to cer- tain things or not, II3. Indestructibility, the supposed, of our acts in the hypothesis that they are separable entities, 32. Inferior things may be known more clearly than things superior, but the latter are fiist known, 108. Infinite power, must, extend to all time, even to the Past? 62. Infinite series, an, of acts to be elicited before any act takes place, in the theory of Wyclif's opponents, 6. Informity, the, of matter, and its sim- plicity, objections against: matter can never exist without form; and as it is identical with the compound essence, it is compound, 206, 207; answered by the statement that matter is prior to form, not in time, but by nature, 207 to 212; and that ‘compound’ refers to the complete nature, not to the ele- ments of which it consists, 215, 216; the Trinity is not a compound, 216. Insolubles, 28 and note. Instant, an, in the Scholastic sense, 50. Instantancous acts cannot explain lasting sensations, I2; they cannot feel a suc- cessive continuzm 4s successive, 13. Intensive parts may always be predicated of acts, 54. Instrinsic acts, 38. Introspective thought, or sclf-knowledge, is impossible if we posit one act know- ing another, and to suppose an act knowing itself is absurd, 29.
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248 Isidorus, 219. Jaudun, John of, LVI. King, a dead or a painted, is not really a king; identity of name does not mean absolute identity, 161. Knowable, a being, and Possible amount to the same, 98. Knowledge, our, of our own acts is the most perfect, 30. Kolenati, Professor, T.VII. Lechler, UVI, LVII. Leibnitq speaks in favour of Scholasti- cism, LXXIV. Lewis' History of the life and opinions of John de Wycliffe, LIV. Liberty, the highest, is necessity, 78. Light, an instantaneous movement, 40; is not what we see directly, but co- lour is, 108. Lightness is in fire an accidental, not a substantial form, 181. Limit, the, of God’s power is what is impossible to Him and therefore im- possible in itself, 107. Locke ascribed falsely to Scholastics the doctrine that colours as seen are ex- ternal to the eye, XXXVIII. Logic:l priority, the mere, of the Uni- versal over the Singular, 140. Loserth's *Huss and Wyclif”, LV, I IX. Lundstrom, Pastor Hermann; his con- tribution to Wycliffian literature, X1.VI; impossibility of entering into corre- spondence with him; his Introduction to the Replicacio de Universalibus, X!.VII—LXIII. I.ying, the act of, is essentially evil, 56. Magnet, the experiment of a, counterac- ting the earth's attraction, 53. Man has the power to change his past, 63, 64; in the Nominalistic system, is not necessarily an animal, 138. Manuscript of De Actibus Anime des- cribed, XXIX —XXXI; of Replicacio de Universalibus, XLVI-LXIII; MSS. of De Materia et Forma (Prague Uni- versity, 4 H. 9 and 3 G. 10, | XIX to LXI. Material substances cannot act but by means of their qualities; these, if they could exist and act alone, would be more perfect than the substances to which they belong 118. INDEX. Matter, Aristotle’s definition of, 185 and note; primal matter is successively fire, earth, etc, 216, 217; this is proved by Scripture, 217—220; to the objection that then no substance would ever begin or cease to be, the answer is that all things were created together in their essences, 221, 222, but not the compounds themselves, 222, 223; for the union of matter with form has its beginning in time, 223; that which began with time may be called cor- ruptible or not as we please, in diffe- rent senses, which is a good way to answer sophists, 223, 224; this doc- trine being in agreement with Scrip- ture, Aristotle is wrong where he con- tradicts it, 224; Scriptural expressions are literally true in Wyclif’s doctrine, 225: and it would by no means con- fuse the persons of the Trinity, ib.; that primal matter is never formless does not prové that it has no entity of its own, 226; we can only say it has no form by itself, and therefore its nature is formless, though it re- quires a form to exist, 227. Objection that every creature exists eternally in God, and yet the non-existence of the world. is eternally known to be true, 228; to which we may either reply that ‘non-existence’ does not contradict the idea of possible entity, but actual existence only, 228, 229; or that there never was or will be any such thing as absolute non-existence, 230—232; Gods knowledge of the world as non-existing is not sbsolute, since the world is now, and from all eternity was about to be; 232, 233; God does not see the being of that which is not, but sees it to be pos- sible, 234. Mental acts are universally admitted to exist, 1; three theories concerning them, 2; some say they are qualities, some, the soul itself, some, an accident of the genus ‘quality’, ib.; these acts do not necessarily imply movement, 35, and are merely the subject qud per- ceiving, in Wyclif's view, 36. Metaphysical, physical, and moral ne- cessity or impossibility, 103. Mind requires no quality to intervene between it and its object, 3.
248 Isidorus, 219. Jaudun, John of, LVI. King, a dead or a painted, is not really a king; identity of name does not mean absolute identity, 161. Knowable, a being, and Possible amount to the same, 98. Knowledge, our, of our own acts is the most perfect, 30. Kolenati, Professor, T.VII. Lechler, UVI, LVII. Leibnitq speaks in favour of Scholasti- cism, LXXIV. Lewis' History of the life and opinions of John de Wycliffe, LIV. Liberty, the highest, is necessity, 78. Light, an instantaneous movement, 40; is not what we see directly, but co- lour is, 108. Lightness is in fire an accidental, not a substantial form, 181. Limit, the, of God’s power is what is impossible to Him and therefore im- possible in itself, 107. Locke ascribed falsely to Scholastics the doctrine that colours as seen are ex- ternal to the eye, XXXVIII. Logic:l priority, the mere, of the Uni- versal over the Singular, 140. Loserth's *Huss and Wyclif”, LV, I IX. Lundstrom, Pastor Hermann; his con- tribution to Wycliffian literature, X1.VI; impossibility of entering into corre- spondence with him; his Introduction to the Replicacio de Universalibus, X!.VII—LXIII. I.ying, the act of, is essentially evil, 56. Magnet, the experiment of a, counterac- ting the earth's attraction, 53. Man has the power to change his past, 63, 64; in the Nominalistic system, is not necessarily an animal, 138. Manuscript of De Actibus Anime des- cribed, XXIX —XXXI; of Replicacio de Universalibus, XLVI-LXIII; MSS. of De Materia et Forma (Prague Uni- versity, 4 H. 9 and 3 G. 10, | XIX to LXI. Material substances cannot act but by means of their qualities; these, if they could exist and act alone, would be more perfect than the substances to which they belong 118. INDEX. Matter, Aristotle’s definition of, 185 and note; primal matter is successively fire, earth, etc, 216, 217; this is proved by Scripture, 217—220; to the objection that then no substance would ever begin or cease to be, the answer is that all things were created together in their essences, 221, 222, but not the compounds themselves, 222, 223; for the union of matter with form has its beginning in time, 223; that which began with time may be called cor- ruptible or not as we please, in diffe- rent senses, which is a good way to answer sophists, 223, 224; this doc- trine being in agreement with Scrip- ture, Aristotle is wrong where he con- tradicts it, 224; Scriptural expressions are literally true in Wyclif’s doctrine, 225: and it would by no means con- fuse the persons of the Trinity, ib.; that primal matter is never formless does not prové that it has no entity of its own, 226; we can only say it has no form by itself, and therefore its nature is formless, though it re- quires a form to exist, 227. Objection that every creature exists eternally in God, and yet the non-existence of the world. is eternally known to be true, 228; to which we may either reply that ‘non-existence’ does not contradict the idea of possible entity, but actual existence only, 228, 229; or that there never was or will be any such thing as absolute non-existence, 230—232; Gods knowledge of the world as non-existing is not sbsolute, since the world is now, and from all eternity was about to be; 232, 233; God does not see the being of that which is not, but sees it to be pos- sible, 234. Mental acts are universally admitted to exist, 1; three theories concerning them, 2; some say they are qualities, some, the soul itself, some, an accident of the genus ‘quality’, ib.; these acts do not necessarily imply movement, 35, and are merely the subject qud per- ceiving, in Wyclif's view, 36. Metaphysical, physical, and moral ne- cessity or impossibility, 103. Mind requires no quality to intervene between it and its object, 3.
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INDEX. Miracle, by a, an accident, might be se- parated from its subject, 121, but this would involve very great difficulties, 123. Miracles, possibility of, 74. Modes (or measure, mensura) of exist- ence, seven different, 210, 211. Movement, in what sense it is under- stood by the School; its species, 34 and note. Music of the spheres, the, 49. Musings, the, of Wyclif at Oxford in his youth, XIII, XIV. Nature, seven significations of the word, 198, 199. Nature's moral law is such that even God cannot dispense with it, 23. Necessary and contingent truth are con- fused in the theory of Wyclif's adver- saries, 27. Necessity of a thing known to be eter- nally true as taking place in time, 67; different senses of the word, 71, 72; simple and conditional, difference bet- ween, 153. Negation, every, is based upon an affir- mation, 87. Neo-Scholasticism, LXXIV. Nominalism, what it was, VI, VII; how refuted by Wyclif, VII, VIII. Non-existence is no bar to thought, 36. Numerical identity, there is, wherever existence is identical, 135, I47. Obligations, the Scholastic and dialecti- cal exercise of, 60 and note, 79 and note. Oblivion of the Past, on the part of a multitude of persons, were a great evil, 85. Ockam's razor, 119 note. Omnipotence, God’s, is limited by Him- self alone, 109; many subtleties have been uttered in this matter, such as v. g. that God can do anything that we do not distinctly see to be absurd, make the same thing exist at once in different places with contrary attributes, or contrary attributes co-exist in the same thing, IIO. Opponents of Realism, the, admit the ‘Uni- versal Man” merely as an idea or as part of a proposition, not as an entity, 138. Opposite, the, of what is necessary is in so far unthinkable, 107. 249 Order of publication, the, of Wyclif's philosophical works, XXIX. Organic and non-organic acts, 40. Pantheism, a snare for many Realists, XII; never admitted by Wyclif, though he seems very near to it, LXXVI, LXXXI, LXXXII, Pantheistic consequences urged against Wyclifs doctrine; the actual and eter- nal and real existence of all creatures in God's mind, 235; Wyclif denies this, saying that no creature, as such, is eternal; its intelligible, not its caused being, lives in God eternally, 236; to say that every creature is in God does not imply that it is eternal, since its archetype alone is eternal, 237; this would be wrongly expressed if we said that all is identical with God, 239; intelligible Being is ‘life’ in Him, but this life does not imply temporal existence, 239, 240; and although it exists eternally, we deny its existence at any moment of time, because God does not know it as existing thus, 240, 241. A man is God, quà thought of eternally by God; but then he is not a man, having no self of his own, 241, 242; All creatures are as accidents to God, in whom they inhere more closely than any so-called accidents in their substances, 242. Parity of disparity (example, the ass and the goat) 151, 152. Past, is a, prior to its whole by priority of nature? 148. Passions, the, leave behind them a change in the disposition of the mind, 43. Part, the truth of the, is not contingent, but necessary, 59—87; arguments to the contrary, 59—65; arguments in favour of this view, 65 —71, and replies to the first arguments against it, 71—87. Petirka's researches, LV. Perceived, if that which is, be continually changing, our mental acts must change too, IO. Permanence or succession of the acts of sense, 47. Philosophers even now rarely steer clear of Scylla or Charybdis in their answer to the fundamental question to which Nominalism and Realism strove to reply, XXVI, XXVII. 17
INDEX. Miracle, by a, an accident, might be se- parated from its subject, 121, but this would involve very great difficulties, 123. Miracles, possibility of, 74. Modes (or measure, mensura) of exist- ence, seven different, 210, 211. Movement, in what sense it is under- stood by the School; its species, 34 and note. Music of the spheres, the, 49. Musings, the, of Wyclif at Oxford in his youth, XIII, XIV. Nature, seven significations of the word, 198, 199. Nature's moral law is such that even God cannot dispense with it, 23. Necessary and contingent truth are con- fused in the theory of Wyclif's adver- saries, 27. Necessity of a thing known to be eter- nally true as taking place in time, 67; different senses of the word, 71, 72; simple and conditional, difference bet- ween, 153. Negation, every, is based upon an affir- mation, 87. Neo-Scholasticism, LXXIV. Nominalism, what it was, VI, VII; how refuted by Wyclif, VII, VIII. Non-existence is no bar to thought, 36. Numerical identity, there is, wherever existence is identical, 135, I47. Obligations, the Scholastic and dialecti- cal exercise of, 60 and note, 79 and note. Oblivion of the Past, on the part of a multitude of persons, were a great evil, 85. Ockam's razor, 119 note. Omnipotence, God’s, is limited by Him- self alone, 109; many subtleties have been uttered in this matter, such as v. g. that God can do anything that we do not distinctly see to be absurd, make the same thing exist at once in different places with contrary attributes, or contrary attributes co-exist in the same thing, IIO. Opponents of Realism, the, admit the ‘Uni- versal Man” merely as an idea or as part of a proposition, not as an entity, 138. Opposite, the, of what is necessary is in so far unthinkable, 107. 249 Order of publication, the, of Wyclif's philosophical works, XXIX. Organic and non-organic acts, 40. Pantheism, a snare for many Realists, XII; never admitted by Wyclif, though he seems very near to it, LXXVI, LXXXI, LXXXII, Pantheistic consequences urged against Wyclifs doctrine; the actual and eter- nal and real existence of all creatures in God's mind, 235; Wyclif denies this, saying that no creature, as such, is eternal; its intelligible, not its caused being, lives in God eternally, 236; to say that every creature is in God does not imply that it is eternal, since its archetype alone is eternal, 237; this would be wrongly expressed if we said that all is identical with God, 239; intelligible Being is ‘life’ in Him, but this life does not imply temporal existence, 239, 240; and although it exists eternally, we deny its existence at any moment of time, because God does not know it as existing thus, 240, 241. A man is God, quà thought of eternally by God; but then he is not a man, having no self of his own, 241, 242; All creatures are as accidents to God, in whom they inhere more closely than any so-called accidents in their substances, 242. Parity of disparity (example, the ass and the goat) 151, 152. Past, is a, prior to its whole by priority of nature? 148. Passions, the, leave behind them a change in the disposition of the mind, 43. Part, the truth of the, is not contingent, but necessary, 59—87; arguments to the contrary, 59—65; arguments in favour of this view, 65 —71, and replies to the first arguments against it, 71—87. Petirka's researches, LV. Perceived, if that which is, be continually changing, our mental acts must change too, IO. Permanence or succession of the acts of sense, 47. Philosophers even now rarely steer clear of Scylla or Charybdis in their answer to the fundamental question to which Nominalism and Realism strove to reply, XXVI, XXVII. 17
Strana 250
250 Phoenix, there is in the world but one, what of its universal? is it identical with, or different from, the individual? 136 and note. Wyclif's answer, 142. Plato, 59, 75, 146, 222. Pain is the perception of disagreement, 21; absurdity of supposing it capable of existing without a subject, 24. Points without dimensions, that, touching one another, yet do not coincide, XVI. Positivism closely allied to Nominalism, XXV. Possibility abstracts from time, but not when applied to events determined by time, 67, 68; absurdity of the contrary opinion, 69, 70; possibility does not suffice to explain actuality, 99; it is an attribute only of the First Truth (God exists) and of those which pro- ceed therefrom, 104; and depends (as does impossibility as well) upon that First Truth, 105. Possible, Wyclif's doctrine of the, XIV. Potentiality may at some future time become actual; but an actuality does not become potential when it has ceased to be, 8r. Powers, the mental, require a subject for basis, 53. Presentation, 10, note. Primary truth of “Nothing can at once be and not be’, can we deny the? 88. Principles of individuation, the, are place and time, 50. Priority, four sorts of, 212—215. Privation, the, of a good thing is as evil as that thing is good; but not absolutely so, 115. Prokop v. Pilsen’s defence of De Ydeis, LV, LVI. Promise, a, though free, includes the necessity or obligation to keep it, 78. Proper and common objects of sense, 54 and note. Proposition, a, may be impossible without self-contradiction; example, 93. Purgatory and Hell, difference between the pains of, 33. Purley for Burleó and Burley, 149 note. Quality, a, if it could exist alone, would, in the case of a mental act, be iden- tical with the thinking subject, 4; could in no case be universal, true, false, etc., as mental acts are, 6; if we INDEX. say it can exist alone, it can act alone, be acted upon, be moved, underlie motion, and is in short a substance, 118. Quantitative and qualitative parts, the, of certain mental acts, 14. Queen Victoria, having reigned over England, cannot, in Wyclif's system, be conceived as not having reigned, XLI. Realism, the, of Wyclif in its essentials, XI— XIII. Realism is closely allied to modern Ide- alism and Transcendental philosophy, XXV. Reality, the Scholástic idea of, 125; reality of the Universals denied by the writer of Replicacio de Universalibus, I34. Recriminations of Wyclif and his oppo- nent as concerns faulty reasoning, I59. Reflection opon any act is a hindrance to its performance, 30. Replicacio de Universalibus was certainly not written by Wyclif, LXIII— XV. Representation, 10, note; is that by which, not that which we cognize, 36. Responsibility for the past exists, not because we can undo it now, but be- cause we might then have done other- wise, 86. ' Resurrection, the, is not proved by our sorrow for the dead, 86. Scepticism, absolute, one consequence of the affirmation that everything is con- tingent, IOI. Scholastic doctrine of matter and form, the, LXXIII, LXXIV. Scholastic philosophy, how, is all but ab- solutely forgotten nowadays, VI; thought much of by Leibnitz, LXXIV; its exasperating method of reasoning, a good example of, 39 and note. Scotus, Duns, 92, 115, 133. Self-contradictory affirmation, is a, the only impossible proposition? 87— 104. Sensation is only of the present, II. Sensations, depending on their objects, cannot be absolute qualities, 3. Shirley, Walter Waddington, LVI, LVIII. Sight depends upon eight varying factors, 15; perceives directly only two dimen- sions, IS and note.
250 Phoenix, there is in the world but one, what of its universal? is it identical with, or different from, the individual? 136 and note. Wyclif's answer, 142. Plato, 59, 75, 146, 222. Pain is the perception of disagreement, 21; absurdity of supposing it capable of existing without a subject, 24. Points without dimensions, that, touching one another, yet do not coincide, XVI. Positivism closely allied to Nominalism, XXV. Possibility abstracts from time, but not when applied to events determined by time, 67, 68; absurdity of the contrary opinion, 69, 70; possibility does not suffice to explain actuality, 99; it is an attribute only of the First Truth (God exists) and of those which pro- ceed therefrom, 104; and depends (as does impossibility as well) upon that First Truth, 105. Possible, Wyclif's doctrine of the, XIV. Potentiality may at some future time become actual; but an actuality does not become potential when it has ceased to be, 8r. Powers, the mental, require a subject for basis, 53. Presentation, 10, note. Primary truth of “Nothing can at once be and not be’, can we deny the? 88. Principles of individuation, the, are place and time, 50. Priority, four sorts of, 212—215. Privation, the, of a good thing is as evil as that thing is good; but not absolutely so, 115. Prokop v. Pilsen’s defence of De Ydeis, LV, LVI. Promise, a, though free, includes the necessity or obligation to keep it, 78. Proper and common objects of sense, 54 and note. Proposition, a, may be impossible without self-contradiction; example, 93. Purgatory and Hell, difference between the pains of, 33. Purley for Burleó and Burley, 149 note. Quality, a, if it could exist alone, would, in the case of a mental act, be iden- tical with the thinking subject, 4; could in no case be universal, true, false, etc., as mental acts are, 6; if we INDEX. say it can exist alone, it can act alone, be acted upon, be moved, underlie motion, and is in short a substance, 118. Quantitative and qualitative parts, the, of certain mental acts, 14. Queen Victoria, having reigned over England, cannot, in Wyclif's system, be conceived as not having reigned, XLI. Realism, the, of Wyclif in its essentials, XI— XIII. Realism is closely allied to modern Ide- alism and Transcendental philosophy, XXV. Reality, the Scholástic idea of, 125; reality of the Universals denied by the writer of Replicacio de Universalibus, I34. Recriminations of Wyclif and his oppo- nent as concerns faulty reasoning, I59. Reflection opon any act is a hindrance to its performance, 30. Replicacio de Universalibus was certainly not written by Wyclif, LXIII— XV. Representation, 10, note; is that by which, not that which we cognize, 36. Responsibility for the past exists, not because we can undo it now, but be- cause we might then have done other- wise, 86. ' Resurrection, the, is not proved by our sorrow for the dead, 86. Scepticism, absolute, one consequence of the affirmation that everything is con- tingent, IOI. Scholastic doctrine of matter and form, the, LXXIII, LXXIV. Scholastic philosophy, how, is all but ab- solutely forgotten nowadays, VI; thought much of by Leibnitz, LXXIV; its exasperating method of reasoning, a good example of, 39 and note. Scotus, Duns, 92, 115, 133. Self-contradictory affirmation, is a, the only impossible proposition? 87— 104. Sensation is only of the present, II. Sensations, depending on their objects, cannot be absolute qualities, 3. Shirley, Walter Waddington, LVI, LVIII. Sight depends upon eight varying factors, 15; perceives directly only two dimen- sions, IS and note.
Strana 251
INDEX. Simon Magus fell into the error of think- ing grace an entity that was market- able, 45. Sin, the original, did not consist in a positive material stain, 45. Singular, is the, identical with its Uni- versal, or not! 135; are these only relative terms, or contrary? 149. Soul, the human, once posited, requires no quality to make it active, 4; it is the only form which has a separable entity of its own, 7. Space and Time, Wyclifs doctrine of, XV—XIX. Spinoga's doctrine, closely related to that of Wyclif, .XXV; 168 note. Stephen's researches on Wyclif, repeatedly referred to in Pastor Lundstrom's In- troduction, XLVII —LXIII, Stockholm MS., the, described at length, XLVII—LXIIIl; a curious particular concerning it, XLVIII, note; examples of abbreviations, X' IX—T I. Stone, a, might think, if the theory of Wyclif's opponents were true, 25. Substance, a, is either that which under- lies accidents, or that which exists by itself, 4; it is the subject of successive changes of phenomena, 26 and note; cannot become an accident, nor an accident a substance, I17; would be uscless if any accidents were absolute, 119. Syllogistic reasoning, in the view of Wyclif's adversary, would perish if the doctrine of Real Universals were allow- ed, 137. Testimony, the only proof of past truths, is an indirect one, 107. Theories, three, concerning the essence of mental acts, 2. Thomists assert that grace has a real entity of its own, XL. Thought. if a self-subsistent entity, must have extended parts, I6. Time, not being active, cannot produce a change, 63, but may be the occasion of one with God's concourse, 84 Time and Space, Wyclif's doctrine of, XV—XIX. To Be means to be known, 106. Transubstantiation, how understood by Wyclif, XXII, XXIII. 251 Trinity, the doctrine of the, much used by Wyclif to strengthen his position, XII, XIII; a vestige -of the, to be found in all things, matter corresponding to the Father, form to the Son, and the compound tho the Holy Ghost, 195, 196. Ultimate end, the tendency of every act towards an, 38. Unchangeability of God, the, precludes His being Jess powerful at one time than at another, 63. Universal truth, can a, including many singulars, be primitive? 89. Universe, the, can neither be larger nor smaller than it is, according to Wyclif, XV, XVI. Untenable position of Wyclif, an alleged, 145. Unthinkability (for me) of ‘my not having been) 71. Urso, 218. Uselessness, the, of arguing with persons, the basis of whose systems is a flat self-contradiction, II3. Vacuum. a, is an absolute absurdity, XIV, XXIII. Variations of Wyclifs views regarding the Eucharist, XXIV. Vattier's “John Wyclyff, sa vie, ses oeuvres, sa doctrine,” LVI Vision, if an absolute entity, would be an extended thing; which is impossible, 17, 18. Vitellio, 12, 13, note. Volitional movements; statement that they are directed by the soul itself; refuted, 5; they are difficult of explanation in every system, 37. Weak points, the, in Wyclif's theory and in that of his adversaries, | XVII, LXVIII. Whiteness, the sensation of, in the theory of absolute accidents, might exist by itself, not experienced by anyone, 120. Will, to have the, eternally united to that of God is to be confirmed in grace, 78. World, the, fills all space, XV; might be unsubstantial, if the “absolute ac- cidenť theory were true, 123; the an- swer to this objection is a mere thcolo- gical juggle, 126. 17*
INDEX. Simon Magus fell into the error of think- ing grace an entity that was market- able, 45. Sin, the original, did not consist in a positive material stain, 45. Singular, is the, identical with its Uni- versal, or not! 135; are these only relative terms, or contrary? 149. Soul, the human, once posited, requires no quality to make it active, 4; it is the only form which has a separable entity of its own, 7. Space and Time, Wyclifs doctrine of, XV—XIX. Spinoga's doctrine, closely related to that of Wyclif, .XXV; 168 note. Stephen's researches on Wyclif, repeatedly referred to in Pastor Lundstrom's In- troduction, XLVII —LXIII, Stockholm MS., the, described at length, XLVII—LXIIIl; a curious particular concerning it, XLVIII, note; examples of abbreviations, X' IX—T I. Stone, a, might think, if the theory of Wyclif's opponents were true, 25. Substance, a, is either that which under- lies accidents, or that which exists by itself, 4; it is the subject of successive changes of phenomena, 26 and note; cannot become an accident, nor an accident a substance, I17; would be uscless if any accidents were absolute, 119. Syllogistic reasoning, in the view of Wyclif's adversary, would perish if the doctrine of Real Universals were allow- ed, 137. Testimony, the only proof of past truths, is an indirect one, 107. Theories, three, concerning the essence of mental acts, 2. Thomists assert that grace has a real entity of its own, XL. Thought. if a self-subsistent entity, must have extended parts, I6. Time, not being active, cannot produce a change, 63, but may be the occasion of one with God's concourse, 84 Time and Space, Wyclif's doctrine of, XV—XIX. To Be means to be known, 106. Transubstantiation, how understood by Wyclif, XXII, XXIII. 251 Trinity, the doctrine of the, much used by Wyclif to strengthen his position, XII, XIII; a vestige -of the, to be found in all things, matter corresponding to the Father, form to the Son, and the compound tho the Holy Ghost, 195, 196. Ultimate end, the tendency of every act towards an, 38. Unchangeability of God, the, precludes His being Jess powerful at one time than at another, 63. Universal truth, can a, including many singulars, be primitive? 89. Universe, the, can neither be larger nor smaller than it is, according to Wyclif, XV, XVI. Untenable position of Wyclif, an alleged, 145. Unthinkability (for me) of ‘my not having been) 71. Urso, 218. Uselessness, the, of arguing with persons, the basis of whose systems is a flat self-contradiction, II3. Vacuum. a, is an absolute absurdity, XIV, XXIII. Variations of Wyclifs views regarding the Eucharist, XXIV. Vattier's “John Wyclyff, sa vie, ses oeuvres, sa doctrine,” LVI Vision, if an absolute entity, would be an extended thing; which is impossible, 17, 18. Vitellio, 12, 13, note. Volitional movements; statement that they are directed by the soul itself; refuted, 5; they are difficult of explanation in every system, 37. Weak points, the, in Wyclif's theory and in that of his adversaries, | XVII, LXVIII. Whiteness, the sensation of, in the theory of absolute accidents, might exist by itself, not experienced by anyone, 120. Will, to have the, eternally united to that of God is to be confirmed in grace, 78. World, the, fills all space, XV; might be unsubstantial, if the “absolute ac- cidenť theory were true, 123; the an- swer to this objection is a mere thcolo- gical juggle, 126. 17*
Strana 252
252 INDEX. Wyclif's popularity in his time and neglect in ours, both natural occur- rences, V, VI; his Realism in its essential points, XI—XIII; his doctrine of the Possible, XIV; his position as regards Necessity springs from his philosophical standpoint, XX—XXII; so does his doctrine of the Eucharist, XXII—XXIV; he is, as a philosopher, immeasurably higher than Luther, XXIV; he is accused by his adversary in discussion to have abandoned his position as to the reality of the Uni- versals, 145. Zbinco, Archbishop, caused four treatises of the Stockholm MS. to be burned, LV. Zwinzeticz, Idislaw, defended De Uni- versalibus in Prague, LVIII.
252 INDEX. Wyclif's popularity in his time and neglect in ours, both natural occur- rences, V, VI; his Realism in its essential points, XI—XIII; his doctrine of the Possible, XIV; his position as regards Necessity springs from his philosophical standpoint, XX—XXII; so does his doctrine of the Eucharist, XXII—XXIV; he is, as a philosopher, immeasurably higher than Luther, XXIV; he is accused by his adversary in discussion to have abandoned his position as to the reality of the Uni- versals, 145. Zbinco, Archbishop, caused four treatises of the Stockholm MS. to be burned, LV. Zwinzeticz, Idislaw, defended De Uni- versalibus in Prague, LVIII.
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